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Self-knowledge in Alcibiades I https://doi.org/10.17863/CAM.111347 Wasmuth, Ellisif Warren, James This dissertation explores the topic of self-knowledge as it is presented in *Alcibiades I*. Although self-knowledge is widely recognised as the unifying topic of the dialogue, it has proved difficult to derive one unified conception of self-knowledge from it. I argue that this is partly because the dialogue treats of three different conceptions of self-knowledge, without, however, making the shifts between them explicit. The first conception of self-knowledge, is the traditional Greek notion of knowing one’s limits and knowing one’s place. Socrates recasts this, through a lengthy exposition of Alcibiades’ ignorance, as knowing the limits of one’s knowledge, stressing that these limits also determine the bounds within which one should act. A second conception of self-knowledge underlies the *Alcibiades*’ discussion of statesmanship and the statesman’s need for self-knowledge. I argue that the self-knowledge required of the statesman is a craft-like knowledge of what a human being is. In so far as it also includes knowing what a *good* human being is, this kind of self-knowledge turns out to be substantial, covering knowledge of justice and virtue as well. However, neither of these conceptions of self-knowledge make sense of self-knowledge as it is presented in the analogy drawn towards the end of the dialogue, between a self-seeing eye and a self-knowing soul. Here self-knowledge emerges both as an ideal to strive towards and as knowledge of the particular knower herself. I argue that we should understand the eye analogy as illustrating the *Alcibiades*’ core conception of self-knowledge, namely self-knowledge as mirroring. I further argue that although dialogue provides the paradigm case of self-mirroring, the soul can in fact mirror itself in the whole sphere of its practical life. Moreover, the two earlier conceptions of self-knowledge serve as necessary conditions for knowing oneself most fully (*malista*), i.e. knowing oneself as someone whose practical life is in full accordance with wisdom. University of Cambridge 2016-08-15 Thesis Doctoral Doctor of Philosophy (PhD) https://www.repository.cam.ac.uk/handle/1810/372481 https://apollo8-f-pro.lib.cam.ac.uk/bitstreams/f20f6b0e-5b1e-4868-8d3d-e4318843920c/download eb9d2d75cbfff5683a827dd2229be5c0 https://apollo8-f-pro.lib.cam.ac.uk/bitstreams/7e0aa345-a5f2-4d02-8b32-a61590942ee7/download 2f15e1a25644ae3aaa53051deb46f16b https://www.rioxx.net/licenses/all-rights-reserved/ self-knowledge Delphic inscription Plato Socrates Alcibiades Alcibiades I