2026-09-23T16:31:15Zhttps://api.repository.cam.ac.uk/server/oai/requestoai:www.repository.cam.ac.uk:1810/3868152025-07-17T00:53:43Zcom_1810_276com_1810_256063col_1810_218415
Essays in Applied Microeconomic Theory: Contests and Matching
https://doi.org/10.17863/CAM.119853
Chung, Adrian
Harris, Christopher
This thesis contains three chapters on contests and matching. The first two chapters explore the role of target prizes in contests with sabotage. The third chapter studies the optimal college admissions mechanism where students are horizontally and vertically differentiated.
University of Cambridge
2025-03-10
Thesis
Doctoral
Doctor of Philosophy (PhD)
NSTC research grant;
Yushan Fellow Program by the Ministry of Education (MOE), Taiwan
https://www.repository.cam.ac.uk/handle/1810/386815
embargo
2026-07-10
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admissions lottery
Boston mechanism
college admissions
deferred acceptance
endogenous prize
optimal mechanism
sabotage
Tullock contest