<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?><?xml-stylesheet type="text/xsl" href="static/style.xsl"?><OAI-PMH xmlns="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xsi:schemaLocation="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/ http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/OAI-PMH.xsd"><responseDate>2026-09-23T11:30:43Z</responseDate><request verb="GetRecord" identifier="oai:www.repository.cam.ac.uk:1810/328389" metadataPrefix="uketd_dc">https://api.repository.cam.ac.uk/server/oai/request</request><GetRecord><record><header><identifier>oai:www.repository.cam.ac.uk:1810/328389</identifier><datestamp>2023-12-22T13:36:27Z</datestamp><setSpec>com_1810_273</setSpec><setSpec>com_1810_256061</setSpec><setSpec>col_1810_221775</setSpec></header><metadata><uketd_dc:uketddc xmlns:uketd_dc="http://naca.central.cranfield.ac.uk/ethos-oai/2.0/" xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/" xmlns:dcterms="http://purl.org/dc/terms/" xmlns:uketdterms="http://naca.central.cranfield.ac.uk/ethos-oai/terms/" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xmlns:doc="http://www.lyncode.com/xoai" xsi:schemaLocation="http://naca.central.cranfield.ac.uk/ethos-oai/2.0/ http://naca.central.cranfield.ac.uk/ethos-oai/2.0/uketd_dc.xsd">
   <dc:title>Trusting</dc:title>
   <dc:identifier xsi:type="dcterms:DOI">10.17863/CAM.75838</dc:identifier>
   <dc:creator>Domenicucci, Jacopo</dc:creator>
   <uketdterms:advisor>Holton, Richard</uketdterms:advisor>
   <dcterms:abstract>This work starts from what may seem like a narrow and technical question in the mental metaphysics of trust. I ask about the portion of reality that our mental state of trust takes as its object, as its world-side referent — just like others have asked this about belief, desire, or knowledge. The trust literature has an implicit answer that I spell out: trust takes the future actions of our partners as its object. I contest the cavalier way in which this assumption about the mental metaphysics of trust is regarded as obvious. There are actually other ways to answer the object question — I introduce them and arrange them in a taxonomy. Among these alternatives, there is one that I find more promising than the traditional assumption. It is the Person-first approach, according to which trust primarily takes persons as its object. This approach to the conceptual modelling of trust is guided by a specific conjecture, the Settling Conjecture, according to which trust is the state that settles our interactions with persons. I illustrate the merits of this conjecture in its own terms. I also arbitrate between the standard and the Person-first approach by comparing them on a specific point — the role of expectations in trust. While the standard approach gives expectations the centre stage, the Person-first approach only treats them as a derivative manifestation of trust. I argue that this is more accurate in the light of what we otherwise know about trust. I also suggest that the Person-first approach opens up a promising research agenda for the study of trust in philosophy. I conclude wrapping up the results and spelling out some take-away messages about humans’ social interdependencies and humans’ social nature.</dcterms:abstract>
   <uketdterms:institution>University of Cambridge</uketdterms:institution>
   <dcterms:issued>2021-07-21</dcterms:issued>
   <dc:type>Thesis</dc:type>
   <uketdterms:qualificationlevel>Doctoral</uketdterms:qualificationlevel>
   <uketdterms:qualificationname>Doctor of Philosophy (PhD)</uketdterms:qualificationname>
   <dc:language>eng</dc:language>
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   <uketdterms:embargotype>embargo</uketdterms:embargotype>
   <uketdterms:embargodate>2026-11-03</uketdterms:embargodate>
   <dcterms:license>https://apollo8-f-pro.lib.cam.ac.uk/bitstreams/36c65d86-67e6-4651-941b-5b7907e25c6a/download</dcterms:license>
   <uketdterms:checksum xsi:type="uketdterms:MD5">353adac0d1ebdfd65ab16480263c3c87</uketdterms:checksum>
   <dc:identifier xsi:type="dcterms:URI">https://apollo8-f-pro.lib.cam.ac.uk/bitstreams/099ca167-99b8-4d4f-83a0-1df88ecaa54e/download</dc:identifier>
   <uketdterms:checksum xsi:type="uketdterms:MD5">1ed20f23ee18bc046c38cf5f9bffc74a</uketdterms:checksum>
   <dc:rights>https://www.rioxx.net/licenses/all-rights-reserved/</dc:rights>
   <dc:subject>trust</dc:subject>
   <dc:subject>philosophy of mind</dc:subject>
   <dc:subject>philosophy of action</dc:subject>
   <dc:subject>cooperation</dc:subject>
</uketd_dc:uketddc>
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