Outsourcing Security and the Reconfiguration of State Power after the Arab Uprisings

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This dissertation is submitted for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy
Declaration

This thesis is the result of my own work and includes nothing which is the outcome of work done in collaboration except as declared in the Preface and specified in the text.

It is not substantially the same as any work I have submitted, or, is being concurrently submitted for a degree or diploma or other qualification at the University of Cambridge or any other University or similar institution except as declared in the Preface and specified in the text.

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Thesis Abstract

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Abstract
Since the 2010-2011 uprisings, several Arab countries have witnessed considerable reconfiguration of their market for force. Alongside continuous reshuffle and reform schemes affecting the public security institutions, the market for force has experienced a notable expansion of the private security industry, initially in the private sector and increasingly through an expanding outsourcing process.

Acknowledging the enduring centrality of the security institutions to state power and regime stability in the Arab region, this research explores how increased privatization and outsourcing of security, amid wider reconfigurations of the market for force, has contributed to the reconfiguration of state power in some of the Arab region’s security states since the 2010-2011 uprisings. Particularly, how has the outlined phenomenon impacted internal regime structure and state-society relations?

This enquiry is pursued in two case studies: Egypt and Tunisia. Unlike other Arab countries equally affected by the uprisings, Egypt and Tunisia experienced a quick change in leadership followed by a relatively stable transitional period. Despite their distinct histories and divergent post-uprisings political development, both countries share a long history of being prominent security states. The considerable historical and contemporary similarities between both countries offer rich grounds for comparative analysis while the particularities of each case present unique elements of analysis and grounds to draw different conclusions to test in other cases.

Drawing upon interviews, official documents and fieldwork, the study argues that the post-uprisings reconfiguration of the market for force, amid intensifying security threats and persisting popular unrest, fits into an ongoing framework of authoritarian adaption pursued by the Arab region’s ruling regimes to ensure their survival and prosperity following the 2010-2011 uprisings. Beyond its roots in neo-liberal governance, this phenomenon effectively serves to enhance regime security by providing alternative agents and strategies for social control while offering new venues to expand regime interests through networks of patronage that nurture broad-based authoritarian coalitions and attach the interests of diverse social groups to regime survival.
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Table of Contents

Declaration .......................................................................................................................... 2
Thesis Abstract .................................................................................................................. 3
Acknowledgment .............................................................................................................. 4
Table of Contents ............................................................................................................. 5
Acronyms .......................................................................................................................... 8

Chapter 1 - Introduction ............................................................................................... 9
1 Introduction .................................................................................................................. 9
2 Research question, argument and value ..................................................................... 11
   2.1 Research question .................................................................................................. 11
   2.2 Main argument ..................................................................................................... 12
   2.3 Research value .................................................................................................... 13
3 Conceptual framework ............................................................................................... 13
   3.1 Nodal security governance and the markets for force ........................................... 13
   3.2 Authoritarian adaptation ...................................................................................... 15
   3.3 Regime security and regime interests .................................................................. 19
   3.4 Security states ..................................................................................................... 20
4 Case studies ................................................................................................................ 23
5 Empirical literature and methodology ....................................................................... 27
   5.1 Identified gaps ..................................................................................................... 27
   5.2 Research design .................................................................................................. 28
      5.2.1 Interviews and fieldwork ............................................................................... 28
      5.2.2 Official documents ......................................................................................... 31
6 Chapters overview ...................................................................................................... 32

Chapter 2 - Privatizing Security under Authoritarian Rule: The Case of the Arab Region .......... 37
1 Introduction .................................................................................................................. 37
2 Privatization of security: from global display to context sensitivity .......................... 39
   2.1 The contemporary global rise of the private security industry ............................. 39
   2.2 Outsourcing security: “the efficient versus weak states” debate ......................... 40
   2.3 Critical approaches to outsourcing security .......................................................... 42
3 Markets for force and diversified coercion under authoritarian rule .......................... 45
4 Privatizing security under authoritarian rule in the Arab region ............................... 50
   4.1 The rise of the private security industry since 2011: continuities and changes .... 50
   4.2 Outsourcing security in the aftermath of the 2010-2011 uprisings ..................... 53
      4.2.1 Creating a secure economic environment ....................................................... 54
      4.2.2 Cultivating networks of patronage and alleviating economic distress ............ 56
      4.2.3 Diversifying the regime’s bases of security .................................................... 60
      4.2.4 Curbing constant sources of political and social unrest ............................... 62
5 Conclusion ................................................................................................................... 64
Chapter 3 - The Coercive Institutions of a Security State: Balancing Regime Security and Interests in Tunisia and Egypt

1 Introduction .......................................................................................................................... 66

2 Tunisia’s state security institutions .................................................................................. 68
   2.1 The domestic security forces and Ben Ali’s politics of security ....................................... 68
   2.2 Tunisia’s armed forces and the post-2010 ‘security’ balance of power .......................... 72
   2.3 Security reform initiatives: struggles and limitations amid a shaky environment .......... 74

3 Egypt’s state security institutions ..................................................................................... 79
   3.1 Meticulous domestic security architecture ..................................................................... 79
   3.2 Internal fractures ......................................................................................................... 81
   3.3 Political subjugation and social control ....................................................................... 82
   3.4 The armed forces ....................................................................................................... 84
   3.5 Security reconfigurations amid persistent rivalry ...................................................... 85
   3.6 Regime interests, institutional corruption and privatized violence ............................. 89

4 Conclusion ........................................................................................................................ 91

Chapter 4 - Private and Non-State Security Actors and the Development of Tunisia’s Market for Force after the 2010-2011 Uprising

1 Introduction ....................................................................................................................... 93

2 Private security in the shadow of security sector reform .................................................. 95
   2.1 Outsourcing foreign security assistance in Tunisia: How and why? ............................. 95
   2.2 Trajectory and impact of foreign-led security reform projects in Tunisia ..................... 101
      2.2.1 The impact of “terrorism” ...................................................................................... 103
      2.2.2 The challenges and limitations facing security reform in Tunisia ......................... 104

3 Tunisia’s private security industry and public-private security relations post-2010 .......... 107
   3.1 Heightened demand for private security in post-uprising Tunisia ............................. 107
   3.2 New dynamics of supply in Tunisia’s private security industry after the uprising ........ 110
   3.3 Implications on Tunisia’s state control over the market for force ............................. 112
   3.4 Outsourcing public security functions in Tunisia after the uprising .......................... 115

4 Conclusion ....................................................................................................................... 117

Chapter 5 - Outsourcing Security amid Social and Political Unrest: The Case of Egypt

1 Introduction ....................................................................................................................... 120

2 Brief history and legal framework .................................................................................... 121
   2.1 The birth of the private security industry in Egypt ..................................................... 121
   2.2 The legal history of the private security industry in Egypt .......................................... 123

3 The private security industry in Egypt from 2011 onward .............................................. 127
   3.1 The impact of the 2011 uprising on Egypt’s private security market .......................... 127
   3.2 The uncontested rise of Falcon Group International .................................................... 129

4 Public-private relations within Egypt’s market for force ................................................. 132
   4.1 Securing Egypt’s airports and restoring the country’s international image .................. 133
   4.2 Public surveillance and places of worship .................................................................. 134
   4.3 Outsourcing security at critical sites of social and political unrest .............................. 137
      4.3.1 Controlling the university campuses and the student movement .......................... 137
      4.3.2 Outsourcing the security of football stadiums: Shutting down the ultras groups .... 139

5 What does outsourcing security bring to the Egyptian regime? .................................... 142
   5.1 Mitigating a loose control over the state security forces ............................................. 143
Chapter 6 – Comparative Analysis of Security Market Developments in Tunisia and Egypt ............................................. 154

1 Introduction ......................................................................................................................................................... 154

2 Security market developments compared between Tunisia and Egypt ............................................................ 155
  2.1 The public security institutions, the regime and the ruling elite ............................................................... 155
  2.2 The evolution of the private security industry ......................................................................................... 158
  2.3 The relationship among the state, the public security institutions and private security actors ........... 160
    2.3.1 The public security institutions and the private security industry .................................................. 160
    2.3.2 Outsourcing security and the state-security-PSI nexus ................................................................. 162
  2.4 The international input to the market for force and larger political reconfigurations .................................. 164

3 Conclusion ......................................................................................................................................................... 165

Chapter 7 – Conclusion: Outsourcing Security and State Reconfiguration in Post-Uprisings Authoritarian Countries ........................................................................................................................................ 167

1 Introduction ......................................................................................................................................................... 167

2 Beyond Egypt and Tunisia: outsourcing security and regime adaptation in post-uprising countries ........ 172
  2.1 Outsourcing security and the transition toward democratic rule ............................................................. 172
  2.2 Outsourcing security and potential obstacles on the path to democracy .............................................. 174
  2.3 The private security industry, outsourcing security and the reestablishment of authoritarian rule ... 177

3 Conclusion ......................................................................................................................................................... 179

List of Interviewees .............................................................................................................................................. 183

Bibliography ......................................................................................................................................................... 185
  Scholarly Sources ............................................................................................................................................. 185
  Non-scholarly Sources ................................................................................................................................. 192

Appendix 1 - Private security companies operating in Egypt ............................................................................. 204

Appendix 2 - Private security companies operating in Tunisia ..................................................................... 206
Acronyms

CSCTC      National Syndicate Chamber of Security and Cash Transfer Companies (Tunisia)
DCAF       The Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces
MOI        Ministry of Interior (Tunisia and Egypt)
PMC        Private military company
PSC        Private security company
PSI        Private security industry
SSR        Security sector reform
UGTT       Tunisian General Labor Union
USIP       The United States Institute of Peace
Chapter 1 - Introduction

1 Introduction

The 2010-2011 uprisings marked an overt confrontation between some of the Arab region’s entrenched autocratic regimes and their highly discontent populations. The abusive and repressive practices of the state security apparatuses across the Arab region constituted one of the prime drives for the uprisings. The unprecedented scale of the protests, the large-scale international echo and the regimes’ internal fractions amplified some immediate results, including the ousting of the presidents of Tunisia and Egypt and the temporary breakdown of their domestic security apparatuses. Nonetheless, since this initially favorable outcome was enabled by some powerful agents from within the autocratic regimes, the post-uprisings years have featured more continuity than change as the old elite thrive to reconstitute themselves as well as preserve and nurture their established interests.

Notwithstanding the continuous overpowering position of the state security institutions over the post-uprisings period, the uprisings have generated a set of noticeable changes within the region’s markets for force. Notably, the growth of the private security industry (PSI) and the expansion of state security outsourcing stand out. Privatizing state security functions or outsourcing security entails a practice whereby “private actors are called upon to take on (supposedly) public functions; and private-sector methods and market mechanisms such as profit and competition are introduced into parts of the public sector dealing with issues such as national security and policing” (Berndtsson, 2009, 9). The nature and scope of the privatized state functions vary massively across countries, involving many actors and featuring a set of highly dynamic and evolving procedures.

As the critical literature on the privatization of security suggests, the expansion of private security is not an isolated event but rather a manifestation of a wider intensification of security activity across societies. According to Abrahamsen and Williams (2011, 63), this process is “abetted by the state and, in many countries, drawing power from an increasing demand for security from other sectors of society.” These scholars further note that contrary to numerous claims that equate outsourcing security with the state retreating from the provision of security,
the policies of outsourcing security contribute to “a crucial relocation of (the state’s) place within such provision” (Abrahamsen and Williams, 2011, 63).

While the privatization and outsourcing of security in the Arab region certainly predate the 2010-2011 uprisings, the scale and speed of the post-uprisings growth exhibited by the PSI in some Arab countries are remarkable. This phenomenon, partially state-led and partially a reaction to a quickly evolving transitional environment, has progressively and profoundly restructured the region’s markets for force, previously dominated by the public security forces. To date, scholars and security experts have predominantly conceived this phenomenon within the framework of security sector reform (SSR), or as an inevitable outcome of a chaotic security environment triggered by the uprisings.

Instead, this study analyses the Arab states’ increasing dependence on private security actors in light of the changing power dynamics, and the diverse challenges currently facing the Arab regimes and populations alike. At large, this study seeks to disclose the relationship between, on the one hand, the growth of the PSI and the expansion of state outsourcing security, and, on the other hand, the schemes of adaptation espoused by the ruling elite together with different state institutions in some Arab countries in response to the uprisings. The study ultimately speaks to the politics and dynamics of state power reconfiguration and the continuous remaking of power relationships among the diverse actors dominating these countries’ post-uprisings period.

Following this brief introduction, the opening chapter proceeds to present the study’s research question, argument and value. The third part examines some key terms that constitute this study’s conceptual framework and theoretical basis. These are the markets for force and nodal security governance, authoritarian adaptation, regime security and interests, and security states. A discussion of case selection appears next followed by a brief outline of the empirical literature and research methods. Lastly, the chapter concludes with an overview of the dissertation’s chapters.
2 Research question, argument and value

2.1 Research question

At the core of this research is the following question:
How has increased privatization and outsourcing of security, amid wider reconfigurations of the market for force, contributed to the reconfiguration of authoritarian rule and state power in some of the Arab region’s security states since the 2010-2011 uprisings? Particularly, how has this phenomenon impacted the regime’s structure and internal dynamics pertaining to the balance of power among different regime factions, the state-security relationship and the regime’s bases of power and control? Additionally, how has it affected the state-society relations in terms of the available channels of mobilization and political expression, popular claims over public spaces and entitlement to public security?

In pursuit of these questions, the research investigates the input that the privatization of security has on the reconfiguration of state power, the reestablishment of authoritarian governance and the continuous reshuffle of power relationships among state and non-state actors. When examining state and regime reconfigurations in the context of a security state, the study is primarily looking at changes within two domains. The first concerns the regime structure as captured in the elite’s composition and the balance of power between different political factions and state institutions. The second pertains to the state-society relationship as it manifests in the political power available to the population as well as the present balance between regime security and public security and between regime interests and the public interest.

With respect to examining outsourcing security and the activities carried out by private security companies (PSCs) within a security state or a post-uprising country, the key aspects to consider encompass the general historical and political context alongside the societal relations within the studied country. Secondly, there is the post-uprising environment which includes the national challenges and opportunities (e.g. a security vacuum, multifaceted turbulence, economic hardships, areas of state weakness, social and political polarization, among others). Equally important to examine are the areas of outsourcing (where and for what tasks is the state relying on private security actors?) as well as the state objectives of outsourcing security (declared state narrative versus masked or alternative purposes). Lastly, attention is due to
where outsourcing security fits into the post-uprising framework of state security reform, which is studied at two levels: first, as particular schemes pursued by the state and the diverse foreign actors involved, and second, as in the general sense of the reconfiguration of the market for force, especially in regard to the balance of power between different security actors in light of the privatization and outsourcing processes.

2.2 Main argument

This study argues that the post-uprising reconfigurations of the market for force, amid persisting popular unrest and sizeable militia activism, fit into an ongoing framework of authoritarian adaption pursued by the ruling regimes across the Arab region to ensure their survival and prosperity following the social and political unrest that peaked during the 2010-2011 uprisings. In this light, outsourcing security amidst a notable expansion of the private security industry across the Arab region is essentially shaped by the primacy of regime security which is embedded in a close political-security tie and a damaged state-society relationship. Beyond its roots in neo-liberal governance, the privatization and outsourcing of security in some post-uprising Arab countries effectively serve to enhance regime security by providing alternative agents and strategies for social control while offering new venues to expand regime interests through networks of patronage that nurture broad-based authoritarian coalitions and attach the interests of diverse social groups to regime survival.

Figure: The relationship between outsourcing security and authoritarian adaptation
2.3 Research value

The value of this study rests on a number of grounds. It seeks to bring the political and economic dynamics of privatizing and outsourcing security to the academic discourse on post-uprising security developments shaping the Arab region. The collected data, presented cases and new findings then serve to construct a wider analytical framework that serves to study similar processes in other post-uprisings countries, especially those in politically and security troubled regions. Furthermore, by contextualizing the processes of outsourcing security within larger schemes of perpetuating regime security and consolidating authoritarian rule, the research sheds light on the diverse and increasingly masked strategies of state control adopted by some Arab regimes since 2011. This in turn raises awareness about the limits of the existent channels of social mobilization and expression of political dissent. Doing so, it enables the opposition forces and liberty advocates to re-evaluate their political environment and upgrade their resistance strategies to match the diversified forms of repression that continue to define the post-uprisings security states.

3 Conceptual framework

This study lies at the intersection of two rich bodies of literature: studies on authoritarian regimes and the critical security studies literature, particularly studies pertaining to the privatization of security. The coming chapter engages at length with these literatures examining some major themes, lines of criticism and areas of intersections that form the theoretical framework and the bases of the analysis carried out in this study. Complementing chapter two, this part outlines a set of core terms that constitutes the conceptual framework guiding this study.

3.1 Nodal security governance and the markets for force

Contemporary security governance comprises a vast number of agencies and agents, outside the state security apparatus, which outnumber the latter in many countries. Reflecting on the growing pluralized security environment, many scholars describe privatizing security as “a ‘privatization’ or ‘devolution’ from within a state-centered framework dominated by
Westphalian imagery” (Shearing and Wood, 2003, 403). Consequently, examining the new security environment, including the actors involved and their interactions, processes of regulation and monitoring, among other issues, requires embracing non-state centric lenses, freed from entrenched assumptions about the state, traditional security provision and public-private relations.

Such attempts crystalized in the theory of nodal security governance, which emerged in the early 2000s. Nodal security governance views the new security environment as complex, vibrant and shaped by continuous interactions among a diverse set of actors and nodes. The theory’s understanding of power is tied to Michel Foucault’s notion of ‘disciplinary power’, which recognizes power “as constitutive of social subjects and as operating through diverse and dispersed social practices” (Abrahamsen and Williams, 2011, 68).

In this spirit, the theory of nodal security governance contests the central and hierarchal position of the state in the governance and delivery of security. It acknowledges the state as simply one node, defined as “a site of governance exhibiting four fundamental characteristics: mentalities, technologies, resources and institutional arrangements” (Martin, 2013, 149), or a collection of nodes, with no intrinsic conceptual privilege within the large nodal security network (Abrahamsen and Williams, 2011, 83-4). Ultimately, investigating the various security nodes and their relationships translates into an analysis of power relations, where “no set of nodes is given conceptual priority; rather, the exact nature of governance and the contribution of the various nodes to it are regarded as empirically open questions” (Shearing and Wood, 2003, 404).

Against this background, security scholars increasingly employ the term ‘market for force’ to substitute for the state-centric ‘security sector’. Using Dunigan and Petersohn’s (2015, 4) comprehensive definition, the markets refer to “arenas where commodities are sold and bought, and property rights are transferred upon monetary payment.” Market exchange represents a regular process where “commodities are characterized by a certain degree of similarity” (Dunigan and Petersohn, 2015, 4). Additionally, the markets differ in their level of openness—free entrance for new actors—and competitiveness, having multiple suppliers and sellers regularly competing. Accordingly, a market for force, unlike the ‘security sector’, captures the growing commodification of security and its exchange outside a comprehensive state control.
The term equally stresses the market rationality, which increasingly guides the public and private security agencies alike (White and Gill, 2012).

Acknowledging the security sector as a market underscores the sector’s volatility as the number, identities and activities of its actors continuously evolve. Moreover, a market perspective enriches security analyses by contesting the rigid boundaries of the security sector and taking account of a wide range of outsiders, such as non-security state institutions or actors, as well as normal citizens, who directly and indirectly interact and influence the security sector. Given these advantages, this study considers the concept of a market for force or security market, in place of the security sector, as highly suitable for the analysis of the privatization and outsourcing of security in authoritarian countries.

3.2 Authoritarian adaptation

Widely viewed as resilient authoritarian regimes, the Arab states have been focal to abundant studies dedicated to the features and dynamics of authoritarian rule. Having survived numerous internal and external efforts pushing for democratization, the concept of “authoritarian robustness” became deeply attached to the Arab region. Scholars have suggested numerous factors to account for the resilience of authoritarian Arab regimes in the face of democracy, some shared with non-Arab authoritarian regimes while others being arguably region-specific. For example, Bellin (2004) advances four components that foster authoritarianism in the Arab region by fueling the will and capacity of the state coercive apparatus to consolidate the status quo and confine democratic reforms. Bellin’s explanatory factors include “the prevalence of patrimonialism in state structures and the low level of popular mobilization,” both of which are common outside the region (Bellin, 2004, 152).

Meanwhile, the region uniquely features access to ample rent deriving “from different endowments—petroleum resources, gas resources, geostrategic utility, and control of critical transit facilities” (Bellin, 2004, 148 & 152). This abundant rent is complemented by a substantive share of international financial support that, unlike in other regions, was not affected by the end of the cold war. As Bellin (2004, 149) observes “the cold war’s end has not signaled great power retreat from patronage of authoritarianism” in the Arab region where autocrats continue to utilize the multiple security concerns of the West to retain international
support. These last two features—significant reservoirs of rent and continuous international support—enhance the fiscal health of the state coercive institutions and subsidize much of their cost, especially as the region suffers from poor economic condition and high vulnerability to financial crises.

Another approach to the entrenched character of authoritarianism in the Arab region speaks of upgrading and adaptation mechanisms. Heydemann (2007, 1) defines authoritarian upgrading as the reconfiguration of “authoritarian governance to accommodate and manage changing political, economic, and social conditions.” Viewed as a system’s capability to absorb political change, authoritarian adaptation captures the diverse strategies a regime’s elites continuously develop to preserve their dominant status and hierarchical authority over the state and society (Stacher, 2012, 21 & 181). One common example of authoritarian regime adaptation that developed in some authoritarian states prior to the 2010-2011 uprisings was the practice of competitive authoritarianism.

Facing considerable international pressure to open up their political systems and to “democratize”, particularly in the wake of “the war on terror” launched since the early 2000s, several authoritarian countries, in the Arab region and beyond, gradually adopted a hybrid form of authoritarian rule that seemingly abides by the democratic practice of holding free, ‘fair’ and competitive elections. Competitive authoritarian systems, as Levitsky and Way (2010, 5) describe, are “civilian regimes in which formal democratic institutions exist and are widely viewed as the primary means of gaining power, but in which incumbents’ abuse of the state places them at a significant advantage vis-a´-vis their opponents.” While opposition parties appear to seriously contest for power through formal democratic institutions, the system remains authoritarian because “well-entrenched incumbents have so many advantages with regard to control of state resources and the media” (Geddes, 1999, 116).

Similarly, Hinnebusch (2015, 11) asserts that the “elites’ disproportionate command of resources … enables them to defend and recover their domination against the normally divided or inattentive masses.” Autocrats regularly enhance their electoral advantage and weaken the opposition by deploying informal mechanisms of coercion and control such as press censorship, or by using organized corruption in the form of bribery, blackmail, proxy ownership, among other mechanisms. Many of these regimes also resort to “legal repression, or the discretionary use of legal instruments, such as tax authorities and libel laws, to target

16
opposition and the media;” while others hire “informal or privatized violence to suppress opposition” (Levitsky and Way, 2010, 27-8).

Competitive authoritarianism, as a sub-type of authoritarian rule, sheds substantive light on the conduct of many Arab states where a multi-party electoral system was introduced over the course of recent decades. Nonetheless, a close reading of the competitive authoritarianism model inevitably excludes authoritarian Arab states from fully belonging to this category. Primarily, the competitive authoritarian systems refer to “civilian regimes”, while many countries in the Arab region have for decades been ruled by agents of the military or domestic security apparatus, a situation which the 2010-2011 Arab uprisings have largely failed to change. In response, recent studies on the Arab region have featured new terms including “military electoral authoritarianism”1 to account for the political prevalence of the state security agencies, and especially the post-uprisings aggressive political empowerment of the military institutions and leadership, amid established multi-party electoral systems (Aziz, 2017).

With respect to regime adaptation in the post-uprisings years, instead of initiating reform processes, the response of the Arab elite to the revolt of their populations from late 2010 onward has reflected a dynamic process of adaptation. Attaching the durability of authoritarianism in Egypt to its remarkable adaptability, El-Ghobashy (2012) contends that while “the people’s revolt defeated a presidency that had seemed unassailable … without a vanguard or a militia, those at the helm of the uprising were unable to seize the commanding heights and turn their revolt into a revolution.” Overcoming the uprisings, Arab rulers have essentially maintained “the one thing they do well: repressing their citizens” (Cook, 2016). In the shadows of unfolding struggle and political contestation between old and new actors, the public security institutions have reclaimed substantial institutional autonomy, effectively shielding themselves from demands and proposals for reform or from being held accountable for their past and present actions (Sayigh, 2014).

Against this background, the current study uses the concept of “regime adaptation” to examine and comprehend the changes affecting the markets for force in different Arab countries since

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1 Military electoral authoritarianism refers to “a type of hybrid regime where the military upholds the facade of elections but places current and former military officials at the helm of the elite selectorate. [] the military effectively controls the executive branch, which in turn manipulates the legislative and judicial branches through fringe benefits and coercive measures” (Aziz, 2017, 282)
the 2010-2011 uprisings. According to Heydemann (2007, 5), regime adaptation in the Arab region has been long achieved by “appropriating and containing civil societies; managing political contestation; … controlling new communications technologies; and diversifying international linkages.” With regard to the market for force and the state-security-society nexus more broadly, Heydemann’s outlined strategies of authoritarian adaptation have taken diverse forms. For instance, appropriating and containing civil societies have been attained through low-intensity forms of coercion, which, as elaborated in chapter 3, perpetuate a constant level of public fear and despair that commonly result in forced co-optation.

Managing political contestation has been widely achieved through manipulation of the political system and processes, both directly and indirectly, which is attributed to different public security institutions who function within a frame of fierce competition among each other while seeking to please their countries’ authoritarian rulers and increase their own political and economic interests. Moreover, controlling new communication technologies has been at the core of the elaborate surveillance systems which are increasingly being developed and appropriated by the state intelligence agencies in addition to other public security institutions and private allies to the regime as they seek to preempt and control all potential channels of political and social mobilization and dissent.

Lastly, diversifying international linkages has manifested in the regular arrangements of cooperation among the public security institutions of different countries as in the domains of security sector reform, arms trade and multifaced bilateral and multilateral “counterterrorism” collaborations. Additionally, international linkages have extended beyond state-to-state relations to include non-state actors and private parties including PSCs who can act either independently or be affiliated with foreign states and specific agendas. As the dissertation progresses, Heydemann’s strategies of authoritarian adaptability will serve to follow and comprehend how an expanding process of outsourcing security amid a wider growth of the PSI contributes to authoritarian adaptation thus enabling some of the Arab region’s security states to survive and thrive.
3.3 Regime security and regime interests

Insecurity, fueled predominantly by internal factors, constitutes one of the chief features observed across authoritarian states. Regime security, Mohamedou (1998, 62) defines, reflect “the idiosyncratic set of dispositions, orientations and strategies of a particular regime as it seeks to maintain its physical presence, establish and perpetuate legitimacy, and further its permanent and ad hoc interests.” States generally achieve regime security using four broad approaches: power consolidation, economic viability, maintenance of legitimacy, and threat diffusion (Shama, 2014, 11-12). Due to the lack of popular support for and public legitimacy of the ruling elite in authoritarian countries, threat diffusion frequently represents the core of regime security. As a regime develops strategies of threat diffusion, it seeks to pre-empt “any danger to its existence, its actions, and the values attached to its identity” (Mohamedou, 1998, 65). Nonetheless, as threats often take various forms encompassing “political, economic, social, external, internal, global, long-term, short-term, isolated [and] pervasive” (Shama, 2014, 12), it represents a constant challenge for a regime to decide which threats to prioritize and which ones to temporarily ignore.

At large, to consolidate their power and ensure the durability of their regimes, autocratic rulers recurrently depend on “the critical assistance, to varying degrees, of ruling parties, security services, and the military” (Sassoon, 2016, 8). Put differently, authoritarian sustainability widely depends on a regime’s possession of at least one source of “incumbent strength: an institutionalized single ruling party; an extensive security apparatus; and state control over the economy” (Sassoon, 2016, 222). For years prior to the 2010-2011 uprisings, regime insecurity, which has constantly hunted the Arab ruling elites, translated into the development of strong security states, where state security institutions became the ultimate safeguard for maintaining authoritarian rule (Stacher, 2012, 44).

In this vein, regime insecurity has effectively generated a close dependency between the ruling elites and the state security institutions, including the intelligence services, police forces and militaries. Across different Arab countries, this political-security relationship was sustained through a substantive amount of patronage disbursed by the ruling elite to ensure their security personnel’s loyalty and willingness to defend their rule in the face of any dissent. Successively, the Arab region’s public security institutions have carried as prime responsibility to “ensure
that the population is policed, disciplined, controlled and prevented from actively fathering information from igniting instability” (Stacher, 2012, 151).

Complementing regime security, regime interests, particularly political and economic, are equally crucial in outlining the incentives, shaping the objectives and dictating the domestic and foreign policies of any regime. In principle, state officials and institutions are responsible to preserve the national interest of the state and its population. Ideally the national interest mirrors the shared interests of the whole nation by transcending the narrow interests of different social groups, political parties, sects, stakeholders, among others. While state leaders and affiliates commonly have personal interests, which they seek to pursue, “many actions carried out by states serve the national interest as a whole in addition to the parochial interests of decision-makers” (Shama, 2014, 13).

Nonetheless, amid ambiguous accountability and widespread political irresponsibility, the rulers and elites of authoritarian regimes could more easily forgo the national interest without being seriously questioned by the public, the judiciary or any other state institution. This has been recurrently the case in different Arab countries before and after the 2010-2011 uprisings, with regime interests strongly dictating the development of various sectors, including the market for force as the dissertation’s coming chapters will demonstrate.

3.4 Security states

The notion of a “security state” has appeared in recent studies without exhibiting a uniform or shared definition. Some scholars use the term interchangeably with the state security apparatus, aiming to highlight the dissected nature of the apparatus with multiple bodies constantly developing over time (see Guo, 2012). More relevant to this study are the analyses that use security states to capture particular modes of government and state-society interactions. In this vein, Hallsworth and Lea (2011, 142) define security states as “a new type of authoritarianism which, beginning at the periphery and pre-occupied with the management of the marginalized and socially excluded, is gradually infecting the core social institutions, the criminal justice system in particular.”
Mirroring traditional authoritarian regimes, the contemporary security states are highly coercive. Nonetheless, unlike the “authoritarian corporatism”\(^2\) that developed between the two world wars, the new security states do not seek to incorporate all social classes into the state under the flag of nationalism. Instead, this new mode of government targets “the management of social fragmentation and the ‘advanced marginality’ of a growing global surplus population rendered ‘structurally irrelevant’ to capital accumulation” (Hallsworth and Lea, 2011, 142).

Driven by profound changes to the welfare state, the present-day security state heavily depends on the strategy of securitization to deal with “new categories of powerful offenders,” by reconstructing “problems as risks requiring ever more coercive forms of management” (Hallsworth and Lea, 2011, 143-44).

While primarily looking at present-day Europe, Hallsworth and Lea’s analysis matches several aspects of the authoritarian regimes across the Arab region and beyond. The emphasis on coercion in shaping and defining state-society relations, and the interplay between a neo-liberal economy and the display of state power through the formal coercive apparatus, among other actors, constitute two major aspects where contemporary security states and Arab authoritarian regimes align. In a similar vein, Ismail (2015) uses the terms “police government” and “police state” to accentuate the focal position which the coercive apparatus of the state, especially the police forces, occupies in Arab politics and societies. The Arab public security and intelligence services have traditionally carried far-reaching mandates that surpass regular policing and maintaining social order. Many of these agencies effectively possess “virtual control of public space and maintain oversight of social, economic and cultural activities” (Ismail, 2015, 62).

Similar to Hallsworth and Lea, Ismail recognizes the police government as deeply intertwined with the policies of neo-liberalism, introduced across the Arab region in recent years. In essence, authoritarian manifestations in many Arab countries, especially those that accompanied the privatization and economic reforms wave of the 1990s, “rested on the articulation of security politics with neo-liberal government” (Ismail, 2015, 63). More explicitly, the new security-economic environment has embraced “the conjunction of the

\(^2\) Authoritarian corporatism is defined by Thornhill (2015) as “a phenomenon that occurred as both state and society became thoroughly politicized: that is, state-corporatism became a dominant mode of political/economic direction as the state assumed inclusionary responsibility for society as a whole, and as it was obliged to politicize itself and other areas of society in order to perform its expanded public functions.”
objectives of enforcing a particular vision of public order and the protection of the economic interests of privileged segments of the population” (Ismail, 2015, 65).

While the concept of a police state or government carries significant value for the current study, the term itself is problematic as it inevitably attaches a special status to the police forces, which is increasingly challenged theoretically and empirically. Across the Arab region, the 2010-2011 uprisings have had considerable impact on the dynamics and parties continuously shaping the market for force in individual countries. Among others, the rise of non-state and private security actors alongside the growing and assertive role of the military institution in the design and provision of domestic security invite serious revisions of earlier understandings of the police state. Hence, while still, at least numerically, predominant in most cases across the Arab region, the centrality of the police forces amid the larger market for force is increasingly questionable with new actors and relationships at play.

In this respect and given the evolving security environment and market for force, globally and across the Arab region, the term “police state” appears too narrow to adequately reflect the current dynamics shaping the authoritarian rule and states’ reliance on coercive actors. By contrast, the term “security state” proves more comprehensive, allowing the possibility for a multiplicity of actors to prevail within the domestic security market by dismissing any presumptions about a predominant role for the police forces. Furthermore, using the term security state underscores the notion of regime security as integral to the empirical manifestation and academic understanding of authoritarian rule in many Arab countries.

Being used by several scholars to highlight a growing link between the politics of security and neo-liberalism, the concept of security states is particularly relevant and suitable for studying the privatization of security and the growing state-private security partnerships in different authoritarian settings. Moreover, as it has served to describe systems of government in countries outside the Arab region, like in Hallsworth and Lea’s analysis, the term equally offers numerous venues to conduct comparative analysis on security practices between Arab and non-Arab countries, as well as authoritarian and non-authoritarian settings.

In terms of characterization, this study advances the following indicators to identify a security state. Primarily, a security state represents a country where regime security and the interests of the ruling coalition prevail over national and public interests and concerns. The public security
apparatus of a security state defies civilian monitoring and embraces a code of conduct that is not bound to a clearly defined legal framework. In such an environment, the behavior of the public security institutions typically features a high level of corruption and prevalence of personal connections and interests. Correspondently, with respect to the relationship between the public security institutions and the populace, the public perception of the state security apparatus largely features a mixture of fear and hatred, with rare sentiments of respect and trust.

Politically, the leadership and elite of the public security institutions claim a substantive share of power in the decision-making process. Nonetheless, as security states usually possess enormous public security apparatuses, the direct or indirect involvement of particular public security agencies in the decision-making mechanisms ought not be taken for granted. Namely, what characterizes a security state is a significant contribution of the leadership of their security institutions in politics. Meanwhile, which security agency or agencies prevail in this respect is subject to the studied cases. Depending on the country and time period observed, each of the major security agencies—police forces, intelligence services and military institution—can display a direct, indirect or no political involvement. Nonetheless, at any particular time, at least one of these agencies must exhibit a substantive direct or indirect decision-making role for the country to be considered a security state.

4 Case studies

Among the Arab countries that witnessed the 2010-2011 uprisings, Egypt and Tunisia are unique in having experienced a quick change in leadership followed by a relatively stable transitional period. The uprisings effectively toppled both countries’ presidents without generating excessive violence as witnessed in other Arab countries, such as Syria and Yemen, where civil wars have largely prevailed. Furthermore, despite their distinct histories and divergent post-uprisings political development, Egypt and Tunisia have shared a long history of being two prominent security states in the Arab region. For decades, the ruling elites in both countries have profoundly depended on the state security institutions to advance their interests and ensure their survival. This political-security alliance has generated a system of governance
where state security agencies enjoyed great autonomy, especially financial, and developed a significant base of power.

While popular resentment against the public security institutions was at the heart of both countries’ uprisings, the latter’s overall impact on the state security forces, in terms of improving their structure and practices, has remained largely minimal. As Sayigh (2015a, 4-5) affirms, The Egyptian and Tunisian security sectors had clear institutional boundaries and chains of command that the uprisings did not break, enabling them to avoid complete collapse and to regain internal cohesion relatively quickly. … Appeasing the security sectors and assuring their political neutrality, rather than reforming them, became the watchword of successive interim governments.

Beyond the state security forces, both countries’ markets for force have witnessed significant changes since the uprisings linked to a growing presence and activity for non-state and private security actors. As recognized in the literature, security governance is not a mere decision-making process. Instead, it enables “the production and constitution of social subjects through systems of knowledge and discursive practices,” a process where the powers of private actors may well be enlisted in strategies of rule at a distance (Abrahamsen and Williams, 2011, 66). Similarly, Schulz and Yeung (2008, 2) argue that the PSCs who exhibit “strong ties to state institutions can aggravate and reinforce oppressive practices and structures of a state’s security sector.”

In Egypt and Tunisia alike, the PSI initially expanded its activities and services to the private sector as a reaction to a chaotic security environment generated by the 2010-2011 protests. Shortly after, outsourcing state security, alongside a scheme of security partnerships between both countries’ regimes and the PSI, domestic and international alike, began to expand. The outsourcing process has taken multiple forms. In Egypt, different state institutions have recurrently hired PSCs to perform a diverse set of public security functions, previously assigned to the state security agencies. In Tunisia, non-state and private security actors, chiefly foreign, have been significantly involved in the ongoing schemes of security reform that encompassed both the domestic security forces and the military institution, by offering training and supplying the security forces with diverse resources.
These evolving variations characterize both countries’ post-uprisings markets for force and suggest an alteration to the pre-2011 relationship between the ruling elite and the public security institutions. In such light, this study seeks to explore the dynamics shaping this evolving relationship and its broader implications on the reconfigurations pertaining to the market for force, the political system and state-society relations in both countries. In pursuit of that end, the dissertation paves its way into the theoretical literature and empirical data by addressing the following concerns. First, why have cases of outsourcing security expanded in Egypt and Tunisia in recent years? Has it really been a question of necessity? Second, how are these countries outsourcing security? In other words, what characterize the decision-making processes of outsourcing security, including how are the PSCs being chosen and what functions are they asked to perform?

Third, what is the legal framework regulating the PSI in Egypt and Tunisia? Were there any changes introduced following the 2010-2011 uprisings? Furthermore, to what extent is the law being implemented and in what forms, and what implications does the law carry for the different actors involved in the wider security market? Fourth, what kind(s) of relationships exists between the various players within the market for force, most notably between the ruling coalition, the state security institutions and the PSCs? Lastly, how does the process of outsourcing security relate to the larger context of structural and institutional changes introduced in both countries following the uprisings? Similarly, what implications or opportunities does this process offer the current regimes?

With respect to the value of studying these two cases together, the considerable historical and contemporary similarities between both cases provide rich grounds for comparative analysis while the particularities of each case present many unique elements of analysis and grounds to draw different conclusions to test in other cases. In line with the notion of context sensitivity, explained in chapter 2, the research investigates each of the cases on its own grounds, taking into consideration each case’s own nuances and distinctive development of events. As such, the purpose of this study is not to reach some general conclusions about the privatization and outsourcing of security that fit both cases but rather to show how both countries as former, and continuing in the case of Egypt, security states illustrate the studied phenomenon in light of a number of common criteria that manifest differently in each case. These factors include: the political and economic power of the domestic security agencies and the military institution, the status of the PSI before 2011 and its development after the uprisings, the nature and expression
of the security-political alliance, and the scope of reconfigurations witnessed across the public security forces in the aftermath of the uprisings.

At large, by studying these cases concurrently the research effectively sheds light on the different ways in which increased privatization and outsourcing of security, amid wider reconfigurations of the market for force, have contributed to the post-2010 reconfiguration of authoritarian rule and state power in some of the Arab region’s security states, particularly Egypt and Tunisia. Seeing the unique path each of these countries has taken since the uprisings across different sectors—political, security, economic and social—the answer to this research’s question has proven much richer and less straightforward than anticipated. While the Egyptian case was more aligned with the main argument advanced by this research—the expanding privatization and outsourcing of security being both indirectly and directly implicated into larger schemes of authoritarian adaptation—establishing this link in the Tunisian case has proven much more challenging.

In essence, the Tunisian experience with privatizing and outsourcing security since 2011 has offered valuable insights into the potential link between the studied phenomenon and the prospects of enhancing an authoritarian state’s gradual transition toward democratic rule amidst a challenging environment of social and political unrest, as well as the attached limitations and challenges encountered on this path. Put differently, while the Egyptian case has proven to support this research’s outlined argument, the Tunisian case effectively balanced this argument by offering a very different experience with privatizing and outsourcing security and thus a more nuanced answer to the relationship between privatizing and outsourcing security and the reestablishment of authoritarian rule in post-uprisings’ periods.

In such light, as elaborated in the concluding chapter, instead of simply answering the question of “how can privatizing and outsourcing security contribute to the reestablishment of authoritarianism after popular uprisings or revolutions?”; studying the Tunisian enabled this research to offer valuable insights on two further questions. First, how can the PSI and outsourcing security enhance an authoritarian state’s gradual transition toward democratic rule amidst a challenging environment of social and political unrest? And second, what are the potential harm on a country’s path toward democratic rule which might accompany the rise of the PSI with an expanding process of security outsourcing?
5 Empirical literature and methodology

5.1 Identified gaps

At the start of this research in 2016, and largely continuing into the present, the empirical literature on the PSI in the Arab region has been considerably limited. Qualitatively, studies on the market for force in the Arab countries since 2011 have uniformly subscribed to the SSR discourse. Notable contributions in this direction include Sirrs’s (2013) ‘Reforming Egyptian Intelligence: Precedents and Prospects, Intelligence and National Security’, and Sayigh’s (2015a) ‘Missed Opportunity: The Politics of Police Reform’. As academically recognized, SSR is founded on “the core values of democracy, good governance, gender equality, transparency and accountability, as well as a desire to propagate universal human rights” (Jackson, 2011, 1810). Being heavily informed by Western governance and security models, the SSR approach thus inevitably overlooks the critical significance of the public security forces, and the market for force more broadly, to the Arab region’s authoritarian ruling systems.

The Arab countries’ public security apparatuses lie at the heart of the state, mutually shaping and maintaining the autocratic regimes. Given this, any major change to the market for force would probably inflict an equivalent change to the very nature of the Arab state. As many Middle East scholars note, the tight political-security relationship has strongly inhibited serious security reform in the region since 2011 as the ruling coalitions across different Arab countries have actively opted for regime adaptation. Similarly, Fishman (2015, 148) affirms that the Middle East “should be evaluated not primarily in terms of democratization, which is still a distant reality for most countries, but in terms of the commitment to implementing institutional reforms in the security, governance and economic spheres.”

In this regard, an SSR perspective fails to apprehend the authoritarian adaptation strategies by embracing “reform” as the prime lens of analysis. By contrast, adopting the nodal security governance approach, as suggested in the present study, enables a more comprehensive and objective investigation of the market for force in the concerned countries. Focusing on the power rather than the identity of different actors and going beyond traditional views of a hierarchical security structure to studying their dynamic and evolving interaction, leads to a
richer, more comprehensive and realistic analysis of the developments and reconfigurations of 
the markets for force across the Arab region.

5.2 Research design

Quantitatively, the research faced a critical shortage in the academic literature with respect to 
the rise of the PSI in the selected cases. Since the 2010-2011 uprisings, security scholars 
examining Egypt and Tunisia have predominantly focused on the state security apparatuses. 
Marginal academic attention, if any, was paid to the mounting privatization of security carried 
out by several Arab regimes, which led to the emergence of the PSCs as strong players within 
these countries’ markets for force. Most of the information and updates on the PSI, including 
the PSCs’ activities and evolving relationship with the ruling regimes, have appeared primarily 
in media sources, either written or broadcast.

Against this background and in pursuit of depth and accuracy, the empirical data for this 
research was collected through a combination of primary and secondary sources. The primary 
data was gathered through a series of interviews, fieldwork observations and analysis of official 
documents. These were complemented with secondary sources from academic articles and 
political commentaries as well as media coverage. At large, the media sources used encompass 
news reports, political analyses and TV programs in Arabic, English and French. As Shama 
(2014, 3) points out “relying on the media is almost futile” for research on Arab countries as 
the media is highly politicized, manipulated and often unreliable. To navigate this issue, the 
media sources, which the study uses, were constantly scrutinized and cross-checked with other 
sources, including some of the interviewees, to ensure the accuracy of the data.

5.2.1 Interviews and fieldwork

Beyond the quantitative and qualitative shortage in resources and data available on this 
research topic, another major challenge encountered during the research process, especially in 
respect of the Egyptian case, was finding people to interview who are not only sufficiently 
familiar with the topic and able to provide some useful input, even when their research scope 
or work focus is apparently very different, but more importantly who are essentially willing to 
speak, share their knowledge and experience, and when possible accept to go on the record
instead of remaining anonymous. Similarly, my personal safety has also represented a matter of concern, as I needed to be very prudent while approaching people who are closely affiliated to the Egyptian regime and thus might harm my person or my career by giving away the research topic and subject of enquiry to the Egyptian authorities who are already very suspicious of academics, particularly those researching issues of security and national interests.

Adding to these challenges, the process of contacting relevant sources has been very dynamic and continuously evolving. Out of hundreds of emails sent, including numerous reminders and follow-ups, only a small number of responses were received, many of which were rejections or unhelpful responses. It was particularly difficult to establish contact with local representatives of the PSI in Egypt, with some insisting that I need to visit their office in-person so they may verify my identity before accepting to speak to me. Indeed, trying to conduct this research remotely has limited my ability to include more voices from the PSI in Egypt into this dissertation. Yet knowing the tight security measures inside the country and the suspicion of public and private security actors alike toward academics and their lack of willingness to share information, it is reasonable to conclude that being present in Egypt would have achieved very little extra value to this research as it would have still failed to meet the aspired outcome of a normal fieldwork.

With respect to Tunisia, the collection of data through interviews has mirrored a two-stage process: prior to and during the fieldwork. A considerable amount of my second year of research was dedicated to gathering as much data as possible on the Tunisian case and compiling a list of sources, including institutions, academics and security experts, whom I aspired to contact in order to enrich and deepen the research enquiry. The few months preceding my research visit to Tunisia, which took place in January 2019, were particularly challenging as it involved a continuous process of sending emails and making phone calls for which the return rate was very low. Nonetheless, the few contacts successfully established at this stage, primarily with academics, developed into rich interviews, which not only answered many of my questions and opened new areas of interest in line with my research, but also directed me to other experts and professionals in the field, some of whom I managed to interview remotely, others I met during my fieldwork, and few I was very fortunate to meet twice, combining both a virtual and an in-person interview.
This snowball sampling technique was equally experienced while trying to reach out to different PSCs during the fieldwork in Tunisia. On the one hand, direct contact with the private security companies have proven extremely unsuccessful, with no replies to emails or phone calls, and even some of the addresses provided online for their offices proving to be false as no physical presence was found for some of the companies which I decided to simply visit after failing to remotely reach them. On the other hand, once I managed to secure the first interview, which was with the regional manager of a well-established Tunisian PSC, Polygarde, he then directed me during the interview to a colleague of his, being both ex-military officers, who works at another PSC. The latter then put me in contact with another colleague of his and so forth, until I managed to interview a good number of people, who do not only belong to the PSI, but are also well grounded in the field of public security by virtue of having served for years as public security or military officers.

In sum, with regard to interviews, the study conducted a total of 31 individual interviews, some carried remotely over the phone and some conducted in person in the UK or during fieldwork in Tunisia and Qatar. The interviewees included security experts, representatives of the private security industry and delegates of international organizations involved in the security reform programs pursued in the case studies, specifically Tunisia, and beyond, ex-members of the military institution and domestic security forces, security and Middle East scholars, political analysts and journalists alongside representatives of the student movement in Egypt.

For instance, I interviewed members of two transnational PSCs based in the UK: G4S Plc that operates in Egypt and Aktis Strategy Ltd that is involved in the security reform projects in Tunisia. These interviews informed the research on these PSCs’ perception of the work and status of the industry in the concerned countries, as well as the companies’ contribution to improving the domestic security situation since 2011. Moreover, these interviews significantly served to review some of the information promulgated in the media, and to answer some of the research enquiries about these companies’ framework and their relationship to the ruling elites in Egypt and Tunisia.

All the interviews were semi-structured; the questions were designed to explore the central themes of the study, particularly, the nature and significance of the post-2010 rise of the PSI in the Arab region; the changes that the public security forces and markets for force at large have witnessed since the uprisings; the evolving state-security-society relations amid continuing
unrest and political contestation; and perspectives on the impact of outsourcing security on the venues of social and political mobilization and on perpetuating authoritarianism in Egypt and Tunisia, and the Arab region more broadly.

With respect to the fieldwork, a one-month visit to Tunisia was arranged in early 2019 to conduct some of the outlined interviews as well as acquire a firsthand account of the activities carried out by the PSCs in the country, which included simple guarding tasks at private venues like shopping malls and big hotels, and the industry’s development in recent years. Conducting fieldwork in Egypt has not proven possible due to the security restrictions and danger imposed on researchers and research activities since 2011. As such, all the interviews pertaining to the Egyptian case were conducted over the phone, with some interviews taking place in person in Qatar where a significant number of Egyptian activists and dissident scholars have been based in order to escape persecution and harassment in Egypt.

5.2.2 Official documents

Alongside the interviews and fieldwork, the study heavily relies on legal texts and pieces of legislation, together with official documents and reports published by the case studies’ governments and a number of international bodies in relation to security reforms and the PSI. In this vein, the research closely examined all the laws and legislations that have addressed the PSI or indirectly framed and shaped its legal presence in the case studies. Doing so the study was able to track the legal history and changes introduced to the industry, alongside their actual implementation and wider significance for the security and political developments witnessed since the 2010-2011 uprisings.

Similarly, the research looked at press releases of, and announcements made by PSCs, foreign entities and other actors in regard to the privatization of security and the security reform programs in the case studies. For instance, the British embassy in Tunisia has published on its official website a number of reports and press releases pertaining to the security cooperation between the two countries where the PSI has been recurrently involved. Similarly, the PSCs’ branch within the Cairo Chamber of Commerce in Egypt have issued several statements in response to the new legal framework imposed on the industry. Collecting and analyzing this type of documents enhanced the research’s understanding of the scope of privatizing security
in the case studies, the different actors involved, and the wider political and economic dynamics embedded in the process.

6 Chapters overview

The present study consists of seven chapters in total. Beyond this opening chapter, the dissertation develops as follow:

Chapter 2 introduces the theoretical basis guiding this study’s analysis of the rising PSI and outsourcing security in the Arab region since the 2010-2011 uprisings. Doing so, it critically engages with two bodies of literature: the critical security studies and studies on authoritarian regimes. At first, the chapter reviews the mainstream approaches on privatizing security within the security literature. This serves to highlight different grounds of criticism which include adopting state capacity as a prime factor of analysis and embedding a sharp dichotomy between the public and private spheres, as well as between the states and non-state actors of security. The critique ultimately underscores the significance of local contexts and political backgrounds to the study of the PSI’s growth.

Accentuating the centrality of coercion to the politics of authoritarianism, the chapter proceeds to examine how regime insecurity under authoritarian rule generates a close dependency between the ruling elite and state security institutions, leading to a heightened coercion and a damaged state-society relationship. Bringing these two literatures together the chapter then scrutinizes the post-uprisings growth of the PSI across the Arab region presenting four reasons as to why state outsourcing security has intensified in some Arab countries in recent years. These reasons include creating a secure economic environment; cultivating networks of patronage and alleviating economic distress; compensating for an internally fragmented public security apparatus; and curbing constant sources of political and social unrest.

Chapter 3 offers a focused overview of the main coercive institutions in Egypt and Tunisia in order to highlight their centrality to the ruling system and to the expression of the security state in these countries. Specifically, it seeks to show how the public security institutions, who have chiefly dominated the market for force before and after the 2010-2011 uprisings, are core to
the structures of economic exploitation and marginalization, in addition to the tight social and political control of large segments of the population. To do that, the chapter highlights these institutions’ structures and powers, as well as their mutual relationship, their relationship to the regime, i.e. the political and economic elite, to other security actors and to the wider population.

Clarifying this context paves the way for a better understanding of the current role of the PSCs within the markets for force explored in the following chapters, especially as many of these PSCs are owned, hired or closely connected to the regime and its public security institutions. The key public security nodes examined within the markets for security services in the case studies are the military institution, the police forces together with other domestic security agencies, and the intelligence services.

Chapter 4 is dedicated to the Tunisian case. In line with significant changes affecting Tunisia’s political system, the country’s market for force has witnessed a set of noticeable changes since the outbreak of its uprising in late 2010. Some transformations concerned the state security institutions, while others comprised the recurrent reliance on non-state and private actors in security reform projects and the assertive growth of Tunisia’s domestic PSI. In this light, the chapter examines the growing presence of non-state and private actors within Tunisia’s post-uprisings market for force by looking at the realm of state security reform and the domestic private security market respectively.

In terms of state security reform, the study demonstrates that the increasing presence of non-state actors in security reforms projects in Tunisia from 2011 onward is not explained by the efficiency of these entities alone but involves a more diverse and complex set of factors that encompass personnel connections and the governance system of the contracting parties. Moreover, the impact that the non-state and private actors have had on reforming the Tunisian public security forces into a more professional apparatus has depended on the historical and political background of the public security forces alongside the arrangements followed within different security reform projects. The impact is thus largely mixed and presently uncertain.

With regard to the domestic PSI in Tunisia, the study explores the various manifestations and reasons for the industry’s growth after the 2010-2011 uprisings by identifying new grounds for demands and various sources of supply. These include the rising insecurities and militia activism in recent years, which led foreign companies and domestic businesses to increasingly
enlist PSCs’ services instead of relying on the public security forces. Similarly, the early reshuffles affecting the public security forces following the uprisings supplied the private security market with new founders and personnel, which further boosted the industry’s development.

In terms of the wider implications, the chapter concludes by showing the various ways through which the ongoing expansion of non-state and private security actors in Tunisia, in domestic security provision and security reform schemes alike, is significantly reconfiguring the country’s market for force by creating new relationships and dynamics of interactions among the different security providers, as well as between them and the citizenry.

**Chapter 5** explores the Egyptian case whose security market has been profoundly reconfigured in recent years amidst heightened militia activism across the country and the continuous struggle of the regime to ensure its control over a persistently agitated population. In particular, from 2011 onward, Egypt has been site to a booming private security market where social, economic and political factors mingle and compete. To explore this phenomenon, the chapter investigates what forms outsourcing security has taken since the 2011 uprising, as well as why and how they impacted the current regime and its relationship with the citizenry. In this light, it traces the development of the private security market in Egypt since its launch in the late 1970s until today, while examining the legal status of the PSCs in Egypt and their relationship to the domestic security providers and the army.

The chapter equally speaks to the public-private relationship within the PSI by presenting some of the prominent cases of outsourcing security pursued by the Egyptian regime in recent years. Building on these examples, the chapter proceeds to scrutinize some of the explanations and implications attached to the rising phenomenon of outsourcing security in Egypt today. In short, outsourcing security enables the Egyptian regime to mitigate a loose control over its public security institutions, especially the police forces, which is central to the security and robustness of the regime. Completing security concerns with economic objectives, outsourcing security effectively enhances the regime’s interests by generating substantial economic benefit for public figures and institutions and their allies within the private sector. It equally helps alleviate some of the national economic hardships by offering employment to a great number of people as well as enhancing the security of private properties and businesses which stabilizes the country’s economy and help attract foreign investment.
The third and arguably the most critical ground to analyze the post-2011 rise of private security and increased security outsourcing in Egypt pertains to the tightening of state control over social and political mobilization by having PSCs serve as indirect agents of repression which ultimately nurtures regime security and leads to overall stability. In this light, for the Egyptian state and its institutions, privatizing and outsourcing security effectively fits into a broader scheme of regime adaptation. Amid an insecure environment of political challenges and militia activism, PSCs represent a unique asset to the Egyptian state both as a tool of regime stability and economic enrichment as well as an agent of political and social control.

Chapter 6 engages in a comparative analysis of Tunisia and Egypt by closely examining the commonalities and differences in their experiences with security market’s reconfigurations. Building on the historical overview of the state security forces explored in chapter 3 and the empirical data and attached commentary presented in chapter 4 and 5, this chapter explains how these two security states, by virtue of featuring different bases of power and approaches to political challenges and change alongside authoritarian upgrading, have experienced security markets’ changes since 2011 and the impact of these continuing experiences on authoritarian survival and regime adaptation in these countries. The comparative analysis essentially shows that the evolution of their markets for force after the 2010-2011 uprisings have featured more differences that similarities, and by extension the political paths pursued by both states have been considerably diverse with regime adaptation being at the center of Egypt’s path while Tunisia’s path has been largely dynamic featuring more daring and assertive steps toward establishing the basis of a democratic rule.

Chapter 7 builds on the theoretical and empirical data and findings presented in the previous chapters as it revisits the dissertation’s research question in order to draw a comprehensive and cohesive conclusion on the relationship between the expanding phenomenon of outsourcing security and the concurrent processes of state reconfigurations in post-uprisings authoritarian countries. Capitalizing on the comparative analysis presented in chapter 6, this chapter further scrutinize the relationship between the reconfiguration of the security market and that of state power in the context of authoritarian regimes and the framework of regime adaptation being followed when authoritarian countries are confronted with large-scale and continuous social and political challenges. This is achieved by addressing two main questions: first, how can the PSI and outsourcing security enhance an authoritarian state’s gradual transition toward
democratic rule amidst a challenging environment of social and political unrest? Second, how can privatizing and outsourcing security contribute to the reestablishment of authoritarianism after popular uprisings or revolutions?
Chapter 2 - Privatizing Security under Authoritarian Rule: 
The Case of the Arab Region

1 Introduction

In 2017, more than half of the world’s population was living in countries where private security workers outnumbered public police officers (Provost, 2017). Moreover, worth an estimated $200 billion in 2017, the global market for private security services is projected to reach $269 billion in 2022, of which $145.2 billion is attached to global guard services (SDM Magazine, 2018). The global presence and continuous expansion of the private security industry (PSI), comprising its military and guarding facets, is growingly integral to international security governance and global politics. This global phenomenon is however far from uniform, featuring wide discrepancies based on where it manifests and for what purposes. The need to scrutinize the privatization of security, and particularly states’ reliance on the PSI’s services, is increasingly highlighted by critical security studies. They move beyond the neo-liberal argument, which attaches privatizing public security services to factors of efficiency and cost-effectiveness, to look at the dynamics of intra-state competition over power, political arrangements and public-private relations.

In a similar vein, this study attributes particular attention to “context sensitivity”: an informed recognition that privatizing security in different countries inevitably entails variations in terms of the scope and identities of the actors involved alongside the nature of their relationship, which naturally influence the dynamics driving the privatization procedure. As Werthe (2007, 322) contends, a country’s decision to outsource, or not to, constitutes a societal choice pertaining to how governments opt to manage power. Examining this phenomenon thus requires a close attention to the spectrum of shifting political ideas together with “the role of powerful persons and interests that may choose to frame government power in particular ways to suit particular desired ends” (Werthe, 2007, 322).

Looking at the Arab region, the aftermath of the 2010-2011 uprisings has witnessed intense growth of the PSI and notable expansion of state outsourcing security. While preceding the
uprisings and seemingly following the global transition to neo-liberal governance, the current development of the PSI and its significant post-2010 expansion in different Arab countries is essentially shaped by contentious domestic politics and the impact of authoritarian rule on state security forces alongside the damaged state-society relationship it produces. In this light, this chapter argues that the current expansion of private security provision in the Arab region, and particularly the practice of outsourcing security, embeds a new form of state interventionism alongside a revised expression of authoritarian rule and a primacy for regime security. The reconfiguration of the market for force since 2011, amid a security environment defined by persisting popular unrest and sizeable militia activism, actively fits within a larger frame of regime adaptation where the pre-uprisings ruling elites have sought to navigate the social and political unrest that peaked in 2011 through new strategies of public security, political co-optation and social control.

The chapter advances the outlined argument over three main parts. It starts by briefly reviewing the mainstream approaches on the privatization of security within the security literature. This serves to highlight different grounds of criticism to this literature, which include adopting state capacity as a prime factor of analysis and embedding a sharp dichotomy between the public and private spheres, and between the states and non-state actors of security. The critique ultimately underscores the significance of the local contexts and political backgrounds within which the privatization of security takes place. The second part of the chapter speaks to the politics of authoritarianism by accentuating the centrality of coercion to autocratic regimes while examining its diverse forms and wider implications. It essentially highlights how regime insecurity under authoritarian rule generates a close dependency between the ruling elite and state security institutions, which translates into an emphasis on coercive measures and a damaged state-society relationship.

Bringing part one and two together, the chapter proceeds to scrutinize the post-uprisings growth of the PSI across the Arab region. In the process, four explanations are put forward in response to why state outsourcing security has intensified in some Arab countries in recent years. These reasons include creating a secure economic environment; cultivating networks of patronage and alleviating economic distress; diversifying the regimes’ bases of security; and curbing constant sources of political and social unrest. In essence, each of these reasons contribute to regime adaptation as the regimes and politicians in the concerned countries seek to perpetuate regime stability and sustain their interests.
2 Privatization of security: from global display to context sensitivity

2.1 The contemporary global rise of the private security industry

The contemporary rise of the PSI represents a worldwide phenomenon that mirrors profound changes in the global security environment. These changes included the consolidation of the neo-liberal model of governance, the fall of the Soviet Union in December 1991, and a significant increase in inter-state and intra-state wars erupting predominantly in Third World countries. In particular, the end of the Cold War impelled a “massive reductions in the size of the armed forces on both sides of the Atlantic,” which created an abundance of ex-military personnel, who found a niche in the PSI (Krahmann, 2009, 16). Successively, the PSI has played an increasingly prevailing role within the private and public sectors alike in and across many countries.

The PSI generally encompasses two main streams: private security companies (PSCs) and private military companies (PMCs). PMCs are “specialized in military skills, including combat operations, strategic planning, intelligence collection, operational support, logistics, training, procurement and maintenance of arms and equipment” (Schreier and Caparini, 2005, 2). Meanwhile, PSCs, to which the scope of this study mainly extends, represent “profit-driven organizations that trade in professional services linked to internal security and protection” (Schreier and Caparini, 2005, 26). The PSCs’ domestic activities run across different security areas including guarding; electronic security, sensor and surveillance; investigation and risk management; in addition to private intelligence services. While an increasing number of security companies defy this functional distinction by acting simultaneously as PMC and PSC, the division remains important to the analysis of the distinctive roles played by each of these two streams, as well as the nature of their relationship with other actors within the market for force.

The strong emergence of PSCs in recent decades has introduced a set of domestic policies as different countries sought to regulate the expanding industry. At the outset, the rise of the PSI seems to challenge the states’ monopoly over coercion. Meanwhile, Krahmann (2009) argues that the international understanding of the norm on the state monopoly on violence has witnessed a fundamental shift, specifically, with respect to the scope and manifestation of this
monopoly. Instead of adopting a comprehensive and exclusive monopoly on violence, including its normative and physical display, the norm is currently perceived within the international community of states as largely limited to its legal and regulatory manifestations: a “legal control of the actors who wield armed force to protect others” (Krahmann, 2009, 9). In the same vein, security studies have used the concept of ‘security governance’ to depict the evolving role of the state from a “monopoly security provider to an enabler, employer, and regulator of private actors in complex networks” (Krahmann, 2005, 211).

2.2 Outsourcing security: “the efficient versus weak states” debate

Looking at contemporary security provision across the globe, it is fairly evident that not only are the private security actors steadily occupying a substantial domestic and international position, but the relationship between the majority of states and the PSI is largely collaborative, or at the very least not confrontational. This is particularly important to recognize in light of the continuous growth of the PSI and the expanding practice of state outsourcing security. With regard to why some states choose to outsource security, the dominant approach in the literature follows a functional economic logic and is generally embedded in large debates such as “the efficient versus weak states” debate. Taking a comparative approach, Avant (2005) identifies a state’s capacity as the crucial variable to understand and evaluate the privatization of security in any given country.

State capacity, Avant explains, encompasses three forms of state control: social, which reflects a state’s ability to reconcile social values and internal law with the deployment of force, political that entails “the subjection of the use of force to political or civilian rules and decisions,” and functional, which is captured in the abilities and effectiveness of the military apparatus (Westermeyer, 2013, 27). In light of the quick and considerable developments affecting the market for security services, states’ control over violence is heavily undermined as many states struggle to develop a strategy that simultaneously capture all dimensions of control. Eventually, managing the market for force requires strategies where “individual states find themselves making trade-offs between different elements of control” (Avant, 2007, 419).

In reference to efficient or strong states, who are depicted as coherent, capable and legitimate (Avant, 2008, 441), the logic for outsourcing security centers on achieving maximized
flexibility, cost-efficiency and enhanced quality. This economic rationale motivating outsourcing security is commonly described as “a direct result of the application of neo-liberal principles to domestic and international security” (Krahmann, 2009, 16). It particularly reflects neo-liberalism’s “preference for the small state, free market and maximizing consumer choice” (Krahmann, 2009, 16). Indeed, the rise of neo-liberalism in many countries witnessed a decline in state investment in the provision of public services during the 1970s and 1980s. However, as a number of studies remarks, many states, including Britain and the United States, actually increased their investment in public policing over this same period (White, 2011, 87).

Considering their advanced capacities and substantive level of control, strong states are generally perceived as equipped to regulate and effectively monitor the PSI. Nonetheless, Holmqvist (2005) identifies several areas of concern with respect to outsourcing security by efficient states. These concerns comprise establishing clear mandates, ensuring PSCs’ accountability, managing control and monitoring in a skewed security market, and achieving “basic and practical coordination of efforts both among private actors and between PSCs and regular forces” (Holmqvist, 2005, 25).

With regard to weak or fragile states, traditional studies on privatizing security have regularly framed outsourcing as the outcome of a state’s incapacity or failure to provide security to its citizens due to the lack of adequate administrative and physical resources. Additionally, suffering from fragile administrative capabilities, weak states are presumed to fail in properly monitoring the activities of the private security and military companies, which can lead to further fragmentation of authority while enhancing the power of external actors, including private capital and foreign states, at the expense of local interests (Hansen, 2008, 586).

By contrast, several analyses highlight a range of benefits that private security actors can bring to weak states, such as supporting these states to develop and protect their territories, institutions and inhabitants through the provision of external resources and the transfer of needed skills from states who exhibit more competent security and military systems (Hansen, 2008, 586). Nevertheless, academic proponents of the PSI still acknowledge the risks attached to the extensive reliance on private security and military companies in weak states. These include the creation of a short-term false image of security, having “a skewed distribution of security among populations, and crowding out the establishment of legitimate and functioning state institutions” (Holmqvist, 2005, 12).
The “weak versus strong states” paradigm is well established within the security literature; nonetheless, it is increasingly considered as empirically inadequate and analytically reductionist. The limits of the debate regularly appear in research that examines the diverse cases of outsourcing security, political violence and armed conflicts in many of the developing and under-developed countries. For example, with respect to outsourcing security in Africa, Holmqvist (2005, 12) asserts, “state incapacity or failure provides only a part of the story.” In some African countries as elsewhere, the PSI has occasionally contributed to preserving the status quo of inequitable security provision. Similarly, Krause and Milliken (2009, 216-17) underscore the need to critically treat the categories of weak or failed states by examining “how state institutions actually work to provide public order and security (or not), and how states interact with potential and actual challengers to the state’s monopoly on the legitimate use of violence.”

2.3 Critical approaches to outsourcing security

Security as a public good and an entitlement of all citizens within a state continues to inform and underpin a considerable segment of the security literature, particularly scholarship on the privatization of security. Adherents to this view consider the public nature of protection among the defining features of the modern state, closely linked to state sovereignty and legitimacy. In this context, the publicness of security remains fundamental to the state-building process, constituting a political entitlement of all citizens as part of a social contract with the state. In this vein, Jackson (2011, 1813) asserts, “it is an obligation of the state to provide security for its citizens, not to protect personal regimes.” Extending this approach to the study of the privatization of security, the principles of democratic rule, including transparency and state accountability, influence many scholars as they analyze and evaluate the rise of the PSI. As Westermeyer (2013, 27) accurately notes, “the main concern for political scientists with regard to the privatization of security relates to the effects of private actors on governmental control and democratic norms.”

While many democratic countries continuously struggle with these ideals when outsourcing security, these ideals are either absent or highly undermined in autocratic countries. Sharing this view, Abrahamsen and Williams (2011, 113) explain, “the agents and agencies of state security always possess the potential to pose dangers to the very citizens they claim to protect…
The publicness of security should also not conceal the extent to which public force was, and often still is, wielded in support of private or sectional interests under the guise of the public good.” As such, a traditional democratic-based analysis of outsourcing security appears fundamentally unsuitable to understand autocratic settings.

In a similar vein, Hibou (2004, 19) criticizes studies that attribute the privatization and outsourcing processes to a state retreat or loss of sovereignty and legitimacy of subscribing to a substantialist and normative approach to state power. She alternatively suggests that privatization effectively embodies a new practice of state interventionism, where state power is not uniform and control is not exclusive (Hibou, 2004, 18). This approach to privatization attributes particular attention to the deliberately volatile nature of the process, which centers on a series of formal and informal negotiations, contracts and agreements among the actors involved in security governance. Notwithstanding the process appears deeply unstable, secretive and always up for renegotiation, Hibou (2004, 16) affirms, “this instability is not the result of poor management or other inadequacies, nor is it the expression of external dependency. It is rather at the heart of politics: creating and maintaining conditions for the exercise of power.”

Another ground of criticism to the mainstream security literature concerns the sharp dichotomy between the public and private spheres as well as between the state and non-state actors, which underlines both the historical account and the neo-liberal state-centric approach to the privatization of security, as both fail to account for the significant power acquired by many private actors, which frequently equate them with state representatives. In this vein, Murphy (2001, 7) depicts the public-private dichotomy as becoming increasingly blurred as states, especially developing ones, potentially maintain an expanded but increasingly rational economic function, while political competitions and alliances cross over the divide. In a similar vein, looking at the African continent, Hibou (2004) highlights the crucial role played by numerous state representatives in advancing the privatization of security for personal gains.

In Cameroon for instance, increased privatization of security has translated into direct political and economic benefits for a number of state ministers and senior state agents, who either own or run numerous private security services. Similarly, high profile state representatives in Mozambique, encompassing former senior military personnel and active ministers, tightly monitor the privatization process by controlling “the hierarchical structure of networks, and
the shrinking of the political space” (Hibou, 2004, 5). Furthermore, by closely collaborating with the heads of major PSCs, these state representatives manage to secure large economic resources, under the pretext of substituting “for an incompetent police force and undisciplined army” (Hibou, 2004, 6).

Mirroring many other documented cases, these two examples underscore the entangled relationship between the public and private actors that shapes the privatization of security within different countries, particularly those under authoritarian rule. Ultimately, the contemporary privatization of security defies the public-private dichotomy by engaging in broader transformations of governance and “a complex reconfigurations of state power in which the public and private spheres are increasingly entangled” (Østensen, 2011, 371).

On the subject of states interacting with non-state actors, a number of security studies continue to assume a certain hierarchy in favor of the state. Conversely, many scholars argue that security governance represents “a system of rule, which lacks a hierarchical order with a dominant sovereign entity” (Westermeyer, 2013, 25). Some even declare governance as “the antonym to the rule of government by the nation state” (Westermeyer, 2013, 25). In the meantime, the governance literature has itself been criticized of remaining widely loyal to the conceptualization of the state as one entity. This uniform version of the state appears increasingly inadequate to match the complex structures of contemporary security governance systems.

Echoing the critical scholarship on the privatization of security, this study rejects the traditional view of the state as a uniform superior actor, as well as the consequent dichotomy perceived between the state and non-state actors, opting instead for a disaggregated conceptualization that better captures the evolving nature of the state. Particularly, with respect to outsourcing security, the notion of the state reflects the continuously constructed sum or aggregation of a vast number of agents, who despite uniformly carrying the label of state representatives, whether by being employed by the state, acting on its behalf or exercising a certain form of public power, embed diverse and volatile interests and allegiances. This perspective enables a richer account of the internal dynamics driving the process of outsourcing security, whether in terms of the state decisions or the vibrant relationships between state representatives and the PSI. It examines privatizing security through the lenses of the vibrant power relations
continuously being negotiated among a diverse set of actors, including state representatives, private entities and multiplex actors that connect both.

Additionally, this perspective permits a closer and more accurate evaluation of states’ provision of security and its relationship to notions of state sovereignty and legitimacy. As Abrahamsen and Williams (2011, 9) point out, “the question becomes not whether the state is gaining or losing sovereignty via private security actors, but how its place and relationship to other actors in a field of power is shifting and how, in the process, state power itself is reconfigured.”

3 Markets for force and diversified coercion under authoritarian rule

Across authoritarian countries, climbing the ladder of political leadership entails an intense engagement with repression and coercion, which largely substitutes for electoral platforms and fair competition. Even when elections are held, as in competitive authoritarian states, the real competition for power manifests elsewhere, “with brute force rather than electoral rules deciding who gets to hold power” (Svolik, 2012, 23). In that respect, the capacity for coercion is widely acknowledged as integral to the establishment, development and durability of authoritarian rule. Coercion is commonly defined “as a regime’s ability to use force or the threat of force against dissenting individuals or groups” (Stacher, 2012, 44). Nonetheless, by primarily depicting the overt facet of coercion, this basic definition misses the diverse forms of coercion which are widely practiced across authoritarian countries. Sharing this view, Greitens (2016, 4) asserts, “conceptualizing authoritarian regimes as uniformly dependent on coercion ignores a critical element of variation in their governance: the different ways in which they use violence and repression to maintain power.”

Overt, or high-intensity, coercion, refers to high-visibility actions which target large segments of the population, well recognized individuals, or major institutions (Levitsky and Way, 2010, 57). Despite representing a defining feature of authoritarian rule, overt coercion and violence in the form of regularly observable practices are not always prevalent in authoritarian settings. Looking at the roots of this condition, Svolik (2012, 16) notes, “while not all dictatorships resolve political conflicts violently all of the time, and formal rules appear to constrain some dictators at least some of the time, this may be precisely because the option of violence looms
in the background, thereby precluding the need to carry it out and enforce compliance with institutional rules.”

Prior to the Arab uprisings erupting in late 2010, the region witnessed several incidents of mass killings and large-scale intense repression. These include the Hama massacre in Syria in 1982, and in Iraq the Dujail massacre in 1982 and the Halabja massacre in 1988. While of great gravity, these horrific incidents are but few landmarks amid a much wider, deeper and perpetual practices of day-to-day state violence. In essence, all Arab autocrats have resorted to torture, imprisonment and trials in order to perpetually coerce opposition forces in its diverse shapes and forms (Sassoon, 2016, 8). In many authoritarian countries, the widespread use of torture serves as a regular exhibition of the power of the state. As Mandour (2017) summarizes, “pain is inflicted on whoever [the state] chooses and in the manner it chooses. There are no legal or moral protections for the citizen from the powerful elites and security apparatus.”

In this context, systematic torture in prisons has for decades constituted the chief instrument to extract enforced and fake confessions (Sassoon, 2016, 8; Stacher, 2012, 146). It was even common among the heads of different public security agencies to be rewarded for torturing convicts and breaking down cells of suspects (Sassoon, 2016, 137). Scenarios of widespread, intense and rewarded violence are particularly attributed to authoritarian regimes with a fragmented public security apparatus. Amidst intense internal competition among the public security agencies, the success of a security institution and its personnel is customarily assessed by how many enemies it manages to neutralize (Greitens, 2016, 50).

Unlike high-intensity coercion or enclosed torture, “low-intensity coercion” is heavily embedded in, and an integral part of, the pervasive daily performance of authoritarian rule. Autocrats and their coercive institutions prefer low-intensity coercion because its large-scale impact serves to maintain regime security, while its low visibility saves the regime recurrent international condemnation (Lachapelle, Way and Levitsky, 2012, 5). Low-intensity coercion can manifest physically in the form of targeted attacks on activists and supporters of different opposition factions. Such attacks, labelled low-profile physical harassment, encompass the public security forces or paramilitary thugs being deployed to disrupt opposition meetings, attack independent or critical media offices, as well as “harass, detain, and occasionally murder journalists and opposition activists” (Levitsky and Way, 2010, 58). Furthermore, low-intensity
coercion can be formalized through legal repression, where legal instruments are selectively used, and abused, to punish members of the opposition.

Affecting a significantly wider constituency of the population are the nonphysical forms of low-intensity coercion. Such acts primarily target people’s access to basic services and restrict available venues toward personal achievements. For example, different state agencies can severely damage the lives of dissidents, their affiliates, and even their wider communal base, by denying them employment, both in the public and private sectors, scholarships and university entrance, as well as the provision of public services such as heating and water (Hill, 2019, 278). In principle, low-intensity coercion aims to deter the escalation of opposition activities and hence decreases the necessity to resort to high-intensity coercion.

In the same vein, surveillance represents an established form of low-intensity coercion that is commonly used across democratic and non-democratic states alike. Operating in accordance with the “counterterrorism” paradigm that emerged in the early 2000s and has been growing ever since, democratic countries have increasingly been site to wide scale surveillance schemes that exhibit highly sophisticated levels of technology and necessitate active participation from wide segments of the population. Examining the security policies and practices of several democratic governments, scholars use the concepts of “securocratic state” or “new securocracy” to depict “a generalized mode of organizing and orienting public sector administration toward a collective and pervasive sense of vigilance and responsibility for combating the threat of terrorism” (Oswick, Harney and Hanlon, 2008, 1025).

Seeing the growing number of public sector workers and ordinary citizens being ensnared and implicated in a policing role, Oswick, Harney and Hanlon (2008, 1025 & 1029) assert, “in this police concept of the public sector we are all implicated either by virtue of being one of the communities who are profiled because of our “objective guilt” or by virtue of our being part of the services of law and order or, increasingly, as wider public sector workers and as watchful citizens.”

Extending far beyond “counterterrorism” concerns, the practice of surveillance in authoritarian countries is guided by considerations of regime security, primarily serving as a tool of social control and political repression. In addition to offering valuable venues to closely monitor dissident activities, surveillance is used in blackmailing elements of the regime in order to
constantly ensure discipline among different parties of the ruling coalition (Levitsky and Way, 2010, 58). Toward this end, authoritarian regimes adopt diverse strategies and resort to copious means to maintain and nurture the reach and quality of public surveillance. Many of the surveillance tasks are carried out by the state intelligence and affiliated security bodies, while the police force is commonly branched out into numerous departments allocated to supervise a variety of mundane activities. Ultimately, an authoritarian regime’s public security institutions constantly aim to stretch their eyes and ears across all sectors and factions of the population.

At the same time, autocratic regimes heavily invest in cultivating an extensive web of informants among the people, even in autocrat countries where the public security institutions are overstaffed and relatively well-equipped with surveillance technologies. In such cases, the means they use to recruit informers feature a great sense of diversification. For instance, following the Tunisian uprisings, a number of citizens shared stories on being recruited by the former regime as citizens’ watchers. Acting as an informer entailed transferring information about colleagues, family members and friends to the regime in exchange for better living conditions, including getting perks, a home and car loans (Daragahi, 2011). Another example pertains to the prisoners who approach their release date. These prisoners commonly have to comply with an agreement of “good intentions” as they forcibly commit to inform and report on fellow inmates, in addition to their friends and colleagues upon release from prison (Sassoon, 2016, 148-49).

Reflecting on the diverse methods of informers’ recruitment and the considerable scale of the process, Greitens (2016, 288) highlights how autocratic regimes seem keen on involving as many people as possible in their strategies of control and violence. In principle, autocrats seek through different means to ensure that the majority of the population are morally discredited by being largely and regularly induced to breach their own moral standards (Greitens, 2016, 288). Concurrently, nurturing a wide network of accomplices into public policing and surveillance enhances regime security as autocrats “feel more secure in the “safety” of a large group versus a small number of executioners” (Sassoon, 2016, 116).

Furthermore, the intense level of state penetration through the use of formal institutions and strategies, alongside indirect means and informers, generates an environment of fear and caution among the population with regard to the potential response of the regime to one’s
actions. As Sassoon (2012, 197) describes, “terrorizing the population had a random quality to it.” Similarly, Stacher (2012, 44) notes, “the presence of plain-clothed informers on the streets, who may be informally on the service’s payroll, operates as a daily reminder that the state is always watching.” Conclusively, by perpetuating a culture of mass surveillance, whether in its technical facet, through the use of eavesdropping and filming devices for example, or its human manifestations that are carried out by public security personnel and ordinary citizens alike, authoritarian regimes effectively create a sense of omnipresence and an entrenched culture of fear among the people (Sassoon, 2016, 113-14).

In many respects, the intrusive and abusive environment created by the Arab security states was at the heart of the popular upheavals and protests erupting since late 2010 across the region. One of the few achievements allegedly attributed to the Arab uprisings was to have broken down, albeit temporarily, the wall of fear that was long nurtured and sustained by the region’s regimes, as well as to have conveyed to the international community the magnitude of the popular anger generated by the diverse and widely practiced forms of coercion, encompassing targeted attacks on activists, harassment, surveillance and the widespread use of informants.

On the other end, the general survival of authoritarian rule in the region post-2010 through the diverse strategies of authoritarian adaptation was essentially enabled through the reestablishment and the reassertion of public fear from the state and its arbitrary and ruthless reach. In this context, the post-2010 role played by different non-state and private security actors is worthy of attention. As explored in the coming chapters, the significant rise of the PSI and its growing involvement in processes of security outsourcing have at times proven to contribute to the diversification of the means and agents of coercion pursued by the surviving authoritarian Arab regimes in the aftermath of the uprisings.

In conclusion to this section, it is important to emphasis that the privatization of security and state reliance on private security actors to substitute, complement or support public security forces with training, forces and sophisticated technology ultimately transcends the political orientation and governance system in a given state. While different political systems definitely have their specificities, security policies have been dictated in recent years across countries by a number of transnational factors that transcend political orientation and the nature of relationship between the state and the citizenry. In this light, moving beyond the binary framework of democracies versus non-democracies in terms of their approach to and
engagement with the privatization and outsourcing of security, the current research recognizes this phenomenon as grounded into notions and practices of regime security and interests which are deeply influenced by local dynamics, and more importantly, are indicative of a global neoliberal order that feeds on the growing commodification of security and increasing securitization discourses, and where private security actors are growingly contributing to the circulation of capital across different regions, regime types and forms of state-society relations.

4 Privatizing security under authoritarian rule in the Arab region

4.1 The rise of the private security industry since 2011: continuities and changes

The 2010-2011 uprisings introduced significant changes to the markets for force across the Arab region including an intense growth of the PSI and an expansion of outsourcing security. The popular upheavals initially created a public environment of chaos and insecurity, where the PSCs, existent and newly formed, rushed to fill the security vacuum, particularly following the temporary retreat of the domestic security forces as was the case in Egypt and Tunisia (Carr and Adam, 2013). Notwithstanding the subsequently reestablished dominance, and at times abusive practices, of the public security forces across the Arab region, the demand for private security services has continued to head upward, making the private security market at odds with the general decline of the region’s domestic economies.

The emergence of PSCs, along a steady path toward a growing privatization of security in the private and public spheres alike, predates the 2010-2011 uprisings in many Arab countries. Nonetheless, the uprisings have hastened the growth of the PSI in terms of profit making, scope of activities, number of suppliers and clients, among other factors. In Egypt, the financial accomplishment of the growing security industry is considerably high; the monthly income of the market was estimated at billions of Egyptian pounds in 2013 (Marroushi and Shahine, 2013). Egypt’s PSI was estimated to encompass around 600 companies in 2014 (Tarek, 2014), more than double its size before 2011, with over 200 unregistered PSCs actively operating on the market (Marroushi and Shahine, 2013). This growing security market was sustained by a continuous flow of recruits: the number of PSCs’ employees ranged between 100,000 and 120,000 in 2015 (Abdelrahman, 2016, 12).
The expansion has been even the more remarkable for the PSCs who are recurrently involved in contracts of outsourcing security. Falcon Group International—an Egyptian joint venture company and a favorite agent of the current regime and several state institutions—claimed 15000 employees in 2016, compared to 261 in 2006 (Worldfolio, 2016). Similarly, the post-2010 market for force in Tunisia has seen new PSCs opening their doors and many unemployed people joining their staff. In 2015, there have been 86 companies operating in the country, with a total of over 5,000 employees (Mullin, 2015). Before the 2010-2011 uprising, the PSI in Tunisia was limited to guarding premises and transferring cash. Today, its activities have expanded to include security consulting and advanced physical security, with a mounting demand from the petroleum and tourism industries (Desorgues, 2017).

On one level, the remarkable growth of the PSI in the private sector since the uprisings, focusing primarily on the guarding and protection facet of private security rather than the military, reflects a continuation of some old trends and a response to a turbulent security environment shaped by post-uprisings developments. From an international perspective, the emergence of the PSI in the Arab region has followed the outlined global trend: a political and structural move toward neo-liberal governance, which advocates replacing the public provision of welfare and social security, which are no longer seen as vital to political stability and social efficiency, with notions of security that are privately purchased (Rose and Miller, 2010, 297). Moreover, looking at the wider development of the region’s markets for force since the uprisings, with considerable state security resources focused on the issue of “terrorism”, the contemporary growth of the PSI answers a mounting demand for protection from different sectors of the society. Namely, for many ordinary citizens, and specifically for big businesses and foreign actors and institutions located in the region, the PSI fulfils a serious need for protection from militia activism, criminal activities, among other forms of insecurities.

Amidst such environments, the emerging PSCs largely draw their power and legitimacy from “being legal ‘agents’ of those who control and own private property” (Sarre, 1994, 169). The PSCs hence enjoy what Hall and Bierstecker (2002, 16) call “a legitimate social recognition.” In weak states, this recognition reflects the PSCs’ role in filling a power vacuum left by the state and in providing a public good that the latter has failed to provide. In the Arab region, the state capacity rationale is often complemented, and occasionally overwhelmed, by a non-willingness on the part of the state and the public security institutions to provide public
protection. Along these lines, Holmqvist (2005, 12) rejects tying the rise of the PSI to state incapacity or failure to deliver public security services. Instead, she connects the proliferation of PSCs to the foundation of parallel or ‘shadow’ configurations of authority and power, where police corruption and political cronyism “are often linked with and reinforced by economic structures of exploitation and elite domination, featuring an inequitable distribution of resources.”

In a similar vein, the expansion of private security in the Arab region largely reflects the severe social inequalities within different Arab societies. Private security often represents a privilege which only a relatively small portion of the population can afford, especially if professional security services provided by well-established PSCs are required. This has further cemented social disparity, offering only the few a sense of security and a safe environment for prosperity. Accordingly, while the PSI expands in specific areas, or enclaves, making them less vulnerable to criminal activities, the overall crime rate remains largely constant as crime simply relocates to areas that lack private protection (Irish, 1999).

At large, the current expansion of private security services in the Arab region is not an isolated event but rather a constituent of wider intensification of security activities across the Arab societies. In this context, outsourcing security particularly contributes to an important relocation of the role of the state within the provision of security, rather than a simple state retreat from such provision. For instance, as “the war on terrorism” continues to expand across the region, it consumes a great amount of state security forces’ effort, resources and personnel. In a troubling transitional phase marked by diverse sources of internal instability—recurrent popular protests, deteriorating living conditions with struggling economies and increasing social problems including high criminal rate—the state’s reliance on PSCs is regularly explained in terms of meeting a growing need. Less emphasized is how outsourcing security in this context reflects a reordering of state priorities as militia activism becomes the prime threat, which state forces are dedicated to confronting, while lower priority security tasks are allocated to the PSCs. In this regard, outsourcing security has enabled some post-uprisings Arab regimes to progressively adapt to contemporary challenges by better securing themselves and their states’ territories from the threat militia activism, while equally maintaining internal control with the assistance of carefully selected PSCs.
With respect to the relationship between the state and the PSI, the privileged position of some Arab states within their evolving markets for force is embedded in the legal framework governing the PSI. On the one hand, a regulatory status marks an official legitimization of the PSI: promoting its expansion while enhancing public acceptance of privatized violence. Meanwhile, the presence of a legal code strengthens the perception of state monopoly over the means of violence as PSCs become legally bound by state laws and subject to state monitoring and control in terms of issuing licenses and fulfilling training requirements. Additionally, the legal code regulating the PSI can serve different political and economic ends. For example, the 2015 legal code for the PSI in Egypt has placed considerable financial requirements on the PSCs, including making licenses mandatory for companies and guards alike, to be acquired from the Ministry of Interior for a sum of 100,000 and 200 Egyptian pounds respectively and to be renewed every 3 years (Carr and Adam, 2013).

As many PSCs fall short of meeting these financial obligations, yet continue to operate on the market, they turn into illegal security actors and become part of the informal economy. The informal economy under Arab authoritarianism has been commonly subject to considerable control and manipulation by the domestic security bodies, who use it to implicate large groups of people in practices of bribery and corruption, making them forcibly dependent on the regime for survival. Along these lines, Reno (2004, 100) asserts that state power remains valuable “since the capacity to declare activities illegal, then sell exemption from prosecution, still enables political favorites to accumulate wealth while preserving means to punish opponents.” Whether the outlined state practices would extend to the informal PSI is yet to be seen, but the post-uprisings reestablishment of powerful Arab security apparatuses and the perpetuation of authoritarian rule in different Arab countries foster the prospects of this scenario.

4.2 Outsourcing security in the aftermath of the 2010-2011 uprisings

Across the Arab region, the 2010-2011 uprisings have generated new social and political settings characterized by largely young and agitated populations. In response, different Arab regimes have sought to upgrade old strategies of social control and supplement their heavy dependence on the state security institutions with other means. In this light, some Arab states, through their different institutions and agencies, have increasingly contracted PSCs to provide a range of public security services. As G4S Managing Director in Egypt notes in 2011, “Now
the approach is just outsourcing” (American Chamber of Commerce in Egypt, 2011). Egypt, where the police forces used to guard most of the government buildings and organizations until early 2011, has experienced a sharp decrease in the police forces’ deployment by public institutions. By mid-2011, many state agencies alongside the ministries of health, justice, and transport tendered for security projects (American Chamber of Commerce in Egypt, 2011).

At large, ongoing processes of outsourcing security across the Arab region reflect broad transformations in governance where the public and private sectors are being continuously reconfigured. Particularly, the domestic politics of authoritarian control and the damaged state-society relationship it produces are central to the examination of the rising PSI amid a lack of serious and widespread public debates about the repercussions of expanding privatized violence. This is especially relevant since many Arab countries still lack a comprehensive legal framework to monitor the activities of the booming security industry. Against this background, the coming sections present four explanations to why state outsourcing security has intensified across the Arab region following the 2010-2011 uprisings.

4.2.1 Creating a secure economic environment

As recent years have witnessed non-state armed groups’ activities intensify across the region, Arab regimes have become increasingly concerned with border security and the protection of vital locations that carry critical economic value, including oil fields and minerals mines. Mirroring similar developments in neighboring African countries, Arab regimes’ political authority has grown progressively “connected to control of areas that contain resources or serve as transit trading centers” (Reno, 2004, 109). This form of political authority is commonly perpetuated by the spread and direct employment of privatized violence, as seen in Iraq for example, where PSCs have been widely active, hired by state and non-state actors alike. The intense militia activism across the Iraqi territory in recent years have inflicted severe economic damage including low foreign investments and disrupted trade and exchange with neighboring countries. Accordingly, the Iraqi government contracted American PSCs in 2017 to secure the Baghdad-Amman Highway, a major trade route between Iraq and Jordan, recurrently attacked and captured by militia groups (Middle East Monitor, 2017).

While seemingly an admission of the inability of the Iraqi forces to provide effective internal security, contracting foreign PSCs to guard this important road mirrors the Iraqi government’s
determination to impose control and prevent disruption to this major trade path. Seeing the recurrent militia threat to this road, the outsourcing contract distributes the state burden of counterterrorism with private security actors who may well be more suited to perform this task. Moreover, as a principal trade road, securing the Baghdad-Amman Highway by PSCs restore the cross-borders exchange of people and goods, which assists in reviving economic activities alongside improving the international image of Iraq as a safe country, with secure borders; thus, a desirable destination for foreign investments.

The value of employing PSCs at critical sites of national economic revenues is heightened when looking at cases across the Arab region where security personnel belonging to the state security institutions, or directly employed by the state, have caused disruption and occasionally severe damage to national economies. One such example has persisted in Southern Libya at the Elephant, or El-Fil, oil field. Since 2011, the oil installations guards have staged several protests over delayed payment of salaries and other benefits (Reuters, 2018a). The Libyan oil installations guards follow the Ministry of Defense, to whom their demands are presumably directed. The most recent protests, in February 2018, witnessed a complete withdrawal of the guards who demanded that “the government pay their outstanding salaries of three months” (Xinhua, 2018). Before withdrawing, the protesting guards reportedly broke into the field’s offices, tampered with official documents and opened fire in the air, which forced the National Oil Corporation, operating the site, to evacuate all employees and temporarily halt the field’s production (Aljazeera, 2018).

Being heavily dependent on oil revenue, the economy of Libya has been significantly affected by such incidents. The oil installations guards’ protests coincided with a wider governmental delay of budget spending and allocation to different state departments (Reuters, 2018b). As the issue persists, PSCs may represent a suitable alternative, helping to surpass bureaucratic deficiencies and financial constraints. Ideally, once an outsourcing security contract is signed between the government, or the concerned state agency, and the PSC, the latter is responsible for the payment and behavior of its employees. Notwithstanding this simplistic scenario, a number of domestic factors risk complicating the outsourcing process, including the demography and ethnic composition of a country’s population. For instance, many of the oil installations’ guards at the Elephant oil field belong to the ethnic group of Tabu in southwestern Libya (Aljazeera, 2018). This might create unnecessary tensions between the Tabu group and the Libyan government if the oil installations guards are replaced by private security personnel.
4.2.2 Cultivating networks of patronage and alleviating economic distress

Across authoritarian countries, the rulers pursue diverse strategies, including establishing hegemonic parties and extensive bureaucracies, to foster their power and consolidate their regimes. Similarly, patrimonialism represents a common mechanism of co-optation, which nurtures regime longevity by establishing a reliable base of support using selective favoritism and unrestricted patronage (Bellin, 2004, 145). Notwithstanding a global phenomenon, networks of patronage in authoritarian settings are widespread across different sectors and levels of social interactions. These networks effectively reach a grassroots level that is not limited to the bureaucracy’s surface but grows deeply entrenched among the socioeconomic and political strata of the society (Menza, 2013, 22). Constituting a political tool of co-optation, authoritarian patrimonialism commonly entails pervasive corruption as well as embedded social and economic inequalities.

Alongside businessmen and bureaucrats, the security and military elite represent powerful actors within authoritarian patrimonial networks. Bellin (2004, 149) contends that across the Middle Eastern region, many countries’ security institutions, mirroring the regimes themselves, are governed by patrimonial logic. In such contexts, low level of institutionalization dominates the public security apparatus with personalism and political reliability replacing meritocracy and heavily influencing recruiting and promotion decisions. Nevertheless, patrimonialism doesn’t necessarily translate into the professional incompetence of the public security agencies, with many of them being “professionally well-trained and equipped to handle the most modern military material” (Bellin, 2004, 149).

Reflecting on how patrimonialism enhances regime security and authoritarian robustness, Bellin (2004, 149-50) concludes that patrimonialism generates a robust personal linkage between the regime and its coercive institutions as the latter develop a sense of personal identification with the regime that entails ensuring its longevity and subsequently becoming resistant to political reform. While acknowledging Bellin’s argument, many academics contend that patrimonialism is insufficient on its own to ensure regime cohesion and resilience, particularly during periods of crisis. Way (2011, 20) argues, “even the most extensive and well-established patronage-based regimes are vulnerable to sudden collapse and mass defections.”
Correspondingly, Slater (2010) distinguishes between “provision” and “protection” coalition pacts. Claiming the superiority of “protection pacts”, Slater (2010, 12) asserts that “understanding elite collective action under dictatorship requires more than “following the money.” It requires recognizing how a shared “fear of enemies” can serve as “a means for the achievement of collective ends.” Given this, nonmaterial ties, including shared ideology or ethnicity, are increasingly considered as more reliable sources of party as well as regime cohesion (Levitsky and Way, 2010, 65). Particularly, when authoritarianism faces serious vulnerability, nonmaterial ties “bolster trust within the elite … and make it more costly for high-level allies to defect” (Way, 2011, 20).

Looking at how different public security institutions across the Arab region have responded to the popular uprisings from 2010 onward, the distinction between material and non-material ties appears largely blurred as they have become often intertwined and mutually enforcing. In fact, material ties, equally to non-material ones, seem to have constituted a solid ground for regime survival particularly in cases where the public security institutions and their leadership exhibit substantial economic and political power that is heavily dependent on the existent regime. In that respect, through material ties, autocrats have effectively made their public security institutions deeply involved in the established system of governance that its destruction is perceived as their own. This scenario was evident in the Egyptian case in early 2011 where the military leadership, whose tie to the regime is predominately based on patrimonial structures, were willing to give up on Hosni Mubarak, the head of the regime, in order to preserve the system as a whole and ensure that their powers and interests remain intact and are possibly expanded.

Amidst the networks of patrimonialism that developed within the market for force since the Arab uprisings, the status of the PSI is noteworthy. While the PSI has attracted many newcomers, and enabled old players to flourish, a close look at the PSI’s structure and members suggests that a considerable share of the industry belongs to already powerful actors: state personnel and institutions alongside established businessmen. The booming PSI in different Arab countries essentially confirms Murphy’s observation (2001, 11), “The ruling elite is simultaneously the heart of the state and an arm of the private sector.”

For example, the CEO of Falcon Group International, Sherif Khaled, has repeatedly asserted that his company occupies over 50% of the Egyptian private security market (Worldfolio,
Falcon Group International is partially owned by government institutions, including the Civil Aviation Ministry (Rabie, 2016), with claims of a significant share of the company belonging to prominent Egyptian businessman Naguib Sawiris\(^3\) (Qena, 2014). Other major companies in the market include El Nasr for Services and Maintenance, which belongs to the National Service Projects Organization\(^4\) affiliated to the Egyptian Ministry of Defense, together with Care Services and Risk Free, both of which are managed by former security and military personnel.

The situation is analogous in Tunisia where former public security personnel, many of whom were sacked amid the post-uprising security reshuffles, have turned to the growing private security market, where their expertise and connections elevate them above other actors (Kartas, 2018). Forced into retirement shortly after the uprising, Taoufik Dimassi, a senior official at the Ministry of Interior under Ben Ali, founded Société de Protexion et de Scurité in Megrine, south of Tunis (Maghreb Confidential, 2014). Some commentators anticipated that while entering the flourishing security industry, Dimassi will rely on his close connection with renowned businessman Kamel Eltaief, a key figure of Ben Ali’s regime, to boost his business (Maghreb Confidential, 2014). This prediction basically reflects the limited changes introduced to the circles of power after the Tunisian uprising.

Similarly, recognizing the notable potential of the post-uprising security market, Tunisian Businessman Kamel Landousi established Titanium Atlas Protection Agency in 2011, relying on the expertise of two former military men (Maghreb Confidential, 2011). Alongside providing core security services such as bodyguard services for important personalities and ensuring security at public events, Titanium Atlas Protection Agency offers risk assessments services in addition to a range of products that encompass security audits, alarms and video systems (Maghreb Confidential, 2011).

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3 Naguib Sawiris is an Egyptian billionaire and businessman, and a scion of one of Egypt's wealthiest families. The founder of Orascom Construction is famously known for his rich and diversified investment career. Alongside investing in the telecom sector in Egypt and in less popular markets including Iraq, Pakistan, North Korea and Bangladesh, Sawiris has diversified into the financial sector by buying out Egyptian investment bank Beltone Financial Holding. He also expanded in the mining sector, becoming, with his family, the sector’s largest investor through shareholdings in Evolution Mining, Endeavour Mining Corporation and La Mancha Resources Inc.

4 The National Service Projects Organization was established in 1979 under the wing of Egypt’s Ministry of Defence. It was tasked to achieve relative self-sufficiency of the armed forces’ requirements as well as locally and internationally market the surplus of the army’s products.
Economically speaking, the PSI is a largely secure and assured field for personal and institutional enrichment as the private and public demand for non-state security services has been steadily rising. In this respect, the expanding outsourcing contracts with particular private security actors, amid a wider state encouragement of the PSI, resembles a new form of patronage. More specifically, for post-uprisings Arab regimes, outsourcing security nurtures old, and creates new, networks of patronage, effectively tying the owners and managers of selected PSCs to the regime, as their competitive advantage in the market follows their good connection, and pronounced loyalty, to existent rulers. As such, outsourcing security amid a booming PSI aligns with regime adaptability by serving as a political tool of co-optation to compensate for the legitimacy deficit of the Arab regimes by fostering a small base of economically powerful and loyal cohort.

On a related note, seeing the diverse nature of security services required by the state institutions and agencies, allocating even some of these tasks to the PSI offers a strong boost to the latter: new domestic and foreign firms are established, while old ones increase their personnel and diversify their activities. Outsourcing security thus strongly enriches the PSI, which attracts an increasingly large number of unemployed people, many of whom with high educational qualifications. In this regard, outsourcing security indirectly enhances the economic viability of the Arab regimes, which represents a key source of regime security, by helping to decrease the high unemployment rate and alleviate widespread economic distress.

In sum, the dominant position occupied within the expanding PSI by state security personnel, active and retired, alongside different state institutions and connected business elite is not what makes the Arab states distinct. Across cases, “the networks of non-state armed actors are often well connected with state actors, with police officers moonlighting as private security agents, or ex-police or military directly employed as private police” (Krause and Milliken, 2009, 214). Instead, it is the role that these actors have for years, sometimes decades, played in the perpetuation of authoritarian rule and preservation of regime security that raises concerns about their prevalence over the mounting provision of private security. For decades, the Arab region’s public security institutions have carried as prime responsibility to “ensure that the population is policed, disciplined, controlled and prevented from igniting instability” (Stacher, 2012, 151).

Similar processes occurred in several African countries where policing has focused less on crime prevention and public protection and more on “the enforcement of order on behalf of a
regime” (Hills, 2000, 162). Accordingly, including the PSI in the regime’s network of patronage and entrusting the provision of private security to business and security elite who are loyal to and dependent on the regime provide the regime’s allies with substantial influence over private security and diffuse the distinction between public and private security agents as the latter become closely linked to the regime and potentially implicated in its authoritarian strategies and policies.

4.2.3 Diversifying the regime’s bases of security

Alongside building networks of patronage, state security outsourcing ought to be examined in light of the internal dynamics of authoritarianism, especially pertaining to the relationship between Arab rulers and state security apparatuses. While many authoritarian countries exhibit an antagonistic relationship between the regime and the general public, the power relations and dynamics within the ruling coalition is often subject to similar distress. Noting that an overwhelming majority of dictators have been ousted by members of their own cohort, Svolik (2012, 5) asserts, “the predominant political conflict in dictatorships appears to be not between the ruling elite and the masses but rather one among regime insiders.”

At large, the more an authoritarian regime depends on its coercive apparatus to counter internal threats and curb domestic unrest, the more privileged, economically and politically, the regime’s repressive agencies become. By securing a substantial input to the decision-making process, state security agencies progressively grow into autonomous and independent spheres of power. Capturing this upgrading process, Svolik (2013, 768) writes,

> We frequently observe that in return for the military’s support of the government against mass domestic opposition, the government concedes greater institutional autonomy, resources, and a say in policy to the military. … more frequently, the military demands and obtains greater institutional autonomy, in the form of self-rule over personnel, budgetary, and procurement decisions, as well as political influence via legislation that gives it control over internal security and places limits on the prosecution of military personnel.

In general, an enhanced security and military input toward regime survival, together with subsequent elevation of the security elite into key political and decision-making positions, necessarily creates a tense relationship between autocrats and their repressive agencies.
Essentially, the more the rulers depend on their public security agencies to sustain their regime, the more fearful they become of the extended powers of their public security institutions. As Bellin (2004, 152) affirms, “An autocrat … does not worry about the security services destroying democracy or the polity, but about the security services destroying him.”

Fearing the immense power, material and societal, attached to the public coercive institutions, autocrats constantly work on preventing this power from overwhelming theirs, or worse, pursuing their destruction. As such, autocrats habitually allocate internal security functions to numerous security agencies that carry overlapping, and at times competing, assignments with confined channels of inter-organizational communication and coordination (Greitens, 2016, 25). In this regard, institutional redundancy reflects “the express intention of these autocrats who rely on a strategy of ‘balanced rivalry’ to ‘guard the guardians’ and protect against insurrection and coups” (Bellin, 2012, 130). Nonetheless, while a fragmented domestic security apparatus keeps autocrats at bay from their own weapons, it makes them significantly vulnerable to popular threats. Hence, autocrats are constantly subject to a “coercive dilemma: whether to organize their internal security apparatus to protect against a coup, or to deal with the threat of popular unrest” (Greitens, 2016, 23).

On the eve of the 2010-2011 uprisings, the Arab countries’ domestic security forces were at large closely tied to their respective autocrats, who effectively ensured their loyalty and obedience through various strategies of co-optation. In this light, the early phase of the uprisings severely shook the mutual dependency between the Arab autocratic regimes and their public security forces, which was presumed as invincible. After all, the retreat of the police forces from the streets, as seen in Egypt and Tunisia, alongside the decision of the military leadership to abandon their countries’ presidents, gave substantive ground to the uprisings and marked a reshuffle of power relations within the ruling regime.

In a parallel development, the state security personnel across the Arab region have since 2011 acquired a wide range of material advantages from foreign actors in order to boost their ability to effectively engage in “counterterrorism”. The impact of this material empowerment on the efficiency of the Arab security apparatuses at confronting militia groups is not highly assertive; nonetheless, it has further disrupted the balance of power among old regime circles. Furthermore, while Arab autocrats have always feared their public security institutions, this fear has become the more imminent in the post-uprisings period as social unrest became a
constant and incidents of defection inside the public security institutions have repeatedly occurred (BBC Arabic, 2015).

In this light, the regime’s preference to deploy PSCs, instead of the police or the armed forces, to fulfil certain public security functions, could be viewed to imply a diversification of the regime’s coercive allies and an attempt to decrease its dependence on the public security forces. With many of the PSCs closely linked to the current regimes, either owned or run by members of the ruling elite and allies of the regime, they exhibit a great degree of loyalty to the regime and consider the regime’s security and stability among their main priorities. Compared to a recurrently inefficient police force that is internally fragmented and whose loyalty, particularly this of the lower ranks, is considerably uncertain, PSCs represent a more secure and reliable agent for selected public security tasks. The PSCs’ competitive nature and private dynamics of operation offers an advantage with respect to their performance: being presumably more professional, effective and cost-efficient; while the need to renew their contracts with the regime, state agencies and private parties on a regular basis boosts the incentive to enhance their performance and reassert their loyalty to the regime in order to secure new contracts and remain strong in the business.

4.2.4 Curbing constant sources of political and social unrest

While militia activism across the region has represented a serious threat to post-uprisings Arab states, it has equally provided current regimes with multiple grounds to exercise and justify political oppression and tight social control. Several Arab regimes have used the label of “counterterrorism” to consolidate their political control, frequently branding opposition forces as “terrorists”, sympathizing with “terrorists” or as a threat to national integrity by inciting social unrest; hence justifying their repression, execution and imprisonment by the regime. These measures have effectively curbed and intimidated a significant portion of the region’s populations. Meanwhile, some traditional sites of social unrest have remained troubling as they intertwine with the daily lives of a large number of people across the social and political spectrums, while equally attracting significant international attention. Two major examples of these sites are public universities and football stadiums.
Since the 2010-2011 uprisings, the student movement and football ultras groups\(^5\) have constituted prominent forces of opposition to the reestablishment of authoritarian rule across the region. Student activists and ultras groups’ members have regularly staged protests and communicated public dissatisfaction and liberal demands on the streets and university campuses, in the stadiums and on different social media platforms. In some Arab countries, Egypt most notably, public universities and football stadiums also carry a dark history of confrontations between the state security institutions and ordinary citizens, including the murder of many young people, with occasional episodes of overt massacres. This history together with great international interest in the challenges regularly emanating from these sites have turned both locations into a source of constant trouble for and heavy burden on the concerned regimes, particularly as the latter seek to improve their international image and diversify international linkages in order to secure external legitimacy for their rule and widen the scope of their economic interests.

In general, authoritarian regimes compensate for their chronic legitimacy deficit and sustain their rule by consolidating large-scale social control and pre-empting all prospects of opposition, primarily through constant wide-scale monitoring and surveillance. Meanwhile, seeing that neither the capacity of an overstretched domestic security force, nor its reputation, could afford to constantly impose tight control on the aforementioned locations, the need arose for an alternative, more stable and diffused mechanism of control. In this regard, PSCs, seemingly more professional and specialized than the police forces and often closely linked to the ruling regimes in the region, has represented a promising agent of low-intensity coercion.

In essence, outsourcing security at critical locations of social unrest to PSCs, as explored in subsequent chapters, expands the coercive agents and control capabilities of some Arab regimes without directly implicating the state and involving its public coercive forces. Deployed primarily to pre-empt and prevent recurrent episodes of social unrest, PSCs thus contribute to a reconfiguration of the state strategies of social control and political repression. Particularly, outsourcing the security of public university campuses and football stadiums, among similar sites of constant social unrest, mirrors the Arab regimes’ increasing preference

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\(^5\) Football Ultras correspond to associations of football fans attached to different football teams who are famous for their extremely passionate support. During football matches, ultras groups openly and assertively ensure their support for their team through the use of flares, the display of huge banners, and by chanting in large groups, all of which are aimed to create an atmosphere which encourages their own team and intimidates the opposing players and their supporters.
for a diffuse form of security governance where the powers of private actors are enlisted in strategies of rule at a distance.

5 Conclusion

The contemporary rise of the PSI, enhanced by expanding processes of outsourcing security, is a global phenomenon with wide-ranging discrepancies depending on where it manifests and for what purposes. “Context sensitivity” proves critical in studying this phenomenon, necessitating careful examination of a diverse set of local factors, including domestic politics and the different actors involved in the privatizing process as well as their relationship, and how they influence the dynamics of privatizing and outsourcing security. Looking at the Arab region since 2011, several countries have witnessed considerable development of the PSI with a notable expansion in outsourcing security. At the outset, this development has followed some Arab states’ gradual adoption of the neo-liberal governance model. Meanwhile, a careful look at the history and contemporary political and social developments across the Arab region advances a more complicated picture. Beyond its neo-liberal roots, the recent rise of the PSI in many Arab countries is essentially shaped by the primacy of regime security embedded in a close political-security tie and a damaged state-society relationship.

Aligning with post-uprisings regime adaptation across the Arab region, the contemporary reconfigurations of the market for force, amid a security environment defined by sizeable militia activism and persisting popular unrest, effectively serve to enhance regime security by providing alternative agents and strategies for social control and offering new venues to expand regime interests. Seemingly immune to the general decline in the region’s domestic economies, the PSI has steadily expanded to meet increasing demands from different sectors and social groups, and become enhanced by a growing state outsourcing of public security functions. As it continuously prospers, the PSI opens wide venues for employment and business growth; thus, indirectly enhancing Arab regimes’ economic viability by helping to alleviate widespread economic distress.

In a similar vein, the spread of non-state armed groups across the region in recent years have inflicted severe political and economic damage, including low foreign investments, and
disrupted cross-countries trade and exchange. As the example of the Baghdad-Amman Highway in Iraq demonstrates, employing PSCs at critical sites of national economic revenues can serve to enhance regime security, politically and economically. Particularly, outsourcing security enables the protection of cross-borders exchange of people and goods and possibly improves the international image of the hiring country as a safe and desirable destination for foreign investments.

With respect to the internal regime dynamics, outsourcing security amidst a booming PSI serves as a political tool of co-optation to compensate for the regime’s legitimacy deficit by fostering a small base of economically powerful and loyal cohort. For post-uprisings Arab regimes, outsourcing security nurtures old, and creates new, networks of patronage that effectively tie the owners and managers of selected PSCs to the present regime as their competitive advantage in the market follows their good connection, and pronounced loyalty, to existent rulers. Concurrently, as “the war on terror” intensifies across the region and consumes a great amount of the state security forces’ effort, resources and personnel, state reliance on PSCs increasingly becomes a question of necessity. Hiring PSCs for mundane public security services essentially enables post-uprisings Arab regimes to dedicate their public forces to fighting militia activism while maintaining internal social control through carefully selected PSCs.

Furthermore, PSCs have been used by some Arab regimes to curb constant sources of political and social unrest. Essentially, hiring particular PSCs to guard critical locations of social unrest serves as a pre-emptive measure against imminent episodes of social and political turbulence. Outsourcing security at such sites, including public university campuses and football stadiums, effectively embeds a strategy of rule at a distance by expanding the coercive agents and control capabilities of some Arab regimes without the direct implication of the state and its public security forces.
Chapter 3 - The Coercive Institutions of a Security State: Balancing Regime Security and Interests in Tunisia and Egypt

1 Introduction

At the top of authoritarian regimes, long-standing autocrats have over years, often decades, consolidated their rule and tightened their grab on power by relying on the critical assistance of ruling parties, domestic security forces and the military institution. Amid a vast literature, scholars use multiple terms when referring to a state’s security apparatus, including security or coercive institutions, agencies, bodies and services. The term “coercive” particularly serves to underline the prominence of coercion under authoritarian rule. Greitens (2016, 12) defines the coercive institutions as “the specific set of institutions that collectively hold responsibility for internal intelligence and security.” Seeing the varied nature of the functions allocated to different public security agencies across countries, the coercive institutions may encompass some divisions of the military institution, presidential or praetorian guards, local or national police forces, intelligence agencies, among other bodies. Within this functional paradigm, other political or social institutions, such as political parties or local associations, can be also conceived as part of the coercive apparatus if such groups are formally and institutionally incorporated into a country’s security architecture (Greitens, 2016, 21).

Focusing on the Middle East, Bellin (2012, 130) highlights how disaggregating the coercive apparatus by function “does not even begin to account for the full panoply of security forces” actively present in these countries, with various intelligence services, police forces and military divisions. In democracies and autocracies alike, the domestic security agencies alongside the military institution perform a set of regular functions which include preserving a country’s sovereignty, confronting external aggression and maintaining public order. Beside these regular tasks, the coercive institutions of an autocratic country seek to protect the ruling regime (Stacher, 2012, 44). They typically constitute the predominant “apparatus for coercion and control by providing the rulers with information on political, economic, and social issues.
among the population” (Sassoon, 2016, 117). The mandate of these institutions commonly extends to advance the interests of the executive body, which occasionally force the public security agencies to compromise on their own institutions. At times, a strong security apparatus can partially work as an alternative to weak political parties. Similarly, intelligence services can heavily influence elite cohesion through close monitoring, intimidation, and bribery; while other public security agencies can serve as party-like mobilizational tools (Levitsky and Way, 2010, 67).

Moreover, when confronted with a large-scale public mobilization, autocrats commonly implicate their armed forces in domestic repression. Commenting on the 2010-2011 Arab uprisings, Bellin (2012, 131) asserts that once mass anti-regime protests overwhelmed the regular domestic security forces—the police forces and intelligence services—regime survival depended on the military institution “and its willingness and capacity to bring in the tanks, the heavy weapons, and the men in numbers large enough to contain a mass uprising.” Correspondingly, in cases of persistent significant domestic opposition, authoritarian regimes commonly grant their militaries substantial material resources and institutional autonomy, alongside ensuring that the legal framework of the state permits the military’s participation in internal repression (Svolik, 2012, 127).

Against this background, the security environment in Egypt and Tunisia has since the 2010-2011 uprisings remained considerably fragile. Alongside persistent threats from militia groups, criminal activities have witnessed a sharp increase, fueled by deteriorating living standards and growing illegal arm trade. In Egypt for instance, the official discourse has blamed rising criminality on the interplay of three factors: the general chaos created by the 2011 uprisings, “an overtaxed and demoralized police force” and a significant inflow of weapons from Libya (Daragahi, 2013). Meanwhile, some scholars attributed the heightened criminality since the uprisings to the doing of some factions within the public security apparatus, who, Sayigh (2016, 5) argues, turned into “entrepreneurs of insecurity, not enforcing the law so much as negotiating it, often through corruption and the sale of protection.” Ultimately, while already suffering from serious disorder prior to the 2011 uprisings, policing together with the attached formal criminal justice system have deteriorated much further amidst tumultuous transitional politics (Sayigh, 2016).
At large, the relationship among the authoritarian regimes, public security institutions and private security agents lies at the heart of contemporary developments within the markets for force across the Arab region. Inflicting radical changes on the abusive conduct of the Arab countries’ public security institutions represented a core demand of the protests and quickly gained considerable international support. Meanwhile, amid the political and social turmoil characterizing the aftermath of the uprisings, state security agencies rapidly recovered their strength and reclaimed their pre-uprisings privileges. The conduct of the state security apparatuses across the region is as abusive and repressive today as it was prior to the uprisings, if not more, with little changes, if any, introduced to their structure and code of conduct. At present, regime security, as opposed to public or national security, chiefly remains the ultimate objective of the region’s public security apparatuses.

Chapters 4 and 5 closely examine the private security industry (PSI) in Tunisia and Egypt; meanwhile, this chapter sketches the state coercive institutions in both countries by highlighting their structures and powers, their mutual relationship, alongside their relationship to the regime, to other security actors and to the population at large. The eventual objective here is to introduce where the PSI—the general privatization of security as well as outsourcing security—fits into both countries’ markets for force today by showing the different gaps they could fill and the purposes they are potentially fulfilling. The key public security actors within the market for security services in the case studies are the police forces together with other domestic security agencies, the intelligence services and the military institution.

2 Tunisia’s state security institutions

2.1 The domestic security forces and Ben Ali’s politics of security

During Ben Ali’s 23-year rule, Tunisia grew into a complex security state. Mirroring other authoritarian regimes across the Arab region, Ben Ali’s authoritarianism featured high levels of repression and diversified coercion, executed by different domestic security agencies and their affiliates. In essence, this system of repression sought to curb any source of political dissent or social discontent as the country’s wealth and economic resources increasingly fell into the hands of the regime, specifically Ben Ali and Trabelsi’s families, who “controlled a
vast number of companies and real estate, sometimes taken by force” (Raghavan, 2011). Permeating through economic and social processes, the regime’s logic of policing, control and repression was most noticeable in the tax system, social security system, development programs, social programs for disadvantaged people and bank credit (Hibou, 2006, 192).

While the president’s family was distinctively personalist and predatory, Anderson (2011, 3) contends that its corruption didn’t really spread across the administration, which wasn’t relying on the various forms of accumulating small bribes that undermined bureaucracies elsewhere. On the other end, Hibou (2006, 193) challenges Anderson’s view by arguing that the mechanisms of repression practiced by Ben Ali’s regime transcended the monopoly of the president, his entourage and public security agencies to become “deeply rooted in Tunisian society and in social and economic mechanisms of power, all the more so because they participate in processes of state formation.”

Indeed, the network of patronage long nurtured by Ben Ali’s regime and its embeddedness into the larger fabric of the country’s political sphere, economy and social structures has continued to prevail despite the former’s fall in early January 2011. In the 2015 elected parliament for instance, over half of the 86 deputies representing the political party Nidaa Tunis used to hold high positions in Ben Ali’s ruling party, the Rassemblement Constitutionnel Democratique. The same party was equally reported to enjoy privileged links to major businesses, the media and the public security forces (Marzouki, 2015).

The domestic security forces, under the umbrella of the Ministry of Interior (MOI), were integral to Ben Ali’s authoritarian system of governance at the expense of a marginalized and poorly funded military corps and a highly suppressed population. From the 1990s onward, the size of different MOI’s agencies increased drastically, quadrupling by some accounts; it encompassed forces under the formal control of the MOI together with militias who were accountable directly to the president (Brooks, 2013, 212). The foundations of the Tunisian security state can be traced to the colonial era which ensured that “the political, social, and material energy of the state is overwhelmingly focused on questions of security and public order” (Mullin, 2015). Following the French model, Tunisia’s domestic security apparatus is highly centralized: depends predominantly on the central state and its administration. The three main legal documents pertaining to the general organization of the MOI are Decree No. 75-
343, Decree No. 84-1244 and Decree No. 91-543, all of which have seen several amendments introduced to their original texts.

The MOI oversees two major forces: The National Police, in charge of the large cities, and the (paramilitary) National Guard, responsible for the coastal and rural regions. To date, official details on the various units operating under each of these forces remain limited. The structural map available on the MOI’s website only features the different departments within the ministry (Tunisia’s Ministry of Interior, 2020). Nonetheless, based on numerous reports and academic accounts, the National Police comprises several elite units “dedicated to the protection of government personalities or anti-terrorist missions” (Pachon, 2014). Among these units are the Rapid Intervention Response Brigade, Service of Protection for High Personalities, the Anti-Terrorism Brigade, which functions similarly to SWAT teams in the United States, and the Public Order Brigade, or riot police, which was central to the regime’s efforts to repress the 2010-2011 uprisings (Brooks, 2013, 212; Pachon, 2014). Similarly, the National Guard has its own elite unit, the Special Unit of the National Guard, which is based at Bizerta (Brooks, 2013, 212). Additionally, the MOI oversees the Presidential Guard Forces, and the Judicial Police, which operates in the Ministry of Justice and the courts (Hanlon, 2012, 5), in addition to more specialized law enforcement agencies such as the Civil Protection Force and the Prison Guard (Lutterbeck, 2012, 8).

Under Ben Ali’s rule, the repressive reach of the regime seemed heavily present across the population. Such a securitized environment has led many scholars and human rights organizations to attach high estimates to the corps of the MOI forces, some estimates reaching as high as 200,000 (Goldstein, 2011). Nonetheless, the first transition government after the uprisings confirmed that the Tunisian police forces merely stood at 50,000 security personnel (Bouguerra, 2014). In a parallel development, a considerable number of security personnel had actively joined the anti-regime public anger, which peaked during the 2010-2011 uprisings, and went on the street to publicly denounce the abusive treatment they endured under the regime of Ben Ali, including working for very long hours with very low wages (Lutterbeck, 2012, 19; Crisis Group, 2015, 4). As such, instead of initial assumptions of a need to downsize the Tunisian police force, “the transition government rather recruited an additional 10,000 police officers in an effort to relieve their workload, and policemen have also received a (modest) pay rise” (Lutterbeck, 2012, 18).
Controversial accounts equally emerged after the uprisings with respect to the resources and human capabilities of the public security personnel under Ben Ali. As further examined in chapter 4, this subject has heavily shaped the outlook and focus of the security reforms pursued in Tunisia since the uprisings. In essence, despite their pre-uprisings omnipresence, the ability of Ben Ali regime’s domestic security forces to guarantee public safety used to exhibit serious deficiency. While exerting considerable efficiency at monitoring and intimidating the Tunisian people, Ben Ali’s public security agencies were increasingly challenged by “jihadism, criminality and juvenile delinquency” (Crisis Group, 2015, 3). Among others, the public security apparatus was largely suffering from defective and inadequate equipment, the operational capacity and analytical skills of the intelligence services were weak, and the competency, professional ethics and integrity of the new recruits were declining (Crisis Group, 2015, 4). Concurrently, Ben Ali’s obsession with regime security and frequent interference by the president’s family deepened institutional divisions and rendered corruption endemic within the public security apparatus.

Mirroring their counterparts across the region, Tunisia’s public security forces generally suffered from a lack of clear mandates attached to their numerous entities, who have exerted considerable autonomy from the government in the years succeeding the uprisings. This complex security system was purposely nurtured by the regime of Ben Ali to ensure its stability and security. Perito (2015) argues that authoritarian Arab regimes have successfully created elaborate networks “of civilian and military security organizations with different official missions, but with overlapping and redundant functions of intelligence gathering and internal enforcement.” The work of these entities was further enhanced by vast networks of informers, and featured notable brutality, which were often directed at the political opposition.

The complex organization of Ben Ali’s security system had frequently led to internal competition and a significant waste of resources due to the replication of tasks. A culture of impunity was equally established as the work of the public security forces recurrently escaped the radar and control of the government. In the same vein, seemingly escaping the uprisings’ impact, the “confusion and duplication of tasks between principal security agencies” has continued to represent a major hindrance to information-sharing and tactical coordination which strongly undermine successful security missions and counterterrorism (Sayigh, 2015b).
2.2 Tunisia’s armed forces and the post-2010 ‘security’ balance of power

Contrasting a largely hated and feared Ministry of Interior, the armed forces have mostly maintained a strong link to the Tunisian population. The Tunisian armed forces, established after the country’s independence in 1956, encompass the Army, the Navy and the Air force. In 2017, the armed forces personnel reached 48,000 (International Institute for Strategic Studies, 2019), including a large segment of conscripts. Carrying the burden of a political struggle that goes back to the early days of the country’s independence, the military corps is far from homogenous. On the one hand, the majority of officers and members of the military’s three main forces “belong to Tunisia’s educated, politically conscious middle class and come from families which comprise part of the country’s urban elite” (Jebnoun, 2014, 299). Meanwhile, the low-ranking and non-commissioned officers come from regions of the center and south of the country, which amid larger political and economic marginalization, have continued to experience underrepresentation in the senior echelons of the armed forces (Jebnoun, 2014, 299). That said, some scholars assert that the security reforms introduced in the post-uprisings years to counter some of Ben Ali’s exclusionary authoritarian policies have included “the end of privileging officers from the wealthy coastal regions from which Bourguiba and Ben Ali hailed” (Grewal, 2016, 1).

Under Ben Ali’s regime, the management of the military institution was centralized under the command of a single man, initially Ben Ali then General Rachid Ammar. The traditional operational responsibilities of the Tunisian army were chiefly limited: it contributed to disaster relief, humanitarian support and infrastructure development. It acted alone in the southern parts of the country and together with the National Guard in border control (Brooks, 2013, 210). After the 2010-2011 uprisings, the management of the military institution has become more decentralized, shared between the president and the prime minister. Tunisia’s constitution of 2014, Article 77, identifies the president as the commander in chief of the armed forces in charge of “determining the general state orientations in the domains of defense, foreign relations and national security,” and of declaring war (Constitute, 2015, 16). In consultation with the prime minister, the president is also responsible for appointing the top military positions (Constitute, 2015, 17). As for the management of more routine military and defense affairs, these are left to the prime minister together with the minister of defense. Furthermore, the institutional rule, substituting personal command, that is currently governing the armed
forces has offered “senior officers direct and regular input into national security policy” (Grewal, 2016, 7).

While acknowledging the constitutional changes and institutional empowerment introduced to the armed forces following the uprisings, the military institution has effectively remained subordinate to the country’s political leadership and subject to civilian control (Lutterbeck, 2012, 6-7). Most notably, the Tunisian Ministry of Defense continues to be largely civilianized: the minister of defense and many of the ministry’s highest officials are civilians. In the meantime, facing rising security threats, Tunisia’s civilian leaders have appointed a number of military officers to different civilian and security posts, particularly in areas where security threats are the highest as in the interior and border regions (Grewal, 2016, 11).

Furthermore, from 2011 onward, consecutive post-uprisings governments have sought “to enhance the military’s budget, weapons, international linkages, institutional capacity, and political influence” (Grewal, 2016, 1). The budget of the armed forces has increased at an average of 21 percent each year since the uprisings, exceeding all other ministries. Additionally, many retired officers have become active participants in the country’s civil society, providing the armed forces with a new lobby to pursue its interests. These various developments have subsequently led to a progressive revision of the pre-uprisings balance of power between the military institution and the domestic security forces.

The relationship between Tunisia’s domestic security agencies and the armed forces has often been subject to deep tensions, perpetually cultivated by Bourguiba’s and Ben Ali’s regimes. Not only was the military institution poorly funded and equipped, and its officers deprived of postmilitary civilian career opportunities, but more impactfully, “the officer corps had to adapt itself to the constant watch of the regime’s security organs” (Nassif, 2015, 74). Particularly following the Barakat al-Sahil affair in 1991—a fictitious coup d’état—the military fell severely into the disgrace of the regime. The Tunisian armed forces were effectively excluded from the realm of regime interests: they didn’t exhibit any patrimonial ties to the regime, neither ethnic as in Syria, nor economic as in Egypt whose armed forces have for decades enjoyed ample commercial economic enterprises and occupied privileged civilian posts upon retirement in the public and private sectors alike (Brooks, 2013, 210; Pachon, 2014, 511).
The tense relationship between the domestic security agencies and the armed forces peaked during the 2010-2011 uprisings as numerous reports spoke of violent confrontations between some domestic security and military personnel (Hanlon, 2012, 2). Concurrently, the armed forces together with factions of the police “fought fierce gun battles around the capital, including at the presidential palace in Carthage and interior ministry, with members of the presidential guard and private militia, recruited and directed by Ben Ali, who remained loyal to the leader” (Brooks, 2013, 213). In recent years, rising insecurities, alongside major challenges that the domestic security forces have faced while reaffirming their national control, led to a substantial involvement of the armed forces in the provision of domestic security. Additionally, the military institution took responsibility of handling the large flow of refugees from Libya and maintaining public security in the course of the October 2011 parliamentary elections (Lutterbeck, 2012, 13). Transcending persistent tensions between the military and domestic security forces, policies were thus put forward to enhance the internal security situation through collaborative efforts between the domestic security forces and military institution in the form of joint patrols and joint strategic committees (Jrad, 2015, 9).

2.3 Security reform initiatives: struggles and limitations amid a shaky environment

With the security abuses against a large part of the Tunisian population being a major driving force for the Tunisian uprising in late 2010, reforming the public security institutions has since been largely considered a prime public demand and a political priority to implement by consecutive post-uprising governments. Amid Tunisia’s complex security architecture, the intelligence apparatus was probably the most reconfigured in the aftermath of the uprising. At the heart of this system resided the Department of State Security, the MOI’s most infamous and dreaded agency by the population. Also labelled the political police, the Department of State Security was integral to the regime’s structure of repression and the MOI’s “war against terrorism”. It encompassed “a network of intertwined officers and spies, inside and outside the government, who worked to collect information on any potential threat to the regime” (Bouguerra, 2014). With no public legal statute outlining the duties of the Department of State Security, its personnel were involved in house searches and arrests alongside carrying the initial interrogation of suspects. In the process, they exhibited serious human rights violations, comprising “arbitrary arrests and detention, torture and harassment of lawyers and relatives of terrorist suspects” (Pachon, 2014).
In one of many hurried decisions taken by the transitional authorities with respect to state security reform, then-Tunisian Interior Minister Farhat Rajhi disbanded the Department of State Security in early 2011 to allegedly put an end to the political police of the former regime. Additionally, the Directorate General of Anti-Terrorist Prevention and the Joint Committee for Intelligence and Border Control were also disbanded; while the work of several intelligence agencies including “the Directorate General of Specialized Affairs, an important intelligence unit within the ministry” was closed down (Privacy International and Nawaat, 2017). Some security experts expressed considerable concern over these decisions, which apparently underestimated the security value of these intelligence agencies.

Putting aside its repressive orientation, the Department of State Security constituted the backbone of the Tunisian intelligence apparatus and “ensured a streamlined and well-integrated intelligence system” (Bouguerra, 2014). Thus, by simply disbanding this central agency in the absence of a suitable substitute, the whole intelligence system was substantially shaken and weakened. As examined in chapter 4, the weakness of the state intelligence network in the aftermath of the Tunisian uprising has been integral to the foreign security assistance delivered to the country in recent years, where multiple non-state actors, including private security agents, have been heavily involved.

At large, the different security reshuffles introduced particularly in the immediate aftermath of the uprising led to a serious security crisis. The Tunisian interim government was then urged “to strengthen its intelligence capabilities in the face of mounting jihadist attacks and security challenges, while also ensuring that past abuses would not be repeated” (Privacy International and Nawaat, 2017). In this light, Tunisia has since witnessed the creation of new security bodies, predominantly in the intelligence domain, alongside the restructuring of existing ones. In 2014 alone at least three major security reform measures took place.

In addition to the creation of the Strategic Planning Units announced by the MOI in November 2014, the same month witnessed the set-up of the Agence des Renseignements et de la Sécurité pour la Défense (ARSD), a new military intelligence service under the authority of the Ministry of Defense to replace the old regime’s military intelligence apparatus (Privacy International and Nawaat, 2017). Furthermore, aiming to better coordinate the fight against jihadism and organized crime, the government decided in December 2014 to consolidate the intelligence structures by “bringing together the Interior, Defense, Justice and Foreign Affairs under two
Beyond the intelligence apparatus, Tunisia’s domestic security institutions have since 2011 experienced a series of substantive reformative measures. These include “the ratification of a procedural guide on human rights for internal security forces, the revision of laws governing arrest and detention … and the ending of the electoral role” of the MOI (Mahfoudh, 2014, 1). A more controversial security reform has pertained to the legislation that enabled public security personnel to form unions and the latter’s attitude toward state security reform. At first, the security unions appeared very keen on reforming the public security apparatus to the point that Lutterbeck (2013, 2) called them “among the most vocal advocates of internal security reforms.”

The pro-reform tone adopted by the two firstly established unions, the National Union of Tunisian Security Forces and the Tunisian Association for a Citizens’ Police, was evident in their initial actions. In a reform roadmap submitted to the MOI, the National Union of Tunisian Security Forces called for “the establishment of a clearer legal framework for all aspects of police work, ranging from recruitment, promotions, training, remuneration to the carrying out of police operations, as well as the drafting of a police code of ethics” (Lutterbeck, 2012, 19). Concurrently, the Tunisian Association for a Citizens’ Police strongly advocated for “the principle of police neutrality in the new Tunisian constitution, in order to prevent the police from being instrumentalized by the political leadership of the country” (Lutterbeck, 2012, 19).

Nonetheless, more recent accounts have captured significant deviations from this initial pro-reform stance. Embracing an alarmist security-driven rhetoric, the National Union of Tunisian Security Forces has progressively maintained a strong media presence to furiously challenge “the new, democratic notion in Tunisia that police officers should be subject to the rule of law” (Salah, 2015). Moreover, several demonstrations that were organized by different Tunisian groups, particularly by young activists for human rights and anti-corruption, have been harshly countered by these security unions, who strongly deploy the “counterterrorism” discourse to secure pro-impunity for the public security forces (Salah, 2015).

One way to comprehend these unions’ anti-reformist approach is by looking at their membership composition. As a Crisis Group’s report (2015, 10) accounts, some of the officers
who formed the core of the early security unions were dismissed by the regime of Ben Ali because their integrity was questionable. For these officers, the security unions primarily constituted a mean to obtain their professional reintegration; while for others, particularly the general directors, the unions offer a shield through which to uphold their own positions within the Interior Ministry (Crisis Group, 2015, 10).

Paralleling the police unions’ growing anti-reformist approach, security reforms have been heavily undermined by increasing instability—rising militia activities and urban criminality—which pushed the media and citizen groups to be among “the first to demand that the security services crack down in the old manner on criminals and demonstrators” (Perito, 2015). Furthermore, reforming the MOI has faced considerable resistance inside the public security institutions, primarily from senior officials who were part of the strong tie between the regime of Ben Ali and the domestic security forces. This internal resistance, mostly vocal under Rajhi, has capitalized on the fierce and perpetual political contestations progressively forming in post-uprising Tunisia. Specifically, progress toward meaningful and impactful security reforms was profoundly constrained by what Sayigh (2014) describes as the “factional and partisan struggles between Islamists and their opponents, and also between those demanding a complete, revolutionary sweep of the old order and those seeking to preserve basic structures and professional skills of existing police forces and security agencies.” In such a context, it is not surprising that the new constitution didn’t impose parliamentary oversight on the public security institutions, nor did it make them accountable to other state institutions or the public (Mahfoudh, 2014, 1).

In a similar vein, the few positive changes introduced to the domestic security apparatus following the uprisings, particularly, the ratification of a procedural guide on human rights and the revision of laws governing arrest and detention, have effectively lost much of their essence under the new “counterterrorism law”, adopted by the Assembly of the People’s Representatives on 25th July 2015, and the state of emergency that has been in effect since November 2015, following a suicide attack on a police bus. Alongside upholding the same flaws of the 2003 law and the 2014 revision draft (Mullin, 2015), the newly adopted “counterterrorism” measures by the Tunisian state seem to further enhance the use of torture in police investigation.
For instance, while the Tunisian law continues to give police officers the power to prohibit those who get arrested from accessing a lawyer until the seventh day of their detention, the new counterterrorism law of July 2015 prolonged the detention period in terrorism-related cases even further, permitting the police up to 15 days to keep “suspects incommunicado with no access to a lawyer or any contact with their family” (Human Rights Watch, 2015). Beside the issues pertaining to the length and conditions of detention, human rights organizations have also criticized the definition of “terrorism” adopted in the law of being broad and ambiguous. These organizations fear that the current definition would lead to the criminalization of many forms of political dissent and social protest by treating them as terrorist offenses, which according to the law incorporate the act of inflicting harm on “private and public property, vital resources, infrastructures, means of transport and communication, IT systems or public services” (Human Rights Watch, 2015).

In sum, amidst persisting, even growing, security threats alongside ongoing political struggles among competing forces from the old regime and newly formed parties, the domestic pursuit of serious and profound security reforms in Tunisia was gradually pushed aside, being overwhelmed by the traditional discourse of national security and “the war on terror”. Consecutive governments since 2011 have essentially taken a realist approach to security reform, focusing on confronting mounting security challenges with a primary focus on hard power and armament. In this light, the executive branch witnessed a 2.2% increase in its budget in 2014, which was largely allocated to the ministries of interior and of national defense. The additional financial resources available to both ministries were to be dedicated to better equipment and materials in addition to enlisting new recruits (Jrad, 2015, 8-9).

This securitized environment has offered the domestic security institutions considerable institutional autonomy, and effectively shields them, at least temporarily, from being accountable for past or current actions (Sayigh, 2014). In the meantime, as Sayigh (2015b) underlines, without effective reform the state security forces will continue to struggle in countering “terrorism” and curbing other security threats as they lack the adequate capabilities and resources to face these challenges, having always relied on torture, alongside other repressive means, to extract confessions.
3 Egypt’s state security institutions

3.1 Meticulous domestic security architecture

Since the 1952 coup d’état, the market for force in Egypt has been dominated by the public security institutions. The country’s domestic security apparatus encompasses four main agencies: the police forces, the Central Security Forces, the National Security Apparatus, previously the State Security Investigation, and the General Intelligence Agency (Al-zayat, 2013). The General Intelligence Agency directly affiliates with “the presidential establishment and has its own special status under the legal framework” (Ashour, 2015). Meanwhile, the other three agencies belong to the Ministry of Interior (MOI), which over the last few decades has exhibited an enormous structure and far-reaching powers. The MOI’s authorities comprise diverse geographical and functional security agencies, which deal with numerous issues including “criminal investigations, drug trafficking, morality policing, immigration and border control, counterterrorism and homeland security, traffic control and vehicle licensing, tax evasion, prison management, election administration, public transportation security, and tourism security” (Brumberg and Sallam, 2012, 6).

At large, the Egyptian police force has for many years been run in a centralized and militarized fashion, with overlapping mandates and blurred boundaries between its multiple bodies and departments (Ennarah, 2014, 409). Seeing the complex and ramified structure of the Egyptian police force, it is considered among the hardest and most resilient institutions to reform. The militarization of domestic security notably intensified in the aftermath of the 11th September 2001 attacks and the henceforward global “war on terror”. All of the Arab states established new police units, or reequipped existing ones, to engage in “counterterrorism” missions. While the forms of these units vary, comprising SWAT teams, commando-type special forces, dedicated “counterterrorism” battalions, among others, they were all militarized in their armament and training (Sayigh, 2011, 404).

In the immediate aftermath of the 2011 uprising the MOI was reported to have 1.4 million employees and around 700,000 informants on the payroll (Sassoon, 2016, 119). The MOI’s expansion was boosted by Ministerial Decree 702 of 1986, which in the name of specialization transformed the Interior Ministry into a petrifying bureaucratic empire encompassing 32...
separate departments (Kandil, 2012, 194). This intense proliferation of the MOI, Sassoon (2016, 126) contends, nurtured authoritarian sustainability as “hiring large numbers to join these agencies gave them a sense of security, as well as providing employment to loyal supporters and co-opting many others into the system.” Similarly, overemployment and tolerated corruption inside the public security forces have been used by authoritarian regimes across the region to co-opt these forces and compensate for the deficiency of financial investment and political will to professionalize and upgrade them (Sayigh, 2016, 10).

It is noteworthy that corruption has not been limited to the circles of power but disseminated across the Egyptian society to become embedded in the daily practices of a large portion of the population. As Sedra (2011, 5) argues, corruption carries a stabilizing effect while offering a channel for wealth redistribution. She explains,

Without effective state welfare mechanisms, corruption allows wealth to trickle down through society; where the public administration is inadequately remunerated, graft helps employees make ends meet, keeps supporters in line, and calms dissent. The problem is, of course, that this wealth does not tend to trickle down evenly or proportionally throughout society, with regime loyalists absorbing the lion’s share.

In a parallel development, the political, social and economic turbulence characterizing the post-uprising years has accompanied a notable expansion of the black economy with “both competition and collusion between state agencies on the one side and criminal groups or armed groups and militias on the other” (Sayigh, 2016, 16). Considered among the chief beneficiaries of post-uprising lawlessness, criminal gangs have substituted the public security forces in some of Cairo’s most dangerous slums, “allegedly with the tacit permission and even encouragement of police” (Revkin, 2013). Similarly, Springborg (2011, 431) partially connects the crime wave during and following the Egyptian uprising to “the activities of the police and their shadowy accomplices among these thugs, who share an interest in subverting justice and indulging in outright theft.” Mirroring this development, public complaint of state security forces’ dismissal of calls to assist victims of theft and other crimes have significantly increased in recent years. Beyond police apathy and incompetence, normal citizens have often referred to corruption and direct complicity of the police forces in organized crime (Revkin, 2013).
3.2 Internal fractures

On the surface, the MOI has been largely successful in maintaining a coherent façade with a unified character. However, far from a monolithic body, the MOI’s police force for example represents a highly differentiated institution “in terms of privileges and is divided into several ranks with often severely unequal access to power and resources” (Abdelrahman, 2016, 7). Unlike the armed forces, whose top tier are fortunate with good education and training opportunities abroad, many of the police recruits are poorly educated, and lack adequate training (Sedra, 2011, 7). Moreover, policemen commonly belong to “a different social background to the bourgeois, or tribal, higher-ranking officers” (El Raggal, 2014). This has multiple benefits: being better suited to understand the dynamics of the lower-class neighborhoods, the particularities of their relationships and their ways of operating; while equally giving the policemen “the advantage of mastering the language and rhetoric in these areas” (El Raggal, 2014).

By contrast, the Police Academy has been home, a “club”, to the sons of wealthy or new middle-class families and rural notables (Sayigh, 2016, 27). Occasionally the Police Academy recruited from lower-income social groups to balance the growing transition of middle-class officers to the business sector and prosecution service. Only in late 2011 were applicants from peripheral areas finally accepted to the Police Academy, yet the old pattern has largely persisted (Sayigh, 2016, 27).

Beyond internal tensions inside the police corps, the poor working conditions and capabilities of the common policemen resulted in them failing to secure the regime at several occasions (Hashim, 2011). This occurred during the bread riots in 1977 which forced the regime at the time to call upon the armed forces to control the situation. The poor working conditions and capabilities of the police forces were also a main contributor to the quick and extended spreading of the demonstrations during the January 2011 uprising. Noteworthy this deficiency has not been limited to controlling street mobilization but stretched to areas of significant national interest like airport security. This recurrent failure, in spite of abundant human and financial resources, has, as examined in chapter 5, constituted one of the reasons for state outsourcing security in recent years, especially amidst numerous incidents of defections across the public security institutions.
3.3 Political subjugation and social control

Considering the poor legitimacy enjoyed by the authoritarian regime, consecutive Egyptian rulers have constantly depended on their public security institutions to secure the regime and ensure its longevity. In this light, Egypt’s domestic security apparatus, with its diverse agencies, has for decades been infamous for its repressive practices and unrestrained use of torture. Within the MOI, the Central Security Forces, “a paramilitary police force tasked with riot control and counterterrorism,” recurrently used extreme force to disperse public manifestations of political dissent (Brumberg and Sallam, 2012, 7). Describing the process of recruiting and training police officers, a former State Security officer asserts that “all officers were trained in beating, torture, and interrogation techniques of suspects, and this became a habit and ‘a fact of life’ in these services rather than learning how to investigate properly to uncover the truth” (Sassoon, 2016, 125).

At large, policemen have been pronounced executers of state domination and social subjugation. This role specifically crystalized during the 1990s amid three concurrent developments which entailed a heavy reliance by the MOI on policemen and informants. These developments included the sharp increase in the size of the Egyptian population that resulted in a swift proliferation of informal housing, “the weak presence of institutional police forces in different parts of the city,” and the “war on terrorism” (El Raggal, 2014). In the meantime, the police services and the State Security Investigation grew accustomed to share close connections, making them evenly frightening in the eyes of the population. While the police force has been the first on the ground to confront increasing political and social mobilization (Ennarah, 2014, 409), both forces have mutually dealt with “labor strikes, terrorist activities, and arrests and investigations of the Muslim Brothers” (Sassoon, 2016, 119).

Nonetheless, unlike policemen, State Security Investigation officers, as described by Hammuda, a former State Security officer himself, were “highest-profile officers in terms of their education, training and social origins” (Aclimandos, 2012, 4). Their recruitment involves IQ tests, the heavy weight of connections and above all secret assessment reports. Moreover, officers who have served in the General Security Division (criminal affairs) were generally favored as they are commonly experienced in beatings and torture alongside exhibiting a notable practical knowledge of the field of duty. While State Security Investigation officers
were not necessarily well-paid, except for the high-ranking officials, their post "provided influence and prestige, including a great deal of power over appointments" (Aclimandos, 2012, 4). As highlighted in chapter 5, the poor financial status and working environment of public security personnel has driven many of them to join the PSI, where they occasionally enjoy better payment and more favorable working conditions. While certainly true in Egypt, this line of development may vary across countries, based on the maturity of the PSI in the examined country and the working conditions of public security personnel.

The domestic security apparatus’ preoccupation with regime security manifested through a diverse set of direct and indirect strategies of social control. The direct version of social control generally translated into opposition forces of different forms, encompassing students, activists, journalists and labor, frequently being subject to harassment, arbitrary arrests, illegal detention, imprisonment and torture (Sassoon, 2016, 130). Meanwhile, the indirect forms of control were more diverse and broadly institutionalized. They entailed the involvement of multiple security agencies in many aspects of the personal and professional lives of ordinary citizens. As such, the Egyptian police force featured many specialized units, including the municipality police, transport police, utilities police, electricity police, public morality police, among others, who were allocated to supervise an array of mundane activities. The scope and reach of these specialized units, as Ismail (2015, 65) highlights, enabled the police institution to have “virtual control of public space and maintains oversight of social, economic and cultural activities.”

Career pursuit was another common field where security control was unavoidable. When ordinary citizens would apply for a public job or promotion, or seek to open a private business, their names were directly referred to the State Security Investigation for security check. One of the main duties of the State Security Investigation was to keep a list of all individuals affiliated to an opposition movement or a political party, especially young people. Now if the applicant’s name showed up on the State Security Investigation list, the agency promptly summoned that person and forced them to make certain compromises for their job application to move forward (Abd El Wahab, 2013).

On the eve of the 2011 uprising, the influence of the State Security Investigation on people’s careers and professional progression was unmatched by any other public institution. Acting more like a state within the state, the State Security Investigation “scrutinized nominees for cabinet positions, parliament seats, governorships, university chairs, editorial boards, public
sector companies and banks, and, of course, the military” (Kandil, 2012, 197). Ultimately, both the direct and indirect strategies of control exercised by the various domestic security forces have aimed to nurture an omnipresent state that is capable of pre-empting any source of political dissent before they acquire the capacity to grow and effectively mobilize.

3.4 The armed forces

The Egyptian military, unlike its Tunisian counterpart, has crafted for itself a focal position in state management since the 1952 coup d’état. While considerably smaller than the domestic security forces, the military personnel claimed better recruitment process, superior training schemes and higher social status. Compared to the 1.4 million belonging to the domestic security forces in 2011, the total of Egypt’s armed forces personnel stood at 835.500, which remained relatively stable between 2010 and 2017 (International Institute for Strategic Studies, 2020). Nevertheless, being for decades away from the battlefield and primarily preoccupied with wealth accumulation and regime protection, the professionalism of the Egyptian military was considerably compromised. As Henry and Springborg (2011) describe,

The Egyptian army is not the tight professional force that many consider it to be. It is bloated and its officer core is indulged, having been fattened on Mubarak’s patronage. Its training is desultory, maintenance of its equipment is profoundly inadequate, and it is dependent on the United States for funding and logistical support … The raison d’être of the military was always to support the Mubarak regime, not defend the nation.

During the 1950s and 60s, the power of the military elite under Gamal Abdel Nasser’s leadership was unmatched as they directly administered all realms of the Egyptian state. The presidency of Anwar Sadat then introduced profound changes to the ruling circle, particularly following the peace treaty with Israel and the economic open-door policy, ‘Infitah’. Egypt rapidly witnessed the rise of an elite business cluster and apparent marginalization of the military elite, who gradually forfeited direct political control. Nonetheless, the military elite remained strongly active in the country’s politics and economy. Among others, military personnel, retired and active duty, have continuously occupied influential governmental posts and key executive positions across the country, a phenomenon that intensified toward the end of Hosni Mubarak’s rule (Achcar, 2013, 184) and continues into the present.
Within the military institution, the Military Intelligence Apparatus constitutes the third pillar of the Egyptian intelligence apparatus, together with the General Intelligence Agency and the National Security Apparatus. Under Mubarak, the intelligence services were integral to state repression and a reliable arm of social control. Belonging to the Ministry of Defense, the Military Intelligence Apparatus has gradually grown in power and mandate since 2011 to dominate the two other intelligence agencies. Officers of the Military Intelligence Apparatus gained the exclusive trust of the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces, becoming its “eyes and ears” and eventually its brain (Ashour, 2015). Recent years witnessed the Military Intelligence Apparatus intervening in parliamentary elections, devising anti-opposition policies and operating political prisons.

3.5 Security reconfigurations amid persistent rivalry

Until the 2011 uprising, the public security apparatus was largely perceived as invincible and closely tied to Mubarak’s regime, who effectively ensured its loyalty and obedience through various strategies of co-optation. In this regard, the uprising sent shocking waves across the entire Egyptian public security apparatus, with the MOI, and the police forces in particular, being the most affected. Essentially, the quick and extensive spreading of the 2011 demonstrations revealed the deficiency of the seemingly invincible MOI in suppressing sudden large-scale mobilizations. The intelligence services were equally criticized of failing to predict the coming of the uprising and their potential impact on the stability of the regime. By contrast, the military elite and institution initially emerged as the victorious party amid the struggling state security structure. Not only did the military leadership shield itself from public outrage during the uprising by seemingly siding with the protests and abandoning Mubarak, but it effectively reclaimed its hegemony over Egypt’s politics.

Since the establishment of the republic in 1952 and the gradual molding of its authoritarian character, the public security agencies, with different dates and purposes of creation and paths of development, have exhibited a largely tense relationship, due to overlapping missions and mutual mistrust. During Sadat’s presidency and thereafter, the tense relationship between the different public security agencies acquired a heavily competitive outlook as each agency sought greater share of power and autonomy. Essentially, in light of the regime’s poor popular legitimacy and its growing reliance on the public security apparatus to ensure its survival, both
parties—domestic security forces and the military institution—continuously sought to enhance their political leverage by increasing their share of regime interests in exchange for their loyalty and services. In that regard, the economic terrain offers interesting insights into this fierce security competition.

Under Mubarak, Egypt was widely considered a police state with the domestic security forces exercising substantive political power and extensive influence on the whole population. As Ismail (2015, 62) asserts, the police essentially grew to constitute “an apparatus of government.” By contrast, a number of scholars contend that Mubarak’s Egypt was “a military state to which the police were subordinate” (Henry and Springborg, 2011). These scholars stress the economic might of the military institution, its superior capabilities and the strong presence of armed forces personnel within the executive apparatus. Indeed, over the last seven decades the military elite has progressively secured control over a significant portion of the national economy.

Encouraged by the regime, the military has built a continuously expanding economic empire which generates considerable financial revenue that grants the military great financial autonomy, and essentially allows the regime to buy the officer corps’ loyalty (Henry and Springborg, 2011). The magnitude of the Egyptian military’s economic might is widely acknowledged; meanwhile, the exact extent of this empire has remained subject to diverse accounts with some estimates reaching as high as 40% of the national economy in 2011 (Mandour, 2016). While closely examining this economic empire is beyond the scope of this study, what is important to note here is the strong presence of the military’s economic arm in the PSI, both as a major client and dominant provider; this is closely examined in chapter 5.

In essence, the 2011 uprising significantly altered the structure and inner relations within Egypt’s public security architecture. This didn’t however translate into serious security reforms and a radical shift toward public accountability and civilian protection as the protesters aspired. On the contrary, the post-uprising years have witnessed the various public security forces becoming more powerful and autonomous, continuously escaping the centralized control of the executive branch. As numerous scholars affirm, “the departure of powerful autocratic leaders enabled their security sectors and armed forces to expand their autonomy” (Cammack et al, 2017). Additionally, the uprising led to a unanimous acknowledgment among public security
actors of the considerable potential of the opposition movement in the country, which risks to profoundly threaten their stability and interests.

This perception of a common threat explains the continuous power of the MOI under a post-uprising military regime, as well as the recurrent collaboration among different public security agencies, particularly during Mohamed Morsi’s presidency. As Abdelrahman (2016, 3) contends,

Egypt’s new rulers do not want to allow a repeat of the 25 January uprising and are consequently in hock to the state security apparatus. The MOI has exploited this situation by winning support to increase its budget and enlarge its authority. The police have kept their side of the bargain by quashing any form of opposition in recent years. The central role of the security apparatus in the ousting of Mohamed Morsi, the first president elected after the ousting of Mubarak, and in the bloody crushing of his supporters in the summer of 2013 is clear testimony to this development.

Additionally, the real, yet widely abused and overstated, threat by non-state armed groups shaping and leading the national discourse and policies since the ousting of Morsi has forced a continuing collaboration between the armed forces and the domestic security agencies. This collaboration is essentially motivated by concerns of regime survival, which has been threatened by persistent factions of political and social dissent, and concerns of state survival, threatened by non-state armed groups particularly in the Sinai Peninsula. Noteworthy, the continuous engagement of domestic security forces since the coup of 2013 in “counterterrorism” and the hunting of political dissent meant that the corps is stretched out with new tasks of public security and a growing need for state control. In this respect, the rise of PSI and security outsourcing, as discussed in chapter 5, allegedly supports a need that was created with the allocation of a huge share of the police forces’ personnel and resources to “counterterrorism” and large-scale extermination of political opposition.

Notwithstanding the armed forces and the MOI, alongside other public security agencies, closely collaborating to oust Morsi in 2013, this alliance of interests and convenience has been largely volatile. Once Morsi was overthrown and the military elite took control of the Egyptian state under the leadership of El-Sisi, the deeply rooted tensions and competitions among the diverse security institutions quickly surfaced as each has tried to maximize its gains and increase its power. These tensions have been recurrently noticeable in the media, especially on
Egyptian private media networks over which the public security agencies exert significant influence. Instances of “sudden upsurge in criticism” against El-Sisi for instance, alongside denunciation of specific security services as seen in early 2016, were interpreted as signs of internal rifts between the president and the public security services, as well as among different public security bodies (Trager, 2016).

Similar spheres of influence and competition are equally common in the political arena, particularly during parliamentary elections. Shadowing pre-2011 patterns, the parliamentary elections of late 2015 were highly influenced by the public security agencies with The Homeland Defenders Party⁶ being backed up by the domestic intelligence service and the pro-Sisi parliamentary bloc being headed by a former military general (Trager, 2016). Similarly, the security institutions have recurrently exhibited contradictory stances with respect to the Palestinian Hamas movement. In 2015 for instance, former Head of the State Security Investigation, and then Minister of Interior, Magdy Abdel Ghaffar, accused the Palestinian Hamas of direct involvement in the assassination of former Attorney General Hisham Barakat⁷. Meanwhile, Hamas’ political leaders were invited to Cairo by the General Intelligence Agency “to discuss security and military cooperation in Northeast Sinai, where the regime has failed to quell a growing insurgency” (Ashour, 2015).

Beyond potentially destabilizing the regime, the power struggle and fierce competition among the public security agencies have deeply reflected on the latter’s response to political unrest and public discontent. In terms of social impact, these growing rivalries have largely translated into “a qualitative change in the nature of state violence in Egypt,” which supersedes the pre-2011 level that was largely tolerated by the urban middle class (Mandour, 2015). More specifically, these institutions’ competition and outbidding risk generating and sustaining heightened levels of domestic repression as “more torture, extra-judicial killings, mass-arrests, and political detentions continue to be an official policy and tools of outbidding” (Ashour, 2015). With the control over repression gradually falling into the hand of the lower ranks of the public security forces, instead of being directly controlled by the core of the executive

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⁶ The Homeland Defenders Party is a center-left political party founded in May 2014 in Egypt. The party secured 18 seats in the 2015 parliament. It has been the largest member party of the Call of Egypt coalition which has been supportive of Abdel Fattah el-Sisi’s presidency.

⁷ Hisham Barakat was appointed Prosecutor General of Egypt days following the coup d’état in July 2013. Barakat was assassinated in a car bombing on 29 June 2015 as he left his home in Heliopolis.
branch of the government, repression essentially became an end in itself instead of constituting a tool to preserve regime’s stability (Mandour, 2015).

3.6 Regime interests, institutional corruption and privatized violence

While ensuring regime security by curbing political dissent, domestic security institutions in Egypt have played a crucial role in nurturing regime interests by sustaining and perpetuating an expansive system of economic exploitation and social manipulation. On the outset, neoliberal capitalism, as chiefly championed by Mubarak’s son Gamal and his cohort of crony businessmen from the early 2000s until the 2011 uprising, generated a system where the national economy became subject to fierce competition among the elite over power and wealth, with limited return on the growing population who gradually sank into poverty and despair. In this environment, the power and size of the MOI has sharply inflated to ensure “the protection of the new ruling elite and the interests of capital from increasingly disgruntled social groups” (Abdelrahman, 2016, 2). In the process, the public security institutions, particularly their leadership, have grown integral to the regime structure and a key constituent of its ruling elite, while developing their own interests, which similarly to the interests of other elite factions depended on the perpetuation of authoritarian rule and abuse of national economy resources. In this context, ‘crony economic liberalization and predatory privatization’ have involved extensive participation from different public security agencies in corruption and criminal economic activities (Sayigh, 2016, 5).

Notwithstanding corruption and acting with impunity being widely practiced and steadily growing under the watch of the ruling regime, its causes and manifestations have varied significantly across different strata of the MOI personnel. Among most noncommissioned ranks low pay has been a prime driver for corruption. In 2014, the lowest ranking police officers reportedly received a monthly salary of nearly 800 Egyptian pounds ($115 at the time), which prompted many of them to seek “free services and goods from the public, especially in lower-income areas, or to extract petty bribes by threatening people with arrest” (Sayigh, 2016, 13-14). Subsequently, corruption, particularly bribery, has been notably widespread in the informal economy, as many police officers opt to accept bribes, from arms and drug dealers for example, to supplement their official low-income (Khaled, 2016).
At the higher ranks and among the administrative circles of the public security institutions, corruption has been largely institutionalized. It is highly diversified and wide-ranging, carrying far more serious implications (Sayigh, 2016, 14). Secret funds and black boxes for instance have been used to provide ranking officers with numerous benefits. In 2015, some estimates suggested that the MOI possessed “174 off-budget funds that were believed to hold 15 billion Egyptian pounds ($2 billion at the time)” (Sayigh, 2016, 15). Additionally, the MOI has also developed its own commercial and investment arm that extends across multiple sectors of the Egyptian economy. Albeit smaller in comparison to the military-industrial-complex, the economic might of the domestic security forces is considerable in size and reach. Following the military institution’s footsteps, the domestic security agencies, especially the Interior Ministry, have sought under the leadership of former Interior Minister Habib El Adly (1997-2011) to engage in diverse economic activities whose revenue created a private enclosed budget that sustained a set of financial privileges for the higher ranks of these agencies and strengthened their position amid the political circles of power.

Similarly, the General Intelligence Agency carries a long record of investment “in front companies that vie for commercial contracts, with the proceeds held by the directorate” of the agency (Sayigh, 2016, 15). Moreover, the General Intelligence Agency constantly ensured the placement of affiliates “as delegated members on private sector companies in certain domains of interest, such as high-tech, communications, and external trade” (Sayigh, 2016, 15). More recently, the agency has exhibited overt determination in controlling the public discourse by developing its own soft power platforms, through the purchase and establishment of gigantic media outlets, as it steadily seeks to impose monopoly over all forms of circulated information inside the country (see Alaraby, 2018; Bahgat, 2017; Midan, 2017). Noteworthy, some PSCs, allegedly affiliated with the intelligence services, have actively contributed to this soft power approach. As featured in chapter 5, some of these PSCs have established independent ‘outreach’ companies that quickly built a wide media network where several famous regime supporters from the media industry were recruited (see Mohamed, 2017; Elsayed, 2017; Aljazeera, 2017).

Preceding contemporary state use of PSCs, the Egyptian regime has often practiced other forms of outsourcing security, or “outsourcing repression” to be more precise (Kandil, 2012, 195), as part of its pursuit of political supremacy and social domination. For instance, thugs and paid hooligans were frequently hired across the country by the police forces, former ruling party
members alongside local social actors to suppress dissent voices, illegally extract resources and advance private interests. The use of thugs by different factions of the elite, individually and institutionally, is widely documented as in the 2000 elections when the MOI hired a significant number of uniformed and plainclothes thugs to intimidate the electors. Hereafter, mutual intervention by state security personnel and hired thugs during elections has become a common practice, diminishing any effective role for judicial observers (Brownlee, 2007, 148).

More broadly, state use of thugs amid increasing impunity, led some scholars to perceive criminal investigation officers as promoting “a new ‘police force’ of baltagyā (thugs),” while the MOI increasingly outsourced its most ‘dirty’ business (Abdelrahman, 2016, 5). In a way, state privatizing violence met “the needs of an ever-expanding regime of terror” (Abdelrahman, 2016, 5). Meanwhile, beyond political intimidation during and outside elections’ seasons, many state security officers also deployed thugs “to settle scores with political enemies or simply with individuals or neighbors who irritated them” (Sassoon, 2016, 120). These established forms of privatized violence and outsourcing repression over the last few decades in Egypt led some observers to draw comparisons between these old practices of state privatizing violence and the current state use of PSCs. Chapter 5 digs into the depth of contemporary forms of outsourcing security and the diverse dynamics they involve. In the meantime, awareness of old, and persistent, forms of privatized violence in Egypt accentuates the need for a critical reflection on the nature of outsourcing security in Egypt today beyond the neoliberal discourse of efficiency and cost saving, and on its relationship to state oppression and strategies of social control.

4 Conclusion

Over several decades, Egypt and Tunisia have developed into two security states with complex public security systems whose prime objective has been to protect the regime and advance its interests. Sustaining and nurturing authoritarian control in these countries has involved wide scale social repression and political subjugation. Through direct and indirect mechanisms of control, extensive networks of surveillance and a growing culture of corruption and impunity, both countries’ populations have grown largely and forcibly compliant out of fear and mistrust in the public security institutions. In the meantime, as authoritarian rule cemented its
foundations in both countries, a security-political alliance was nurtured through expansive networks of patronage that benefited the political, security and military elite.

This alliance was more developed in Egypt than in Tunisia due the former’s massive domestic security apparatus and the political history of its military institution. Seeing the political and economic benefits acquired by the public security institutions in Egypt since the early 1950s, their leadership has been integral to the regime and thus actively much keener to ensure its survival and continuous prosperity. This largely explains the general absence of security reforms in Egypt following the 2011 uprising in addition to the lack of international pressure or input in this domain. By contrast, Tunisia’s military was generally disfavored by the regime and didn’t have any strong attachment to it. Moreover, the Tunisian domestic security institutions, while heavily attached to the regime and dedicated to ensuring its survival and prosperity, didn’t apparently possess much political or financial power or independence from the regime. This is partially due to the overwhelming dominance of the ruling party under Ben Ali which, alongside governing the country, used to carry heavy security functions.

It is within this context of confined security reforms, persisting abusive practices and impunity of the public security forces, and continuous, occasionally expanding, internal divisions and fierce competition among the different public security agencies and institutions that the PSI has gradually and steadily grown since 2011. Seeing the different political paths that Egypt and Tunisia have taken since their uprisings, the dynamics shaping the reconfigurations of their markets for force and the subsequent role played by, and functions allocated to, the PSCs have varied. As the coming two chapters explore these variations and distinct lines of development, the underlying question to eventually answer is how the expanding PSI in both countries, together with the growing state security outsourcing, affect old partners of authoritarian governance and relate to processes of regime adaptability centered on the pursuit of regime security and interests.
Chapter 4 - Private and Non-State Security Actors and the Development of Tunisia’s Market for Force after the 2010-2011 Uprising

1 Introduction

Looking at the Arab region from late 2010 onward, Tunisia emerges as a fairly unique case. Its 18th December 2010 to 14th January 2011 uprising led to a change in leadership followed by a relatively stable transitional period that featured several democratic reforms. In the meantime, the post-uprising period has witnessed a set of noticeable changes within Tunisia’s market for force. Some concerned the state security institutions, which as discussed at length in chapter 3 have encompassed the reshuffle of some segments of the security leadership and the empowerment of the public security forces with extensive equipment and training. Other changes have comprised the recurrent reliance on non-state actors in security reform projects, including private security companies (PSCs), and the assertive growth of the domestic private security industry (PSI).

Since the uprising, Tunisia has essentially experienced a growing presence of diverse non-state security actors within the public and private sectors alike. These actors, predominantly foreign, have significantly contributed to security reform schemes that encompass both the domestic security forces and the military institution, offering training and supplying the public security forces with various resources. Concurrently, rising security threats have created a general environment of insecurity where different groups and sectors have increasingly turned to private security actors to seek protection and help create an image of a stable and secure economic and social environment, a necessity for the struggling tourism industry in the country.

To better comprehend these ongoing security developments and effectively explore their intricate dynamics, this chapter examines the growing presence of non-state and private security actors within Tunisia’s market for force since 2011, looking at the realm of state security reforms and the domestic security market respectively. In terms of state security
reform, two core questions are at stake: First, how and why have non-state and private security actors increasingly contributed to state security reform in post-uprising Tunisia? Second, what impact has this development had on the reform processes of the public security forces, especially in areas of accountability, efficiency, responsibility toward the population, by ensuring civil protection instead of regime protection, and professionalism, by stopping the abusive treatment and torture, all of which are central to the establishment of democratic rule in Tunisia.

To address these questions, the first part of the chapter features two main sections. It starts by sketching the foreign security assistance to Tunisia from early 2011 onward, with particular emphasis on examples of outsourcing to non-state and private security actors. In this vein, this section examines why a number of foreign governments have opted to outsource some of the security reform projects signed with the Tunisian government, presenting the key advantages and drawbacks attached to this process. The second half of this part explores the trajectory followed by the foreign security assistance to Tunisia since 2011 in order to evaluate its impact on the attitude and performance of Tunisia’s public security forces.

Ultimately, this part demonstrates that the increasing presence of non-state actors in state security reform projects in post-uprising Tunisia is not explained by the efficiency of these entities alone but involves a more diverse and complex set of factors including personnel connections and the governance system of the contracting parties. Moreover, the impact that non-state and private actors have had on reforming Tunisia’s public security forces into a more professional security apparatus has depended on the specific historical and political background of the security forces together with the arrangements followed within different security reform projects. The impact is thus largely mixed and presently uncertain.

The second part of this chapter is dedicated to the growth of Tunisia’s PSI from 2011 onward. At first, we explore the various manifestations and reasons of this growth by identifying new grounds for demands and various sources of supply. These include the rising insecurities and militia threats in recent years, which led foreign companies and domestic businesses to increasingly enlist the services of private security agents instead of relying on the public security forces. Similarly, the early security reshuffles among the public security forces following the 2010-2011 uprising supplied the private security market with new founders and personnel, which further boosted its development.
Building on this, the discussion proceeds to examine how the steady expansion of PSCs has impacted the relationship between public and private security providers, alongside the future of state control over the means of violence. Overall, the ongoing expansion of private security and non-state actors in Tunisia, in domestic security provision and security reform schemes alike, is significantly reconfiguring the country’s market for force by creating new relationships and dynamics of interactions among different security providers, as well as between them and the citizenry.

2 Private security in the shadow of security sector reform

2.1 Outsourcing foreign security assistance in Tunisia: How and why?

Public resentment at the abusive practices of the public security apparatus under Ben Ali has significantly shaped much of the international support and aid coming to Tunisia in recent years. Once Ben Ali fell in January 2011, many foreign donors and funding entities rushed to propose initiatives in the field of security reform to the Tunisian authorities. As part of the transition to a democratic rule, there was a push that came primarily from the international community to bring outside help to advise the Tunisian police forces and the various other public security bodies on how their operations needed to change in order to facilitate the development of an open society. Ultimately, the public security institutions themselves were not the ones demanding security reform; it was largely coming from the outside (Nisetich, interview 2018).

Many of the security reform schemes pursued by the Tunisian state in collaboration with foreign governments and international agencies have involved cases of outsourcing to non-state and private security actors. Worth noting that these non-state and private security actors have not substituted official security personnel, who belong to the contracting foreign countries, in their engagement with the Tunisian forces, the military and domestic security forces alike. While tactical exercises, such as those that involve live-fire and training on shooting techniques, usually have occurred through government-to-government engagement, non-state and private security actors have focused on security consultancy and crowd
management training (Herbert, interview 2017). As such, the contribution of non-state and private actors to the security reforms in Tunisia has predominantly aligned with the work focus and expertise of private, rather than military, security companies. Despite recurrently coordinating and engaging with the Tunisian military forces, as shortly explored, the focus of the private security companies involved in these reform schemes has thus been on internal security and protection, and not on military training and engagement in combat operation.

Immediately after the uprising, the United States conducted a large assessment exercise to understand the structure of the Tunisian security apparatus and the training available to its forces (Herbert, interview 2017). Subsequently, the United States instituted a variety of programs to assist reforming Tunisia’s public security forces. According to the United States’ spokesperson’s office (2015), the Tunisian state was offered more than $250 million in security assistance, aimed at building institutional capacity in order to provide security in a manner that respects the rights of the Tunisian people as claimed during the 2010-2011 uprising.

In September 2015, the International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs at the United States Department of State awarded a three-year program in Tunisia to the Densus Group, a PSC specialized in crowd management, use of force management and capability-based training (Densus Group, 2018). The $6 million Multiple Threats Tactical Training Program tasked the Densus Group to “train Tunisian security forces to deliver the advanced tactical skills necessary to neutralize threats related to terrorist activities and continue to facilitate the transformation to a more democratic police service” (Densus Group, 2015).

Moreover, 2015 witnessed a partnership agreement between the United States and Tunisia to establish the largest Police Academy in the country, “a long-term, multimillion-dollar effort to fully renovate the training curriculum” for the Tunisian National Police and National Guard (Office of the United States Spokesperson, 2015). The United States assigned the responsibility of the curriculum design, training reforms and development aspects to the United States Institute of Peace (USIP). Entitled Educational Design and Curriculum Development in Tunisia: Engaging Police and National Guard through Education, Partnership and Reform, the USIP program focuses on reforming how the actual training is delivered, looking at the tools, the quality and long-term impact of the taught curriculums, and the capability of trainers.
As Ouiem Chettaoui (interview 2018), USIP Project Officer in Tunisia, describes, “in agreement with the United States’ government, [USIP] looks with the security forces at how the training content and methods can be improved from a general pedagogical and training management angle.” Beside its contribution to the police academy project, USIP has been active in Tunisia since 2012 as the United States’ State Department enlisted its expertise in several reform projects aimed at cultivating community mediators, supporting community-focused policing and improving regional border security.

Looking at the wider Arab region, the political promotion of US security aid abroad and its interference in domestic politics has heavily benefited from the democratization discourse that perpetually presents US security aid as tied to human rights advocacy and promotion of democracy. Jordan in particular presents a clear case where “the idea that democracy and security reinforce each other [has been] one of the guiding principles for US support to” the ruling regime” (Schuetze, 2019, 170). Nonetheless, US security assistance has gradually developed into a hindrance instead of a promoter of democratic rule in Jordan. This is attributed to the continuously growing emphasis on security concerns domestically and regionally which led to promises of democratization being constantly postponed to a seemingly attainable but yet distant future. More importantly, as Schuetze (2019, 184) demonstrates, instead of limiting the regime’s use of its security services, or increasing the security sector’s accountability to the Jordanian people, US security support to Jordan draws the country into a subcontractor-like role within regional US imperial strategy, and directly reinforces deeply problematic processes of militarisation and commercialisation that only further reduce the chances of popular control over the country’s security sector.

The prospects of the outlined Jordanian experience with US security aid being replicated in Tunisia are not seemingly evident by virtue of their contemporary developments and political differences—a well-grounded monarchy versus a dynamic political structure continuously tilting between popular democratic aspirations and authoritarian tendencies amid continuous political, economic and security challenges. Nonetheless, the persistent security concerns inside the country and along its boarders risk alleviating the “security first agenda” to a stage where domestic promoters of democracy would be effectively silenced and international aid, including US security assistance, would be implicated into strategies of authoritarian reestablishment as democracy becomes recognized as a potential threat to stability and prosperity.
Alongside the United States, the United Kingdom has invested considerably in security reform projects in post-uprising Tunisia with several instances of outsourcing. In 2014, the British embassy signed an agreement with the Tunisian government to establish the Strategic Planning Units within the Ministry of Interior (MOI). This move followed a number of attacks on the Tunisian armed and police forces by non-state armed groups (Middle East Eye, 2015). It also aligned with other international efforts dedicated to reconstructing Tunisia’s intelligence apparatus which, as discussed in chapter 3, has been severely weakened in the aftermath of the uprising.

According to the British government, the Strategic Planning Units’ objective was to enhance the accountability of the Tunisian security forces. These units would ensure efficient responses to key security threats, “through managing risk, more effectively deploying resources, coordinating plans and operations across the Ministry and with other Tunisian and international agencies, and planning to tackle key security threats such as border security and terrorism” (Gov.uk., 2015a). Upon signing this bilateral agreement, the United Kingdom outsourced the project to Aktis Strategy Ltd, a British PSC, for a sum of £1.4 million, with an additional sum of £158,881 to be paid by the British Department for International Development for “project delivery costs and supplier services” (Powell and Jones, 2015).

It took a year to prepare the staff to be involved in these units, and in November 2015, the Strategic Planning Units were reportedly deployed in the MOI headquarters, as well as in the National Guard, the National Security and the Civil Protection (Gov.uk., 2015a). The effectiveness of the Strategic Planning Units was subject to large skepticism from security experts with some denying their very existence (Kartas, interview 2018), while others undermined any actual output coming from them (Nisetich, interview 2018). In a similar vein, the British government was criticized after the 2015 Sousse attacks as some commentators doubted the value of the Strategic Planning Units’ project, and specifically questioned the competency of Aktis Strategy Ltd at improving Tunisia’s security capabilities.

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8 The Sousse attacks are a mass shooting that occurred on 26 June 2015 in Tunisia in the coastal resort town of Sousse. Thirty-eight people, of which 30 were British, were shot dead by a gunman during the attack alongside another 39 non-fatal injuries.
Nonetheless, all the security experts interviewed rejected the alleged relationship between preventing the 2015 attacks and the efficacy of the Strategic Planning Units. Essentially, strategic planning pertains to long-term thinking and building robust action plans that commonly take years to implement and bear fruits. As Tunisian security scholar and expert Moncef Kartas (interview 2018) summarizes, “developing strategy takes years, then moving to action plans then implementation of action plan. It is a cycle that takes a long time, especially under a completely dysfunctional administration.”

Alongside crowd management and intelligence restructuring, border security constitutes another area which caught substantial international attention in Tunisia from early 2011 onward. With state breakdown and continuous fighting in Libya, Tunisia’s borders with its eastern neighbor have experienced profound turbulence and reordering of pre-uprising arrangements. Similarly, security at the western border with Algeria were severely affected by the Tunisian uprising up until 2013 due to the collapse of old border controls, “a collapse subsequent to the withdrawal of the National Guard and the police due to the difficulties of establishing a new legitimate and effective apparatus” (Lamloum, 2016, 20).

Sharing great concern and interest in border security, the United States has dedicated considerable share of its security aid in Tunisia to build operational capacity down on the frontiers, working primarily on the western southern border with Algeria (Herbert, interview 2017). Similarly, during the 2014-2015 financial year, the British government contracted private security consortium Aktis Strategy Ltd—International Alert—Strategic Capacity Group to develop and pilot “new community engagement approaches on the Tunisian-Algerian border area, working with local security forces and communities” (Gov.uk., 2015b).

Given the highly advanced security resources and apparatuses of the United Kingdom, the United States and the other states who have invested in security reform projects in Tunisia following its uprising, the question arises: why do foreign governments opt to outsource some of the security reform projects signed with the Tunisian government? Examining this recurrent practice leads to a number of explanations, occasionally contingent on the contracting party and the project examined. For instance, with respect to the United States, it is largely accepted that outsourcing some foreign security assistance missions is a common and understandable practice. Since the United States doesn’t possess one national policing agency, the approach to
support policing reform and offer security advice abroad has often been to work through for-profit and non-profit entities to do such implementation (Herbert, interview 2017).

More generally, foreign security assistance commonly faces financial constraints and issues to secure funding authorization, which, for the security reform programs abroad, vary based on the proposed project and the parties available for its delivery. These factors considerably affect whether a grant is dispensed to particular entities within the public security forces of the assisting state, to non-profit organizations, governmental or non-governmental, or whether a contract is made with a private entity (Herbert, interview 2017).

Using non-state and private security actors is largely seen to bring a more strategic vision, help share good practices and enhance the responsiveness of the recipient party toward security reform. Having acted as ex-project coordinator for British PSC Aktis Strategy Ltd, Alexander Nisetich (interview 2018) considers the interaction between the British government and its Tunisian counterpart as very limited because “Tunisians simply wouldn’t trust the government officials. They were more likely to talk to a foreign consultant if they have the confidence that the information that they share will not go back directly to the British embassy.” Moreover, the implementation of security reform projects normally involves a large and mixed cohort of experts and employees who don’t necessarily have connections to the contracting party (Herbert, interview 2017). This mirrors another advantage recurrently identified with the use of PSCs in security reform projects which is flexibility.

While foreign governments chiefly rely on experts and advisors of their own, contracted private actors can call upon the expertise of a diverse group of people, not limited to specific nationality or affiliations. For example, if the United Kingdom decides to send an expert, it has to be a British expert. By contrast, when the British government enlists the services of Aktis Strategy Ltd, the latter brings experts from different countries. This gives Aktis Strategy Ltd more room for action and a wider network to define the experts it brings to advise the Tunisian security forces, which “the United Kingdom simply couldn’t have when they are acting in the capacity of the government” (Nisetich, interview 2018).

In a similar vein, Deputy Head of The Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces (DCAF) Tunis mission, Maxim Poulin (interview 2019), takes pride in the independence and freedom of action that has characterized DCAF’s security assistance to
Tunisia since it opened its local office in July 2011 upon the Tunisian authorities’ request. Operating from a trust fund meant that DCAF doesn’t take any directives from the countries supporting its work in Tunisia. This gives DCAF the freedom to be flexible in framing its projects and better positioned to respond to the initiatives and requests made by the Tunisian authorities (Poulin, interview 2019).

Other experts are more critical of the impact of personnel connections and the donors’ agendas on outsourcing security contracts. Nabil Smida (interview 2019), Vice President of Tunisian Observatory of Global Security, stresses that these foreign entities and organizations are not charity organizations. In other words, the security reform projects which they fund and support are commonly motivated by particular political projects. While some projects are driven by human rights principles, “they are also subject to paradigms of control, attempts to increase spheres of influence and the sources of funding” (Smida, interview 2019). Furthermore, some perceive the NGOs and security companies involved in the internationally funded security reform projects to be “creating for the foreign aid agencies and ministries the framework on which these parties, once contracted, are going to act” (Kartas, interview 2018). These experts point to cases where ministries and agencies providing foreign security aid prioritize particular type of projects that fit very specific profiles of companies.

Similarly, these experts accused some of the parties, for-profit and not-for-profit alike, contracted to contribute to the security reform projects in Tunisia, particularly in the immediate aftermath of the Tunisian uprising, of lacking competency and awareness of the local context. This presumably led to false assumptions and expectations on what is feasible, with the NGOs lacking the courage to face the donors and say these fundamentals need reform first. Subsequently, reforming Tunisia’s public security apparatus has become increasingly difficult as some of the old guards inside the Tunisian forces take the failure of these projects as an excuse to reject reform. As Kartas (interview 2018) asserts, “the constant failure of these institutions has led to a situation where the MOI is almost irreformable.”

2.2 Trajectory and impact of foreign-led security reform projects in Tunisia

After nearly a decade of continuous security collaboration between the Tunisian state and foreign governments and agencies, accompanied by the growing deployment of non-state
actors within old and new security reform projects, the nature, objectives and impact of these collaborations deserve close attention. An overview of the foreign-sponsored security reform projects conducted in Tunisia in recent years suggests a general preference for capacity-building training and enhancing tactical security capabilities at the expense of improving security governance and security-society relations. There are certainly some security reform programs, like those carried by the USIP, which focus on the softer side of security reform: fostering transparency in the work of the public security services and improving the attitude of the police forces in their engagement with the general public.

However, the entities offering a comprehensive approach to security are currently very few. Tunisia-based American security consultant Matthew Herbert (interview 2017) considers the work of USIP as prominent in this regard, “going into the different security academies and attempting to understand what is being done and build up new ways of doing things: a comprehensive attitudinal and behavioral shift.” Even crowd management training, which directly relate to security-community relationship, has taken a more technical and tactical outlook: “how you essentially form a block of riot control officers and act in such a way that doesn’t escalate the situation but deescalates it” (Herbert, interview 2017).

Within bilateral security agreements, training and equipment are largely welcomed by the recipient party. Meanwhile, reform of structures and making the public security apparatus more service oriented are harder to pursue because they face considerable internal resistance and lack the political will to support them (Poulin, interview 2019). In the meantime, the training offered by foreign countries, non-state actors and private entities has become part of “a larger promotional scheme within the Tunisian security forces that focuses on education” (Herbert, interview 2019). Tunisian security personnel often attend these courses, even if they are not necessarily useful or meant to be implemented in the field, because they contribute to their promotional scheme. Similarly, training sessions are not openly accessible to all, with a relatively small number of well-connected personnel becoming overrepresented at the majority of these training sessions (Herbert, interview 2019).

On a related note, the post-uprising security cooperation between the Tunisian public security forces and foreign actors has created what Nisetich (interview 2018) describes as “a little bit of a brain drain.” The security reform schemes introduced from 2011 onward have involved extensive interaction between foreign entities and experts, and Tunisian security personnel and
civilians who work at different public security agencies in Tunisia. In the process, relationships have been built, and better career opportunities opened up in the private and non-governmental sectors for many of the capable Tunisian officials. Ultimately, cooperation with foreign entities translates into career opportunities. “Those who found themselves more accommodating, more open to these outside organizations, found that this led to jobs down the road” (Nisetich, interview 2018). Leaving the public services to work for international agencies and foreign contractors offer more favorable working conditions, including much higher salaries and better management.

2.2.1 The impact of “terrorism”

Looking at the trajectory of security reform projects in Tunisia from 2011 onward, the outlined preference for tactical and capacity-building reforms appear to have followed recent security developments rather than being an established approach from the beginning. A significant share of the foreign funding coming to Tunisia soon after the uprising was actually dedicated to community policing, multiple-threat training and crowd-management. Similarly, Chettaoui (interview 2018) affirms an early dedication to “developing a police force that is more service oriented, bringing law enforcement into civic and service-oriented frame, and generating community-based solution to security problems in the community such as delinquency at schools.”

Nevertheless, the troubling security environment at Tunisia’s borders with the continuous civil war in Libya, and the heightened level of domestic militia activism with two major attacks in 2015, have profoundly shaped the scope and nature of security reform programs pursued in the country hereafter. As Herbert (interview 2017) remarks, “international donors became much more focused on the wake of those attacks on the entire issue of tactical capacities, and it became more of a counterterrorism support mission, while before 2014 it really wasn’t.”

This is particularly visible within the security reform projects implemented along the Tunisian borders. The latter became increasingly militarized with “the establishment of a buffer border area guarded by the army” in 2013, followed in 2015 by the construction of a border wall aimed at stopping smuggling and blocking any terrorists’ entry to the country (Lamloum, 2016, 21). Some foreign security support was effectively dedicated to enhancing security-community relationships in border zones and integrating these communities into wider security strategies.
Nevertheless, Tunisia’s borders were progressively viewed as a security challenge that requires tougher state measures and tighter control.

Assisting Tunisia to secure its borders has essentially followed an ongoing regional “war on terrorism”, where western approaches and confrontational strategies “predicated upon militarization and aggressive responses to illicit crossings” have been widely applied (Gallien and Herbert, 2018). This translated into a considerable share of foreign funding being allocated to transferring equipment, intense training and aid support into the effort of controlling the borders. For example, building the Tunisian border wall and its surveillance equipment was enabled by a donation of $44.9 million from the United States and Germany since 2016 (Gallien and Herbert, 2018).

Nonetheless, rather than making the region safer, securitizing the borders has raised the risk of instability along the frontiers by enhancing corruption among border control officers and making smuggling a highly expensive and uncertain occupation for the poorest residents of these regions (Lamloum, 2016, 21). While placing border communities under significant economic distress, the new system of border management has “given security forces new room to abuse power, as seen by the noticeable rise in the number of smugglers wounded and killed on the Tunisia–Libya border” (Gallien and Herbert, 2018). Managing border security became “the object of complex arrangements between various civil or security actors, whether old or new, private or institutional, competing for revenue and legitimacy, all of whom are subject to the vagaries of an unstable political situation on both sides of the border” (Lamloum, 2016, 22). Ultimately, although Tunisia’s borders seem presently more secure than in recent years, this apparent stability accompanies growing networks of corruption and persistent social and economic vulnerabilities for the region’s inhabitants.

2.2.2 The challenges and limitations facing security reform in Tunisia

On the receiving end, the willingness of the public security forces in Tunisia to cooperate with foreign parties and to accept introducing large-scale and long-term reforms to their systems of operation have had its own profound impact on the substance and success of many of the security reform projects introduced since the uprising. Chronologically, there has been an openness to security reform in the immediate aftermath of the uprising and the MOI welcomed multiple actors to help providing this. The public security bodies largely realized the limitations
of their old ways and the utility of reaching out to international actors for support that went beyond new equipment, weapons and intelligence gathering capacities (Herbert, interview 2017).

Nonetheless, this initial openness to change was challenged by a deeply rooted pre-2011 state-security nexus where many high-caliber security officials strongly and persistently opposed change to ensure that no security reform happen. More generally, the work environment inside the MOI and the complex bureaucratic structure of the public security institutions and agencies in Tunisia tended to discourage reform initiatives and heavily constrain their implementation. In this light, general fatigue was a common reason why public security officials, overloaded with work and very constrained by their jobs, weren’t necessarily interested in major security reform initiatives. Nisetich (interview 2018) describes the public security services in Tunisia as designed in such a way that it is very difficult to take an individual initiative or to do anything collectively. Essentially, “it is very easy to kill any initiative to change something regardless if everybody agrees it is good or not” (Nisetich, interview 2018).

Additionally, the two attacks of 2015 have considerably affected the institutional attitude toward security reform. Perceived as a sign of deficiency of the public security forces, spreading militia activities obliged the Tunisian state to lean to international pressure to pursue more security reforms (Chettaoui, interview 2018). Nonetheless, state security reforms amidst a “war on terror” has translated into enhancing tactical capabilities, engaging in “counterterrorism” training and receiving considerable supply of equipment and arms to win this war. While militia activism has largely decreased at present, the turbulent regional security environment has kept “the war on terror” alive and with it the international and domestic joint focus on tactical and capacity-building security reforms in Tunisia.

Overall, the internationally sponsored security reform schemes implemented in Tunisia from 2011 onward have led to general improvements in the practices and capabilities of the public security apparatus as apparent in the enhanced security situation at Tunisia’s borders and across its territory. Particularly, progress was noticed in the cooperation between different public security agencies, in the way that they share information and that they now view security threats from a strategic rather than a tactical point of view (Nisetich, interview 2018). These improvements were chiefly attributed to external pressure and contact with international advisors, alongside internal pressure from the Tunisian public.
Meanwhile, the international approach to state security reform in Tunisia has featured serious shortcomings that limited the prospects of profound long-term impact. The international donors who rushed to Tunisia upon the fall of Ben Ali highly overestimated the capacity of the Tunisian public security institutions and political leadership to plan strategically and quickly produce solid reform proposals. While strong on the repressive side, Tunisia’s public security institutions were deficient in terms of developing and implementing policies (Poulin, interview 2019). Failing to respond to the donors’ expectations, the public security forces in Tunisia have grown dependent on foreign initiatives, with foreign security experts recurrently called upon and security reform not “seriously considered and invested into from within the Tunisian security institutions and its personnel” (Smida, interview 2019).

Another major shortcoming of foreign security assistance to Tunisia is poor coordination. While numerous parties, governmental and private, contributed to state security reform, collaboration between them has been limited and inconsistent. For instance, since 2011 till today there has been no routine engagement among all the different donors in Tunisia to talk about what they are doing. Similarly, there was no attempt to build up a structure that would ensure that what each party is doing fits with what the other parties are individually doing. “Rather everyone is pursuing their own curriculums with the Tunisians themselves not really in favor of the idea of donors’ coordination because it means the potential of less opportunities coming to them” (Herbert, interview 2017).

Given the outlined drawbacks, the impact of security reform projects, mostly funded and carried out by different foreign actors, on transforming Tunisia’s public security forces into a more professional apparatus has been largely uncertain. Although some units within the public security forces have become significantly more efficient than before, reforms targeting the governing structure and attitude of the public security forces at large has remained generally limited. Subsequently, Tunisia’s public security forces have continued to exercise a large degree of autonomy from the government, which leads to weak institutional accountability and undermines the security apparatus’s professionalism and responsibility toward the population.
3 Tunisia’s private security industry and public-private security relations post-2010

3.1 Heightened demand for private security in post-uprising Tunisia

While the public security forces continue to dominate Tunisia’s market for force and the political discourse promulgating national stability, the active presence of private security actors in Tunisia hasn’t been limited to the realm of state security reform, nor did it emerge solely after the 2010-2011 uprising. Since the late 1970s and early 1980s, domestic PSCs in Tunisia have been slowly growing, focused primarily on basic guarding, transferring cash and offering cleaning services. The opening of many foreign businesses in the country over the last few decades ought to have boosted the young security industry; nonetheless, the former predominately called upon the state security forces to secure their premises. In the meantime, the state constituted PSCs’ prevalent client as different ministries and public institutions opted to outsource basic security and maintenance services. Carrying the burden of an immense body of public employees, some state institutions used PSCs to hire guards and cleaners for their sites on the basis of temporary contracts.

Immediately after the 2010-2011 uprising, the transitional government signed an agreement with the Tunisian General Labor Union, or UGTT, to eliminate all subcontracts between the public sector and the private companies of the service sector, especially those offering guarding and cleaning services (Kapitalis, 2011). State subcontracting security and cleaning services was reportedly outlawed due to the ill-treatment of some workers by the contracting companies. Concurrently, seeking to professionalize Tunisia’s PSCs, the state recognized security provision as distinct amidst the wider service sector. This decision required the companies that offer security services alongside a range of other services to review their foundational structure and establish separate companies that are exclusively dedicated to the provision of security (Leaders, 2011).

The 2011 agreement between the Tunisian government and the General Labor Union was presented as a triumph for the workers’ rights with a large number of cleaning workers and privately contracted guards being promised, and many eventually granted, stable public employment at the state institutions where they were formerly based. The Ministry of Health
for instance collaborated in early 2013 with the MOI to train 1200 security guards to join its staff. In June 2013, 350 guards, the first cohort of trainees, completed the training program provided by the MOI which focused on securing medical facilities, specifically from fire and theft, learning first aid practices and properly welcoming visiting citizens (Almissawy, 2013).

At present, the sustainability of the 2011 agreement seems considerably uncertain. Bacem Nasri (interview 2019), Regional Manager at Polygarde, a Tunisian PSC, claims that abolishing subcontracting by public institutions has failed. “They wanted to abolish subcontracting but finally couldn’t. They couldn’t codify that in law because the quality of the PSCs’ security guards is difficult for them to find.” By contrast, Abbas Mansouri (interview 2019), the founder of Polygarde, asserts that the 2011 agreement was effectively implemented and that no public institution in Tunisia today is officially depending on the private sector for security or cleaning services. That said, although all the security guards currently working at state institutions and public companies in Tunisia are meant to be directly affiliated to these public entities, there seem to be exceptions. Some public institutions and joint ventures allocate certain security services to PSCs such as securing parking areas, while others ask for “reinforcement from PSCs because of their specialization and the better quality of their services” (Nasri, interview 2019).

Similarly, in late 2017, the ex-Mayor of Tunis announced a decision by the city authority to allocate the security of the capital’s 15 districts to PSCs through a major tender call (Maghreb Confidential, 2018). As informed by the Municipality of Tunis (interview 2018), the municipal administration sought through this tender call “to receive offers from PSCs to provide professional guards to secure some administrative premises like the municipality of Tunis, the municipal departments and car parks.” It is worth noting that even before 2011, the municipality of Tunis didn’t depend on the Tunisian public security forces to secure these sites but instead used to hire its own security guards. At present the municipality of Tunis depends on PSCs’ guards to secure the parking spaces attached to public administration buildings (Cheich-Rouhou, interview 2019).

Despite losing many public institutions and agencies as their prime clients, Tunisia’s PSCs have developed a strong presence in the private sector as foreign companies and domestic businesses have since 2011 increasingly enlisted their services instead of relying on the public security forces. The heightened risk of militia groups across the country in recent years, paralleled by the longstanding regional “war on terror”, raised the domestic level of insecurity
and directed much of the resources of the public security forces toward “counterterrorism” efforts. This sentiment of insecurity was widely shared within the private sector. Big businesses and foreign institutions became reluctant to call on the services of the public security forces for their protection (La Presse, 2015), which translated into a growing demand for private security services. In the same vein, Hazem Ksouri, lawyer at the bar of Tunis, contends that the dual 2015 attacks “have in part ruined the confidence of the private sector in the efficiency of the Tunisian security forces” (Desorgues, 2017).

The increasing demand from the private sector led some existing PSCs to flourish with a notable expansion in their business and personnel. For example, Tunisian PSC Polygarde, established in 2006 with only four employed guards, currently operates across the country with over 400 employees (Abbas, interview 2019). Since 2011, the clients of Polygarde have grown to include petroleum and gas companies alongside big businesses and corporations. In the meantime, several new companies entered the private security market, such as Titanium Atlas Protection Agency, founded immediately after the uprising by Businessman Kamel Landousi in collaboration with two former military personnel (Maghreb Confidential, 2011). As with many PSCs in Tunisia today, Landousi’s company “offers risk assessments, security audits and installs alarms and video systems,” in addition to providing bodyguard services for important personalities and securing public events (Maghreb Confidential, 2011).

Alongside domestic PSCs, a number of foreign companies, such as Whispering Bell and Heimes, have since 2011 opened offices in Tunisia that offer security-related services. These companies are usually self-portrayed as consultancy and security risk management companies. At large, the role of the private security consultancy in Tunisia has significantly increased in the aftermath of the 2010-2011 uprising. Herbert (interview 2019) considers this development to be chiefly linked to the aforementioned “donor-driven focus on state security reform especially on building up the capacity of Tunisian security entities and structures.” Looking at some of these consultancy companies and the security services they offer, they highly resemble regular PSCs. These services include embedded security managers, secure journey management, travel security, soft target protection and site security assessments. Globally, PSCs commonly use the label of consultancy and risk management to promote a wide range of security services. It is viewed as an effective marketing strategy and occasionally a necessity to overcome domestic legal restrictions and implications pertaining to the PSI.
3.2 New dynamics of supply in Tunisia’s private security industry after the uprising

Paralleling the heightened demand for private security services in recent years, the steady growth of Tunisia’s PSI is attributed to a notable increase in supply. Speaking in 2015, Nemri, President of the National Syndicate Chamber of Security and Cash Transfer Companies, asserts that the PSI strongly enhances the national economy by protecting vital institutions and by employing thousands of young people, particularly those with humble education and no specialization (Al-Tayary, 2015). For many Tunisian youth, men and women, working as private security guards constitutes a suitable temporary placement, until a better job is found or a post in the public sector is guaranteed. Others who are passionate about security but fail to join the national security forces find in the PSI a convenient, potentially more ambitious, alternative (Ben Brika, interview 2019).

In a similar vein, the steady growth of the PSI since the uprising has attracted a large number of security and military officers, whose background and experience have guaranteed good positions in the industry. Most of the security coordinators, supervisors and managers working at big PSCs in Tunisia are either ex-military or ex-security officers. Some of these security officers join the PSI upon retirement, while others have opted for an early exit from the public security forces. Working for the PSI commonly translates into better social conditions, salaries, qualifications and career progression. Being an ex-military officer Nasri (interview 2019) remarks, “in the MOI, the objective you can achieve is known and set;” by contrast, in the PSCs, there is always room to grow and develop.

The early reshuffles that affected the public security forces following the uprising seem to have equally boosted Tunisia’s PSI, supplying the latter with new founders and personnel. The 2011 to 2015 period featured five ministers and six secretaries of state for security affairs, each having “transferred agents to new departments and proceeded to push some senior officials into early retirement” (Crisis Group, 2015, 12). To mention some examples, Farhat Rajhi, the first Minister of Interior after the uprising, “pushed 42 agents into early retirement; his successor Habib Essid between 10 and 20; Ali Laraidh, between 80 and 130; and Lotfi Ben Jeddou between 45 and 50” (Crisis Group, 2015, 12). According to Kartas (interview 2018), those officers who were dismissed were the smart ones with the skills to run a business. While some waited, hoping to rejoin the public forces amid continuous governmental changes, “others
tried to make money in the meantime and they profited from their contacts and close links with businessmen” (Kartas, interview 2018).

The security companies established by these ex-security officers, such as the Société de Protection et de Sécurité founded by Taoufik Dimassi, a senior MOI official under Ben Ali who was forced into retirement shortly after the uprising, have provided broad security services and various kinds of security analysis. In general, ex-security personnel like Dimassi, who are highly skilled and well connected in many cases, tend to have preferential access to state institutions and ministries. They are thus better positioned to secure contracts with public institutions, while potentially benefiting from weak state oversight (Kartas, interview 2018). The prime concern in this regard is the risk of abusing those positions: instead of meeting an actual need for security, outsourcing becomes a venue for personal enrichment and sharing benefits with close connections.

Alongside the expanding demand from the private businesses and the new grounds for supply, Tunisia’s PSI has actively sought since 2011 to enhance its national status and improve its services. In this vein, the National Syndicate Chamber of Security and Cash Transfer Companies (CSCTC) signed in 2015 a convention of cooperation and partnership with its French counterpart, the SNES. The CSCTC has aimed to benefit from the French model and expertise to improve its legal framework, its scope of services and the formation of its agents (UTICA, 2015). Equally in 2015, the president of CSCTC announced the chamber’s collaboration with the responsible public authorities in Tunisia to establish training centers for security services. For years, the Tunisian public has viewed security guards “as a low paying and demoralizing job,” especially as many security guards were underpaid, overworked and poorly trained (Tunisia Security Update, 2011). In this context, one of the prime purposes of these new training centers has been to improve the image of private security personnel in the Tunisian public mentality (Al-Tayary, 2015).

CSCTC’s input toward the development of the PSI in Tunisia was contested by a number of PSCs’ owners who complain about the chamber’s approach and management since 2011. Speaking of the chamber’s internal defects, Mahdi Ben Brika (interview 2019), owner of GSP, a Tunisian PSC, remarks a lack of collaboration and good relationship among the owners of different PSCs. Similarly, Abbas (interview 2019), the founder of Tunisian PSC Polygarde, criticized the confrontational line adopted by the chamber in response to the agreement reached
between the Tunisian General Labor Union and the first transitional government following the uprising. Abbas (interview 2019) affirms that this approach has heavily harmed the industry since all the PSCs’ personnel are members of the Tunisian General Labor Union and the conflict between the chamber and the union has inevitably affected the relationship between the different PSCs and their personnel.

3.3 Implications on Tunisia’s state control over the market for force

As Tunisia’s market for force continues to evolve, it is crucial to consider how the steady expansion of the PSCs impacts the relationship between public and private security providers, alongside the future of state control over the means of violence. In terms of the relationship, public security providers clearly maintain the upper hand on all grounds: training, licensing, and monitoring. For the last two years, the General Director of the Police training Samir Tarhouni has closely upheld existent regulations on the establishment and training pertaining to PSCs (Cheich-Rouhou, interview 2019). To open a new PSC, a business plan must be submitted and approved by the General Directorate of the Police training, and the security guards employed by the company must receive appropriate training at the Police academy. For existing PSCs, Tarhouni aims to have all their security guards properly trained within a year or two (Cheich-Rouhou, interview 2019). At present, all the security personnel currently employed by PSCs, including security guards, coordinators and supervisors, receive certificates from the MOI to testify to their experience and suitability to work in the industry.

When considering how a public security apparatus that is itself in serious need for reform can provide effective training to private security providers, looking at the nature of the training is key. The training currently provided to PSCs’ personnel is essentially functional: using mirrors to check that there are no explosives hidden under the cars, using metal detection tools, and so forth (Chettaoui, interview 2018). These transferable skills are not outside the capacity of the MOI: technical and easy to transfer (Herbert, interview 2017). Nevertheless, as Chettaoui (interview 2018) explains, the implementation by the private guards is not always as rigorous as it should be, which is not necessarily a fault in the training but “sometimes when you go on the field, it is a question of rigor which has to do with you being held accountable.”
The growing reliance on PSCs at major industrial sites and tourist resorts in recent years has introduced a new frame of collaboration between the private and public providers of security in Tunisia. The present environment where PSCs work, particularly in areas of high risk, entails a close engagement with the police forces and military personnel in order to receive, and occasionally exchange updates and intelligence on the security situation in these areas. In this context, the security and military background of PSCs’ personnel represents a great asset as it facilitates the coordination with the Tunisian authorities and enables the former to better meet the security needs and demands of their clients (Nasri, interview 2019).

Beside high-risk areas, the MOI also cooperates with PSCs when enlisted to secure major cultural and sports events. Founded in 2012 by Ben Brika, former member of the national anti-terrorism unit, GSP was contracted to secure the 2017 World Minifootball Federation World Cup hosted in Tunisia. As Ben Brika (interview 2019) affirms, securing this event involved a close coordination between the private security guards of GSP and the public security forces.

In terms of legal presence, the PSI in Tunisia, although smaller than its counterparts in other Arab countries, has effectively appeared in the Tunisian legal code since 2002. Legislations concerning the private provision of security are detailed in Law No. 2002-81 (Official Journal of Tunisia, 2002), modified and completed by Law No. 2008-14 (Official Journal of Tunisia, 2008), and Decree No. 2003-1090 (Official Journal of Tunisia, 2003). These legislations address, respectively, the exercise of private activities of control, guarding, transport of remittance and precious metals, and physical protection of persons, in addition to the procedures and rights of giving authorization to the exercise of these activities.

The relationship between the PSI and public security forces made several appearances in these laws. For instance, Article 4 of Law No. 2002-81 and Articles 2 of Decree No. 2003-1090 put the MOI in charge of issuing authorizations and licenses for the PSCs. As for training private security personnel, Article 11 of Law No. 2008-14 requires the PSCs to provide new recruits with “basic and continuous training in the field of activity for which they are recruited,” which is to be delivered by a relevant training center at the MOI (Official Journal of Tunisia, 2008).

The charted legislations have been criticized for lacking a clear demarcation between the provision of public and private security in terms of the scope and nature of their functions. On the one hand, the Tunisian law seeks to exclude from the activities of private security and
military companies “those that may overlap with the functions of the police or the armed forces” (OHCHR, 2014). According to Article 15 of Law No. 2002-81, the private security agents are prohibited “to intervene or participate for any reason in any act outside the limits of the mission legally assigned to them or which would be assigned to public authorities” (Official Journal of Tunisia, 2002). Similarly, the Interior Ministry does not allow its off-duty police officers to engage in any private security activities (Tunisia 2018 Crime and Safety Report).

Meanwhile, some argue that the law does not clearly distinguish between the functions of the public law enforcement agencies and the PSCs, failing for instance to indicate whether “the related rules should apply only to times of peace or to situations of armed conflict as well” (OHCHR, 2014).

Furthermore, despite the growing role of the PSCs in post-uprising security provision in Tunisia, the current legislations continue to prohibit the private guards from holding any weapons, thus limiting them to carrying sticks and using guard dogs. Many security experts within the PSI consider armament as an exclusive right of the state security forces and hence strongly oppose any prospect of providing PSCs’ employees with weapons (Ben Brika, interview 2019; Nasri, interview 2019). Other practitioners argue that without arms the private security personnel are significantly constrained in their ability to provide serious protection, especially in the case of militia attacks (Al-Tayary, 2015). Endorsing this view, the CSCTC has been strongly promoting the state revision of existent PSI legislations. The CSCTC aims to enhance the powers and room for intervention permitted to the private guards in order to effectively respond to the security requirements of key private actors across the country, including big businesses and foreign investments (Al-Tayary, 2015).

The prospect of having armed PSCs’ personnel in Tunisia is similarly contested among independent security experts. Some believe that arming private security providers in the near future is very unlikely since neither the MOI nor the general Tunisian public is ready to entrust weapons in the hands of private security actors. While the MOI has the capacity to train private security guards on basic skills, it is not ready nor does it desire to export any knowledge on arms’ use (Chettaoui, interview 2018). With the existent PSI legislations prohibiting private security guards from carrying or using arms, some experts dismiss the current need to even speculate or discuss the issue of the ability of the MOI to transfer skills concerning the use of weapons to private security guards.
Meanwhile, other experts suspect this resistance to change over time with the importance and scope of PSCs’ activities continuously expanding. As the PSI grows, Kartas (interview 2018) asserts that the PSCs’ power will increase and start providing people within the MOI and other ministries, who often complain of poor salaries and working conditions, with entrepreneurship opportunities and financial rewards. These state representatives would eventually be the ones sponsoring the law that enables arming PSCs’ personnel.

In this light, reflecting on the future of the private security market in Tunisia leads one to question whether the post-uprising Tunisian state, once it eventually overcomes continuous political reconfigurations and internal struggles, will manage to control a fully developed PSI. Similarly, how will the Tunisian society evolve when the domestic PSI really rises: will Tunisia witness the emergence of gated communities for instance? Ultimately, for domestic PSCs “the potential of abuse is always there. The question is how much power is entrusted to these authorities and how much the government is able to control” (Nisetich, interview 2018). As the PSI in Tunisia continues to grow amidst an arguably turbulent political and security environment, there is a risk that the PSCs escape the tight control of the state, especially when the government is weak and fragmented. Particularly, “these companies are going to be heavily involved in the security architecture, the daily one” (Kartas, interview 2018).

### 3.4 Outsourcing public security functions in Tunisia after the uprising

In terms of the state reliance on private security services, outsourcing public security functions is currently not part of the Tunisian agenda for security reforms (Van Vierberghe, interview 2019). The police forces are widely viewed as strong and numerous with no actual need to substitute them with any private security agents. Placing outsourcing on the security reform agenda at the current stage would, as some argue, divert attention “from the more difficult questions of reform” (Herbert, interview 2019). In the meantime, economic reforms, especially those sponsored by the programs of the International Monetary Fund, entail significant privatization of publicly provided services. Outsourcing public services is thus becoming unavoidable in Tunisia at the same time that the need for private security is continuously rising. Moreover, the spreading perception and discourse of insecurity in Tunisia means that a growing number of ordinary people and private entities are requesting private security services, notably among the wealthy who feel they are primarily targeted (Kartas, interview 2018).
At present, two domains seem closer than others to witness state security outsourcing: national airports and football stadiums. Among those pushing for the privatization of airport security in Tunisia is the founder of the Tunisian French Academy for Civil Aviation Safety and Security Training, Hassan Seddik. According to Tarak Cheich-Rouhou (interview 2019), a Tunisian journalist and writer, Seddik wanted to open a PSC with the ex-director of the counter-terrorism unit in Tunisia in order to privatize airports security. Cheich-Rouhou asserts that without a real need for it, outsourcing airport security risks introducing corruption and corporate interests to a system which, while far from perfect, still remains subject to state authorities and public monitoring.

The assessment is very different with respect to outsourcing the security of football stadiums, where several advantages are commonly identified. Privatizing the security of football stadiums generates “financial profits for different parties and alleviate the burden on the public forces” (Smida, interview 2019). More importantly, the presence of PSCs’ personnel at the stadiums would reduce unnecessary tension between the people and public security forces during football matches which usually involve a tense environment with occasional radical acts from the fans. Instead of enforcing the typically vertical relationship between the public forces and the people, deploying private security guards creates a citizen-to-citizen relationship that is seen to exhibit less tension and more understanding (Ben Brika, interview 2019). There is currently a proposal put forward to allocate the security of sports events to the PSI. This proposal doesn’t seek to substitute the public security forces with private guards, but rather outsourcing in this occasion would involve a close coordination between the public security forces and the private security personnel (Ben Brika, interview 2019).

On the whole, any move toward outsourcing security in Tunisia represents, as commentators affirm, a strong boost to the private security market, especially as the struggles of some PSCs from the pre-uprising era opened further opportunities for newly established companies to expand (Chennoufi, 2018). More importantly perhaps, unlike pre-uprising instances of outsourcing security to domestic PSCs that primarily targeted basic guarding and cleaning services, post-uprising proposals of outsourcing security seem to fall within the traditional realm of public security services. From this perspective, the post-uprising Tunisian regime would be deviating from Ben Ali’s approach with respect to public security provision, which had always been highly centralized with no recorded cases of privatization. As Hibou (2006,
197) remarks, Ben Ali’s “authoritarian regime never sought to delegate its security functions, its maritime ports or its customs service to private entities.”

In other areas of the public sector, pre-2011 cases of outsourcing have traditionally exhibited significant intervention from the state, with the state-led privatization eventually translating into “the development of corruption and the monopolization of wealth by ‘clans’ close to Ben Ali” (Hibou, 2006, 197). In this regard, privatization in the pre-uprising years was effectively “a supplementary and fundamental means of control of economic and political life by the regime” (Hibou, 2006, 198). At present, the relatively small scale of the domestic PSCs and the limited state engagement with them in terms of outsourcing core security services makes the outcome of the pre-uprising privatization in other sectors largely unlikely in the Tunisian market for force.

4 Conclusion

Recent years have witnessed non-state and private actors progressively contributing, either directly or indirectly, to the market for force in Tunisia. This growing presence has chiefly concentrated in internationally sponsored security reform projects and domestic provision of security services. With respect to state security reform, non-state and private security actors have been generally contracted by foreign governments under the scope of security assistance or in partnership with the Tunisian government. Some security experts outline flexibility in initiating and implementing security reforms as well as a greater chance to gain the trust of the recipient entity as key advantages for using PSCs in internationally sponsored security reform programs.

Meanwhile, other scholars note that outsourcing security reform projects recurrently entails prioritizing personal connections in the selection of PSCs over carefully meeting the needs of the recipient state in terms of understanding the local context and pursuing the required reforms. Ultimately, outsourcing some security reform projects in Tunisia has been shaped by considerations for the efficiency of the private security actors while equally being influenced by personnel connections and broader state policies, from the side of the Tunisian state and foreign donors alike.
More generally, the internationally sponsored security reform schemes implemented in Tunisia from 2011 onward have been diverse in nature, dynamics and outcome. Sketching the overall impact of these security reform schemes and of the involvement of non-state and private actors on the reform processes of the public security forces thus produces a multifaceted picture. On the one hand, the internationally sponsored security reform projects led to general improvements in the practices, attitude and capabilities of the Tunisian public security apparatus, as apparent in the enhanced security situation on the Tunisian borders and across the country’s territory. Meanwhile, the international approach to security reform in Tunisia has featured serious drawbacks which restricted the success of the suggested or implemented security reform projects. Among others, the collaboration between the various parties, governmental and private, contributing to the security reform projects has been largely limited and inconsistent.

Against this backdrop, the impact that the foreign-led security reform schemes had so far on reforming Tunisia’s public security forces into a more professional apparatus remains uncertain. While the efficiency of some public security units has significantly improved, the pre-uprising state-security nexus in Tunisia, alongside regional instability and domestic militia activism, have limited the reforms that target the governing structure and attitudes of the public security forces. Ultimately, the public security forces in Tunisia have continued to exercise a large degree of autonomy from the government. This has translated into weak institutional accountability and continues to undermine the public security forces’ professionalism and responsibility toward the general population.

With respect to the domestic security market, the political and security developments in Tunisia since 2011 have largely boosted the demand and supply sides alike. Notable in this regard are the frequent security reshuffles which followed the Tunisian uprising. These led to the establishment of several PSCs by Tunisian security officials who lost their positions or were temporarily put on hold. The expansion of PSCs’ activities was most visible in the private sector, particularly in the tourism and petroleum industries. PSCs, old and new, have rushed to answer a large and fairly new demand for protection put forward by key private actors and important foreign entities who felt threatened by the heightened wave of militia activities and urban crimes in the aftermath of the uprising.
In the meantime, outsourcing security services by the Tunisian state and its public institutions has generally decreased in comparison to the years preceding the uprising. This was primarily due to the agreement reached between the transitional government in early 2011 and the Tunisian General Labor Union which entailed that all public institutions will be directly hiring employees from the service sector, including security guards and cleaners, without any resort to private subcontracting companies. Nonetheless, despite the Tunisian PSI losing major contracts with state institutions, working with the private sector has offered the growing industry a great boost and strong motive to develop its services and increase its powers.

In a parallel development, the post-uprising years have witnessed a new collaborative relationship between the public and private security providers due to the latter’s deployment in high-risk areas and sites of mass gathering including major cultural and sports events. Meanwhile, the public security forces continue to occupy a clearly superior status, being responsible of training, licensing and monitoring domestic PSCs and their personnel. This arrangement is codified by law, with a clear prohibition on PSCs’ personnel to carry or use arms. At present, state reliance on PSCs is very limited. Outsourcing public security functions is not part of the Tunisian security reform agenda since the public security forces are widely viewed as strong and numerous with no actual need to substitute them with any private forces.

Nonetheless, the move to outsource public services at large is becoming progressively unavoidable in Tunisia paralleled by a constantly rising need for private security. Faced with severe economic hardships since 2011, Tunisia has gradually introduced a series of reforms that entailed significant privatization of publicly provided services. Moreover, the spreading perception and discourse of insecurity in the country has meant that an increasing number of ordinary people and private entities are requesting private security services. Ultimately, with the private security market in Tunisia continuing to grow amidst an arguably turbulent political and security environment, there is a risk that the PSCs may potentially escape the tight control of the Tunisian state, especially at times when the government is weak and fragmented.
Chapter 5 - Outsourcing Security amid Social and Political Unrest: The Case of Egypt

1 Introduction

The security environment in Egypt has been profoundly reconfigured in the aftermath of the 25th January 2011 uprising. The heightened militia activities across the country and the continuous struggle of the regime to ensure its control over an increasingly agitated population, has led, as explored in chapter 3, to numerous changes across the state security institutions and the modes of interaction among them. In the meantime, Egypt has experienced intense commodification of security as it became a scarce service actively sought by different sectors of the society and institutions of the state. From 2011 onward, Egypt has thus been site to a booming security market where social, economic and political factors mingle and compete.

For many ordinary citizens and business actors, using private security companies (PSCs) is an unavoidable solution for a crisis of competence and trust in the state security forces. For others, PSCs seem less corrupt, more efficient and relatively neutral within a large political struggle, between the people and the police forces whose first objective is to protect the regime through public oppression. Relying on PSCs, instead of requesting the services of the state security forces, is how many local businesses and international companies simply avoid the risk of falling into this political struggle and being subsequently harmed. Meanwhile, the question of who secure “the locals, the work sites, the institutions, the facilities, the resources, the equipment and all the things that need security,” is integral to state power and control (Lawrence, interview 2018).

In this light, this chapter investigates what forms outsourcing security has taken since the uprising, for what purposes and how they impacted the current regime and its relationship to the citizenry. At large, the chapter traces the development of the private security industry (PSI) in Egypt since its launch in the late 1970s until today, with particular focus on the post-2010 period and the political and economic features shaping this development. To do so, the chapter
starts by introducing the industry and examining the legal status of PSCs in Egypt and their relationship to public security providers and the military institution.

The following part explores the post-uprising expansion of the PSI in Egypt and outlines Falcon Group International, an Egyptian PSC, as a leading player in the market with a special attachment to the current regime. The chapter then speaks to the public-private relationship within the PSI by presenting some of the prominent cases of outsourcing security pursued by the Egyptian regime in recent years. Building on these examples, the chapter proceeds to scrutinize some of the explanations and implications attached to the rising phenomenon of outsourcing security in Egypt today. This part essentially addresses what outsourcing security brings to the Egyptian regime and to what effect on regime security and interests, and on political dissent.

2 Brief history and legal framework

2.1 The birth of the private security industry in Egypt

The first PSC to operate in Egypt, ‘Care Services,’ opened in 1979 in response to an official request for private protection from the United States’ Embassy in Cairo, previously secured by the Egyptian Police and the United States’ Marine forces. From then onward, the PSI has steadily grown in scope and scale in line with wider political and economic developments in the country. The aftermath of the 1973 war, which brought the Egyptian-Israeli conflict to a halt, followed by the signing of the Camp David treaty in 1979, resulted in unexpected waves of early retirement among Egypt’s military personnel. Subsequently, “a large pool of human resources was suddenly made available to provide expertise” for the emerging PSI (Abdelrahman, 2016). In the meantime, the flourishment of the industry coincided with profound state transformations that changed the structure and dynamics of Egypt’s economy ever since. Egypt’s open-door policy, or ‘Infitah’, adopted by Egypt’s President Anwar Sadat in 1974, Law No. 43, came to replace a government-managed economy, viewed as inefficient and ineffective, set up by Sadat’s predecessor Gamal Abdel Nasser (McLaughlin, 1978). With the ‘Infitah’ a largely latent private sector was resurrected.
Following the footsteps of other industries in the private sector, security services companies have gradually expanded, benefiting particularly from the growth of international businesses opening in the country, who represented the former’s chief clients. The private security market in Egypt was attractive to domestic and international actors alike. In 2001, G4S Plc, the world’s largest security company, established G4S Secure Solutions Egypt as a subsidiary of G4S Plc in the country. G4S Plc entered the growing Egyptian security market through late Major General Sameh Seif El Yazal, an ex-military and intelligence service officer, who served as chairman of G4S Secure Solutions Egypt until late 2014 and was a member of the 2015 Egyptian parliament (Ahram Online, 2016). G4S Secure Solutions Egypt rapidly expanded to currently have 6 branches across Egypt with over 6000 employees (Abdelallah, 2015).

Catching up with G4S Plc, Securitas, the world’s second biggest security services company, entered Egypt’s PSI in 2008 by purchasing Global Partner Services Ltd founded by Ahmed Emam in 2006 (Securitas, 2018). In addition to core security services such as static and specialized guarding alongside training and integrated security systems, the company offers a wide range of products including CCTV Cameras, intelligence software, metal gate detectors and X-Ray equipment. With a guard force of 2000 personnel and an annual turnover exceeding 50 million Egyptian pounds, Securitas Egypt currently operates across the Egyptian territory serving a diverse set of clients including factories, schools, offices, retail and tourism, oil and gas, among others (Securitas, 2018).

Seeing the notable profitability of the private security market in Egypt, the public security institutions have since the 1980s gradually built a strong presence in the industry: establishing their own companies, becoming partners in existing PSCs, and making security personnel overwhelmingly in charge of PSCs’ administrative boards. Essentially, the Egyptian state “didn’t want this industry to be outside its control so it started entering into and infiltrating” the industry (El Raggal, interview 2018). The military institution in particular has occupied a dominant position within the flourishing PSI.

At large, the Egyptian army has since the 1950s developed its own economic empire, exercising considerable formal and direct control over the country’s economy, including ownership of companies which are involved in the security of the public and private sectors alike (Lawrence, interview 2018). In 1982 for instance, the National Service Projects Organization, affiliated to the Ministry of Defense, established El Nasr for Services and Maintenance, also called Queen
Service, to offer a variety of services comprising security, guarding and management of tourist facilities. The National Service Projects Organization was itself established in 1979 “for the sake of achieving the relative self-sufficiency of the armed forces’ requirements as well as locally and internationally marketing the surplus” of the army’s products (National Service Projects Organization, 2017).

Prior to the 2011 uprising and continuing into the present, Queen service has represented a leading player in the country’s PSI. The company clearly symbolizes the fusion of the public and private sectors in Egypt: being fully owned by the military institution yet acting in the country’s security market like a normal private company. For many scholars, this type of companies, security providers as well as those in other industries, defy the very definition of private. As William Lawrence, ex-Associate Director of Control Risk’s Middle East and North Africa division, remarks (interview 2018), “Something that is controlled so fundamentally down to its establishment by the public agencies isn’t there for private. You have to call it something else: public-private or parastatal, and there is a whole history of parastatal establishments in Africa and contexts that are problematic.”

2.2 The legal history of the private security industry in Egypt

Between the 1970s and 2015, the Egyptian state used Law 68 of 1970 on private guards to regulate the activities of personnel employed by domestic and foreign PSCs. The law focused on the question of licenses, requiring private security guards to acquire a three-year renewable license from the public security head in the governorate where they are stationed. As for the issues of personnel training and accountability, these were neither considered in Law 68 nor in any of the other laws used to regulate the different aspects of the industry (Carr and Adam, 2013). Moreover, the PSCs as a distinct type of companies were nowhere mentioned in the Egyptian legal system.

Security companies used to legally register as commercial entities, which made their establishment a relatively easy and quick process (Alessandro and Piazzese, 2014). According to the Head of Egyptian PSC Risk Free, Ihab Youssef, private security personnel used to have no legal authority nor were they required to fulfill any official training program, including those who applied for firearm licenses. Youssef equally notes that while the functions performed by
PSCs’ personnel have for decades been chiefly organizational—working inside premises like embassies, banks or private clubs—the post-2010 new security environment imposed a more pronounced role for these agents, as currently witnessed in public universities, where they are “pushed closer toward the gate to assume a greater role as security guards” (Tarek, 2014).

The first attempt to formally include PSCs into the Egyptian legal framework after the 2011 uprising took place in the Egyptian parliament in March 2013. Former head of the labor committee in the People’s Assembly and leading member of the Muslim Brotherhood’s Freedom and Justice Party, Saber Abul-Fotouh, put forward a proposal for a draft legislation that would allow the state to use PSCs for domestic policing duties (Al-Tawy, 2013). The draft law addressed multiple aspects of the private provision of security including personnel training, issuing licenses and state monitoring the industry’s activities. Unlike previous legislation, the draft law made licenses mandatory for the companies and guards alike, to be acquired from the Ministry of Interior (MOI) for a sum of 100,000 and 200 Egyptian pounds respectively, and to be renewed every three years (Carr and Adam, 2013). In relation to the private security personnel, together with fulfilling a set of criteria—being literate, over 21 years old, physically capable to perform the job, and having completed the military service or having obtained an exemption—private security guards must acquire special training in the security service which they intent to provide (Carr and Adam, 2013).

The proposal essentially emerged amid a prolonged nationwide strike by a significant number of police officers. It represented one of different alternative means put forward by the administration of Mohamed Morsi to respond to the police forces’ unwillingness to fully resume their duties amid growing lawlessness and crime. The proposal was met with a wave of severe criticism from various political factions, who largely accused Morsi’s administration, and the Muslim Brotherhood more specifically, of seeking “to build parallel security structures and Islamic morality police” (Sayigh, 2015a, 6). For instance, outraged rights activists and leading figures from the opposition accused the proposed legislation of being a means invoked by the Muslim Brotherhood to consolidate its “grip on state institutions and effectively legalize Brotherhood-formed militias” (Al-Tawy, 2013).

Similarly, former head of the Egyptian Judges Club, Zakareya Abdel-Aziz, claimed that the state resorting to PSCs could trigger civil war, by replacing “institutionalized security operations with popular, non-technical [security] operations” (Al-Tawy, 2013). Furthermore,
and despite sharing the Freedom and Justice Party’s concerns over the police forces’ strikes, especially in upper Egypt, Al-Gamaa Al-Islamiya equally rejected the 2013 draft legislation. The group argued that instead of hiring private security agents to preserve public security, the people themselves ought to take charge of safeguarding the state. In this vein, they proposed forming “unarmed popular committees”, otherwise labelled security militias, which would be answerable to the Interior Ministry and mandated to confront thuggery and vandalism (Revkin, 2013).

Contrary to the outlined disapproval exhibited across the political spectrum, members of the Egyptian PSI actively welcomed the Freedom and Justice Party’s proposal. Speaking in April 2013, the Security Division Manager General of Care Services, Abdel Rahman Bahgat, criticized the status of the private security market as being highly unregulated and full of untrained and unqualified security personnel (Carr and Adam, 2013). He asserted that numerous security companies, including Care Services, have for over 20 years campaigned for the kind of market regulations advanced by this draft law. At the end, the proposal was put before the Shura Council in early April 2013 but failed to proceed further (Carr and Adam, 2013).

The second attempt to regulate the booming market came in July 2015, in the form of a presidential decree, amid a series of national insecurity events, including the bombing of the Italian Consulate in Cairo, the assassination of Prosecutor General Hisham Barakat and several militant attacks in North Sinai. Instead of a draft law to be discussed, debated and voted on in the Egyptian parliament, the new regulation took the form of a presidential decree issued by Abdel-Fattah El-Sisi himself. The presidential decree for Law 86 of 2015 extended beyond the usual aspects of private security regulations, such as training, monitoring and issuing licenses, to provide the Ministries of Interior and Defense, together with the General Intelligence Agency, with the legal power to establish their own private security companies (Mostafa, 2015). The second clause of the law reads (Egypt’s President, 2015),

> Without being bound by the provisions of this law, the Ministries of Defense and Interior, the agencies affiliated to them, and the General Intelligence, are permitted to establish companies for the security of establishments and money transfer.

Security experts largely consider this clause to be merely normalizing an already established situation. As aforementioned the Egyptian military institution has for years been active in the
private security market, amid a wider set of private services provision. The other public security institutions however didn’t have that formal power to take part in the private security market before, which the new law clearly enable them to do. Unlike the Ministry of Defense, prior to this law the MOI and the intelligence services used to infiltrate PSCs but didn’t publicly own any of them. Now by allowing all state security institutions to create their own PSCs, the current regime is seeking to further reduce its public services and permanently turn them into private services, through which to generate profit (El Raggal, interview 2018).

In addition to institutional ownership, the law equally grants former military personnel and police officers an unconditional access to the administrative positions at PSCs. As the regulations of the new law, elaborated in MOI Decree 133 of 2016 (Ministry of Interior, 2016), specify,

It is required of the managing director of the security company to have received a certificate of experience of no less than 3 years endorsed from one of the companies licensed to work in this sector; or to have passed a two-week training course in the field of guarding enterprises and transferring money at the National Centre for Guarding at the MOI; or to be a former officer of the armed forces or the police or the general intelligence service.

Furthermore, the 2015 law limits the activities of licensed security companies to the protection of establishments and money transport, thus prohibiting them from engaging in any other business activities or provision of services. This legal addition is worth noting because many of the well-established PSCs in Egypt, including the military-owned Queen Service, have for years been offering a diverse range of services that exceed the scope of physical security and protection. Additionally, the 2015 law requires all security companies to be fully owned by Egyptian citizens and to limit their operations to the Egyptian territories, which has particularly placed the two internationally affiliated PSCs currently operating in Egypt, G4S Secure Solutions Egypt and Securitas Egypt, at a seemingly problematic position. In this regard, examining how these companies have managed to continuously maintain their presence in the private security market in Egypt sheds light on the dynamic relationship between the state and powerful actors within the PSI, alongside the wider development of the security market.

Acknowledging the continuous growth of Egypt’s private security market and the notable market value of operating in the country, G4S Secure Solutions Egypt has undergone a number
of procedures to work around and adapt to the new legal framework. To start, the company split into two separate branches, one of them dedicated to the two services mentioned in the law—manned security and cash transport—and following the 100% Egyptian ownership regulation. The transfer of ownership for the, legally speaking, G4S Secure Solutions Egypt PSC branch has been a lengthy process of over three years. Nonetheless, a G4S senior manager asserts (Interviewee 1, 2018),

Our owners and decision-makers see a future in Egypt. We have thus conformed to the law by looking for new partners and we have been extremely successful at it. The law is the law and it is not something that you could ignore, and we respect it. As a multinational company that is what we must do.

Manned security and cash transfer aside, the new law is silent on all the other aspects of security services, including facilities management, system security and access control. For these technical security services, G4S Secure Solutions Egypt, together with many other security companies in the domestic security market, have continued to offer them in Egypt but not through their registered PSC branches (Interviewee 1, 2018).

3 The private security industry in Egypt from 2011 onward

3.1 The impact of the 2011 uprising on Egypt’s private security market

Since the January 2011 uprising the growth of the private security market in Egypt has notably hastened, in terms of profit making, scope of activities, number of suppliers and clients, among other factors. In 2014, the Head of PSC Risk Free estimated the Egyptian security market to encompass around 600 companies (Tarek, 2014). As a G4S senior manager describes, the PSI in Egypt is embryonic and continuously learning with a growing emphasis on developing criteria and standards (Interviewee 1, 2018). The PSCs are realizing that large corporations and multinationals have particular requirements to their security and security management. “The industry is competitive around costs, but there are many who are willing to spend a little more” to get advanced services and better service quality (Interviewee 1, 2018).
To date, there is no official record on the exact number of PSCs operating in the country because they have traditionally been registered as commercial entities, with many of them offering other services in addition to security. Moreover, a significant number of security providers in Egypt are not officially registered. In 2013, Karim Ennarah, a researcher at Egyptian NGO Initiative for Personal Rights, estimated that over 200 unregistered PSCs operate in the country (Marroushi and Shahine, 2013).

The 2011 uprising initially created a public environment of chaos and insecurity, where temporarily missing and generally dysfunctional policing went hand in hand with the growth of the private market for force, as private security actors, including formal security companies and hired thugs, rushed to fill the security vacuum (Sayigh, 2016, 27; Carr and Adam, 2013). The period between 2011 and 2013 witnessed a significant segment of the police forces’ personnel frequently going on strikes to demand higher wages and better equipment (Marroushi and Shahine, 2013). Meanwhile, the gradual return of the police forces to its duties, as the momentum of the uprising gradually declined, hardly improved the general sentiment of public insecurity, because the public trust in state security competence has been heavily compromised.

Against this background, the demand for private security services has been on the rise, making the security market at odds with the general decline in the domestic economy. The financial accomplishment of this growing security industry in recent years has been remarkable. Two years into the post-uprising era, experts already estimated the monthly income of the private security market to reach “billions of pounds” (Marroushi and Shahine, 2013). In April 2013, the Operations Manager of Egyptian PSC Care Services, Mohamed Eissa, noted an increase of 10% in his company’s business since the uprising (Carr and Adam, 2013); while G4S Plc mentioned in 2012 a double-digit jump in revenue from Egypt. Similarly, the Head of Securitas Egypt, Ahmed Emam, revealed in 2013 that his branch accomplished a 33% increase in revenue equivalent to 40 million Egyptian pounds (Marroushi and Shahine, 2013).

Some of the newly established security companies equally signed some very profitable contracts, strongly positioning themselves in the growing security market. Firewall Security Consultants, established in 2012 by Hesham Samy, a former Navy officer, is a good example
of these newcomers. Following violent incidents at the Nile City Towers in Cairo\(^9\) in August 2012, Firewall Security Consultants’ personnel were hired to secure the towers. Each guard received a monthly salary of 6,000 Egyptian pounds, corresponding to triple the average family income in Egypt at that time (Marroushi and Shahine, 2013).

Alongside the prevalent boom of the PSI since 2011, the industry’s role during the uprising is equally worth noting. As the security situation deteriorated quickly during the 18 days of the 2011 uprising and uncertainty about the future status of the political situation in Egypt intensified, a significant number of foreigners quickly opted to leave the country. Profit-wise, security companies charged between $5,000 and $300,000 for evacuation missions, depending on the security service provided, which ranged from a simple security escort to the airport to “the charter of a jumbo jet and a 15-man armed security team” (Hope, 2011).

In this context, a joint venture between international security companies Control Risks and International SOS was deployed to evacuate “hundreds of expatriate businessmen and their families” as early as the sixth day of the uprising (Hope, 2011). Similarly, G4S Secure Solutions Egypt conducted large-scale evacuations and relocations at the beginning of the uprising, the biggest of which had over 300 people in Cairo escorted from Maadi to downtown to the Cairo International Airport (American Chamber of Commerce in Egypt, 2011). Overall, G4S Secure Solutions Egypt evacuated 1,000 people. As noted by G4S Secure Solutions Egypt ex-managing director Mohamed Ezeldin, the company’s ties with the military represented a great asset in facilitating the operations, the majority of which were under the supervision of ex-military personnel (American Chamber of Commerce in Egypt, 2011).

3.2 The uncontested rise of Falcon Group International

Amid this quickly evolving market for force in Egypt, Falcon Group International, an Egyptian joint venture security company, has in recent years occupied a distinctive position within the public discourse and the vibrant political environment. Unlike new actors in the security

\(^9\) The Fairmont Nile City hotel was violently attacked in August 2012 leaving one assailant dead, a security guard hospitalized and extensive destruction of property. The attack followed tensions between the Nile City Towers business complex, which includes the Fairmont Nile City hotel and has been viewed as an icon of Egypt’s shift to a private-sector economy since opening in 2003, and local residents of the Boulaq Abul Ela district, one of the most impoverished and expansive slum areas in Cairo, with the width of a parking lot separating the luxury facility from the informal settlements (Benman, 2012).
market, Falcon Group International’s history goes back to 1974, when it was established under the Commercial International Bank’s security and safety department in charge of money transportation. In 2006, Falcon Group International branched out as an independent security company, with the Commercial International Bank being its chief investor (Rabie, 2016). Today the company resembles a public-private conglomerate with The Civil Aviation Ministry and other state institutions owning 80% of the company’s assets (Rabie, 2016). Being largely state-owned enables the company to get contracts much easier than other companies in the security market (Elrefai, interview 2018), as well as being involved in assignments that seem to carry significant political weight. As noted by Sherif Mohy Elddeen (interview 2018), a scholar on security and transitional justice in the Middle East, “choosing Falcon Group International is certainly related to who Falcon Group International is and not to its effectiveness.”

Beginning with 261 employees, the company’s personnel jumped to 6000 within three years, as the company gradually shifted into a holding company. With over 15000 employees, Falcon Group International currently encompass five companies: “one for physical security, one for cash transit, one for equipment, one for general services and one for tourism” (Worldfolio, 2016). In 2016, the CEO of Falcon Group International, Sherif Khaled, claimed that the company’s share of the domestic security market has reached 56% (Worldfolio, 2016). The company offers a diverse set of private security services to a number of banks and financial institutions, among other actors, including physical security, cash transit, security equipment, general services and tourism, as it currently operates in more than 1500 locations across the Egyptian territories (Falcongroupinternational.org, 2017).

In terms of competence, the company’s CEO asserts that Falcon Group International invests 25% of its budget in employee training, which takes place in Egypt and abroad, and encompasses all employees, including active guards and even cleaners (Worldfolio, 2016). Relatedly, an agreement was reached in 2016 between Falcon Group International and Restrata, a British security company, which involves the provision of training to 7,000 security guards as well as “collaborating on establishing a training facility for private security guards in Egypt” (Rabie, 2016).

Among the chief clients of Falcon Group International, major state institutions and personnel stand out, contracting the company on a frequent basis and for diverse assignments. As closely
examined in the coming part, the Ministry of Education hired Falcon Group International to secure the gates of several public universities at the beginning of the 2014-2015 academic year, and continuing into the present, for a sum of over 84 million Egyptian pounds. Similarly, anticipating a high level of tension to accompany a football match between Egypt and Tunisia in September 2014, the Ministry of Defense placed Falcon Group International in charge of securing the event attended by nearly 15000 fans (Alessandro and Piazzese, 2014).

Additionally, Falcon Group International was hired to secure two military candidates during their presidential campaigns, Ahmed Shafiq during the 2012 elections (Abdelallah, 2015), and El-Sisi in 2014, as well as protecting the latter’s electoral headquarter in New Cairo (Rabie, 2016). Moreover, Falcon Group International personnel participated in the inauguration of the New Suez Canal\(^{10}\) in August 2015. To ensure the security of the event, the company claims to have used the latest explosive detectors and remote detection, which according to the company’s CEO were provided by Falcon Group International without any charge (Mounir, 2015).

The political weight attached to some of the assignments given to Falcon Group International led experts and ordinary people alike to presume a special relationship between the company and the Egyptian regime, particularly under the presidency of El-Sisi (Alessandro and Piazzese, 2014). At large, Falcon Group International is considered to be owned by, or closely affiliated to, the intelligence services in Egypt. As Egyptian journalist Passant Rabie remarks (interview 2018),

> Just by visiting Falcon Group International’s headquarter, with the barbed wire around the building, and the fact that they own a three-story building in New Cairo, you can see that there is a lot of money going into it, and you can easily tell from years of contact that the security guards are military officers.

In a similar vein, Ahmed Elbaqry (interview 2018), Ex-Vice President of the Egyptian University Students Union, perceives the company as “the private armed group that is responsible to tighten the regime’s control on a large scale over the pillars of the state.”

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\(^{10}\) The “New Suez Canal” refers to a major expansion of the Suez Canal, which connects the Mediterranean Sea to the Red Sea through the Isthmus of Suez since its inauguration in 1869. The “New Suez Canal”, opened in August 2015, deepens the main waterway and provides ships with a 35km channel parallel to it. The digging of the parallel waterway lasted a year and costed £5.3bn.
By contrast, Tarek Elrefai (interview 2018), whose ticketing and event management company ‘El Mudaraj’ contributed alongside Falcon Group International to securing a major sport event in 2016, asserts that Falcon Group International doesn’t depend on the police force but employ private guards who are neither from the police forces nor the military. At the end, although the exact relationship between Falcon Group International and the current Egyptian regime, especially the country’s president, remains undefined, the privileged position acquired by the company, as reflected in its domination of Egypt’s PSI and its exclusive selection for all the major contracts of outsourcing security, is beyond contestation. As elaborated in subsequent parts of this chapter, being recurrently favored by different state institutions and given responsibility of critical security assignments largely support the narrative of a special relationship between Falcon Group International and the current regime.

4 Public-private relations within Egypt’s market for force

The post-uprising years, particularly from 2013 onward, have seen a notable expansion of state reliance on the services of PSCs across all sectors. Outsourcing security has extended to street surveillance projects; digital surveillance and physical guarding of public metro stations; security of electricity and transmission towers; and guarding major national events such as the inauguration of the New Suez Canal project. Interestingly, PSCs’ personnel were equally hired to perform non-security public functions such as collecting electricity meter readings and bills (Abdel Qader, 2017). Involving the PSCs in this capacity, instead of privatizing the electricity sector as a whole or allocating this function to a non-security firm, raises several concerns including the required access to citizens’ data and the risk of using violence to enforce payment.

Other cases of state outsourcing security that attracted considerable domestic and international attention encompass airport security, large-scale public surveillance schemes and the surveillance of public spaces of worship. Equally noteworthy was the deployment of PSCs at public universities and football stadiums which became highly contentious due to the unique nature of these two public spaces: sites of frequent mass mobilization that gather representatives of the Egyptian society at large, carry a dark history of confrontations between the public security forces and segments of the population before and after the 2011 uprising, and attract considerable international attention from state and non-state actors alike. Some of
these examples of outsourcing security are briefly discussed below, before closely examining the two latter cases where social-political tensions and repression of dissent have been prevalent. The following part of the chapter then engages in scrutinizing the rationale and objectives of state outsourcing security in Egypt using some of the discussed examples alongside others.

4.1 Securing Egypt’s airports and restoring the country’s international image

In general, maintaining a strong airport security system is integral to a regime’s stability and by extension to its ability to adapt and navigate turbulent periods. A robust airport security enhances a country’s international image and strengthens a country’s economy by boosting tourism, encouraging business visits and assuring a safe air shipping of goods. In this light, airport security has, in recent years, constituted a serious concern for the Egyptian regime, following the crash of the Russian flight over the Sinai Peninsula in October 2015. Being a main channel of contact with the outside world and a mirror to the country’s security capabilities and internal strength, upgrading airport security and enhancing safety measures at Egypt’s airports became unavoidable for the country to restore international confidence after a number of major countries interrupted their flights to Egypt.

In this context, PSCs have played a significant role in upgrading Egypt’s airports’ security. To start, the Egyptian state hired Control Risks, a British security company, in December 2015 to review and evaluate the security arrangements at the Cairo International Airport and Sharm el-Sheikh Airport (Rabie, 2015). According to Control Risks’ CEO for the Middle East and North Africa, Andreas Carleton-Smith, his company’s role was to “assist the Egyptian government in ensuring that security at these airports meets international best practice and governance standards” (Egyptian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2015; Ahram Weekly, 2015). Control Risks’ mandate has equally entailed “periodical reviews of Egypt’s airport security [to] assess whether recommendations have been implemented or not” (Rabie, 2015).

Despite the growing private security market inside the country, the Egyptian government didn’t approach any of the domestic PSCs to contribute to the assessment of its airports’ security. This decision triggered contradictory reactions among local actors. The head of Egyptian PSC Risk Free, also Control Risks’ national representative, criticized the government for not
consulting with the PSCs’ division at the Egyptian Chamber of Commerce (Rabie, 2015). Meanwhile, the chairman and managing director of Royal Manta Travel, a local travel agency, praised the government’s choice to hire an international PSC, deeming the local security market as lacking the appropriate capabilities, and claiming that having an international company involved will positively enhance Egypt’s image as a secure country worldwide (Rabie, 2015).

Control Risks’ assessment of the status of security at Egypt’s airports was never publicized; however, the CEO of Falcon Group International claimed that among Control Risks’ recommendations was the use of PSCs to enhance security procedures at the airports (Rabie, 2016). Subsequently, in August 2016 and after months of increasing domestic and international doubts concerning security measures at Egypt’s airports, the Egyptian government allocated, albeit partially, the security management of the Cairo International Airport and Sharm el-Sheikh Airport to Falcon Group International.

Falcon Group International’s CEO took pride in his company being chosen without evoking any competitive mechanism to include other companies from the domestic security market. Meanwhile, the Head of PSC Risk Free condemned the absence of a public tender, or even the creation of “a consortium of private companies or several companies (to) take on different airports for there to be some form of competition” (Rabie, 2016). It is worth noting here that the state’s preference and direct selection of Falcon Group International in the case of managing airports’ security had a precedence in outsourcing the security of public universities where the Ministry of Education also hired Falcon Group International without putting out “a public bid for the contract or consult[ing] other security companies” (Alessandro and Piazzese, 2014).

4.2 Public surveillance and places of worship

Similar to how securing national airports is integral to regime security, building extensive webs of public surveillance, as explored in chapters 2 and 3, is widely practiced across authoritarian regimes to expand the regime’s public reach, tighten its control over the people’s private lives, and establish more advanced and quicker tracking mechanisms of political dissent. Private actors enlisted in this capacity thus directly or indirectly become tools and facilitators of regime security as their services enable autocratic regimes to install fear from the regime among the
people while preempting against potential channels of social and political mobilization. In this light, Egypt’s pursuit for widespread public surveillance has witnessed the regime’s reliance on foreign PSCs, especially for the purchase of advanced surveillance technologies. A famous case was recorded in early July 2016 when the hacking of the Milan-based Hacking Team, an Italian surveillance firm, revealed an active contract with the Egyptian Ministry of Defense.

Selling intrusion and surveillance tools, the Milan-based Hacking Team was hired in 2012, according to an invoice found among the leaked documents, for a sum of 58,000 euros which was addressed to Egypt-based company GNSE Group. GNSE, owned by Mansour Group, is believed to be one among many private companies that serve as mediators between the Egyptian government and private security and surveillance companies, as direct interaction is typically avoided (Mada Masr, 2015). The Egyptian authority’s use of the Remote Control System, a “sophisticated computer spyware marketed and sold exclusively to governments by Milan-based Hacking Team,” first appeared in a report produced by the Citizen Lab, an interdisciplinary laboratory based at the University of Toronto, in February 2014 (Marczak et al., 2014).

Acknowledging the repressive approach taken by the Egyptian state against social and political dissent, particularly the state’s constant abuse of citizens’ privacy through the use of sophisticated surveillance technologies and digital spywares, the European Parliament issued a resolution in January 2015, calling for “an EU-wide ban on the export to Egypt of intrusion and surveillance technologies which could be used to spy on and repress citizens; [and] a ban on the export of security equipment or military aid that could be used in the suppression of peaceful protest or against the EU’s strategic and security interests” (European Parliament, 2015). In the meantime, the July 2016 hacking of the Milan-based Hacking Team, which reveals that the firm’s contract with the Egyptian Ministry of Defense is still active, marks a clear indication that the European Parliament resolution was not respected.

Continuing with the Egyptian regime’s efforts to expand public surveillance, public spaces of worship have in recent years become among the prominent targets. Under the flag of Egypt’s “counterterrorism campaign” launched by El-Sisi in the aftermath of the 2013 coup d’état, the Minister of Endowments Mohamed Jumaa announced in August 2016, during a joint anti-terrorism coordinating conference, that the Endowments Ministry is contracting PSCs for mosques’ surveillance. Jumaa outlined three objectives for establishing and outsourcing
security systems in public mosques. These include “to respond to advocates of militancy and extremism inside mosques, to ensure imams are fully dedicated to preaching, and to keep out books that incite violence” (Saied, 2016). In this context, surveillance cameras would be placed around and at the mosques’ gates to monitor terrorist and bombing operations, as well as inside the buildings to oversee all activities carried out by the imams and workers, including religious lessons and Friday sermons, in order to ensure mosques’ commitment to the ministry’s statements (Cairo Post, 2015; Saied, 2016).

The surveillance of public spaces of worship makes a clear case for the developing bond between the Egyptian state’s use of PSCs and the prevalence of the fight against “terrorism” as a central theme that underlines the state narrative and its political strategy of adaptation in recent years. Similarly, fighting “terrorism” and contributing to public security has been core to the discourse advanced by different members of the PSI in Egypt since 2013. For instance, the CEO of Falcon Group International has recurrently portrayed his company as part of civil society: serving the state and contributing to public safety against threats of “terrorism” and public disorder.

Commenting on the state’s efforts to reestablish order and stability, Falcon Group International’s CEO explained (Worldfolio, 2016),

> We are currently in a state of war on terrorism, and completely committed to this fight. We need the private security services to fill the gap and ensure a full range of protection. This does not mean that the public forces lack skill or power in providing security; there are other points which they need to address. What the private security companies do is pick up the slack to let the government do its job in consolidating national security and fighting terrorism and crime.

A similar view was expressed by Retired Major General Badawy Abdel Wahab, a former policeman who established his own PSC, United Group Security Services, in 2012. Carrying 25 years of experience in the public security services, Abdel Wahab stressed his desire to contribute to the country’s stability “by helping out the Ministry of Interior and the police force, attempting to make people feel secure again” (Rabie, 2014).
4.3 Outsourcing security at critical sites of social and political unrest

4.3.1 Controlling the university campuses and the student movement

Amid the various cases of outsourcing security that followed the 2011 uprising, securing public universities chiefly stands out. Two background factors are at stake in order to fully comprehend state outsourcing security in this area. Historically, university students have always played a critical role in expressing social discontent, confronting colonial policies and advocating freedom and independence. In early 2011, the uprising didn’t start in the universities, nevertheless “the backbone of the uprising were the generation of students and recent graduates, who used to protest under Mubarak during the previous decade” (Mady, interview 2018). Essentially, the 2011 uprising was a political movement built upon the youth and the students.

In this light, since 2011, and particularly following the ousting of President Morsi in July 2013, public universities have been sites to continuous students’ unrest and significant opposition movement. Politically active students have regularly staged protests and demonstrations, on and off campuses, highly disrupting the flow of the educational process and posing a heavy burden on the post-coup regime. Political activism was supplemented by a wider mental and social environment of distress among the students who have increasingly lacked a positive vision for the future and grown discontent with the current regime (Mady, interview 2018).

With respect to the regime’s response, there was an initial, short-lived, hesitation to use the police forces to suppress the student movement due to a 2010 court decision which prohibited the police forces from entering the universities’ campuses except when crimes are committed. Nonetheless, the 2013 Protest Law, which makes any demonstration illegal unless sanctioned by the police forces (Ahram Online, 2013), eventually enabled the public security forces to swiftly intervene on the universities’ campuses when large protests take place. Police violence couldn’t however fully counter the students’ mobilization, especially during its organizational phase. Elbaqry (interview 2018) recounts that as students’ demonstrations gained momentum and amplified, “state security forces couldn’t control the students inside the universities, they thus took the decision to break into the campuses and establish military units inside the universities.”
Moreover, in October 2014, Egypt’s president declared that all public and vital facilities in the country, encompassing public universities, shall be subject to the jurisdiction of the military and that any crime or offense committed inside them would be referred to the military courts (Daily News Egypt, 2016). Subsequently, the 2014-2015 academic year witnessed 89 students being tried before the military courts (Linn, 2015). Furthermore, intensive security measures were introduced to public universities including “the installation of steel walls, barbed wire, metal detectors and CCTV, backed by a heavy-handed security presence in and around campuses” (Al Jazeera, 2014).

In many respects, the 2014-2015 academic year was a turning point in the post-2010 intense confrontations between dissident students and the public security forces as the Egyptian regime eventually opted for “a more subtle approach: quietly silencing critical academics, narrowing the scope of academic research, and instilling a spirit of fear across campuses” (Linn, 2015). Furthermore, Elbaqry (interview 2018) argues that state repression at public universities was “legalized in the form of a PSC, Falcon Group International, which is affiliated to the intelligence agency.” Days before the start of the 2014-2015 academic year, the Ministry of Education signed a contract with Falcon Group International to secure the gates of 15 public universities, alongside the Cairo campus of Al-Azhar University, Egypt’s chief Islamic university. Electronic gates were set at the campuses’ entrance in order to contain violence if protests erupted on the universities’ campuses.

State media and public officials presented the outsourcing process as a necessary procedure to defuse tensions on the universities’ campuses and guarantee a stable educational environment (Abdelatty, 2014). According to Falcon Group International’s Press Bureau Head, Walid Fouad, the company was not responsible for dealing with demonstrations or sit-ins inside or outside the universities concerned. The company’s mandate, he added, is limited to tracking violations, such as the students’ possession of any harmful device, like sticks and explosives, that may represent a threat to the educational process and reporting them to the administration (Abdelatty, 2014). Meanwhile, upon orders from the university administration, the security personnel of Falcon Group International were entitled to prohibit some students from going through the university’s gates and accessing the campus (Ramzy, 2016, 12).

The immediate outcome of Falcon Group International’s presence at the campuses’ gates was highly problematic. The beginning of the academic year in October 2014 exhibited a large scale
of student opposition movements and a heightened level of violence. In addition to demonstrating against the regime, students led several protests to denounce Falcon Group International’s presence on their campuses. The turbulent situation peaked on 12th October 2014 when the security guards of Falcon Group International abandoned their position and the company’s equipment at the gates of Beni Sweif University were severely damaged (Abdelatty, 2014). Subsequently, over 195 university students, across the country, were taken into custody during the first week alone for protesting Falcon Group International’s deployment (Alessandro and Piazzese, 2014).

As a local researcher commented on the events, “El-Sisi could not send the police in or use the army upfront, so he thought that private companies might be less hostile to students”; but “he made things worse because Falcon Group were still seen by the students as intrusive or an extension of the police” (Alessandro and Piazzese, 2014). In a similar vein, the relationship between the private security personnel and the students has been equally tense at some private universities. The first week of April 2013 witnessed serious clashes at Misr International University between the students and the private security guards hired by the university to secure the university’s gates and campus. Misr International University students, who staged “a sit-in to demand increased safety measures on the highway and a road leading to campus,” were reported to have been “attacked with excessive force by the university’s private security” (Carr and Adam, 2013).

4.3.2 Outsourcing the security of football stadiums: Shutting down the ultras groups

Mirroring the tense environment at Egypt’s public universities, football stadiums have equally had their share of drama and security makeover in the aftermath of the 2011 uprising. Known for their fanatic passion for football, a great number of Egyptians, particularly among the youth, take great pride in supporting their football teams and attending their training sessions and matches. Despite the decline in stadiums’ attendance in the 1990s due to the widespread use of satellite televisions, the formation of the ultras groups in 2007 restored the legacy of attending matches as a regular ritual and a looked-for event. Seeing the difficult social and political atmosphere that spread across the country during the late years of Mubarak’s presidency, the formation of the ultras groups coincided with the emergence of football as “one of the few, if not the only valve for the release of pent-up frustration and escape from daily worries” (MENAFN, 2018).
According to Ennarah (2017), the ultras groups were initially apolitical, having “nothing to do with the politics of left and right.” Beside “occasional expressions of nationalist fervor or solidarity with Palestine,” the ultras groups were before 2011 generally antagonistic to all political ideologies and projects (Ennarah, 2017). The regime’s problem with the ultras groups however was not related to their political views but rather to their organizational capabilities, their claim over the stadiums and their fearlessness from the public security forces. The fans’ claim over the stadiums essentially turned football into a threat to the Egyptian regime who perceived the ultras groups as “an increasingly fearless, well-organized, highly politicized, and street battle-hardened force that attracted thousands of young men who were willing and able to stand their ground against the security forces” (Dorsey, 2018).

Leading a security state, the Egyptian regime and its public security forces simply could not tolerate independent mass assemblies, especially youth gatherings. By contesting the state’s tight control over the stadiums, the ultras groups have thus been always political. As different ultras groups developed, they gained credibility and courage in facing the Egyptian authorities. In this context, confrontation with the public security forces was inevitable as “the regime wouldn’t allow uncontrolled public spaces” (Dorsey, interview 2018).

The aftermath of the uprising witnessed a surge in ultras groups’ activism as a large constituency of these groups became politically active, taking part in the 2011 uprising and subsequent protests against the regime and its coercive institutions (see Montague, 2013; Gamal, 2017; Gibril, 2015; E. Rabie, 2016). More broadly, the 2011 uprising effectively turned the stadiums into highly contested public spaces and a “key force in anti-government protests” (Dorsey, 2018). As with the student movement, the ultras groups were met with a diverse set of repressive strategies to curb their activities and ultimately demolish their very existence. Following the massacre of 74 members of Ultras Ahlawy, or UA07, the first Egyptian ultras group to be formed, during a match in February 2012 between Al-Ahly and Al-Masry football teams in the Suez Canal city of Port Said, a ban on attending football matches was imposed. Targeting domestic rather than international matches, the ban was supposed to be gradually lifted in 2015 but was re-imposed following the death of 22 fans of Zamalek football team at the Air Defense Stadium in Cairo on 8th February 2015 (MEE Staff, 2018).

The ban on football crowd effectively closed the door on mass political mobilization inside the stadiums. In the meantime, while the stadiums remained closed to the fans, and as the security
measures at public universities increasingly tightened, members of the ultras groups’ have since 2013 occupied the core of anti-government protests by playing “a key role in flash demonstrations on Fridays in popular neighborhoods of Egyptian cities” (Dorsey, 2015). The resilience and persistent activism of the ultras groups eventually led the regime in May 2015 to brand the ultras groups as “terrorist” organizations and ban their activities through a Cairo court ruling that “ordered security officials to seize their meeting locations and funds” (Schietti, 2017). However, as the ultras groups lacked both, stable meeting locations and defined sources of fund, the ban merely provided the Egyptian regime with a legal cover to further repress the ultras groups rather than effectively eradicating them. From then onward, members of the ultras groups have been constantly harassed by the public security forces with scores of temporary arrests and prison sentences (Dorsey, 2018).

Things took a new turn with El-Sisi’s ascendance to power in 2015 as the regime gradually reestablished its grip on the streets with mass mobilization and social movements clearly losing their momentum due to the imprisonment and constant harassment of dissident voices. In the meantime, pressure has been rising on the state from the administrations of football clubs and the fans demanding the reopening of the stadiums to the public. Nevertheless, as the ultras groups largely disregarded the 2015 ban, opening the stadiums risked once again turning the latter into anti-protests venues with potentially deadly confrontations between the fans and the public security forces. Against this background, calls were put forward by a number of interested parties including football clubs and PSCs to outsource stadiums’ security during the domestic football matches (Faramawy, 2014). Simultaneously, proposals to secure the stadiums were advanced by different PSCs, some of them going beyond physical security to encompass the purchase of tickets and the set-up of comprehensive electronic surveillance systems inside the stadiums.

In regard to ticketing, El Mudaraj, an Egyptian ticketing and event management company specialized in sports events, proposed in 2015 to provide 2700 selling booths across the Egyptian territories, where fans would purchase matches’ tickets using their passport or national ID cards with their information being subsequently registered on the purchased tickets (Elrefai, 2018). According to El Mudaraj’s CEO, Tarek Elrefai, the personal information of those purchasing the tickets was to remain private and not be shared with the Egyptian authorities except when riots occur. In the meantime, state authorities would provide the
company with a list of names that correspond to those individuals who are allegedly banned from attending football matches, so the company wouldn’t sell tickets to them in the first place.

Complementing this ticketing process, a new security infrastructure system would be put in place. Elrefai (interview 2018) explains,

The stadiums will be covered with a security camera system encompassing real-time face detectors. We would already have photos of those attending the matches, collected when they purchased the tickets, so upon entering the stadium, the data on each attendee would show up: their name, address and everything else. As such if they participate in riot activities inside the stadiums, they will be handed to the public investigative authorities with the recorded evidence. Despite being partially and successfully trialed during the 2016 African cup for Men’s Handball organized in Egypt, El Mudaraj’s proposal eventually met a deadlock as it failed to secure the necessary approvals from the concerned state authorities for it to be implemented during football matches.

This wasn’t however the end of outsourcing security at football stadiums in Egypt. Physical security, in the form of securing the stadiums’ gates and the fans’ sitting areas, was partially allocated to PSCs. Following recurrent offers from Falcon Group International, made to the Ministry of Sports and the Egyptian Football League, the company became the main private party called upon to secure football matches (Faramawy, 2014). Alongside offering their security services during domestic and international matches, Falcon Group International sought to secure the Egyptian national football team and its various events prior to the world cup that was held in Russia in June 2018. Interestingly, Falcon Group International’s CEO asserted that the company wouldn’t seek any financial compensation for its services at this occasion, which he portrayed as a national duty toward the success of the Egyptian national football team (Saleh, 2018).

5 What does outsourcing security bring to the Egyptian regime?

While outsourcing security in Egypt is not a post-uprising novelty, its expansion since 2011 is notable and deserves close investigation. This is particularly the case in light of the political and security changes explored in chapter 3 that have shaped the Egyptian state and society in
recent years. These include the very limited security reforms introduced to the continuously massive and repressive public security apparatus, and the alarming spread of public discontent directed at the regime especially following the 2013 coup d’état, which has been met with heightened state repression. Building upon the history and orientations of Egypt’s public security institutions explored in chapter 3 together with the examples of outsourcing security that followed the 2013 coup d’état and were examined in the previous part, the present discussion suggests three grounds to examine and comprehend the development of the PSI in Egypt from 2013 onward, especially the increasing stress on state outsourcing security.

These grounds encompass the Egyptian regime’s struggle to mitigate a loose control over its public security institutions, especially the police forces, which is central to the security and robustness of the regime. Second, enhancing the regime’s interests by generating substantial economic benefits for public figures and institutions and their allies within the private sector, alongside alleviating widespread economic hardships by offering employment to a great number of people as well as enhancing the security of private properties and businesses which stabilizes the country’s economy and helps attract foreign investment. The third and arguably the most critical ground of analysis is the tightening of state control over social and political mobilization by having the PSCs serve as indirect agents of repression which ultimately nurtures regime security and leads to overall stability.

5.1 Mitigating a loose control over the state security forces

While the alliance among the different domestic security forces together with the military institution was central to the fall of President Morsi, this alliance was primarily an alliance of convenience. Once Morsi was overthrown and the military took control of the state under the leadership of El-Sisi, the deeply rooted tensions and competitions among the public security institutions quickly surfaced as each has tried to maximize its gains and increase its power. In addition to institutional rivalry and the accompanied level of unprecedented mass repression, discussed at length in chapter 3, the weakened control of the regime over its public security agencies appeared through numerous voices of dissent and instances of defect that regularly occurred since the 2011 uprising, and particularly after the 2013 coup d’état, within the domestic security forces and the military institution alike.
Dissatisfaction and dissent among the domestic security forces, especially the police forces, have been primarily related to the unfavorable working conditions continuously imposed on policemen and other low rank public security personnel. Police officers and secretaries have recurrently staged protests to improve their working conditions, demanding higher wages, medical care and better rearmament to face the mounting level of criminality across the country (Alborsa Team, 2014; Marroushi and Shahine, 2013). These protests have commonly ended with the arrest of several policemen and no fulfilling answers to their demands. In April 2018 for instance, an Egyptian court sentenced 13 policemen to prison for taking part in a 2015 strike, a year that witnessed hundreds of policemen going on strike especially in the northeastern province of Sharqiya (New Arab and agencies, 2018). The imprisoned policemen were accused “of illegal assembly, inciting against the Interior Ministry, which is in charge of law enforcement, and belonging to an outlawed group” (New Arab and agencies, 2018).

Alongside peaceful protests, media channels represented another venue where policemen strongly expressed their dissatisfaction and pushed for their demands. Whether by directly speaking to the media or drawing considerable public attention on social media outlets, as with the Facebook page “Egypt’s Police Officers Speak” which gained over 135,000 fans soon after its establishment, policemen’s media exposure represented a source of increasing trouble for the regime “with a growing number of scandals, leaks and social media revelations from Egypt’s police ranks” (Mansour, 2016). In response, the regime passed in August 2016 a disciplinary law that bans police forces from addressing the media or sharing information without prior authorization from the Interior Ministry, from “forming any independent movements, unions and associations of any form and from organizing protests or strikes” (Mansour, 2016). Furthermore, to calm public discontent from rising security abuses and to avoid any public opposition to this law, the latter instructed the police force to respect human rights and made noncompliant policemen subject to “unspecified prison terms and fines of up to 20,000 Egyptian pounds” (Amin, 2016).

With respect to the military institution, which seemingly represents El-Sisi’s natural base of support, the post-2013 years have witnessed growing dissatisfaction from established personnel and security officers in regard to El-Sisi’s state management. El-Sisi’s ad hoc approach toward economic hardships and growing social problems, which has translated into the recurrent reliance on the army’s resources and power in a largely abrupt and unstructured manner to contain diverse instances of economic emergencies, generated considerable
discontent among the military leadership. Moreover, El-Sisi’s narrow political circle has bred mistrust and jealousy among high-ranking officials, while signs of friction simultaneously emerged “within the top brass, with high-ranking generals showing a lack of deference to their superiors during meetings with foreign officials” (Trager, 2016). This tense relationship between the president and the military leadership led at times to pronounced confrontations as seen with Lieutenant General Sami Anan attempting to stand against El-Sisi in the 2018 presidential election. The regime’s punitive reaction against Anan’s political attitude through his public discredit and imprisonment clearly demonstrated the regime’s intolerance to any voice of dissent and served as a strong deterrent to similar actions in the future.

Discontent among the military corps at large was expressed through multiple instances of coup attempts made by different groups of military officers to overthrow El-Sisi. In August 2015, an Egyptian military court sentenced 26 army officers, four of whom were retired colonels, to jail over charges of plotting for a military coup, “disclosure of military secrets, and membership of the Muslim Brotherhood” (MEE staff, 2015). In December 2015, news spread about three army officers being “sentenced to death for allegedly planning to assassinate” El-Sisi (New Arab, 2016). Moreover, on February 2016, an Egyptian military court sentenced two army officers, one of whom is a naval colonel, to life in prison for plotting a coup and belonging to the Muslim Brotherhood (New Arab, 2016). This was the fourth conviction of its kind since the 2013 coup d’état.

The increasing tension among the regime, its public security institutions and their personnel, particularly members of the police forces and low-caliber officers on the one hand and the top tier of the military institution on the other, created a platform of skepticism and caution on the side of the president and his close entourage. By and large, the aforementioned precautionary and disciplinary measures imposed on different public security institutions together with the intolerance of the regime toward dissent have effectively maintained overall regime control. Meanwhile, they fell short of addressing the underlying fragmentation and dissatisfaction among the public security forces. Under a security state, this shaky setting is severely problematic since the protection of the regime from political opposition and its shield from social discontent is primarily attributed to the public security institutions. Seeing the loose control of the regime over its public security institutions and personnel in recent years, the regime had no choice but to cultivate other sources of protection and insurance to its stability and sustainability.
In this context, the encouragement of the PSI, the mounting cases of outsourcing security, and the close relationship between the regime and different PSCs’ members are noteworthy. Taking Falcon Group International as an example, the company’s charge of El-Sisi’s personal protection during his presidential campaign, its presence during the inauguration of the New Suez Canal, enlisting its services at major national events and places of potential unrest, mostly alongside the public security forces, among other important assignments, ultimately represent a parallel source of security for the president and his regime and act as a buffer against potential betrayal from the public security institutions or their personnel.

While PSCs in Egypt are often linked to the public security institutions, by virtue of the latter being heavily represented in these companies’ administrative boards and personnel, PSCs tend to maintain a margin of independence from the public security institutions which the ruling elite seem keen to cultivate and use to its benefit. This is particularly apparent in the regime’s effort to enhance the industry’s growth and increasing its competitive nature by favoring specific companies over others and by turning the industry into a realm where the public security institutions would compete among each other as well as with private PSCs over major contracts with the private sector, and public contracts with different state institutions who opt to outsource security. Being smaller in size and resources when compared to the public security forces, the PSCs are easier to control and seemingly more trustworthy as their growth and survival in the Egyptian market for force is largely dependent on the approval of the regime.

5.2 Enhancing the economic interests of the regime and its allies

Complementing regime security, the interests of the regime and its allies are of vital contribution to the regime’s survival and prosperity. Seeing the heavy dependence of the Egyptian regime on repression to control the population, appeasing the public security institutions and their members, particularly those in leadership positions, who have always imposed public order through fear and force, is a necessity. In this regard, the growing private security market, which is strongly enhanced by the regime’s regular use of PSCs’ services and the resort of many state institutions to outsourcing security, represents a fertile arena to appease a large segment of public security personnel by proving them with secure employment, investment opportunities and potential venues to gain and exercise power. In a similar vein, the establishment of a strong PSI indirectly contributes to the sustainability of the regime and
its legitimacy by enhancing the security of private properties and businesses which stabilizes part of the economy and helps attract foreign investment.

Economically, the PSI generates considerable revenue for the Egyptian regime and its allies. Outsourcing security essentially contributes to a broader move toward the commodification of security in the country, which, Mohy Eldeen (interview 2018) notes, serves a particular class of society with the PSCs’ main clients being big businesses, businessmen and banks. The PSI “plays a parallel role to the police forces in public life but make bigger profit because it gets directly from the wealthy people in society” (Mohy Eldeen, interview 2018). In that respect, unlike public security forces, PSCs, the majority of which are either owned or run by state security institutions, their personnel and affiliates, make more money, better financial revenue and offer employment to public security personnel once they go on retirement or in cases where they decide to take an early leave from the public service.

Seeing the gigantic size of Egypt’s public security institutions, joining the PSI, as founders of new companies or employees in existing ones, provides ex-security personnel with a largely satisfying source of income. This serves well the regime as it diverts these ex-security personnel away from the state budget. In the meantime, joining the PSI, whose members and line of development are closely attached to the regime, effectively guarantees the containment of ex-security personnel under state control and their continuous loyalty and identification with the regime. This is recurrently apparent in the strong support to the current regime and its policies by many of the current PSCs’ owners, who initially belonged to the public security institutions.

Commenting on “the war on terrorism” launched by the regime after the 2013 coup d’état, the CEO of Falcon Group International, expressed his full support and belief in the necessity of this war while completely disregarding how the Egyptian regime has as outlined earlier used and abused this war to curb social and political dissent and tighten its grip on society. Khaled notes (worldfolio, 2016),

Egypt's success in eradicating and countering terrorism is providing safety to the entire world. That will make us say the following: if each and every nation is keen to make its citizens safe, either within or outside their borders, they must stand with Egypt, not only with security reinforcements or equipment, but assisting with Egypt's economic opening.
Beyond the benefits acquired by ex-security personnel, the evolving security market in Egypt opens wide venues for employment to the population at large. With an unemployment rate of 8.76% on the eve of the 2011 uprising, Egypt witnessed a drastic jump in 2011 with an unprecedented record of 11.85%, the highest in more than five decades (International Labour Organization, 2019). The situation deteriorated further over the following years reaching a highest of 13.15% in 2013. According to the latest data recorded by the World Bank, Egypt is ranked 9th on the list of countries with the highest unemployment rate worldwide (World Bank, 2019a), and the fifth in terms of youth unemployment with a rate of over 32% (World Bank, 2019b). With over 11% of the capable labor force currently suffering from unemployment, working as a private guard is among the scarce job opportunities available today to a continuously growing segment of the population, particularly the unemployed youth, many of whom are university graduates who fail to secure a decent job in the public sector or find a suitable opportunity in the private sector.

5.3 Curbing perpetual sources of political and social unrest: PSCs as agents of state repression

Beyond enabling the regime to appease a large segment of the public security institutions’ members and to ensure the overall loyalty of the PSI, the win-win settlement between the regime and the public security forces, particularly their leadership, allows for the use of PSCs in serving the regime as in the example of the security of public universities and football matches allocated to Falcon Group International. Rabie (interview 2018), who reported extensively on the PSI in Egypt, accounts,

These companies still fall under the state’s control. Falcon Group International, for example, is known to be owned by the military intelligence. The other company I reported on, Risk Free, its founder is a former Ministry of Interior official, still highly connected to the ministry and continues to serve the state agenda. Additionally, the companies hire former state security agents to train their security guards and serve other functions for the company. Private security and state security are thus one and the same, and ultimately serve the same agenda, but private security companies are a way for the state to avoid responsibility by hiding behind a private company facade.
As discussed in chapter 2, the neoliberal approach to the privatization of security attaches several advantages to state outsourcing security. Whether deployed to support or substitute the public security forces, PSCs are seen as more professional, specialized and cost efficient. Nonetheless, this perception of the PSI is recurrently contested by critical security scholars and security experts. In this vein, Lawrence (interview 2018) affirms, “Everywhere you hire a security firm not because it is better but because it is cheaper. And often what makes them cheaper is low-paid employees with less benefits and less trainings. And that in itself creates a set of questions and a set of problems.”

The question of competency aside, claims are often made about the need for the PSI to contribute to the provision of public security by attending to basic domestic security tasks while the public security forces concentrate on new security threats. In the case of Egypt, the public security institutions have certainly been stretched out in recent years with mounting militia threats and criminal activities. Nonetheless, neither the number of the police forces nor their funding were subject to any decrease. Starting from a base of abundance, the Egyptian security forces has preserved its gigantic size in the post-uprising years, while its allocated budget has according to the latest data available regularly increased (Krafchik, 2014, 48). As such, even if the need for public security forces has arose in recent years, the existent size and resources of the public forces should accommodate the evolving situation.

This skepticism toward outsourcing security is particularly significant in contexts of political contestation and social unrest. Going back to the examples of the public universities and football stadiums, both sites represent contentious public spaces where political activism and mobilization have been concentrated since the 2011 uprising. Meanwhile, overt repression of university students and football fans led to deadly confrontations with the state security forces and attracted considerable domestic and international attention that the current regime have largely sought to avoid. In this respect, using PSCs help keep the state “hidden from scrutiny when things go wrong at a football match or outside of a university’s gates, while at the same time being a huge business” (Rabie, interview 2018). In other words, deploying PSCs at these locations essentially serves regime interests and enhances regime security by ensuring state control without harming the regime’s image or involving its public security forces in recurrent confrontations with the people.
Whether at the universities or the stadiums, PSCs are positioned at the gates, responsible for the entrance and exit of visitors, and in the case of football matches, their personnel are also positioned inside the stadiums to maintain order and prevent confrontations among the fans of competing teams. In the meantime, the police forces are positioned outside the gates of both sites and across the surrounding areas, acting as a source of deterrence and containment for any arising mobilization or expressed form of opposition. This combined public-private security system essentially has a number of implications on the security of these sites, the rights of the people visiting them and the latter’s ability to mobilize. First, placing PSCs in close interaction with the citizens, while the public security forces occupy the backstage, situates the security and control of these sites within a private context, citizen to citizen relationship. This largely enables the public security forces to escape responsibility for any occurring abuses and violence, since any confrontation between PSCs’ personnel and the public, or abuses carried by the former, is placed away from the responsibility of the state.

In a similar vein, Ali El Raggal (interview 2018), a political sociologist specialized in security studies, perceives outsourcing security at these sites as an attempt from the Egyptian regime to include more than one party with it in the political struggle and to maintain control over the situation without directly involving itself as the state. In this context, when a PSC is securing the university for instance, “the regime is putting the students face to a new enemy, which has new dynamics” (El Raggal, interview 2018). Similarly, according to Former Major General Adel Suleiman, by allowing PSCs to secure the stadiums, the Interior Ministry has aimed “to remove itself from the picture, so if there are clashes between the Ultras and a private security company, then it’s the company and not the ministry that is responsible” (Rabie, 2014).

Another significant asset of outsourcing security at these sites is the establishment of a stable and consistent mechanism of public surveillance. By virtue of controlling these sites’ gates, carrying personal searching and knowing who is entering and who is exiting these premises, the PSCs contracted by the state fulfil the role of an intelligence agency. While mingling with the students and being dressed as civilians and not as public security officials, PSCs’ personnel constitute a surveillance network with all the information gathered by the contracted companies recurrently being handed over to the authorities (Elbaqry, interview 2018). Indeed, despite asserting its independence and professionalism, Falcon Group International for instance has according to multiple accounts and published reports been implicated in cases of state repression and strategies of public control.
As Ahmed Elseidi (interview 2018), former coordinator of the student movement against the coup in Al-Azhar university, describes, “the PSC personnel are the eyes of the Interior Ministry on the university gates.” Moreover, beyond general monitoring and close surveillance, Hamzawy (2017) notes that private security personnel aided the administrative security units and police forces in the 84 students’ arrest made during the 2015-2016 academic year. Similarly, Elbaqry (interview 2018) affirms that some private security guards had used university employees to report on students, while Elseidi (interview 2018) asserts that PSCs personnel have “participated in the arrest of some students, in hitting them and humiliating them.”

In sum, outsourcing security at these two major sites of political contestation fits into a larger state approach to control all public places across the country. This manifests through the substitution of overt repression with more subtle strategies of control including the use of the judicial system, as seen in the ban on the ultras groups and the tight control over the activities of university students, and the recruitment of insiders from among the universities’ employees and the student body, who express loyalty and support for the current regime, in order to report on their dissident fellows. More broadly, outsourcing the security of critical locations of social unrest to PSCs expands the coercive agents and control capabilities of some Arab regimes without directly involving the state. As the next chapter elaborates, PSCs, deployed primarily to pre-empt and prevent recurrent episodes of unrest and mass mobilization, contribute to a reconfiguration of the state strategies of social control and political repression. Particularly, outsourcing security of public university campuses and football stadiums, among similar sites of constant social unrest, mirrors the Arab regimes’ increasing preference for a diffuse form of security governance where the powers of private actors are enlisted in strategies of rule at a distance.

6 Conclusion

Mirroring other Arab states, Egypt has witnessed considerable developments within its market for force since the 2011 uprising. While attempts at reforming the public security forces have been very limited, the country’s market for force has witnessed a remarkable expansion of the private security industry alongside a growing state reliance on private guards through regular
contracts of security outsourcing. The expanding PSI has largely followed an environment of significant uncertainties and security concerns that emerged with the 2011 uprising. In addition to the rising criminal activities and recurrent militia attacks especially in the Sinai Peninsula and big Egyptian cities, the occasional unwillingness of the public security forces, particularly the police forces, to ensure public safety and protection has led a large segment of the population, especially the rich, big businesses and shop owners, to enlist the services of PSCs in order to secure themselves and their properties. This increasing demand from the private sector has given a great boost to the PSI and encouraged many people to join the rising industry by establishing their own companies or working for established ones.

While emerging in the country since the late 1970s, the PSI in Egypt has considerably evolved following the uprising, growing in profit, scope of activities as well as the number of suppliers and clients. In the meantime, the PSI has at last secured a place in the Egyptian legal system, being defined and confined by a new legal code, Law 86 of 2015, that seemingly sought to regulate the activities and expansion of the market amid a series of major national attacks, which comprised the bombing of the Italian Consulate in Cairo and the assassination of Prosecutor General Hisham Barakat. More importantly, Law 86 of 2015 sealed the blurry relationship between the public security institutions and the PSI by enabling the MOI, the military institution and the intelligence agencies to establish their own PSCs, as well as granting former public security officers an unconditional access to the administrative positions at PSCs.

Complementing its continuous flourishment in the private sector, the PSI has equally been boosted by an increased demand for its services from different state institutions and ministries. Alongside street surveillance projects, digital surveillance and physical guarding of public metro stations, outsourcing security has extended to airport security, large-scale public surveillance schemes and the surveillance of public spaces of worship, which attracted considerable domestic and international attention from state and non-state actors alike. Equally noteworthy was the deployment of PSCs at public universities and football stadiums which became highly contentious due to the troubling history and mobilizing capacities attached to these two public spaces.

When examining why a state like Egypt with gigantic public security institutions would outsource security and resort to the services of private security actors, three reasons were
presented in this chapter. First, there is the regime’s struggle to mitigate a loose control over its public security institutions which is integral to the security and sustainability of the regime. In light of the persistent internal competitions among the public security forces, the growing uneasiness of the military with respect to the president’s policies and approach to the country’s development, alongside the recurrent instances of dissidence and occasional events of defect witnessed amidst different public security forces, depending solely on the domestic security institutions or the military for regime security and the consolidation of El-Sisi’s rule is not sufficient and potentially dangerous. Outsourcing security in this context, and particularly the president’s use of private security guards at different public and private events, seems to offer a parallel source of protection for the president and his regime.

Seeing the close relationship between the president and the PSCs on which he depends, notably Falcon Group International, and the tight control he appears to exercise over them as visible in their discourse and attitude, including proclaiming loyalty to the regime and offering expensive private security services at no charge, PSCs do not only protect the regime but assist in advancing its interests and improving its international image. In this respect, complementing security concerns with economic objectives, outsourcing security effectively enhances the regime’s interests by generating substantial economic benefit for public figures and institutions and their allies within the private sector, in addition to alleviating economic hardships by offering employment to a great number of people as well as enhancing the security of private properties and businesses which stabilizes the country’s economy and helps attract foreign investment.

Lastly, the notable expansion of private security provision and increased security outsourcing in Egypt since the 2011 uprising significantly contributes to the regime’s tightening its control over social and political mobilization by having PSCs serve as indirect agents of repression which ultimately nurtures regime security and leads to overall stability.
Chapter 6 – Comparative Analysis of Security Market Developments in Tunisia and Egypt

1 Introduction

How have Tunisia and Egypt, by virtue of featuring different bases of power and approaches to political challenges, change and authoritarian upgrading, experienced security markets’ changes post-uprisings and the impact of this continuing experience on the authoritarian survival and regime adaptation in these countries? To address this question, this chapter builds on the research and findings presented in chapters 4 and 5 to engages with a comparative analysis of Tunisia and Egypt. The analysis closely examines the commonalities and differences in both countries’ experiences with security market’s reconfigurations by identifying the various factors that have shaped and directed these differences.

When comparing the different lines of security market developments that Tunisia and Egypt have experienced since early 2011, the analysis is primarily examining why and how both countries differed in four core areas. First, the relationship among the regime, the ruling elite and their public security institutions. This entails examining the pre-uprisings status, power and interests of the military institution together with that of other public security agencies, particularly the Ministry of Interior and the intelligence services, in both countries and tracing how these have evolved in the aftermath of the uprisings. Particularly, this section looks to trace the historical roots of the reconfigurations and changes affecting the public security institutions since 2011.

The second area of concern pertains to the evolution of the private security market. This section examines the scope and activities exhibited by each country’s PSI prior to the uprisings, the industry’s reaction and attitude during the transitional period and the factors that have shaped the contemporary evolution of the industry including the legal code and the dynamic mechanisms of demand and supply.
Bringing the earlier sections together, the discussion proceeds to examine the main changes that affected the relationship among the regime, the public security institutions and the private security actors. This is done over two stages: examining the relationship between the public security institutions and the PSI then proceeding to outline the interplay between the state, the public security institutions and the PSI through the process of outsourcing security.

Lastly, the chapter outlines the scope, manifestations and impact of foreign actors, state and non-state alike, and of external pressures on the development of both countries’ markets for force in addition to their input toward the larger political reconfigurations witnessed in both countries.

2 Security market developments compared between Tunisia and Egypt

2.1 The public security institutions, the regime and the ruling elite

Starting with the military institution, Egypt and Tunisia represent two distinctive cases before the uprisings and strongly continuing into the present. This has in turn greatly affected the security and political development in both countries. The Egyptian military institution, by virtue of being integral to the old regime and for decades enjoying extended economic privileges and interests across different sectors of the economy, including the private security market, has opted on the wake of the 2011 uprising to secure the old regime with its authoritarian tendencies which, as explored in chapter 5, have provided the military institution and its leadership with economic and political powers that they could not have otherwise possessed.

In that respect, the military institution has actively sought to largely preserve the pre-2011 authoritarian regime while reshaping it in ways that would increase their power and widen their acquired benefits even further. This pursuit has chiefly manifested in the pronounced political role which the leadership of the military institution has exercised since the ousting of Mubarak in February 2011, in addition to the armed forces’ active involvement in wide scale national projects, including the digging of the New Suez Canal, alongside being put in charge of major
contracts in the construction sector as well as the provision of some highly demanded basic goods.

By contrast, the armed forces in Tunisia have been traditionally apolitical and largely disfavored by the regime and its ruling elite before 2011. By virtue of exhibiting very weak affiliation to the previous regime, the fall of Ben Ali didn’t really affect the military’s status and interests; if anything, it has actually offered new venues for the military institution to establish a strong national presence, upgrade its functions, as well as enhance its capabilities and resources. Nevertheless, while the military institution has been subject to gradual and significant changes in the post-uprising years, the restrictions that continue to be imposed on their national political and economic role meant that their overall impact on the evolution of the market for force, the political destiny of the country and the survival of remnants of the old regime has been largely limited.

Beyond the military institution, Tunisia and Egypt’s domestic security forces have constituted the backbone of the security states developed by both countries’ regimes for decades prior to the uprisings in order to ensure their political dominance and the protection of their economic prosperity. This translated into a very bitter relationship between both countries’ populations and the domestic security forces who instead of guaranteeing public safety and protection for the citizenry have recurrently engaged in practices of political subjugation and economic exploitation, the latter especially noticeable in the Egyptian case, in order to keep the population submissive and contained. Beyond protecting the regime, Egypt’s Ministry of Interior and the intelligence services have developed considerable economic power and channels of autonomy as they gradually grew to become core elements of the regime rather than mere servants, supporters or tools of regime security.

This was made possible partially thanks to the gigantic size of the public security apparatus in Egypt in addition to the close connection between some key politicians and top public security officials, as seen in the intimate relationship among Mubarak, his younger son Gamal and the ex-Minister of Interior Habib El Adly. Of equally significant influence in this regard has been the overall performance of the Egyptian economy which has been far exceeding its Tunisian counterpart in scope, size and revenue. This has enabled the public security institutions and their leadership in Egypt to engage in different national economic activities and to exploit
considerable economic resources without attracting much attention or evidently disrupting the overall flow of the economy.

Furthermore, seeing the political and economic attachment of the public security institutions, principally those occupying the leadership positions, to the old regime in Egypt, their resolve to ensure the regime’s survival and continuous prosperity was expectedly firm. In the process, the domestic security forces have occasionally allied with the military institution as in the ousting of President Mohamed Morsi. Embedding a history of subtle tension and competition between the military institution and the domestic security forces, as well as among the different agencies of the latter, the recurrent episodes of alliance among these forces since the 2011 uprising have been largely categorized as alliances of convenience with each public security institution or agency essentially seeking its own interests amidst a troubling political, social and economic environment. That said, this alliance of convenience is considered central to the reconfiguration of the Egyptian market for force since 2011 as it has continuously ensured the survival and perpetuation of the old structures of authoritarian rule where the state security institutions have remained at the core of the regime structure and strongly determinative of its character and policies.

In sum, the changes and reforms affecting the domestic security institutions and the armed forces in Egypt were largely very limited as the survival of the previous regime meant the overall continuity of the same public security architecture with its significant defects including the public security agencies’ repressive and predatory practices, the internal fractions that have often manifested inside the different forces and the competition among them over political and economic privileges, as well as the public security institutions’ persistent acquisition, especially with respect to the military institution, of extra juridical powers and privileges that spread across different sectors.

The situation has been very different in Tunisia due to the distinct composition of its public security architecture. Unlike in Egypt, the Tunisian regime under Ben Ali depended heavily on the ruling party, the Constitutional Democratic Rally, to ensure its security and tightly impose social and political control. In the meantime, the public security agencies, especially those under the umbrella of the Interior Ministry alongside the intelligence services, were more responsible for the confrontational aspects of Ben Ali's security state, dealing with the daily
practices of oppression and constantly working toward ensuring a stable environment for the regime to pursue its self-interests and reward its loyalists.

In this light, the work of the public security forces and the security functions carried out by the Constitutional Democratic Rally were complementary, mutually contributing to regime security and enhancing its interests. Accordingly, once the ruling party broke down with the swift fall of Ben Ali in early 2011, the public security apparatus found itself severely vulnerable to popular demands and international pressure to change and reform. As explored in chapter 3, many of the security reforms, especially those introduced directly after the Tunisian uprising, were rushed and not carefully considered, thus occasionally leading to more damage than improvement in the overall performance of the public security forces and restricting the forces’ transition toward a more accountable and civic oriented public security apparatus.

2.2 The evolution of the private security industry

With respect to the development of the PSI, both Tunisia and Egypt have witnessed a significant rise in the activities and presence of private security actors in the aftermath of the 2010-2011 uprisings. The scale and reach of this phenomenon have varied considerably between both countries due to their difference in the status of the PSI before 2011, the legal framework organizing the industry and the diverse dynamics of supply and demand.

In Egypt, building on a strong presence that gradually developed since the early 1980s, the post-uprising growth of the PSI was quick and seemingly uncontrollable. As featured in chapter 5, Egypt introduced its first legal code to regulate the PSI in July 2015 in the form of a presidential decree amid a series of events that demonstrated a serious lack of security nationwide. Beyond the usual aspects of private security regulations that encompass training and issuing licenses, Law 86 of 2015 provided the Ministries of Interior and Defense, alongside the General Intelligence Agency, with the legal power to establish their own private security companies (Egypt’s President, 2015). To be shortly discussed, this legal power granted to the public security institutions would prove central to the evolving relationship between the public and private providers of security in Egypt.

While emerging around the same time period as its Egyptian counterpart, yet effectively securing a legal presence at a much earlier date, in 2002, the Tunisian PSI has experienced a
much slower and narrower growth before the 2010-2011 uprising. With the security industry primarily focused on basic guarding, transferring cash and offering cleaning services, the Tunisian state constituted the PSCs’ prevalent client as different ministries and public institutions opted to outsource basic security and maintenance services. In the meantime, major domestic businesses together with the foreign corporations that opened in the country over the last few decades had predominately been calling upon the state security forces to secure their premises.

The situation was fundamentally altered in the aftermath of the Tunisian uprising, with the PSI losing many of the public institutions and agencies as their prime clients, following a 2011 agreement between the Tunisian government and the General Labor Union that aimed to eliminate all subcontracts between the public sector and the private companies of the service sector, including the PSCs (Kapitalis, 2011). In the meantime, from 2011 onward Tunisia’s PSCs have developed a strong presence in the private sector as foreign companies and domestic businesses have increasingly enlisted their services instead of relying on the public security forces amidst a widespread environment of spreading threats and high insecurities.

At present, the Tunisian PSI is continuously growing, with around 100 companies currently active on the market. Beside the heightened demand from the private sector, the PSI has been largely boosted by a considerable flow of supply. The post-2010 steady growth of the PSI has attracted a large number of security and military officers whose background and experience guarantee good positions in the industry. Furthermore, the security industry has appealed to many Tunisian youth, men and women, for whom working as private security guards constitutes a convenient temporary placement until a better job is found or a post is guaranteed in the public sector.

Bringing together the changes affecting the public security institutions and these shaping the PSI in Egypt and Tunisia, they both appear to be mutually reinforcing. Essentially, the changes affecting the public security apparatus amidst the larger shaky security environment in both countries have impacted their respective private security markets in two main ways. First, the state security reforms introduced to the domestic security agencies and the military institution, particularly in the Tunisian case, have provided the private security market with a surplus of security personnel who have either lost their jobs with the recurrent security reshuffles, predominantly in the immediate aftermath of the uprising, or who amid rising
economic hardships decided to look for better career opportunities in the private sector being especially drawn to the PSI.

Secondly, the passive, and occasionally hostile, attitude of the public security agencies toward the chaotic security environment that emerged with the uprisings and the deterioration of the security situation across both states’ territories accentuated the latter and nurtured a public perception of insecurity, especially among the rich and the business community. This chiefly led to a surge in the demand for private security services, as the public security forces largely lost the confidence of a great section of the population in their capabilities and their willingness to impose public safety and counter the rising criminality. This situation was mainly prevalent in the Egyptian case where the post-2010 alarming rise of the PSI was seen as a natural outcome of a failing, passive and abusive public security apparatus. As discussed in chapter 5, for many ordinary citizens and business agents, using PSCs’ services became an unavoidable solution for a crisis of competence and trust in the state security forces.

In a similar vein, acknowledging the centrality of the public security forces to the confrontational atmosphere that has continued to shape the state-society interactions since the 2011 uprising, many local businesses and international companies simply resorted to private security actors, instead of requesting state security assistance, in order to avoid the risk of falling into ongoing political struggles and being subsequently harmed. Ultimately, this development became self-perpetuating as the growing private and public dependence on private security services has greatly reduced existing and potential incentives to reform the attitude of the public security forces and to improve their performance. As Revkin (2013) commented on the Egyptian case, “instead of working to reform the country’s dysfunctional [security] institutions, some political leaders have embraced the devolution of core security functions to community-based policing initiatives or private contractors.”

2.3 The relationship among the state, the public security institutions and private security actors

2.3.1 The public security institutions and the private security industry

From 2011 onward, the relationship between the public security institutions and the PSI has featured growing cooperation while maintaining a strictly hierarchal structure in favor of the
public security forces both legally and practically. In Egypt and Tunisia alike, the public security forces have continued to occupy an unmistakably superior status, being responsible for training, licensing and monitoring the domestic PSCs and their personnel.

On the ground, the recent and growing reliance on PSCs at major industrial sites and tourist resorts, as seen in the Tunisian case, has exhibited significant collaboration between the private and public providers of security. The present environment where the PSCs’ personnel are deployed, including to some areas of high risk, has entailed a close engagement with the police forces and military personnel in order to receive, and occasionally exchange, updates and intelligence on the security situation in these areas. Even in sports and cultural events, where the risk appears less significant, a close coordination between the private security guards and the public security forces has been regularly established.

Similarly, in Egypt, the PSCs’ personnel have worked side-by-side with the police forces when deployed at public universities and football stadiums. At both locations, the private security guards are stationed at the main gates to monitor the entrance and exist of all visitors, while the public security forces are positioned across the area surrounding these premises, not too far away from the gates, in order to ensure an additional level of security and layer of social containment.

Beyond this growing collaboration between both groups, the potential for the relationship to become sour and even confrontational remains present, being much more likely in the case of Egypt for a number of reasons. On the one hand, some of the functions allocated to a number of PSCs in Egypt, particularly Falcon Group International, have carried a great level of political weight and sensitivity as in the case of the personal protection of El-Sisi during his presidential campaign in 2015 and the partial outsourcing of airport security, alongside the security of a number of public universities and major sports events. These cases, among others, increasingly incorporate members of the PSI in structures of regime security, which as elaborated in chapter 5 underlines the loose control that the current regime is exercising over its public security institutions, while potentially creating suspicion and sensitivity between the regime and its public security forces as well as between the public security forces and the private security agents.
On the other hand, being given the legal right to create their own PSCs places the public security institutions in Egypt in direct competition with many of the PSCs currently operating in the market, presumably putting the latter at a great disadvantage because of the ability of the state-owned security companies to secure more and better contracts with the state and the private sector alike. That said, this point could be strongly and rightly contested on the basis that a great number of the PSCs operating in Egypt today, especially those with big shares of the security market like Queen Service and Falcon Group International, are already owned or closely attached to different state security institutions. In this regard, while potentially adding a frame of competition, the new law regulating the PSI in Egypt essentially affirms a situation that has already been established. Nonetheless, the apparent eagerness of some major PSCs in Egypt to take pride in their independence from the state and its public security institutions, albeit overly pronouncing their loyalty to the state and support of national security at the same time, generates a sense of distance even if minimal or superficial between them and the public security institutions which may grow further with the expansion of the private security market and the continuous opening of new PSCs.

2.3.2 Outsourcing security and the state-security-PSI nexus

Complementing the interaction between the public security institutions and the PSI, the evolving relationship between the state or the regime and private security actors has considerably influenced Egypt and Tunisia’s different experiences with security markets’ reconfigurations and the attached effect on regime and state reconfiguration. This evolving relationship is mostly traceable through the increasing state reliance on the services of private security actors through different cases of outsourcing security.

In Egypt, outsourcing security has sharply increased since the 2011 uprising. With most of the major PSCs either closely affiliated or owned by the state and public security institutions, the independence of the former has been highly questionable. As seen in the diverse examples of outsourcing security examined in chapter 5, the Egyptian state’s reliance on the services of PSCs appear to be closely linked to concerns of regime security and interests. Whether it pertains to securing the Egyptian airports, contributing to schemes of public surveillance or securing critical sites of potential unrest, the hired PSCs seem to be largely serving specific state’s objectives which closely connect to the regime’s continuous attempt to effectively adapt to a turbulent post-2010 environment by seeking to maintain its authoritarian character through
better strategies of regime security and more venues for regime interests. These state objectives encompass providing the regime, and the country’s president more specifically, with a parallel source of security as it continues to suffer from a loose control over its public security institutions with diverse and recurrent voices of dissent alongside frequent instances of serious defects.

In addition to protecting the regime, Egypt’s PSI at large, and the PSCs involved in security outsourcing in particular, effectively assist the regime in advancing its interests and improving its international image by generating substantial economic benefit for public figures and state institutions and their allies within the private sector, while alleviating some of the national economic hardships by employing a significant number of people as well as enhancing the security of private properties and businesses which stabilizes the country’s economy and helps attract foreign investment. Lastly, the post-2010 rise of the PSI and the increased contracts of security outsourcing strongly support the Egyptian regime’s resolve to tighten its control over all social and political mobilization by having PSCs serve as indirect agents of repression which ultimately nurtures regime security and leads to national stability.

The overall picture has been chiefly different in Tunisia. While, as discussed in chapter 4, there has been a persistent push toward encouraging outsourcing security by members of the domestic PSI as in the case of national airports and football stadiums, the practice of outsourcing security to domestic PSCs by different state institutions has been generally limited since the uprising due to the 2011 agreement between the state and the Tunisian General Labor Union. Moreover, in contrast to Egypt, the current relationship between the Tunisian state and the domestic PSI features a great level of independence, with the PSCs appearing largely distant from political pressure and potential strategies of regime security and interests. This independence is partially due to the overall status of the industry, being still largely immature and small thus not particularly adequate to contribute to strategies of regime security, and partially because of the post-2010 nature of the Tunisian state which has featured continuous struggle among different political actors and groups, old and new, to reshape the state and build a stable and sustainable political structure.

Ultimately, no connection could be currently drawn between the few instances of outsourcing security examined in chapter 4 and the post-uprising reconfiguration of the Tunisian political system, nor the attempts pursued by some factions and members of Ben Ali’s regime to ensure
the survival of the pre-2011 authoritarian rule. Essentially, the fall of Ben Ali and his ruling party, the expansive and continuous reconfigurations of the public security forces, and the ongoing changes affecting the political system as it has been slowly moving toward a more democratic form of rule, all of these factors have limited the scope of regime adaptation to a considerable degree and reduced the manifestation of this phenomenon to specific actors or practices rather than a systematically pursued strategy.

2.4 The international input to the market for force and larger political reconfigurations

Of great significance to the evolving markets for force in Egypt and Tunisia is the international input to and occasionally pressure on the political development within these countries, in addition to the international linkages generated and developing inside the security market, through packages of foreign aid and security assistance dedicated to a number of post-uprising countries as well as the different forms of bilateral and multilateral exchange and cooperation introduced in the domain of state security reform and beyond.

Contrary to Egypt, Tunisia has largely attracted more international attention and experienced considerably more serious and consistent pressure toward the country’s political transition to democratic rule. Within the market for force, international involvement by foreign countries and non-state actors has primarily concentrated on the domain of state security reform together with increasing security cooperation directed at the regional and global “war on terror”. As elaborated in chapter 4, the international involvement in Tunisia’s market for force has carried its own merits and flaws, particularly with respect to the public security institutions and their position on the country’s path toward democracy.

On the one hand, the internationally sponsored security reform projects led to some general improvements in the practices, attitude and capabilities of the Tunisian public security forces, as apparent in the enhanced security situation on the Tunisian borders and across the country’s territory. Meanwhile, the international approach to state security reform in Tunisia has featured serious drawbacks, which restricted the progress and success of the reform projects. These have included the lack of collaboration between the various parties, governmental and private, who have contributed to the security reforms projects, alongside a general preference for capacity-
building training and for enhancing tactical security capabilities at the expense of improving security governance and security-society relations.

Eventually, although some units within the Tunisian public security forces appear to be significantly more efficient than before, the security reforms that targeted the governing structure and attitude of the public security forces at large have remained generally limited. Subsequently, Tunisia’s public security forces have continued to exercise a considerable degree of autonomy from the government, which has recurrently led to weak institutional accountability and has largely undermined the public security apparatus’s professionalism and responsibility toward the population.

In Egypt, the military and other public security institutions, having considerably grown in strength and influence in recent years, have effectively constrained any international input toward democratizing the country’s political system and strongly countered all foreign or internationally sponsored calls for serious and meaningful security reforms. In the same vein, the rising militia activities in the Sinai Peninsula and in major Egyptian cities have constituted a favorite card of the post-2010 military regime which the official discourse and diplomatic relations have regularly invoked to further shut down international calls for political and security reforms. Furthermore, the Egyptian state’s pronounced “war on terror” has become a pretext of convenience to strengthen the Egyptian security state by building international connections with state and non-state actors in the spheres of security building and armament while simultaneously being engaged in bilateral and multilateral security cooperation with foreign countries whose overwhelming fear of militia activism, or “terrorism”, has superseded any concern they may have had in respect of the political fate of Egypt and its largely repressed population.

3 Conclusion

The various reconfigurations experienced amidst the markets for force in Egypt and Tunisia have had a great share of impact on the reconfigurations of the state and the post-2010 regimes during a continuously challenging era. By virtue of past and contemporary differences in respect of both countries’ bases of power and approaches to political challenges, the evolution
of their markets for force after the 2010-2011 uprisings have featured more differences that similarities, and by extension the political paths pursued by both states have been considerably diverse with regime adaptation being at the center of Egypt’s path while Tunisia’s path has been largely dynamic featuring more daring and assertive steps toward establishing the basis of a democratic rule.

Looking at the diverse channels through which the PSI and outsourcing security can contribute to the reestablishment of authoritarianism post-uprisings or revolutions, they seem closely connected to the different strategies of regime adaptation identified by Heydemann, as discussed in chapter 1, which encompass controlling new communication technologies, appropriating and containing civil societies and diversifying international linkages. Reflecting on the detailed accounts of the privatization and outsourcing of security in Egypt and Tunisia, as explored in chapters 4 and 5 and critically synthesized in this chapter, both the Egyptian and Tunisian regimes seem to have engaged and largely accomplished some of these adaptation strategies.

Nonetheless, the implications of these adaptation strategies on the survival of authoritarian rule has been considerably more pronounced and assertive in the Egyptian case due to the effective survival of the pre-2011 regime and the current supremacy of the military institution over the country’s politics and economy. Additionally, the direct input of the PSI, and outsourcing security more specifically, toward achieving state objectives that pertain to ascertaining regime security and enriching regime interests is more established and consolidated in the Egyptian case due to the large scope of the private security market, its solid establishment in the country and its close attachment to the state, the regime and public security institutions.
Chapter 7 – Conclusion: Outsourcing Security and State Reconfiguration in Post-Uprisings Authoritarian Countries

1 Introduction

Since the 2010-2011 uprisings, authoritarian regimes across the Arab region have been under considerable pressure to adapt to a new social and political environment where old strategies of co-optation and coercion are no longer sufficient to ensure regime continuity and prosperity. Facing a multitude of old and new challenges, encompassing a politically demanding and agitated youth and a significant rise in militia activities, different Arab regimes have engaged in a dynamic process of regime adaptation as the old ruling elites have sought to preserve their political dominance and power as well as secure the continuity and prosperity of their economic privileges. Paralleling this continuous stream of reconfigurations affecting the state structure and system of governance, several Arab countries have witnessed considerable reconfigurations within their respective markets for force. In addition to the numerous reshuffles and reform schemes that have affected the public security institutions, the region’s markets for force have experienced a remarkable expansion of the private security industry (PSI), initially attending to the security needs and concerns of the private sector and increasingly following an expanding process of state outsourcing security.

At first sight, the contemporary rise of the PSI in the Arab region seems to be a manifestation of the Arab countries’ steady move toward adapting the Western states’ model of neo-liberal governance. Meanwhile, a closer look at the historical and contemporary political and social developments across the region suggests a more complicated story. Beyond its roots in neo-liberal governance, the rising private security market in many Arab countries has largely followed an evolving course of regime adaptation in response to the multifaced challenges—economic, political and social—that these countries have been facing since the 2010-2011 uprisings. Carrying the legacy of decades of authoritarian rule that culminated in the establishment of resilient security states, regime adaptation in the Arab region has since 2011 been essentially guided by the primacy of regime security and the pursuit of regime interests.
nurtured through a close political-security tie and embedded in a damaged state-society relationship.

The link between the market for force on the one hand and the state structure and the larger mechanisms of governance on the other hand is historically established across countries and under different ruling systems. As all states are in principle responsible for maintaining security and stability within their territories, which is traditionally achieved through their domestic security institutions and the armed forces, the link between the state and the public security institutions is traditionally strong and everlasting. Meanwhile there are a number of factors that make this link particularly interesting and worthy of exploring in authoritarian contexts, especially in many of the Arab countries since the 2010-2011 uprisings.

Among others, there is the distinct nature of the state: some Arab authoritarian regimes have over decades transformed their countries into heavily rooted security states, with highly repressive public security institutions whose loyalty and allegiance are strongly attached to the regimes and ruling elite instead of the state and the citizenry. Moreover, the Arab region has since the 2010-2011 uprisings been subject to a constantly turbulent environment with widespread social, political and economic challenges that continuously threaten the ruling regimes.

To effectively engage with this rich topic, the present study has primarily focused on addressing the following question: How has increased privatization and outsourcing of security, amid wider reconfigurations of the market for force, contributed to the reconfiguration of authoritarian rule in some of the Arab region’s security states following the 2010-2011 uprisings? Precisely, how has this phenomenon impacted the regime structure, the tie between the ruling regimes and their public security institutions, the state-security-society nexus alongside available channels of mobilization and political expression? In pursuit of this enquiry, the dissertation’s second chapter sought to explore the critical approaches dedicated to the rise of the PSI in different authoritarian settings. In this light, the chapter emphasized the centrality of diversified coercion to the expression of authoritarian rule and its impact on the direction and functions taken by the private security actors in such settings.

Looking at the relationship between the reconfiguration of state power and the reconfiguration of the market for force in different Arab countries in the aftermath of the 2010-2011 uprisings,
the dissertation identified four broad explanations with respect to the notable expansion of the private security market and the attached process of outsourcing security across the region. These explanations include the creation of a secure economic environment that effectively attracts foreign investment; the cultivation of new and wider networks of patronage while alleviating some of the national economic distress; the diversification of some regimes’ bases of self-protection and sustainability; and lastly, but potentially more importantly, the curbing of constant sources of political and social unrest that emerged with the 2010-2011 uprisings and are continuously perceived as a challenge and threat to the authoritarian rule that survived the uprisings. At large, each of these motivations essentially contributes to the process of authoritarian adaptation as the regimes and ruling elites in the concerned Arab countries have benefited from and utilized the private security market to perpetuate regime stability and sustain their interests.

Acknowledging the discrepancy witnessed across the Arab region with regard to the developments affecting each country’s market for force and the latter’s impact on state power, state control and the pre-2011 strategies of governance, the dissertation chose two case studies, Egypt and Tunisia, to closely study this phenomenon and explore its nuances together with its diverse manifestations and implications. Both Egypt and Tunisia witnessed the early waves of the uprisings in late 2010, early 2011, followed by the overthrow of their long-standing presidents and the introduction of a chain of political events and changes of which the effect on establishing democratic rule in these countries has been highly questionable.

Other cases, specifically Algeria, would have highly enriched the current study and widened its scope of analysis and conclusions. Algeria represents a fascinating case because it offers many grounds of comparison with Egypt, especially the role of the student movement and ultras groups in social and political mobilization and the historical role of the military institution in the formation and sustainability of authoritarian rule. With a gap of eight years between the overthrow of Egypt’s Hosni Mubarak and Algeria’s Abdelaziz Bouteflika, this comparative analysis begs the question of how different states, regimes and populations alike, learn from past experiences and adapt to new circumstances in pursuit of better outcomes. Nonetheless, as this research started in late 2016 and the Algerian state experienced its mass uprising in early 2019, including Algeria as a case study in this dissertation was not feasible; meanwhile, it constitutes a promising venue to take the present research further in the future.
To engage with Egypt and Tunisia, the dissertation had to first outline the foundations and modes of operation guiding the market for force in the two cases, particularly looking at the domestic security agencies and the armed forces which have been dominating these countries’ markets for force for many decades. Chapter 3 thus explored these two models of security states, examining the centrality of the public security institutions to the development of authoritarian rule as direct and indirect mechanisms of coercion and co-optation, together with daily practices of economic exploitation and disciplinary power, have generated and sustained an environment of constant fear that kept the population contained, largely through forceful compliance.

In such light, the 2010-2011 uprisings in Egypt and Tunisia were considerably shocking and disrupting to the established practices of authoritarian rule which have been long adopted by both countries’ ruling elite and their public security agencies. Between losing confidence and control over the public security forces and countering the domestic, and occasionally international, pressure and demands for the establishment of democratic rule, which has centered on granting greater political rights and participation, better economic opportunities and services to the citizenry as well as developing a more responsible and citizen-oriented public security apparatus, the old ruling elites had to upgrade their governing strategies and bases of control in order to sustain their political dominance as well as to protect and potentially extend their existent interests, which have heavily depended on widespread economic exploitation and the regular abuse of national resources.

Building on this background, chapters 4 and 5 examined in depth the Tunisian and Egyptian experiences respectively by looking at the particularities of the state security reforms together with the security markets’ reconfigurations introduced and achieved in both countries since the uprisings. In the process, the post-uprisings rise of the PSI and the ongoing practice of outsourcing security were carefully traced and examined. In brief, the rise of the PSI in Tunisia has been closely linked to the domain of state security reform, which has been largely conducted in partnership with foreign actors. This was complemented by the gradual growth of the domestic PSI which has progressively sought to establish itself amid an ongoing domestic and regional environment of uncertainties and considerable security risks. At large, the Tunisian state has essentially witnessed slow and narrowly focused state security reforms which were subject to considerable resistance from the old guards inside the public security institutions, and were heavily shaped by a number of unfavorable conditions alongside
unanticipated national and regional challenges and threats. These have subsequently limited larger reconfigurations within the public security apparatus which continues to enjoy a great share of institutional autonomy.

On the Egyptian front, the successful survival of the old regime after the 2011 uprising meant that the reconfiguration of the market for force was closely monitored and shaped to fit the regime’s prime objective of preserving state control and tightening the state’s grip over the society. As such, all demands and initiatives for meaningful and effective security reforms were largely dismissed and fought against as the Egyptian regime invested heavily in revisiting its security strategies by upgrading its instruments and diversifying its agents of repression. Contrasting the limited changes experienced within the public security apparatus, the private security market has considerably flourished serving the private and public sectors alike. Being closely tied to the ruling regime and aligning with its objectives and policies, the rise of the PSI at large and the growing schemes of outsourcing security in particular have ultimately fed into enhancing regime security and interests.

Taking the research and findings presented in the empirical chapters forward, chapter 6 engaged with a comparative analysis of Tunisia and Egypt, exploring the commonalities and differences in their experiences with security market’s reconfigurations by identifying the various factors that have shaped and directed these differences. The chapter essentially examined how these two security states, by virtue of featuring different bases of power and approaches to political challenges, change and authoritarian upgrading, have experienced security markets’ changes post-uprisings and the impact of this continuing experience on the authoritarian survival and regime adaptation in these countries.

Building on this comparative analysis, this concluding chapter revisits the dissertation’s initial research question as it further scrutinizes the relationship between the reconfiguration of the market for force and that of state power in the context of authoritarian regimes and the framework of regime adaptation being followed when authoritarian countries are confronted with large-scale and continuous social and political challenges. In this vein, the following questions are addressed: on the one hand, how can the PSI and outsourcing security enhance an authoritarian state’s gradual transition toward democratic rule amidst a challenging environment of social and political unrest? On the other hand, how can privatizing and
outsourcing security contribute to the reestablishment of authoritarianism after popular uprisings or revolutions?

2 Beyond Egypt and Tunisia: outsourcing security and regime adaptation in post-uprising countries

Building on the comparative analysis between Egypt and Tunisia in chapter 6, this part further scrutinizes the relationship between the reconfigurations affecting the market for force and these pertaining to state power in the context of authoritarian regimes, being particularly attentive to the framework of regime adaptation that is followed when authoritarian countries are confronted with large-scale and continuous social and political challenges. In this vein, three questions are being addressed. The first is how can the PSI and outsourcing security enhance an authoritarian state’s gradual transition toward democratic rule amidst a challenging environment of social and political unrest? Second, what are the potential harm on a country’s path toward democratic rule which might accompany the rise of the PSI with an expanding process of security outsourcing? Lastly, how can privatizing and outsourcing security purposefully contribute to the reestablishment of authoritarianism after popular uprisings or revolutions?

2.1 Outsourcing security and the transition toward democratic rule

Acknowledging that each country’s experience is unique, as captured in the concept of context sensitivity endorsed early on by this dissertation and as demonstrated in the distinct experiences of Egypt and Tunisia, it is only fair to assume that authoritarian adaptation would not be the only path followed by authoritarian countries when confronted with large-scale social and political unrest. In other words, depending on the interplay of numerous local and international dynamics within a country, the uprisings or revolutions against authoritarian rule may carry a considerable potential for success pushing the concerned country toward a more accountable and open political system. Considering such a scenario, this section examines the various means through which outsourcing security may improve security governance and enhance an authoritarian state’s transition toward democratic rule in a post-uprising context.
Starting with the field of security reform, domestic or foreign private and non-state security actors can assist in the restructuring of the public security forces and in effectively redefining and focusing their mandates, which in the case of post-uprisings security states have chiefly been operating within a confined paradigm of regime security and interests. In this vein, the assistance of private and non-state security actors can take the form of targeted consultancy to advice and support the public security forces while they undertake this shift and introduce these developments. This scenario has largely manifested in Tunisia from early 2011 onward where the role of the private security consultancy has significantly increased. This was primarily influenced by the international donors’ focus on security reform projects, especially those directed at building up the capacity of the Tunisian security entities and redefining their structures (Herbert, interview 2019).

Acknowledging the positive input of the private security consultancy in Tunisia, Nisetich (interview 2019) notes that the British PSC Aktis Strategy Ltd, who was hired to advise the Tunisian security forces at a number of occasions, did a good job at “diagnosing many of the issues that existed within the public security apparatus and helped it operate more efficiently in a democratic environment.” Meanwhile, the solutions and suggestions proposed by Aktis Strategy Ltd have had “a much more mixed record” (Nisetich, interview 2019). This struggle was equally experienced by other private security actors whose success at diagnosing the issues of the public security apparatus in Tunisia didn’t necessarily enable them to provide suitable solutions and programs to address these problems.

Outside the field of state security reform, private and non-state security actors can enhance an authoritarian state’s gradual transition toward democratic rule by substituting the public security forces, or significantly assisting them, in the provision of some non-sovereignty related public security tasks. These may include securing some important public or national events, such as football matches and national festivals. Some have equally advocated the allocation of some administrative services, such as issuing identity cards and passports, to security or non-security private actors, which is expected to “create financial profits for different parties as well as alleviate the growing burden being placed on the public security forces” (Smida, interview 2019). Depending on the non-sovereignty related public security task, the privatization process could constitute a short-term approach in order to ease and quicken the security reform process, or it could endure in some areas and for some tasks, where PSCs would prove to be more specialized and cost efficient.
The broad objective here is for the public security forces to become more focused on maintaining public security and crime control and less involved in the diverse domains of state management of the population, which under a security state has regularly translated into the security forces influencing people’s career development, manipulating business and economic opportunities as well as being in charge of mundane state interactions with the population. In a similar vein, the presence of PSCs, presuming their independence from the regime and public security institutions (i.e. not being subject to political pressure and considerations nor serving specific regime interests) can reduce the dependence of economic actors, domestic and foreign, on the public security forces, which subsequently reduces the latter’s involvement in the private sector. This is particularly important at times of heightened militia activities and rising criminality as the outsourcing process in this capacity would alleviate some of the burden carried by the public security forces, who are often overstretched and lacking in resources.

2.2 Outsourcing security and potential obstacles on the path to democracy

While acknowledging the benefits of outsourcing security in post-uprisings countries, it could be argued that even in cases where the larger political environment is receptive to political change and democratic reforms, a heightened presence of PSCs and an expanding reliance on them through outsourcing security contracts can still negatively affect a state’s path toward democracy after an uprising or revolution. This may occur in multiple forms. With respect to outsourcing security in the domain of security reform projects, this carries the potential of nurturing the autonomy and enhancing the power of the public security institutions.

As shown in the Tunisian case, many of the security reform projects, where private and non-state security actors have been involved, were heavily focused on the technical capabilities and material empowerment of the public security forces at the expense of improving the security governance and accentuating the civil aspects of security. While some private and non-state security actors have actively contributed to developing a more service-oriented police forces and generating community-based solutions to security problems (Herbert, interview 2018; Bouzid, interview 2019), the heightened level of militia activism domestically and regionally has deeply influenced the orientation of the security reform projects and by consequence the mandates allocated to the private and non-state security actors through the outsourcing contracts.
In a parallel development, outsourcing security may nurture existing networks of patronage within the public security institutions and limit the circle of benefit and actual scope of reform. In Tunisia for instance, as the state continues to experiment and struggle with reforming its public security institutions, the consultancy role played by the private and non-state security actors was expected to continually expand. This expansion is partially attributed to the private security consultancy being heavily focused on tactical skills, which is largely welcomed by the Tunisian forces, but also because of its contribution to a larger promotional scheme inside the Tunisian security apparatus, which focuses on educating the public security forces through the provision of specialized courses and training.

In essence, the more training that public security officers complete, the higher chances they will advance in the ranks. While generally beneficial, this educational-promotional scheme has been occasionally subject to favoritism as the circle of trainees became increasingly small, being limited to a group of public security personnel whose connection to powerful members of the public security institutions has enabled them to secure regular participation in these training. Subsequently, less people are benefiting from the training programs with the same group of privileged security personnel regularly attending the various training provided by the private and non-state security actors as long as they play into their promotional scheme even if some of these training “are not necessarily useful or necessarily meant to be implemented in the field” (Herbert, interview 2019).

On a different note, one persistent issue that has generally limited the benefits of internationally sponsored security reform projects is their detachment from a domestic security approach and a strategic vision that is developed and endorsed by local actors, including state and non-state security actors in addition to the government and the wider population. With diverse foreign, state and non-states, actors involved in the security reform projects without a clear collaborative framework, the ability of these reform projects to bring long-term comprehensive benefits has been considerably compromised. Particularly, as witnessed in Tunisia since 2011, the continuous flow of diverse, large-scale and ready-made, as opposed to domestically tailored and designed, security reform projects following the uprising has led to the lack of a domestically driven strategic vision and a long-term security approach (Herbert, interview 2019).
Another potentially negative effect of outsourcing security in post-uprising settings is the likelihood of draining the public security institutions of some of its high caliber security personnel and civilian managers whose continuous presence in the public security institutions is likely to play an influential role in positively reforming the public security apparatus. As these key public security actors interact with private and non-state security actors in the frame of subcontracted security reform projects or other outsourcing contracts where the public and private forces closely collaborate, some eventually decide to opt out of the public security forces in order to join the private sector, which promises better career progression and multifaceted benefits. As a consequence, the chances of the public security apparatus to follow and maintain the path of continuous upgrading and professionalism is relatively weakened.

In a similar vein, pertaining to the foreign PSCs, who openly operate in a post-uprising country, being either directly hired by the state or other entities to fulfil public or private security functions or those who are involved in security reform projects, either way, the risk of these foreign security actors advancing specific agendas that belong to other countries and major private parties is undeniable. This scenario was documented in studies of privatizing and outsourcing security in different African countries in the past and was equally alluded to by some of this dissertation’s interviewees in chapter 4.

Lastly and more broadly perhaps, the quick expansion of private security actors amid a public discourse and general atmosphere of insecurity and uncertainties risks enforcing this troubled environment by constantly increasing the level of demand for private security services. In essence, the continuous growth of the PSI is largely dependent on the presence of security risks and public feelings of insecurity. This may inhibit a country’s democratization and feed into authoritarian regime adaptation process in two ways. On the one hand, a troubled security environment and a perpetual perception of public fear may ultimately push a transitional government toward prioritizing security and stability at the expense of encouraging civil liberties, political engagement and other foundational elements of democratization.

On the other hand, the expanding presence of private security actors may reduce the incentive to reform the public security forces, especially if the latter exhibit high level of resistance to reform or are deeply dysfunctional, which makes the process of reform very lengthy and expensive. This observation was recurrently made during the presidency of Mohamed Morsi in Egypt where the deployment of PSCs was seen as increasingly covering up for a
dysfunctional state security apparatus. In this respect, Revkin (2013) remarked how “the growth of a largely unregulated industry of private security guards, some of whom are licensed to carry weapons, presents another obstacle to comprehensive security sector reform.” In a similar vein, during transitional periods and under weak executive and legislative state authorities, the rise of PSCs may accompany limited state monitoring and a weak legal framework to regulate the private security market. This may result into the spread of private violence outside a clear and comprehensive supervision from the state, which risks disturbing national stability and thus obstructing a state’s prospects of democratization.

2.3 The private security industry, outsourcing security and the reestablishment of authoritarian rule

Beyond the potential harm which outsourcing security can inflict on a state’s path toward democratic rule, the rise of the PSI and outsourcing security in post-uprising settings can deliberately contribute to regime adaptation and the reestablishment of authoritarianism after a popular uprising and revolution through a set of direct and indirect mechanisms. To start, the PSI and outsourcing security can be directly conducive to the perpetuation of authoritarian rule by becoming directly involved in regime policies and strategies of social and political control. These may encompass feeding into the expansion of a state system of public surveillance, either by relying on the PSCs as manufacturers and providers of surveillance technologies or by using PSCs’ personnel in the actual exercise of public surveillance which may extend to monitoring and constraining political activism and mobilization in public spaces. This was evident in the Egyptian case, where the PSCs, contracted to secure the gates of public universities and to manage sports’ events, were found to be gathering data on people, reporting on suspected or actual dissidents, and making arrests or assisting in them, among other repressive measures (Hamzawy, 2017; Elbaqry, interview 2018; Elseidi, interview 2018).

In terms of the indirect mechanisms which are essentially more subtle and diffused, private security actors can be part of the soft power developed by some states and their security institutions to control and monopolize the public discourse through the purchase or establishment of gigantic media outlets and the recruitments of famous pro-regime media presenters to serve as strong voices of state propaganda in this respect. Again, this approach has manifested in Egypt, where Falcon Group International, associated with the state intelligence services, established three media outlets in July 2017: Tawasul PR company, DRN
FM Radio channel and Radio One for Media production. In September 2017, the Tawasul PR company acquired the Cairo-based Hayat TV Network, founded in February 2008, for a sum of 1.4 billion Egyptian pounds, worth 79 million US dollar at the time (Egypt Independent, 2017; Zeinobia, 2017). Ironically, while Falcon Group International has been steadily establishing a strong presence for itself in the media industry through the aforementioned outlets in order to act as a defender and promoter of the current regime, all media coverage on the company that is conducted by any written, broadcast or online domestic channel, be it simple reporting or investigative journalism, has been strictly prohibited (Ghayth, interview 2019).

Furthermore, PSCs can contribute to the perpetuation of authoritarian rule or become a tool of regime adaptation in times of social and political unrest by assisting the state in maintaining control over the provision of key public goods and services, such as electricity, public transportation, among others. Seeing some states’ shortage of resources, human or financial or both, that would enable them to maintain complete control over these fields, some state institutions and ministries opt to hire PSCs’ personnel, as has been recently practiced in Egypt, to support in collecting electricity readings and bills as well as maintaining order at public transport stations and protecting major electricity towers (Abdel Qader, 2017; Ghayth, interview 2019). The state use of PSCs in this capacity carries its own risks. For instance, as mentioned in chapter 5, using PSCs’ personnel to collect meter readings instead of privatizing the electricity sector as a whole or allocating this function to a non-security company, raises several concerns including the required access to citizens’ data and the risk of using violence to enforce payment.

Last but not least, outsourcing security may serve to divert international attention from ongoing state oppression by establishing some apparent distance between the state and the citizenry. Namely, by replacing public security forces with private security personnel, especially at sites where political and social mobilization are common and by extension confrontations with the public security forces are highly probable, the state aims to place any occurring confrontations at these locations within a private context: PSCs personnel face-to-face with the citizenry. In this new context, the state seeks to avoid the blame and escape the accountability attached to any harm or oppressive measures exercised against the population by the PSCs at these locations.
3 Conclusion

As different Arab states have continuously struggled to achieve political stability and national security since the outbreak of the popular uprisings in late 2010 early 2011, their security markets have been witnesses to notable reconfigurations. Between limited or failed security reform schemes, recurrent bilateral and multilateral security cooperation, and a growing expansion of the private and non-state security actors, the reconfigurations of the region’s markets for force have been at the heart of the larger changes that have affected the state structure, ruling systems and state-security-society relations in post-uprisings Arab countries. As examined in the case of Egypt and Tunisia, there is a strong connection between the reconfigurations affecting the security market and the schemes of regime adaptation pursued by the ruling elite and state institutions who effectively survived the uprisings as they seek to preserve old structures of rule, which empowered them with extra juridical powers and entitled them to extended benefits and notable interests.

On the whole, the post-uprisings reconfigurations of the market for force, amid intensifying militia activism and persisting popular unrest, fit into an ongoing framework of authoritarian adaption pursued by the Arab region’s regimes and ruling elite to ensure their survival and prosperity following the social and political unrest that peaked during the 2010-2011 uprisings. More specifically, outsourcing security amidst a notable expansion of the private security market across the Arab region has essentially been shaped by the primacy of regime security embedded in a close political-security tie and a damaged state-society relationship. Beyond its roots in neo-liberal governance, this phenomenon has effectively served to enhance regime security in the aftermath of the Arab uprisings by providing the current regimes with alternative agents and strategies for social control while offering new venues to expand regime interests through networks of patronage that nurture broad-based authoritarian coalitions and attach the interests of diverse social groups to regime survival.

Pushing beyond the boundaries of the Arab region, the Egyptian and Tunisian experiences with security markets’ reconfigurations in the aftermath of their uprisings effectively enable us to reflect more broadly on the growing presence and activity of private and non-state security actors in countries that may face large social and political unrest. On the one hand, the rise of the PSI and the resort to outsourcing security following popular upheavals may generally
endorse an authoritarian state’s transition toward a more democratic system by indirectly limiting the abusive power and social involvement of the public security forces in the arena of the daily interactions with the citizenry.

More actively, non-state and private security actors can assist in the restructuring of the public security forces and in effectively redefining and focusing their mandates. This can take the form of targeted consultancy to advice and support the public security forces while undertaking this shift and introducing these developments. Moreover, outsourcing security can serve to alleviate some of the burden placed on the public security forces, especially in times of heightened militia activism and criminal activities, by either substituting or significantly assisting the public security forces in the provision of some non-sovereignty related public security tasks.

On the other hand, privatizing and outsourcing security can indirectly hinder a post-uprising country’s path toward democratic rule by nurturing existing and generating new networks of patronage within the public security institutions as well as limiting the circle of benefit from the reform training. It is also common for this phenomenon to drain the public security institutions of some of its high caliber security personnel and civilian managers who upon close interaction with non-state and private security actors may decide to opt out of the public security forces and join the private sector which promises better career progression and diverse benefits. With respect to the involvement of non-state and private security actors in some security reform projects, as clearly featured in the Tunisian case, this approach, while carrying significant value, doesn’t easily or necessarily translate into the improvement of security governance or the reorientation of the public security forces away from regime security and toward national security and civil protection.

Although the private and non-state security actors may certainly support the public security forces to become more professional, efficient and better equipped, the outcome of the former’s input is largely contingent on the local context and the distinct features of each security reform project, alongside the personnel connections and broader relations dictating the outsourcing process. In addition to the above, privatizing and outsourcing security in post-uprising settings can deliberately contribute to regime adaptation and the reestablishment of authoritarianism by becoming directly involved in regime policies and strategies of social and political control. Among many forms, this could manifest through assisting the state to maintain control over
the provision of key public goods and services, which is very likely to involve access to and collection of private data that pertains to the general public.

In a similar vein, private security actors can actively enhance the expansion of a state system of public surveillance either by acting as manufacturers and providers of surveillance technologies, or by becoming involved in the actual exercise of public surveillance. This is evident in cases where private security guards have been deployed instead of or alongside the public security forces at selected public spaces, which are usually sites to mass gathering, in attempt to extend the scope of state monitoring and further constraint all venues for political activism and social mobilization. Lastly, the PSI can become part of the soft power which is continuously being nurtured by some authoritarian states and their security institutions to control and monopolize the public discourse, through the purchase and sponsorship of sizeable media outlets that are dedicated to advocate for the regime, promote its policies and defend its image domestically and internationally.

Ultimately, privatizing and outsourcing security in post-uprising settings always carry the potential to either enhance a state’s path toward achieving democratic rule or conversely reinforce old structures of state control and purposefully assist in the reestablishment of authoritarian regimes. As the Egyptian and Tunisian cases demonstrate, the exact impact which the private and non-state security actors have on the reconfiguration of the market for force, the state power and structure, and the political system evolving in the aftermath of an uprising or revolution is largely contingent upon the historical background and continuous developments that a country experiences in the following areas.

First, there is the relationship among the regime, the ruling elite and their public security institutions. This encompasses the pre-uprisings status, power and interests of the military institution together with that of other public security agencies, particularly the Ministry of Interior and the intelligence services in the concerned country and tracing how these evolve in the aftermath of the uprising. The second area of concern pertains to the private security market: the scope and activities exhibited by the country’s PSI prior to the uprisings, the industry’s reaction and attitude during the transitional period and the factors that have shaped the contemporary evolution of the industry including the legal code and the dynamic mechanisms of demand and supply.
Next come any major changes that affect the relationship among the state, the public security institutions and the private security actors, especially with respect to cases of outsourcing security. Last but not least, attention is due to the scope, manifestations and impact of foreign actors, state and non-state alike, and of external pressures on the development of a country’s market for force in addition to foreign actors’ input toward the larger political reconfigurations taking place in the concerned country. With respect to the market for force, the influence and input of foreign actors may manifest in the form of targeted security aid, bilateral and multilateral security cooperation as well as sponsorship of particular programs of state security reform.

As for the political system and the path toward democratic rule, foreign actors may exercise substantive amount of pressure on a country’s political elite to open up the country’s political system, enhance genuine political participation and limit political and social oppression. Or, on the contrary, the international community, especially foreign actors who exhibit a strong say in the internal affairs of many developing and under-developed countries, may prioritize domestic stability over political openness seeing the latter, and the shaky path toward democratic rule more broadly, as a risky move amidst heightened security threats and militia activism.

At the end, whether inside and outside the Arab region, the answer to how privatizing and outsourcing security enhance democratic rule or enforce authoritarian reestablishment in a post-uprising state eventually depends on a large interplay of factors that are themselves dynamic, often unpredictable, and not easily controlled.
List of Interviewees

Abouaoun, E. Director of the Middle East and North Africa Programs at the U.S. Institute of Peace. (November 2017)

Azab, M. Sports journalist at Moheet Website. (January 2019)

Ben Brika, M. Director and Owner of GSP Security Tunisia. (January 2019)


Bouzid, S. Monitoring and evaluation expert and reporter on UNDP projects in Tunisia. (January 2019)

Cheich-Rouhou, T. Tunisian Journalist and Writer. (January 2019)

Chettaoui, O. USIP Project Officer in Tunisia. (January 2018)

Dorsey, J.M. Senior fellow at Nanyang Technological University and author of the blog “The Turbulent World of Middle East”. (May 2018)

El-Raggal, A. Political sociologist specializing in security studies. (July 2018)

Elbaqry, A. Ex-Vice President of Egypt’s University Students Union and Ex-President of Al-Azhar University Students Union. (August 2018)

Elrefai, T. Chairman of El Mudaraj, a ticketing and event management company specialized in sports’ events. (May 2018)

Elseidi, A. Coordinator of the student movement against the coup in Al-Azhar university. (September 2018)

Ghayth, A. Sports journalist at Moheet Website. (January 2019)

Ghrab, A. Vice president of the research and investigation commission and Member of commission on functional examination and reform of institutions. (January 2019)

Herbert, M. Scholar and Tunisia-based security consultant. (December 2017 and January 2019)

Interviewee 1. Managing Director of G4S Egypt. (July 2018)

Kartas, M. Research Associate at the Centre on Conflict, Development and Peacebuilding at the Graduate Institute in Geneva. (February 2018)

Lawrence, W. Visiting Professor at George Washington University and ex-Associate Director Control Risk’s Middle East and North Africa. (May 2018)

Mady, A. Associate Professor of political science at Egypt’s Alexandria University. (August 2018)

Mansouri, A. Owner of Polygarde Tunisia. (April 2019)

Mohy Eldeen, S. Scholar on security and transitional justice in the Middle East. (July 2018)

Municipality of Tunis. Email correspondence with the author. (June 2018)

Nasri, B. Regional Manager at Polygarde Tunis Branch. (January 2019)

Nisetich, A. Research analyst and ex-project coordinator at British PSC Aktis Strategy Ltd’s office in Tunisia. (July 2018)

Poulin, M. Deputy Head of DCAF Tunis mission. (January 2019)

Rabie, P. Egyptian Journalist. (May 2018)

Rossiter, A. Assistant Professor of International Security at Khalifa University of Science & Technology. (July 2018)

Smida, N. Vice President of Tunisian Observatary of Global Security. (January 2019)

Thabet, Y. Journalist and author of several books on the ultras groups in Egypt. (May 2018)

Van Vierberghe, E. Police Reform Project Coordinator, DCAF Tunisia. (January 2019)
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189


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Non-scholarly Sources


Appendix 1 - Private security companies operating in Egypt

Note: Security experts have estimated the Egyptian private security market to comprise over 600 companies in 2014; with over 200 unregistered security companies operating in the country. There are also a number of business companies, with subbranches dedicated for the provision of security services.

A brief list of major PSCs in Egypt

Care Services
The first PSC to operate in Egypt, opening in 1979. The company offers a multiplicity of services including guarding and protection, electronic security and integrated solutions.

Falcon Group International
An Egyptian joint venture security company that was established in 1974 under the Commercial International Bank’s security and safety department in charge of money transportation. In 2006, Falcon Group International branched out as an independent security company, currently resembling a public-private conglomerate with The Civil Aviation Ministry and other state institutions owning 80% of the company’s assets.

G4S Secure Solutions Egypt
The company opened in 2001 in Egypt as a subsidiary of G4S Plc, the world’s largest security company. At present, the company has 6 branches across Egypt with over 6000 employees.

Queen Service
The company was founded in 1982 as part of the Egyptian Ministry of Defence’s National service projects organization.

Securitas Egypt
Securitas, the world’s second biggest security services company, entered Egypt’s PSI in 2008 by purchasing Global Partner Services Ltd founded in 2006. In addition to core security services, the company offers a wide range of security products. With a guard force of 2000 personnel, Securitas Egypt currently operates across the Egyptian territory serving a diverse set of clients.

Risk Free Group Egypt
The company’s scope of work includes assessment and security master planning, crisis management and enforcement strategies and execution. Risk Free is the national representative of Control Risks, a UK based global risk and strategic consulting firm specializing in political, security and integrity risk.
Other security companies operating in Egypt

**Al Thuraya Security**
Operating since 2011, the company, owned by ex-military Egyptian officers, is licensed since 2016 by the Egyptian Ministry of Interior.

**El Masa for Security and Services**
Established in 2011, the company is an Egyptian joint stock company. Its main activity is to guard real estate and establishments of various kinds from within and to set up security plans for all facilities and equip them with safety and security systems and the method of control and follow-up.

**First Power Security Guards & Services (FPSS)**
Operating since 2012, the company specializes in tourist facility management as well as security & sentry for public and private clients including factories, companies and hospitals.

**Global Security Logistics (GSL)**
In 2011, GSL was acquired by Global Consolidated Contractors, a business cooperation founded in 2005.

**Middle East Security Egypt**
The company was established in 2009 by a group of security specialists alongside policemen and military officers. It specializes in travel, proximity protection, corporate events, corporate investigations and product protection.

**Security and Monitoring Services**
Formerly GALEA SMS, Security and Monitoring Services was established in 2003, currently with over 700 employees. It specializes in security, risk management, and consulting.
Note: The majority of the PSCs operating in Tunisia today are small in size and limited in the scale of their operations. They also rarely have an online presence, which made it very hard to find and contact them.

Brief list of PSCs in Tunisia

**INTER-CON Security Systems of Tunisia**
Founded in 1998, the company is a subsidiary of Inter-Con Security Systems Inc. in the US. The company offers a variety of services including guarding and security services as well as surveillance systems.

**GSP sécurité**
The company was established in 2012 by Mahdi Ben Brika, a former member of the national anti-terrorism unit.

**KSS protection**
The company offers guarding and security services as well as surveillance systems. It operates on many sites in Tunisia including industrial zones, hotels and construction sites.

**Manwork Security**
The company was established in 2017.

**Polygarde**
The company was established in 2006. It currently operates across the country with over 400 employees.

**Promogarde**
Established since 1995, the company has been providing security and cleaning services, among others.

**SOTUGarde**
Founded in 2008, the company’s services include fire protection, electrical work, and security systems.

**SPS Securite Tunisie**
The company is an affiliate of SMG-Groupe International, a French PSC. Operating throughout Tunisia, it specializes in services, training, advice and expertise in the field of security.

**Team Guard**
The company specializes in the field of risk management and prevention. Its services include event security, close protection, guarding and surveillance.