

Workshop 4: Innovations in Genomic AMR Surveillance

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41 **Summary**

42 Whole genome sequencing of antimicrobial resistant (AMR) pathogens is increasingly being used for
43 AMR surveillance, particularly in high-income countries. Innovations in genome sequencing and
44 analysis technologies promise to revolutionise AMR surveillance and epidemiology even further.
45 However, routine adoption of these technologies is a challenge, particularly in low- and middle-income
46 countries. As part of a wider series of workshops and online consultations, a group of experts in AMR
47 pathogen genomics and computational tool development conducted a situational analysis, identifying
48 the following under-utilised innovations in genomic AMR surveillance: clinical metagenomics,
49 environmental metagenomics, gene or plasmid tracking, and machine learning. The group
50 recommended developing cost-effective use cases for each approach and mapping data outputs to
51 clinical outcomes of interest to justify additional investment in capacity, training, and staff required to
52 implement these technologies. Harmonisation and standardisation of methods, and the creation of
53 equitable data sharing and governance frameworks, will facilitate successful implementation.
54
55

56 **1. Background**

57 In early 2022, the Surveillance and Epidemiology of Drug Resistant Infection Consortium (SEDRIC)
58 held a series of workshops to map the current and future landscape of genomic antimicrobial
59 resistance (AMR) surveillance. While genomics has already begun to complement or replace
60 phenotypic, immunological, and molecular approaches for isolate-based surveillance, recent
61 innovations in genomic technologies promise to improve surveillance and epidemiology of AMR
62 further. These developments will allow for tailoring of AMR interventions in real-time and address some
63 of the barriers that impede widespread implementation. Held on 5th May 2022, the fourth workshop
64 focused on 'Innovations in Genomic AMR Surveillance' and brought together stakeholders to conduct
65 a situational analysis and reach a qualified consensus on the use of several predefined innovations
66 for the surveillance and monitoring of AMR. Innovations were identified on the basis of proven benefits
67 in research and a lack of implementation in routine surveillance. The innovations selected were clinical
68 metagenomics, environmental metagenomics, gene or plasmid tracking, and machine learning.
69 Through discussions on the benefits, barriers, and potential implementation pathways for these
70 approaches, we identified common challenges that need to be addressed to enable the integration of
71 these innovations with genomic AMR surveillance systems.

72

73 **2. Clinical metagenomics**

74 Metagenomics is the study of genetic material directly from environmental or clinical samples, without
75 the need for isolation or lab cultivation of individual organisms. For the purposes of the workshop,
76 "clinical metagenomics" was used as a broad term encompassing any approach that aims to analyse
77 all genetic material from microorganisms and their hosts in clinical samples.¹ This is achieved through
78 next-generation sequencing (NGS) and aims not only to detect potential pathogens but also to enable
79 an understanding of the host, the microbiome, and host-microbe interactions.
80

81 Clinical metagenomics offers multiple advantages for AMR surveillance over traditional laboratory
82 culture and single-isolate sequencing approaches. Removing the need to culture an isolate has the
83 potential to enable much faster diagnosis and the detection of as-yet-uncultured pathogens.² These
84 approaches have the potential to generate robust aetiological and phenotypic information in clinically
85 relevant turn-around times (hours rather than days) and could therefore increase the uptake of
86 genomic AMR surveillance on the clinical frontline (Figure). Metagenomic data can also enable the
87 detection of infections caused by multiple strains (polyclonal) and species/pathogens (polymicrobial),³
88 and lends itself to the discovery of unexpected or previously unknown pathogens⁴ and pathogens not
89 subject to routine surveillance. Additional benefits include the ability to identify and characterize all
90 antibiotic resistance genes in a sample,⁵ determine reservoirs for resistance,⁶ provide real-time
91 reporting of resistance elements during sequencing⁸, and identify at-risk individuals.⁸
92

93 Analysing metagenomic data in a clinically meaningful way can be challenging owing to complexities
94 in accurately predicting AMR phenotypes,⁹ achieving enough sequencing depth to comprehensively
95 detect resistance determinants,¹⁰ and correctly assigning the origin of metagenomic reads to a
96 microorganism in the sample,¹¹ which is particularly challenging when a resistance mechanism is
97 carried on a plasmid. Public datasets will be essential for clinical metagenomic analyses as they allow
98 baseline trends and patterns to be established against which samples can be compared. However,
99 there are currently large representation gaps in these sources of data.¹² Consequently, the implications
100 of finding under-represented populations of bacteria present in a sample are hard to determine and
101 require expertise to interpret. Data coordination is also inherently challenging on a global scale, with
102 geopolitical sensitivities presenting challenges to routine data sharing.¹³ These challenges mirror the
103 representation and data governance issues identified in previous workshops (see Workshops 1-3 [ref
104 D-23-00144, D-23-00145, D-23-00146]). Additional barriers include technical issues around
105 methodology and reproducibility, such as standardising controls between datasets, the handling and
106 automated processing of large datasets, as well as accessing funding, data storage, and resources
107 for analysis, all of which vary by geographical region. As highlighted for isolate-based genomic AMR
108 surveillance in previous workshops 1-3 (D-23-00144, D-23-00145, D-23-00146), certain barriers to
109 implementation (e.g., training, infrastructure development and maintenance) are likely to be
110 particularly challenging to meet in LMICs.

111
112 Improvements in frameworks, databases, and software are needed to address challenges in the
113 biological interpretation of raw metagenomic data. Regional differences in funding and coordination
114 create barriers that can be mitigated by developing models in which routine metagenomic sequencing
115 might begin at regional ‘hubs’ before being disseminated to local and national ‘spoke’ laboratories.
116 Such models enable retention of the support and benefits of large regional hubs (e.g., centralised
117 training and individual skillset development), whilst eventually permitting a more tailored approach
118 at the local level, similar to that outlined for isolate-based surveillance [Overview, D-23-00143]. While we
119 should ensure that training provision is guided by geographically-tailored blueprints to ensure that
120 individuals are trained in using the tools and approaches available to them, wherever possible it will
121 also be important to develop standard methods such as the use of mock communities during lab pre-
122 processing and sequencing¹⁴ and the use of well-characterised and robust pipelines for bioinformatic
123 analysis.¹⁵ However, it should be acknowledged that certain aspects of standardisation are not always
124 feasible across all locations (e.g., the type of sequencing technologies available). Additionally, limited
125 standardisation across databases adds further complexity. For example, while the National Database
126 of Antibiotic Resistant Organisms (NDARO) possesses a higher number of acquired resistance genes,
127 the Comprehensive Antibiotic Resistance Database (CARD) provides better coverage of mutation-
128 conferred resistance.¹⁶ As such, in common with other domains covered by the working group, training
129 for competency in varied approaches for genomic analysis and epidemiology will be crucial to success
130 in clinical settings and clinical care of infectious disease cases. This training will also be vital in
131 facilitating infrastructure development to enable both country-level self-sufficiency and international
132 collaboration.

133 134 135 **3. Environmental metagenomics**

136 Sequencing of genetic material from environmental samples – known as environmental
137 metagenomics¹⁷ – creates opportunities to better understand the niches, reservoirs, and transmission
138 routes of AMR bacteria. It also holds promise as a tool to monitor the impact of public health measures
139 (see Figure 1). Environmental samples make it possible to survey overall levels of AMR, including
140 carriage among the healthy, non-symptomatic population, and are comparatively accessible, which is
141 particularly valuable in settings where access to healthcare is less equitable. Furthermore,
142 environmental metagenomics is culture-independent, and may function as an early warning of AMR
143 yet to be observed in clinical isolates.

144 However, sample sources for environmental metagenomics can be highly variable. For AMR
145 surveillance in a One Health context, surveillance of sources such as wastewater, waterways, farms,
146 and air can all provide valuable information on the flow of AMR within and between potential reservoirs
147 (Workshop 3, D-23-00146).^{18,19} For example, wastewater sampling has been successfully employed

148 in the surveillance of a number of infectious diseases and public health threats.^{20,21} Experience from
149 the COVID-19 pandemic²⁰ has indicated that community wastewater surveillance can be an important
150 supplement to hospital case reporting and that, while not a perfect proxy for population incidence,
151 corresponds well with infection trends and incidence data.²²

152 Difficulty in resolving gene-pathogen relationships, determining viability, and quantifying abundance
153 (or relative abundance) challenge the interpretation and actionability of environmental metagenomic
154 surveillance data.⁶ However, recent genomic approaches offer the promise of overcoming some of
155 these challenges; for example, metagenomic chromosome conformation capture technologies have
156 the potential to allow the attribution of plasmids to their hosts in metagenomic samples through
157 physically linking plasmids to the chromosomes of their hosts.²³

158 Epidemiological interpretation of a single environmental sample is fraught with difficulty.²⁴ For
159 environmental metagenomics to be most effective, long-term funding (a minimum of 10 years) and
160 implementation will be needed to establish baseline rates and diversity of AMR in a given environment
161 (e.g. wastewater), track trends, and identify disruptions in these patterns across harmonised sampling
162 frameworks. Analysis workflows are also required to enable comparison across settings.
163 Understanding the uncertainties and variability in environmental samples,²⁵ which stem from multiple
164 stochastic and systematic sources, will be crucial to fostering confidence in the utility of the datasets.
165 Establishing sample archives now (e.g., biobanking), which can be analysed with future pipelines, will
166 be crucial to understanding and interpreting environmental metagenomic data over time. Effective data
167 management processes and systems, including data storage, transfer, and sharing, must also be
168 developed. Of note, clarity and consistency on the ethical and regulatory implications regarding the
169 handling of human reads found within environmental samples is vital to enable the sharing of this
170 data.²⁶

171 The use of environmental metagenomics for AMR surveillance has, so far, largely been confined to
172 the research domain,⁶ and a lack of political will to invest in advancing this technology into active
173 surveillance and/or monitoring was identified as a barrier to its future use, though this picture is
174 changing. The best ways to apply these approaches as a surveillance tool are not yet well understood,
175 and we have not yet evaluated the additional information provided over traditional clinical surveillance
176 measures versus the time and cost of more comprehensive environmental surveillance. Researchers
177 must generate successful use cases that demonstrate proportionate, cost-effective, and timely
178 actionable insights that correlate with indicators relevant to clinical and/or public health.

179 Defining a purpose (for example, early warning, monitoring of control measure success),
180 harmonisation of sampling and analysis processes, and validation are all areas where consensus is
181 needed for progress to occur. This will require long-term partnerships between researchers and
182 policymakers to align surveillance efforts with data needed to inform concrete actions that address
183 AMR. Establishing global leadership to maintain a long-term vision and highlight the potential
184 importance of the environment in AMR is a key area for advocacy, which could lead to embedding
185 environmental surveillance within AMR Action Plans and disrupting current research silos.

186

187 **4. Gene/Plasmid based tracking**

188 Tracking AMR genes or the mobile genetic elements that carry them (rather than, or as a complement
189 to, the pathogen lineages in which they reside) offers several advantages for enhancing AMR
190 surveillance. Targeted sequencing of AMR genes and plasmids can provide clearer insights into the
191 presence,^{27,28} emergence,^{29,30} and direction^{31–33} of transmission of AMR among different ecological
192 compartments (e.g. human and animal, hospital and community), individual hosts, and
193 microorganisms than that provided by metagenomic surveillance or isolate-based sequencing (see
194 Figure). Gene or plasmid-based tracking can aid in assessing the risk of critically important resistance
195 mechanisms moving between compartments, for instance from humans to animals or vice versa.³⁴ It
196 can also determine the means by which AMR spreads, whether by a small mobile genetic element
197 such as a transposon, a larger mobile genetic element such as a plasmid, or a chromosomally
198 integrated gene, which can be used to anticipate dissemination patterns among bacterial populations.

199 Plasmid monitoring can function across all One Health sectors; at a local level for outbreak
200 detection^{32,35} and at a national and global level for surveillance and larger contextual
201 understanding.^{36,37} Tracking plasmid backbones of concern, even when they do not carry AMR genes,
202 is key to understanding plasmid epidemiology and identifying high-risk settings before an AMR gene
203 is acquired. Similarly, tracking the presence of AMR genes in non-pathogenic bacteria will reveal the
204 flow of AMR genes through different reservoirs, including the environment.³⁸ Consideration must be
205 given to how existing risk assessment frameworks based on single-isolate models can be adapted to
206 mobile cassette or plasmid transmission. Mathematical modelling to establish the minimal sampling
207 required³⁹ and cost-effectiveness studies would help justify the cost of targeted gene and plasmid
208 monitoring.

209 Tracking of AMR genes and plasmids currently relies on a range of sequencing technologies and
210 platforms that have different requirements for consumables and offer specific benefits and limitations.
211 While short-read sequencing currently dominates AMR surveillance, long-read sequencing that
212 produces more complete plasmid sequences has the potential to offer more detailed insights into
213 plasmid epidemiology.⁴⁰ Lessons can be transferred from the metagenomics community on how to
214 standardise and harmonise different methods.⁴¹ The working group noted that from an implementation
215 perspective, a single composite genomics platform that would deliver complete genomes sufficient for
216 resolving AMR context with a throughput comparable to short-read technologies would be ideal.

217 Defining plasmid similarity and classification can be challenging, especially for plasmids with highly
218 plastic sequences. Nomenclature standardisation and identification of plasmid characteristics,
219 including their individual structure, would benefit these efforts. Building upon the National Collection
220 of Type Cultures⁴² and American Type Culture Collection,⁴³ institutional and stakeholder endorsement
221 of a physical set of standardised plasmids from clinical, environmental, and animal samples would
222 allow for platform and phenotypic benchmarking.

223 Improving the interpretability of plasmid surveillance data by linking plasmid characteristics with health
224 outcomes in human and animal hosts is a priority for future research. We must better characterise
225 plasmid diversity,⁴⁴ transmission rates,⁴⁵ permissiveness,^{46,47} stability,^{46,47} and other phenotypes.⁴⁸
226 Epidemiological data can be used as a starting point and as a supplement to investigating the clinical
227 and public health risk of plasmids, but a better understanding of plasmid biology will allow academic
228 researchers and public health bodies to produce increasingly accurate databases^{49,50} and tools^{51,52} to
229 better define and describe plasmids and their associated AMR risk.

230

231 **5. Machine learning**

232 Machine learning (ML) is a subfield of artificial intelligence that focuses on enabling computer systems
233 to learn from and make decisions based on data. The goal of machine learning is to create systems
234 that can autonomously improve their accuracy and performance over time, without being explicitly
235 programmed to do so. ML tools for the analysis of large, diverse, and often complex data streams
236 have improved a great deal over recent years,⁵³ creating an opportunity to improve genomic AMR
237 surveillance through the integration and analysis of different data streams. Two such use cases were
238 highlighted during this workshop.

239 The first application is the use of ML to predict AMR using genomic and antimicrobial susceptibility
240 testing (AST) data (see Figure). The advantages of adopting ML approaches include identifying novel
241 resistance mechanisms,⁵⁴ predicting AMR from incomplete data, e.g. metagenomics,⁵⁵ and modelling
242 the interaction between resistance mechanisms.⁵⁴ However, several challenges exist in translating
243 promising preliminary work in this area into public health benefits. Large, internationally representative
244 datasets of high-quality phenotypic AST data are required to develop accurate ML algorithms.⁵⁶
245 Quantitative minimum inhibitory concentration (MIC) data are more easily combined and compared
246 than categorical SIR (sensitive, intermediate, resistant) data owing to the breakpoints between
247 categories and conventions changing over time,⁵⁷ but are less commonly made available to the
248 research community. Centralised AST tends to produce more consistent phenotyping results but
249 distributed international capacity for AST coupled with external quality assessment (EQA) would
250 enable more sustainable and equitable data generation.^{58,59} Good model training data should have an

251 even representation of sensitive and resistant isolates, and of different resistance mechanisms, a
252 distribution unlikely to be captured by a standard surveillance sampling framework. In the future,
253 algorithms would ideally be independently benchmarked against a shared set of test isolates that are
254 changed regularly to capture new AMR mechanisms⁶⁰ and prevent over-training of algorithms to the
255 test data. A valuable adjunct to standard surveillance sampling frameworks would be to preferentially
256 sequence treatment failures and rare resistance phenotypes to enrich for potentially novel resistance
257 mechanisms.⁶¹

258 The second promising application of ML to AMR surveillance is the use of forecasting tools to measure
259 and predict changes in resistance rates over time and space.^{62,63} Models can be trained to predict
260 resistance rates based on historical prevalence data and identify unexpected fluctuations in resistance
261 that may reflect a successful intervention or a concerning new trend. However, heterogeneous data
262 obtained at different scales is difficult to integrate.⁶⁴ Fine-scale data such as monthly AST data broken
263 down by postcode is ideal,⁶² but increased granularity in surveillance poses greater privacy concerns.
264 These concerns could be addressed by providing restricted access to data, similar to GISAID⁶⁵ and
265 the United Kingdom Biobank.⁶⁶ Another limitation of current models is that there is little or no
266 integration of the mechanisms causing AMR in the modelling process.⁶⁷ This could be achieved by
267 integrating other data sources such as gene/plasmid tracking, antimicrobial usage, and/or human and
268 animal movement data.⁶³

269 Several general challenges in the application of ML to AMR surveillance were identified. ML algorithm
270 accuracy can degrade over time following deployment.⁶⁸ Existing training datasets are biased toward
271 a small number of high-income countries, making it likely that algorithms will perform better in these
272 settings and may falter in different locations or over longer time periods. As such, these surveillance
273 tools should be regularly validated against traditional surveillance data to evaluate their robustness.⁶⁹
274 Successful deployment and translational impact of ML for AMR surveillance will require bringing
275 together experts and stakeholders from different disciplines from the conception of a project to its
276 deployment. But the development of ML for health is still, to a large degree, undertaken in silos, without
277 the integration of knowledge and expertise available from other fields of application.⁷⁰ Using
278 community platforms such as Kaggle (www.kaggle.com) or CAMDA (<http://www.camda.info/>) could
279 improve the interaction between the machine learning community and stakeholders to identify key
280 challenges and describe robust solutions.

281

282 **6. Recommendations from the working group**

283 Several key themes emerged when discussing potential innovations in genomic AMR surveillance.
284 First, funding and political will are key requirements for the implementation of technological innovations
285 in AMR surveillance, across regional, national, and international scales. A proposed concrete step for
286 engaging funders and policy makers was for researchers and public health organisations to provide
287 clear use cases where these innovations add demonstrable value, and present a thorough economic
288 assessment of the costs versus benefits of investing in additional capacity. Ultimately, a long-term
289 strategy and supporting funding and infrastructure are needed to realise the potential of innovations
290 in genomic AMR surveillance.⁹ In the long-term it will be important to harmonise these strategies on
291 multiple levels: globally, by working with key partners like the World Health Organisation; nationally,
292 by working with governments and public health providers; and locally, working with health
293 professionals familiar local needs and priorities.

294 Second, introducing innovative technologies and data streams requires training, capacity building,
295 infrastructure, and collaboration to provide actionable insights. The successful translation of
296 innovations therefore requires multidisciplinary stakeholder involvement from the initiation of a project
297 (e.g., choosing a problem to address) to the deployment and maintenance of an effective surveillance
298 system. This includes the involvement of stakeholders (from research, industry, public health, and
299 policy) from across the One Health landscape to ensure data can be integrated and compared in a
300 meaningful way and avoid duplication of efforts. Harmonisation and standardisation of methods and
301 overcoming technical challenges are still required to get the best use out of these innovations.
302 Importantly, it will be vital to map how well these data streams correspond to outcomes of interest,

303 such as clinical infection incidence and disease outcomes, to justify the additional investment in
304 capacity, training, and staff.

305 Data governance challenges must also be addressed. For example, human reads in metagenomic
306 sequencing pose potential privacy concerns. Consensus guidelines on addressing these concerns
307 should be established. The availability of representative data for training machine learning algorithms
308 is also a challenge, particularly where providers of the data may be risking potential reputational
309 damage (e.g. in the food industry), or reduction of their research competitiveness.

310 Agreement on sampling frameworks and standards for data quality and sharing for denominator
311 populations (which illustrate the baseline frequency of an AMR mechanism of interest) is needed,
312 particularly for environmental and plasmid monitoring. These could be modelled from existing
313 frameworks, such as the European Food Safety Authority (EFSA) harmonised monitoring of AMR⁷¹ or
314 the UK Veterinary Antimicrobial Resistance and Sales Surveillance frameworks.⁷² Part of achieving
315 this agreement will be resolving a core tension between standardising genomic AMR surveillance
316 practices globally and tailoring approaches to provide cost-effective solutions to local problems. Tiered
317 models of adopting genomic AMR surveillance at different price points are a good example of a
318 strategy for addressing these tensions.⁵⁹

319

320 **7. Conclusions**

321 Moving to more technically sophisticated AMR surveillance will improve human and animal health
322 provided that the approaches focus on solving the right problem, produce actionable data, and can be
323 integrated into existing systems. To achieve this transition, researchers must provide clear evidence
324 of the marginal utility of these innovations. The innovations discussed here are likely to function as a
325 complement to some degree of ongoing isolate-based surveillance, rather than a replacement. Indeed,
326 each of these innovations relies on high-quality reference data produced from whole-genome
327 sequencing and phenotyping of single isolates. Each innovation offers potential improvements in
328 surveillance relative to isolate-based sequencing, either by allowing analysis of many isolates at once
329 across multiple ecological compartments, allowing targeted tracking of AMR mechanisms of interest
330 at a lower cost, or enabling the analysis of data at a scale and speed not achievable by other
331 approaches.

332 While nations work to translate these methods from research to practice, technical innovation
333 continues. Promising developments, such as on-site sequencing that dynamically enriches and
334 depletes specific sequences,⁷³ rapid point-of-care AMR diagnostics,⁷⁴ and automated literature mining
335 for novel AMR mechanisms,⁷⁵ may play important roles in the future. To achieve ongoing
336 enhancements, it is essential to provide platform-agnostic support for integration as outlined in the
337 recommendations from the working group (Overview, D-23-00143). By implementing these strategies,
338 we can proactively enhance AMR surveillance and effectively confront the challenges presented by
339 antimicrobial resistance.

340

341 **Figure legend**

Clinical diagnostics

Rapid diagnostic sequencing could provide genotypic AMR prediction and inform on polymicrobial infections in clinically relevant timeframes



AMR gene/plasmid tracking

Tracking mobile genetic elements across pathogens and host compartments would provide greater resolution of the sources of transmission of AMR and information on potential further spread




Environmental metagenomics

Monitoring of AMR in the environment offers a highly accessible and information-rich sample type that might act as an unbiased proxy for future surveillance



Machine learning

There is significant potential for developing machine learning models to predict resistance phenotypes from genomes and future trends in AMR across complex networks



342

343 **Figure 1.** Four genomic innovations and AMR surveillance domains that could be positively affected
344 by their realisation, indicated by dots overlaying the lines intersecting with the central schematic of the
345 nested surveillance domains.

346

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362

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371

372 **Author contributions**

373 Conceptualisation – SJP, NAF, KSB, EJ, JGN, JTM, NEW all Data Curation – KSB, EJ, JGN Formal
374 analysis – KSB, EJ, JGN Funding acquisition – SJP, NAF, JGN, JTM Investigation – SJP, NAF, KSB,
375 EJ, JGN, JTM, NEW, all Methodology – SJP, NAF, KSB, EJ Project administration - SJP, NAF, KSB,
376 EJ, JGN, JTM Supervision – SJP, NAF, NEW, KSB, EJ Visualisation – KSB Writing – original draft –
377 NEW, VP, ECO, KKT, EJ, KSB Writing – reviewing and editing – all Workshop engagement and
378 participation – all

379

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