


**Newspapers in Wartime: Case-studies in Madrid, Valencia, and
Barcelona during the Spanish Civil War (1936-1939)**



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Declaration

This dissertation is the result of my own work and includes nothing which is the outcome of work done in collaboration except where specifically indicated in the text. It has not been previously submitted, in part or whole, to any university or institution for any degree, diploma, or other qualification. In accordance with the guidelines of the Degree Committee of the Faculty of Modern and Medieval Languages and Linguistics, this dissertation does not exceed 80,000 words.

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September, 2023

Abstract

During the Spanish Civil War (1936-1939), Republican newspapers attempted to bridge politically and culturally diverse audiences in defense of an unstable democracy attacked by authoritarian forces. Spain is a complex country home to multiple national identities which claim their own region, language, and way of life, making the theme of Spanish unification tense and conflicting. Using rhetorical framing analysis, with elements of historical discourse analysis and affect theory, this thesis explores the fluid dynamic between political communication and propaganda and the ways both incorporate themes of history, nationalism, and religious faith in Spain. Through analysis of daily coverage in Madrid, Valencia, and Barcelona, the three capitals of the Second Spanish Republic, each chapter focuses on a popular periodical of the city and era. Case-studies include Republican *ABC* (Madrid), *El Pueblo* (Valencia), and *La Vanguardia* (Barcelona) as I investigate framing strategies in wartime journalism, the narratives they produced, and the selective emphasis and omission of events in the quest to accomplish mandated messaging objectives. I argue that the impacts of emotion on lived experience help separate the journalist from the historian. Testimonies demonstrate that in the midst of conflict, editors and reporters are susceptible to the same biases and emotions as the general public, resulting in the construction of frames to guide (or distort) the processing of information. I find that national imaginaries are critical to the practice of communicating armed resistance in wartime, moulding frightening realities to specific cultural contexts and locating them within motivational interpretations of the national past. The history of the press is integral to the human search for knowledge and understanding, and it is my hope that the following case-studies of newspapers in the Spanish Civil War will contribute new insights into the role and function of news media in times of crisis.

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Preface

“¿Quién le mete a V. en la aventura? ¿Para qué se empeña en exhibir su insuficiencia? ¿A beneficio de quién acomete V. un trabajo tan evidentemente superior a sus elementos de acción? Trataré de explicar la incongruencia. Y quiera Dios que la calidad de mis razones sirva de perdón a mis yerros.”—Ángel Ossorio y Gallardo, 1913

Despite his conservative values and Catholic faith, Ángel Ossorio y Gallardo stood by the Second Spanish Republic in its darkest hour, faithfully penning spirited editorials throughout the war, often without compensation. In his youth, he published a study on the evolution of eighteenth-century Catalan political thought in the hopes of enhancing understanding of the Catalanist resurgence of his time. Though I offer a study on a different topic, I feel compelled to make a similar confession to my readers—should I be lucky enough to have them—of what he called “el grave pecado de audacia,” for investigations of the Spanish Civil War are frequently contested.

My interest in the Spanish Civil War began with the discovery that my great-uncle fought in the International Brigades. Milton, as he was called, gave up a fully-funded scholarship to the University of Chicago Medical School to defend Spain’s young democracy. Like many who volunteered, he believed the Spanish Civil War to be the start of a greater world conflict against Fascism. As it was illegal for Americans to break neutrality in the conflict, records show he travelled first to Canada. He arrived in Spain in July of 1937 as part of the Mackenzie-Papineau Brigade, affectionately nicknamed the “Mac-Paps.” One year later, he died in the Ebro Offensive at Gandesa just a week shy of his twenty-sixth birthday. Cited for bravery at Fuentes, he served as a machinist and metalworker and held the rank of Cabo, but little else is known about his experiences. A former compatriot described him to my father as ‘a true believer’ and credited him with once saving his life.

Following this lead, I began to wonder about the daily challenges of life in the Spanish Civil War and the news read by locals. My research lured me deep into the archives of Valencia, Barcelona, and Salamanca, and even to an unexpected coronavirus lockdown. I will never forget sifting through the delicate pages of press releases, administrative reports, and manifestoes or falling down rabbit hole after rabbit hole in the various libraries across Spain. I unearthed thousands of documents—most of which seemed irrelevant—in desperate search of materials that could illuminate the as yet untold story behind the newspapers I was reading. Under the watchful eye of the archivists, I navigated—not always successfully—the labyrinthine paths of history, gathering what I could like a grave-robber. For better or for worse, my research

took me on a number of adventures. From a burning building in Valencia to a flooded house in Burriana to a series of quarantined flats around the world, this thesis survived disasters of fire, flood, and modern plague before finding its way into the readers' hands. I hope my scholarship offers a new dimension to journalism history in wartime. However, to paraphrase Ossorio yet again: What is the point of demonstrating my inadequacy? Why do I undertake this venture? I shall explain the discrepancies, and may the quality of my argument make up for my mistakes.

Introduction

Re-imagining a Republic at War

On July 17, 1936, military insurgents launched a violent attack on the democratically-elected officials of the Second Spanish Republic. The next day, General Francisco Franco made a radio broadcast from the Canary Islands in which he declared a state of war against an allegedly illegitimate and lawless government beholden to foreign corruption and anarchist chaos.¹ Spaniards were split as they took to the streets overnight. Many sided with the so-called Nationalist rebels but more identified with the Republican loyalists to defend what semblance of democracy remained. Thus began the Spanish Civil War, a three-year conflict that would claim the lives of hundreds of thousands of victims,² devastate the national infrastructure for decades to come, and set the stage for a tremendous confrontation between political powers as audiences around the world anxiously watched.

Some towns were massacred as they slept, taken by surprise as the rebels systematically abducted and assassinated suspected liberals, Socialists, Communists, Anarchists, and leftist sympathisers. Others successfully resisted the coup to reaffirm decisive Republican allegiances. Galicia, Northern Asturias, most of Andalusia, and parts of Castile succumbed within weeks, while the regional capitals of Madrid, Valencia, and Barcelona firmly rejected enemy advances and established themselves as Republican strongholds. The Basque Country was also victorious in its defense, but fell piece by piece under heavy bombardment until Bilbao surrendered the following year. The war attracted international attention as government leaders across Europe and the Americas debated whether to intervene and on whose behalf. Though workers, artists, and intellectuals tended to support the Republican cause, conservative politicians and their allies favoured the insurrectionist movement as populations contested which political force posed the greater threat, Communism or Fascism.

The Second Spanish Republic was neither Communist nor Anarchist, even if it exhibited, at times, radical leanings and extremist tendencies. Their ranks were also comprised

¹ “La patriótica alocución del general Franco al iniciar el movimiento,” *ABC Sevilla*, July 23, 1936.

² Scholars dispute the number of lives taken in the Spanish Civil War, with estimates ranging from 200,000 to 1,000,000 victims. Totals depend upon the inclusion of deaths from disease, starvation, malnourishment, displacement, and imprisonment in Spain and concentration camps abroad in addition to the combat-related fatalities of both sides. Some numbers also attempt to account for Francoist reprisals. See Helen Graham, *The Spanish Civil War: A Very Short Introduction* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005); Ángel Viñas, *La República en guerra: contra Franco, Hitler, Mussolini, y la hostilidad británica* (Madrid: Editorial Crítica, 2012); Gabriel Jackson, *The Spanish Republic and the Civil War* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1965); Julián Casanova, *España partida en dos: Breve historia de la Guerra Civil española* (Barcelona: Editorial Crítica, 2013).

of Republicans, socialists, progressives, and Basque and Catalan nationalists. Neither were the Francoists uniformly Fascist. Launched by a group of generals who had planted secret cells throughout the country, the uprising was, in its early stages, affiliated with multiple conservative parties. Scholars have yet to reach a consensus on how to label the political character of the military insurgents, whose forces included monarchists, militarists, Catholic officials, Carlists, and Falangists (Spain's Fascist party led by José Antonio Primo de Rivera, son of the late dictator). What began as a civil war quickly spilled over into European terrain as others joined opposing ranks. Historians disagree on the extent of international involvement in the Spanish Civil War, though most argue that Franco received superior aid from Germany and Italy while Republicans obtained limited materials from the Soviet Union. Moreover, the timing of the conflict has led to contentious debate over its classification as a civil war or the prelude to World War II.³ Particularly at the time, the nature of the conflict and its implications stirred considerable controversy as global correspondents flocked to report on the action in Spain.

Álvaro de Albornoz, famed writer and a Republican founder, once stated “la historia del periodismo español es la historia de las luchas políticas de nuestra patria.”⁴ Renowned Catalan journalist, Arturo Mori, also contended “el periodismo es lucha, y la lucha se ha impuesto en España, como en todas partes.”⁵ Indeed, Spanish journalists have exhibited a unique sense of pride and duty throughout their nation's history, developing bellicose discourses on the nature of events in Spain. While British and American newspapermen sought to project an image of relative neutrality amid detached, sometimes dispassionate reports (an image not always aligned with the reality), Spaniards were more forthright in declaring their allegiances without attempting to mask their political slants. Spaniards viewed journalism as a form of direct political engagement and intellectuals often used newspapers as a forum for activism, not adhering to the appearance of passive coverage or analysis of national events cultivated in the journalism traditions of some countries. Especially in the Spanish Civil War, during which right and left competed for influence, Spanish journalists considered themselves front-line soldiers in the battle for public opinion as they sought to effect ideological change

³ George Esenwein and Adrian Shubert, *Spain at War: The Spanish Civil War in Context, 1931-1939* (Longman: London and New York, 1995); Francisco J. Romero Salvadó, *The Spanish Civil War: Origins, Course and Outcomes* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005); Paul Preston, *The Spanish Civil War: 1936-1939* (Chicago: The Dorsey Press, 1989); Charles J. Esdaile, *The Spanish Civil War: A Military History* (London: Routledge, 2019).

⁴ Álvaro de Albornoz, “Prólogo,” in Arturo Mori, *La Prensa española durante La Segunda República* [1943] (Seville: Editorial Renacimiento, 2019), 43.

⁵ Arturo Mori, *La Prensa española durante La Segunda República* [1943] (Seville: Editorial Renacimiento, 2019), 58.

and persuade spectators: “el periodismo español de nuestro tiempo ha sido, en general, espejo de caballeros y batalla entre hidalgos, pobres y soñadores.”⁶ Mori also observed that journalists, while chronicling events for posterity, are not themselves historians.⁷ It is precisely this concept which informs the present thesis. Specifically, I ask how newspapers frame history in the quest to motivate audiences and shape a chaotic world. How does the national imaginary they share reflect a particular ideology or agenda and how is it constructed? What rhetorical strategies do journalists employ to interpret issues and convince others of their worldview? Over the course of the Spanish Civil War, as Spaniards battled internal and external foes, how did Republican reporting reflect and manipulate the conflict for local and international readers in the fight to preserve Spanish democracy? My research questions consequently orbit a greater fundamental query concerning news framing as a propagandistic tool when it no longer derives from a passive or unconscious process. Critically, I question how propaganda deliberately engages framing to communicate political messaging and ideology in wartime journalism.

Using rhetorical framing analysis, with elements of historical discourse analysis and affect theory, this project explores the fluid dynamic between political communication and propaganda and the ways both incorporate themes of history, nationalism, emotion, and religious faith in Spain. Through analysis of daily coverage in Madrid, Valencia, and Barcelona, the three capitals of the Second Spanish Republic, each chapter focuses on a popular periodical of the city and era. Case-studies include Republican *ABC* (Madrid), *El Pueblo* (Valencia), and *La Vanguardia* (Barcelona) as I investigate framing strategies in wartime journalism, the narratives they produced, the types of emotions they employed, and the selective emphasis and omission of events in the quest to accomplish mandated messaging objectives. Through a unique juxtaposition of news-framing, historical analysis, affect, and imagined communities, therefore, I interrogate journalistic practices in the Spanish Civil War as a fundamental extension (and distortion) of the national imaginary in wartime.

Journalism History and the Spanish Civil War (1936-1939)

⁶ Arturo Mori, *La Prensa española durante La Segunda República* [1943] (Seville: Editorial Renacimiento, 2019), 58.

⁷ He wrote: “No somos historiadores propiamente dichos. La historia del periodismo español no se podrá escribir hasta dentro de muchos años, cuando las figuras de mayor realce de la prensa nuestra hayan salido ellas solas del montón y den en los ojos del historiador su luz genuina. Esta es crónica de periódicos y periodistas; lo que se ha visto y lo que se ha vivido.” See Arturo Mori, *La Prensa española durante La Segunda República* [1943] (Seville: Editorial Renacimiento, 2019), 57.

The most published subject after World War II, “the bibliography on the Spanish Civil War is almost unattainable, but the matter continues to elicit such interest that it remains open to new historiographic trends.”⁸ This popularity speaks to its sustained relevance to polemics of democracy and culture in contemporary Spanish and European societies. The continued growth and expansion in the field as new or previously neglected elements are incorporated into the history of Spain’s greatest conflict presents opportunities for greater understanding of wartime politics and communication trends. Historians on the Spanish Civil War are many, but only a few are communication historians. Subsequently, my research builds upon sparse—though excellent—studies on journalism in the war, the themes that regularly appeared in coverage, and how they communicated an explosive conflict to garner public enthusiasm and support in real time. In placing the unfolding terror within a larger peninsular history of popular heroism and perseverance, I interrogate how Spanish newspapers incorporated elements of both positive and negative emotions to secure an active fighting force behind and beyond enemy lines.

Wartime journalism is a complex field as human experience is subjective and informed by emotion. Case studies indicate that inaccuracies and sensationalism may be the inevitable consequences of a practice shaped by restricted access and scope, incomplete testimonies, and extreme personal risk. Moreover, journalists face heightened pressures from military, government, and commercial groups.⁹ In such circumstances it becomes challenging, if not impossible, to sustain an unbiased view of events. BBC war correspondent Kate Adie, for example, once wrote that due to the inescapable contradictions imposed by violent conflict on journalistic codes of conduct, “the very nature of war confuses the role of the journalist.”¹⁰ In the Spanish Civil War, correspondents faced additional constraints as it was difficult to verify facts or investigate stories.¹¹ Reporters were often dependent upon rumours, government statements, and the emotional accounts of refugees fleeing the Nationalist-occupied zone while answering to powerful political organisations who monitored their coverage. Moreover, as Beevor commented, the newspapermen of the Spanish Civil War “were as much affected by the emotions of the time as anybody else.”¹² Reporters wielded these emotional experiences to

⁸ Eduardo González Calleja, “The Spanish Civil War: New Approaches and Historiographic Perspectives,” *Contemporary European History* 29, no. 3 (2020): 264.

⁹ Stuart Allan and Barbie Zelizer, “Rules of Engagement: Journalism and War,” in *Reporting War: Journalism in Wartime*, Ed. Stuart Allan and Barbie Zelizer (London and New York: Routledge, 2004), 3.

¹⁰ Kate Adie, “Dispatches from the Front: Reporting War,” *Contemporary Issues in British Journalism* (Vauxhall Lectures, Centre for Journalism Studies: Cardiff University, 1998), 44.

¹¹ William P. Carney, “Uncensored Report on the Siege of Madrid,” the *New York Times*, December 7, 1936.

¹² Antony Beevor, *The Battle for Spain: The Spanish Civil War, 1936-1939* (New York: Penguin Books, 2006), 81, 244-245.

powerful affect, weaponising dual sentiments of love and hate, fear and optimism in readers as they constructed an ideological battleground between good and evil.

Existing scholarship on the Spanish Civil War generally focuses on the propaganda of the Republican and Nationalist press and political posters, the liberal and conservative ideologies governing them, and the enormous obstacles impacting soldiers, journalists, and civilians in violent conflict. Both sides produced propaganda designed to “seize upon isolated incidents to make general points” so as to support their claims, though Figueres notes differences in news agents’ access to sources and information.¹³ Censors were employed in their respective camps, but Republican reporters enjoyed greater freedom of movement than their Nationalist counterparts, who were subjected to strict surveillance at all times.¹⁴ Scholars have documented that the Spanish Civil War became a “magnet” for foreign journalists, resulting in the distribution of quick, hurried impressions of the conflict containing little first-hand information. This was due, in part, to the fact that in its early phase, “correspondents were rushed into Spain, regardless of whether they spoke the language or understood the country’s politics.”¹⁵ Figueres and Beevor state it was common practice worldwide to send a reporter to the faction a news outlet supported. *The Chicago Tribune*, *The New York Times*, and *Pravda*, for example, favoured the Republic, whereas Catholic and other politically conservative publications endorsed the military uprising.¹⁶

While foreigners had options regarding their involvement and affiliation, Spanish war reporters had no choice but to engage actively in the fighting from the announcement of the military coup onward. Republican journalists directly participated in the defense of the legality of the Republic from July of 1936 while Nationalist journalists did the same for insurgents.¹⁷ Most interestingly, Figueres observed that the tone of Spanish reporting lay at the intersection of literary and informative narration and that the chronicles of war disseminated by both camps

¹³ Antony Beevor, *The Battle for Spain: The Spanish Civil War, 1936-1939* (New York: Penguin Books, 2006), 245; Josep M. Figueres Artigues, “Periodismo de guerra: las crónicas de la guerra civil española,” *Estudios sobre el Mensaje Periodístico* 11 (2005): 284, 289-290.

¹⁴ Josep M. Figueres Artigues, “Periodismo de guerra: las crónicas de la guerra civil española,” *Estudios sobre el Mensaje Periodístico* 11 (2005): 284, 289-290.

¹⁵ Antony Beevor, *The Battle for Spain: The Spanish Civil War, 1936-1939* (New York: Penguin Books, 2006), 81.

¹⁶ Josep M. Figueres, “Introducción,” in *Madrid en Guerra: Crónica de la batalla de Madrid, 1936-1939*. Ed. Josep M. Figueres (Barcelona: Ediciones Destino, 2004), 8; Fearghal McGarry, “Irish Newspapers and the Spanish Civil War,” *Irish Historical Studies* 33.129 (2002): 68-90; Antony Beevor, *The Battle for Spain: The Spanish Civil War, 1936-1939* (New York: Penguin Books, 2006), 244.

¹⁷ Josep M. Figueres Artigues, “Periodismo de guerra: las crónicas de la guerra civil española,” *Estudios sobre el Mensaje Periodístico* 11 (2005): 286.

were not simply descriptive, but also advanced particular morals, concepts, ideas, and values.¹⁸ Regarding his personal experiences in the war, Orwell remarked that “Early in life I had noticed that no event is ever correctly reported in a newspaper, but in Spain for the first time, I saw newspaper reports which did not bear any relation to the facts, not even the relationship which is implied in an ordinary lie.”¹⁹ Figueres also demonstrated that journalism printed during the Spanish Civil War was notoriously untrustworthy: reports were merely atmospheric and involved disinformation as the norm.²⁰

Considering the large body of work that has been produced on the Spanish Civil War, it is surprising to find just how little research has focused on the daily periodicals printed between 1936 and 1939, which locals consulted as their main source of news. In fact, most discussions of wartime journalism of the period survive in the form of critiques written by foreign correspondents, particularly George Orwell, Ernest Hemingway, and Arthur Koestler, among others. While valuable in their own right, such works are not scholarly documents to analyse systematically the periodicals they engaged and lack cultural knowledge of Spain, its people and history. Josep M. Figueres, Antonio Laguna Platero, Enrique Borderia Ortiz, Antonio Checa Godoy, Justino Sinova, and Mirta Núñez Díaz-Balart are among the few scholars to have published on Republican media production and censorship during the war. Still fewer studies have appeared on the precise content, themes, styles, or rhetorical strategies of wartime coverage in the most widely-read Spanish publications of the time. Figueres examines Catalan-language outlets throughout the course of the twentieth century as well as front-line reporting in Madrid. Laguna chronicles the eventful history of *El Pueblo* from its beginnings in 1894 to its dissolution in 1939. Borderia charts the trends of censorship and political suppression in Valencia during its tenure as Republican capital. Checa traces the rise of Spanish journalism, especially at the zenith of Republican, Socialist, and Communist publishing, in the birth and death of the Spanish Republic with particular focus on 1931-1936. Sinova studies the stringent censorship laws of the press in the 1930s and the attempts to overcome them, lamenting the destruction of Spanish journalism during the war when right and left shut down dissenters to replace reporting with combative propaganda. Núñez records

¹⁸ Josep M. Figueres Artigues, “Periodismo de guerra: las crónicas de la guerra civil española,” *Estudios sobre el Mensaje Periodístico* 11 (2005): 284, 289.

¹⁹ George Orwell, “Looking Back on the Spanish War,” The Orwell Foundation, 2016. <https://www.orwellfoundation.com/the-orwell-foundation/orwell/essays-and-other-works/looking-back-on-the-spanish-war/>.

²⁰ Josep M. Figueres Artigues, “Periodismo de guerra: las crónicas de la guerra civil española,” *Estudios sobre el Mensaje Periodístico* 11 (2005): 289.

the hundreds of periodicals published on the front-lines and the rear-guard during the Spanish Civil War, their politics and affiliations. In his study of Spanish nationalism since 1808, Xosé M. Núñez Seixas, though not researching journalism, specifically, points out parallels in liberal and conservative narratives, particularly their infatuation with the Reconquista and the Spanish War of Independence to contextualise their respective ideological missions. Despite being important contributions to research on the Spanish Civil War, its origins and implications, however, their attention predominately lies with the history of journalism, politics, and nationalism in Spain as opposed to a closer look at the operation and function of rhetorical strategies in wartime media. My work remedies this gap by investigating the framing of events in Madrid, Valencia, and Barcelona, while also addressing their cultural and regional differences, how they covered damning developments, and how they contributed to the discursive battle for Spanish identity over three years of steadily increasing violence and suffering in the Republican Zone.

Framing, Discourse, and Propaganda

Framing, in this thesis, describes two interactive but separate processes. Mostly studied as a passive process reliant upon unconscious assumptions, formats, and guidelines in the production of news with minimal references to corporate or journalistic awareness, I expand the theory into the realm of propaganda and active political discourse. Specifically, I observe the conversion of framing from the simplification and distillation of information according to journalistic norms to a deliberate and pre-meditated tool for public manipulation over the course of violent conflict. I hold that while framing may begin as a byproduct of existing professional practices and codes, war forces it to evolve into a conscious process that polices public ideology and interpretation. The study of this occurrence subsequently necessitates taking into account external and internal factors, relating text to context and vice versa, to analyse the greater role assumed by newspapers at the centre of combat. This type of scholarship draws upon elements of theories stemming from multiple scholars in multiple fields, including history, media studies, and critical discourse. While I do not orientate my work toward a social scientific or quantitative premise, Ruth Wodak's Discourse-Historical Approach to Critical Discourse Analysis has influenced my perspective of discourse as a reflection of social realities and how individuals collectively construct them, so that I consider discourse to be socially constructed as well as socially constitutive. I observe discourse as the written extension of political language in news media and discourse analysis as the study of its

unique composition in mass communication. The term discourse encompasses a number of linguistic genres, but I focus on political understandings of the historical and national imaginaries of war-torn Republican Spain. Importantly, I engage two concepts central to the Discourse-Historical Approach: interdiscursivity and intertextuality.²¹ My work draws from these linguistics phenomena within qualitative methods to contribute an original understanding of framing in propaganda. Like Wodak, I differentiate between discourse and text, identifying the latter as a constitutive part of discourses,²² thereby distinguishing between the process and its components and re-positioning framing as a fundamental and willful ingredient of wartime journalism.

I employ a rhetorical approach to framing analysis, one which involves the textual analysis of Republican newspapers published during the Spanish Civil War and their messaging strategies. I explain allegories, metaphors, and cultural and religious symbolism incorporated into their news coverage to persuade local and international audiences. To this end, I define propaganda as the weaponisation of discourse to advocate for a particular system, government, or ideology. I argue that propaganda uses framing techniques to present an incomplete picture of issues with the end goal of leading spectators and transforming them into active participants of a cause. In so doing, I furnish a new methodology for media framing theories enriched by existing concepts borrowed from linguistics and sociology for a multidisciplinary project which inserts journalism history into contemporary conversations on nationalism, fake news, and political indoctrination.

Theoretical Premise: The Rhetorical Framing Approach in Context

Framing in mass communication has not yet been established as a consistent collection of ideas for constructive discussion and remains a matter of significant controversy regarding diverse approaches and assumptions. However, theorists agree overall that framing is a central power in the democratic process and has the potential to illuminate undercurrents of political discourse, rhetoric, and propaganda. According to Entman, “whatever its specific use, the concept of framing consistently offers a way to describe the power of a communicating text.”²³

²¹ J. R. Martin and Ruth Wodak, “Introduction,” *Re/Reading the Past*, Ed. J. R. Martin and Ruth Wodak (Amsterdam; Philadelphia: John Benjamins Publishing Company, 2003), 6.

²² Rudolf de Cillia, Martin Reisigl, and Ruth Wodak, “The Discursive Construction of National Identities,” *Discourse & Society* 10.2 (1999): 157; J. R. Martin and Ruth Wodak, “Introduction,” *Re/Reading the Past*, Ed. J. R. Martin and Ruth Wodak (Amsterdam; Philadelphia: John Benjamins Publishing Company, 2003), 6.

²³ Robert M. Entman, “Framing: Toward Clarification of a Fractured Paradigm,” *Journal of Communication* (Autumn 1993): 51.

He describes framing as a fractured paradigm, arguing that this diversity of thought should be transformed into a strength of Communication Studies as disciplines normally separate from one another are brought together in new and original ways. My thesis upholds this premise, uniting interdisciplinary ideas of framing and discourse. It goes beyond standard observations, however, to investigate the capacity of media frames to “reflect the play of power and boundaries of discourse over an issue”²⁴ and to signal the construction of an imagined community in moments of acute crisis. In line with Myra Macdonald, my usage of the term discourse denotes a system of communication practices corresponding to larger social and cultural practices which aid in the construction of particular frameworks of thought so I might elucidate the “*process* of making meaning.”²⁵ I demonstrate that news-framing structures such processes in ways that are not always latent. Moreover, I posit that the fragile line between news and propaganda blurs in warfare when neutrality is viewed as damaging to political survival.

The concept of framing, since it was formulated by Gregory Bateson in the 1950s and later introduced into the social sciences by Erving Goffman, has become popular in multiple areas of communication, but has not often been applied to media history.²⁶ Because framing analysis reveals the structuring of content and ideas, it provides a valuable lens for examining news media and its evolution throughout modern history. In a process that can be, at once, conscious and unconscious, the media frame issues to headline particular aspects over others. The media act as the primary source of public news and are essential to the study of discourses in past and present societies, and researchers have demonstrated that media producers actively encourage readers to consider policy and current events in specific ways. Kuypers and Entman have acknowledged that the connections among framing analysis, narrative, and political discourse, however complex, are inevitable as they operate together to impart meaning. Framing analysis therefore requires an understanding of culture, history, and discourse and their interactions with one another. According to Kuypers, “Frames are central organizing ideas within a narrative account of an issue or event.”²⁷ Entman seconds this notion, claiming “We can define *framing* as the process of culling a few elements of perceived reality and assembling

²⁴ Robert M. Entman, “Framing: Toward Clarification of a Fractured Paradigm,” *Journal of Communication* (Autumn 1993): 55.

²⁵ Myra Macdonald, *Exploring Media Discourse* (Chatham: Arnold, 2003), 1.

²⁶ Erving Goffman, *Frame Analysis: An Essay on the Organization of Human Experience* (Boston: Northeastern University Press, 1986), 21-39.

²⁷ Jim A. Kuypers, *Press Bias and Politics: How the Media Frame Controversial Issues* (Westport: Praeger Publishers, 2002), 198.

a narrative that highlights connections among them to promote a particular interpretation.”²⁸ Because frames appear as a set of patterns and repetitions in the rhetoric of a particular group of a particular era, they push researchers to examine them as interpretive packages that are deeply embedded in culturally-specific and socio-political circumstances. The fundamentals of framing are rooted in and bound by culture, and their processes reveal the political, cultural, and societal strategies behind attempts to influence discourses surrounding an issue.²⁹ I advance this notion into the study of calculated propagandistic discourses designed to harness public opinion.

Research into the rhetoric of historical news media provides opportunities for meaningful reflection which I believe is best-suited to the rhetorical framing approach of Jim A. Kuypers. As the rhetorical framing approach provides a practical framework for analysing the organisation of themes and ideas in news media, especially in daily reporting, it allows for an original study of political discourse and its relationship with propaganda. What interests me in this thesis is not merely the construction of propaganda in wartime, but how propaganda is woven (overtly and covertly) into daily newspapers distributed to ordinary citizens. I consequently extend Kuypers’ work into the study of propaganda *in news coverage*, an element heretofore overlooked in Journalism History. This is largely due to the fact that most framing theories come from Anglophone scholars whose studies are based in British and American assumptions of news production. As previously stated, journalistic traditions in Spain departed significantly from British and American models, with notions of impartiality being adopted substantially later. In fact, most prominent Spanish writers and politicians of the nineteenth- and early-twentieth centuries began their careers as journalists who editorialised current events for readers. Additionally, while editorials and reports now tend to occupy separate spaces in most newspapers, this was not always the case, and Spanish periodicals of the 1930s did not regularly distinguish between them. Their formats were not consistent, but subject to daily changes, so that the various genres of news were commonly mixed in with one another, thereby minimising the distance between them.

My research demonstrates that framing has important implications for media studies, political communication, and journalism history and builds upon the argument that news media play a key role in the development and dissemination of discourse:

²⁸ Robert M. Entman, “Framing Media Power,” in *Doing News Framing Analysis: Empirical and Theoretical Perspectives*, Ed. Paul D’Angelo and Jim A. Kuypers (New York: Routledge, 2010), 336.

²⁹ Hank Johnston and John A. Noakes, *Frames of Protest: Social Movements and the Framing Perspective* (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2005), 49.

Media are more than merely passive and transparent conveyors of information. They play an active role in shaping our understanding of the past, in “mediating” between us (readers, viewers, listeners) and past experiences, and hence in setting the agenda for future acts of remembrance within society.³⁰

Astrid Erll and Anne Rigney observe that public remembrance can be a “social performance of memory” as a type of agenda-setting technique which sets up collective points of reference in the public sphere.³¹ Though agenda-setting is largely considered separate from framing, the two theories address salience and repetition in news coverage and acknowledge a relationship between media production and public opinion. Spanish Republican newspapers utilised public remembrance of past conflicts in their portrayal of the Spanish Civil War as a revived battle for national autonomy, foregrounding historical narratives and cultural memory to depict the present day as a reincarnation of previous centuries. Spanish history was therefore framed as repetitive, even cyclical, to prompt restricted interpretations of political conflict and elicit specific emotions on a national scale.

The Role of Narrative

The media structure narratives within frames which are specially designed to relay information, and in so doing, alter perceptions of past, present, and future realities. Journalism targets contemporary populations and cultures and, consequently, is reflective of ideological shifts and transformations in society. According to Johnson-Cartee and McNair, the news is a form of narrative and narrative is ideological.³² Journalism is a communicative instrument which transmits meaning to audiences. I say meaning, because it does not merely convey facts or information, but also promotes attitudes, assumptions, values, and beliefs drawn from a particular world-view. In this way, news narratives arise from a layered and multi-directional process known as our mediated political reality.³³ Narrative has been recognised by an increasing number of Communication theorists as a an important human artefact with the

³⁰ Astrid Erll and Ann Rigney, *Mediation, Remediation, and the Dynamics of Cultural Memory* (Berlin: De Gruyter, 2012), 3.

³¹ Astrid Erll and Ann Rigney, *Mediation, Remediation, and the Dynamics of Cultural Memory* (Berlin: De Gruyter, 2012), 9.

³² Karen S. Johnson-Cartee, *News Narratives and News Framing: Constructing Political Reality* (Lanham: Rowman and Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 2005), 156-160; Brian McNair, *The Sociology of Journalism* (London: Arnold, 1998), 6.

³³ Karen S. Johnson-Cartee, *News Narratives and News Framing: Constructing Political Reality* (Lanham: Rowman and Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 2005), 181.

potential to reveal deeper truths about the human experience.³⁴ Fisher writes that “the idea of human beings as storytellers indicates the generic form of all symbol composition; it holds that symbols are created and communicated ultimately as stories meant to give order to human experience and to induce others to dwell in them to establish ways of living in common.”³⁵ It should be noted, however, that the reality of events and the narration of those events do not necessarily align and can depart in significant ways. Narrative is an attempt to communicate a particular understanding of human experience, but is shaped by the social structures and institutions that surround us.

Discourse and narrative are closely linked as they depend on one another to expand, grow, and succeed. Narratives are central components to discourse, which engages linguistic and ideological frameworks. In the case of political discourse, narratives must be framed in language that is decisive and compelling so as to persuade larger audiences. Consequently, news narratives generally avoid the subtleties and complex layering of those frames present in literary narratives.³⁶ As a rule, narratives are constructed by components of theme, setting, plot, and character, which are derived from existing political discourses of a time and society.³⁷ These components are ultimately packaged for audiences in a series of interpretive frames intended to explain a confusing and overwhelming human experience and thereby convince receivers of a particular mindset. Public opinion is constantly in flux as the ideological narrative foundation shifts with major events. In war, when participants find themselves in imminent danger and their way of life is violently threatened, news narratives reflect and manipulate the resulting fears, perceptions, and political views of events in an unstable environment. For this reason, I bring in framing analysis to understand the ways such experiences are imparted to others to promote shared ideological stances in wartime.

Historical Imagination, Affect, and Emotionality

Historical conditions frame the spatial imagination, mark spaces, and define borders. Spain is a diverse country and the story of its centralisation and unification has been long and

³⁴ Karen S. Johnson-Cartee, *News Narratives and News Framing: Constructing Political Reality* (Lanham: Rowman and Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 2005), 149.

³⁵ Walter Fisher, “Narration as a Human Communications Paradigm: The Case of Public Moral Argument,” *Communications Monographs* 51 (1984): 1-22.

³⁶ Robert Rowland, “The Narrative Perspective,” in *The Art of Rhetorical Criticism*, Ed. Jim A. Kuypers (Boston: Pearson Education, Inc., 2005), 136.

³⁷ Astrid Erll and Ann Rigney, *Mediation, Remediation, and the Dynamics of Cultural Memory* (Berlin: De Gruyter, 2012), 2.

conflicting. For the purpose of this thesis, I adapt Charles Taylor's notion of multiculturalism to the Spanish context, defining Spanish multiculturalism in the Spanish Civil War as the defense of the right for distinctive cultures to thrive in a shared geographic space within the political confines of Spain. The Spanish Republic may never have embraced a truly multiculturalist vision of Spain, but it did advance pluricultural interests and representation through the construction of a democratic and arguably more inclusive Spanish national imaginary. I share Vasilijus Sofronovas' assertion that "it is important to investigate the construction of national spaces in pluricultural border regions because doing so both allows us to compare the strategies applied by different types of nationalisms against one another and clarifies the interactions among national cultures."³⁸ Commonly defined as a pluricultural state, Spain offers unique insights into the political relations of disparate groups that have maintained a strong sense of cultural and linguistic difference throughout their history. Pluriculturalism describes the state of different cultural groups cohabitating a territory over which one culture assumes priority or dominance, while multiculturalism refers to the coexistence of distinct national and cultural groups within a society. Opponents argue that a cultural monopoly is the only means of preserving the country's interests from chaos and dissolution while supporters assert that diversity serves all communities by growing and enriching them through continuous interaction. Taylor examines multiculturalism as a "discourse of recognition." He holds that the collapse of social hierarchies have contributed to the modern concern with identity and recognition, which have intensified since the late-eighteenth century and are "intrinsically linked to inequalities."³⁹ Amy Gutmann states that liberal democracies "cannot regard citizenship as a comprehensive universal identity because (1) People are unique, self-creating, and creative individuals...and (2) people are also 'culture-bearing,' and the cultures they bear differ depending on their past and present identifications."⁴⁰ Though I recognise that pluriculturalism and multiculturalism differ in scope and framework, I also appreciate there is substantive overlap between them, and my work relates to the established hierarchies of Castile, Catalonia, Valencia, Galicia, and the Basque Country in the newspaper discourses of the Spanish Civil War. Because Galicia fell so early in the war, however, most newspaper messaging of the time tended to neglect the Galician cause, focusing instead on unifying

³⁸ Vasilijus Safronovas, *The Creation of National Spaces in a Pluricultural Region: The Case of Prussian Lithuania*, Trans. Albina Strunga (Boston: Academic Studies Press, 2016), 5.

³⁹ Charles Taylor, "The Politics of Recognition" in *Multiculturalism: Examining the Politics of Recognition*, ed. Amy Gutmann (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994), 26-28.

⁴⁰ Amy Gutmann, "Introduction," in *Multiculturalism: Examining the Politics of Recognition*, ed. Amy Gutmann (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994), 3-7.

Basque, Catalan, and Valencian audiences with central Spain, so that it is not a point of focus in the following chapters.

With peripheral cultures subjected to the leadership of Castile, Madrid has been the official capital of Spain—excluding brief interludes—since 1561. Located on the Manzanares River at the geographic centre of the country, it represented Castilian power and dominance in the peninsula as regional capitals were forced into secondary roles. Barcelona, Valencia, and Bilbao vied for influence but Madrid, since the reign of Felipe II, ascended to the top of the national hierarchy. Conservatives viewed Madrid as the symbolic and political heart of the nation and considered the promotion of other regional identities, languages, and national sentiments to be a threat to Spanish unity, culture, and values.⁴¹ With the inauguration of the Second Spanish Republic in 1931, however, new opportunities arose for recognition. Although Madrid remained the undisputed seat of the state, Republicans were much more open than their predecessors to conceding autonomous privileges reflective of the ancient *fueros* in the campaign to secure Basque, Catalan, Valencian, and Galician support for the new government. I relate this to the national imaginary of Benedict Anderson, which I define as the collection of symbols and ideas in the discourses surrounding a specific (government-sanctioned) version of national identity in Republican Spain. I hold that news framing cultivated a national imaginary built upon Spanish Republican values and emotional discourses tied to myths of conquest, empire, and history in Spain.

In this way, reports seized upon heroic narratives of peninsular resistance to incursion, particularly the Reconquista, the 1808 War of Independence, the War of Spanish Succession, and even, at times, to Roman and Carthaginian sieges at Numantia and Saguntum. Anderson states that the ideas approximating nationality, nationalism, and nation-ness are unique cultural artefacts: “to understand them properly we need to consider carefully how they have come into historical being, in what ways their meanings have changed over time, and why, today, they command such profound emotional legitimacy.”⁴² I argue that war crystallises the national imaginary of a group and its perceived legitimacy through the confrontation between different imagined communities and the emotional responses they engage. This research demonstrates that wartime news framing involves formulating appeals to public anger, fear, and anxiety

⁴¹ Núñez notes that the history of linguistic recognition in Spain, though seldom “treated as a topic in its own right,” was varied and even contradictory, but the loss of colonial holdings in 1898 sharpened monolingual discourses of Castilian superiority. See Xosé M. Núñez Seixas, “The Language(s) of the Spanish Nation,” in *Metaphors of Spain: Representations of Spanish National Identity in the Twentieth Century*, ed. Javier Moreno-Luzón and Xosé M. Núñez Seixas (New York: Berghahn Books, 2017), 142.

⁴² Benedict Anderson, *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism* (London: Verso, 1983), 25-26. Ebook.

regarding the enemy, but also to emotions of hope, pride, and trust in the nation to articulate a specific version of patriotism and, by extension, nationalism. Jo Labanyi explains emotion as “an amalgam of feeling and thought” which is not always conscious, but lies on a continuum between the mind and body, making the articulation of its sensations possible.⁴³ As Javier Krauel points out, the manipulation of emotion has long been a topic of controversy among intellectuals of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, who either cheered or decried the use of affective rhetoric.⁴⁴ Despite investigations into affect and emotion in other fields, little scholarship has addressed their roles in media history. Karin Wahl-Jorgensen and Mervi Pantti state that this neglect stems from “journalism’s allegiance to the model of liberal democracy, and the associated ideal of objectivity and focus on rational communication.”⁴⁵ The positioning of rationality and emotionality as binary opposites, they argue, has concealed the reality that journalism has always been emotional in its goals of “creating engaging experiences” to captivate audiences’ attention. As liberal democracy in Spain was still new at the time of the 1936 coup, Republican journalists sought to forge kindred sympathies with more established democracies for support, even if wartime restrictions made it impossible to maintain the principles of a free and independent press. In using a version of framing analysis that fuses elements of affect, emotion, and competing conceptions of the national imaginary, therefore, this thesis probes the rhetorical appeals of the Spanish Republican government to the morals, values, and patriotism of readers in the attempt to hold together disparate groups in a joint cause for national survival. My incorporation of these various disciplinary approaches yields meaningful insights into media production and strategies, their use of emotion, cultural myths, and combative rhetoric at a critical point in European history.

Methods: Framing as Journalistic Tool in the Construction of National Imaginaries

Media historians have oft acknowledged the interdisciplinary nature of journalism and its history along with the need for the field to grow, restructure, and revitalise. James Carey’s “The Problem of Journalism History” explains the importance of articulating a narrative that recovers past forms of imagination and historical consciousness, calling upon researchers to

⁴³ Jo Labanyi, “Doing Things: Emotion, Affect, and Materiality,” *Journal of Spanish Cultural Studies*, vol. 11, no. 3-4 (2010): 224.

⁴⁴ Javier Krauel, “The Battle for Emotional Hegemony in Republican Spain (1931-1936),” in *Engaging the Emotions in Spanish Culture and History*, Ed. L. E. Delgado and J. Labanyi (Vanderbilt University Press, 2016), 141-155.

⁴⁵ Karin Wahl-Jorgensen and Mervi Pantti, “Introduction: The Emotional Turn in Journalism,” *Journalism*, vol. 22, no. 5 (2021): 1148.

reimagine how it felt “to live and act in a particular period of human history.”⁴⁶ He states that the study of journalism history ought to encompass the ways in which people in the past have grasped reality because “the central and as yet unwritten history of journalism is the history of the idea of a report.” Scholars Michael Schudson, Martin Conboy, Marion Marzolf, William David Sloan, and Michael Stamm debate the requirements of historical scholarship, but agree on the importance of advancing the study of journalism history to ascertain past media trends and their applications.⁴⁷ Conboy argues that “to extricate journalism from broader media history, we need to develop better ways of understanding the generic characteristics of journalism over time and across geopolitical space.”⁴⁸ He pinpoints the paradoxes upon which the platform relies, including, but not limited to: the fact that journalism is not a fixed or stable enterprise, but a changing range of practices; that past journalistic practices can define present and future practices; and that journalism must cultivate understandings of journalism within specific national and cultural contexts to “consider how it has formed and mutated over the centuries as a global phenomenon.”⁴⁹ Sloan and Stamm also make the case for historical analysis that investigates the reality of a time and place.⁵⁰ My work responds to their calls by providing detailed case-studies of Spanish Republican journalism between 1936 and 1939 in three prominent newspapers of Madrid, Valencia, and Barcelona, comparing and contrasting their respective frames in the reporting of critical events, and demonstrating how the press is instrumental to constructing and propagating national imaginaries in war. Furthermore, by synthesising rhetoric, frames, and discourse in news that services propaganda, I provide an original method for exploring the work of framing to war-impacted societies where freedom of the press is severely restricted.

As previously stated, I follow Kuypers’ rhetorical approach to news-framing which “begins inductively by looking for themes that reside within news narratives across time and then determining how those themes are framed.”⁵¹ Frames can be found by searching for specific terms

⁴⁶ James W. Carey, “The Problem of Journalism History,” *Journalism History* (Spring 1974): 4-5.

⁴⁷ Michael Schudson, “How Culture Works: Perspectives from Media Studies on the Efficacy of Symbols,” *Theory and Society* 18 (1989): 153-180; Martin Conboy, “The Paradoxes of Journalism History,” *Historical Journal of Film, Radio and Television* 30.3 (September 2010): 411-420; Marion Marzolf, “The Woman Journalist: Colonial Printer to City Desk,” *Journalism History* 1.4 (1974): 100-146; David Sloan and Michael Stamm, *Historical methods in Communication, Third Edition* (Northport: Vision Press, 2010), 51-55.

⁴⁸ Martin Conboy, “The Paradoxes of Journalism History,” *Historical Journal of Film, Radio and Television* 30.3 (September 2010): 411.

⁴⁹ Martin Conboy, “The Paradoxes of Journalism History,” *Historical Journal of Film, Radio and Television* 30.3 (September 2010): 411-420.

⁵⁰ David Sloan and Michael Stamm, *Historical methods in Communication, Third Edition* (Northport: Vision Press, 2010), 55.

⁵¹ Jim A. Kuypers, “Framing analysis from a rhetorical perspective,” in *Doing News Framing Analysis: Empirical and Theoretical Perspectives*, Ed. Paul D’Angelo and Jim A. Kuypers (New York: Routledge, 2010), 298.

and visuals that recur regularly within a narrative to convey thematically consistent messages.⁵² Being structured over multiple articles and editorials, themes cannot be examined in isolation as frames take time and space to emerge clearly. Themes signal the repetition of ideas and values, and I use them to trace framing strategies in wartime Republican Spain. I read hundreds of editions of *ABC Madrid*, *El Pueblo*, and *La Vanguardia* from the official start of the war on July 18, 1936 to the fall of Madrid on March 28, 1939. I systematically studied their daily coverage while focusing on dates of special significance in the form of battles, military campaigns, sieges, and political announcements, such as the sieges of Madrid and the Alcázar of Toledo, the bombing of Guernica, the Battle of Teruel, the Ebro offensive, and the defeat of Barcelona, among others. I detected frames by identifying presences and absences of certain words, phrases, images, sentences, and sources of information surrounding major events that demonstrated thematically coherent facts and judgments.⁵³

I chose newspapers based upon location, affiliation, and readership. Specifically, I prioritised periodicals with wide circulations published in the most important Republican cities of the period that upheld allegiance to the presiding government in Madrid. This was done to avoid conflation with warring leftist entities which exercised varying degrees of power throughout the Republican zone. *ABC*, *El Pueblo*, and *La Vanguardia* were among the most prolific and popular news sources of the day. Moreover, they carried large memberships and claimed national distributions which lent them increased credibility and prestige. As they claimed to represent central Republican authorities, I found them best-suited to the following case-studies. By restricting my focus to three popular periodicals in Madrid, Valencia, and Barcelona, I was able to view more clearly the messaging designs of Spain's endangered liberal press. This process allowed me to locate and evaluate the strategies of Republican coverage, how they operated during the war, and how they communicated objectives to improve understanding of the ways they sought to shape perceptions and interpretations of the Spanish Civil War in fortress-cities of the Second Spanish Republic.

My thesis upholds the notion that journalism plays a central role in the organisation and operation of democratic societies. When consulting the primary sources, I applied the bottom-up approach of historical methods which requires the researcher to study materials without retrofitting predetermined conclusions or philosophies to them. I documented concepts, motifs, and metaphors which repeatedly appeared in the columns of each newspaper and how they developed over time. I

⁵² Robert M. Entman, "Framing US Coverage of International News: Contrasts in Narratives of the KAL and Iran Air Incidents," *Journal of Communication* 41.4 (1991): 248.

⁵³ Robert M. Entman, "Framing: Toward Clarification of a Fractured Paradigm," *Journal of Communication* (Autumn 1993): 52.

defined frames according to themes and how they were constructed in political discourse. For example, legitimacy, independence, liberty, paradise, and divine destiny permeated the texts. While some themes appeared early on and intensified, such as justice and liberal democracy, others developed later. I linked these terms and their associations to the socio-political contexts that produced them and, in turn, connected discourses to the ideologies that motivated them. I found the greater the repetition, the more pronounced the theme and its corresponding frame. This process revealed the strategic assemblage of concepts designed to raise citizen morale, inspire collective action and endurance, and materialise a Republican vision of the future. Anderson tethered the rise of the newspaper to the dawn of the printing press, which he claimed was a type of book of “ephemeral popularity” or “one-day best-seller,” thus making journalism a business commodity and an effective mass communication tool linking together individuals in a shared imagining of the nation.⁵⁴ Through analysing periodicals immediately impacted by violence in 1930s Spain, therefore, this thesis illuminates past communities’ experiences of journalism in a momentous conflict sometimes deemed ‘the dress rehearsal’ for World War II.

Conclusion

Republican newspapers attempted to bridge politically and culturally diverse audiences in defense of an unstable democracy attacked by authoritarian forces. Spain is a complex country home to multiple national identities which claim their own region, language, and way of life, making the theme of Spanish unification tense and conflicting. To address these issues, the present thesis is divided into three main chapters, each of which focuses on a city and newspaper, the social and political contexts affecting them, and the cultural narratives they engage in their retellings of Iberian history to explain the Spanish Civil War.

The first chapter, “Maintaining Morale in a City Besieged: The Tale of *ABC* Madrid during the Spanish Civil War (1936-1939),” centres on Madrid-based *ABC* when it was severed from its secondary headquarters in Seville. While the newspaper’s insurrectionist editors continued to disseminate propaganda from the Nationalist Zone in Andalusia, its offices in Madrid were seized by loyalist authorities and its resources appropriated for the Republican cause. Under the leadership of Augusto Vivero, Elfidio Alonso, and Unión Republicana, it adopted profoundly leftist views with growing Communist influences as the war progressed in

⁵⁴ Benedict Anderson, *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism* (London: Verso, 1983), 72-73. Ebook.

line with the rise of the Communist Party in the region until the Casado coup in March of 1939. This chapter analyses the role of Madrid as the symbolic capital of Spain in the Republican press even as the government appeared to abandon the city in its darkest moments. Madrid was unique in the war for being the target of aggression from the beginning with few periods of respite. Nationalist forces had expected to take the city from the outset, but were pushed back by fierce local resistance. This did not change the fact that Madrid, being situated on the front lines for the duration of the conflict, was continuously brutalised by enemy attack to demoralise citizens and crush Republican defiance to the military rebellion. In analysing six editorials produced by *ABC*'s Madrid sector throughout the war, this chapter traces the construction of a new Republican national imaginary for Spain through emotional appeals and a reinterpretation of the country's past in the quest to redefine present and future realities. I incorporate Jim A. Kuypers' rhetorical approach to news framing, Javier Krauel's discussion of affect and imperial emotions, and John Auerbach and Russ Castronovo's analysis of propaganda to demonstrate how *ABC* Madrid's wartime news frames strategically highlighted aspects of Iberian history to craft a renewed sense of Spanish nationalism in a fractured nation.

The second chapter, "A Republican Capital in Crisis: Spanish Civil War Coverage in *El Pueblo* (1936-1939)," follows Valencia's *El Pueblo*, a Republican newspaper founded in the late-nineteenth century by literary giant and anti-monarchist rebel Vicente Blasco Ibáñez. What began as an artistic and political outlet designed to educate Spaniards towards liberal perspectives and reformist policies soon evolved into a daily publication which expounded radical Republican views. By the time of the proclamation of the Second Spanish Republic in April of 1931, it had spiked in popularity and claimed a wide readership as a number of its associates achieved powerful positions in local government. The name Valencia simultaneously encompasses a province and a city and the region is culturally and linguistically distinct from the Castilian centre and Catalan neighbours. Valencian is officially recognised as separate from Catalan, though the two are closely related and mutually intelligible, and many speakers hold them to be dialects of the same language. However, Valencia is also notable for containing areas that speak exclusively Castilian Spanish over Valencian, making the capital representative of both linguistic groups. In light of this complexity, *El Pueblo*'s rhetoric attempted to reconcile conflicting political and pluri-national beliefs to formulate a cohesive defence in the temporary capital of Spain. To this end, it built upon narratives of historic resistance to weave past and present cases into episodes of the same prolonged crusade to liberate Spain from oppression. Because Valencia spent the first part of the war in the rear-guard, somewhat distanced from the harsher realities of war, the newspaper warned against

any sense of complacency or disunity that could damage Republican efforts. Editorials thus included impassioned themes of the triumphant underdog, Catholic destiny, and romanticised images of heroic conviction to reinforce Republican fervour among readers and fortify them against potential demoralisation from the Nationalist advance. *El Pueblo* framed the war in the language of Christian imagery, dramatising themes of sacrifice, martyrdom and undying faith in a Republican saviour. Moreover, it emphasised a sense of kinship among the various regions of Spain—particularly, Valencia, Catalonia, Castile, and the Basque Country—to bridge factions and consolidate a collective Spanish identity and homeland beneath a Republican banner. This chapter derives its analysis from the rhetorical framing approach outlined by Jim A. Kuypers, Javier Krauel’s conception of imperial emotions, and Jo Labanyi’s discussion of feelings as actions to examine the role of affect in the propagandistic themes which framed news narratives during the Spanish Civil War.

The final case study outlined in the third chapter, “In Defense of the Republic: *La Vanguardia*’s Plea for Unity in the Spanish Civil War (1936-1939),” focuses on Barcelona’s most prestigious newspaper, *La Vanguardia*, its wartime transitions and strategies, as it was reoriented toward the Republican cause. Operated, from its beginnings, by the wealthy Godó family who had constructed an influential global network before the loss of Cuba and the Philippines in ‘el desastre’ of 1898, it represented Catalan business interests in Madrid and Barcelona and embraced conservative candidates. *La Vanguardia* traditionally opposed Catalanist parties to advocate for a dual patriotism between Spain and Catalonia, and fiercely criticised leftist reforms. When the civil war broke out, however, the Godó family fled abroad with their fortune and the newspaper and its staff were left to fend for themselves amid commercial seizures and shutdowns by newly empowered workers’ committees which had taken control of the city. Thus began a new era in the history of the newspaper as it furthered coverage “al servicio de la democracia.” This chapter analyses how the newspaper forged a common destiny among disparate groups of Spain to unify Catalan and Castilian politics into a supportive Republican mission. Drawing upon Ruth Wodak’s ideas of historical discourse and Benedict Anderson’s concept of imagined communities, I interrogate the framing of the national imaginary constructed by a Barcelona newspaper to encourage a strong and collective resistance to military insurgents in the fight to protect Catalan autonomy and culture. This national imaginary envisioned Catalonia as a distinctive region within a federation of Spanish states in the promotion of a Republican Spanish identity inclusive of historically marginalised nationalisms in the peninsula. *La Vanguardia* positioned Barcelona at the centre of conflict through recalling popular narratives of Iberian resistance and depicted the war as representative

of a larger world war on the horizon threatening to stamp out democratic liberties. It subsequently imagined a unified Republican Spain as the vanguard of global democracy and urged citizens to fight even when all hope was lost in the attempt to salvage remnants of dying faith in a distant Republican future.

In some ways, the press can be considered the first historians since they provide important services to the public while simultaneously documenting what will become history.⁵⁵ I argue that the impacts of emotion on lived experience help separate the journalist from the historian. Testimonies demonstrate that in the midst of conflict, editors and reporters are susceptible to the same biases and emotions as the general public, resulting in the construction of frames to guide (or distort) the processing of information. I find that national imaginaries are critical to the practice of communicating armed resistance in wartime, moulding frightening realities to specific cultural contexts and locating them within motivational interpretations of the national past. The history of the press is integral to the human search for knowledge and understanding, and it is my hope that the following case-studies of newspapers in the Spanish Civil War will contribute new insights into the role and function of news media in times of crisis.

⁵⁵ Robert W. Desmond, *The Information Process: World News Reporting To the Twentieth Century* (Iowa City: University of Iowa Press, 1978), xii.

Chapter 1: Maintaining Morale in a City Besieged: The Tale of *ABC* Madrid during the Spanish Civil War (1936-1939)

Background

Madrid's oldest continuously operating newspaper, *ABC* began in January of 1903 as a weekly conservative publication supportive of military and Church interests under the leadership of Torcuato Luca de Tena y Álvarez Ossorio.⁵⁶ Within two years it had become a daily periodical and by 1928, it had opened a second headquarters in Seville. Following the announcement of the Second Spanish Republic in April of 1931, the founder's son who had taken over its direction, Juan Ignacio Luca de Tena, continued its conservative and monarchist legacy.⁵⁷ He remained controversial for his frequent visits to the Spanish royal family in London and for his sustained support of the monarchy.⁵⁸ While congratulating the young Republic on its bloodless transition, his newspaper also warned against a descent into anarchy and unrest under the chaotic control of the left.⁵⁹ After the proclamation of the military coup which he had supported, *ABC* Madrid was seized by authorities on July 20, 1936 and refashioned as a leftist Republican newspaper.⁶⁰ This marked an abrupt split in the periodical that would last until the end of the war as the Seville Branch became an official organ for Nationalist propaganda, with the result that both papers preserved the same original masthead to promote drastically different messaging.

To reflect these changed views in its Republican debut on July 25, 1936, *ABC* Madrid opened with a new mission statement.⁶¹ It claimed to have been reformed to stand with democratic Spain and announced its intentions of becoming the pride of the Republican Press, effective immediately: "Queremos que A. B. C. sea orgullo de la Prensa republicana, y lo será inmediatamente." It asserted the legitimacy of the government for the fact that its authority had been bestowed democratically: "Entra hoy este periódico en una vida nueva. Frente a sí tiene un porvenir de vida republicana, franca y leal, de honda y sincera compenetración con el pueblo y con la ley que el pueblo se ha dado."⁶² It accused clericalism and militarism of being the two most horrifying national plagues, which wound together, were the primary constructs of

⁵⁶ "En cumplimiento de un deber," *ABC*, January 1, 1903.

⁵⁷ W. Fernández Florez, "La vasija dispuesta," *ABC*, April 14, 1931; "Nuestra Actitud," *ABC*, April 15, 1931.

⁵⁸ Arturo Mori, *La Prensa española de Nuestro Tiempo* (Mexico, 1943), 190.

⁵⁹ W. Fernández Florez, "La vasija dispuesta," *ABC*, April 14, 1931; "Nuestra Actitud," *ABC*, April 15, 1931.

⁶⁰ "ABC, Republicano," *ABC Madrid*, July 25, 1936; "Viva España," *ABC Sevilla*, July 20, 1936.

⁶¹ "ABC, Republicano," *ABC Madrid*, July 25, 1936.

⁶² "ABC, Republicano," *ABC Madrid*, July 25, 1936.

Fascism. More specifically, it announced a break with the allegedly conservative traditions of privilege and plutocracy. In condemning the church's role in the uprising and identifying the Fascist oppressor as the greatest threat to the nation, the newspaper identified a clear enemy in the clergy and a clear hero in the presiding government according to a Republican interpretation of the war for readers in Madrid. As Enrique A. Sanabria has pointed out, the anticlerical movement of the Restoration coincided with the articulation of a new nationalist discourse within Spain, a discourse which faulted the Catholic Church for stunting the nation's progress and reformation in the modern age.⁶³

The fact that anticlerical nationalism found such strong support among Anarchists, Socialists, and the working classes regardless of affiliation demonstrates the deep resentment many Spaniards felt for the Church and its impact on local politics in the years leading up to the establishment of the Second Spanish Republic. Sanabria and Álvarez Junco argue that understanding of this tradition in the Restoration period sheds light on the rise of anticlerical nationalism during the Spanish Civil War.⁶⁴ Indeed, anticlerical nationalism played an important role in the propaganda of the era, especially in relation to news coverage as authorities attempted to orientate readers—many of whom were Catholic—against Church authorities who endorsed the insurrection. Because Republican news coverage explained the war in passionate language encouraging zeal, faith, and devotion in their cause, this chapter explores the use of emotion and national history in the rhetoric produced in the war-torn capital of the Second Spanish Republic.

Methods

I hold that a rhetorical framing analysis of *ABC* Madrid reveals that emotion and morale were foundational to the articulation of the Republican imagined community constructed in the years 1936-1939. Using Jim A. Kuypers' approach,⁶⁵ I identify themes in the daily news coverage of Madrid's largest newspaper intended to preserve confidence and inspire collective action on behalf of the Republic during the Spanish Civil War. I argue that these themes, far from disintegrating as their cause worsened, actually intensified on the road to defeat. Furthermore,

⁶³ Enrique A. Sanabria, *Republicanism and Anticlerical Nationalism in Spain* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009), 11-13.

⁶⁴ Enrique A. Sanabria, *Republicanism and Anticlerical Nationalism in Spain* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009), 10-14; José Álvarez Junco, *The Emergence of Mass Politics in Spain: Populist Demagoguery and Republican Culture, 1890-1910* (Brighton: Sussex Academic Press, 2002), ix-xi, 68-69.

⁶⁵ Jim A. Kuypers, "Framing Analysis from a Rhetorical Perspective," in *Doing News Framing Analysis: Empirical and Theoretical Perspectives*, ed. Jim A. Kuypers and Paul D'Angelo (New York: Routledge, 2010).

the agenda of war engaged framing as a journalistic tool of propagandistic discourse in the effort to prolong Republican survival. To this end, my analysis follows five editorials printed around news headings in the first and final year of the war to show how Madrid's biggest newspaper responded to the most intense phases of conflict, particularly issues of mobilisation and defeat. Specifically, I focus on the declaration of the military uprising in July, 1936, the siege of Madrid in November, 1936, the Fascist offensive in Cataluña in January, 1939, and the Casado coup against Negrín in March, 1939. I have chosen to juxtapose editorials printed at the beginning and end-stages of the war to highlight the stark contrast in coverage and demonstrate the scale of transformation in the Republican framing process. Taken together, the differences between 1936 and 1939 evidence the crystallisation of a strategic political discourse intended to produce emotional responses in Madrilenian readers, boost citizen morale, and fortify a unified front against the enemy. As the last major city to fall to Francoist aggression, *ABC* Madrid was the only periodical in this study to acknowledge any level of surrender. By tracing the cultivation of the Republican national imaginary from the earliest days of the war to its total abandonment in the capital's final doomed moments, it illuminates a unique aspect of Madrid's news coverage.

The use of emotion in Republican political discourses in Spain can be traced back to the late nineteenth century, when it formed a large part of court rhetoric and played an important role for decades in literary traditions.⁶⁶ While more moderate groups, as embodied by writers Sagarra, Ayala, and Chaves Nogales, among others, attempted to curb the emotional responses of readers, anarcho-syndicalists and other radicals played them up as much as possible.⁶⁷ Some moderates were concerned that such powerful emotions clouded reason and led to irrational hopes and expectations for the new regime that could spell severe disappointments later on, while radicals emphasised them as necessary to launching a successful social and economic revolution. Once the coup took place, however, the comparatively subdued emotionalism of moderates would be banished to the fringes of the movement and Republican passion became central to Republican discourse.⁶⁸ The far-right similarly escalated emotional appeals, though to reactionary ends, recalling a glorious past to

⁶⁶ Javier Krauel, "The Battle for Emotional Hegemony in Republican Spain (1931-1936)," *Engaging the Emotions in Spanish Culture and History*, Ed. L. E. Delgado and J. Labanyi (Vanderbilt University Press, 2016), 141-155.

⁶⁷ Josep Maria de Sagarra, "l'alegria més forta," *El Perfum*, April 21, 1932; Francisco Ayala, "La conciencia republicana ante las perturbaciones sociales," *Luz*, January 13, 1933; Manuel Chaves Nogales, *Obra periodística, Tomo 3*, Ed. María Isabel Cintas Guillén (Seville: Diputación de Sevilla, 2013), 1433; Javier Krauel, "The Battle for Emotional Hegemony in Republican Spain (1931-1936)," *Engaging the Emotions in Spanish Culture and History*, Ed. L. E. Delgado and J. Labanyi (Vanderbilt University Press, 2016), 153-154.

⁶⁸ Javier Krauel, "The Battle for Emotional Hegemony in Republican Spain (1931-1936)," *Engaging the Emotions in Spanish Culture and History*, Ed. L. E. Delgado and J. Labanyi (Vanderbilt University Press, 2016), 153-155.

be resurrected and the importance of military, church, and monarchical institutions in cementing Spain's historic achievements (namely, imperialism).⁶⁹ This precipitated the confrontation of two myths—from the right and from the left—which competed in stoking the public's affections.

Krauel, recalling Carl Schmitt, posits that the nationalist myth of the conservatives, evoking stronger emotions, was more persuasive.⁷⁰ I argue that it is impossible to surmise which ideology found greatest support among Spaniards at the time, considering the rightist parties carried the election of 1933 (marking the start of the black biennium) but the leftist parties won those of 1931 and 1936 (the last of which triggered the civil war). The case of Madrid, a city which held out against Francoist forces for over two-and-a-half years of intensive aerial bombings and ground assaults—the longest of any Spanish city in that position—demonstrates the presence of a determined collective resistance convinced of Republican principles. As discussed later in this chapter, it is true that locally-based newspapers like *ABC* Madrid commonly reported inaccurate or misleading stories, denied the unfavourable turning of events, discounted losses, and exaggerated victories, but such sustained defiance on a massive scale would hardly have been possible if residents did not emotionally identify, at least to some degree, with Republican values.

Morale is a vital element in the production of propaganda, especially in wartime. High morale boosts confidence in a regime, its aims and operations, guiding public opinion through periods of crisis. Constantly in flux, it affects the communal vision and self-perception of a group, drumming up emotions of pride, love, and fear in the service of a national mission. In this way, Republican newspapers like *ABC* Madrid articulated an imagined community defined by faith in democratic ideals of liberty and equality, thereby seeking to envision for readers the workers' utopia they claimed to represent. Unsurprisingly, the task of maintaining morale is made much more challenging in the face of failure than in the wake of success. As the capital of Spain, Madrid remained under constant bombardment by Franco and his allies throughout the war so that readers experienced daily the harsh realities of being on the front lines of violence. The situation became so severe that the Republican Government relocated to Valencia within the first few months of attack, never officially returning to Madrid for the rest

⁶⁹ "Por la salvación de la Patria: Guerra a muerte entre la Rusia roja y la España sagrada," *ABC Sevilla*, July 20, 1936; "Discurso del general Queipo de Llano," *ABC Sevilla*, July 20, 1936; "Claridad en las actitudes," *ABC Sevilla*, July 25, 1936.

⁷⁰ Javier Krauel, "The Battle for Emotional Hegemony in Republican Spain (1931-1936)," *Engaging the Emotions in Spanish Culture and History*, Ed. L. E. Delgado and J. Labanyi (Vanderbilt University Press, 2016), 155.

of the conflict.⁷¹ In light of these challenges, it is even more impressive that Madrid should have delayed surrender to Francoist forces until April of 1939. Indeed, the importance of Madrid in the Spanish Civil War can hardly be overstated as Republican strategies would have proved very different had the city succumbed earlier.⁷²

Traditionally, calls for morale in wartime target a single nation through engaging an imagined community but what happens to these appeals when the nation in question is split into multiple parts? Civil Wars pose unique challenges for authorities amid shifting allegiances and oppositional forces competing for recognition and legitimacy both locally and internationally. For this reason, those overseeing news coverage impose censorship on reporting to ensure that messaging aligns with particular objectives and shapes events in line with their agenda. Consequently, newspapers must message in a way that passes government scrutiny, expresses an ideology, and appears credible. In the case of Republican Madrid, this translated to spinning for Madrilenians an inspirational history of resistance as the winning path to the brighter and freer future they imagined. Periodicals reflected the vision of a unified workers' Spain, secular and incorruptible, which integrated all regions and classes on the path to the greater good of the imagined Spanish nation. As it became clear that the military rebellion would not be quelled within a few short weeks as initially hoped, however, their rhetoric took on increasingly faith-based elements.

Jonathan Auerbach and Russ Castronovo have noted that “to be effective, propaganda must harness a rich affective range beyond negative emotions such as hatred, fear, and envy to include more positive feelings such as pleasure, joy, belonging, and pride.”⁷³ Consequently, propaganda must invoke a variety of emotions that balance positive and negative traits in the quest to persuade participants. This, in turn, requires the dissemination of an ideology that sparks a sense of belief in readers. Some scholars have argued that ideology is intended to reassure followers with a coherent interpretation of the world, even alleging a kind of willful ignorance on behalf of senders and receivers alike, thereby protecting them from “the overwhelming chaos of undifferentiated signification.”⁷⁴ This describes a process not

⁷¹ “La situación en Madrid,” *ABC Madrid*, November 6, 1936; “¡Que nadie se desmoralice!,” *ABC Madrid*, November 7, 1936; “Ayer se reunió en Valencia el Gobierno, en Consejo de ministros,” *El Pueblo*, November 8, 1936.

⁷² Josep Maria Figueres, “Introducción,” in *Madrid en Guerra: Crónica de la batalla de Madrid, 1936-1939*. Ed. Josep Maria Figueres (Barcelona: Ediciones Destino, 2004), 7.

⁷³ Jonathan Auerbach and Russ Castronovo, “Introduction: Thirteen Propositions About Propaganda,” in *The Oxford Handbook of Propaganda* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013), pp. 10.

⁷⁴ Slavoj Žižek, *The Sublime Object of Ideology* (Verso: London, 2008), 1989, 15-17; Jonathan Auerbach and Russ Castronovo, “Introduction: Thirteen Propositions About Propaganda,” in *The Oxford Handbook of Propaganda* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013), 10-11.

dissimilar to framing, which facilitates understanding of complicated issues by interpreting them in news coverage according to a pre-determined or ideologically-specific narrative.⁷⁵ An extension of ideology by nature, then, propaganda must fulfill a similarly comforting function to simplify complex events and facilitate comprehension. Propaganda must therefore invoke emotions like hope and kinship as well as fear to garner support and to inspire collective action. Most importantly, however, it must function as its own religion, demanding blind faith in a cause in the quest to battle adversity. Since its formal conception in the Counter-Reformation, propaganda had operated as a means of “safeguarding” the true Catholic faith.⁷⁶ Faith is a central element of propaganda which disseminates an ideology, secular or religious, and ultimately functions as religious faith, often rejecting rationalism in favour of conviction as the means to securing authority.

Even when the government retreated to Valencia and Barcelona, Madrid remained the symbolic capital of the Spanish Republic. The defense it sustained throughout the Spanish Civil War, despite extreme tactical and material disadvantages, made it, perhaps, the most celebrated Republican city abroad.⁷⁷ It was important, therefore, to uphold Madrid as an example for the rest of Spain. Depictions of its model citizens and its uncorrupted ideals were disseminated around the world to position Madrid as the beating heart of Spanish democracy and to encourage both national and international support. In this way, even as Republicans suffered devastating setbacks, they could still furnish claims of optimism and devotion in the crusade to reclaim territory and save an oppressed people. Though reporting strategies of faith and passion ultimately failed amid leftist chaos and destruction in the battle with a larger military foe, the resistance in Madrid was credited with giving the Republic a fighting chance in the early phase of the conflict. Its fall in 1939 dashed lingering hopes of liberal revival in the peninsula, but it also became the most famous case of Republican grit and heroism. As evidenced by *ABC* Madrid, ideology and emotion serve as powerful tools in shaping the public’s understanding of crisis, highlighting the fluctuating and often conflicting dynamic between news reporting and propaganda. The contrast in coverage between the initial and final days of Republican news framing thus reveals crucial elements of the Spanish Republican

⁷⁵ Robert M. Entman, “Framing Media Power,” *Doing News Framing Analysis: Empirical and Theoretical Perspectives*, Ed. Paul D’Angelo and Jim A. Kuypers (New York: Routledge, 2010), 336.

⁷⁶ Maria Teresa Prendergast and Thomas A. Prendergast, “The Invention of Propaganda: A Critical Commentary on and Translation of *Inscrutabili Divinae Providentiale Arcano*,” in *The Oxford Handbook of Propaganda* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013), Ed. Jonathan Auerbach and Russ Castronovo, 20-27.

⁷⁷ Herbert L. Matthews, “Under the Death-spurting Skies of War-torn Madrid,” *New York Times Magazine*, February 21, 1937; Jesús Izcaray, “Los compromisos de todos,” *Ahora*, November 4, 1936; Gabriel García Maroto, “El dulcificado Madrid,” *La Vanguardia*, January 7, 1938.

mindset and communication agenda in their effort to win a war and effect radical change. In pursuit of this goal, government-backed newspapers like *ABC Madrid* framed the war in terms of an imagined community consisting of loyal workers, Republicans, and democratically aligned citizens in the war to protect human liberties and create a new and lasting Spanish paradise. In conclusion, this chapter combines concepts of framing, rhetoric, and affect to study Spanish Republican political discourses and scrutinise the role of emotion in the construction of national imaginaries in wartime propaganda.

Editorial 1: “La Segunda Guerra de Independencia”—July 25, 1936

ABC Madrid presented the civil war as another fight for independence, comparing the conflict to the Peninsular War of 1808. However, it asserted that this war was “más triste, más amarga que la de 1808” because in the first instance they had cast out foreign invaders while in the present they clashed against native Spaniards turned traitors to outside interests.⁷⁸ The theme of treason was central to the framing of Republican news coverage during the Spanish Civil War and it extended beyond the immediate consequences of the military coup. The newspaper traced the disloyalty of the far right to the founding days of the Spanish Republic, specifically the October arrival of CEDA to the new government.⁷⁹ This was likely a reference to the original constitutional debates of October 1931, in which the rightest representative Gil Robles, the leader of the Confederación de Derechas Autónomas (CEDA), who argued against proposed reforms, was elected to parliament, though it might also have been alluding to the “bienio negro” of 1934 in which he played a starring role. Gil Robles and his party had spouted wildly inflammatory antisemitic and anti-republican rhetoric advocating for a government overthrow in the years before the coup as he embarked on a reactionary agenda which faulted Jews, Communists, and other perceived divergent groups as harmful to the development of the nation. With the backing of Generals Emilio Mola, Manuel Goded, and Joaquín Fanjul, they even went so far as to call upon Catholic Spain to take a stand against the Republican administration and reverse their heretical policies.⁸⁰ Fernando Vázquez Ocaña, Socialist journalist and editor-in-chief of *La Vanguardia* in 1937, grimly recalled it in his memoir as “la

⁷⁸ “La Segunda Guerra de Independencia,” *ABC Madrid*, July 25, 1936.

⁷⁹ In his self-glorifying memoir, Gil Robles argued that the establishment of the Republic made civil war inevitable, with the working classes turned into the instruments of a societal subversion that had to be stopped. See José María Gil Robles, *No fue posible la paz* (Barcelona: Ediciones Ariel, 1968), 63-64.

⁸⁰ Paul Preston, *The Spanish Civil War: Reaction, Revolution and Revenge* (3rd ed.) (London: Harper, 2006).

represión de Octubre,” a period he described as “el largo *sabbat* de la intolerancia.”⁸¹ The editorial thus connected the insurrection to the greater antagonist of international fascism propped up by the Roman Catholic Church in Rome and its tradition of militarism. Its list of names denounced the instigators of the rebel faction and identified for readers the principal antagonists of the conflict.

Though Franco eventually took control of the campaign following the suspicious deaths of several colleagues, the coup had primarily been planned by Mola, Sanjurjo, and Goded. Mola had been known as “the director” of the insurrection and originated the phrase “la quinta columna” based off an alleged fifth column waiting to be mobilised within the Republican capital.⁸² These secret rebels, strategically based in Madrid, were prepared to join the insurrection from within during the first wave of attacks but failed to take the city, resulting in a multitude of arrests and executions. Consequently, the phrase quickly became synonymous with treason and disloyalty and commonly appeared in Republican and Nationalist discourses throughout the war. While the editorial did not yet incorporate the exact terminology, it commented on the injustices of the betrayal of the conservative parties, their seedy motives and allegiances. *ABC* Madrid condemned the “traición odiosa” committed by dishonest Spaniards, or “hombres nacidos en España, pero que renuncien a todo nexo con la noble ideología patria, ganosos de convertirnos en una colonia del más repugnante fascismo negro.”⁸³ It thereby framed the civil war not as a domestic disagreement among political parties within Spain, but as an act of calculated treason in the service of Europe’s rising Fascist powers. The Spanish Nationalists were dubbed the slaves of black Fascism, while the Spanish Republicans, labelled “los leales,” were promoted as the icons of Spanish heroism and fortitude who fought freely as the selfless servants of an ideal.

To this supreme act of sedition, the newspaper linked collaborators Francisco Franco and Queipo de Llano. Franco received the nickname “Don Oppas II,” an allusion to a controversial figure in medieval Spain. According to legend, Oppas had served as bishop of Seville, but had betrayed his faith and country to abet the Moorish conquest of the region.⁸⁴ This also served as a reference to Franco’s Moroccan legion fighting in the peninsula, as before the insurrection he had been stationed in northern Africa and had won fame for his exploits in the Rif War (1921-1926). Though a tone of anger and bitterness characterised the editorial, as

⁸¹ Fernando Vázquez Ocaña, *Pasión y Muerte de la Segunda República Española* [1940] (Madrid: Cátedra del exilio, 2007), 75.

⁸² Stanley G. Payne, *The Spanish Civil War* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012), 65-67.

⁸³ “La Segunda Guerra de Independencia,” *ABC Madrid*, July 25, 1936.

⁸⁴ Roger Collins, *Visigothic Spain, 409-711* (Oxford: Blackwell Publishing, 2004).

evidenced by the descriptors “traidores,” “envilecido,” “odioso,” and “repugnante,” among others, it also offered a ray of hope in its sustained comparison with 1808. Just as the Spanish people had ultimately claimed victory against their French invaders, so too would they crush the latest subversive movement, labelled immoral and iniquitous: “Donde quiera, el pueblo los vence, los arrolla, los desposee de las armas que han envilecido, y ya envolviendo en irrompible círculo de hierro a los que trajeron sobre España el dolor de una guerra civil inicua.”⁸⁵ It supported these claims with news of early Republican successes in which citizens had rallied together to beat back a powerful enemy. Despite the fact that the rebels had acted with the help of professional soldiers, the Civil Guard, a vast supply of arms and ammunition [“pertrechos de todas clases”], the element of surprise, and above all, “una organización estratégica de primer orden,” the common people had decisively stamped out the rebellion in Madrid. Despite lacking a cohesive military at the time of the uprising, proper training, organisation, weapons, or machinery, the Republican loyalists had managed to destroy in a matter of days the evils of the insurrection, which, it alleged, had been years in the making: “[el pueblo] destrozó en unos cuantos días de intensa lucha toda la paciente obra preparada por las estrategias de la felonía en dos largos años de maquinación incesante.”⁸⁶ In this way, the newspaper bolstered the imagery of the common man facing a greater oppressor and emerging victorious. The theme of the underdog is popular in the rhetoric of revolutionary movements as it encourages vulnerable members of society to act. As *ABC* Madrid argued that the Republican government sought to secure (and advance) the achievements of the Spanish Revolution begun in April of 1931, such messaging inspired hope and resilience. Revolutionary rhetoric functions as a means of challenging those groups in power by rejecting the alleged selfish interests of privilege and individual wealth. Additionally, in appealing to the traditionally unenfranchised, the editorial promoted class conflict in terms of the universal concept of the triumphant underdog overcoming evil.

The imbalance of power between the Nationalist and Republican camps served as an interesting focus in multiple editorials in the Madrilenian press from the start. By contrasting material and diplomatic disparities, they highlighted the superiority of the Republicans over the Nationalists (as evidenced by their victories in spite of overwhelming odds), and framed the former as superhuman and the latter as superficial. The editorial clearly outlined the enemy’s multiple advantages: “tropas organizadas, pertrechos de todas clases, la posibilidad

⁸⁵ “La Segunda Guerra de Independencia,” *ABC*, July 25, 1936.

⁸⁶ “La Segunda Guerra de Independencia,” *ABC*, July 25, 1936.

de lanzarse a la infamia cuando les conviniera, y, sobre todo, una organización estratégica de primer orden.”⁸⁷ Yet notwithstanding their conspiracies, their better-equipped and better-trained military, their advanced and abundant weaponry, and their intimidating totalitarian partners, the people—disorganised, ambushed, and defenseless—had beaten them back. Moreover, they had demonstrated a singular unity and discipline of spirit that had saved the Republic and, by extension, the people’s Spain. The repetition of the term “pueblo” was key to the editorial’s framing, as it lay at the heart of the Republic’s claim to legitimacy. In validating the standing government’s democratic backing, it rejected the Nationalist agenda as spurious and unlawful, and supported the legality of Republican authorities. Moreover, it carefully aligned the will of the people with all that was good and virtuous and thus provided a counterattack to Franco’s speech broadcast on July 18, 1936, which claimed the insurrection was the only remaining means to rescue Spanish democracy from the clutches of leftist fraud, godlessness, and anarchy.⁸⁸ Even so, the fact that the Republic was so quick to admit to tactical disadvantages of any kind is significant, as the truth was less than ideal in the campaign to elevate morale. This was most likely the result of the material shortcomings being too obvious to the populace at large to deny so that authorities attempted to spin an objectively negative situation as a positive turnaround in the war effort. As Kuypers noted, *how* something is said can be as important as *what* is said.⁸⁹ They thereby framed a misfortune as a circumstance to rally around rather than lament, transforming their position of weakness into proof of their strength, a sort of rhetorical badge of honour that promised victory despite glaring deficiencies.

Rhetoric is a means of “altering reality”: it involves the “creation of discourse which changes reality through the mediation of thought and action.”⁹⁰ Because the rhetor’s words bring to life an intended discourse for an intended audience, it inevitably becomes a mode of persuasion. Consequently, *ABC Madrid*, as an extension of Republican messaging, set about to alter the nature of the conflict and to turn the tide of the war in favour of the popularly elected government of Spain. To this end, it appealed to readers through impassioned testimonials and commentaries which invoked emotional ties to their endangered homeland, pitting the “odiosa” treason of the enemy against the greater virtues of “la noble ideología patria.”⁹¹ The loyalty versus treason binary reinforced the overarching theme that the military coup did not signify

⁸⁷ “La Segunda Guerra de Independencia,” *ABC Madrid*, July 25, 1936.

⁸⁸ Francisco Franco, “Proclama del Alzamiento,” July 18, 1936; “La patriótica alocución del general Franco al iniciar el movimiento,” *ABC Sevilla*, July 23, 1936.

⁸⁹ Jim A. Kuypers, “Framing Analysis from a Rhetorical Perspective,” *Doing News Framing Analysis: Empirical and Theoretical Perspectives*, Ed. Paul D’Angelo and Jim A. Kuypers (New York: Routledge, 2010), 301.

⁹⁰ Lloyd F. Bitzer, “The Rhetorical Situation,” *Philosophy and Rhetoric*, 1 (1968): 1-14.

⁹¹ “La Segunda Guerra de Independencia,” *ABC Madrid*, July 25, 1936.

the start of a civil war, but the fight between patriots and traitors. The loyalists remained the true Spaniards, the original guardians of liberty and democracy, while the traitors mutated into evil mercenaries in the service of foreign despots. Not only did the newspaper accuse the insurgents of serving hostile outside interests, it also spelled out a full-scale invasion, holding that the main objective of the uprising was to convert Spain into another Fascist colony.

Propaganda uses emotion in a number of ways, even pulling upon the same emotion to different effect depending upon the objective. Fear, for example, can act as a deterrent or a weapon, and military commanders have, since antiquity, recognised it as both an obstacle and an advantage on the battlefield.⁹² Especially in the case of citizen-soldiers with little experience in the ways of war, it is difficult to strike a balance between encouraging heroism and preventing a sense of overconfidence that can alternatively lead to unpredictable battle frenzy or, in other extremes, mass panic. The individual is only important so far as s/he impacts the whole because an army must collectively demonstrate faith, loyalty, and discipline in the field. In the fight to gain or maintain ground, discipline is key to success, as fear can be contagious, spreading like a disease from soldier to soldier if not kept in check. The Spanish Republic faced a unique challenge in the war as they lacked a functioning professional military. Many officers had defected in the preliminary stages of the war (if they were not a part of the original uprising), and those who remained were viewed with suspicion.⁹³ Bereft of their conventional defenses, the Republican government was suddenly fragmented and feeble, their survival reliant upon a disjointed fighting force of amateur soldiers, foreign volunteers, street resisters, and a newly-armed civilian public.

Madrid was unique for its vulnerable position on the front lines for the entire duration of the war. As the capital of Spain, it was the prime target for attacks by opposition forces. Consequently, even when the government retreated to Valencia and later to Barcelona, Madrid remained the symbolic heart—located at both the geographic and political centre of the state—and was celebrated as an example of antifascist fervour. In a city mercilessly besieged by Italian and German aviation campaigns and suffering destruction and loss on a daily basis, demoralisation became a primary concern from early on so that propaganda focused on maintaining public confidence and enthusiasm in the Republican cause. In this effort, newspapers drew parallels between the current environment and historic cases of resistance,

⁹² Łukasz Różycki, *Battlefield Emotions in Late Antiquity: A Study of Fear and Motivation in Roman Military Treatises*, Trans. Krzysztof Chorzewski (Leiden: Brill, 2021), 63-64.

⁹³ Michael Alpert, *Republican Army in the Spanish Civil War, 1936-1939* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2013), 103.

citing famous examples at Saguntum, Numantia, and Zaragoza, respectively.⁹⁴ In this way, they issued calls to patriotism through the glorification of remarkable episodes of peninsular defiance to foreign invaders.

Though a number of famous battles had been fought at the ancient fortress of present-day Sagunto in Valencia, *ABC Madrid* was most likely referencing that from the Second Punic War (218-201 B.C.E.). The Saguntines, ignored by Rome, held off Hannibal's siege for eight months at which point they refused his terms of surrender. As punishment, every adult in the city was put to death.⁹⁵ The Battle of Numantia (present-day Soria in Castilla-León) took place during the Celtiberian Wars (153-133 B.C.E.). After thirteen months of relentless attacks by the Romans, the inhabitants burned their city to the ground instead of relinquishing control.⁹⁶ There were two sieges of Zaragoza during the Peninsular War (1808-1814), but the newspaper probably referred to the latter, bloodier battle. The second siege of Zaragoza involved a confrontation between Spanish guerrilla fighters and the French army. Napoleonic forces assailed the city for nearly two months, after which, the Aragón capital, once known as the "Florence of Spain," lay in ruins with more than 50,000 casualties. Even the French General Lannes estimated that only some 15,000 people had survived the assault, himself shocked by the scale of destruction.⁹⁷ The episodes at Numantia and Zaragoza inspired famous literary and artistic representations in the works of Miguel de Cervantes, Benito Pérez Galdós, and Francisco de Goya, making them especially salient in the cultural memory of Iberian fortitude and resistance.⁹⁸ All three references served to inspire heroism, yet much like the Francoist camp, they also glorified death in the service of the nation. The early days of the war did not spell certain defeat for the Republican cause, as the coup failed in most major cities owing to their underestimation of the popularity of the sitting government in Madrid. However, the asymmetry of resources and allies between factions was visible from the start, making the issue of morale a leading concern among Republican officials. To make matters worse, Madrid was starving. Restaurants, bars, cafés, and most food shops were forced to close due to shortages.

⁹⁴ "La Segunda Guerra de Independencia," *ABC Madrid*, July 25, 1936.

⁹⁵ John Briscoe, "The Second Punic War," in *The Cambridge Ancient History (Second Edition)*, Ed. A. E. Astin, F. W. Walbank, M. W. Frederiksen, and R. M. Ogilvie (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989), 8, 44-80.

⁹⁶ Rachel Schmidt, "The Development of 'Hispanitas' in Spanish Sixteenth-Century Versions of the Fall of Numancia." *Renaissance and Reformation / Renaissance et Réforme* 19, no. 2 (1995): 27-45.

⁹⁷ Charles Richard Vaughan, *Narrative of the Siege of Zaragoza* (Pamphlets. Printed for James Ridgway, 1809). <https://jstor.org/stable/60215551>; Tara Zanardi, "From Melancholy Pleasure to National Mourning: 'Ruinas de Zaragoza' and the Invention of the Modern Ruin," *Zeitschrift Für Kunstgeschichte* 72, no. 4 (2009): 519-44. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/40379436>.

⁹⁸ Miguel de Cervantes, *Tragedia de Numancia* [1582], Ed. Baras Escolá (Alfredo: Prensas Universitarias de Zaragoza, 2009); Benito Pérez Galdós, *Zaragoza* [1873] (Spain: Editorial Minimal, 2015).

The little they had went to sustain the soldiers at the front. In a city plagued by internal schisms and prolonged sieges, blocked transport systems, and limited travel to other cities, citizen hunger began within the first year and lasted until the end of the war.⁹⁹

In recalling episodes of gallantry from the peninsular past, the newspaper likened the second war of independence to the first of 1808 not only by way of defeating a foreign invader, but also by the similarity of the odds stacked against them. Just as Spaniards had overcome remarkable obstacles in the previous century, so too would they succeed in the present conflict in the quest to secure their national sovereignty. Moreover, it upped the ante. It emphasised that 1936 posed a greater threat than 1808, making “la segunda guerra de independencia” greater due to the sedition of the Spanish military: “Grande es todo lo hecho por nuestro pueblo desde el 14 de abril; pero la epopeya de hoy es tan grande, que ni siquiera puede borrar su epicismo la gesta de la otra lucha por la independencia.”¹⁰⁰ Connecting the two wars framed calls to patriotism and inspired confidence by recalling a triumphant past in which Spaniards beat overwhelming odds. It told the tale of a poor and weakened country that had unified to reject the exploitation of a much more powerful aggressor. The editorial concluded by quoting turn-of-the-century Granadan writer, Ángel Ganivet: “la gran obra de España es la obra del pueblo.”¹⁰¹ The newspaper equated the underdog with the people and the people with the Republic that represented them. By apposing them, *ABC Madrid* made calls for faith and obedience to a readership situated perilously close to the front lines of war, lauding them and by extension the Republic as the true guardians of Spain. The July editorial promoted a superior national spirit to inspire confidence and counter an obvious and potentially demoralising asymmetry of wealth and resources between the Republican and insurrectionist camps, thereby cultivating optimism, hope, and patriotism in a city under constant threat.

Editorial 2: “Defender a Madrid es defender al hombre: El hombre eterno”—November 8, 1936

On November 7, 1936, a brutal air raid upon Madrid was swiftly followed by ground attacks.¹⁰² Bombs and gunfire blanketed the city, reducing the outskirts to rubble and prompting the

⁹⁹ Carmen Gutiérrez Rueda and Laura Gutiérrez Rueda, *El hambre en el Madrid de la Guerra Civil: 1936-1939* (Madrid: Ediciones La Librería, 2014), 11, 29, 61.

¹⁰⁰ “La Segunda Guerra de Independencia,” *ABC Madrid*, July 25, 1936.

¹⁰¹ “La Segunda Guerra de Independencia,” *ABC Madrid*, July 25, 1936.

¹⁰² “El trueno artillero rompió el silencio del alba madrileña,” *ABC Madrid*, November 7, 1936; “¡Que nadie se desmoralice!,” *ABC Madrid*, November 7, 1936.

evacuations of thousands of women and children.¹⁰³ As described in the editorial, the boom of the cannons, “ya cercanos,” shook the rooftops and terrorised the populace.¹⁰⁴ “Cercanos a Madrid,” the sinister powers of “la España Negra” approached, signaling an epic battle between the forces of good and evil in which the survival of Madrid represented the salvation of all mankind: “Los cañonazos retumban ya cercanos y, sobre azoteas y cúpulas, se ciernen los aviones. Cercanos a Madrid están ya los poderes siniestros de la España negra.” The repetition of “cercanos” reinforced the immediacy of the threat readers experienced. This, combined with the dramatic imagery of trembling houses, hovering planes, and thundering cannons, portrayed the grim plight of citizens and the immediate need to sustain resistance.

From its beginnings, the editorial, published the following day on November 8, 1936, established a clear protagonist and antagonist in the conflict, labelling each respectively as the hero and enemy of the people. “España negra” or “Black Spain” was the label commonly applied to anti-liberal, anti-revolutionary parties who opposed modernist reforms.¹⁰⁵ Used three times in the editorial—strategically at the beginning, the middle, and the end—the term effectively portrayed the position, agenda, and villainy of the insurrectionist cause, framing it as symptomatic of the Fascist takeover of Europe. It was defined as “los generales, los moros, las partidas de italianos, los legionarios, los aviadores alemanes, los banqueros, los terratenientes, los arzobispos, los señoritos” and all those who sought to transform Spain into a nation of lies. They subsequently identified the enemies of the Republic as Spanish military leaders (generales, legionarios), senior Church officials (arzobispos), foreigners (alemanes, italianos, moros), and the upper classes (banqueros, terratenientes, señoritos), thereby implicating the players in a vast conspiracy of sinister world powers made up of Nazis, Fascists, capitalists, and Catholic Inquisitors. In this way, Republican coverage carved out two Spains occupying the same plane, one which was real and liberated and one which was counterfeit and victimised. In so doing, they maintained the image of a single Spain artificially divided and attacked by turncoats and foreigners while promoting their mission to unite and rescue the nation from persecution.

¹⁰³ Paul Preston, *The Spanish Civil War: 1936-1939* (Chicago: The Dorsey Press, 1989), 273.

¹⁰⁴ “Defender Madrid es defender al hombre: el hombre eterno,” *ABC Madrid*, November 8, 1936.

¹⁰⁵ The concept of “España negra” is connected to “la leyenda negra.” The extent to which it was based in fact or was imagined has been hotly contested by scholars, some of whom argue it was born of anti-Spanish sentiments in Europe, particularly following the rise of Protestantism. Notwithstanding these debates, the term remains suggestive of a backwards and tyrannical history in Spain, from the Spanish Inquisition to a series of military dictatorships. See José Manuel López de Abiada, “De Leyendas Negras y Españas Imaginarias,” *Iberoamericana*, 19.71 (July, 2019): 277-290; Ricardo García Cárcel, “Los Fantásticos Relatos Acerca de Nuestra Patria: La Leyenda Negra,” *Historia Social*, no. 3 (1989): 3-15.

The binary of truth versus lies served multiple purposes. First, it bolstered the argument that the Republicans were credible and honest sources of information in the war, their cause noble. Second, it cast opponents as frauds, their cause, by extension, deceitful and corrupt. Third, it countered claims of Republican illegitimacy by justifying its popular foundations. The cause of truth was linked to purity, equality, justice, and other benevolent ideals, while that of “mentira” conjured up negative concepts of falsity, fraudulence, and oppression. Truth was connected to the light, and lies to the darkness in highly stylised literary language intended to drum up emotional responses in readers. This contrast repeatedly resurfaced throughout to frame the light of Madrid, the light of the Republic, and, above all, the light of man—eternal man. This resurrection imagery conveyed that the body of man might be mortal but the soul had the potential to transcend death in the ongoing battle between good and evil. *ABC Madrid* consequently constructed a Republican message in a series of religious symbols of crucifixion and resurrection, destruction and creation, and persecution and salvation. These, in turn, set up the themes of benevolence against cruelty, freedom against slavery, and Christian decency against barbarous brutality, a direct counter to Nationalist propaganda which attacked an allegedly godless and depraved Republic in a legendary crusade.

Both sides explained their cause in terms of a contemporary Reconquista which bonded the homeland as one in the name of transcendent faith. Nationalists claimed they fought to uproot a modern (decisively, foreign) evil from Iberian soil which was the reason for all Spain’s problems, constantly blaming Communist, Anarchist, Soviet, and Jewish agents in the government.¹⁰⁶ Republicans, meanwhile, responded that they defended the nation against the real foreign invaders, linking the Moroccan troops allied with Franco to the Mameluke cavalry of the French Imperial Guard which participated in the Madrid massacres of May 2nd and May 3rd, 1808.¹⁰⁷ Having been so shocking that they were immortalised by Goya and displayed in the Prado, these acts marked critical days in the history of Spain, making them particularly moving in the public imagination. *ABC Madrid* encouraged readers to stand up for Spain’s capital, even to die in its defense with the same grit and gallantry as their ancestors:

Con la misma cólera con que, en las comunidades, lucharon contra un emperador; con el mismo sombrío fulgor que en 1808, en la Puerta del Sol, tuvieron sus armas y sus ojos entre los caballos de los mamelucos de Napoleón.¹⁰⁸

¹⁰⁶ The characterisation of the Second Spanish Republic as a foreign Marxist and anti-Christian infection of the nation, sometimes called “la lepra muscovita,” began long before the conflict and intensified in the years leading up to the Spanish Civil War. See “Por la salvación de la patria: Guerra a muerte entre la Rusia Roja y la España Sagrada,” *ABC Sevilla*, July 22, 1936; “El Sr. Gil Robles declara que la táctica de las derechas debe ser formar un frente antimarxista,” *El Sol*, October 17, 1933; “Discurso del obispo de Madrid,” *ABC*, October 17, 1933.

¹⁰⁷ “Defender Madrid es defender al hombre: el hombre eterno,” *ABC Madrid*, November 8, 1936.

¹⁰⁸ “Defender Madrid es defender al hombre: el hombre eterno,” *ABC Madrid*, November 8, 1936.

The terms *moros* and *mamelucos*, placed in parallel, jointly conjured up racist imagery in the Spanish historical imagination. Coordinated visuals of the Islamic Conquests of the middle ages, the Spanish War of Independence of 1808, and the recent Rif War of 1921-1926 bridged past and present foes in the portrayal of a consistent league of foreign antagonists throughout Spanish history. As Handler and Linnekin observed, “authenticity is always defined in the present” and notions of continuity are manufactured through the active and selective recollection of symbols, metaphors, and references to the past.¹⁰⁹ Spirited depictions of Republican confidence in victory based on historical precedent thereby assumed religious proportions through unwavering commitment, eternal life through faith, and endurance and sacrifice in pursuit of a class-free utopia that extended through the ages.

In framing the Spanish Civil War as a twentieth-century *Reconquista*, *ABC Madrid* conceived of an ascendant cause with ascendant importance and placed Madrid at the centre. The editorial affirmed Madrid was the heart of the Republic: strategically, it joined the cities to the provinces; symbolically, it joined the oppressed and the liberated who looked to it for light and guidance. Specifically, Madrid fought for all of Spain—the liberated as well as the oppressed areas—and therefore to fight for Madrid meant to fight for Spanish sovereignty and re-unification. In listing Asturias, the Basque Country, Catalonia, Valencia, Murcia, and Andalusia, *ABC Madrid* consolidated major regions behind an ideological banner of truth, beauty, and justice (conventionally positive traits lacking direct political affiliation). For this reason, Valencia and Catalonia immediately reinforced their efforts, turned up every corner of every village—“coronados de palmeras”—to march to the defense of Madrid.¹¹⁰ Contributors underlined Spain’s role in the defense of liberal values so that as the nation’s capital, Madrid also became the capital of the world’s democracies. Placed at the head of an emerging world war, the editorial hailed Madrid as the guardian of Spain, Europe, and all the free peoples of the world: “Es más: defender a Madrid es defender a todos los pueblos del mundo.”¹¹¹ In support of this stance the newspaper cited demonstrations organised by intellectuals to protest Fascist cruelty and the assembly of labour unions campaigning for aid from afar in the way of weapons and aeroplanes. Referring to occasions of international solidarity would have stirred hopes of material assistance from Britain, France, and the United States. Such claims were kept suspiciously nebulous and imprecise, however, not because the Republic found few allies

¹⁰⁹ Richard Handler and Jocelyn Linnekin, “Tradition, Genuine or Spurious,” *The Journal of American Folklore* 97, no. 385 (1984): 286.

¹¹⁰ “Defender Madrid es defender al hombre: el hombre eterno,” *ABC Madrid*, November 8, 1936.

¹¹¹ “Defender Madrid es defender al hombre: el hombre eterno,” *ABC Madrid*, November 8, 1936.

abroad (it was true that many supported the Republic), but because the official channels refused to intervene in a presumed civil war for fear of mounting conflict in Europe and uncertainty as to the extent of “red” influences in the Republican regime. With the agenda of preserving the delicate balance between world powers and political forces, the “naciones democráticas” so celebrated by Republican Spain remained largely silent.¹¹²

That same day, to the left of the main editorial, *ABC* Madrid reproduced orders by General José Miaja, who had recently been given command of the Republic’s defense.¹¹³ He similarly demanded heroism and confidence from his soldiers and the civilian population in addition to their total cooperation. Under no circumstances would he abide mass panic or disloyalty as the defense of Madrid could only be guaranteed by the bravery of its combatants and the public order. It was imperative that everyone resist without ceding a single inch of land: “resistir sin ceder un palmo más de terreno.” The cause demanded sacrifice and endurance for the survival of the Republic: “Espero igualmente de las fuerzas de retaguardia y de la población civil una cooperación eficaz, activa y abnegada.” Such rallying cries for discipline and solidarity highlighted the Republican imagined community of a unanimous national spirit capable of vanquishing a greater enemy. Miaja required Madrilenians to hold together in the face of adversity because survival depended upon it: “Todo Madrid debe sentir de modo unánime y firme el deseo de vencer a cualquier precio.”¹¹⁴ His orders served to warn readers by demanding their sacrifice (at any price) but also to inspire them by promising them victory. This appeal to suffering required belief in a higher cause. Readers had to care about a Republican victory and to understand what was at stake if they were to resist. Newspapers like *ABC* Madrid were tasked with convincing readers that the survival of the Republic mattered—to Spain, to Europe, and to the world at large, thereby cultivating an imagined community for Spaniards that encompassed a wider global network of democratic citizens.

Despite calls for unconditional loyalty, Republican and Francoist propaganda presented the theme of rationalism differently. Republican propaganda like that disseminated by *ABC* Madrid promoted rationalism as a Republican virtue and anti-rationalism as a Fascist evil. Francoist propaganda posed that rationalism was a kind of disease that had infected the nation which only tradition and Catholic morality could cure. Gil Robles famously described “el virus

¹¹² Indeed, the report released by the Non-Intervention Committee in 1937 appeared to be more concerned with allegations of the Soviet shipment of arms to the Republic than with any meaningful investigation into accounts of Italian and German involvement on behalf of the Nationalist faction. See “Report on the Non-Intervention Committee and Spain: Appendix (part ii),” January 13, 1937, Archives of the Trade Union Congress, 292/946/15b/2(ii), 1-12.

¹¹³ “Orden general de ayer,” *ABC Madrid*, November 8, 1936.

¹¹⁴ “Orden general de ayer,” *ABC Madrid*, November 8, 1936.

racionalista” as the culprit behind the lack of morality, patriotism, and strength corrupting generations of Spaniards which many conservatives blamed for the episodes of protest and revolt now threatening the national stability.¹¹⁵ Interestingly, Republican propaganda at once celebrated and rejected rational thought, a contradiction that became increasingly apparent as the war progressed mostly unfavourably for the left. Newspapers held that the Spanish Republic protected rationalism which was key to the function of a just and democratic government, but also assured readers that their coming victory would not follow the laws of logic (that is, that they could still win the war despite the growing loss of territory, dwindling funds and resources, and, most critically, without securing western allies).¹¹⁶

Following this trend, *ABC* Madrid echoed religious themes within the context of a utopian mission. It presented the war as part of an eternal fight for humanity with the fate of the world hanging in the balance: “Defender a Madrid es defender al hombre. El hombre eterno.”¹¹⁷ The Republic—concentrated in Madrid—thereby transcended the mortal realm as the vanguard of a better future so that its citizens fought to protect something greater than themselves. The Spanish Civil War, designated a modern Reconquista by both sides, surpassed material conflict to become a battle between heaven and hell. Republican coverage depicted the war in a way that relied upon the tensions between creation and destruction. Specifically, it highlighted the Republican agenda of creating a new and honourable Spain, “de lo justo y de lo bello,” while alleging that the Nationalists sought to destroy progress and return Spain to a feudalistic nightmare. Light versus shadow imagery became critical to this depiction of a bright future utopia pitted against the dark ages. Common descriptors included “aurora,” “emana,” “resplandor,” and “apagarán jamás”:

La aurora rosa, la aurora roja amanece para España. Para sus obreros y sus campesinos. Para sus soldados y marineros; para sus escritores y pintores. Para todos... Porque, sobre todo, defender a Madrid es defender al hombre. El hombre que lleva en la frente el resplandor de la verdad, de lo justo y de lo bello... Es defender el resplandor de su frente, de los poderes siniestros de la mentira, la injusticia, y la fealdad. Los poderes de la España negra quieren apagar para siempre este resplandor de la frente del hombre; deformar el cuerpo y el espíritu del hombre con las torturas miserables de sus mentiras.

¹¹⁵ Gil Robles wrote “El virus racionalista logró infiltrarse en la conciencia de varias generaciones, que vivirían uno de los periodos más críticos de la historia de España sin frenos morales, sin el resorte de un poderoso sentimiento patriótico; escépticas, indiferentes, llenas de amargo sentido crítico, fáciles a todo género de rebeldías y protestas.” He expanded on this in his notes with descriptions of modern cities, “donde se apiñaban en tugurios infectos cientos de miles de seres humanos en la promiscuidad más nauseabunda, sin una iglesia, sin una escuela cristiana, sin oír hablar de Dios, sin escuchar una palabra de consuelo que neutralizara la constante propaganda del odio...” See José María Gil Robles, *No fue posible la paz* (Barcelona: Ediciones Ariel, 1968), 63.

¹¹⁶ Ángel Ossorio y Gallardo, “El fracaso de la lógica,” *La Vanguardia*, January 8, 1939; “La hora de la resistencia y la hora de atacar,” *ABC Madrid*, January 25, 1939.

¹¹⁷ “Defender Madrid es defender al hombre: el hombre eterno,” *ABC Madrid*, November 8, 1936.

The editorial closed with a reference to the assassination of Andalusian poet, Federico García Lorca, concluding that while his mortal body had been executed by the Fascists, his art would live on never to be dimmed. Subsequently, just as “el resplandor de su poesía eterna” had survived his earthly death, so too would the light of the Republic, and through it the light of humanity, never (“jamás”) be extinguished.¹¹⁸ In this way, Lorca was claimed as part of the Republican mission and legacy, his literature an extension of the beauty and brilliance they cultivated. Though Franco denied any involvement in his disappearance or execution, it was apparent to the international scene that Lorca’s death had occurred at the hands of insurrectionists in Granada. Moreover, the statement served as a counter to the Nationalist accusation that Republicans were the culprits who assassinated Spanish art, culture, and heritage at the behest of Soviet commanders.

The Nationalist assault of November 7, 1936, though ultimately unsuccessful, lasted days and claimed many lives. Republican officials, having intercepted enemy intelligence, were able to concentrate their forces in the appropriate areas, and managed to hold control of the capital despite Francoist coordination with Italian and German aeroplanes.¹¹⁹ Indeed, the event served as one of the most famous testaments to the strength and conviction of Republican resistance and would regularly be recalled throughout the war to inspire action.¹²⁰ *ABC Madrid* structured its messaging in Christian symbolism of deliverance from death, cinematic imagery of light and dark, and impassioned language of hope and outrage to target readers’ emotional responses to current affairs. The commemoration of “valentía” and “heroísmo” of ordinary citizens, past and present, sought to inspire pride in an epic national history and a sense of duty to preserve a uniquely heroic legacy. It encouraged Spaniards to fight for their capital—“en las calles y en las barricadas”—and to protect their country from unwelcome intruders and would-be imperialist rulers.¹²¹ Such editorials wove together former conflicts as examples of Spanish greatness and of the people’s ability to surmount treacherous obstacles on the road to triumph, thereby boosting public courage and morale during a long, gruesome, and terrifying siege.

Editorial 3: “La hora de la resistencia y la hora de atacar”—January 25, 1939

¹¹⁸ “Defender Madrid es defender al hombre: el hombre eterno,” *ABC Madrid*, November 8, 1936.

¹¹⁹ Raymond L. Proctor, *Hitler’s Luftwaffe in the Spanish Civil War* (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1983), 61-66.

¹²⁰ “La conmemoración del 7 de Noviembre,” *La Vanguardia*, November 9, 1937; “Conmemoración del 7 de Noviembre,” *ABC Madrid*, November 8, 1938; “La situación es grave pero no crítica,” *ABC Madrid*, January 25, 1939; “España en pie dispuesta a defender energicamente su independencia,” *ABC Madrid*, January 25, 1939.

¹²¹ “Defender Madrid es defender al hombre: el hombre eterno,” *ABC Madrid*, November 8, 1936.

As the Nationalists made continuous gains in Catalonia, *ABC* Madrid coverage turned toward the fighting in Barcelona. By late January, 1939 the conditions in the city were critical, its fall imminent.¹²² Despite the grim state of affairs, the newspaper assured the public that resistance in Catalonia was still possible. Considering the loss of Barcelona would signify calamity for the Spanish Republic, rightfully interpreted by many as indicative of approaching defeat, it is unsurprising that authorities feared telling readers the truth. Barcelona survived among the last Republican fortress cities, its political significance and geographic positioning of extreme strategic value. To admit defeat in the capital of Catalonia would have been akin to admitting Francoist victory in all of Spain. Consequently, to lose Barcelona would prove a major blow to citizen morale and further isolate Madrid. In response to this troubling situation, the newspaper tried to calm readers while admitting the situation was becoming dire.

On January 25, 1939, *ABC* Madrid led its coverage with the editorial “La hora de resistencia y la hora de atacar,” insisting that while the situation in Barcelona was certainly serious, it was far from critical: “Las circunstancias son graves, pero no críticas.”¹²³ Urging citizens not to panic, it posed two arguments: first, no one in high command or government office had lost composure due to their unshaken confidence in Barcelona’s ability to defend itself; second, in the grand scheme of things and all the Republic stood for (“para todo lo que es y representa la República española”), the siege was not decisive as difficulties were to be expected in wartime.¹²⁴ Moreover, challenges such as these had been overcome before in moments of true greatness. It cited as evidence the events of the Second Battle of the Marne in World War One, during which Allied General Ferdinand Foch had launched a successful counter-offensive when most compromised. According to *ABC* Madrid, he had allegedly stated: “Me veo comprometido. Luego ha llegado la hora de atacar.”¹²⁵ Clearly intended to suggest that Republican positions were not so fragile as they appeared, the newspaper held that the fight in Barcelona was not yet desperate enough to warrant panic, that the enemy had encountered an adaptable and effective resistance, and furthermore, that the city was sufficiently strong to launch an attack should circumstances deteriorate. It claimed the Republic could exploit the national anguish and procure from it a life-giving resurgence of strength that occurs in times of real crisis. The newspaper subsequently sought to transform this “desesperación vital” into a fierce and advantageous fighting force which would apparently

¹²² Paul Preston, *The Last Days of the Spanish Republic* (London: William Collins, 2016), 37-39.

¹²³ “La hora de la resistencia y la hora de atacar,” *ABC Madrid*, January 25, 1939.

¹²⁴ “La hora de la resistencia y la hora de atacar,” *ABC Madrid*, January 25, 1939.

¹²⁵ “La hora de la resistencia y la hora de atacar,” *ABC Madrid*, January 25, 1939.

manifest instinctively and ultimately lead them to a favourable outcome, thereby weaponising hopelessness as a means of defense: “El enemigo encuentra una resistencia flexible y prevista, pero la ‘desesperación vital’ de los españoles está a punto de dispararse y se disparará.”¹²⁶ The newspaper reiterated that the Republic had not yet reached this level of desperation but was close and would soon spring into action. The article readily admitted to its strategy of weaponising the national despair to galvanise the population, claiming that the advances of the insurgents, emboldened by the monstrosity of German and Italian interference, would eventually push Spaniards to a breaking point which would, in turn, feed their powerful impulse to resist foreign injustice and domination: “Hemos usado más de una vez este concepto: ‘Organizar la desesperación vital’. Entiéndase bien esta expression.”¹²⁷

The World War One analogy was key for multiple reasons, not least of which because it tied Spain, which had remained neutral in 1914-1918, to the Allied powers of France, Great Britain, and the United States. In the continued attempt to convince world leaders to lift the non-intervention pact which suppressed the Republic’s ability to defend itself, *ABC Madrid* pulled on powerful sympathies among Spanish and international audiences. It suggested that the Republic aligned with democratic interests, values, and history, and also with their joint triumphs. Though it described the second battle of the Marne as an unlikely victory launched hastily by French forces who had been backed into a corner, the reality told a rather different story. The battle was, in fact, part of a carefully planned counter-offensive intended to exploit defects in the German front lines.¹²⁸ Allied forces had captured intelligence detailing their artillery plans and expected dates—down to the minute—of attack. The long summer days which made it difficult for the Central Powers to hide preparations further stifled their efforts so that General Foch was able to organise daily aviation espionage sweeps to chart changes in the military positions behind enemy lines. With ample time to fortify French positions and launch their own counter-attack a full half-hour in advance, Allied units took the enemy by surprise, severely shaking their confidence, thwarting their more concentrated offensives in Belgium (as the attack on the Marne was supposed to be a diversion), and ultimately forcing them to retreat. Furthermore, General Foch had ample tactical support from American and British troops, having coordinated the battle with multiple units from multiple countries, hardly reflective of

¹²⁶ “La hora de la resistencia y la hora de atacar,” *ABC Madrid*, January 25, 1939.

¹²⁷ “La hora de la resistencia y la hora de atacar,” *ABC Madrid*, January 25, 1939.

¹²⁸ Elizabeth Greenhalgh, *Foch in Command: The Forging of a First World War General* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011), 376-406.

the isolated and unaided position in which the Spanish Republic now found itself entrenched.¹²⁹ As Kuypers argued, framing, by nature, relies upon an incomplete retelling of events to advance specific messaging objectives over others.¹³⁰ Despite the reality of the Second Battle of the Marne being radically different from that of the Siege of Barcelona, *ABC Madrid* spun a narrative of unlikely champions forged through undying belief.

Repeated appeals to the international community went ignored even as Republican officials presented damning evidence of German and Italian involvement in the war.¹³¹ *ABC Madrid* tried to rally for support from Spain's neighbours by reminding France of their shared border in Catalonia: "los cañones que se dirigen contra Barcelona apuntan también contra la seguridad de Francia."¹³² Although hopeful of a diplomatic shift, leaders understood by 1939 that this was unlikely. Newspapers worked to bolster morale by drumming up pride in the national mission on the front lines and in the rearguard, lauding the heroism of their soldiers and the abnegation of civilians in service of the nation's defense. As Krauel states, "One is proud to belong to a nation if one sees oneself approximate the ideal the nation has set for itself, whatever its content may be (for instance, the nation as being democratic, as promoting liberty, as reinforcing cultural unity)."¹³³ In this way, *ABC Madrid* held that the people's tireless fighting in spite of the odds stacked against them demonstrated a superiority of morals that reflected the goodwill of Republican political and diplomatic policies and embodied their conciliatory spirit: "A saber: luchando denodadamente, pese a la inferioridad de nuestros medios, y realizando actos políticos y diplomáticos llenos de buena fe y de espíritu de conciliación."¹³⁴ The valour of their troops, the fortitude of their citizens, and the righteousness of their cause were the vehicles of a benevolent democratic government trying to humanise a savage war. The editorial thereby refuted claims of civil war on multiple fronts, citing foreign interference in favour of the insurrection and characterising government actions as defensive, civilised, and reasonable: "Nos sobra la razón, y ningún país puede reprocharnos a los

¹²⁹ Elizabeth Greenhalgh, *Foch in Command: The Forging of a First World War General* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011), 376-406.

¹³⁰ Jim A. Kuypers, "Framing Analysis from a Rhetorical Perspective," *Doing News Framing Analysis: Empirical and Theoretical Perspectives*, Ed. Paul D'Angelo and Jim A. Kuypers (New York: Routledge, 2009), 300.

¹³¹ Eduardo Ortega y Gasset, "Appeal to the Opinion of the World," *Presidency of the Order of Barristers of Madrid* (1936), 15/3/8/223(i); Ángel Ossorio y Gallardo, *L'esvenidor d'Espanya: la meva fe en la victòria – Raons (Text de la conferència pronunciada a París, pel senyor Angel Ossorio i Gallardo)* (Barcelona: Comissariat de propaganda de la Generalitat de Catalunya, 1937), 3-19.

¹³² Fabra, "La camara continua dándose por enterada de la grave amenaza que representa para Francia la ofensiva de Mussolini contra Cataluña," *ABC Madrid*, January 25, 1939.

¹³³ Javier Krauel, *Imperial Emotions: Cultural Responses to Myths of Empire in Fin-de-Siècle Spain* (Liverpool: Liverpool University Press, 2013), 158.

¹³⁴ "La hora de la resistencia y la hora de atacar," *ABC Madrid*, January 25, 1939.

españoles que no la hayamos servido con los dos procedimientos que aconseja la dignidad.”¹³⁵ The focus placed on Republican reason and unselfishness promoted the legitimacy of the Republican regime while also relying upon unbroken faith as the key to victory. Madrid and its people would persevere despite heavy losses throughout the country out of the purity of their belief and the fearlessness of their spirit so that morale became twisted into the ultimate weapon of democratic righteousness.

The newspaper was careful not to disregard entirely the difficult trials ahead, however, acknowledging Spanish suffering and promoting solidarity between Madrid and Barcelona, positioning them as sister capitals and vital Republican strongholds. Their shared defenses promoted a greater good emblematic of Spanish strength, unity, and stability. It described the offensive against Catalonia and its people’s hardships as the result of global inaction which threatened democratic progress. Subsequently, resistance through faith at every moment was imperative. The day’s coverage closed with a warning that appeared to target local and international readers alike: “Nadie podría llamarse a queja mañana si la incompreensión hace que salte rápidamente sobre nuestras fronteras, para salirse de ellas, todo el tremendo drama que España vive.”¹³⁶ In characterising Spain as the first target of insatiable Fascist powers, *ABC* Madrid crafted a rhetorical defense of Republican goals and values. It articulated the significance of a conflict destined to extend beyond Spanish borders and evolve into a second world war. Spain was therefore designated as the guardian of free Europe, the last barrier standing between democratic liberty and Fascist slavery. Spain’s exceptional resistance was therefore all the more important because it was a testament to the outside world of Republican courage, conviction, and endurance. Rather than having become discouraged by relentless enemy onslaught, the exalted love Spaniards felt for their freedom had propelled them to defend their homeland to the bitter end, imbuing them with the supernatural power to succeed despite impossibilities. Spaniards were so convinced of their Republican principles that they could not be swayed from their mission and the war’s continuance merely served to invigorate them. Consequently, Republican news indirectly admitted to the unfavourable turn in the war despite projecting the image of idealism. The war was no longer discussed in terms of an assured offensive to reunite the country or reinstate the Republic in occupied territories. Instead, the newspaper had transitioned to a strategy of prolonging the war they were no longer winning. It thereby promoted the image of uncompromising resistance as the means to

¹³⁵ “La hora de la resistencia y la hora de atacar,” *ABC Madrid*, January 25, 1939.

¹³⁶ “La hora de la resistencia y la hora de atacar,” *ABC Madrid*, January 25, 1939.

vanquishing evil, most likely to distract readers from the imminent fall of Barcelona. In this way, *ABC Madrid* re-framed damning developments in Catalonia as evidence of their triumphs to elevate dispositions in a dying city.

To reinforce a message of optimism, the article was surrounded by others detailing the siege of Barcelona, though they contained little in the way of information on its progression. They attempted to energise the faithful with a series of headlines promoting composure and security, including: “España en pie dispuesta a defender energicamente su independencia,” “la situación es grave pero no crítica,” “El Gobierno muestra confianza en la defensa de Cataluña,” “El general Miaja muestra su fe en el pueblo catalán,” and “Saludo a los nuevos movilizados.”¹³⁷ Combined, these stories misrepresented events in Catalonia despite recognising certain dangers. They portrayed the Republican positions there as stronger than they actually were by redirecting attention to the voluntarily self-imposed discipline of citizens, the fresh supply of troops, unshaken Government confidence in the Catalan resistance, military advances in other regions, and former successes in the famous siege of Madrid. The newspaper promoted the importance of Barcelona as a capital city with symbolic moral power, thereby necessitating its defense at all costs, though maintained it as a regional—not national—capital:

La patria está en peligro. Todo el mundo debe estar en su puesto. Barcelona ha de ser defendida: como lo fué Madrid. El valor simbólico y el poder moral de la resistencia de la capital de España debe ser emulado por la capital de Cataluña.¹³⁸

The day’s coverage subsequently endorsed an important hierarchy in its campaign for sustained national resistance and unification, positioning Barcelona and Madrid as the capitals of Catalonia and Spain, respectively, framing them as allies and capital cities. However, Barcelona was characterised as secondary to Madrid. This strategy can be explained by two important factors. First, it advanced the image of a unified national identity, with Catalans and Madrilenians fighting together as Spaniards for the preservation of all Spain as opposed to the defense of a single region. Second, it supported government reassurances to the public that the war was not lost so long as Madrid—the highest capital in the land—survived. It supported this notion by arguing that central Spain, specifically Madrid, had demonstrated its invulnerability to enemy attack, making it the best base of operations for the country’s resistance moving forward. Such statements, while intended to assuage civilian anxieties, betrayed the emptiness behind government promises of Republican ability to rescue strongholds in Catalonia.

¹³⁷ *ABC Madrid*, January 25, 1939.

¹³⁸ “La situación es grave pero no crítica,” *ABC Madrid*, January 25, 1939.

It should be noted that the day's coverage coincided with the Republic's declaration of martial law in all territories.¹³⁹ *ABC Madrid* was careful to deliver the news confidently without diminishing morale. It quoted the statements of General Miaja and underscored their importance but also attempted to discourage readers from panicking:

El general [Miaja] ha dicho que la declaración del estado de guerra es una medida completamente natural cuando todo el país se ha puesto en pie de guerra para defender su independencia y su vida. El pueblo que combate sin distinción, entre el frente y la retaguardia, debe estar sometido a normas militares para el mayor rendimiento en la disciplina que voluntariamente se impuso.¹⁴⁰

At once reassuring and motivating the population to maintain composure and fight on, the newspaper walked a fine line between news and idealism. It had to hearten readers enough to keep resisting by giving them a reason to persevere despite crushing setbacks (“Todos los ciudadanos deben obediencia y ayuda a los fines del Mando... Así se parará al enemigo y se le rechazará después.”).¹⁴¹ As Spain's misfortunes continued to accelerate toward total defeat, daily life became increasingly harsh for soldiers and civilians alike who found themselves thrust closer and closer to a merciless foe. Broken lines and lost territory caused severe food and material shortages and hindered Republican defenses whose failings became increasingly obvious.¹⁴² Consequently, *ABC Madrid* prioritised a message of resistance as a form of attack to furnish hope. It produced narratives that framed the Republican defense as offense to promote the illusion of a tactic that would eventually serve to reconquer and reunite a divided nation.

Editorials 4 & 5: The Future of “El pueblo español” and The Sunset of the Republic (March 25 & 26, 1939)

By March, the war was accelerating toward its end with no hint of the long-prophesied victory in sight. In response to increased dissatisfaction with Prime Minister Juan Negrín's leadership and his close collaboration with the Communist Party and the Soviet Union, Republican military officials Seismundo Casado, José Miaja, and Cipriano Mera, along with Socialist politician Julián Besteiro, led an ill-timed coup which only served to weaken Republican positions further.¹⁴³ Negrín had assumed power following the disaster of the Barcelona May

¹³⁹ “España en pie dispuesta a defender enérgicamente su independencia,” *ABC Madrid*, January 25, 1939.

¹⁴⁰ “La situación es grave pero no crítica,” *ABC Madrid*, January 25, 1939.

¹⁴¹ “La situación es grave pero no crítica,” *ABC Madrid*, January 25, 1939.

¹⁴² Paul Preston, *The Last Days of the Spanish Republic* (London: William Collins, 2016), 38-41.

¹⁴³ Ángel Viñas and Fernando Hernández Sánchez, *El Desplome de la República* (Barcelona: Editorial Crítica, 2009).

Days of 1937 which had forced the resignation of Francisco Largo Caballero and his cabinet. Many officials, however, perceived Negrín's administration to be a thinly-veiled Communist takeover of the Spanish Republic. Moreover, by 1939, they believed he was inflicting unnecessary death and destruction on the country by prolonging military resistance despite knowing the war to be irretrievably lost. Scholars have debated his tactics and motivations, but Negrín evidently hoped to acquire international assistance in establishing a peace treaty that would minimise Nationalist retribution against Republican citizens.¹⁴⁴ He held that the administration and the public needed to maintain the appearance of confidence and unyielding resistance if the Republican Government were to convince the democratic powers of France and Great Britain to oversee arbitration.¹⁴⁵

Believing themselves better equipped to negotiate a comprehensive amnesty with the Nationalists, Casado and his co-conspirators toppled the failing Republican regime.¹⁴⁶ They immediately sued for peace, but soon learned that Franco was uninterested in securing anything but Madrid's unconditional surrender. Instead of fortifying their position as they had hoped, therefore, their takeover merely initiated a solemn transition in the Republican rhetoric. The emphasis changed from stoking public faith and resilience in a transcendent cause to calming the anxieties of a war-weary populace. The newspapers reflected this turn, dropping themes of optimism and resistance in favour of submission and acceptance. Anti-communist headlines dominated coverage as reporting condemned the totalitarian activities of the "rojos" for costing them the war. The new leaders prosecuted prominent Communist officials and castigated Negrín for his allegedly traitorous sympathies.¹⁴⁷ Within weeks it became clear to everyone that the war was over. Worse still, the dying Republic had no more bargaining chips and no system in place to protect its citizens from the dangers of Nationalist retaliation.

Unable to postpone the inevitable any longer, *ABC Madrid* began preparing readers for the end, publishing two editorials over the course of March 25-26, 1939 which read more like the continuation of a single article than separate pieces. Focus shifted from the portrayal of a Republican national identity to a broader Spanish national identity. Though the concepts of loss and defeat were never explicitly mentioned in either, they were heavily implied. Specifically, the newspaper spoke in terms of an upcoming transition of power and the reunion

¹⁴⁴ Paul Preston, *The Last Days of the Spanish Republic* (London: William Collins, 2016), 38-41.

¹⁴⁵ "La Paz que nos obliga a luchar," *ABC Madrid*, March 5, 1939.

¹⁴⁶ "Manifiesto a los trabajadores y al pueblo antifascista," *ABC Madrid*, March 7, 1939; "Discurso de Don Julián Besteiro," *ABC Madrid*, March 7, 1939.

¹⁴⁷ "El pueblo y el ejército rinden emocionante tributo a los jefes asesinados por los comunistas," *ABC Madrid*, March 25, 1939.

of a broken country in which the warring territories of Spain, described as “bárbaramente separados,” were likened to a wrongfully-separated family unit. Significantly, the newspaper rejected for the first time the image of two Spains (one liberated and one invaded) it had recalled and cultivated since July, 1936, and instead took to describing them as “two half-Spains”: sick, mutilated, and incomplete. It argued that the only remedy was to restore the country to its original borders and become whole once more. It wrote:

Hay que reparar bien en la situación existente hasta ahora: en lugar de una España ha habido dos–dos medias Españas, se entiende. Hemos vivido en un país mutilado, incompleto, imperfecto, sin equilibrio económico, sintiendo en todo instante la falta del gran trozo escindido.¹⁴⁸

In citing the economic hardships and the forced fragmentation of a nation resulting from the flawed mindset of a people at war with one another rather than with a foreign adversary, it reversed its earlier rhetoric to reduce a complex international conflict to the comparatively smaller dimensions of a civil war. News reports omitted references to the virulently antidemocratic ideals of Franco’s regime and the German and Italian forces supporting them. It now held that Spain had been divided into two false nations or “pseudo-nations” from the outset (“las dos pseudo-naciones en que España está dividida”), unnaturally separated by political disagreements and other competing interests that were, in fact, secondary to the fundamental national unity of the Spanish people.¹⁴⁹ It thereby presented the upcoming merge with the triumphant Nationalist Zone as the natural reunion of a feuding family rather than the crushing destruction of Republican Spain at the hands of an openly hostile and undemocratic military rebellion.

Forced to address public anxieties surrounding the war’s conclusion, therefore, *ABC* Madrid attempted to soothe the prevailing attitude of uncertainty in the capital (“Para muchas gentes se ha producido una actitud de desconcierto ante la inminencia de la guerra”).¹⁵⁰ On March 25, 1939, it carefully admitted to the imminency of the end without calling it a loss or a defeat, though the use of terms like “desconcierto” and “grave” within the first three sentences followed by an indictment of its own recently-abandoned propaganda mission communicated an unhappy conclusion. It held that the transition should not be viewed as the end of a war but as the beginning of peacetime and criticised previous Republican rhetoric in the process:

Son gentes, y esto es lo grave, que piensan más en el final de la guerra que en el comienzo de la paz. La culpa de esto la tiene la propaganda en su más amplio sentido, que se nos ha estado sirviendo, casi sin excepción, a lo largo de estos años. En sentido

¹⁴⁸ “La División del pueblo español,” *ABC Madrid*, March 26, 1939.

¹⁴⁹ “La División del pueblo español,” *ABC Madrid*, March 26, 1939.

¹⁵⁰ “El Papel de los Republicanos en la Paz,” *ABC Madrid*, March 25, 1939.

tan amplio que incluimos en ella, y muy principalmente, las manifestaciones de los Gobiernos, en especial las del último, y el tono mismo de la vida oficial y oficiosa. Esta propaganda ha sido hasta tal punto irreal, que nos ha pretendido convencer de que no había más que nosotros en España. Los demás eran divisiones italianas que por azar utilizaban para fines secundarios a algunos españoles. Así se hizo creer a la mayoría de la opinión que el único desenlace posible de la guerra era la entrega incondicional del adversario.¹⁵¹

In faulting the official propaganda lines it had been fed over the years, it reprimanded for the first time the Republican Government's comportment regarding wartime news coverage in Spain. It complimented Madrilenians on their sustained loyalty, courage, and heroism, but also encouraged them to embrace the prospect of unification at the hands of the Nationalists. In this way, the newspaper renounced the previously established frames depicting events as a fateful collision of the forces of good and evil. The binaries of native versus foreigner, democracy versus fascism, light versus darkness, truth versus lies, and man versus monster disappeared from coverage to be replaced by a lone overarching theme of a temporarily divided Spanish people in need of healing through reunion. By apparently admitting to the fallacy of considering one side to be less Spanish than the other, it rejected earlier framing strategies. In so doing, it portrayed the Spanish Civil War as a violent political disagreement rather than the epic fight to determine the destiny of the free world. This new frame allowed contributors to sidestep discussion of the true meaning of Republican defeat and the painful conditions of their surrender by orientating readers' attention away from the most devastating impacts of Republican failure. Instead, it emphasised the image of a forthcoming peace. The end no longer signified catastrophe or the death of democratic Spain, but represented the restoration of the Spanish people and the country they inhabited. Newly interpreted as the reparation of a jointly damaged community as opposed to a hostile foreign takeover, it denied that the enemy was comprised only of meddlesome outsiders and Fascist mercenaries.

ABC Madrid subsequently shifted tactics to reprioritise the survival of a nation over the continuance of a regime and urged Spaniards not to lose sight of what mattered most: the endurance of "el pueblo español".¹⁵² It criticised Republican rhetoric whose "monótonos escribillos" regarding the ominous date of July 18, 1936 had acted like defeat spelled the end of the world. Despite earlier narratives which put forth the notion that the military insurrection marked a tragic and remarkable phase of Spanish history, even encompassing the entirety of Spanish experience, it argued it had not in fact sealed the fate of Spain or spelled the end of

¹⁵¹ "El Papel de los Republicanos en la Paz," *ABC Madrid*, March 25, 1939.

¹⁵² "El Papel de los Republicanos en la Paz," *ABC Madrid*, March 25, 1939.

their nationhood: “Pero el mundo seguirá a pesar de ello, y también España; y, desde luego, el pueblo español.”¹⁵³ Repeated twice, “el pueblo español” came to be redefined as the millions of Spaniards who would not evacuate the country, not just those who served the Republican mission. It is key to note that no mention was made of the known Francoist reprisals against soldiers and other Republicans trapped in the line of duty or the inability of at-risk Spaniards to flee the country. To support spurious claims of harmony, it followed with certain numerical facts, citing a population of 22-24 million people who would remain and continue their lives within the apparatus of a new state. In this way, it acknowledged that an important phase of Spanish life would, along with the dissolution of the Republican Zone, disappear but tried to assuage readers’ anxieties by saying that the Nationalist Zone would also be altered: “Se va a liquidar una fase de la vida española, la que comenzó el 18 de julio del 36; y más especialmente la de nuestra zona, aunque también la de la otra, en buena parte.”¹⁵⁴ In so doing, it distinguished between the start of the war and the start of the Republic to refocus readers’ attention on the end of a period of war rather than of the whole of the Second Republic first established in 1931: “El pueblo español, formado por veintidós o veinticuatro millones de hombres, no se va a marchar de España, no va a evacuar, y continuará su vida profunda, creando los regímenes y las formas de Gobierno de España, cosas secundarias respecto a él.”¹⁵⁵ The newspaper’s conception of Spaniards was thereby expanded to include those previously held to be Fascist non-citizens and not only the loyal Republicans who defended the motherland. Consequently, *ABC* Madrid forced matters of politics and ideology into the background to identify both their Republican readers and their traditional antagonists as inherently Spanish and fundamental to the unity of Spain, effectively doubling the country’s population heretofore represented.

The next day’s editorial, titled “La división del pueblo español,” on March 26, 1939 continued its message of framing Spanish reunification—even if not under a Republican banner—as a natural, positive, and urgently needed occurrence. The split in summer of 1936 (no longer referred to as the military’s iniquitous attack on democracy) had brought pain and deformity to a people always meant to be whole:

La mayoría de las gentes se fijan más en la sobrehaz aparente de las cosas que en su fondo; conceden más importancia al nombre del Estado o al regimen político imperante que a ese hecho sencillísimo de que España, parida en dos mitades desde el verano de 1936, estará luego nuevamente junta y una.¹⁵⁶

¹⁵³ “El Papel de los Republicanos en la Paz,” *ABC Madrid*, March 25, 1939.

¹⁵⁴ “El Papel de los Republicanos en la Paz,” *ABC Madrid*, March 25, 1939.

¹⁵⁵ “El Papel de los Republicanos en la Paz,” *ABC Madrid*, March 25, 1939.

¹⁵⁶ “La División del pueblo español,” *ABC Madrid*, March 26, 1939.

Subsequently, reunification was not portrayed in terms of a Republican defeat but reframed as the termination of a frightful “anormalidad” in Spanish history. It omitted all mention of Franco or ensuing reprisals and highlighted the mending of territorial hostilities. Descriptions turned literary and emphatic. Salamanca would return to being just a couple hours’ journey from Madrid, Pamplona and Cartagena would regain access, and the Galician rivers would finally lose the “aire fantasmal” they had acquired deep behind enemy lines.¹⁵⁷

Political differences were deemed “fenómenos superficiales y sin última gravedad” so that the unity of the nation superseded the allegedly menial conflicts of government and civic identity.¹⁵⁸ The newspaper drew upon the painful experiences of readers, especially those stemming from the separation from loved ones and the breakup of families by the arbitrary divisions of war, most likely to invoke emotions of acceptance and relief regarding the end. Gone were the days proclaiming a single loyal Republican could reconquer Spain and that every inch of Republican soil had to be protected at all cost. In the final hours of the Republic in a collapsing city, messaging transitioned to themes of peace and reconciliation. News-framing was altered to communicate the need for Spain’s complete reunification, no matter the victor, because every corner of every province was vital to the basic health and functioning of the country, from the fields of Andalusia to the mountain passes of the Basque Country. The divisions of war had hindered trade, travel, and economic activity, resulting in shortages of milk, fish, coal, and other important resources. *ABC Madrid* thereby transformed the Spanish Civil War from the battle for enlightenment into a meaningful lesson regarding the failings and perils of national separation. The tragedy of Spain’s fragmentation eclipsed that of Republican collapse, making Spanish reunification all the more critical: “No se puede separar impunemente lo que no puede estar sino reunido. Media España es, con cualquier regimen, una cosa absurda, sin sentido, llena de faltas y sobras, inhabitable, en suma.”¹⁵⁹ In characterising the two half-Spains, regardless of their respective leadership, as absurd, uninhabitable, and illogical, the newspaper unconvincingly presented the long-feared fall of Madrid as the initiation of a process of healing, reunion, and harmony after nearly three years of war.

¹⁵⁷ With the exception of Cartagena, which remained Republican until February of 1939, the areas referenced by the newspaper were among those most securely held by the Nationalists. Salamanca became Franco’s centre of operations in July of 1936 and the state of Galicia fell within days. Meanwhile, General Mola, who was stationed in Pamplona at the time of the insurrection (and one of its leaders), took the city from the outset of the conflict. See Paul Preston, *A Concise History of the Spanish Civil War* (London: William Collins, 1996), 194, 88, 89, 98, 107, 263. Ebook.

¹⁵⁸ “La División del pueblo español,” *ABC Madrid*, March 26, 1939.

¹⁵⁹ “La División del pueblo español,” *ABC Madrid*, March 26, 1939.

Spain was thus likened to a family unit whose strength and well-being could only be achieved through structural unity and cooperation. It pushed the positives of reconciliation, especially the fixing of their economic woes and the end to provision shortages caused by a blunderous war. It emphasised that while Spain could change abruptly from one regime to another (“se podrá pasar bruscamente de un régimen a otro”), it could not divide the Spanish people without provoking the breakdown of their shared nation:

No olvidemos la lección tan duramente aprendida. La experiencia de esta guerra nos debería enseñar de una vez para siempre a respetar las exigencias de las cosas. Sea España, o Europa, o un núcleo profesional, o una familia, no pretendamos nunca destruir su estructura propia y saltar por encima de sus leyes.¹⁶⁰

The construction of national identity as a familial network served to frame reunification as the natural ending to an abnormal rupture. It therefore detracted from the original Republican rhetoric of preserving democracy and building a new and egalitarian society for all citizens to distract from the horrors of defeat. By refocusing readers’ attention away from the aims and objectives of the war, as well as its primary causes, it promoted the benefits of an upcoming resolution and ignored discussion of the grimmer consequences. It glossed over the fears and challenges of the painful surrender about to take place and effectively retired its mission. Though the tone remained solemn, it promoted acceptance of the triumphant Francoist regime. This would be *ABC Madrid*’s final week to publish as a Republican newspaper dedicated “al servicio de la democracia.”

Both articles contained notes of encouragement, but also of compliance and surrender, feeding a discourse drastically different from that promoted during the rest of the war. *ABC Madrid* apparently hoped to comfort its audience somewhat with the assertion that survival was possible. It argued that though it may seem as if the world was coming to an end, the Republican fight had not been in vain for their fortitude had enriched the Spanish character and identity. Such contradictions, however, ultimately betrayed the magnitude of Republican collapse. In feebly concluding that the Republican experience had been of value in the midst of constructing a distinctly un-Republican imagined community, it destroyed all pretences of the allegedly democratic legacy it had so often boasted. The last Republican editorials of the war instead framed a nation which transcended politics, thus rendering the Republican and Nationalist Zones but artificial divisions of a people bonded by deeper roots of blood and history.

¹⁶⁰ “La División del pueblo español,” *ABC Madrid*, March 26, 1939.

The End of the End

Madrid fell within the week. On March 29, 1939, *ABC* was already publishing once more under its old direction, reuniting with its Sevillian headquarters, and proclaiming the end of the war.¹⁶¹ It celebrated the liberation of Spain and its capital from the Red Terror as Falangist cries of “¡Arriba España!” and “¡Viva Franco!” echoed through the streets. Manuel Sánchez del Arco, the wartime editor-in-chief of *ABC* Seville, excitedly declared that Madrid had finally become Spanish again after years of Russian occupation: “¡Madrid ha vuelto a ser de España!” *ABC*, now restored to its original leadership under Luca de Tena’s patronage, appeared to transition seamlessly from one regime to another to propagate the Nationalist narrative of the Soviet invasion of a corrupted Republic that had necessitated military intervention. The newspaper, much like the country it glorified, was no longer cleft in two.

When war first broke out in July of 1936, Nationalist leaders had hoped to take the capital easily, but were swiftly driven back by a fierce and unexpectedly effective local resistance. The next three years would prove the tenacity of Madrilenians as they battled historic losses and enemy attacks, refusing to give up even as they reached an unhappy end. Newspapers had to drum up faith in a victory that looked increasingly unlikely while also trying to survive amid internal antagonisms and fissures caused by rival parties and ideologies. It is well known that propaganda is an integral feature of modern societies as the quest to shape public opinion becomes paramount in the exercise of power.¹⁶² Because propaganda can be found in all forms of communication, rhetorical framing becomes a valuable means of detecting its primary structures and strategies. Much like the original papal bull from which the term derives, *ABC* Madrid exhibited a strongly “exhortative, missionary rhetoric” to expand its community and administer to the faithful.¹⁶³ As Kuypers observed, rhetoric functions on the personal and public levels, requires information-sharing, and involves “both active and passive attempts at persuasion.”¹⁶⁴ Especially in wartime, during which circumstances are subject to sudden change, this process includes appeals to strengthen citizen morale amidst events of loss, destruction, and tragedy. Appeals utilised dramatic and stylistic language to evoke powerful

¹⁶¹ *ABC*, March 29, 1939.

¹⁶² Johnathan Auerbach and Russ Castronovo, “Introduction: Thirteen Propositions About Propaganda,” in *The Oxford Handbook of Propaganda*, Ed. Jonathan Auerbach and Russ Castronovo (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013), 1-15.

¹⁶³ Maria Teresa Prendergast and Thomas A. Prendergast, “The Invention of Propaganda: A Critical Commentary on and Translation of *Inscrutabili Divinae Providentiae Arcano*,” in *The Oxford Handbook of Propaganda Studies*, ed. Johnathan Auerbach and Russ Castronovo (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013), 24.

¹⁶⁴ Jim A. Kuypers, “Framing Analysis from a Rhetorical Perspective,” *Doing News Framing Analysis: Empirical and Theoretical Perspectives*, Ed. Paul D’Angelo and Jim A. Kuypers (New York: Routledge, 2010), 289.

emotions and motivate readers. Fear and hatred served to target a common enemy and stir collective resistance, while love and pride were meant to unify a nation and consolidate Republican identity. This juxtaposition of five editorials from the beginning and end of the Spanish Civil War in Madrid traces the development of Republican messaging strategies as objectives shifted in wartime Spain and, more significantly, reveals the ideological transitions of news coverage in a city besieged for a prolonged period.

Both sides contended that the majority of Madrilenians had remained loyal to them throughout the conflict.¹⁶⁵ Even in its final days, *ABC Madrid* continued to compliment locals on their bravery and valour, factors it held responsible for their endurance against the odds. On March 25, 1939, it claimed that the conviction of its citizens set the Spanish Civil War apart, as in other wars participants generally lacked such strong political affiliations.¹⁶⁶ On March 28, just one day before Francoist forces took control of the city, *ABC Madrid* praised the composure of a determined Republican populace, affirming that despite the enemy's advances, "Los madrileños dieron nueva prueba de su cordura manteniéndose en la actitud que tan alto viene poniendo su ciudadanía desde el glorioso 7 de noviembre."¹⁶⁷ The harkening back to the successes of the November 7, 1936 defence reminded readers of their finest hour in the war, but also provided a stark contrast with previous coverage encouraging them to fight to the death. Framing shifted from a national imaginary built upon themes of greatness, resilience, and resistance in the name of justice and democracy against tyranny to themes of reconciliation and cohabitation with the enemy, thereby reflecting a devolution in Republican ideology as the war progressed.

As demonstrated by analysis of framing strategies in *ABC Madrid*, Republican reporting devolved over the course of the war. It steadily transitioned from motivational rhetoric intended to battle an existential danger to cultivating irrational faith in unattainable victory, and eventually culminated in delusions of amicable reconciliation when officials could no longer deny defeat. In the beginning, it articulated a clear and rational ideology of defending the Spanish people from oppression and dictatorship. It held that because the military rebellion was a direct attack on a democratically-elected government, the rebels had proven they opposed

¹⁶⁵ Manuel Sánchez del Arco wrote: "En Madrid tuvimos siempre una absoluta mayoría española; hoy lo compruebo." See Manuel Sánchez del Arco, "Al llegar a Madrid," *ABC*, March 29, 1939; Meanwhile, just days before on March 25, 1939, *ABC Madrid* had stated: "Se trata del modo como esperan la paz muchas personas que están limpias de todo delito y, por otra parte, son de escaso o nulo relieve político, pero, en la guerra actual, han estado del lado de los Gobiernos republicanos." See "El Papel de los Republicanos en la Paz," *ABC Madrid*, March 25, 1939.

¹⁶⁶ "El Papel de los Republicanos en la Paz," *ABC Madrid*, March 25, 1939.

¹⁶⁷ "El día de ayer en Madrid," *ABC Madrid*, March 28, 1939.

the national will, and consequently Spain's sovereignty, and were traitors. These changes in reporting corresponded with the decline in Republican fortunes as the Nationalist threat prevailed, pushing the newspaper to promote the concept of salvation through blind loyalty and conviction, a message not dissimilar to that of the enemy. According to Krauel, extreme nationalism necessitates extreme pride and "Less ambivalent and less tolerant of heterogeneity than the patriot's love of country, the nationalist's love of country promotes unconditional loyalty and blind attachment, leaving no space for a generous and charitable love."¹⁶⁸ By March, 1939, Republican ideology had disappeared altogether to embrace reunification without confessing to the violent and terrifying reprisals the administration knew were about to take place. In this way, the newspaper altered themes to frame the Spanish Civil War as a war ending in peace rather than total defeat and unending brutality.

Madrid was the final Republican capital to succumb to Nationalist control. Its capitulation terminated the bitter war instigated by the military rebellion of July 18, 1936, and killed all hopes of Republican survival. Unlike the conquest of Barcelona and Valencia in the previous months, when propaganda could still claim a delayed victory by the spiritual capital of the nation, the loss of Madrid signified the undeniable death of the Second Spanish Republic. Though the new Republican administration continued to propagate lies of negotiating a peace deal with the enemy, the leaders of the coup had already fled the country (only Besteiro bravely remained),¹⁶⁹ and *ABC* Madrid was finally forced to acknowledge the end of an era and the end of an ideal. The turn of events naturally sparked the collapse of Republican rhetoric. Despite requests for citizens to remain calm and stick to their posts to prevent chaos and preserve Republican dignity, the newspaper essentially admitted to defeat. Earlier it had promoted faith and conviction at all costs as the key to victory, much in the same way Christianity held that suffering for faith in Christ was the key to enter paradise, but now it abandoned this message by minimising the importance of the Republican legacy. It held what mattered most was not the victory of the Second Spanish Republic but the fundamental unity of an unbreakable people. Additionally, it explicitly reversed coverage from a global fight for liberalism and progressivism to futile differences of opinion restricted to Spain. This newer conception of a nation which transcended politics betrayed the end of the Republican national imaginary of a people held together by free individual expression of common ideals, virtues, and aspirations.

¹⁶⁸ Javier Krauel, *Imperial Emotions: Cultural Responses to Myths of Empire in Fin-de-Siècle Spain* (Liverpool: Liverpool University Press, 2013), 180.

¹⁶⁹ "“Dos conductas ante la historia,”” *ABC Madrid*, March 28, 1936; Fernando Vázquez Ocaña, *Pasión y Muerte de la Segunda República española* [1940] (Madrid: Cátedra del Exilio, 2007), 123-124.

From July 18, 1936 through March 5, 1939, when the Casado Coup took place, *ABC Madrid* asserted that Spaniards needed to unite to vanquish a common enemy. Furthermore, the fate of the world depended on it. Yet barely three weeks after the coup, it declared the exact opposite, arguing that the war was caused by a pre-existing division among Spaniards which had erupted into a devastating struggle and imposed false borders, disfiguring the nation in the process. In so doing, it effectively admitted for the first time that not all “true” Spaniards supported the Republican cause and deflected blame from the foreign legions fighting alongside the Nationalist forces in far greater numbers than their Soviet allies or the International Brigades had ever done. The newspaper’s greatest deception, however, lay in the omission of reprisals known to have occurred in every other city taken by Franco, whose methods were vengeful, cruel, and swift.

The Francoist regime would spend the next three decades purging Spain of perceived Republican influences, groups, and institutions. Known in the early years as the White Terror, they believed that the nation, overrun as it was by godless degenerates, needed to be purified of evil to restore order. Their long list of enemies included the Communists, Anarchists, Republicans, leftists, Jews, Freemasons, gypsies, and homosexuals, among others. Even those with only minor affiliations were removed from their positions and punished. Thousands were executed and thousands more forcibly disappeared, disposed of in mass graves or secret detention centres. Political prisoners numbered in the tens of thousands. Contrary to *ABC Madrid*’s assertion on March 26 that the end of the war would restore supply lines along with the transport of food and other provisions, the end would actually mark the worsening of famine, remembered in Spain as “los años de hambre.”¹⁷⁰ The precise numbers remain unknown, but the victims of starvation, malnutrition, and related illnesses may count as high as 200,000.¹⁷¹

In the case of *ABC Madrid* during the Spanish Civil War, news framing appeals relied on literary tropes and Christian themes of death and resurrection, sacrifice and salvation to mobilise the cogent and energetic defense of a beleaguered city central to Republican survival. In framing the conflict in Christian imagery, the newspaper drew on Spain’s Catholic roots and provided terrifying accounts of National suppression in the occupied zone. While the cultural makeup of Spaniards was more diverse, their religious background was profoundly uniform.

¹⁷⁰ “La División del pueblo español,” *ABC Madrid*, March 26, 1939.

¹⁷¹ Javier Arroyo, “El hambre fue hambruna, no hubo pertinaz sequía: cómo el franquismo manipuló la historia,” *El País*, January 4, 2022; Miguel Ángel Almodóvar and Almodóvar Martín Almodóvar, *El Hambre en España* (Madrid: Oberon, 2003).

Since the fifteenth century, Catholicism had remained the dominant church authority and Christian faith lay at the heart of national and imperial identities in the Iberian peninsula. As demonstrated by the work of Vázquez Ocaña, journalists were keenly aware of this fact. He claimed that not even Republicans or other secular members were ever entirely dissociated from their faith, but rather rejected its leaders' abetment of the rich.¹⁷² Newspapers communicated events through familiar biblical analogies and metaphors to simplify a complex war impacting national and international affairs and thereby establish clear heroes, enemies, and objectives. As the situation deteriorated, however, the Republican imaginary of a unified Spanish nation opposed to an outside enemy disintegrated to the point of complete reversal. Frames shifted from the portrayal of an epic battle between good and evil to a new message of reunification with the convenient omission of international interference and critical ideological differences dividing the population. Though the newspaper eventually conceded, albeit indirectly, to Republican defeat, it never honestly addressed the scope of governmental and ideological failure or the devastating consequences of their collapse. Indeed, their last-ditch effort to refocus messaging on bridging political hostilities and misrepresenting the nature of post-war relations belied the darker side of a Republican regime incapable of protecting its citizens from the horrors of Nationalist retribution.

¹⁷² Fernando Vázquez Ocaña, *Pasión y Muerte de la Segunda República Española* [1940] (Madrid: Cátedra del Exilio, 2007), 69.

Chapter 2: A Republican Capital in Crisis: Spanish Civil War Coverage in Valencia's *El Pueblo* (1936-1939)

Background

El Pueblo: el diario republicano, the Valencian-based newspaper founded by Vicente Blasco Ibáñez in 1894, sustained a life-long mission of advocating for Republican ideals with the stated aim of providing a space to fight injustice.¹⁷³ Though it began as a largely cultural endeavour to educate the Spanish professional and working classes—publishing scientific treatises, political exposés, fiery editorials, and literary excerpts (including original works by its founding author)—it eventually evolved into a standard daily periodical dedicated to news coverage and leftist political commentary.¹⁷⁴ In April 1931, under the leadership of his son, Sigfrido Blasco Ibáñez, it celebrated the advent of the Second Spanish Republic, publicising the moment as “el franco triunfo” and “la hora de justicia” of a nation liberated from the shackles of tradition “en una aurora de redención.”¹⁷⁵ It denied “el mito comunista” propagated by enemies, rejected rumours of red influences, and insisted that the new Spanish Republic sought to build a democracy separate from the Communist agenda.¹⁷⁶ Following the outbreak of the Spanish Civil War in five years’ time, however, *El Pueblo* would become the mouthpiece of competing Communist and anarcho-syndicalist factions, interpreting the war for readers according to a perspective somewhat removed from that of its founder.¹⁷⁷

Within weeks of the military uprising launched in July 1936, *El Pueblo*, initially connected to the Partido Unión Republicana Autonomista (PURA), was seized by authorities and handed over to the Unión Republicana Nacional led by Valencian writer and activist, José Aznar Pellicer: “Unión Republicana Nacional ha incautado de EL PUEBLO, provisionalmente, por acuerdo del Comité Ejecutivo Popular.”¹⁷⁸ One year later, the newspaper was seized again, this time by Ángel Pestaña’s Partido Sindicalista, whose journalism was dedicated to “hegemonía obrera y pureza sindical.”¹⁷⁹ Remarkably, despite the changes in party affiliation and leadership, the coverage of *El Pueblo* remained relatively stable with no major alterations in style or message following its initial seizure, most likely due to the strict print regulations

¹⁷³ “Noticias,” *El Pueblo*, November 12, 1894.

¹⁷⁴ Antonio Laguna Platero, *El Pueblo: Historia de un diario republicano, 1894-1939* (Valencia: Institució Alfons el Mangnànim, 1999), 53-69.

¹⁷⁵ “¡Viva la República Española!” *El Pueblo*, April 14, 1931.

¹⁷⁶ “El mito comunista,” *El Pueblo*, April 14, 1931.

¹⁷⁷ Antonio Laguna Platero, *El Pueblo: Historia de un diario republicano, 1894-1939* (Valencia: Institució Alfons el Mangnànim, 1999), 331-333, 383-385.

¹⁷⁸ “Saludo,” *El Pueblo*, August 12, 1936.

¹⁷⁹ Arturo Mori, *La Prensa Española de Nuestro Tiempo* (México: Ediciones Mensaje, 1943), 200.

applied by the ministry of defence. As multiple scholars have noted, censorship of the press in Spain pre-dated the war and was embraced by Republican administrations from its beginnings in 1931 with some claiming their efforts may have even surpassed those of their predecessors.¹⁸⁰ Within days of the military coup, however, restrictions became so repressive that the entire media landscape was destroyed, resulting in the installation of “una dinàmica comunicativa perversa sustentada en l’hegemonia de la propaganda i la tutela de la censura,” a system merely cemented (not invented) by Franco’s dictatorship in the years to come.¹⁸¹

El Pueblo had a long history of preaching in the name of Republicanism and liberalism more generally. Vicente Blasco Ibáñez had conceived of it as a political newspaper to influence Spanish society through informing readers. He believed that education would naturally produce Republican voters and thereby enact profound liberal change, or as Jesus Timoteo Álvarez summarised the writer’s agenda: “lectura > cultura > libertad > república.”¹⁸² Thus convinced of the transformative power of the press, Blasco Ibáñez saw *El Pueblo* as a tool for national salvation through literary instruction. The Second Republic, however, though founded by journalists of diverse political persuasions, passed increasingly restrictive press regulations amounting to severe censorship throughout its tenure, a trend accelerated by the war.¹⁸³ They justified harsh legislation with the assertion that it was necessary to clamp down on free speech to enable the survival of the Republic. Only when the national interest in the form of democratic success was secured could sovereignty be restored to the Spanish press.¹⁸⁴ The fact these ideas were so readily embraced by the young Republic would probably have enraged Blasco Ibáñez who had railed against censorship throughout his career at great personal cost, once referring to Spain as a country silenced by anti-democratic authorities, or “una nación secuestrada”: “España es una nación que vive secuestrada. No puede hablar porque su boca está oprimida por la mordaza de la censura.”¹⁸⁵ Among his hopes for a Republican government was the guarantee of a free liberal press to promote liberal reforms and protect civil liberties.

¹⁸⁰ Carmen Martínez Pineda, *Libertad Secuestrada: La censura de prensa en la Segunda República* (Málaga: Última línea, S. L., 2018), 17-20.

¹⁸¹ Enric Bordería Ortiz, “Premsa, propaganda i vida quotidiana a València (1936-37),” in *València, Capital de la República: El Mon Mira a València, Capital de l’Antifeixisme*, Ed. Javier Navarro Navarro and Sergio Valero Gómez (Valencia: Ajutament de València, 2016), 255.

¹⁸² Jesús Timoteo Álvarez, “Prólogo,” in *El Pueblo: Historia de un diario republicano, 1894-1939* by Antonio Laguna Platero (Valencia: Institució Alfons el Magnànim, 1999), 15.

¹⁸³ Carmen Martínez Pineda, *Libertad Secuestrada: La censura de prensa en la Segunda República* (Málaga: Última línea, S. L., 2018), 20-24.

¹⁸⁴ Carmen Martínez Pineda, *Libertad Secuestrada: La censura de prensa en la Segunda República* (Málaga: Última línea, S. L., 2018), 40.

¹⁸⁵ Vicente Blasco Ibáñez, *Por España y contra el rey* [1925] (Madrid: Biblioteca Nacional de España, 2018), 4-11.

Passed from writer to son and seized on multiple occasions, the newspaper went through various phases. By the start of the war and under the direction of such influential names (and former critics) as Fernando Valera, Ángel Pestaña, and José Aznar Pellicer, *El Pueblo* actively promoted a sense of political religiosity aimed at maintaining faith in the Revolution in the face of mounting obstacles and defeats. Consequently, while critical of Catholicism for its purported irrationalism and dishonesty, Communist and anarcho-sindicalist factions similarly cultivated agendas divorced from fact or logic as a means of resistance. *El Pueblo* had never been subtle or compromising in its written attacks on the Catholic Church, regularly expressing disdain for the clergy, their conservatism, and their allegedly pernicious influences. Indeed, the newspaper had always been vocal in its opposition to religious authorities. Blasco Ibáñez himself was imprisoned on multiple occasions and forced to pay heavy penalties during his tenure as director for criticising the nation's anti-Republican institutions, primarily the Church, the monarchy, and *caciquismo*. *El Pueblo* continued to celebrate the author's legacy after his death, boasting a history of protest it claimed set it apart from rivals (a fact which later allowed it to survive the darkest moments of Republican material shortages).¹⁸⁶ The transition to democracy in 1931 led it to declare proudly: "Somos y seremos siempre de izquierdas, anticlericales y netamente republicanos," thus upholding its historical antagonism.¹⁸⁷ Moreover, the Republican shift in Spanish politics contributed to a surge in the paper's popularity.¹⁸⁸

In line with Republican interpretation, *El Pueblo* classified the Spanish Civil War as a war for independence. However, unlike *La Vanguardia* and *ABC Madrid*, *El Pueblo*'s contributors candidly emphasised independence as something that superseded nationhood entirely, that is, as constituting the liberation of the oppressed workers. The core of the conflict, according to the newspaper, lay in the worldwide abuse of labourers. Indeed, at one point *El Pueblo* went so far as to define fascism as "el último baluarte del capitalismo internacional," thereby articulating a radical revolutionary agenda that championed the cause of the masses.¹⁸⁹

¹⁸⁶ Antonio Laguna Platero, *El Pueblo: Historia de un diario republicano, 1894-1939* (Valencia: Institució Alfons el Mangnànim, 1999).

¹⁸⁷ *El Pueblo*, June 25, 1931.

¹⁸⁸ Sigfrido Blasco Ibáñez was elected secretary of PURA and used it to disseminate Republican reforms and garner personal influence. Under his leadership, it attacked rivals as well as competitors, at one point going so far as to argue that anyone who was anti-*El Pueblo* was also anti-Republican. Though at one point the most dominant party in Valencia, PURA declined throughout 1934 and S. Blasco Ibáñez eventually became embroiled in a scandal related to Alejandro Lerroux, effectively ending his political career in disgrace. He eventually sought refuge in France. See Arturo Mori, *La Prensa Española Durante La Segunda República* [1943] (Seville: Editorial Renacimiento, 2019), 223; Antonio Laguna Platero, *El Pueblo: Historia de un diario republicano, 1894-1939* (Valencia: Institució Alfons el Mangnànim, 1999).

¹⁸⁹ "No habrá guerra," *El Pueblo*, February 22, 1939.

Deemed the greatest enemy of a future workers' utopia, the label "el capitalismo internacional" designated more than a financial order. To be called a capitalist in wartime Republican Spain was a venomous accusation as international capitalism became a term used to implicate a group or individual in a nefarious global conspiracy. Capitalism, according to *El Pueblo* and its followers, was the economic and political mask used to benefit the world's most privileged classes. Comprised of bankers, landowners, aristocrats, business executives, and other elites, its members undermined the decency of the commoner and entrapped workers within a ruinous system designed to keep them powerless. Because capitalist interests appeared to stand in the way of most radical reforms under the Second Spanish Republic, fascism was viewed as but the most recent extension of the capitalist agenda built to maintain the status quo, prompting Socialists like Fernando Valera to declare that "la guerra y la revolución son una misma cosa."¹⁹⁰ Its belief in a plot hatched by the world's rich and powerful made some aspects of *El Pueblo's* coverage similar to that of the Francoist zone, which also propped up notions of an international conspiracy.¹⁹¹ Though *El Pueblo* differentiated its culprits from those of its adversaries, the portrayal of an unholy communion of corrupt citizens in the service of foreign interests bolstered strategies to frame a pure Spain positioned against foreign tyranny and manipulation. This is not to say that *La Vanguardia* or *ABC* Madrid did not also push messages of class liberation and social equality in the same period, but that *El Pueblo* was more explicit in redefining Spanish independence as the freedom of the working classes from the Capitalist system bent on exploiting them. In so doing, it minimised competing national identities in Spain even as it supported Basque, Catalan, and Valencian autonomy statutes.

Republicans and Francoists alike connected the events of 1936 to the war against Napoleon in 1808 and the Reconquista victory of 1492.¹⁹² Both camps revised historical narratives to inspire national action, and were similarly comprised of emotional and strategic dimensions. The former stirred up sentimental attachments to the collective past which the latter manipulated to forge an alternative national identity. I argue that this dual-dimension is foundational to the rhetoric of crafting a national imaginary which seeks to impose a collective identity on a group. Readings of Spanish history have remained mired in controversy for centuries, especially in debates on nationalism, modernisation, and economic progress. I build

¹⁹⁰ Fernando Valera, *Una Voz Republicana: desde mi trinchera civil, 1936-37* (Valencia: Ediciones Republicanas, 1938), 131.

¹⁹¹ "La patriótica alocución del General Franco al iniciar el movimiento," *ABC Sevilla*, July 23, 1936; Manuel Sánchez del Arco, "Madrid ya no es España," *ABC Sevilla*, November 20, 1936; Paul Preston, *The Spanish Civil War: Reaction, Revolution and Revenge* (London: William Collins, 2016), 98-99.

¹⁹² Xosé M. Núñez Seixas, *Suspiros de España: El Nacionalismo Español, 1808-2018* (Barcelona: Crítica, 2018), 1808-2018, 35.

upon Krauel's statement that "the past has not been a source of consensus in the Iberian Peninsula, but rather the stage for a number of internal antagonisms that have been continually summoned, invoked, and recalled."¹⁹³ *El Pueblo's* wartime news coverage demonstrated this ambivalence in its efforts to formulate a new and undivided national identity for Spain (apparently, in the hopes of securing a radical and egalitarian future) for all Spaniards regardless of their regional or cultural origin. This meant the repression of separatist movements and the consolidation of peripheral nationalisms into a cooperative workers' state despite conflicting definitions of pluriculturalism. The topic of federalism remains a topic of considerable controversy in Spain, and it was especially contentious in the administrations of the Second Spanish Republic.¹⁹⁴ It should be noted that for the purpose of this chapter I refer to Spanish pluriculturalism as the recognition of Castilian, Basque, Catalan, Valencian, and Galician identities within Spain.

A topic of intensive debate in the short life-span of the Spanish Republic, the extent to which the central government should recognise diverging cultural identities was never one of agreement.¹⁹⁵ Republicans, Socialists, Anarchists, and Communists fell into multiple groups and sub-groups even within their own organisations, some of which were region-specific. PURA, the political party originally sponsored by *El Pueblo*, for example, began as an offshoot of Unión Republicana led by controversial populist Alejandro Lerroux.¹⁹⁶ To counter the anti-autonomy agendas of its Madrid-based cohort, PURA advertised a Republican programme targeted at Valencia, framing a pro-Valencian campaign and advancing the case for the regional autonomy it declared "precisa y obligatoria."¹⁹⁷ It initially supported only legal and governmental distinctions while opposing the protection of cultural institutions, though it eventually came around to promoting Valencian language and education. Scholars have pointed out that the relationship between the state and minority groups is inherently imbalanced as government leaders fear loss of power through recognition of the Other and resulting decentralisation of the national unit.¹⁹⁸ As central Castile came to dominate Spain over a long

¹⁹³ Javier Krauel, *Imperial Emotions: Cultural Responses to Myths of Empire in Fin-de-Siècle Spain* (Liverpool: Liverpool University Press, 2013), 3.

¹⁹⁴ Miquel Caminal, *El federalismo pluralista: del federalismo nacional al federalismo plurinacional* (Barcelona: Paidós, 2002); Gemma Sala, "Federalism without Adjectives in Spain," *Publius* 44, no. 1 (2014): 109, 113.

¹⁹⁵ Arturo Mori, *Crónica de las cortes constituyentes de la segunda república Española, II* (Madrid: M. Aguilar, 1932), 98-100.

¹⁹⁶ Antonio Laguna Platero, *El Pueblo: Historia de un diario republicano, 1894-1939* (Valencia: Institució Alfons el Magnànim, 1999), 335, 353, 364.

¹⁹⁷ "El director de EL PUEBLO habla desde 'Heraldo de Madrid', de la autonomía valenciana," *El Pueblo*, November 8, 1932.

¹⁹⁸ Will Kymlicka, *Politics in the Vernacular: Nationalism, Multiculturalism, and Citizenship* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001), 2-3.

and difficult process of restricting peripheral claims to autonomy, culminating in its rise during the Spanish Golden Age, many politicians opposed any kind of reversal that would reinstate previous entitlements. Regional privileges had mostly stalled in federal legislatures as officials failed to agree on proposed statutes.¹⁹⁹ However, the outbreak of the Spanish Civil War prompted loyalist officials to minimise existing resistance to the establishment of autonomous communities in the endeavour to secure citizen support and defeat military insurgents.²⁰⁰ Republican news media in Valencia subsequently cultivated a renewed pluriculturalist discourse within a larger federal framework which advocated for the recognition of Spain's pluralist nature.

Methods

This chapter analyses the news frames embedded in *El Pueblo*'s war-time coverage, accounts for the socio-political contexts that surrounded them, and thereby contributes a fresh and nuanced perspective of Republican propaganda (criticised for its misleading and manipulative tone) produced in Valencia, Spain in the years 1936 through 1939. Following Jim A. Kuypers conception of news frames as the collection and repetition of themes and images within news discourse, I examine six editorials intended as interpretive lenses for readers that, to my mind, are most representative of Republican rhetorical strategies.²⁰¹ I chose articles published in *El Pueblo* at important political and military phases in the war: the early advances of the Nationalist rebellion (1936), the fall of Toledo (1936), the parliamentary debates for Valencian autonomy (1936), the destruction of Guernica (1937), the Aragon Offensive (1938), and the Siege of Barcelona (1939). I use textual analysis and rhetorical criticism to understand how *El Pueblo* transformed the Spanish Civil War into the conclusive battle between the forces of oppression and the forces of liberation to motivate popular action. In recalling historical narratives of invasion, Republicans hoped to mobilise a strong and cohesive resistance. I discuss how these narratives were packaged for readers in a series of frames intended to simplify complex events for readers and to persuade them toward a Republican-sanctioned

¹⁹⁹ Paul Preston, *The Spanish Civil War: Reaction, Revolution and Revenge* (London: William Collins, 2016), 128.

²⁰⁰ William D. Phillips, Jr., and Carla Rahn Phillips, *A Concise History of Spain*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2016), 334. Second Edition; Xosé M. Núñez Seixas, *Suspiros de España: El Nacionalismo Español, 1808-2018* (Barcelona: Crítica, 2018), 73-76. Kindle Edition.

²⁰¹ Jim A. Kuypers, "Framing Analysis from a Rhetorical Perspective," in *Doing News Framing Analysis: Empirical and Theoretical Perspectives*, Ed. Jim A. Kuypers and Paul D'Angelo (New York: Routledge, 2010), 286-311.

interpretation of the war. Using collective memory tropes to refine an alternate vision of the Spanish national imaginary became central to this effort.

The continuous re-construction of myths of empire in Spain over the centuries, from the early modern conquest of the Americas to the disaster of 1898, reveals that framing contemporary events in terms of a glorious past to be restored (or, conversely, a traumatic past to be remedied) has consistently served as an effective political tool on both sides of the ideological spectrum. Moreover, these historical constructs have the potential to shape nationalist discourse(s) through invoking nostalgia and pride in formerly powerful imperialist nations.²⁰² While Spanish Republican periodicals of the 1930s rejected colonialism and the abuses of a centralised Spanish empire, they formulated a response to the opposing Nationalist narrative which presented the conflict as the defence of Christian Civilisation and the heroic resurrection of Old Spain.²⁰³ As Spain's leftist base continued to fracture over the course of the war, the quest to unite Valencia—for a time the presiding capital of the Republic—against a common enemy (in this case, a foreign invader) became paramount. Periodicals, therefore, in the challenging campaign to sustain popular support for a young and unstable democracy and win over international opinion in the process, attempted to forge a unified Spanish identity that reconciled struggles of class, nationalism, and pluriculturalism. In this way, *El Pueblo* used cultural memory to connect present events to epic moments in the history of the Iberian peninsula. This process involved framing themes of invasion, injustice, and oppression in stylised literary language which redefined the foundations of modern Spain for contemporary audiences to emotional affect.

As Kuypers noted: “The power of frames subtly induces us to filter our perceptions of the world in particular ways; they make some aspects of our reality more noticeable than other aspects. In a sense, the *saliency* of some information is increased over others.” Because our attention, as humans, is highly selective by nature, the process generally passes us by undetected.²⁰⁴ *El Pueblo* selectively recalled peninsular history in the campaign to remake Spanish identity and nationhood in Republican Valencia. Paloma Aguilar observed that the collective memory of a country involves a process of selection, whereby certain historical events are revived due to their *perceived* connection to the present, establishing a “kind of

²⁰² Javier Krauel, *Imperial Emotions: Cultural Responses to Myths of Empire in Fin-de-Siècle Spain* (Liverpool: Liverpool University Press, 2013), 1-27.

²⁰³ Xosé M. Núñez Seixas, *Suspiros de España: El Nacionalismo Español, 1808-2018* (Barcelona: Crítica, 2018), 996, 1052-1053. Kindle Edition.

²⁰⁴ Jim A. Kuypers, “Framing Analysis from a Rhetorical Perspective,” in *Doing News Framing Analysis: Empirical and Theoretical Perspectives*, Ed. Jim A. Kuypers and Paul D’Angelo (New York: Routledge, 2010), 300.

mutual influence” between eras. Not only does a society’s understanding of the past shape its present, therefore, but its understanding of the present also shapes its past.²⁰⁵ Sebastiaan Faber, supporting Aguilar, summarised the three elements comprising a community’s historical memory as “the *selection* of events or experiences from the past that are deemed worthy of commemoration; the *representation* of those events or experiences; and the *lessons* the community derives from them.”²⁰⁶ Newspapers, by nature dedicated to the coverage of current affairs, readily employ these elements to explain the surrounding world, in turn revealing those analogies in the collective memory of a group. Liberal and conservative publications will differ in their choice and interpretation of analogies, but both will appeal to those associations considered most salient in public opinion. My analysis does not propose to define a collective Spanish memory as a concrete or uniform entity, but rather to demonstrate how newspapers, especially in wartime, attempt to influence readers’ perceptions through selectively recalling and interpreting historic events, thereby situating an over-complicated present within an over-simplified past.

Because emotion inspires individuals to take action, I hold that it assumes a central role in the production of both news and propaganda (the relationship between the two has been characterised as fluid by propaganda scholars).²⁰⁷ According to Jo Labanyi, “feelings as well as ideas” should be viewed “not as properties of the self, but as produced between the interaction between self and world.” Such interactions, then, are not “the coming together of two separate entities,” but rather “a process of entanglement in which boundaries do not hold.”²⁰⁸ National identities have long been held as “the most powerful and contested foci for social and emotional identification”²⁰⁹ and these are shaped by their nation’s stories. Newspapers play an active role in the articulation of national histories, strategically stoking the national consciousness of readers through the narration of a collective past. Subsequently, this chapter seeks to explore the frames used by news media in a country immediately impacted by violence and the pivotal role of history in the process of constructing and interpreting national imaginaries. As such, it

²⁰⁵ Paloma Aguilar, *Memory and Amnesia: The Role of the Spanish Civil War in the Transition to Democracy* (New York: Berghahn, 2002), 1-24.

²⁰⁶ Sebastiaan Faber, *Memory Battles of the Spanish Civil War: History, Fiction, Photography* (Nashville: Vanderbilt University Press, 2018), 145-147. Kindle Edition.

²⁰⁷ Jonathan Auerbach and Russ Castronovo, “Introduction: Thirteen Propositions about Propaganda,” in *The Oxford Handbook of Propaganda*, Ed. Jonathan Auerbach and Russ Castronovo (Oxford: Oxford University Press), 5.

²⁰⁸ Jo Labanyi, “Doing Things: Emotion, Affect, and Materiality,” *Journal of Spanish Cultural Studies*, vol. 11, no. 3-4 (2010): 223.

²⁰⁹ Geoffrey M. White, “Emotional Remembering: The Pragmatics of National Memory,” *Ethos: Journal of the Society for Psychological Anthropology* (2008): 526.

advances understanding of the Republican press and illuminates key rhetorical strategies involved in the mass-mobilisation campaigns of the Spanish Civil War.

Editorial 1: “Independencia”—August 14, 1936

The right-wing rebellion of July, 1936 gave rise to working class revolutions throughout Spain as the government armed its people in defense of the Republic against what many interpreted as an excuse to re-establish a military dictatorship.²¹⁰ While workers’ groups were quick to secure Republican jurisdiction in the major cities of Madrid, Barcelona, and Valencia, authorities found it difficult to curb extremism as church burnings, indiscriminate detentions, and business seizures (authorised and unauthorised) ensued. The atmosphere in Valencia changed overnight as formerly bourgeois hotels, cafes, and estates became meeting places for revolutionary organisations. These early successes invigorated the region’s citizens, fortifying the city against future attempts.²¹¹ Because the Nationalist forces received near-immediate endorsements from Italian and German administrations upon announcement of the coup, Republicans identified the uprisings as symptomatic of a hostile takeover by foreign powers.

The city’s periodicals thus emphasised morale and working class solidarity above all else in the battle for Spanish sovereignty. Like other Republic-backed publications of the time, *El Pueblo* highlighted the international aspects of the conflict to reject the label civil war. “Independencia,” an editorial penned by J. Aznar Pellicer two days after his party’s seizure of *El Pueblo* in August, 1936, described the war as Spain’s campaign for independence from foreign invaders, linking the military coup to the Napoleonic incursion of the previous century.²¹² As historians have noted, the Spanish War of Independence still occupies a powerful site in the country’s historical memory. Aguilar and Humlebæk have argued that the fact this historical myth was so prominently weaponised by the propaganda of both sides evidences the great rhetorical weight it carried in the Spanish Civil War campaigns aimed at “presenting themselves as the heirs of the Spanish people who had fought against a ‘foreign’ enemy, and thus trying to appropriate the national identity from the opposing side, as always

²¹⁰ Spain experienced a military dictatorship under the leadership of Miguel Primo de Rivera from 1923 to 1930. See “La Protesta Militar contra el gobierno y los políticos,” *ABC*, September 14, 1923; Miguel Primo de Rivera, “Al país y al ejército,” *El Pueblo*, September 14, 1923; “La dimisión del gobierno,” *El Pueblo*, January 29, 1930.

²¹¹ Josep Lluís Barona, “Esplendor de la ciudad en crisis: Valencia, capital cultural durante la Segunda República,” *Pasajes*, (Otoño, 2007): 99-100.

²¹² J. Aznar Pellicer, “Independencia,” *El Pueblo*, August 14, 1936.

happens in civil wars.”²¹³ In advocating their cause, many editorials recalled the Spanish War of Independence of 1808 against France, framing the conflict as one in which the underdog emerged victorious against a superior military.

Aznar’s framing, however, stood out for its characterisation of 1808 as both a victory and a defeat: a victory against French occupation but also a defeat for the resulting restoration of absolutist monarch Fernando VII whom he designated “el peor enemigo” of the Spanish homeland.²¹⁴ He branded Fernando VII and his followers “afrancesados,” or “Frenchified” courtesans, reframing the absolutist tendencies of former monarchs as the product of a bygone era and as characteristically French rather than Spanish. The precise origins of the term remain uncertain, but by the time of the civil war it was wrought with contempt in popular discourse. “Afrancesados” was actually a complex political classification dating back to the mid-eighteenth century which also encompassed pre-Enlightenment Spaniards who either delayed or outright rejected allegiance to the Bourbon monarchy. The reasons for identifying with the *afrancesados* in the War of Independence were many and varied, ranging from aspirations for liberal reforms to fear of anarchy in the resulting power vacuum to avoidance of armed confrontation with the greatest European military of the day. The term initially referred to Spanish ex-patriots in France but became synonymous with collaborators and traitors, specifically Spaniards who sympathised with the French occupation of the Iberian peninsula.²¹⁵ Aznar invoked this older discourse to assert that it was the result of outside, not Spanish, influences, that a cowardly leader had come to betray his own people and advance the abuses of the Napoleonic tenure in Spain.

Because Fernando VII had reneged on his promises of liberalism and restitution of the medieval *fueros* following his victory in the war of independence, he was considered the supreme turncoat. Despite being celebrated for a brief time as “el Deseado,” he came to be known as the cruelest and most despotic of the Bourbon kings.²¹⁶ Indeed, Stanley Payne once described him as “in many ways the basest king in Spanish history. Cowardly, selfish, grasping,

²¹³ Paloma Aguilar and Carlsen Humlebæk, “Collective Memory and National Identity in the Spanish Democracy: Legacies of Francoism and the Civil War,” *History and Memory*, vol. 14, no. 1-2 (Spring-Winter, 2002): 134-135.

²¹⁴ J. Aznar Pellicer, “Independencia,” *El Pueblo*, August 14, 1936.

²¹⁵ Ricardo García Cárcel, *El Sueño de la nación indomable: Los mitos de la guerra de la Independencia* (Madrid: Ediciones Temas de Hoy, S. A., 2007), 177-219.

²¹⁶ Miguel Antonio Rodríguez, *Oración fúnebre en las exequias de los que murieron en el cuartel el dos de agosto de 1810* (Quito: Imprenta del Gobierno, 1823), 7; José Álvarez-Junco, *The Emergence of Mass Politics in Spain: Populist Demagoguery and Republican Culture, 1890-1910* (Brighton: Sussex Academic Press, 2002), 1; Jean-Philippe Luis, “La Década Ominosa (1823-1833), Una Etapa Desconocida en la Construcción de La España Contemporánea,” *Ayer*, no. 41 (2001): 85-89.

suspicious, and vengeful, D. Fernando seemed almost incapable of any perception of the commonwealth.”²¹⁷ Subsequently, according to Aznar, the Spanish people were left to continue their struggle for the rights they were wrongfully denied despite their success in casting out foreign rulers.²¹⁸ Interestingly, this alleged rejection of non-Spanish ideals had formed a fundamental part of liberal and conservative propaganda for at least a century as Ferdinand VII had similarly justified his agenda by claiming to eradicate outside influences—especially those awakened by the French Revolution—so as to restore the pre-war “purity” of the Spanish state.²¹⁹

Despite commonly being presented as a war for Spanish liberation, the War of Independence was naturally more nuanced and the French occupation had hardly marked a more oppressive form of government than the Spanish monarchy it purported to replace. In fact, some Napoleonic reforms embodied values not far removed from Republican ideals. For one, the French had taken steps to disband the Spanish Inquisition and to liberalise certain aspects of the political infrastructure. They had proposed a liberal constitution, freedom of religion, and the government absorption of Church privileges. Moreover, contrary to criticisms of French absolutism, Joseph I never exercised absolutist authority or even controlled all of Spain with Galicia and most of Valencia falling beyond his reach for the duration of his reign.

Much like Ferdinand VII, however, the Bonapartes were not sincere in their proclaimed intentions of recognising the pluralist nature of Spain. The French imposed a highly centralised form of government with little regard for the Basque and Catalan autonomies they had previously courted to curry favour. Joseph I, like his younger brother, promoted a distinctly centralist ideology for the state, causing clashes with Basque, Catalan, and Valencian nationalists who began to reject French domination upon realising this. Napoleon had previously demonstrated awareness of the complexities of Spanish identity and pluralism, yet his policies actively disregarded the recognition of competing nationalisms. In one complimentary letter to Manuel Godoy, then *de facto* leader of Spain, he went so far as to acknowledge the difficult task of consolidating the country under a single ruler:

Nadie que no fuera notable podría haber gobernado durante cerca de veinte años bajo su autoridad un país compuesto de tal variedad de instituciones, de pasiones, de lenguas, de razas, de costumbres y de actitudes.²²⁰

²¹⁷ Stanley G. Payne, *History of Spain and Portugal* (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1973), 428.

²¹⁸ J. Aznar Pellicer, “Independencia,” *El Pueblo*, August 14, 1936.

²¹⁹ D. Juan Antonio Llorente, *Llorente’s History of the Inquisition: The History of the Inquisition of Spain from the time of its establishment to the reign of Ferdinand VII*, Trans. Anonymous (London: William Clowes, 1827), 575.

²²⁰ Napoleon Bonaparte in Ricardo García Cárcel, *El Sueño de la nación indomable: Los mitos de la guerra de la Independencia* (Ediciones Temas de Hoy, S. A., Madrid, 2007), 177-219.

As far as *El Pueblo* was concerned, such references to Napoleon also implicitly addressed issues of Spanish multiculturalism with calls for political recognition and sovereignty.

Republican administrations were eager to recognise regional autonomies and liberties to secure Basque, Catalan, and Valencian support. Furthermore, in the quest to persuade citizens of the Republic's legitimacy, *El Pueblo* sought to distance the sitting government from the tyrannical and exclusively centralist agendas of past leaders and Francoist adversaries. Aznar portrayed a multi-layered Spanish nationalism which encompassed Valencian nationalism by linking Spanish independence to Valencian autonomy. In so doing, he reinforced Republican messaging objectives by promoting unity before a common enemy and identifying Spanish citizens with a formidable underdog capable of winning the fight for self-determination on the world stage. *El Pueblo* described Spaniards as the persecuted and underprivileged working classes that confronted the rebellion despite lacking military-grade weapons, organisation, and expertise. Antonio Merino Conde, in an accompanying article, declared them to be armed "por la sacrasonta llama de un ideal" which enabled them to defeat an allegedly superior foe and change the course of the world:

Por ello veréis en la historia patria cómo hombres casi incultos y sin preparación militar alguna, hacen frente a las falanges secuaces y las destrozan, y cómo en la época contemporánea un pueblo inerme, con arcabuces y picas pone en fuga en los campos de Bailén a las aguerridas huestes del gran Napoleón Bonaparte, ante cuya presencia tiemblan los déspotas de la tierra y que con el filo de su espada acababa de cambiar toda la geografía política de Europa.²²¹

Underdog imagery is popular in political rhetoric and appeals to readers through a range of techniques as it naturally produces a sense of empathy. The editorial framed a contemporary conflict in terms of the historical memory of Spanish nationalism by stacking one national myth atop another so as to renew a cultural narrative of tireless and continuous Spanish resistance.

Aznar's editorial constructed the war in a series of binaries: cowardice vs. bravery, tyranny vs. liberty, autocracy vs. democracy, treason vs. patriotism, and invasion vs. defense.²²² He used them to connect his readership to a critical moment in their national past—one which stimulated the first modern articulation of Spanish identity—while also erasing the inevitable ambiguities and contradictions of a complicated civil war. In reducing the conflict to yet another example of the Spanish fight against absolutist control, he pulled on emotional ties to a national homeland, invoking pride in a common history and fear in the repercussions of

²²¹ Antonio Merino Conde, "El pueblo en armas," *El Pueblo*, August 14, 1936.

²²² J. Aznar Pellicer, "Independencia," *El Pueblo*, August 14, 1936.

defeat, with the intent to elicit a sense of patriotism. Moreover, he fueled anger and antagonism against an accountable enemy by magnifying the malfeasance and corruption of insurgents, thereby drumming up feelings of contempt and betrayal in readers. Such rhetoric merged two separate wars into one, transforming them into a series of battles in an ongoing crusade of the oppressed classes challenging their oppressors. This crusade was at once national and international, with Spaniards coming to symbolise humanity's noble heroes in a war between good and evil, here defined as the fight for the greater good of the common man. *El Pueblo* evidenced the notion that, even when propaganda does not believe in a god, it must believe in a devil, "as the importance of hatred to mass movements can hardly be overstressed; for it serves as a unifying force."²²³ Propaganda, therefore, must craft an easily identifiable villain on which to focus readers' hatred. Hatred is a powerful emotion connected to dread and anger and is an instrumental aspect of propagandistic ideology and production. In the Spanish Civil War, Republicans cast this villain as the imperialist, the fascist, the 'anti-Spaniard' subverting democratic progress from within Spain and beyond, while the hero was drawn up as the common citizen who defended Republican initiatives in a fight to the death.

Aznar dramatised the concept of the anti-Spanish Spaniard, an insidious character that wantonly betrayed his own people.²²⁴ His portrayal of the autocratic Ferdinand VII thus served to foreshadow the Nazi-backed Franco, or more precisely, a leader who actively assaulted the Spanish homeland in the quest to destroy a just and esteemed Republic. Held to be the main advantage in the present conflict, he claimed that because this time Spaniards defended a legitimate government of their own choosing their faith could work miracles. In representing the true will of the Spanish people, it transcended local politics to embody the national spirit. Aznar invoked pride in the historic Spanish blow to Napoleonic tyranny in Europe, but also shame in the ascension of the "cobarde" Ferdinand VII accused of crushing citizen liberties.²²⁵ In drawing the connection between 1808 and 1936, he positioned Spain at the opening of an expanding world conflict: just as Spain had witnessed the European defeat of Napoleon, so too would Spain set the stage for the global battle against the forming Axis powers. In so doing, he linked cowardice to tyranny and autocracy while joining bravery to freedom and democracy, thereby extolling the allegedly superior virtues of the Republican war effort. Such framing

²²³ Ronald F. Reid, "Apocalypticism and Typology: Rhetorical Dimensions of a Symbolic Reality," *The Quarterly Journal of Speech*, vol. 6 n. 3 (August, 1983), 238; See also Eric Hoffer, *The True Believer: Thoughts on the Nature of Mass Movements* (New York: Mentor, 1958), 86. Hoffer observed that "Mass movements can rise and spread without belief in a God, but never without belief in a devil."

²²⁴ J. Aznar Pellicer, "Independencia," *El Pueblo*, August 14, 1936.

²²⁵ J. Aznar Pellicer, "Independencia," *El Pueblo*, August 14, 1936.

claimed that their collective virtue would ensure their collective victory (an argument pushed, in part, to discount the major material shortages in ammunition and weaponry). As Kuypers and Althouse explained, “leaders must unite constituencies and justify leaps from discontent to revolution. Thus historical perspectives are augmented by a rhetorical viewpoint, especially one that recognizes that power may flow from a wellspring of emerging social consciousness.”²²⁶ Consequently, Aznar’s rhetoric was at once reflective and constructive of Republican attitudes of the period, utilising ideographs of liberty, independence, and justice to create a political system cognizant of pluricultural identities held together by leftist conceptions of a reformed workers’ state.

In addition to its interpretation of the war of 1808, Aznar’s article was notable for targeting, at moments, a specifically female audience. Calls of “¡independencia!” were made out to be the unanimous cry of the nation with even the mothers and children of Spain taking to the streets to protect their beloved Republic.²²⁷ He stated that both men and women counted among the heroes in the long fight to preserve Spanish independence, citing Agustina de Aragón and Mariana “Marianita” Piñeda as special examples.²²⁸ Agustina was deemed legendary for her actions in the 1808 Siege of Zaragoza, while Piñeda was considered a martyr of the liberalist cause, executed by the Fernandist regime in 1831 and later immortalised in the dramatic work of Federico García Lorca.²²⁹ Performed to critical acclaim in 1927, Lorca’s play would have to come to mind in the vision of a “profoundly Spanish woman...impelled by an heroic passion” and her love of liberty.²³⁰ In listing them alongside one another, Aznar extended the timeline of the war of Independence to include the rule of Ferdinand VII. Moreover, he appealed directly to female readers, calling them his “compañeras,” who, joined with the rest of the population would secure Republican triumph: “Veo clara la victoria, porque junto a los mozos combatientes van valientes compañeras, y ante su presencia, no hay hombre, joven o viejo, que sea cobarde.”²³¹ Through abundant praise of the bravery and integrity of Spanish women, he framed them as established comrades and boosted Republican appeals to

²²⁶ Jim A. Kuypers and Matthew T. Althouse, “John Pym, Ideographs, and the Rhetoric of Opposition to the English Crown,” *Rhetoric Review*, vol. 28, no. 3 (2009): 228.

²²⁷ J. Aznar Pellicer, “Independencia,” *El Pueblo*, August 14, 1936.

²²⁸ J. Aznar Pellicer, “Independencia,” *El Pueblo*, August 14, 1936.

²²⁹ Adrian Shubert, “Women Warriors and National Heroes: Agustina de Aragón and Her Indian Sisters,” *Journal of World History* 23, no. 2 (2012): 309-310; Charles Richard Vaughan, *Narrative of the Siege of Zaragoza* (Pamphlets Printed for James Ridgway, 1809), 15-16; Jean-Philippe Luis. “La Década Ominosa (1823-1833), Una Etapa Desconocida en la Construcción de La España Contemporánea.” *Ayer*, no. 41 (2001): pp. 93-94.

²³⁰ Francisco Ayala, Federico García Lorca, Manuel Machado, Pedro Massa, and Rupert C. Allen. “Lorca Discusses His Plays,” *The Tulane Drama Review*, vol. 7, no. 2 (1962): 114-117.

²³¹ J. Aznar Pellicer, “Independencia,” *El Pueblo*, August 14, 1936.

rally a collective defense in which the sexes participated equally as active and engaged citizens in the revolution. The emphasis on popular support for the Republic dominated news coverage to portray every aspect of the Spanish defense. The Republican military was branded “el pueblo en armas” to portray the historic armament of the Spanish people and distinguish their forces from Nationalist soldiers.²³² While most militaries, particularly those of the enemy, were comprised of “jóvenes imberbes arrancados a fortiori del campo o del taller” serving out of fear rather than loyalty or conviction, *El Pueblo* asserted that the Republic had established “un verdadero ejército nacional.”²³³ Descriptions of breaking “el yugo napoleónico en los comienzos del pasado siglo” and the participation of every man, woman, and child in the fight “contra el ejército invasor” further sharpened the contrast between a democratic Spanish people and their Fascist enemy.²³⁴

Having been seized by the Partido Unión Republicana Nacional by virtue of agreement with the “Comité Ejecutivo Popular,” *El Pueblo* preceded the day’s news coverage with a bolded announcement about its distribution to troops on the front lines.²³⁵ It would now become the link between the “bravos milicianos” and their families back home, a loyal messenger between parties in the fight to liberate the Republican masses. *El Pueblo*’s job would be to communicate the militants’ hopes and anxieties to the rearguard, thereby connecting readers to their valour and heroism (referred to as “maravillosa joya”) so as to inspire a coordinated public resistance. Self-described as “el portador,” *El Pueblo*’s columns would transport their homesickness and enthusiasm to Valencian readers, create a collective “grito” to resound across the land, and unite the embattled front with the rearguard in an electrifying aggregate voice.²³⁶ Its calls, much like the subsequent news coverage it endorsed, played on the nostalgia and anxieties of Valencian friends and relatives but also promoted pride and optimism in lauding the virtue of their cause. To this effect, descriptors such as “valentía,” “heroísmo,” “bravos,” and “libertades” were repeatedly employed in daily coverage. Such framing functioned as a tactic to reinforce the good vs. evil binary central to war narratives, underlining claims that the Spanish Republic had not taken up arms against its Spanish brothers, but was instead clashing with an alienated antagonist.

In line with his party’s agenda and the endeavour to promote unity and optimism in the rearguard, Aznar defined independence as transcendent liberty. His argument framed the

²³² Antonio Merino Conde, “El pueblo en armas,” *El Pueblo*, August 14, 1936.

²³³ Antonio Merino Conde, “El pueblo en armas,” *El Pueblo*, August 14, 1936.

²³⁴ J. Aznar Pellicer, “Independencia,” *El Pueblo*, August 14, 1936.

²³⁵ “EL PUEBLO, en el frente de Teruel,” *El Pueblo*, August 14, 1936.

²³⁶ “EL PUEBLO, en el frente de Teruel,” *El Pueblo*, August 14, 1936.

Spanish Civil War as yet another war for Spanish independence, as part of a series of struggles against foreign domination: “de independencia es también de la guerra actual, porque independencia es libertad y la libertad es lo que defendemos.”²³⁷ He went on to accuse the elites (“los poderosos”) of having enslaved the Spanish nation, so that the revolution represented breaking free from a sordid past of proletarian servitude. In this way, the fight for independence became more than a dispute between Spain and a foreign tyrant: it represented the fight for liberty and justice on a global scale. Consequently, the ongoing war had to establish a total victory to make success definitive. He echoed popular Marxist phrases like “¡A trabajar todo el mundo!” and “No mas señoritos vagos!” to emphasise the ideological and political foundations of the Second Spanish Republic and drum up fervour for their revolutionary mission.²³⁸ Moreover, such statements reflected the Unión Republicana Nacional’s Communist alignment, which interpreted the war as a the ultimate confrontation between the proletariat and the capitalist world order (indeed, references to the evils of the “banca internacional” abound in editorials through the years). This point is especially interesting, as independence, though in the editorial situated within Spanish history and government, is redefined as something beyond nationhood entirely to include class. It frames Spanish independence, then, as the independence of the working classes against the Capitalist system bent on exploiting them. The core of the conflict, according to journalists like Aznar, lay in the mistreatment of labourers internationally.

Consequently, the writer disputed the label of civil war, rejecting the notion of a war between brothers due to the enemy’s close association with the Fascists. He argued that in turning on their fellows and fighting against the interests of the greater good, Republicans’ opponents had demolished their Spanish identity. The language turned blunt and rigid in commanding readers not to interpret the conflict as a traditional domestic conflagration. In framing foes as vicious strangers, he strategically attempted to cut off all sense of connection or fraternity with compatriots located in the Nationalist camps, upped the stakes by describing a conflict that would either destroy Spain or establish a global utopia, and highlighted Spanish patriotism as unique to the Republican cause. In challenging the Republic, enemy soldiers (and sympathisers) had surrendered their national identity to serve the criminal interests of the anti-Spanish elites, thereby embodying human avarice, selfishness, and cruelty. In accusing these traitors of subverting democracy “para convertirnos en esclavos suyos,” his writing evoked the

²³⁷ J. Aznar Pellicer, “Independencia,” *El Pueblo*, August 14, 1936.

²³⁸ J. Aznar Pellicer, “Independencia,” *El Pueblo*, August 14, 1936.

fear and national pride of readers to sever lingering attachments to surviving countrymen in the Nationalist Zone.²³⁹ Aznar contrasted descriptions of Nationalist betrayal with the loyalty of Republicans, labelled “camaradas,” the ultimate compliment in leftist rhetoric of the era. Comradery of the proletariat was upheld as the guaranteed means to victory and valued more highly than blood so that “sí que podremos llamarnos hermanos, y más que hermanos, ¡camaradas!”²⁴⁰ The notion that political ideology and affiliation trumps national (even familial) connections inevitably dominates civil war coverage as populations become divided along internal lines that are changing, uncertain, and imprecise.

This introduced a national imaginary somewhat distinct from that cultivated in *La Vanguardia* and *ABC* Madrid, both of which refrained from denying (outright, at least) the enemy’s Spanish identity, or in the reprinted words of Pedro Rico: “Cuando el ejército español deja de ser ejército de la libertad, no es ejército español; son mesnadas al servicio de los reyes, son guardias pretorianos que caen como cayó la monarquía.”²⁴¹ As the *afrancesado* discourse of the peninsular wars reveals, the meaning of ‘anti-España’ could be manifold and convoluted, with both sides of the conflict depicting the other as the arch-enemy of Spain. *Afrancesados* tended to frame their plea as the will to bring Spain into modernity, to renovate the national infrastructure, and to reform the abusive institutions of the church and monarchy so as to ensure a code of citizen rights.²⁴² Supporters of Ferdinand VII argued that the French, and by extension their allies, being non-Spanish, merely sought to unleash the evils of their own disastrous revolution, to disassemble their empire, and to destroy Spain’s cultural and religious heritage. Aznar’s editorial borrowed aspects of early nineteenth-century patriotic discourses to bolster the theme of the Pro-Spanish Republic against the Anti-Spanish Fascists. He clearly argued that “los sublevados” were Spaniards who had betrayed Spain and forfeited their national identity. This asserted Republican values by highlighting the democratic foundations of the Second Spanish Republic. As a democracy it represented the public will, meaning that the destruction of the Republic signalled the destruction of the people’s voice. It followed then that to attack the people’s voice should make them enemies of Spain and therefore anti-Spanish. In this vein, *El Pueblo* framed coverage in a way that fashioned a sense of unity from a disjointed whole, stitching together the various strands of political, cultural, and national identities within

²³⁹ J. Aznar Pellicer, “Independencia,” *El Pueblo*, August 14, 1936.

²⁴⁰ J. Aznar Pellicer, “Independencia,” *El Pueblo*, August 14, 1936.

²⁴¹ *El Pueblo*, August 14, 1936.

²⁴² Prudencio Vivero Mogo, “La Transición al Liberalismo: De Las Reformas Administrativas a Las Reformas Políticas (1823-1833),” *Ayer*, no. 44 (2001): 177; Jean-Philippe Luis, “El Afrancesamiento, Una Cuestión Abierta,” *Ayer*, no. 86 (2012): 95-99.

Spain. This process necessitated the exclusion of traitorous Spaniards who fought on the opposing side in order to disavow more convincingly the allegedly misplaced notion of civil war.

Editorial 2: “Educad para el Trabajo”—September 19, 1936

The day Toledo fell to military insurgents after a prolonged struggle between forces, *El Pueblo* unusually admitted to a terrible loss: the fall of the Alcázar of Toledo.²⁴³ Long considered a site of cultural and strategic significance, it had served as the seat of Ferdinand and Isabella during the Reconquista and presided over a prestigious military academy.²⁴⁴ While the headline “El fin del alcazar de Toledo” loomed across the front page in pronounced lettering, news pertaining to the loyalist victories in Teruel, Orrios and Cuevas Labradas were positioned to receive immediate coverage, pushing reports of the defeat to page three.²⁴⁵ What followed in between were calls to patriotism, celebratory rhetoric of Valencia as “granero de la revolución,”²⁴⁶ announcements for public order and singular command (“mando único”) in both public and private life,²⁴⁷ and an uneasy editorial by returning writer J. Aznar Pellicer on the risks of recruiting child-soldiers.²⁴⁸

Republican military efforts faced major obstacles from the beginning of the war for obvious reasons. First, Franco had claimed the allegiance of a large portion of the Spanish armed forces, himself among the rightist coalition of generals who had coordinated the revolt. Second, a fundamental principle of Republican values lay in anti-militarism and other avowedly pacifist ideologies which fiercely opposed the imperialist practices commonly associated with European militias. This made forming a national defense against the insurrectionists a difficult and complicated task, its activities plagued throughout the war by chaos, inexperience, disorganisation, political tensions, and conflicting interests. While scholars dispute the allocation of resources in the warring camps and the tactical advantages of the Nationalist insurgents and Republican loyalists, respectively, they tend to agree that Franco received superior aid from the Fascist countries in the form of arms, tanks, planes, and

²⁴³ “El fin del Alcázar de Toledo,” *El Pueblo*, September 19, 1936.

²⁴⁴ Burnett Bulloten, *The Spanish Civil War: Revolution and Counterrevolution* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2015), 300; Tom Nickson, *Toledo Cathedral: Building Histories in Medieval Castile* (University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, 2015), 26.

²⁴⁵ “En el día de ayer se tomaron, por las fuerzas leales que operan en el frente de Teruel, Orrios y Cuevas Labradas,” *El Pueblo*, September 19, 1936; “Hacia el epílogo de una tragedia,” *El Pueblo*, September 19, 1936.

²⁴⁶ “Al frente del Centro, en un convoy de víveres,” *El Pueblo*, September 19, 1936.

²⁴⁷ J. Sánchez Requena, “Delegación de Orden Público,” *El Pueblo*, September 19, 1936.

²⁴⁸ J. Aznar Pellicer, “Educad para el trabajo,” *El Pueblo*, September 19, 1936.

unchecked financial credit while Republicans experienced severe cash-flow restrictions and weapon and ammunition shortages.²⁴⁹ Moreover, as Paul Preston and Helen Graham have pointed out, the non-Intervention Pact organised by Britain worked mostly to hinder Republican defense efforts as it unequally restricted access to strategic ports such as Gibraltar and even European banks, thus severing supply lines to the Republicans but not to the Nationalists.²⁵⁰

It appears that as early as September, 1936, some two months after the insurrection, child soldiers began trickling into the Republican ranks, apparently sent by their own parents. Aznar condemned the practice, notably without attacking Republican authorities or propaganda messaging, beginning with his personal emotional impressions. He remarked on the sadness it caused him to witness children preparing for war “armados con fusiles de madera, tocados con el gorro de miliciano, en correcta formación militar.”²⁵¹ His objection centred around two themes: the children’s lack of literacy and the militaristic education they would be receiving (a fact he deemed a dangerous combination). He lamented their innocence and mouldable nature as they parroted letters from an alphabet they had never learned to read. He referred to them in piteous terms, as “Niños, muchos tan pequeños que solo conocen del Abecedario las tres iniciales U. H. P., que equivocada e inconscientemente, lanzan como un grito de guerra.”²⁵² The UHP acronym stood for Uníos Hermanos Proletarios, a slogan originally derived from the alliance signed between the CNT and UGT of Asturias in March, 1934, and adopted later that year by participants in the Asturian Miner’s Strike in October. By 1936, it had become a popular proclamation used among Republican factions intended to build consensus and unity among the various leftist groups throughout Spain during the war.²⁵³ As Ernest Gellner argues, educational systems are fundamental in the construction of the modern nation-state, as they help to homogenise a given population and formulate a cohesive identity and ideology.²⁵⁴ This gains special emphasis in the case of multicultural and pluralistic countries in which divisions

²⁴⁹ George Esenwein and Adrian Shubert, *Spain at War: The Spanish Civil War in Context, 1931-1939* (Longman: London and New York, 1995); Francisco J. Romero Salvadó, *The Spanish Civil War: Origins, Course and Outcomes* (New York: Palgrave Macmillian, 2005); Paul Preston, *The Spanish Civil War: 1936-1939* (Chicago: The Dorsey Press, 1989); Charles J. Esdaile, *The Spanish Civil War: A Military History* (London: Routledge, 2019).

²⁵⁰ Paul Preston, *The Spanish Civil War: Reaction, Revolution and Revenge*, 80th anniversary edition (London: William Collins, 2016), 183-185. Ebook; Helen Graham, *The Spanish Civil War: A Very Short Introduction* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005), 37. Kindle Edition.

²⁵¹ J. Aznar Pellicer, “Educad para el trabajo,” *El Pueblo*, September 19, 1936.

²⁵² J. Aznar Pellicer, “Educad para el trabajo,” *El Pueblo*, September 19, 1936.

²⁵³ “La situación en Asturias,” *El Siglo Futuro*, October 16, 1934; “Octubre 1934: U. H. P.,” *Solidaridad Obrera*, October, 1958.

²⁵⁴ Ernest Gellner, *Nations and Nationalism* (Basil Blackwell, Oxford: 1983).

are already deep and manifest, making the task of unification more nuanced. Aznar's focus on education, therefore, served as a tactic to frame the Republican agenda in a way that bolstered the war effort, reinforced pluricultural and political unity within Spain, and fostered the educational reforms meant to shape the younger generation in the image of a new socialist paradise.

Aznar handled the topic with pronounced delicacy, mindful not to admonish too harshly Republican officials or political enthusiasm, while simultaneously cautioning against the practice. Despite being so characteristic of the environment "en que vivimos," he questioned the purpose of these "soldados en miniatura," unable to comprehend the tactical advantage of forming child battalions if not to instruct them in the ways of violence.²⁵⁵ Rather, he posed, recruiting child soldiers could have the opposite of the intended effect by indoctrinating impressionable young into the very militaristic mindset they purported to be fighting. He reminded readers that militarism was an enemy of the people and their new-found liberties ("uno de los enemigos del pueblo, enemigo de sus libertades"). If they were not careful, conditioning their children to embrace this mindset could unwittingly corrupt the survival of the revolution altogether: "veo un enorme peligro en esa educación militar, que...Es preparar una generación que destruya toda la labor revolucionaria actual."²⁵⁶ He declared it incompatible with the ideals of any Republican group, no matter how conservative, thereby weaving a common strand among leftist factions. In so doing, he made an effort to consolidate Republican political philosophies which often diverged on matters of the timing, execution, and organisation of the revolution in Spain. He used the imperative tense (i.e. "educad," "reflexionad," "no miréis") to direct parents to reflect on the type of behaviour their misplaced enthusiasm might furnish and pleaded with readers to remember the very cause of the war: a military insurrection.

Described as "cruenta," he ascribed the rebellion's origins to the European elites who had ruled over the lower classes. Peasant labourers had for centuries lived at the mercy of tyrants who exploited them, but they had finally embarked on a pivotal struggle to turn the tide. Aznar accused Republican enemies of upholding an imperialist past which benefitted the powerful at the expense of the rest. Those who had sided with Franco's Nationalists fought to maintain a regime of caste and privilege that had victimised the proletariat throughout history, instigating wars and other conflicts for their own individualist interests:

²⁵⁵ J. Aznar Pellicer, "Educad para el trabajo," *El Pueblo*, September 19, 1936.

²⁵⁶ J. Aznar Pellicer, "Educad para el trabajo," *El Pueblo*, September 19, 1936.

La preponderancia no cabe más que en un régimen imperialista, amparador de toda clase de egoísmos y privilegios, fomentador de guerras por su ansia dominadora, de la que es víctima siempre el proletario.²⁵⁷

In underlining the long-standing association between militarism and imperialism, he placed the Nationalist insurgents firmly on the side of enemy—specifically, Fascist—investments. He discouraged the cultivation of militarism in Spanish children in any form, even up to the purchase of toy weapons, warning readers that “un arma es una cosa tan seria que, de su existencia o no existencia, puede depender que mueran o que sigan viviendo infinidad de hombres.”²⁵⁸ Pellicer reiterated his stance against the militarist discourses elevated by Nationalist opponents, stating that the only reason for war to occur was in the case of national independence.

Las armas sólo tienen razón de esgrimirse cuando se hace por la independencia, contra una agresión como la de que somos víctimas actualmente, en que todos a una, sin distinción de partidos, ni de edades, ni de sexo, las empuñamos para conseguir de una vez la rotura de las cadenas.

His focus on war as a last resort in the preservation of Spanish autonomy in pursuit of a more civilised and egalitarian world order contrasted with Francoist celebrations of Iberian colonialism and subjugation, but also pushed back against extremists on the far left, who believed violence was the only effective response to classist oppression. Such statements reinforced the anti-war stance of the Republic while still promoting support for the current fighting, yet simultaneously articulated disdain for the public’s apparent enthusiasm surrounding the enlistment of minors.

In referencing his personal emotions, Aznar left no room for ambiguity in how he wanted readers to react. He tied the defence of democracy in wartime to the superior ideals of the Republic, the true people’s government which claimed to fight for peace and prosperity. Such framing supported the leftist interpretation of the war as a struggle for freedom and independence against a destructive antagonist. Using children is a powerful tool in news narratives, at once stirring up a sense of sympathy and defensiveness for society’s youngest and most vulnerable members. What set this editorial apart was the apparent critique of a visible manifestation of Republican fervour. Though expounding upon the origins of war in which the “sublevados” were characterised as imperialist aggressors, Aznar appeared to be checking the kind of fanaticism that would sacrifice children without a clear or strategic

²⁵⁷ J. Aznar Pellicer, “Educa para el trabajo,” *El Pueblo*, September 19, 1936.

²⁵⁸ J. Aznar Pellicer, “Educa para el trabajo,” *El Pueblo*, September 19, 1936.

objective even if for the true proletarian cause, going so far as to chide parents with the repeated phrase “reflexionad un poco, padres.”²⁵⁹ He thus attempted to channel audiences’ emotional attachments into another cherished Republican mission, that of public education, in his insistence that children were meant to be schooled in the ways of peace rather than war.

The cause of primary education had been one of the largest and most controversial campaigns of the Second Spanish Republic since its inception. Long dominated by the auspices of the Roman Catholic Church, the new administration embarked on an ambitious plan to wrest control of educational institutions in the mission to establish a secular foundation and ensure separation of church and state. Private schools were nationalised, priests and other members of religious orders banned from teaching, and thousands of primary schools constructed across Spain, especially in rural areas, in efforts to raise national literacy rates. Such radical reforms were met with staunch pushback from church officials, allied military leaders, religious groups, and other conservative allies, who interpreted these policies as a leftist attack on traditional values and Spain’s Catholic roots.²⁶⁰ Such initiatives, like many under the Second Spanish Republic, highlighted the clashing visions of Spanish history and identity along party lines, with the debate over education becoming particularly heated since it was “hinged on the belief that the school served as the single most important vehicle in shaping society to a specific mission.”²⁶¹ Reformers sought to overhaul completely the antiquated state curriculum with the aim of creating a new generation of citizens with Republican ideals as part of a modern democratic society. Despite facing numerous hurdles, the inheritance of an underfunded and neglected infrastructure among them, Republicans made significant advances in the reformation and expansion of educational institutions. Though there were severe short-comings and many reforms never made it into practice, the Church saw it as a direct assault on what it believed to be its rightful place in the Spanish state.

The 1936 rebellion intensified the contentious debates surrounding children’s education, making the editorial a timely topic. Primary instruction remained a focal point of the commanding government’s agenda, especially in the Valencian capital which had remained a key Republican stronghold. The uprising spurred the regime to increase their involvement in educational affairs, expanding existing legislation and building new schools. Because the

²⁵⁹ J. Aznar Pellicer, “Educad para el trabajo,” *El Pueblo*, September 19, 1936.

²⁶⁰ Rafael Sánchez Mazas, “Sin Dios,” *ABC*, April 14, 1931; W. Fernandez Florez, “La Vasija Dispuesta,” *ABC*, April 14, 1931; Carmen de Zulueta, *La España que pudo ser: memorias de una institucionista republicana* (Universidad de Murcia: Murcia, 2000), 88-90.

²⁶¹ Kathy Schneider, “Defending Catholic Education: Secular Front Organizations during the Second Republic of Spain, 1931-1936,” *Church History* 82, no. 4 (2013): 854.

conflict represented, in part, a war of classes and their corresponding cultures, education became the preferred means of reform, perceived to be the most effective vehicle for ideological transformation.²⁶² Aznar did not refer to education reforms outright, but his writing framed the issue of militarism in antagonistic terms contrasted with that of education, thereby portraying them as oppositional forces. Descriptors commonly associated with militarism, particularly “odio,” “cobardía,” and “víctima,” indicated a tone of condescension toward the reckless parenting of future Republican citizens, even accusing some of sacrificing their children out of cowardice: “Quizá...consiga revestir de valor a esos grandullones que, por cobardía, no se atreven a marchar al frente.”²⁶³ In so doing, he drew upon a Republican vision of Spanish society that encouraged education, emphasising the Republic’s stated mission of creating a peaceful workers’ utopia through the uncorrupted innocence of Spain’s children. Moreover, he tied this battle against militarist ideologies to the historical memory of Spanish imperialism, interpreted by the far right as a golden age and by the left as a shameful and damaging period of exploitation: “Fomentar el espíritu guerrero, es modelar al matón...mientras los libros lloran su abandono. De esas peleas nace el odio y el deseo de predominio, de querer ser más que otros.” As Krauel demonstrated, Spain’s imperial legacy was commonly used to feed nationalistic purposes since the first half of the Bourbon Restoration (1875-1898), a trend disputed by famous Republicans like Francesc Pi y Margall who began to formulate alternative uses of the colonial past expressing indignation rather than pride to construct a federalist political system.²⁶⁴ By the 1930s, Republicans had plainly articulated their objections to these imperialistic discourses of nostalgia to privilege their dreams of a new and progressive future and divorce them from the violence and despotism that had overshadowed so much of Spanish history.

In this vein, the editorial sat beside other articles echoing similar themes, likely to underscore sanctioned critiques of Fascist ideologies which still sought to glorify their lost empire and its traditions of militarism, absolutism, and slavery. The editor’s note, located adjacent, seconded the writer’s objections to “esta guerra civil provocada por el militarismo pretoriano.”²⁶⁵ The note, however, went beyond attempts at suffocating the rebel movement to

²⁶² Javier Navarro Navarro and Sergio Valero Gomez, “Més, millor i different: educació i cultura a la València capital de la República,” in *València, Capital de la República: La ciutat de la saviesa, València, capital de l’educació i la cultura*, Ed. Javier Navarro Navarro and Sergio Valero Gómez (Valencia: Ajuntament de València, 2018), 18-21.

²⁶³ J. Aznar Pellicer, “Educa para el trabajo,” *El Pueblo*, September 19, 1936.

²⁶⁴ Javier Krauel, “Notes on the Conflicting Uses of the Imperial Past: Spain in 1892,” *Anales de la literatura española contemporánea*, vol. 36, no. 1 (2011): 134-135.

²⁶⁵ “Al frente del Centro, en un convoy de víveres,” *El Pueblo*, September 19, 1936.

detail a battle of caste, “porque en realidad ya no se trata de sofocar un movimiento rebelde, sino de casta.” What followed was a condemnation of Spain’s elites, defined as a class and an economic order, along with anyone else who fought against the sanctity of the people. Such statements furnished the Republican regime’s legality argument which asserted that the rebels had no legitimate claim to power since they rejected the results of a fair and democratic election. These editorials, in turn, framed coverage on the Fascist offensive in Toledo as the brutalisation of a national monument rather than a military defeat.²⁶⁶

Titled “Hacia el epílogo de una tragedia,” the article focused readers’ attention on the material devastation of the Alcázar of Toledo and lamented that its only surviving tower was about to crumble.²⁶⁷ It painted an epic picture of the loyalist forces advancing through the fiery wreckage, “a fondo a las ruinas de lo que fué Academia Militar,” to oust the military insurgents who had taken innocent women and children as hostages. Though it refrained from promising victory, it never confessed to the greater issue at hand in the loss of a strategic defense point of the city. It attributed the ongoing attacks on the Spanish people and their cultural history to Fascist greed and militarism, countering enemy narratives of Republican destruction of Spain’s cultural institutions. Additionally, the Alcázar of Toledo was promoted as a proud monument central to all readers’ national identity, regardless of regional origins, thereby drawing together Castille and Valencia as victims of the same totalitarian evil.

This type of coordinated messaging served to fuel Aznar’s opening pleas of educating children in the value of work, only engaging in war as adults when absolutely necessary to protect the independence of the nation and the welfare of the proletariat. *El Pueblo*’s journalists constructed a fanciful vision of an idyllic workers’ state free from the problems of class, sex, and even political factions. Additionally, the editorial and its corresponding news coverage framed a struggle defined by the proletariat and divorced from national boundaries. It was hardly by coincidence, then, that this editorial appeared the same day as the loss of Toledo’s eponymous Alcázar and its famed Military Academy. *El Pueblo*’s framing suggested a greater mission in the education of Spanish children which should exclude the militaristic ideologies that had oppressed the majority of Spaniards throughout their history, fostering a legacy of poverty, abuse, and destruction. Aznar’s emotional piece, in particular, managed to articulate

²⁶⁶ “Hacia el epílogo de una tragedia,” *El Pueblo*, September 19, 1936.

²⁶⁷ “Hacia el epílogo de una tragedia,” *El Pueblo*, September 19, 1936.

a shared agenda that crossed regional and cultural lines while simultaneously discouraging the reactive militarism he witnessed in a Republic at war.²⁶⁸

Editorial 3: “Autonomía de Valencia: ¿Es la hora?”—November 29, 1936

El Pueblo had published almost exclusively in Castilian since its inception, a step taken to reach a wider readership and distance itself from Catalanist contemporaries.²⁶⁹ Throughout the war it maintained Castilian as the dominant language, but regularly incorporated Valencian phrases and sayings. One notable exception included a Valencian-language editorial which designated Catalonia “la germana catalana” to convey “l’admiració que sentim els valencians” for the bright example set by Catalan courage and organisation.²⁷⁰ This rare shift between languages in wartime reflected pluricultural negotiations of regional and national identifications as the Republic encouraged solidarity among traditionally divergent entities. Valencia represents, presently and historically, a unique case of nationalism in Spain, denoting at once a city, a region, and an autonomous community in a single term. The name encompasses multiple groups, languages, and cultural associations. A pro-Valencian and anti-Catalanist newspaper, *El Pueblo* lobbied readers to identify with central Spain, securing a regional autonomy linked to the sovereignty of the Republican homeland. The Spanish Republic conceded the right to the process of gaining limited regional autonomy under its 1932 constitution, paving the way to Catalan and Basque referendums in the coming years, yet Valencia posed a distinct challenge. Despite lobbying for recognition, legal processes were stalled by internal disputes and then completely derailed by the eruption of civil war. These efforts continued but with the agreement of postponing campaigns until the achievement of a total Republican victory.²⁷¹ Connected, for decades, to the political movement of Blasquismo, the newspaper had always been proud of its Valencian heritage and identity. Though it had published in Castilian Spanish since its founding, it had also argued against Valencian marginalisation and regularly celebrated Vicente Blasco Ibáñez as both Valencian artist and Republican hero. In the early days of the Republic it had unequivocally affirmed its dedication to regaining “sus antiguas libertades,” stating that “Sí; Valencia siente, Valencia quiere y

²⁶⁸ José Aznar Pellicer had previously expressed opposition to militarism in his depiction of the suffering caused by conscription in a poor Spanish family in the 1926 novella, *Las dos madres*. See J. Aznar Pellicer, *Las dos madres* (Valencia: Arte y Letras, 1926).

²⁶⁹ Exceptions included literary writings by bilingual author Vicente Blasco Ibáñez and select cartoons and advertisements.

²⁷⁰ José Aznar Pellicer, “La Germana Catalana,” *El Pueblo*, November 15, 1936.

²⁷¹ Arturo Mori, “Autonomía de València: ¿es la hora?,” *El Pueblo*, November 29, 1936.

Valencia camina, sin vacilaciones, sin dudas y sin odios, a una gesta gloriosa que le restituya sus antiguas libertades que le lleve al reconocimiento de su independencia ciudadana.”²⁷² While supportive of regional autonomy within a confederation of Spanish states, however, its affiliation with PURA rendered the specifics somewhat ambiguous and its representatives were conspicuously absent from the statute discussions of 1932, a move it attributed to the party’s rejection of the “Catalanisation” of the political process: “nada de catalanizaciones ni que se saque a relucir el absurdo intolerable de que Valencia es una prolongación de la tierra catalana.”²⁷³ This trend continued through the summer of 1936, at which point policy shifted to delaying autonomy claims in response to the existential threat of war in addition to the central government’s transition to the Valencian capital that autumn.

To this end, on 29 November, 1936, *El Pueblo* opened with a commentary on the proposal for Valencian autonomy to be debated in the courts that December.²⁷⁴ Imparting a positive tone affirmative of Valencia’s right to self-rule within a federation of Spanish states, the editorial highlighted Valencia’s privileged position as capital city of the Republic in a moment of crisis. Further, it portrayed the region as unstoppable and unwavering in its loyalty to the legitimate government of Spain. Penned by Arturo Mori, a distinguished and prolific Catalan author and journalist who began his career in Barcelona, it featured the same passionate literary style for which he was celebrated. One contemporary introduced him to readers as “Pecho abierto, corazón a la vista... Talante de intelectual.”²⁷⁵ His writing was known to be bright, captivating, and imaginative, described according to his own personal classification of “periodismo literario.” Mori held that for journalism to be powerful, it had to be vibrant and evocative (“latido de vida... cálida y viva”), describing literary journalism as the process by which “literature becomes journalism.” He viewed journalism not as a neutral record of current events, therefore, but as an exercise in rhetoric. He argued that what literary journalism lost in depth, it gained in dynamism, placing emotion at the centre of his discursive style. Labanyi pointed out that emotion should be differentiated from conscious thought, as it operates on a more instinctual level. Affect, as part of the “preconscious” is quickest to move the mind to action, making human feeling vital to persuasion.²⁷⁶ Mori’s work demonstrated this distinction

²⁷² “Valencia, hacia su liberación,” *El Pueblo*, October 11, 1932.

²⁷³ “Nuestra posición ante el Estatuto,” *El Pueblo*, October 6, 1932.

²⁷⁴ Arturo Mori, “Autonomía de València: ¿es la hora?,” *El Pueblo*, November 29, 1936.

²⁷⁵ Arturo Mori, *La Prensa Española de Nuestro Tiempo*, (México: Ediciones Mensaje, 1943), 6.

²⁷⁶ Jo Labanyi, “Doing Things: Emotion, Affect, and Materiality,” *Journal of Spanish Cultural Studies*, vol. 11, no. 3-4 (2010): 224-225.

through his strategic focus on evoking emotions in readers to motivate the fortification and defense of a city (and region) vital to Republican success.

The article was organised according to six subsections encompassing various aspects of the debate for regional autonomy.²⁷⁷ Taken together, they argued major aspects of Valencian identity and geography and their relationship to the rest of the Second Spanish Republic. The last subsection, called “un pueblo voluntarioso,” was among the most forceful in framing the recurrent motif that the Republic represented the true will—or ethos—of the people. Furthering the notion of faith, it argued that so long as the government was backed by popular enthusiasm, it could never suffer defeat. The unmatched “fervor” for the Republican cause as the ultimate weapon against Fascism persisted as a dominant theme in newspaper coverage throughout the war. Each section made a point of emphasising Valencia’s importance as the seat of a government at war, but never at the expense of Madrid, still named “la capital auténtica”, which presently made the greatest of sacrifices for the nation. Mori promoted the view that Valencia was merely stepping in to fulfil its duty to “el gobierno, poder único de la guerra” while Madrid suffered the sieges and bombings of Fascist aggression, thus protecting Spain from an invading army of foreign dictators and traitorous Spaniards.²⁷⁸ Only once Valencia ceased to be interim capital of the Republic and the government reclaimed its rightful place in this “historic” seat of Madrid, would the state advance its campaign for autonomy. Mori played up local sympathies for the besieged Castilian capital suffering relentless enemy fire (“castigado hoy por la metralla enemiga”) and inspiring the world over with its heroism. In return for its service to the motherland, Valencia deserved the promise of autonomy, no less than Catalonia or the Basque Country, whose autonomy statutes had already passed through the legislatures:

Cataluña es fuerte por su autonomía. En plena guerra se ha concedido la autonomía a Vasconia. Para la perfecta organización federal de España, el caso de Valencia ha de dejarse resuelto, siempre y cuando no represente una estorción en el recto y patriótico programa del triunfo indiscutible.²⁷⁹

In this way, Mori discussed Valencian autonomy as part of a greater Spanish whole within a just and unified Republic dedicated to the emancipation of the proletariat.

Mori used Valencia’s unfailing loyalty to the Spanish Republic *in Madrid* to bolster the argument for granting Valencians their autonomy. His claim that if the fate of the nation rested upon the creation of a workers’ state, then Valencia so too should be assured of its right to self-governance, reinforced an inclusive vision of Spanish nationalism, pluriculturalism, and

²⁷⁷ Arturo Mori, “Autonomía de València: ¿es la hora?,” *El Pueblo*, November 29, 1936.

²⁷⁸ Arturo Mori, “Autonomía de València: ¿es la hora?,” *El Pueblo*, November 29, 1936.

²⁷⁹ Arturo Mori, “Autonomía de València: ¿es la hora?,” *El Pueblo*, November 29, 1936.

plurilingualism central to Republican messaging. Catalonia had been granted autonomy before the war and Basque Country's "en plena guerra," but he carefully distinguished between those and Valencian autonomies by characterising the latter as fundamentally passive. *El Pueblo*'s leadership had a long history of excoriating Catalan nationalists and their separatist agendas, accusing them of fostering bourgeois and therefore anti-revolutionary interests. The newspaper had, for decades, perceived Pan-Catalan and Valencian nationalisms as incompatible and disapproved of being labelled among "les terres catalanas" by Catalanist movements, criticising the statute debates in October of 1932 with statements of "Valencianismo, sí. Pancatalanismo, no."²⁸⁰ It was not until late 1936 that more Catalonia-favourable coverage began to appear, though contributors continued to distinguish between Valencian and Catalan identities while simultaneously framing Valencian and Spanish identity as inseparable.

According to Mori, because Valencia had never wavered in its loyalty to Republican ideals and the central government, it occupied an exceptional place in the war. He asserted that Valencia deserved its autonomy not because it demanded it, but because it did not threaten the fundamental unity of Spain, acting in the best interests of the Republic (no strings attached) as opposed to the self-interested agendas commonly associated with other autonomy campaigns. Valencia, on the contrary, awaited its autonomy statute only when it no longer posed a threat to the patriotic program of the Republic: "siempre y cuando no represente una estorsión en el recto y patriótico programa del triunfo indiscutible." In this way, Valencia had demonstrated its "valencianismo leal, con un ilustre servicio de enlace" and proven itself worthy and self-reliant. Mori thus equated Valencian patriotism with loyalty to the Spanish Republic, claiming to join regional and state nationalisms in a single force for the perfect federal organization of the nation: "Para la perfecta organización federal de España, el caso de Valencia ha de dejarse resuelto...[Valencia] esperará cuanto haga falta. Vosotros mandáis. Todos obedecemos."²⁸¹ The word "esperar" notably encompasses several meanings in Spanish, signifying "to wait" but also "to expect" and "to hope," effectively conveying Mori's suggestion that Valencia patiently awaited the recognition it was due. The contrast between Valencia and other regions—at one point he condemned the "burguesía liberal" of previous Catalanist movements—provides an important distinction in the elevated role of Valencia as temporary capital of the Republic,

²⁸⁰ "Nuestra posición ante el estatuto," *El Pueblo*, October 6, 1932. Additionally, it should be noted that "Pancatalanismo" was a highly charged term commonly used by Valencian nationalists and, later on, Francoist groups to cast Catalanists and Catalanism in a negative light, accusing adherents of interfering with other regional agendas. See Javier Paniagua, "Un solo territorio y varias identidades. El trauma del nacionalismo valenciano," *Historia Social*, no. 40 (2001): 124.

²⁸¹ Arturo Mori, "Autonomía de València: ¿es la hora?," *El Pueblo*, November 29, 1936.

simultaneously favouring regional autonomy and limiting the influence of competing national identities. *El Pueblo* had often been quick to point out that Valencian and Catalan identities were dissimilar along cultural, economic, environmental, and linguistic lines, with S. Blasco Ibáñez stating in one 1932 interview that “en Valencia el espíritu regionalista es muy diferente del que existe en Cataluña,”²⁸² but this framing necessitated greater delicacy in wartime when authorities sought to promote a sense of affinity among them. Contributors like Mori highlighted Valencia’s pro-Republican and pro-federal historical stances while lauding the Valencian language and identity, both differentiating the region from Catalan neighbours and promoting a sense of shared Republican patriotism as a link among them all.

Mori also made an attempt to reconcile the intraregional differences within the Valencian territory itself, promoting harmony among its major cities in the north, east, and south: Castelló de la Plana, Valencia, and Alicante. This was likely in response to disputes among the areas presently included within the territory now recognised as the Valencian state, as the governments of Castellón and Alicante, being reticent to accept the Valencian capital’s hegemony, argued that the autonomy statute did not represent their interests. Socialist mayor Llorenç Carbonell, for one, had insisted that Valencian autonomy should encompass the city of Valencia alone as Castelló proceeded from the Ebro and “Alicante más que valenciana es levantina.”²⁸³ The frequency of these debates revealed profound disagreements in the definition of the Valencian nation and its people, complicating the construction of the imagined community sold to Republican readers in a period of crisis. In light of these challenges, Mori sought to unify the entirety of the Valencian community while also forging a sense of solidarity with other regions of Spain. Warning against disunity in favour of indulging local sympathies and conflicts, he condemned the promotion of “aquellas supuestas divergencias” as constituting treason. In labelling them “supuestas” he dismissed their existing differences as superficial. He illustrated the coexistence of the Castilian and Valencian languages throughout the region, claiming not only that both were equally Spanish, but also that both were equally Valencian, thereby constructing a regional patriotism connected linguistically and culturally to the national patriotism of central Spain. He attacked those who would seek to exploit this diversity:

en cualquier pueblo de Valencia se habla alternativamente el valenciano y el castellano y nunca fué en ellos motivo de discordia la fonética de la vida cotidiana. Muy arraigado

²⁸² “El director de EL PUEBLO habla desde ‘Heraldo de Madrid,’ de la autonomía valenciana,” *El Pueblo*, November 8, 1932.

²⁸³ Llorenç Carbonell in Vicente Ramos Pérez, *Lorenzo Carbonell: alcalde popular de Alicante* (Alicante: Gráficas Díaz, 1986).

está en Valencia el idioma genuino, pero ningún valenciano lo utiliza como arma ofensiva ni defensiva...²⁸⁴

Mori's discussion of "Valenciano," considered by some a Catalan dialect, further reinforces Valencia's national identity as distinct from that of Catalonia, skillfully elevating its linguistic status without uprooting or demoting Spanish—still the primary language of the Second Spanish Republic—and disarming Republican critics of peninsular pluriculturalism.

Mori repeatedly extolled the virtues of the Valencian people, their strength and bravery in the face of adversity, and their fierce loyalty to the Republic. The concepts of obedience and bravery became popular in the newspaper discourse as all citizen activities were to serve the appropriate Republican authorities. He concluded with advice pertaining to the "intercordialidad" of "la trinidad regional," suggesting that they share rather than divide the region's most important cultural, educational, and political institutions among them. "Obsérvese la transformación enorme de Cataluña," Mori commanded readers in a final note as he highlighted the revolutionary metamorphosis of their northern neighbor from a Bourgeois hub of liberal Republicanism founded on nationalism to the state-led, "purely" proletarian reconstruction of a nation:

De una burguesía liberal y republicana, fundada en el nacionalismo, se ha pasado a una pasmosa obra estatal, basada en las purezas de la disciplina proletaria, con la permanencia consejera del republicanismo leal y la catalanidad que hace falta para mantener en todo su esplendor los flecos del sentimentalismo histórico.²⁸⁵

Mori here penned another lightly veiled criticism of Catalonia's nationalist movements of the past half-century, linking Catalanism to the capitalist ventures of the Catalan business class perceived to have influenced its development. He subsequently constructed in his editorial an association between regional interests and the abuses of capitalism, further distancing "loyal Valencianism" from other nationalist groups.

In recasting "catalanidad" in a supporting role, *El Pueblo* decisively sidelined all regional nationalisms—Valencia's included—as secondary to the greater cause of a new proletarian nationalism defended by the Second Spanish Republic. Consequently, Mori's editorial at once celebrated the promise of Valencian autonomy while also subjugating it to the Spanish whole, re-prioritising Valencian nationalism as complementary rather than rival to the Spanish Republican mission. It should be noted that this editorial was placed alongside prominently placed denouncements of "los cuervos de la revolución," or traitors disguised as

²⁸⁴ Arturo Mori, "Autonomía de València: ¿es la hora?," *El Pueblo*, November 29, 1936.

²⁸⁵ Arturo Mori, "Autonomía de València: ¿es la hora?," *El Pueblo*, November 29, 1936.

revolutionaries.²⁸⁶ *El Pueblo* cautioned audiences that “la revolución tiene sus mayores enemigos en la retaguardia” and that it was every citizen’s duty to serve the Republican cause by weeding out the enemies among them, what he called “el peor enemigo del proletariado español.” While this appeared to undermine the editorial’s (and the newspaper’s) literary account of an undivided Republic, it also promoted a sense of unity through provoking fear and pride in the same passage: fear of betrayal from within and pride in the venerable ideals of Republican Spain. National and cultural identities are intimately connected to emotional attachments that can alternatively support and compete with one another for priority.²⁸⁷ Mori’s reconciliation of the two can be found throughout *El Pueblo*’s wartime coverage. Though firmly rooted in the Spanish historical and geographic contexts, *El Pueblo* reimagined Spain’s cultural identity as something transcending national boundaries, a kind of universal citizenship of the world’s most-oppressed classes.

The editorial preceded reports on “mando único,” cementing themes of unity and singular high command that had come to dominate news coverage. As one article by J. Sánchez Requena, Valencia’s lead delegate of law enforcement, maintained a couple weeks earlier on November 5, 1936, “la guerra en la retaguardia es tan interesante como la guerra en el frente.”²⁸⁸ Requena established two types of fighting considered to be of equal importance: that located on the front lines engaged in direct combat and that in the rearguard in the role of support, jointly comprising a coordinated anti-fascist movement in defense of the Spanish homeland. Accompanying articles lauded the discipline of soldiers in the armed forces, such as “la admirable disciplina” of the Uribarry Column and the brilliant efficiency manifested by victorious units in the North due to consolidated military control.²⁸⁹ In celebrating the strength, unity, and discipline of Spanish Republican troops and civilians alike, *El Pueblo* connected the front lines to the rearguard and portrayed Valencia as a resilient and cooperative community worthy of self-governance.

Mori’s—and the newspaper’s—contradictory characterisation of Republican enemies ultimately revealed a darker side of the Republic’s wartime rhetoric. In describing any individual who did not support all aspects of Republican unity—whether politically, regionally, or culturally—as a traitor to Spain and the people’s cause, he demonstrated an awareness that not all adversaries were foreign, thereby admitting that the Spanish Civil War was, in some

²⁸⁶ “Los cuervos de la revolución,” *El Pueblo*, November 29, 1936; \ “Los esfuerzos de los rebeldes por apoderarse de España,” *El Pueblo*, November 29, 1936.

²⁸⁷ Jacob T. Levy, *The Multiculturalism of Fear* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), 111.

²⁸⁸ J. Sánchez Requena, *El Pueblo*, November 5, 1936.

²⁸⁹ “La admirable disciplina de la columna Uribarry,” *El Pueblo*, November 29, 1936.

respects, an intra-national conflict. This concept would remain a glaring inconsistency in Republican propaganda throughout the course of events as framing strategies continued to depict the Nationalist Camp as a mixture of Fascist mercenaries and agents, German and Italian rulers, and a traitorous military and church advancing the capitalist cause. In branding the Spanish Civil War the extension of a world conflict while simultaneously linking accusations of divergence among those indisputably Spanish, *El Pueblo* exposed deeper vulnerabilities, particularly the many and complex divides across Spain and even within the Republican armed forces. Consequently, as the war deteriorated from a battle of Republican ideology to one of basic survival, leaders continued to cast blame on those groups they held responsible for disrupting Republican cooperation, a strategy which structured appeals to national unity but also illuminated the numerous (and growing) cracks in their base.

Editorial 4: “Guernica”—April 29, 1937

In late April, 1937, the bombing of Guernica generated international coverage and exposed the significance of Italo-German involvement in Spain. While foreign news sources covered the scale of destruction, *El Pueblo* reported on the motives behind the Fascist atrocities.²⁹⁰ Though Francoist leaders pretended to have charged a group of rebels in the town, world sources (most famous among them, *The Times* correspondent, George Steer) were quick to dismantle the whirlwind of lies behind the unprecedented bombing.²⁹¹ Generals Franco and Mola, along with other members of the junta, had insisted on creating the impression of mastery and total control over the war through terrorising the local populace. Anyone who shielded, helped, or cared for Republican agents or sympathisers was to be summarily executed. Their mission was to instil such extreme fear in the Basque territory that their major cities would surrender immediately, thereby crippling the Basque resistance and paving a direct route to Bilbao. Though the Nationalist-backed assaults were also aimed at diminishing Republican access to major industries and arms factories in the region, they massacred towns and villages considered inconsequential in the process to intimidate civilians and weaken Basque defiance.²⁹²

Republican publications were well-aware of Francoist terror tactics and the dishonest justifications woven by enemy propaganda. Moreover, it became an opportunity for Republican sources to garner world sympathy for their cause by revealing the brutality of newly

²⁹⁰ G. L. Steer, “The Tragedy of Guernica: Town Destroyed in Air Attack,” *The Times*, April 27, 1937; “Guernica,” *El Pueblo*, April 29, 1937.

²⁹¹ G. L. Steer, *The Tree of Gernika: A Field Study of Modern War* (London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1938).

²⁹² Paul Preston, *The Destruction of Guernica* (London: William Collins, 2017), 6. Ebook.

developed Italo-German aviation campaigns. *El Pueblo*, in an article titled “Guernica” on April 29, 1937, condemned the attack as emblematic of the insurgents’ unchecked hatred of the Basque nation, their people, history, and heritage.²⁹³ They claimed that the act of destruction, which was motivated purely by malice, amounted to an act of treason against all peninsular cultures. In stressing that the village had no strategic or military importance, it highlighted Guernica’s storied past of Basque nationalism, appealing to its cultural symbolism as the soul of regional and democratic liberties. It recognised the role of “la invicta villa” (Bilbao’s nickname carried over from the Carlist Wars) and its proud history, but classified Guernica as the true centre of Basque identity.²⁹⁴ It described it as the brain and the heart of all Basque nationalism and therefore the mother of the beloved traditions they had forged over the centuries. In this way, the article limited its definition of the Basque country to its liberal and autonomous traditions, conveniently avoiding any mention of the Carlist sympathies of disputed popularity among those in the North and suspicions of the Partido Nacional Vasco’s collaboration with Franco. It unambiguously qualified Basque nationalism as essential to *Spanish* nationalism and to *Spanish* victory, reinforcing the notion that though a distinct cultural group, the Basques made up a fundamental part of Spain.

Rather than solely focusing on the devastation of the present, it used the article’s remainder to reassure readers that Guernica, its sacred tree, its ancient archives, and its democratic spirit would be born anew from the wreckage, generating imagery of rebirth and renewal, not mere endurance, all of which would contribute to the rise of the common man, or more specifically, the proletariat. This is perhaps the greatest difference between the national imaginaries cultivated by *La Vanguardia* and *El Pueblo*. The former also upheld the cause of the working class, but was somewhat less forceful in its appeals to Communist terminology, engaging an arguably more diverse sector of Spanish citizens, and focusing instead on the equality of all Spaniards under the “legalidad” of the Republican government regardless of regional origin. The latter envisioned the Spanish Civil War in terms of an epic class struggle, holding that the financial inequality between societal groups was at the root of all evil: it was the return to the unjust and oppressive practices of the past which served as the primary mission of Franco and his collaborators.

Unerring love for the Republic was what held the Spanish nation(s) together as one with the bombing merely serving to compound their collective faith in victory. Moreover, *El*

²⁹³ “Guernica,” *El Pueblo*, April 29, 1937.

²⁹⁴ “Guernica,” *El Pueblo*, April 29, 1937.

Pueblo used the opportunity to demonstrate that growing support overseas for their plight would ultimately inspire outside assistance. Though Guernica nearly amounted to a PR disaster for Franco as foreign governments denounced the bombings, however, it did not disband the non-intervention agreements. Still, *El Pueblo* continued to insist that by inflicting such a hateful wound against the Basques, the heart of “el mundo entero” was finally beginning to beat as one with “la España leal,” so that it was only a matter of time before they saw reason and joined in the battle against such terrible villainy (“tan grave villanía”).²⁹⁵ *El Pueblo* frequently reiterated the same hero-villain ideology found in leftist propaganda, with the Republican government (described throughout the war as “leal,” “legítimo,” and “auténtico”) embodying goodness in the pursuit of a utopia on earth, on one side, and the Nationalist insurgents (described throughout the war as “cruel,” “violento,” “ensangrientado,” and “inhumano”) embodying pure villainy in its archaic bloodlust on the other. The article concluded by urging readers not to despair but to keep on fighting while simultaneously asserting the unity of all Republican Spain. Their shared outrage at the atrocity would push Spanish citizens to fight for the protection of “los patrimonios puros de España toda.” In asserting that victory could be attained by the persistence of just one Basque, one Spaniard, the newspaper transformed the massacre of Guernica into a collective national tragedy affecting all citizens: “mientras quede un vasco, un español, habrá patria...” (original ellipsis).²⁹⁶ Subsequently, *El Pueblo* promoted the interpretation that to be Basque meant also to be Spanish, and so long as a single Spaniard prevailed, so too did the rest of the Second Spanish Republic, which they repeatedly proved through exceptional resilience, was the undeniable destiny of Spain.

Positioned in the middle of the front page and sandwiched between reports on the “gran discurso de Fernando de los Ríos,” the editorial echoed the Republican imaginary of a Spanish state liberated from the constraints of historical evils and denounced the insurrectionists as anti-Spanish, anti-Christian, and anti-democratic. The previous day, Minister Fernando de los Ríos had declared that the rebel movement was not truly nationalist or Catholic since it acted contrary to the popular will and devastated the nation through violence and terror: “El movimiento rebelde ni es nacional, ni católico, ni de orden. ‘Un ejército, no un pueblo, se ha levantado contra la legalidad.’”²⁹⁷ Consequently, the editorial on Guernica was perfectly poised

²⁹⁵ “Guernica,” *El Pueblo*, April 29, 1937.

²⁹⁶ “Guernica,” *El Pueblo*, April 29, 1937.

²⁹⁷ “Un gran discurso de Fernando de los Ríos,” *El Pueblo*, April 29, 1937.

to highlight the horrors of Francoist atrocities against the shared cultural heritage of the Basque and Spanish peoples and the democracy they jointly fought to preserve.

It is important to note that while references were made to the casualties of war and the loss of Republican lives, *El Pueblo* concentrated coverage on confidence in government leaders and party ideologies. Interestingly, and perhaps more so than *La Vanguardia* and *ABC* Madrid, *El Pueblo* was especially concerned about readers consulting alternative news sources, as evidenced by Luis de Luna's "La Radio". Soon after declared a disgraced editor, "subrepticia," and "un Director intruso," Luna and others had discussed at great length the dangers of radio emissions from within the Republican zone that could alert the enemy to their faults and weaknesses.²⁹⁸ The following month saw the publication of multiple articles to this effect. "¡Silencio!," which as its title suggests, ordered Republicans to keep silent not just in broadcasting, but in their own homes and social circles: "Si eres antifascista, si quieres lograr el triunfo de la revolución, guarda silencio. Recuerda: 'en boca cerrada, no entran las moscas.'²⁹⁹ The potential release of compromising information was considered treason with silence being named the way to victory: "Silencio, siempre silencio, y vencerás al enemigo." In another article published after the Syndicalist Party's takeover of the newspaper on July 29, 1937, *El Pueblo* published the piece "Acabemos definitivamente con el bulo" which warned readers to be wary of fake news originating abroad which sought to weaken the Republic via the "desmoralización de la retaguardia."³⁰⁰ It criticised news of Republican losses as false and a demoralising weapon of the enemy to be resisted. In fact, *El Pueblo* rarely admitted to wartime losses. The few reports of Republican defeat were issued, not through the voice of the periodical, but rather through reprinted discourses of politicians and sanctioned government transcripts. This lack of commentary on losses also stemmed from Government prohibition of publishing accounts that did not proceed directly from official versions.³⁰¹ By locating hatred at the heart of the brutal attack on Basque nationalism and neglecting the near-immediate occupation of Guernica in its aftermath, it imagined for readers a consolidated Republican identity in which Valencians and Basques recalled a common history and heritage to protect one another from harm.

²⁹⁸ "Un fantasmón," *El Pueblo*, August 12, 1936.

²⁹⁹ "Silencio," *El Pueblo*, September 20, 1936. See also "'Mola está entrando en Madrid,'" *El Pueblo*, September 12, 1936.

³⁰⁰ *El Pueblo*, July 29, 1937.

³⁰¹ Salamanca Archives, Archivo General de la Guerra Civil Española, "Censura," 1936, 1938.

Editorial 5: “La tierra prometida”–May 12, 1938

Following a series of crushing losses in Aragon and parts of Catalonia, calls for faith in the Republican mission continued to increase in frequency and intensity, framing religious allegories and imagery in stylised literary language that was vivid and emotional. Such rhetoric appeared amid rampant anti-clerical violence in the Republican Zone, derived, in part, from Catholic leaders’ anti-reformist attitudes and their support of the military coup. As Mary Vincent stated, “the experience of the Republic had ‘fixed’ the Church as the ideological enemy of the left.”³⁰² Despite this, visions of proletarian Spain were depicted as the biblical promised land, a utopia to be realised after years of suffering and hardship. In one editorial from May, 1938 titled “La tierra prometida,” Julia C. Bazán likened the fighting Spanish nation to the ancient Hebrews of Israel: “en el momento en que la viril resistencia de los españoles va a dar en tierra con prepotencia de los invasores, el pueblo español se encuentra, como el pueblo hebreo, delante de una Tierra Prometida.”³⁰³ The difference, she asserted, was that rather than searching for a new land promised by God, Spaniards were fighting to defend the country they already inhabited, “que esta vez es su mismo suelo, dos veces reconquistado palmo a palmo.” In using the term “reconquistado,” she contributed to the Republican discourse of reinterpreting the Spanish Civil War as a contemporary Reconquista, or the glorious rescue of a Spanish homeland from wicked foreign oppressors.

Bazán’s writing combined past and present struggles, both true and imagined, into an emotional narrative of a people fighting for the future. In addition to emphasising faith in a remarkably Catholic vein, her writing set about to define the Republic as united by ideals rather than physical borders. Her style, at once passionate and refined, drew heavily from readers’ shared religious background to articulate a common mission. Specifically, Bazán elevated the Spanish Civil War to one of biblical proportions by recalling the old testament and the famed Reconquistas of the medieval period. The Republic’s calls for blind faith and unerring devotion on behalf of its citizens closely resembled, in some ways, those of the enemy. Though they differed in their primary objectives and ideologies, they were similar in their choice of allegories and analogies, reinforcing the notion that certain elements of the collective memory remained more culturally salient than others. Franco’s Nationalists had famously conceived of

³⁰² Though the Church did not participate in the planning of the military insurrection, “few doubted its guilt.” Priests, monks, and parish clergy were regularly singled out for attack and thousands of priests (4,184), as well as monks and brothers (2,365) were killed. Nuns were also targeted. See Mary Vincent, *Spain 1833-2002: People and State* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), 139.

³⁰³ Julia C. Bazan, “La tierra prometida,” *El Pueblo*, May 12, 1938.

propaganda tethered to a sense of Catholic nationalism to unify Spain and delegitimise the role of other national and ethnic identities located within their borders. This trend had been born of the counter-reformation of the “long sixteenth century” and was cemented by Church-state alliances built against the effects of liberalism in the nineteenth century, so that Christian analogies of the righteous versus the infidel were commonly recalled and disseminated in conservative messaging.³⁰⁴

The programme, labelled National Catholicism, was from its beginnings, central to the Francoist regime which based Spanish patriotism upon adherence to a Castile-oriented Catholic state. Francoist propaganda served as an extension of a national history founded in the myths surrounding medieval Visigothic conversions and the Reconquista of the early modern period. While the Spanish Republic rejected state-sanctioned Catholicism, advocating for a secular society through the separation of church and state and anti-clerical legislation, Republicans still recognised the powerful cultural sway religion held over their population. Indeed, Spain may be known to outsiders as a “nation of nations” for the unique complexities posed by its diverse ethnic and linguistic makeup, but its religious landscape was, from the late-fifteenth century, profoundly uniform. In fact, “the coercive imposition” of Catholicism in Spain was so effective compared to the rest of Europe that liberals as late as the nineteenth century mostly failed in their attempts to challenge the Church’s authority, accomplishing a secular constitution at only two brief intervals in the course of 500 years: the First Republic of 1873-1874 and the Second Republic of 1931-1939.³⁰⁵ It is unsurprising, therefore, to find that Republican news framing would have called upon the same culturally-salient Catholic analogies and metaphors in their wartime coverage, albeit to different ends, in efforts to persuade target readers of their respective values and victories.

Focus was placed on the meaning of sacrifice and its achievements. Nationalists positioned sacrifice in terms of Catholic martyrdom to restore the greatness of Western Christian civilisation (not dissimilar to the stated goals of the Counter-Reformation in which the Spanish monarchy had played a major role).³⁰⁶ The future they sought to impose amounted to the resurrection of a golden age feudalistic in structure. Republicans also exalted sacrifice,

³⁰⁴ Robert Birely, “Early-Modern Catholicism as a Response to the Changing World of the Long Sixteenth Century,” *The Catholic Historical Review* 95, no. 2 (April, 2009): 238, 239; Jorge Fernández López, “Rhetorical Theory in Sixteenth-Century Spain: A Critical Survey,” *Rhetorica: A Journal of the History of Rhetoric* 20, no. 2 (Spring, 2002), 146; Alexander Anievas and Kerem Nişancıoğlu, *How the West Came to Rule: The Geopolitical Origins of Capitalism* (London: Pluto Press, 2015), 94, 111, 114.

³⁰⁵ Cathelijne de Busser, “Church-state relations in Spain: Variations on a national theme?,” *GeoJournal* 67, no. 4 (2006): 285.

³⁰⁶ “La patriótica alocución del General Franco al iniciar el movimiento,” *ABC Sevilla*, July 23, 1936; “Sevilla en estos días,” *ABC Sevilla*, July 23, 1936.

but framed it as the means to constructing an evolved workers' society unburdened by the historical constraints of class, property, or nationalism. Bazan's passage was striking for her usage of biblical imagery, linking the Hebrew exodus from slavery in Egypt to the present war. Their wandering in the wilderness represented an epic struggle for salvation, culminating in the rebirth of the nation. In this way, Franco's Nationalists came to symbolise their sinful Egyptian slavers who sought to obstruct God's will, while the Republicans embodied divine deliverance. Just as Israel served as a metaphor for the Kingdom of God, so too did Republican Spain covert from earthly terrain to a future paradise for emancipated Spaniards. Birth often appeared as a metaphor for crisis in cultures as far back as the ancient Near East and the Hebrew Bible, pushing audiences to evaluate certain concepts in specific ways through emotional experiences. Bergman pointed out that metaphors "do not provide new information and do not aid the rational search for truth. Instead they evoke emotions in the listeners."³⁰⁷ Metaphor, much like framing, therefore, "has the power to describe reality in new ways and opens new realms of experiencing the world."³⁰⁸ Faith and religion are rarely based on reason or rational judgement, instead preferring to nurse emotional attachments between disciple and doctrine. In the case of propaganda, political discourse favours affective links which render facts either changeable or irrelevant to survive challenges. *El Pueblo* used these associations to overcome contradictions which asserted victory despite defeat and strength despite weakness. Valencian journalists recognised the power of Christian themes in a historically Catholic country to express common aspirations and stimulate national confidence in Republican success.

Despite holding anti-clerical views, *El Pueblo*'s wartime news coverage communicated Communist and Socialist ideals in Christian terms of conversion and salvation. Editorials assumed the tone of sermons, drumming up the role of faith in eventual victory, more interested in preaching to readers than informing them. Entry into the promised land thus required a kind of mass baptism that pushed citizens toward a dictated code of Republican righteousness. It was this version of paradise, here referred to as "la tierra prometida," which hung in the balance. Subsequently, the conflict was not an intra-national conflict but a war to determine the spiritual destiny of Spain. As Kalmanofsky suggests, birth metaphors in the Hebrew Bible can depict personal and universal crises that connote feelings of vulnerability and weakness, with the image of the labouring woman "capturing well the feelings associated with the threat

³⁰⁷ C. D. Bergman, *Childbirth as a metaphor for crisis: evidence from the Ancient Near East and the Hebrew Bible* (Berlin: De Gruyter, 2008), 2.

³⁰⁸ C. D. Bergman, *Childbirth as a metaphor for crisis: evidence from the Ancient Near East and the Hebrew Bible* (Berlin: De Gruyter, 2008), 5.

of military invasion.”³⁰⁹ While Christian metaphors were not uncommon in Republican coverage, few were as developed or belletristic as those incorporated into Bazán’s editorial. It should be noted that she repurposed religious faith as Republican faith, using biblical themes to criticise the “falso patriotismo” of the Fascists who, despite claiming to fight for Christendom, “no persiguen más que el privilegio, el provecho propio y la esclavitud de los demás, sin que los detenga ningún escrúpulo.”³¹⁰ In this way, Republican reporting attempted to counter propaganda claims disseminated by the enemy which pretended to espouse Christian values through highlighting the non-Christian actions and ulterior motives of the Francoist camp.

May of 1938 oversaw critical losses for the Republic, comprising a number of bitter campaigns in the north as enemy forces advanced into neighboring Catalonia, ultimately setting the stage for the catastrophic Battle of the Ebro to unfold that summer. As the seat of the regional government at war (the capital had been transferred to Barcelona late in the previous year) in a Republic showing signs of decline, Valencia sought to buttress public morale and belief to counter negative propaganda from the outside. Censors mandated messages of confidence and national unity in all coverage from the frontlines to the rearguard. According to one instructional booklet distributed by the Ministry of Propaganda later that month, officials were to avoid “los terribles factores de desmoralización”—including “la fatiga, el miedo y la ansiedad”—among the troops at all costs.³¹¹

References to regional nationalisms in the editorial were notably absent. Valencia received no special mention nor did the other cities. Castile, Catalonia, Andalusia and the rest blended together in a monolithic state of distinctly Christian inheritance. Spaniards—as opposed to the combined forces of Catalans, Basques, Galicians, Valencians, and Castilians, etc.—were described as a single (not simply unified) people participating in a single crusade, echoing formal government directives in capital letters to “SOSTENER Y AFIRMAR ESTA MAGNÍFICA UNIDAD DE TODO EL PUEBLO ESPAÑOL” (original emphasis) and guarantee a “happy ending” to the battle sustained by “nuestros heroicos combatientes.”³¹² Specifically, they fought as one for the next generation which would represent the strength and purity of the future Spanish nation by providing the necessary break with the corruption of a

³⁰⁹ Amy Kalmanofsky, “Israel’s Baby: The Horror of Childbirth in the Biblical Prophets,” *Biblical Interpretation* 16, no. 1: 66.

³¹⁰ Julia C. Bazan, “La tierra prometida,” *El Pueblo*, May 12, 1938.

³¹¹ B. F. Osorio Tafall, *El Comisario: sus métodos y formas de trabajo en el seno del ejército popular*, VIII (Ministerio de Defensa Nacional: Comisariado General del Ejército de Tierra, 1938), 35.

³¹² B. F. Osorio Tafall, *El Comisario: sus métodos y formas de trabajo en el seno del ejército popular*, VIII (Ministerio de Defensa Nacional: Comisariado General del Ejército de Tierra, 1938), 14.

decrepit social order of the past (referred to, unambiguously, as the bourgeois society). Playing up the feminine imagery of Spain, it described a virginal spirit on the battlefield desperate for protection and preservation. Consequently, the Spanish Civil War symbolised more than a national battle; it symbolised human redemption with Spain fulfilling the role of sacrificial lamb: “E irá en condiciones de implantar los nuevos ideales que inspiran a sus educadores, inspirados por los apóstoles de la redención humana.”³¹³ Appearing to break somewhat from Aznar’s early anti-militarism of 1936, Bazán connected education and war to Republican survival, stating that Spain’s youth was receiving the best possible schooling through active battle: “esta juventud, la juventud que va a poblar la España nueva, sale de la mayor escuela que puede imaginarse: la escuela del dolor y de la guerra.” Her repetition of “esta juventud,” “España nueva,” and “España futura” was key to envisioning the Republican dream and holding their focus on a time to come, distracting the public from the immediate failings of a deeply flawed Spanish Republic.

As Bergman noted: “Modern interpretations of figurative language show that metaphor is not only a matter of style, embellishing and linguistically beautifying a concept that could be described for precisely by non-metaphoric descriptive language...Metaphor is both informative and emotive; it imparts information and elicits an emotional response.”³¹⁴ Bazán’s conclusion operated to reinforce *El Pueblo*’s vision of a hopeful and unified state in the painful but necessary process of metaphysical transformation into the prophetic Promised Land: “Y al verlos entrar en la Tierra Prometida, nosotros sus progenitores habremos hecho patria, pues como dijo el pensador, nestra patria no es propiamente nuestra madre, sino nuestra hija.”³¹⁵ It is interesting that *El Pueblo* should have used a biblical narrative to communicate the socio-political philosophy of a government criticised by enemies for being anti-God and anti-Church. The re-imagining of Spain from mother to child advocated for Christian-like faith in progressive ideals, thereby framing a consistent condemnation of the imperialist past extolled by Franco. As Bazán’s writing demonstrates, childbirth was an expressive metaphor with the potential to communicate both fear and hope as it highlighted the duality of a core human experience in which pain and pleasure, terror and joy coexisted within the treacherous process of creation.

³¹³ Julia C. Bazan, “La tierra prometida,” *El Pueblo*, May 12, 1938.

³¹⁴ C. D. Bergman, *Childbirth as a metaphor for crisis: evidence from the Ancient Near East and the Hebrew Bible* (Berlin: De Gruyter, 2008), 5.

³¹⁵ Julia C. Bazan, “La tierra prometida,” *El Pueblo*, May 12, 1938.

Editorial 6: “Españoles: Con fe en el triunfo, adelante por la victoria y la independencia de la Patria invadida”—January 24, 1939

As the war progressed and Republican positions deteriorated, the role of faith became increasingly central to leftist propaganda. By 1939, the signs of decline were obvious everywhere as the Republican zone shrank day by day. The Basque Country was long gone and the Catalan Offensive in its final throes. Catalonia and Valencia, the focal points of the rear-guard, came under siege from multiple directions as the Nationalists conquered the coasts and broke through communication lines. If the Battle of the Ebro had proven devastating, the new year brought even worse news when Barcelona, a fortress city of the Republic, was decisively captured on January 26, 1939.³¹⁶ Yet regardless of these fatal setbacks, *El Pueblo* responded by printing coverage that was feverishly enthusiastic. On January 24, 1939, just forty-eight hours before the loss, it publicised “Españoles: Con fe en el triunfo, adelante por la victoria y la independencia de la Patria invadida” accompanied by spurious claims of confidence in the military leadership of General Miaja.³¹⁷ At this point, the Republican government was already preparing to relocate further north to the province of Girona despite providing official reports to the contrary.

The editorial announced that a state of war had been declared in all Republican territories, disclosing the dawn of a new and important phase in the conflict: “El gobierno de Unión Nacional, en su última reunion, acordó declarar el estado de guerra en todo el territorio de la República.” Though the government had eliminated the remaining distinctions between the frontlines and the rear-guard, thereby admitting to pessimistic developments in the war, *El Pueblo* stressed the perseverance and conviction of public resistance. The war raged on in spite of those who had betrayed their country to side with the attackers: “La lucha que mantenemos contra los traidores a su patria y los viles extranjeros que la invaden, entra en una nueva e importante fase.” In line with previous coverage, then, the newspaper vilified the Francoist forces for acting as traitors in league with foreign tyrants, continuing to frame the Spanish Civil War as a fight for national self-determination. While admitting to the gravity of the situation with the news that Catalonia had become the direct victim (“Cataluña es hoy la víctima directa”) and calling all Valencians to its defense, *El Pueblo* never conceded the imminency of the defeat at hand. Instead, it advocated for collective faith in eventual triumph and denied that

³¹⁶ *La Vanguardia*, January 27, 1939.

³¹⁷ “Españoles: Con fe en el triunfo, adelante por la victoria y la independencia de la Patria invadida,” *El Pueblo*, January 24, 1939.

the Republic was ever on the verge of total collapse: “No supone el estado de Guerra agravación a límites extremos de la situación.”³¹⁸ It framed the declaration as strategic rather than desperate, and demanded the public’s unconditional discipline, abnegation, and sacrifice for the war effort.

The theme of keeping faith starred as the only way to ensure success even as the government crumbled all around them. The severing of ties between Barcelona and the rest of the Republic isolated Valencia and the Balearic islands. Forced to fend for itself with few remaining resources, the Valencian capital knew invasion was inevitable. The editorial consequently promoted Republican confidence yet argued it already existed in abundance, suggesting a contradiction it never seemed able to resolve. On the one hand it depicted optimism as high, claiming the morale of the Spanish people had been fortified by the many trials, tribulations, and setbacks of war, while on the other it made constant reference to the need to boost citizen confidence in order to cement a far-off victory. It called for trust in General Miaja, the newly appointed head of the Republican armed forces, and for the “splendid collaboration” (“colaboración espléndida”) between soldiers and civilians, but he emphasised such collaboration as uniquely Valencian (“singularmente el valenciano”). In stressing local anxieties, *El Pueblo* channelled readers’ negative emotions—especially fear, terror, anger, and desperation—into more positive feelings of confidence and faith in a long-expired triumph. The editorial concluded with the characteristic expectations of loyalty and conviction, moulding together Spain’s various regions into a single Republican entity: “Adelante, españoles. Todo por la victoria y por la independencia de España.”³¹⁹ Identified as Spaniards above all else, it privileged Spain over individual regions, thereby depicting a unified homeland warding off foreign mercenaries. It praised Barcelona for modelling Republican stamina to prepare Valencia for the hardships of the upcoming Francoist assault, framing a bonded peninsular people. Such passionate references to the Fascist invasion of “la tierra rica catalana, el más alto exponente hoy de la República” alongside examples of Valencian resilience served to reinforce Spaniards’ sense of kinship as a pluricultural but undivided and unbreakable people.

The conception of sacrifice as vital to achieving victory became particularly prominent in *El Pueblo*’s news framing toward the conclusion of the Battle of the Ebro. Though the campaign made promising gains in its early phases, they were unsustainable and turned into a

³¹⁸ Españoles: Con fe en el triunfo, adelante por la victoria y la independencia de la Patria invadida,” *El Pueblo*, January 24, 1939.

³¹⁹ Españoles: Con fe en el triunfo, adelante por la victoria y la independencia de la Patria invadida,” *El Pueblo*, January 24, 1939.

catastrophe when the rebel forces halved the Republican zone. By November, 1938, it was such a lost cause that not even propaganda tried to deny it (not entirely, at least). Instead, news reporting focused on advances in other regions and accelerated their desperate pleas to the international community (primarily, the “países democráticos”³²⁰ of France, Britain, Canada, and the United States) as journalists and their editors attempted to minimise the blow to citizen morale. Editorials claimed that despite having lost the battle they could still win the war, downplaying the damages and reorienting readers toward insignificant wins in other areas. It is unsurprising, therefore, that the theme of sacrifice should have become dominant in later coverage or relied so heavily upon the concept of Republican fervour. To repeat Kuypers, the way something is said is of equal importance to the content of what is said.³²¹ To this effect, *El Pueblo* made rhetorical pleas to the hopes of a besieged and suffering people in a ruinous situation. Indeed, the newspaper had previously argued that despite the lack of scientific evidence to support their cause, popular belief would carry the Second Republic to a metaphorical Eden. It emphasised the portrayal of a collective noble spirit tenacious enough to overcome the obstacles.

In one editorial from mid-November, *El Pueblo* guided audiences through the routine praises of Republican values, never admitting to the possibility of losing the war. Though it appeared to acknowledge selective Republican losses in the Battle of the Ebro, it assured readers that what they failed to gain in physical space they gained in time: “y vamos venciendo en el tiempo aun cuando no avancemos en espacio, y ello maniene nuestra esperanza de salir de la contienda entre ruinas; pero capaces aun de dirigir nuestro futuro y hacer nuestro hogar.”³²² *El Pueblo* reflected on the darkness of the present but reiterated promises for the future, complimented the national dignity, and refused to surrender to the evils of totalitarianism. It would be their sustained faith in providence, their unwavering belief in the Republican dream that would ultimately guarantee their success. It argued that the rearguard, though “martirizada por los bombardeos y las privaciones y el dolor de la sangre,” still preserved enough morale to suffer greater hardships and prevail. The will to victory alone was sufficient to overthrow the Nationalists and other foreign agitators despite their access to superior military technologies and finances. The adoption of martyr imagery framed the war’s victims as the casualties of a necessary battle against persecution in the service of the

³²⁰ Salamanca Archives, Archivo General de la Guerra Civil Española, “Censura,” 1938.

³²¹ Jim A. Kuypers, “Framing Analysis from a Rhetorical Perspective,” in *Doing News Framing Analysis: Empirical and Theoretical Perspectives*, Ed. Jim A. Kuypers and Paul D’Angelo (New York: Routledge, 2010), 301.

³²² “El Sacrificio de España,” *El Pueblo*, November 14, 1938.

motherland and operated on a religious level in the portrayal of the Republican faithful blessed by the divine. The rhetoric insisted their sacrifice and devotion would eventually wear down the enemy until the Fascists respected, at long last, the legitimacy and independence of the Spanish Republic. The binary of past and future as opposing forces with the former representing oppression and the latter representing liberty was used to depict a Republican dream of freedom and equality. Spain's martyrdom therefore served as the people's escape from a historical prison ("la prisión histórica") that had entrapped them for centuries. Such imagery reinforced the notion that the results of the Spanish Civil War impacted far more than the immediate sovereignty of a lone Iberian nation: it also determined, quite literally, the fate of the world.

Despite having originally been based upon the idea of educating readers and gradually liberalising Spanish society toward Republican reforms, *El Pueblo* swerved deeper into the realm of propaganda following the declaration of the Second Spanish Republic when its party sponsors and affiliates came to exercise real political power.³²³ As a Republican publication it had always been proud of its political bias, but with the change of government in 1931, the newspaper's tune also changed from that of the marginalised rebel to that of the mainstream or "diario de la situación."³²⁴ This shift in status from critic to supporter of the new government marked the beginning of a more propagandistic period in the life of the newspaper which expanded under Communist and anarcho-syndicalist control between 1936 and 1939. As Laguna noted, *El Pueblo* assumed an almost religious-sounding discourse in spite of the anti-clerical views held by its associates: "Ellos, tan anticlericales, sustituían los símbolos de la religión cristiana por otros, formalmente laicos, pero en el fondo equivalentes a una nueva religión."³²⁵ In response to worsening crises on the road to collapse, the tone of propaganda intensified in fervour to advertise confidence and idealism. Its symbolism became progressively more biblical over the course of the war as *El Pueblo* dressed messaging in themes of evangelism, paradise, and Christian sacrifice to highlight a common thread that bonded Spain's pluricultural base, elevated the Republican cause, and resonated with readers of a predominately Catholic background.

³²³ Antonio Laguna Platero, *El Pueblo: Historia de un diario republicano, 1894-1939* (Valencia: Institució Alfons el Mangnànim, 1999), 331.

³²⁴ Antonio Laguna Platero, *El Pueblo: Historia de un diario republicano, 1894-1939* (Valencia: Institució Alfons el Mangnànim, 1999), 365.

³²⁵ Antonio Laguna Platero, *El Pueblo: Historia de un diario republicano, 1894-1939* (Valencia: Institució Alfons el Mangnànim, 1999), 366.

Conclusion

Like its contemporaries, *El Pueblo*'s coverage was more passionate than informative. It preached enthusiasm for the Republican government with bombastic language of military triumphs, progressive reforms, and calls for loyalty to the regime. Those who doubted the government, even momentarily, were explicitly branded the greatest threat to the war effort.³²⁶ From 1936 to 1939, Republican doctrine in the Valencia-based publication interpreted the Spanish Civil War as the sustained Spanish resistance to foreign domination and capitalist exploitation, while Nationalist propaganda argued for a national take-back to stamp out the corrupting influences of socialism and other modernist ideologies and reforms. Each articulated their mission in terms of a renewed Reconquista to galvanise audiences, labelling opponents cold-blooded traitors undeserving of mercy or compromise. *El Pueblo*'s war-time coverage consistently invoked the war of independence frame, but surpassed mainstream Republican coverage in framing all of "los sublevados" as anti-Spanish agents. As the Aragon Offensive raged on and matters began to look increasingly pessimistic for Republican forces and their allies, the frame of a unified Spain against foreign invasion intensified. In tying the Republican struggle to the epic dimensions of the Reconquista, a series of military campaigns long celebrated as the rescue of European Christians from Islamic colonisers, *El Pueblo* utilised selective tropes from the nation's historical imagination. As Krauel noted, perceptions of 1492 were hardly uniform regarding Columbus and the empire, but they unfailingly elicited strong responses from Spanish citizens. During the Spanish Civil War when "the moral identity forged by imperial pride sunk into abjection," the theme of overcoming a greater enemy in the peninsula to reclaim the Spanish homeland was commonly featured in literary and political accounts to powerful affect.³²⁷ This imagery of the Reconquista was bolstered in Republican propaganda with accounts of the Moroccan legions led by Franco and the atrocities committed in his name in the occupied zone, likening them to the Islamic enemies of the middle ages and encouraging mass resistance.

El Pueblo navigated a minefield of political strife and wartime censorship which stipulated acceptable themes and topics of coverage, forbid criticism of allies (real and potential), and promoted a unified national imaginary among an increasingly fractious readership. To invigorate their base, the Spanish Republican administration issued a call for

³²⁶ "Los cuervos de la revolución," *El Pueblo*, November 29, 1936.

³²⁷ Javier Krauel, *Imperial Emotions: Cultural Responses to Myths of Empire in Fin-de-Siècle Spain* (Liverpool: Liverpool University Press, 2013), 177-179.

propaganda to conceive of a united and victorious Spain, one newspapers answered by lacing news reports with passionate commentaries on cultural memory recalling motifs of the medieval *fueros*, the Reconquista, and the Spanish war of independence, ultimately fusing the epic tales of Castile and Valencia into a single, continuous crusade. Newspapers help spread these national histories through the narration of a collective past and a collective present to infuse readers with a sense of destiny and purpose. Consequently, frames and emotions are inevitably intertwined as they seek to persuade an audience without appearing too forceful. Since the processing of knowledge is inevitably social, emotion at once enables and shapes the communication between individuals. *El Pueblo* thereby framed the war in tactical dimensions made powerful by invoking emotional attachments to selective aspects of a common history³²⁸ and exploiting popular myths that featured prominently in the national imagination.

My analysis reveals that *El Pueblo*'s war-time frames were comprised of three points. First, they emphasised the legitimacy of the Republican government as the authentic representative of Spain in opposition to traitorous mercenaries. Second, they articulated the conflict as an epic world battle against a rising evil fought on Spanish soil and necessitating the unification of a pluricultural country. Third, they upheld victory as imminent and inevitable in the quest to promote faith in a besieged Republic that was, in many respects, at a tactical disadvantage from the start. *El Pueblo* constructed a national imaginary founded upon the supposedly unbreakable spirit of Spanish nationalism which always overcame the odds to reclaim its liberties: from the various Reconquistas of the twelfth through fifteenth centuries to the rejection of French occupation in the nineteenth century to the resistance to Fascist aggression in the twentieth century.

El Pueblo conceived of a proletarian utopia transformed from within by the will of the people. It argued that Spanish unity in the face of adversity testified to the nation's strength and greatness as citizens defended their right to self-rule. Contributors produced a national imaginary built upon tales of glory and heroism to justify loyalty to the Republic, consistently repeating descriptors like "defensa," "patriotismo," "lucha," "heroica," "reconquistando," and "libertad" to position the Republic as the benevolent protector of Spanish cultures, freedoms, and sovereignty. *El Pueblo* framed the war in terms of a defense of *all* peninsular peoples— inclusive of Basques, Valencians, Catalans, and Castilians—against a greater foe, what it named

³²⁸ Umut Uzer described a similar phenomenon in Neo-Ottomanist rhetoric of the AKP in contemporary Turkish politics. See Umut Uzer, "Conservative Narrative: Contemporary Neo-Ottomanist Approaches in Turkish Politics," *Middle East Critique* 29, no. 3 (2020): 276-277.

“el enemigo común... las castas feudales de España.”³²⁹ The rallying cries of “España para los españoles,” “Hacia la reconquista de nuestra patria,”³³⁰ and “Independencia” actively redefined a civil war as the prelude to a second world war. Such calls were not directed at local readers alone, but also at potential allies abroad who had signed the non-intervention pact naming the conflict in Spain an isolated incident outside of international concern.

Multiculturalism theorists Jacob T. Levy and Rogers Brubaker have contended that such nationalising rhetoric is not necessarily indicative of a truly pro-multiculturalist stance, but sometimes is intended to undermine minority identities by shifting loyalties from state-seeking areas to a generalised or more dominant entity.³³¹ This notion can also be applied to Republican conceptions of pluriculturalism, as Spain remained intact at the highest levels of governance and demanded supreme allegiance while Valencia, Catalonia, the Basque Country, and Galicia assumed the status of autonomous communities. However, it appears that the Spanish Republic, while unabashedly committed to preserving Spain as a fully unified entity, was genuine in its pledge to respect a pluralist society to a degree unprecedented since the middle ages (when the land was comprised of disparate feudal kingdoms) by legally recognising certain regional groups as entitled to autonomous privileges even if politically linked to Madrid.³³² Specifically, Republican news discourses acknowledged that these identities mattered in the public sphere, were deserving of government representation, and formed a fundamental part of the greater Spanish state.

While *El Pueblo* acknowledged the pluricultural roots of Spain, then, it combined them into a unified national imaginary, framing the Spanish Civil War as the fight for a fair and egalitarian homeland. It extracted selective aspects of the peninsular history to inspire collective action, urging citizens on in a new and singular Reconquista. Labanyi stated that because reason and emotion cannot be kept separate, then “Perhaps we are in the presence of the marks of affect when we encounter particular intensities at the level of sensation or emotion, or indeed at the level of reasoned argument—what we refer to as ‘passionate’ conviction.”³³³ To this end, *El Pueblo* did not focus on the impartial communication of facts and figures—most of which had become decisively unfavourable to the Republican cause—but instead framed

³²⁹ “El Frente Popular Provincial, al pueblo valenciano,” *El Pueblo*, May 12, 1938.

³³⁰ “Hacia la Reconquista de nuestra Patria,” *El Pueblo*, April 9, 1938.

³³¹ Jacob T. Levy, *The Multiculturalism of Fear* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), 73-74.; Rogers Brubaker, *Nationalism Reframed: Nationhood and the National Question in the New Europe* (Cambridge University Press, 1996).

³³² Charles Taylor, “The Politics of Recognition” in *Multiculturalism: Examining the Politics of Recognition*, Ed. Amy Gutmann (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994), 26-28.

³³³ Jo Labanyi, “Doing Things: Emotion, Affect, and Materiality,” *Journal of Spanish Cultural Studies* 11, no. 3-4 (2010): 230-231.

passionate political sermons intended to infuse readers with love for and belief in the Republican mission, or to communicate the message that today's resistance proved tomorrow's victory: "Resistir hoy, es la victoria de mañana."³³⁴ The Spanish War of Independence against the French, no less than the peninsular unification of 1492, was long viewed as an instrumental component in the national mythology. Considered to be "the last occasion on which all Spaniards had been united in an unmistakably national enterprise" before being divided into the detrimental "dos Españas" for nearly two centuries of civil war and political unrest, the parallels between 1808 and 1936 featured prominently in the periodical discourses of the era.³³⁵ Thus bonded by a common history of pain and oppression, the Second Spanish Republic envisioned a collective destiny, collaborating with newspapers like *El Pueblo* to propagate its dreams for the future. Brouwer and Asen, among others, have pointed out that "the public organizes through metaphor."³³⁶ Further, "key metaphors invoke fundamental perspectives and normative frameworks...metaphors render events and contexts intelligible and commit us to particular values and beliefs, highlighting some conceptual connections while obscuring others." The same may be said of allegory, as nations look to the past for inspiration in moments of crisis to formulate ideological agendas, both old and new, in a constantly evolving rhetorical process intended to captivate and persuade audiences. *El Pueblo* mobilised propaganda in news discourse through vivid recollection of examples of Spanish unification and perseverance, drawing upon popular myths of heroism and conquest to invoke emotions of pride, hope, and courage amid the abject terrors of war.

³³⁴ *El Pueblo*, April 9, 1938.

³³⁵ Paloma Aguilar and Carlsen Humlebæk, "Collective Memory and National Identity in the Spanish Democracy: Legacies of Francoism and the Civil War," *History and Memory* 14, no. 1-2 (Spring-Winter, 2002): 127.

³³⁶ Daniel C. Brouwer and Robert Asen, "Introduction: Public Modalities, or the Metaphors We Theorize By," in *Public Modalities: Rhetoric, Culture, Media, and the Shape of Public Life*. Ed. Daniel C. Brouwer and Robert Asen (Tuscaloosa: University of Alabama Press, 2010), 1-3.

Chapter 3: In Defense of the Republic: *La Vanguardia's* plea for unity in Barcelona in the Spanish Civil War (1936-1939)

Background

Barcelona's most prominent newspaper, *La Vanguardia*, used its pages to frame a discursive challenge to fascism and its allies during the Spanish Civil War even when it became clear defeat was imminent. Its contributors made a desperate plea from the front lines for democratic values, not just to the struggling locals or to the international community they still sought to recruit, but to future generations of Spaniards. On September 10, 1936, in a striking break with the past, *La Vanguardia* extended its headline to designate itself "al servicio de la democracia," and argued for the newfound rights of women, minorities, and workers.³³⁷ The themes crafted by *La Vanguardia* revealed a telling aspect of the Republican political discourse, that of complete faith in a revolutionary future which guaranteed justice and liberty for a people still to come. Sebastiaan Faber, quoting Preston, has stated: "the military conflict in Spain gave rise to a 'war of words'...a discursive battle that was fought within Spain as much as outside it."³³⁸ *La Vanguardia* was an active participant in this "war of words" attempting not only to defend the popularly elected government of Spain but also to redefine the image and character of an entire nation for readers at home and abroad.

Originally launched as the self-proclaimed mouthpiece of the Constitutionalist party in 1882, *La Vanguardia* underwent a profound transformation in 1888 in efforts to embody the standards of quality journalism as modelled after the British publication *The Times*, and announced political independence.³³⁹ As Pol Dalmau has illustrated in his history of the newspaper, the line drawn between independent journalism and party affiliation was constantly renegotiated as the wealthy Godó family strove to keep the paper not just profitable and influential, but also in line with the family's conservative ideals.³⁴⁰ Notably, it promoted Spanish colonialism, protective tariffs on trade, and the concept of dual patriotism, or the harmonious coexistence of Catalan and Spanish identities with fierce opposition to the rise of

³³⁷ *La Vanguardia*, September 10, 1936.

³³⁸ Sebastiaan Faber, *Anglo-American Hispanists and the Spanish Civil War: Hispanophilia, Commitment, and Discipline* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008), 215; Paul Preston, "Introduction," in *Revolution and War in Spain, 1931-1939*, Ed. Paul Preston (London and New York: Routledge, 1984), 1.

³³⁹ Pol Dalmau, *Press, Politics, and National Identities in Catalonia: The Transformation of La Vanguardia, 1881-1931* (Brighton: Sussex Academic Press, 2019), 13, 38-39, 42.

³⁴⁰ "España y Marruecos," *La Vanguardia*, October 8, 1893; "Marruecos," *La Vanguardia*, October 8, 1893. "Información política y general de sus corresponsales particulares," *La Vanguardia*, August 15, 1898; Pol Dalmau, *Press, Politics, and National Identities in Catalonia: The Transformation of La Vanguardia, 1881-1931* (Brighton: Sussex Academic Press, 2019), 136, 137.

regional separatism.³⁴¹ After Republican seizure at the start of the Spanish Civil War in July 1936, however, the newspaper dawned overnight a new voice and agenda. The Godós fled to Italy, where they remained until the end of the war, at which point they renamed the periodical *La Vanguardia Española*, apparently to voice support for Franco's monolithic conception of Spanish national identity.³⁴² Faber has argued, "from the moment of its outbreak, the Spanish Civil War gave rise to a discourse in which passion overshadowed reason. Being detached or dispassionate, it seemed, was not an option."³⁴³ Thus reformed, *La Vanguardia* was launched into the discursive battleground of the war to promote the defense of the Second Spanish Republic.

This was no easy task as Barcelona represented, at the time, an extreme example of Republican disorder. Riots erupted on a regular basis, mobs ran rampant, and an atmosphere of suspicion overwhelmed the city. Radical socialists challenged less-radical socialists, Communists attacked Anarchists, and Anarchists assailed liberals and progressives, so that Barcelona acquired a reputation for chaos. Strikes periodically disrupted operations, leading to the infamous "May Days" of 1937, during which rival party factions viciously fought one another in the streets for control of the local government in a series of vicious confrontations throughout the city.³⁴⁴ To counter this trend, the newspaper sought to frame a national imaginary—a fraternal link between Catalonia and the rest of Spain—through a reinterpretation of Spain's contentious national history. Its reports and editorials often prioritised sieges of sites and monuments of cultural prestige over the Catalanist movements coursing throughout the region so that *La Vanguardia* re-contextualised the past and transformed it into a contemporary symbol of national liberation and unity.³⁴⁵

La Vanguardia's reporting opposed a series of divisive issues threatening Barcelona's survival in wartime, including the destructive confrontations between Socialist and Anarchist unions and the rise of separatist movements. Anarchism exercised a particularly powerful

³⁴¹ Pol Dalmau, *Press, Politics, and National Identities in Catalonia: The Transformation of La Vanguardia, 1881-1931* (Brighton: Sussex Academic Press, 2019), 72-81, 146, 196, 197.

³⁴² *La Vanguardia*, January 27, 1939; Pol Dalmau, *Press, Politics, and National Identities in Catalonia: The Transformation of La Vanguardia, 1881-1931* (Brighton: Sussex Academic Press, 2019), 192.

³⁴³ Sebastiaan Faber, *Anglo-American Hispanists and the Spanish Civil War: Hispanophilia, Commitment, and Discipline* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008), 215; Paul Preston, "Introduction," in *Revolution and War in Spain, 1931-1939*, Ed. Paul Preston (London and New York: Routledge, 1984), 3.

³⁴⁴ Helen Graham, *The Spanish Republic at War, 1936-1939* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), 270; Francisco J. Romero Salvadó, *The Spanish Civil War: Origins, Course and Outcomes* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005), 139-142; George Esenwein and Adrian Shubert, *Spain at War: The Spanish Civil War in Context, 1931-1939* (Longman: London and New York, 1995), 217-224.

³⁴⁵ Major examples include the Siege of the Alcázar of Toledo (1936), the bombing of Guernica (1937), and the Siege of Bilbao (1938).

influence in Catalonia, with Confederación Nacional de Trabajo (CNT) perceived to pose a greater threat there to Communist hegemony under Unión General de Trabajo (UGT) than in other areas.³⁴⁶ It effectively positioned Barcelona at the centre of conflict by cultivating the image of a unified city racing toward victory and summarised the war as an age-old battle between two forces and two ideologies: the foreign invaders against the Spanish, the old regime against the new order at a time when the Republic “advocated a vast programme of reforms that, its members believed, could only survive if accompanied by a profound cultural transformation.”³⁴⁷ Interestingly, *La Vanguardia* contributed an additional dimension to its coverage by not denying the fratricidal conflicts characterising Barcelona’s history.³⁴⁸ In so doing, it acknowledged that despite the national and regional divisions within Spain, the present was a recurring struggle for independence against foreign invaders as opposed to the eruption of a purely internal domestic dispute.³⁴⁹ Furthermore, by continuing the newspaper’s tradition of publishing in Castilian Spanish in a Catalan city despite the radical changes in tone and leadership, *La Vanguardia* issued a powerful message of solidarity with Republican leadership in Madrid. It also maintained the ability to engage a more diverse readership through the promotion of a common language, perhaps intending to transform a centuries-old symbol of hegemony into a positive tool for pluricultural unity and inclusivity.

Most news publications of the period in Catalonia appeared in Castilian Spanish, but those in Catalan enjoyed increasing popularity in the early twentieth century.³⁵⁰ The number of Catalan-language publications experienced a notable decline, however, in the immediate aftermath of the coup as radical groups and collectives seized facilities throughout the country, redistributed resources, and prioritised their own messaging. *La Vanguardia* had published, since its beginnings, in Castilian Spanish, and survived among the newspapers ultimately permitted to continue throughout the war under the same title and format.³⁵¹ As previously mentioned, *La Vanguardia* was born of the political ambitions of the Godó family and published in Castilian to reach a wider audience, acquire national prestige, and reinforce certain

³⁴⁶ Martin Blinkhorn, *Democracy and Civil War in Spain: 1931-1939* (London and New York: Routledge, 1988, 10-11.

³⁴⁷ Francisco J. Romero Salvadó, *The Spanish Civil War: Origins, Course and Outcomes* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005), 29.

³⁴⁸ “Triunfo de la legalidad,” *La Vanguardia*, July 22, 1936.

³⁴⁹ George Esenwein and Adrian Shubert demonstrate that this was a common theme in Republican propaganda during the war in *Spain at War: The Spanish Civil War in Context, 1931-1939* (Longman: London and New York, 1995), 245.

³⁵⁰ Josep. M. Figueres, *Prensa i Nacionalisme: el periodisme en la reconstrucció de la identitat catalana* (Barcelona: Pòrtic, 2002), 176, 177.

³⁵¹ Josep. M. Figueres, *Prensa i Nacionalisme: el periodisme en la reconstrucció de la identitat catalana* (Barcelona: Pòrtic, 2002), 176-177.

conservative values (especially in opposition to the Lliga Catalana). The war's outbreak induced sudden changes in its command and politics. Under new leadership, the newspaper attempted to bridge competing leftist views into a single objective for Republican progress and prosperity. Castilian was kept as the primary language, yet contributors appear to have intended its usage as supportive rather than threatening to Catalan language, culture, and values. I therefore analyse the unique position of a Spanish-language newspaper operating in Barcelona during the Spanish Civil War, the ongoing dialogue of what constitutes national identity in Spain, and the critical role(s) assumed by the press in wartime.

La Vanguardia's presentation of the Republican national image was shaped by multiple factors, including material restrictions, violent conflict, financial crises due to steep inflation, and the suppression of information. Newspapers may have multiple audiences, including groups they intended to inform or persuade as well as unintended groups such as outsiders or opponents. In this way, newspapers run the risk of revealing unsavoury truths concerning the state of affairs to the enemy in war. *La Vanguardia* may have framed its coverage for Spanish and Catalan locals and sympathetic foreigners, but it was also read throughout Spain and distributed as far as the French border. Even before the war, former editor Gaziel had commented on its popularity among members of different classes from Barcelona to the edge of the Pyrenees and the Ebro delta.³⁵² The status it had acquired by 1936 as a quality newspaper and its wide circulation suggest it was read by Falangist opponents, who could have scoured it for hints of decline or weakness in the Republican zone. Such concerns surrounding the dissemination of information led to strict government oversight and censorship of news production. In Spain, there were occasions when supply deficits prompted the government to deny paper to "la prensa no encasillada" (the term applied to the unaffiliated press), threatening the continuation of numerous Barcelona-based newspapers, including *La Vanguardia*.³⁵³ As the government sought to conserve valuable resources, it restricted materials to newspapers not identified with a political party. Following the first attack on Madrid on November 7, 1936, *La Vanguardia* was forced to defend its existence in an editorial titled "En defensa propia" in which it made a compelling case for its survival by linking its mission to the survival of the Spanish nation.³⁵⁴

Having boasted political independence since 1888, *La Vanguardia* recognised that the

³⁵² Gaziel, *Una història de La Vanguardia: 1884-1936* (Paris: Edicions catalanes de París, 1971), 72.

³⁵³ "En defensa propia," *La Vanguardia*, November 7, 1936.

³⁵⁴ "En defensa propia," *La Vanguardia*, November 7, 1936.

new restrictions posed a serious threat to its existence or what it termed “peligro de muerte”.³⁵⁵ As paper is the life-blood of a newspaper, *La Vanguardia* equated it to food and argued that since one would not deny basic sustenance to some citizens over others if they were truly considered equal, then the independent press also deserved fundamental resources. It questioned the policy of suspending “la publicación de los periódicos diarios no afiliados a ningún partido, aunque lealmente, después del 19 de julio, vienen defendiendo la nueva situación” in light of the fact that the CNT made no objection to recruiting unaffiliated soldiers into their militias. It further criticised the policy which did not account for the popularity or influence of a newspaper. Because organisations and workers’ unions had taken control of most of Barcelona on a scale unseen in other Republican cities in the wake of the military coup, newspapers unable to claim their patronage came under threat of discontinuation. Though seized by a workers’ collective in late-July, 1936, *La Vanguardia* was not attached to a single political entity so that it was forced to justify its role in the national revolution.

As *La Vanguardia* claimed to have a strong readership deserving of representation, even if supposedly nonpartisan, its contributors contended that the arbitrary application of this policy would ultimately promote a single-sided version of events, or “de un radicalismo tan acomodado a la visión unilateral del conflicto.”³⁵⁶ Here it played to the strength of its established base and international reputation. As a periodical crossing party lines and national borders, *La Vanguardia* was accessible to a global audience to which it reported a less dangerous message than other potentially extreme political newspapers. That is, it argued that the Spanish Revolution did not endanger the stability of other nations, but strengthened democratic causes worldwide. It endorsed the protection of the independent press, demonstrating it capable of promoting a message serving the government in two ways: first, by holding Spain together in the face of adversity and second, by using its prestige to build international support for the Spanish Republic. In this way, it indicated that “la prensa no encasillada” was vital not only to the Republican war effort but also to the creation of a new and just society based upon the promise of equality for all:

La revolución, por supuesto, no se ha hecho sólo para cambiar el orden de los factores, poniendo arriba lo de abajo y abajo lo de arriba. Se ha hecho, se hace, mejor dicho, con la ilusión de establecer la igualdad para todos. Leales servidores de este ideal, alimentado durante siglos por los que sufrieron sed de justicia, en su triunfo tenemos puestas nuestras esperanzas.

³⁵⁵ “En defensa propia,” *La Vanguardia*, November 7, 1936.

³⁵⁶ “En defensa propia,” *La Vanguardia*, November 7, 1936.

La Vanguardia thus implied that “la prensa no encasillada” contributed a necessary account of the conflict, and assured critics that a lack of party affiliation should not be interpreted as disloyalty to the cause or its government. In likening the independent press to the local military recruits who defended the popular government regardless of party membership,³⁵⁷ *La Vanguardia* justified its place in the discursive battleground of competing narratives for Spanish identity.

Methods

In light of these challenges, this chapter examines four editorials printed at critical moments in the war that show how *La Vanguardia* forged the notion of a common history in a culturally and linguistically diverse nation by investigating the circumstances in which it published and by examining the wartime objectives influencing its news coverage. I selected articles from *La Vanguardia*'s opening pages based upon their proximity to major events during the war which attracted the leading coverage of the day, such as the declaration of the insurrection in July 1936, the loss of the Alcázar of Toledo in September 1936, the bombing of Guernica and the offensive against Bilbao in April-May of 1937, and the final Siege of Barcelona in January 1939. These were focal points in Republican newspapers like *La Vanguardia* and they exposed contradictions in official messaging. For example, despite acknowledging a militarist insurrection composed of prominent Spaniards, they declared the Republic was secure; they claimed most of Spain remained in loyalist hands despite lamenting large enemy gains in Andalusia; they asserted the Republican army was stronger despite soldiers' lack of training and weaponry; they stated that the incredible losses suffered at the Battle of the Ebro embodied a successful military campaign. *La Vanguardia* modelled news themes designed to promote Republican ideology and authority in a moment of extreme divisions. It portrayed Spain as a united homeland, fascism as the arch enemy of liberty, the benefits of Republican progress and achievement, Republican laws as representative of the will of the people, the Spanish Civil War as the prelude to a Second World War, and a unified resistance as the key to victory. These portrayals were intended to evoke a platform of shared cultural struggles, experiences, and hopes among a terrorised populace suddenly launched into a violent and oppressive civil war.

Following the work of Wodak, et al., I interrogate the Spanish Republican national imaginary as a “founding myth” which attempts to establish the roots of a nation outside living

³⁵⁷ “En defensa propia,” *La Vanguardia*, November 7, 1936.

memory to consolidate members of a group.³⁵⁸ National identities are the result of a “discursive construction” that aims to impose a sense of order upon the surrounding world.³⁵⁹ Though on opposite sides of the political spectrum, both pro-Republicans and pro-Nationalists condensed their representations of the Spanish Civil War into a two-dimensional struggle “characterised on the left as an encounter between the forces of fascism and democracy and on the right as one between Christian civilisation and Communist barbarism.”³⁶⁰ Drawing upon Benedict Anderson’s concept of imagined communities³⁶¹ in relation to Jim A. Kuypers’ concept of news frames,³⁶² I use textual analysis to illuminate the ways in which the Republican press attempted to construct a unified Spanish community from a discordant past in the hopes of ensuring a shared Republican future. The benefit of combining these theories enriches the understanding of Republican rhetoric during the Spanish Civil War and contributes an original lens for the analysis of news discourse at a turning point in European history. The following sections trace *La Vanguardia*’s creation of a national imaginary in which all the regions of Spain formed a pluricultural but strongly unified anti-fascist state.

Culture has long been acknowledged in the humanities and social sciences as “integral to how social actors conceive their own identities, build communities, draw group boundaries, and claim rights.”³⁶³ A distinctive region with a distinctive language and history, Catalonia has, for centuries, occupied a unique position within Spain, thus rendering its capital an important representative of pluricultural interests. Because spatial definitions and the continuation (or reformation) of national image(s) factor into the framing of national imaginaries in newspaper discourse, this chapter accounts for the pluricultural and plurilingual nature of the Spanish periphery in wartime *La Vanguardia*. Pluriculturalism describes the coexistence of distinct national or cultural groups occupying a space with overlapping boundaries. Generally, certain groups become dominant over others, using myth-making “to establish the sole way of ordering the world and defining world-views” and asserting that holding a monopoly is vital to the

³⁵⁸ Ruth Wodak, et al., *The Discursive Construction of National Identity* (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2009), 24, 31.

³⁵⁹ Ruth Wodak, et al., *The Discursive Construction of National Identity* (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2009), 1-6.

³⁶⁰ George Esenwein and Adrian Shubert, *Spain at War: The Spanish Civil War in Context, 1931-1939* (Longman: London and New York, 1995), 2.

³⁶¹ Benedict Anderson, *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism* (London: Verso, 1983).

³⁶² Jim A. Kuypers, “Framing Analysis from a Rhetorical Perspective,” *Doing News Framing Analysis: Empirical and Theoretical Perspectives*, Ed. Jim A. Kuypers and Paul D’Angelo (New York: Routledge, 2010), 286-311.

³⁶³ Carola Lentz, “The Making, Unmaking and Remaking of an Anthropological Concept,” *Zeitschrift Für Ethnologie* 142, no. 2 (2017): 181.

sustained existence of a community.³⁶⁴ Pluriculturalists reject this view, arguing in favour of the cultural enrichment of diversity. For centuries, Castilian Spain overshadowed peripheral territories, leading to a renewed decentralist movement in the founding of the Second Spanish Republic which had committed to the recognition of regional languages, expanded cultural liberties, and limited self-rule. To this end, the newspaper promoted a sense of kinship among the capital cities of Spain by describing them as pillars of Spanish history and identity. For the purpose of this chapter, I build on Charles Taylor's "discourse of recognition" to define pluriculturalism as the protection and promotion of the right for multiple cultures to thrive in a shared geographic space as secured by national or intranational political frameworks.³⁶⁵ While the extent of the pluriculturalist aims of the Second Spanish Republic remain heavily disputed, it undoubtedly offered more opportunities for minority cultural and linguistic representation in Spain than the Francoist or Primo de Rivera dictatorships between which it was sandwiched.

I argue that newspapers play an important role in the construction and dissemination of national histories and identities as they explain, consciously and unconsciously, the news they report. Consciously, they frame events in ways that favour their benefactors or political affiliations. Unconsciously, they frame events in ways that highlight or subvert their own prejudices and ideologies. In the case of *La Vanguardia*, coverage spoke favourably of Republican officials and elevated the struggle of the proletariat to downplay regional rivalries in accordance with the regime's ideals. As Wodak et al. argue, national identity implies "a complex of similar conceptions and perceptual schemata, of similar emotional dispositions and attitudes, and of similar behavioural conventions, which bearers of this 'national identity' share collectively and which they have internalised through socialisation." They contend that because history is inevitably linked to the present as well as the future, then one cannot understand the future without referring to specific pasts or histories.³⁶⁶ Schöpflin asserts that myths function as a method for collectives, especially nations, "to establish and determine the boundaries of their own being, their own systems of morality and values." He defines myths as a collection of beliefs generally constructed as part of a narrative which a community holds about itself. Even when the artificial roots of narratives appear evident, they do not necessarily diminish their persuasive power as myths relate to the so-called essence of a group and conception of

³⁶⁴ George Schöpflin, "The Functions of Myth and a Taxonomy of Myths," in *Myths and Nationhood*, Ed. Geoffrey Hosking and George Schöpflin (London: Hurst & Company, 1997), 20.

³⁶⁵ Charles Taylor, "The Politics of Recognition" in *Multiculturalism: Examining the Politics of Recognition*, Ed. Amy Gutmann (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994), 26-28.

³⁶⁶ Ruth Wodak, Rudolph de Cillia, Martin Riesigl, and Karin Liebhart, *The Discursive Construction of National Identity, 2nd Edition* (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2009), 24.

self.³⁶⁷ National identities are thus the discursive constructs that come to define communities and differentiate them from one another, and are all the more significant for their reliance on fictional origins. Following this premise, my analysis uniquely synthesises tenets of framing, rhetoric, and historical discourse to provide a deeper understanding of the mechanisms of persuasion and propaganda embedded in Republican newspapers of the Spanish Civil War.

Editorial 1: “Triunfo de la legalidad”—July 22, 1936

On July 19, 1936, a coalition of generals and their forces launched a revolt against the Second Spanish Republic, marking the beginning of the Spanish Civil War. While the initial insurrection took place in Morocco, spreading up the coast to Andalusia, a number of armed mutinies were coordinated throughout the country. Some proved brutally successful, as in the case of Galicia, while others in Madrid, Barcelona, and most of the Basque Country were defeated. These “subversive movements,”³⁶⁸ as termed by Barcelona’s most popular newspaper, led to a three-day hiatus. When *La Vanguardia* returned to print on July 22, 1936, it was with the bolded announcement: “El Gobierno de la generalidad de Cataluña se ha incautado de ‘*La Vanguardia*.’”³⁶⁹ This marked the first time since its founding that *La Vanguardia* had been confiscated. Thus re-oriented to promote the Republican order, it would uphold a leftist stance until the fall of Barcelona in January, 1939.

In the immediate aftermath of General Franco’s announcement of a military rebellion to liberate the Spanish nation from the anarchy reigning over “la mayoría de los campos y pueblos,”³⁷⁰ *La Vanguardia* reappeared under new leadership at the behest of Republican authorities. Abandoned by its previous owners and left in dire financial straits, the periodical put itself to the task of promulgating a message of national cohesion by locating Barcelona at the heart of Republican fervour and condemning the uprising in the harshest of terms. It set about consolidating its diverse readership into a unified group, addressing the citizens of Barcelona, Catalonia, and Spain as a collective community whose identities and interests, both past and present, were inextricably linked. In addressing them individually—“el pueblo español, el pueblo catalán, el pueblo barcelonés”—but identifying their suffering as shared, *La*

³⁶⁷ George Schöpflin, “The Functions of Myth and a Taxonomy of Myths,” *Myths and Nationhood*, Ed. Geoffrey Hosking and George Schöpflin (London: Hurst & Company, 1997), 19, 20.

³⁶⁸ “Triunfo de la legalidad,” *La Vanguardia*, July 22, 1936.

³⁶⁹ *La Vanguardia*, July 22, 1936.

³⁷⁰ Francisco Franco delivered his broadcast, “Manifiesto del General Franco al iniciarse el movimiento militar,” from Las Palmas, Spain on July 18, 1936. See “La patriótica alocución del general Franco al iniciar el movimiento,” *ABC Sevilla*, July 23, 1936.

Vanguardia envisioned a people united by place, history, and circumstance. “No recordamos que, en su ya larga vida periodística,” began the day’s editorial titled “El triunfo de la legalidad,” “*La Vanguardia* hubiese debido asistir a una catástrofe comparable con la provocada por el levantamiento de las fuerzas militares que han intentado subvertir el orden de la República española.”³⁷¹ Not even Barcelona, it claimed, the site of frequent “luchas fratricidas”, had ever experienced a threat of such momentous proportions:

El pueblo español, el pueblo catalán, el pueblo barcelonés no se merecían eso. Siempre hemos condenado con la mayor energía y la más profunda sinceridad los atentados contra el orden establecido. El camino de la ley nos ha parecido constantemente, y sigue pareciéndonos, el único adecuado para lograr las transformaciones políticas y sociales que se crean deseables.³⁷²

The emphasis placed on “el pueblo español, el pueblo catalán, el pueblo barcelonés” serves to distinguish among the various communities reading the newspaper while simultaneously weaving them—Spaniards, Catalans, and *Barceloneces*—together into a single audience. Moreover, it cultivated a sense of solidarity through explicit reference to Barcelona’s divisive past by measuring it against the unprecedented catastrophe of the present conflict.³⁷³

As Wodak has argued, “Formally and logically, ‘identity’ is a relational term” which “defines the relationship between two or more related entities in a manner that asserts a sameness or equality” and which is subject to constant change over the “flow of time”.³⁷⁴ In juxtaposing three identity groups with overlapping as well as opposing boundaries, the newspaper imposes a new identity encompassing them all and utilises inclusive language in the form of the first-person plural, or the Spanish “nosotros.” According to Volmert, who has examined deictic expressions within a German cultural context:

A speaker has at his/her disposal a whole range of (clever) options with which to present the interests and affairs of ‘we-groups’ in the public sphere...a speaker can unite himself and his audience into a single ‘community sharing a common destiny’ by letting fall into oblivion all differences in origin, confession, class and lifestyle with a simple ‘we’...This ‘community sharing a common destiny’ may be bound by different degrees of intimacy and familiarity: from the common economic interests of ‘society as a whole’ to the emotional needs of a family-type community.³⁷⁵

La Vanguardia, in a manner characteristic of Spanish, utilises positive politeness to bring

³⁷¹ “Triunfo de la legalidad,” *La Vanguardia*, July 22, 1936.

³⁷² “Triunfo de la legalidad,” *La Vanguardia*, July 22, 1936.

³⁷³ “Triunfo de la legalidad,” *La Vanguardia*, July 22, 1936.

³⁷⁴ Ruth Wodak, *The Discursive Construction of National Identity, 2nd Edition* (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2009), 10-11.

³⁷⁵ Volmert in Ruth Wodak, *The Discursive Construction of National Identity, 2nd Edition* (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2009), 11.

together disparate communities by consistently conjugating in the first-person plural form.³⁷⁶ It constructs, as Volmert, writes, a “we-group” that claims to represent a greater whole. The newspaper argues that not all civil wars are alike, putting forth a variety of claims intended to emphasise the differences in origin and character. It began by citing Catalonia’s stance in favour of the central Spanish Government against the treachery of the “sitiadores” and the unprecedented scale of the destruction as evidence.³⁷⁷ It characterised Barcelona as a historic capital of conflict within Spain, and held the Spanish Civil War to be singular and critical for the fact that it now supported its traditional rival in Madrid. This worked on a cultural perception of Catalonia frequently being at odds with Castilian Spain, competing for greater autonomy and regional determination over the centuries. By saying Barcelona now supported Madrid set the contemporary war apart from the past and served to frame the state capitals as bonded allies rather than historical rivals. This cast aside regional differences in a way that fostered the image of an allied coalition of forces with a common goal. Forced together by the dire circumstances of war, the newspaper insisted upon national unity through the presentation of facing off against the same enemy.

La Vanguardia went on to declare its support for the Republican authorities, highlighting the legitimacy of their democratically elected government in opposition to the “rebeldes” who, in failing to achieve success in the democratic process, could only exercise power through violent force. The editorial positions the Republic as representative of the will of the people, having been legally elected by a majority of Spanish citizens. The two sides of the conflict are thusly defined: the legitimate Spanish government against the illegitimate rebels. The “fuerzas leales” operate in defence of democracy while the “perturbadores” constitute a militaristic force intended to subdue the popular will. The editorial frames the Spanish Republic as representative of the will of the people, standing in opposition to Francoist despotism based upon a false narrative of anarchy and chaos parading as government in the Republican zone.³⁷⁸ Because the Republic had been voted into power through a democratic election process, the editorial classified the “intento sublevación” of the Nationalists as the ultimate betrayal of Spanish values and society. Still worse, it argues, the rebellion was orchestrated by the very forces committed to the government’s defense, thereby violating their

³⁷⁶ J. A. G. Ardila, “Transition Relevance Places and Overlapping in (Spanish-English) Conversational Etiquette.” *The Modern Language Review* 99, no. 3 (2004): 646.

³⁷⁷ “Triunfo de la legalidad,” *La Vanguardia*, July 22, 1936.

³⁷⁸ Falangist propaganda promoted the messaging that the Second Spanish Republic had become corrupted by international powers, specifically Russian Communists, thereby rendering it an illegitimate, destructive, and depraved form of government. See “Por la salvación de la patria: Guerra a muerte entre la Rusia Roja y la España Sagrada,” *ABC Sevilla*, July 22, 1936.

sacred oath. This assault on the rule of law “por parte de aquellos mismos cuyo máximo, cuya misión primordial y única era el de ampararlo y defenderlo a toda costa” has too “gravely disturbed” national “life” and “tranquility”: “el Ejército es algo demasiado delicado, y la política es un elemento demasiado turbio y cargado de implacables rencores, para hacer de ambos ingredientes una mezcla que fatalmente ha de ser explosiva.”³⁷⁹ The Spanish military had long persisted as a topic of controversy, especially since the Carlist Wars of the nineteenth century with officers’ repeated resistance to Republican reforms. As historians Mark Lawrence and Francisco J. Romero Salvadó have pointed out, the First Carlist War of 1830 and the Spanish Civil War 100 years later bear a number of similarities in terms of domestic and international involvement unique to Spain as “both civil wars took place in an established nation-state with the same national borders.”³⁸⁰ The Carlists, so named for their loyalty to Carlos V and his bid for the throne, rallied against what they held to be the corrupting influences of liberalism and any perceived deviation from traditional Spanish values. Though they made up just one of the factions to fight beneath the Nationalist banner, the Carlists contributed to the fractured political dialogues of the country, adhering to the creed of “Dios, Patria, Rey” until marginalised by Franco.³⁸¹

According to the editorial, this fracturing revealed the “trágicas consecuencias de su obra nemorosa” and “juego abominable,” which resulted in Spain “ardiendo por los cuatro costados, y los españoles hundidos en una guerra civil.” However, it also inspired the spark of resistance in the Spanish masses who unified against the assault on Republican institutions.³⁸² In this way, *La Vanguardia* insisted on the defence of the “legalidad” of the Spanish Republic, calling upon readers to support the established social order: “Nadie puede nada contra un pueblo que se defiende bravamente, y menos todavía si, al propio tiempo, defiende la legalidad.” Such emphasis on the legality of the Second Spanish Republic is key, as it serves to qualify Republican Spain as the legitimate government to support in the war effort while disqualifying the Nationalists as criminal agitators. They argued that the war was a fight for peace in the defense of the Spanish Republic, not a war of aggression or a inconsequential internal dispute. Historians have cited the major losses suffered by the rightist parties in the

³⁷⁹ “Triunfo de la legalidad,” *La Vanguardia*, July 22, 1936.

³⁸⁰ Mark Lawrence, *The Spanish Civil Wars: A Comparative History of the First Carlist War and the Conflict of the 1930s* (London: Bloomsbury Academic Publishing, 2017), 7; Francisco J. Romero Salvadó, *The Foundations of Civil War: Revolution, Social Conflict and Reaction in Liberal Spain, 1916-1923* (New York: Routledge, 2008).

³⁸¹ Martin Blinkhorn, *Carlism and Crisis in Spain, 1931-1939* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1975), 17-18, 296-297; Charles J. Esdaile, *The Spanish Civil War: A Military History* (London: Routledge, 2019), 5, 6, 26, 38.

³⁸² “Triunfo de la legalidad,” *La Vanguardia*, July 22, 1936.

federal elections of 1936 and their conspiracy to take Spain by force so as to halt what they perceived to be undesirable reforms. However, the Nationalist rebellion occurred in the period when the Republic demonstrated limited ability to pass such potentially transformative legislation which regularly stalled because political factions failed to collaborate. The result saw voters on both sides dissatisfied: many leftists perceived the reforms as inadequate, the government formulating them as weak and crippled, while many rightists perceived any threat to private interests and Catholicism as radical and dangerous to the natural order. *La Vanguardia*'s insistence on peaceful legal change in lieu of violent mutiny attempted to address readers located across the political spectrum as Barcelona confronted uprisings on the extreme left as well as on the extreme right of the civic landscape.

In referring to the spirit of sacrifice among the Spanish people as the “más unánime” it had ever witnessed, the editorial calls upon readers to support “incondicionalmente” the Republican efforts to reestablish order and security throughout the country. Above all, the newspaper pleaded for strength through unity, beseeching citizens to organise “como un solo hombre” behind the Republican assemblies of Spain and Catalonia “para ofrecerles incondicionalmente nuestro esfuerzo y ayudarles en su ardua labor de pacificación.”³⁸³ Known as a hub of Anarchist and Catalan nationalist forces, Barcelona witnessed multiple schisms as groups competed for power, influence, and resources.³⁸⁴ *La Vanguardia* subsequently voiced a plea for cohesion against a common enemy. In downplaying Catalan nationalist and divided political sentiments coursing throughout the region, the newspaper not only promoted a strategy for survival, but also supported the Communist alliances of central Republican officials, who viewed the insurgency as symptomatic of the continued fight for the proletariat.

The theme of unity was of special importance to *La Vanguardia*'s readership, and not only with respect to Catalan nationalism. Following a two-day fight against the military rebellion in Barcelona, the city became divided into factions. The anarcho-sindicalist Confederación Nacional del Trabajo (CNT) and the Socialist Unión General de Trabajadores (UGT) emerged as the most powerful political organisations in the wake of civilian victory, but in Barcelona, unlike other parts of Republican Spain: “the state collapsed and the military disintegrated.” The result “led to a great dispersal of power in the hands of civil society” so

³⁸³ “Triunfo de la legalidad,” *La Vanguardia*, July 22, 1936.

³⁸⁴ Martin Blinkhorn, *Democracy and Civil War in Spain: 1931-1939* (London and New York: Routledge, 1988, 11-13; José A. Piqueras and Vicent Sanz Rosalén, “Introduction,” in *A Social History of Spanish Labour: New Perspectives on Class, Politics and Gender*, Ed. José A Piqueras and Vicent Sanz Rosalén, Trans. Paul Edgar (New York and Oxford: Berghahn Books, 2007), 7.

that the first weeks of the civil war witnessed the rise of militia columns, neighbourhood committees, and worker assemblies which “became the centres of real power with effective decision-making capacity”.³⁸⁵ Subsequently, according to Antoni Castells Duran, “it was the workers, and particularly manual workers” who succeeded in suppressing the anti-Republican uprisings in the city, thus effecting a profound and comprehensive transformation of Catalan society that created a unique environment which produced directives not conforming to capitalism or state socialism. The sudden radical changes that took place in Catalonia, including the abrupt handover of the region’s largest newspaper, was unparalleled in the rest of Spain, and editorials targeted a scared and divided populace. The insistence on the legitimacy of the Second Spanish Republic may also have been intended to counteract the Nationalist narrative claiming to rescue Spain from Bolshevik influence.³⁸⁶

Throughout the war, *La Vanguardia*’s coverage embodied a political image which envisioned Spain as a pluricultural but cooperative state defending itself against a subversive alien threat. Catalans, Valencians, Basques, Galicians, and Castilians were made out to be members of culturally distinct but related groups of the same nation, much like siblings who answered to the same parents. Bilbao’s resistance was celebrated as Basque in character but also as emblematic of Spanish defiance to oppression over the centuries. Catalonia’s multiple battles for autonomy against foreign and despotic kings were similarly lauded as evidence of Catalan kinship with other territories. The term Spanish was thus redefined in Republican discourse to mean a citizen of Spain without traditionalist hierarchies of Castilian superiority, thereby promoting regional and national identities as diverse but equal parts of a greater whole. Though the paper explicitly acknowledged the country’s divisive past, it used the common struggle against oppression as the foundation for a shared future. In so doing, *La Vanguardia*’s passionate and culturally inclusive language forged a new national identity among a diverse readership in which Barcelonans, Catalans, and Spaniards merged into a single unified group, or “como un solo hombre.” This political imaginary of an integrated community developed to include a common national past as the war progressed and was used to argue that a previously divided Spain had united from within at multiple points in its history to overthrow foreign injustice and domination.

³⁸⁵ Antoni Castells Duran, “Revolutions and Collectivizations in Civil War Barcelona, 1936-9,” in *Red Barcelona: Social Protest and Labour Mobilization in the Twentieth Century*, Ed. Angel Smith (London and New York: Routledge, 2002), 129.

³⁸⁶ Xosé M. Núñez Seixas, “Nations in Arms Against the Invader: on Nationalist Discourses during the Spanish Civil War,” in *The Splintering of Spain: Cultural History and the Spanish Civil War, 1936-1939*, Ed. Chris Ealham and Michael Richards (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 55.

Editorial 2: “Toledo, Oviedo...”–September 22, 1936

In late September of 1936, *La Vanguardia* found itself in the position of having to communicate the losses of war in a way that defended the stance of the Republic and maintained citizen morale. It condemned the actions of the Nationalists and encouraged collective resistance beneath an inclusive re-definition of Spanish national identity. As major cities fell to enemy sieges, the newspaper boosted its reputation of Republican vanguard through defending government campaigns despite admitting to setbacks. It evaluated participants as the protagonists and antagonists of an epic conflict, highlighting for audiences a narrative of communal Spanish defiance. In one such editorial on the battle for Toledo, *La Vanguardia* incorporated a descriptive literary style in its commentary which served to construct a national imaginary of shared Castilian-Catalan history and illustrated for audiences a discernible adversary. It asserted that the Nationalists, whose forces were influenced by the cruel and unfeeling stupidity of fascism, posed an existential threat to Spain’s proud heritage.

La Vanguardia lamented “la tragedia del Alcázar de Toledo” as “uno de los episodios más dolorosos de esta guerra horrible”.³⁸⁷ Still worse, it argued, were the equally calamitous losses being “repeated” in Oviedo and Córdoba, resulting in the suffering of thousands:

Y lo más triste es que el caso trágico de Toledo se repite en Oviedo y se repetirá en Córdoba y en las otras plazas sitiadas por las fuerzas populares. La consigna de los rebeldes es no rendirse y obligar al pueblo levantado en armas a que, para vencer, tenga que destruir.³⁸⁸

Such commentary framed the imagery of dreams and nightmares, instigating fear in its readers. Presentations of the fiery hellscapes, the near-total destruction of a national monument, and the terrorising of women and children operated to portray the benevolence of Republican ethics and values in stark contrast with the barbarism of fascist evils. As the majority of the newspaper’s readers were civilians living in the rearguard, the horrors inflicted on civilians framed a clear and fearful message of the horrific consequences of the advancing enemy campaigns.

The editorial countered the Francoist claim of rescuing Spain from Republican depravity by accusing the rebels of eviscerating Spain’s artistic heritage and reducing its most prized cities to rubble:

Hermosas ciudades españolas se están convirtiendo en inmensos y humeantes

³⁸⁷ “Toledo, Oviedo...,” *La Vanguardia*, September 22, 1936.

³⁸⁸ “Toledo, Oviedo...,” *La Vanguardia*, September 22, 1936.

montones de escombros. Llamas gigantescas devoran la riqueza material y el patrimonio artístico de España. El país se está hundiendo bajo la doble presión demoledora de dos fuerzas en pugna, lanzadas una contra otra por ese egoísmo feroz de los reaccionarios, que son conservadores sólo para conservar los privilegios de casta y el bienestar individual, sin que les conmueva, en cambio, que la patria quede destrozada.³⁸⁹

The use of pictorial language in this passage accomplishes a number of objectives, not least of which involves the construction of themes to counteract the Nationalist narrative of restoring Spain's glorious past and positioning the blame with the opposition. It challenges this notion by casting the rebel forces as the destroyers, and the loyalist forces as the guardians of Spanish history and culture. Moreover, the dramatic imagery draws a distinct contrast between the two 'sides,' describing the Nationalists as hell-bent on the savage destruction and oppression of a people, and the Republicans as their humane and civilised defenders. Additionally, thematic mappings may be used strategically to evoke specific meanings. By calling out Toledo's suffering *beneath* an oppressive force which seeks to destroy all it encounters, including the once tall and pristine towers of the Alcázar, *La Vanguardia* maps out the battlefield in metaphorical language indicative of spatial relationships, heightening its visual effects. Such bellicose imagery is compounded by apocalyptic descriptions and *La Vanguardia*'s juxtaposition of the opposing military leaders at the scene, beginning with praise for the Republic's Vicente Rojo and ending with condemnation of the Nationalists' José Moscardó.

Rojo is described as "un valeroso capitán de las fuerzas leales, no vaciló en jugarse la vida penetrando solo en el Alcázar para pedirles a los jefes rebeldes que se apiadaran de las indefensas criaturas cuyas suerte encadenaban a la suya con tozudez inhumana."³⁹⁰ Colonel Moscardó, on the other hand, appears to lack even the faintest traces of human feeling or sympathy: "Dos meses han estado esperando el Gobierno y el pueblo inútilmente que brotara un sentimiento humanitario en el corazón del colonel Moscardó." All attempts to reason with the rebels, the editorial notes, have been "todo en vano", likely referring to Rojo's failed negotiations to secure their surrender:

El fascismo es igualmente cínico en todas las latitudes geográficas y encuentra en la fuerza el ambiente que más conviene a su naturaleza. Sería simplemente despreciable si no costara ríos de sangre; pero, como causa males enormes, es odioso.³⁹¹

The repetition of nightmare imagery and related metaphors (i.e. rivers of blood) builds upon multiple schemas intended to frame the war in Republican terms by identifying the evils

³⁸⁹ "Toledo, Oviedo...", *La Vanguardia*, September 22, 1936.

³⁹⁰ "Toledo, Oviedo...", *La Vanguardia*, September 22, 1936.

³⁹¹ "Toledo, Oviedo...", *La Vanguardia*, September 22, 1936.

committed and the criminals responsible, naming the Republican government as saviour of the people, and defending Republican actions in the war as a fight for peace in the defense of Spain.

The editorial skilfully oscillates between the sieges of Toledo and Oviedo, as if melding them into a single tragic battle for civilisation and humanity in the face of fascism's brazen savagery worldwide. Situated on separate fronts in different regions of Spain, the coverage pulled Castile and Cantabria together into a single front for the defense of Spanish peoples and values. The emphasis on international fascism over a peninsular insurgency framed European and Spanish suffering as shared, proclaiming "¡Millares de criaturas inocentes sacrificados a la propaganda fascista! Es monstruoso. Pero 'el fin—dicen sus adictos—justifica los medios.'"³⁹² These figures refer to the victims of fascism globally, emphasising the dangers of its spread. Additionally, the blurring of cultural boundaries within Spain pushes Catalan readers to identify with Castile at a time when regionalist calls for independence were on the rise. The bridging of national difference constitutes a major part of *La Vanguardia's* conception of Spanish unity, especially as it later evolved to include Galicia and the Basque Country.

"Afortunadamente," the editorial concluded on a dark note, "en las dos inmensas corrientes antagónicas en que se divide hoy la opinion del mundo civilizado, nadie engaña a nadie." *La Vanguardia* presented the threat of fascism as objectionable and unmistakable, its adherents as the shameless "adictos" and "enemigos de la Libertad." No one, it posed, was actually deceived by its spread. Rather, it argued, many engaged in self-deceit simply to exonerate themselves from responsibility, "que la conciencia les pese menos." Though the Republican was officially non-religious (and, as some might argue, anti-religious), Catholic language and metaphor were regularly invoked to inspire action. Though divided on regional, cultural, and linguistic matters, all regions of Spain had identified as Roman Catholic for centuries, with the Roman Catholic Church having been the only recognised religious authority since before the end of the Reconquista. The editorial thereby dawned a powerfully religious tone in suggesting that the enemies of the Republic, some of whom were self-proclaimed Catholics, had lost faith in the benevolent wisdom of the Almighty to follow the wickedness of the Devil.

This editorial embodies several qualities of journalism P. R. R. White terms: Evaluation for "those sections where positive or negative assessments are made about the human participants," Blame, a "sub-label...to indicate where the evaluation is negative," and Emotional-Aftermath for "any sections which are substantially concerned with the emotional

³⁹² "Toledo, Oviedo...", *La Vanguardia*, September 22, 1936.

consequences of the event.”³⁹³ The first two paragraphs offer a narrative of war interlaced with commentary and assessment. The literary style of the language lends an especially dramatic tone to the story, resulting in an emotionally charged illustration of events. It designates a clear hero and villain in the narration, extolling Republican virtue while condemning fascist aggression, in the process identifying a single nation against a single oppressor. According to White,

These concerns are threefold: (1) to dramatise and emphasise the violence of the catastrophic event through intensification, (2) to evoke feelings of horror and distress in the reader in the aftermath of the event, and (3) to provide a positive counterpoint to the horror and distress by construing the actions of the rescuers as heroic.³⁹⁴

Such “blame stories,” or “texts for which the primary focus is upon negative assessments of human behaviour by reference to some system of social norms or ethics” occur with great frequency in contemporary journalism and have been identified as successful tools in the redirection of accountability in society.³⁹⁵

In lamenting the loss of the Alcázar of Toledo, *La Vanguardia* forged the notion of a common history in an ethnically and linguistically diverse nation by pinning the blame of the war’s devastation on international fascism. Referred to as an “artistic monument”, the editorial drew upon a unified construction of Spanish national identity through the promotion of collective cultural appreciation. By prioritising the preservation of “la integridad del Alcázar toledano,” the article re-contextualised the past to transform it into a contemporary symbol for national liberation and unity. All countries possess “skeletons” in their closets that follow from past traumas and abuses, and which become enclosed in myths and cultural taboos. National histories are therefore shifted, retold, and reshuffled both to eliminate cultural culpability and to create a unique origin story that distinguish one group from the rest in an otherwise blurred and ambiguous world. The resulting strategies play on the construction of national and personal identities which require what Martin and Wodak have termed “founding myths.” Once composed, these founding myths must be able to be integrated “easily and positively” into present narratives and certain pasts.³⁹⁶ It is precisely these narratives and the interplay of past and present interpretations that inform the schemas composing frames and which invoke in

³⁹³ P. R. R. White, “News as History: Your Daily Gossip,” *Re/Reading the Past*, Ed. J. R. Martin and Ruth Wodak (Amsterdam; Philadelphia: John Benjamins Publishing Company, 2003), 71-73.

³⁹⁴ P. R. R. White, “News as History: Your Daily Gossip,” *Re/Reading the Past*, Ed. J. R. Martin and Ruth Wodak (Amsterdam; Philadelphia: John Benjamins Publishing Company, 2003), 76.

³⁹⁵ P. R. R. White, “News as History: Your Daily Gossip,” *Re/Reading the Past*, Ed. J. R. Martin and Ruth Wodak (Amsterdam; Philadelphia: John Benjamins Publishing Company, 2003), 73.

³⁹⁶ J. R. Martin and Ruth Wodak, “Introduction,” *Re/Reading the Past*, Ed. J. R. Martin and Ruth Wodak (Amsterdam; Philadelphia: John Benjamins Publishing Company, 2003), 11.

readers a collective sense of self and national, ethnic, or cultural membership. Such “founding myths” fuelled the sensationalist accounts comprising both Republican and Falangist propaganda during the Spanish Civil War. While the legends surrounding the Reconquista gave birth to an epic narrative of Spanish conquest, nationhood, and resilience, it also featured a dark and sordid past of exploitation, fanaticism, and extreme violence. Indeed, the Reconquista has since been interpreted as one of the earliest examples of unification in the Iberian peninsula, but it is also remembered for its role in the terrifying ethnic and religious purges of the Spanish Inquisition.

As discussed above, while it became clear by late July that Spain was at war, the situation remained perplexing, with the Nationalists having taken Oviedo, San Sebastián, and all of Galicia, the Republicans maintaining a strong grasp of Catalonia and central Castile, and Andalusia split between them.³⁹⁷ In a highly symbolic campaign, Franco’s forces attacked Toledo in what became known as the “Siege of the Alcázar.” In the early days of the uprising, up to 1,000 Falangist sympathisers took hostage a number of women and children from well-known leftist families³⁹⁸ and barricaded themselves within the reinforced Alcázar, successfully holding off their attackers until Franco arrived with reinforcements to declare a decisive victory.³⁹⁹ The palace-fortress, also the site of Spain’s prestigious infantry military academy,⁴⁰⁰ was revered as the home of the Catholic monarchs in the final days of the Reconquista. As capital of the Visigothic kingdoms in Hispania after the fall of Rome, Toledo held special significance for Spaniards as a proud and powerful emblem city that had wielded influence over three empires. This, compounded by its perceived role in the liberation from the foreign occupation of the Moors driven out in the late-fifteenth century, established Toledo as an important pillar of Spanish history and identity.⁴⁰¹

Frequently at odds with one another, to put it mildly, the ruling parties of Castile and Catalonia offer different narratives of what constitutes Spain and Spanish heritage. This represents a theme carried over from the days of the Godó family, which as previously mentioned, championed the notion of “dual-nationalism” and the peaceful coexistence of

³⁹⁷ Charles J. Esdaile, *The Spanish Civil War: A Military History* (London: Routledge, 2019), 75.

³⁹⁸ Paul Preston, *The Spanish Civil War: 1936-1939* (Chicago: The Dorsey Press, 1989), 63; Charles J. Esdaile, *The Spanish Civil War: A Military History* (London: Routledge, 2019), 75, 76.

³⁹⁹ Charles J. Esdaile, *The Spanish Civil War: A Military History* (London: Routledge, 2019), 75-77.

⁴⁰⁰ Burnett Bulloten, *The Spanish Civil War: Revolution and Counterrevolution* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2015), 300.

⁴⁰¹ Tom Nickson, *Toledo Cathedral: Building Histories in Medieval Castile* (University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, 2015), 26.

Catalan and Castilian patriotism.⁴⁰² While the Godós had sought to promote Catalan industry and business interests in the colonies by negotiating with Conservatives in Madrid,⁴⁰³ however, the Republican Government in Barcelona intended to solidify its diverse base in the face of an existential threat. Additionally, in alignment with dominant Republican ideals, *La Vanguardia* prioritised the fight for moderate democratic freedoms and social equality over the nationalist and Anarchist agendas of Catalan separatism and total workers' revolution, respectively, then gaining momentum.

Within a week of the editorial's publication, Republican forces were forced to retreat from Toledo. Though considered hugely successful in terms of Nationalist propaganda, some argue that the victory was relatively useless in terms of strategic importance for Franco. According to Preston, the siege granted the Republic the time it needed to prepare for the first attacks on Madrid, thereby critically delaying the Nationalist takeover for nearly three years, though Esdaile states this interpretation is inadequate since Nationalist control over Toledo meant that "an attack on Madrid could not be long delayed".⁴⁰⁴ In either case, the defeat at the Alcázar in Toledo spelled potential disaster for Republican morale while boosting "the Nationalist effort to link the civil war against other Spaniards with the *Reconquista* of Spain from the infidel."⁴⁰⁵ As evidenced by *La Vanguardia*'s editorial, the siege also held profound symbolic significance for the Republic, which similarly cultivated a narrative of fighting off a cruel and savage foreign invader, and which emerged as a dominant theme during the Nationalist offensive against the Basque Country nearly seven months later.

Editorial 3: "Pensemos en Bilbao"—April 29, 1937

One editorial, published just three days after the bombing of Guernica, attempted to forge a fraternal connection between Barcelona and Bilbao. By incorporating the name "Euzkadi," the Basque-language term for Basque Country into its headline ("Euzkadi, en su lucha por la libertad y la independencia, necesita el apoyo de Cataluña. ¡No lo olvidéis, catalanes!"), *La Vanguardia* expressed a strategic solidarity with Republican allies in Northern Spain. Arguing for cooperation among the warring factions of Barcelona while also focusing on the "viejos

⁴⁰² Pol Dalmau, *Press, Politics and National Identities in Catalonia: The Transformation of La Vanguardia, 1881-1931* (Eastbourne: Sussex Academic Press, 2017), 146.

⁴⁰³ Pol Dalmau, *Press, Politics and National Identities in Catalonia: The Transformation of La Vanguardia, 1881-1931* (Eastbourne: Sussex Academic Press, 2017), 71-81.

⁴⁰⁴ Paul Preston, *The Spanish Civil War: 1936-1939* (Chicago: The Dorsey Press, 1989), 60-68; Charles J. Esdaile, *The Spanish Civil War: A Military History* (London: Routledge, 2019), 96, 100.

⁴⁰⁵ Paul Preston, *The Spanish Civil War: 1936-1939* (Chicago: The Dorsey Press, 1989), 63.

caminos de simpatía” between Catalonia and the Basque Country, *La Vanguardia* advocated for a pluricultural society drawn together by a common history and held together by the shared investment in a better future. As Jacob T. Levy has argued, “sometimes a common political history can generate a shared culture or identity in a way that creates a civic-cultural community which can make a plausible claim on its members’ loyalty.”⁴⁰⁶ Because the boundaries dividing populations according to ethnic, cultural, religious, and linguistic differences are never fixed or static, then groups can overlap and compete with one another for priority.⁴⁰⁷ As the Republic sought to secure Catalan loyalties to the central Spanish state, media coverage presented potentially conflicting identities as part of a joint civic mission that defined the new democratic Spain as a protector of cultural freedoms.

The editorial highlighted the supposedly “spiritual” connection between the Basque and Catalan capitals by describing them and their peoples as major pillars of Spain, Spanish history, and Spanish identity. “Mutuamente atraídas,” Barcelona and Bilbao were positioned as the two poles of Spanish life:

Las dos ciudades representan los dos puntos extremos de un eje en torno al cual se han desarrollado los principales acontecimientos de la vida española. Esta similitud de destino, puede más que las diferencias que las separan, y se ha puesto desde la sublevación acá más en evidencia que nunca.⁴⁰⁸

The overt dual positioning of Bilbao and Barcelona as iconic Basque and Catalan cities, respectively, but also as being integral to *Spanish* life, reflected *La Vanguardia*’s imagining of a new Spanish identity which included Basque and Catalan nationalisms. The editorial envisioned a pluricultural but unified Spanish state in which diverse groups fought together against “el fascismo internacional.”⁴⁰⁹ In so doing, it promoted the representation of the Spanish Civil War as an international conflict erupting on a national stage, in which Spaniards defended Spain against an outside invasion, and drew a connection between the heroics of Madrid on May 2, 1808 and those of Bilbao on May 2, 1874.

The year 1808 had marked a pivotal moment in European history as Spaniards retaliated against the French occupying forces, engaging in guerrilla warfare tactics and eventually reclaiming Spain’s independence in 1814. Commonly cited as the first conscious articulation

⁴⁰⁶ Jacob T. Levy, *The Multiculturalism of Fear* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), 90.

⁴⁰⁷ Jacob T. Levy, *The Multiculturalism of Fear* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), 82, 83.

⁴⁰⁸ “Pensemos en Bilbao,” *La Vanguardia*, April 29, 1937.

⁴⁰⁹ “Pensemos en Bilbao,” *La Vanguardia*, April 29, 1937.

of Spanish nationalism, 1808 is still remembered as the beginning of the heroic and ultimately victorious Spanish struggle against a foreign oppressor:⁴¹⁰

Alguna vez hemos dicho, cuando al hablar de la defensa de Madrid se apelaba al recuerdo del dos de mayo de 1808, que nos parecía el ejemplo inoportuno. El pueblo de Madrid fue heroico en aquella jornada trágica, pero vencido y sacrificado por las tropas invasoras... Bilbao celebra también su dos de mayo pero ésta es verdadera fiesta de jubilo. Recuerda el dos de mayo de 1874, día en que las tropas carlistas levantaron el cerco que habían puesto a la villa—aquel día ganó el tercer entorchado y conquistó el título de invicta—cuatro meses antes. La invicta villa lo será una vez más.⁴¹¹

La Vanguardia's celebration of "la invicta villa" demonstrated a strategic focus on Bilbao's historic stance against Carlism, a rightist and insular political ideology which found substantial support in the Basque Country, especially Navarra.⁴¹² To this effect, the editorial's throwback to May 2, 1874 recalls the defence of the First Spanish Republic (1873-1874) and the fight against the restoration of the Bourbon monarchy during the Third Carlist War.⁴¹³ Bilbao successfully held off attackers for four months for which it earned the famous title "la invicta villa" or "the indomitable city." One Basque publication commemorating the event in 1887 even defined the confrontation as part of "la eterna lucha entre la libertad y el despotismo, entre la tiranía religiosa y el sacratísimo derecho de conciencia."⁴¹⁴ In weaving together the most celebrated struggles of Bilbao and Madrid—despite the first being "glorious" and the latter "tragic"—the editorial likens them to a single battle for self-determination against foreign tyranny. This theme would have resonated well with Basque and Catalan readers, many of whom supported at least some degree of regional autonomy.⁴¹⁵

Indirectly addressing the recent bombing of Guernica, which marked "a crucial turning point in the northern offensive" against the Republic,⁴¹⁶ the editorial attempts the ambitious

⁴¹⁰ Martin Blinkhorn, *Carlism and Crisis in Spain, 1931-1939* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1975), 5; Xosé M. Núñez Seixas, "Nations in Arms Against the Invader: on Nationalist Discourses during the Spanish Civil War," *The Splintering of Spain: Cultural History and the Spanish Civil War, 1936-1939*, Ed. Chris Ealham and Michael Richards (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 52.

⁴¹¹ "Pensemos en Bilbao," *La Vanguardia*, April 29, 1937.

⁴¹² Sandie Holguín, "Navigating the Historical Labyrinth of the Spanish Civil War," *Teaching Representations of the Spanish Civil War*, Ed. Noël Valis (New York: Modern Language Association of America, 2007), 28; Juan Pablo Fusi Aizpúrua, *El País Vasco, 1931-1937: Autonomía. Revolución. Guerra Civil*. (Madrid: Biblioteca Nueva, 2002), 209.

⁴¹³ Following defeat of the Carlists, the Basque fueros were abolished in their entirety in 1876, thereby angering many Basques who viewed the measure as an attack on their language, society, and culture. See Juan Pablo Fusi Aizpúrua, *El País Vasco, 1931-1937: Autonomía. Revolución. Guerra Civil*. (Madrid: Biblioteca Nueva, 2002), 13-18.

⁴¹⁴ Miguel de Alcibar, "Dos de Mayo: 13º Aniversario," *Sociedad "El Sitio"* (Bilbao, 1887): 6.

⁴¹⁵ Francisco J. Romero Salvadó, *The Foundations of Civil War: Revolution, Social Conflict and Reaction in Liberal Spain, 1916-1923* (New York and London: Routledge, 2008), 39, 118.

⁴¹⁶ William D. Phillips, Jr. and Carla Rahn Phillips, *A Concise History of Spain* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 255; Juan Pablo Fusi Aizpúrua, *El País Vasco, 1931-1937: Autonomía. Revolución. Guerra Civil*. (Madrid: Biblioteca Nueva, 2002), 15, 16.

feat of establishing a sense of unity and cohesion among a diverse readership whose members pertained to a variety of social classes, regional groups, and political affiliations. Above all, *La Vanguardia* called upon readers to be active participants in the conflict, reminding them of the Basque Country's strategic importance: "Bilbao corre riesgo grave y Bilbao es uno de los núcleos vitales de la República en armas." Indeed, the editorial consists of numerous reminders: "Bilbao atraviesa días de evidente peligro. Sería insensatez negarlo y pueril esconderlo," "Bilbao está en peligro," and "Se ayuda a Bilbao recordando que en Aragón existe un frente de batalla y haciéndoselo recordar a quien sea el que lo ha olvidado."⁴¹⁷ Such statements were unusually concise with Bilbao's situation summarised in a single terrifying premise: Bilbao was in danger, putting everyone at risk. If Bilbao fell then Barcelona would become more vulnerable to enemy attack. Because their capitals occupied neighbouring regions, Catalans could not be indifferent to Basque losses. The directness lent a blunt tone which highlighted the perils of losing ground in the north, especially as Basque defeat meant opening up another line of attack against Catalonia, as did occur two months later. However, it was not without offering assurances of Republican victory laden with romantic claims:

Tres veces llegaron frente a ella, en el pasado siglo, las fuerzas enemigas de la libertad, y tres veces tuvieron que levantar el sitio vencidas. Bilbao no conoce el significado de la palabra rendición. Entre las gestas ciudadanas que nos sirven de ejemplos históricos estimulantes, las de Bilbao son las mejores. En ellas, el valor y la fortaleza, fueron recompensados con la victoria.⁴¹⁸

The memory of Bilbao was used to bond Basques and Catalans in a shared defense of autonomous privileges and democratic freedoms, and to enshrine their communal Republican allegiances. The recollection of unlikely past victories stirred up a sense of pan-Spanish nostalgia. The example of the unyielding city represented Republican strength and resilience to cast a brighter light on a grim reality. While the comparison meant to rally morale and encourage civilians, it also suggested an internal conflict, as *La Vanguardia* argued that Bilbao was in grave danger but also that history taught readers it would not fail. This duality of fear and optimism aimed to inspire Catalans with a model of impossible resistance and to strengthen incentives to persevere in the upcoming siege of Barcelona. In romanticising the "tradición gloriosa" of "la invicta villa," *La Vanguardia* guided readers through a Republic narrative interpretation of the war and warned them against a passivity and indifference deemed fatal. Political narratives, like all narratives, are primarily composed of four parts: characters, setting,

⁴¹⁷ "Pensemos en Bilbao," *La Vanguardia*, April 29, 1937.

⁴¹⁸ "Pensemos en Bilbao," *La Vanguardia*, April 29, 1937.

plot, and theme.⁴¹⁹ These components are, in turn, born out of the political discourse of the era and are packaged for the masses in a series of interpretive frames which serve to make sense of the otherwise elusive human experience. To this effect, the editorial highlighted the virtues of the protagonist (Bilbao) over the weaknesses of the antagonist (Fascism). In so doing, Bilbao transcended its status as the ultimate symbol of Basque nationalism to be transformed into a beacon of liberty and independence for the whole of the Second Spanish Republic. The elevated portrayal of Basque identity as connected to the rest of Spain spotlighted Barcelona and Bilbao's shared suffering and fortified a common goal in the fight to banish the criminals responsible for their invasion.

The Fascist offensive in the Basque Country, sometimes called the War in the North began in late March, 1937. Within a month Republican forces there were on the retreat and suffering continuous setbacks. The destruction of Guernica, a historic Basque capital, which left an estimated 300+ civilians dead, dealt a devastating blow to the region. Home to an ancient oak, under which the Basque *fueros*, or code of laws, were proclaimed according to a supposedly democratic tradition stretching back into legend, Guernica had long been upheld in national myths as a symbol of Basque values and regional autonomy. By the twentieth century it was considered a minor and defenseless settlement, but its utter destruction shocked the Western world.⁴²⁰ Still more disturbing was the realisation that as Republicans lost territory in the Basque country, Franco gained the ability to launch attacks on Catalonia from multiple fronts.⁴²¹

Though the modern Basque and Catalan nationalist movements emerged during the same period, they assumed different characteristics. "Both regions were overdeveloped and characterized by similar levels of ethnic competition," but Basque nationalism tended toward total independence from Spain and firm adherence to Catholicism, while Catalanism generally involved regional autonomy as part of a federation of Spanish states which aimed to limit the centralised power of Madrid.⁴²² As Josep Pich i Mitjana argues, "Los *federalcatalanistas* impulsaron un proyecto que pretendía transformar España, un estado políticamente centralista y en proceso de uniformización cultural, en una federación asimétrica que aceptase el

⁴¹⁹ Robert Rowland, "The Narrative Perspective," in *The Art of Rhetorical Criticism*, Ed. Jim A. Kuypers (Boston: Pearson Education, Inc., 2005), 136.

⁴²⁰ William D. Phillips, Jr. and Carla Rahn Phillips, *A Concise History of Spain* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 255-256.

⁴²¹ "Pensemos en Bilbao," *La Vanguardia*, April 29, 1937.

⁴²² Juan Díez Medrano, "Patterns of Development and Nationalism: Basque and Catalan Nationalism before the Spanish Civil War," *Theory and Society* 23.4 (Aug., 1994): 543, 541.

autogobierno y la identidad catalana.”⁴²³ Many Catalan nationalists therefore supported the Spanish Republic as the best hope of securing regional self-government and cultural protections. Joan Serrallonga pointed out that local working-class attitudes embodied a left-wing Catalanism, which was unique for being able to join the existing popular nationalist Catalanism with workers’ organisations.⁴²⁴ Catalonia had undergone heavy industrialisation and dominated approximately 80% of Spain’s textile market. In the process it developed an advanced political and economic infrastructure well-adapted to capitalist interests.⁴²⁵ The Basque Country similarly experienced industrialisation, becoming the leading exporter of iron ore, but its development was distributed unevenly and to the detriment of the lower classes who suffered from harmful mining and agrarian reforms.⁴²⁶ The “separatist and reactionary character of Basque nationalism” thus “differed dramatically from the pro-capitalist and generally non-separatist character of Catalan nationalism” of the era as their respective leaders prioritised divergent values and policies.⁴²⁷

Unlike Catalan nationalism, Basque nationalism donned a largely conservative tone, in some areas joining with Carlist ideologies. While Carlism had previously ignored external affairs, exerting its efforts into stamping out the perceived foreign influences of liberalism and secularism, five years under the Second Spanish Republic apparently awakened it to the development of a “worldwide political crisis, in which left and right were seen to be hurtling towards a collision, crushing democracy between them.”⁴²⁸ Though many Basques, including priests and other church members, supported the Republic as a way to restore the autonomy guaranteed by the Basque *fueros* of previous centuries, collaboration between military insurgents and Carlist sympathisers in the region eventually resulted in irreversible Nationalist gains.⁴²⁹ According to Blinkhorn, Carlist reporting and commentary on foreign affairs constituted a thoroughly propagandistic function of promoting fear of all left-wing victories,

⁴²³ Josep Pich i Mitjana, “La Génesis del catalanismo político. De los inicios de la Restauración a la crisis del Centre Català,” *Hispania: Revista Española de Historia* 229 (May-Aug., 2008): 439.

⁴²⁴ Joan Serrallonga, “Subordination, Supplies and Mortality: The Montaña Catalana, 1939-1945,” in *A Social History of Spanish Labour*, Ed. José A. Piqueras and Vicent Sanz Rozalén (New York: Berghahn, 2007), 278.

⁴²⁵ Juan Díez Medrano, “Patterns of Development and Nationalism: Basque and Catalan Nationalism before the Spanish Civil War,” *Theory and Society* 23.4 (Aug., 1994): 553.

⁴²⁶ Juan Díez Medrano, “Patterns of Development and Nationalism: Basque and Catalan Nationalism before the Spanish Civil War,” *Theory and Society* 23.4 (Aug., 1994): 555; Adrian Shubert, *A Social History of Modern Spain* (London and New York: Routledge, 2005), 27.

⁴²⁷ Juan Díez Medrano, “Patterns of Development and Nationalism: Basque and Catalan Nationalism before the Spanish Civil War,” *Theory and Society* 23.4 (Aug., 1994): 543.

⁴²⁸ Martin Blinkhorn, *Carlism and Crisis in Spain, 1931-1939* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1975), 141.

⁴²⁹ Juan Pablo Fusi Aizpúrua, *El País Vasco, 1931-1937: Autonomía. Revolución. Guerra Civil*. (Madrid: Biblioteca Nueva, 2002), 15-16.

to advance the stimulating triumphs of rightist movements throughout the continent, and most importantly, “to advertise Carlism as the vanguard of a similar triumph in Spain.”⁴³⁰ Carlists and their Nationalist allies therefore interpreted the Spanish Civil War as the conflict to determine the fate of Europe in favour of tradition or liberalism, leading to the promotion of apocalyptic and depraved imagery of Republican society in the rebel zone.

Though the Pact of San Sebastián (1930) had promised autonomy to Catalonia, Galicia, and the Basque Country, the attempted implementation of such statutes proved a more difficult task, with some officials supporting the motion and others opposing it on the grounds that “Spain was an indivisible country.”⁴³¹ The specifics of regional autonomy and pluriculturalism consequently emerged as a critical point of contention in the nascent Republican administration, revealing the deep ambivalence of the Spanish left regarding the nature of power-relations within Spain. This angered the Catalan nationalists who played a key role in the establishment of the Second Spanish Republic, as they felt betrayed by the delay of promised measures which struggled to pass through the federal legislature and take effect. Indeed, the debate over the implementation of a centralised or confederate Spanish state remained a major source of disagreement among the diverse and highly stratified network of political parties governing Spain. The inability to reconcile the competing priorities of Madrid and Barcelona further strained regional relations, increasing nationalist demands for independence. Tensions reached boiling point when in 1934 Companys announced the “Estat Català” after he found his campaign for agrarian reform repeatedly blocked by Republican deadlock in other parts of the country.⁴³² Though the announcement was reversed within a matter of hours and Companys arrested for treason, the question of separatism continued to influence political affairs on a national level, continually bubbling to the surface in the events leading up to, and during, the Spanish Civil War.⁴³³

Catalonia was finally granted limited self-governance in 1934 while the Basque Country was hastily granted a similar agreement in 1936 only after the outbreak of war. The

⁴³⁰ Martin Blinkhorn, *Carlism and Crisis in Spain, 1931-1939* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1975), 141.

⁴³¹ Sandie Holguín, “Navigating the Historical Labyrinth of the Spanish Civil War,” *Teaching Representations of the Spanish Civil War*, Ed. Noël Valis (New York: Modern Language Association of America, 2007), 29; Adolfo Hernández Lafuente, *Autonomía e integración en la Segunda República* (Madrid: Ediciones Encuentro, 1980), 35-42.

⁴³² George Esenwein and Adrian Shubert, *Spain at War: The Spanish Civil War in Context, 1931-1939* (Longman: London and New York, 1995), 55-58.

⁴³³ George Esenwein and Adrian Shubert, *Spain at War: The Spanish Civil War in Context, 1931-1939* (Longman: London and New York, 1995), 55-58. Helen Graham, *The Spanish Republic at War, 1936-1939* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), 218-221.

Republic feared Basque Anarchist and nationalist groups, citing competition with Anarchist strongholds in the north and suspected Nationalist collaboration on behalf of Carlist sympathisers and Partido Nacional Vasco (PNV). Consequently, at the same time that *La Vanguardia* desperately garnered support for Basque allies with impassioned cries of “Pensemos en Bilbao, catalanes”, the Republic withheld sending much-needed firearms to the region. *La Vanguardia*’s political imaginary of a united federation of Spanish states against an army consisting of military traitors and hostile foreigners was thus contradicted by the actual events in the Basque Country. As Phillips and Phillips point out:

The PNV betrayal of the Republic that had granted the Basques autonomous rule illustrates the complicated nature of the Spanish Civil War. Outsiders could define the conflict in simple terms of Nationalist versus Republican or fascism versus democratic freedom. Insiders experienced the surreal complexity of hatreds and multi-layered loyalties and animosities.⁴³⁴

Perhaps with this unusual ode to Basque courage and heritage, *La Vanguardia* hoped to mobilise readers and prepare Barcelona for the fast-approaching “Batalla de Cataluña.” The forgery of an epic destiny linking Bilbao and Barcelona to one other and to the rest of Spain likely attempted to assail the chaos storming Republican cities divided by workers’ strikes, factional schisms, irreconcilable political ideologies, and clashing conceptions of what constituted the fabric of Spanish society.

Despite *La Vanguardia*’s narrative of indomitable Basque resistance, Bilbao surrendered to Franco without a fight in June of 1937, fuelling Republican suspicions of clandestine cooperation between the Nationalists and PNV. Additionally, Franco’s capture of the Basque Country created a second battlefield against Catalonia, eventually culminating in the disastrous Battle of the Ebro the following year.⁴³⁵ *La Vanguardia*’s rhetorical framing endeavoured, therefore, to cultivate a space in which individuals of various cultural backgrounds could interact, form a strong and collective national defence, and effectively battle injustice in a cause which became more desperate with each passing day.⁴³⁶ Its spirited depiction of Bilbao tied Basques and Catalans to a single destiny, suggesting they made up two sides of the same coin, or more precisely, that to stand alone meant to die alone. Such framing used myth-making to uphold favourable coverage of Republican policies and to crystallise a

⁴³⁴ William D. Phillips, Jr. and Carla Rahn Phillips, *A Concise History of Spain* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 256.

⁴³⁵ William D. Phillips, Jr. and Carla Rahn Phillips, *A Concise History of Spain* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 256, 257.

⁴³⁶ *La Vanguardia* continued to develop this theme of an indomitable people with respect to the island of Menorca in June of 1938. See “Menorca, la indómita,” *La Vanguardia*, June 30, 1938.

national imaginary of social equality, ethnic inclusiveness, and cultural diversity in the reconstruction of the Spanish nation.

The usage of Basque and Catalan vocabularies and histories in mainstream Republican discourse as a source of Spanish pride embraced a pluricultural vision of Spain, a major point of difference with the Nationalist Zone, which asserted total Castilian dominance. On March 15, 1938, the front page featured the famous Catalan words: “Ara és l’hora, catalans!”, a phrase associated with the region’s nationalist movements.⁴³⁷ Its exact origins remain uncertain, but it is the official chant of the National Day of Catalonia celebrated on September 11 to honour the fallen heroes who defended Barcelona against Felipe V in the War of Spanish Succession (1702-1715). The siege, which began in 1713 and lasted fourteen months, resulted in the loss of Catalan liberties, institutions, and laws.⁴³⁸ Still remembered as a symbol of the continued Catalan struggle for independence, *La Vanguardia* transformed a Catalanist narrative into a Republican narrative of joint Catalan *and* Spanish resistance to Spain’s fascist oppressors. It began by acknowledging that “la guerra que estaba lejos, muy lejos de Cataluña” rapidly approached by way of Aragon. It asserted that Madrid felt similarly anxious when the war first breached its walls, but persisted despite the danger: “la realidad cruel vencía a los temperamentos más flemáticos; pero vibró, se estremeció, perdió su calma idiosincrásica y se puso a arder de ira, de rabia, de abnegación, de furor violento.” In so doing, it reiterated the fraternal connection between Madrid and Barcelona, calling upon Barcelona to emulate Madrid’s heroism.

Following in Madrid’s example was necessary, it argued, for the preservation of Catalan language and culture, which were uniquely threatened by the Nationalist agenda:

¿Se han dado cuenta los catalanes de lo que significaría para ellos el triunfo, de las hordas que avanzan por Aragón? Nada más que esto: supresión de todos los periódicos catalanes; desaparición, en tiendas, librerías, bibliotecas públicas y privadas, de todos los libros escritos en lengua catalana; persecución de la bandera barrada; abolición de las emisiones catalanas por radio: prohibición de hablar catalán en público.⁴³⁹

The “bandera barrada” referred, of course, to the *Senyera*, or Catalan national banner. The design, derived from the coat of arms of the Crown of Aragon, represents the communities of Catalonia, Aragon, Valencia, and the Balearic Islands. It consists of four red stripes atop a gold background and its usage dates back to the twelfth century. Its mysterious origins remain

⁴³⁷“Ara és l’hora, catalans!,” *La Vanguardia*, March 15, 1938.

⁴³⁸ Horst Pietschmann, “Barcelona, Catalonia and the Crown of Aragón in the Bourbon Spanish Empire,” *European Review* 25.1 (2016): 61, 62; Pere Anguera, “El 11 de septiembre: Orígenes y consolidación de la Diada,” *Ayer* 51 (2003): 17-38.

⁴³⁹ “Ara és l’hora, catalans!,” *La Vanguardia*, March 15, 1938.

steeped in legend and the flag continues to be regarded as an important symbol of Catalan pride.⁴⁴⁰ One story held it was born of the war wounds of a ninth century king during the siege of Barcelona by the Moorish leader of Lleida. Another claimed it originated from the royal seal of Alfonso II of Aragon. In either case, recent studies have shown that members of the Catalan community still identify more strongly with their regional flag than with the national flag.⁴⁴¹

Building on this symbol, the editorial adopted an uncharacteristically nationalist tone which spoke directly to Catalonia, but still connected peripheral regions to central Spain in a way that fortified the newspaper's argument for a collective national imaginary: "Hablamos de lo puramente catalán, porque a los catalanes nos dirigimos." *La Vanguardia* stirred up the sentiments of Catalan nationalism in order to promote a regional resistance connected to a national Spanish resistance in Bilbao and Madrid. It argued that the Second Spanish Republic fought for the preservation of democracy in all parts of Spain against Franco who posed an unprecedented threat to Catalonia, its unique language and culture: "*Ara es l'hora, catalans—como dice el himno de la tierra—ara és l'hora d'estar alerta...La personalidad de Cataluña está en litigio como no lo estuvo nunca en su historia. En las manos de sus hijos reside...*" Such maternal rallying cries to protect the region contended that the Republic fought to defend a Spanish homeland inclusive of Catalonia, while fascists fought to conquer Spain and destroy Catalan. In this way, *La Vanguardia* continued to draw parallels with the Basque Country even after its loss to motivate Catalans, as the surrender of Bilbao marked a period of renewed persecution of Basque nationalism. It used this fact to demonstrate to local audiences that preserving the Republic was the only way to defend Catalan language, institutions, and autonomy. As the war approached Barcelona, efforts to fortify the city's Republican base and repel Franco became increasingly urgent. By reminding readers of the Nationalist repression of cultural and linguistic differences, the newspaper strengthened arguments for a unified resistance. *La Vanguardia* thereby advertised a pluricultural version of Spanish identity in which Spain's diverse languages and cultures were safeguarded by a benevolent Republic. Its depiction of the Basques served not just to exalt a sense of fraternity among regions, but also to cement the loyalty of Catalan nationalists with the Republican cause.

Editorial 4: "El Fracaso de la Lógica"—January 8, 1939

⁴⁴⁰ Victor M. Olivieri, "Sub-state nationalism in Spain: primers and triggers of identity politics in Catalonia and the Basque Country," *Ethnic and Racial Studies* 38.9 (2015): 1615.

⁴⁴¹ Félix Moral del Cura and Araceli Mateos Díaz, "La identidad nacional de los jóvenes y el Estado de las Autonomías," *Opiniones y actitudes*, 26 (1999).

On January 8, Ángel Ossorio published an editorial titled “El Fracaso de la Lógica” which framed rational thought as counterproductive to the Spanish cause due to its supposed irrelevance.⁴⁴² In it, he attacked reason as the enemy of faith. While Republican propaganda sought to transform the Republican cause into a crusade for a better and egalitarian world order, Republicans tended to frame their allegedly superior ideals as clear, reasonable, and intelligent, positioned in stark contrast with the irrationality of Church and Fascist ideologies. Indeed, just two weeks earlier, Antonio Porras has argued that such reason was fundamental and necessary and had been thrown out the window by Catholic leaders: “tener razón es fundamental y necesario al hombre. La Iglesia constituida tiró la razón católica por la ventana.”⁴⁴³ The Nationalist agenda, by extension, was framed as a terrifying combination of madness, praetorianism, and backwardness. In this way, *La Vanguardia* repeatedly reminded audiences about the horrific consequences of Republican defeat, framing resistance as the last remaining weapon against Fascist aggression. Reports on the mass purges of occupied villages, indiscriminate killings of perceived political rivals, and antisemitic persecution in Nazi Europe haunted daily columns. “Tengan o no sombras de responsabilidad indefectiblemente son condenados a la muerte los más mozos,”⁴⁴⁴ stated one. Another commented on the extreme grief, oppression, and solitude suffered even on Christmas Eve in the rebel zone: “¡Nuestra Nochebuena es mala pero la de ellos es peor!”⁴⁴⁵

Unable to launch new offensives or regroup its dwindling forces, Barcelona’s leadership turned to parroting sermons of faith and sacrifice. Articles at once claimed resistance as the greatest option and the only option, the one action standing between the Spanish people and death. *La Vanguardia* insisted that without resistance there could be no victory (even when victory was no longer possible by any means). It harked back to the devastating punishments suffered by the events of May 2, 1808, which sparked the Peninsular Wars, reciting the popular verses of Bernardo López García’s 1866 “Oda al Dos de Mayo” in claiming one cannot enslave a nation that knows how to die.⁴⁴⁶ This continuous demand for sacrifice as the means to victory revealed the darker side of a government unwilling to admit defeat, instead forcing citizens between individual and collective death with no value placed on their survival. Appeals to resistance frequently alluded to historical precedents—the Reconquista, the War of Spanish Succession, and the War of Independence—thereby drawing upon the historical memory to

⁴⁴² Ángel Ossorio y Gallardo, “El fracaso de la lógica,” *La Vanguardia*, January 8, 1939.

⁴⁴³ Antonio Porras, “Proximas Pascuas e invención de Luciana,” *La Vanguardia*, December 24, 1938.

⁴⁴⁴ *La Vanguardia*, January 25, 1939; “La campaña racista en Hungría,” *La Vanguardia*, January 25, 1939.

⁴⁴⁵ “Nuestra Nochebuena y la de los facciosos,” *La Vanguardia*, December 24, 1938.

⁴⁴⁶ *La Vanguardia*, April 7, 1938.

cultivate a Republican national imaginary of a besieged and disadvantaged nation successfully unifying to overcome despotism and foreign oppression. The newspaper attempted to stimulate readers' patriotism through the insistence that Spain would show the world, yet again, its greatness through perseverance. In this way, *La Vanguardia* built upon previous discourses surrounding depictions of national resistance to a greater enemy. In the First Manifesto of the Supreme Council of State to the Spanish Nation from 1808, for example, it was proclaimed that the people had come to reject French tyranny and embrace, at last, their uniquely Spanish strength and virtue.⁴⁴⁷ In recalling these discourses, the newspaper forged a sense of continuity between past and present conflicts for Republican audiences, thereby framing Spanish history as a prolonged–yet victorious–battle against foreign despotism, cruelty, and injustice.

As the war worsened, messages of resistance assumed priority. In late December, *La Vanguardia* dedicated a full page of coverage to a speech by Lluís Companys delivered to the Catalan troops of the rearguard,⁴⁴⁸ in which he called for sustained resistance. He designated audiences as fundamental to Catalan victory and argued that the protection of all Catalonia—from its periphery to the capital—was vital to success since every inch of Catalonia was a piece of the Catalan soul. A Francoist victory would signify the end of Catalan autonomy so that Catalonia would be victimised. Catalan music, language, and soul would disappear. Everything they had accomplished, past and present, would be destroyed along with the aspirational future they had once imagined under the Second Spanish Republic. Companys demanded that all Catalans defend their proud homeland. He framed it not as a request but rather as a demand, an imperative of Catalan (not Spanish) duty and patriotism. *La Vanguardia* celebrated the Catalan president's "palabras de aliento, de estímulo y de esperanza," and echoed the call for citizens to fight the approaching enemy down to the last man for Catalonia, for the Republic, and for Liberty.⁴⁴⁹

This patriotism only intensified as it became apparent that the war was lost. In January 1939, which would mark the final month of Republican control in Barcelona, news coverage extended little beyond misleading headlines and editorials. Instead, pages coursed with emotional editorials preaching enthusiasm and encouragement. An estimated one-third of Catalonia had already surrendered to Nationalist forces by mid-January, clearing the way to the capital. Most members of the international brigades had recently been withdrawn from

⁴⁴⁷ El Conde de Toreno, *Historia del levantamiento, guerra y revolución de España, Tomo I* (Madrid: Imprenta de Don Tomás Jordán, 1835), 1-125.

⁴⁴⁸ "Patriótico discurso del presidente don Luis Companys," *La Vanguardia*, December 30, 1938.

⁴⁴⁹ "Patriótico discurso del presidente don Luis Companys," *La Vanguardia*, December 30, 1938.

active duty following irredeemable losses in the Battle of the Ebro and supply lines were fragmented throughout the Republican Zone.⁴⁵⁰ In attempts to maintain morale despite the fatal setbacks (newspapers had been instructed to uphold morale at all costs), *La Vanguardia*'s contributors continued to proclaim eventual victory in a supposedly epic battle to determine the destiny of all mankind.

Ossorio's 1939 editorial started by quoting Austrian novelist, Stefan Zweig: "Lo heroico es siempre irracional y antirracional [sic] y cada vez que un hombre o un pueblo se imponen una misión superior a su verdadera medida, aumentan sus energías hasta alcanzar un poder jamás sospechado."⁴⁵¹ Beginning every paragraph with "lógicamente," he positioned every alleged fact of the war alongside an apparently unexpected outcome. Logically, he claimed, the insurrection should have triumphed in a matter of minutes due to the lack of resources and the precarious isolation of the Republican president at the time. Logically, the disorganised defenses of Madrid and Barcelona should have failed against the superior weaponry of the enemy. Logically, Madrid should have crumbled in the intensive bombings of November 7, 1936, yet was rebuilt in the wake of destruction (an event immortalised by Republican propaganda campaigns). Logically, Barcelona should have fallen to the Italo-fascist aviation campaign in March of 1938 yet it survived the chaos and maintained its position. Since known as the first aerial carpet bombing in European history, the bombings lasted three weeks and dropped over 44 tonnes of explosives over the city, causing thousands of civilian casualties (the attacks only ceased when Franco intervened for fear of provoking complications abroad). Logically, when Levante was lost, Sagunto and Valencia should have been taken by the enemy, yet they somehow escaped the danger thanks to the "successful" distractions of the Ebro. Logically, then, Spain, attacked by so many nations, betrayed by its allies, and abandoned by the world's most progressive governments should have perished at the start of the war, yet three years later Franco's forces still struggled to conquer it. Yet Spain endured, rebuilt the machinery of the state, begot a grand army, and even established in the midst of war a level of industrial success never achieved in times of peace. Given this series of illogical events, presented here as the natural order of things in Spain (the rule rather than the aberration), he questioned the role of rationalism in interpreting the country's history and fate, as logic failed to serve any purpose. Ossorio rejected logic by claiming it was inapplicable to the Spanish Civil War, and paradoxically promised readers an eventual victory despite looming

⁴⁵⁰ Antony Beevor, *The Battle for Spain: The Spanish Civil War, 1936-1939* (New York: Penguin Books, 2006), 430.

⁴⁵¹ Ángel Ossorio y Gallardo, "El fracaso de la lógica," *La Vanguardia*, January 8, 1939.

defeat.⁴⁵² Defeat, according to his logic, was only a temporary setback in the ongoing progress toward inevitable victory, regardless of how long such a victory might take to arrive.

Moreover, he positioned what the world had deemed an isolated conflict as belonging to a greater destiny, one beyond immediate human comprehension. He considered the possibilities of divine providence, impetus of fate, and mere coincidence, but ultimately cast them aside to inform readers that they all harboured the conviction that the Spanish destiny rose far beyond the laws of logic. He thereby connected the Spanish Civil War to a greater world conflict framed as the confrontation between good and evil, progress and feudalism, and freedom and oppression. He emphasised these apparent contradictions—specifically, the vulnerability of Republican Spain in terms of material resources beside its superiority in terms of ideals and popular support; Its fragile position in world affairs beside the strength of its convictions; Spain’s relatively minor status in Europe beside its epic defense of the world’s democracies. He claimed that doubting, even for a moment, the success of the Republican mission was a spiritual sin (one he admitted to committing): “Muchas veces—vuelvo a confesarlo—me he irritado contra las gentes que proclamaban la seguridad de la victoria sin tener ni el más pequeño motivo en que apoyarse.”⁴⁵³ This clearly alludes to the news discourses produced throughout the war, which repeatedly proclaimed the “imminence” of victory without providing concrete evidence to support its claims. Instead, much like Ossorio’s messaging, newspapers like *La Vanguardia* relied upon popular faith and conviction and explicitly encouraged readers to reject contrary evidence.

While the first half of the editorial listed current examples of the “failure of logic” during the war, the second half provided cases from Spanish history. Ossorio connected these events to the Reconquista, the War of Spanish Succession, and the revolts of 1808, all of which he interpreted as conflicts which proved the tenacity of the Spanish national character (it should be noted he makes no allusion to pluriculturalism or the autonomous communities). He detailed the Reconquista, a campaign which echoed the underdog imagery of Republican propaganda (the common man against the elites): “iniciada por un grupo de desesperados y temerarios en las montañas asturianas contra un ejército y un poder real, ya dominadores de toda España, Sin embargo, fuimos nosotros los vencedores.”⁴⁵⁴ In placing contradiction at the centre of his argument, i.e. the contradiction of winning a cause despite losing, he presented the act of resistance as key despite the fact such resistance was unsustainable. The Reconquista, he added

⁴⁵² Ángel Ossorio y Gallardo, “El Fracaso de La Lógica,” *La Vanguardia*, January 8, 1939.

⁴⁵³ Ángel Ossorio y Gallardo, “El Fracaso de La Lógica,” *La Vanguardia*, January 8, 1939.

⁴⁵⁴ Ángel Ossorio y Gallardo, “El Fracaso de La Lógica,” *La Vanguardia*, January 8, 1939.

(not without humour), may have taken 700 years, but it ultimately ‘triumphed’ in reclaiming the Spanish nation from a more powerful occupying force. In this way, he turned Spain’s many historical defeats in historical victories intended to warn would-be enemies: “Si hace falta luchar siete siglos para echarlos de España, siete siglos lucharemos.”⁴⁵⁵ Recognised as the first major unification of Spain, Ossorio supplemented the Republican news frame of Spanish Civil War as a renewed Reconquista. He continued the narrative of the Spanish struggle against a foreign invader while also prioritising national unity as the strategy to victory (of special importance in fragmented Barcelona). In reframing the approaching Republican loss (at this point, largely known to be inevitable) as a delayed Republican victory, he endorsed a national imaginary of select Iberian myths portraying Spain’s history as a string of epic battles in which Spaniards unflinchingly rescued the nation from prolonged periods of oppression.

He concluded by recounting a popular story from the University of Cervera: “Me doy por vencido. Quisiera no volver a discurrir sobre la guerra española. En punto a ella, cierro los ojos, me declaro discípulo de la Universidad de Cervera y renuncio a ‘la funesta manía de pensar.’”⁴⁵⁶ The event recalled a dark period in Barcelona’s history, when the capital felt isolated and abandoned following Catalan defeat.⁴⁵⁷ The University of Cervera had been constructed in 1717 to reward the province of Lleida (the only part of Catalonia not to join the Hapsburg alliance) for supporting Felipe V in the War of Spanish Succession though it had disbanded by the mid-nineteenth century.⁴⁵⁸ The “funesta manía de pensar” became a reference to the alleged words of the University’s rector during a royal visit with Fernando VII in 1835 in which he announced that nothing was further from the university’s intention than the disastrous mania of thinking. Though the nature of the encounter remains a topic of dispute among scholars, it has come to form part of a popular regional story.⁴⁵⁹ This declaration of faith set the tone for Republican victory as a tenet of Republican faith. Triumph was a matter of conviction as opposed to the rational conclusion of evident facts. His disregard for contrary evidence completed a cycle of news development during the Spanish Civil War in which

⁴⁵⁵ Ángel Ossorio y Gallardo, “El Fracaso de La Lógica,” *La Vanguardia*, January 8, 1939.

⁴⁵⁶ Ángel Ossorio y Gallardo, “El Fracaso de La Lógica,” *La Vanguardia*, January 8, 1939.

⁴⁵⁷ Dr. José Vilar in “Barcelona, abandoned by both friends and allies, stands alone against Felipe V (July 12, 1713)” in *Spain under the Bourbons, 1700-1833: A Collection of Documents*, Ed. and Trans. W. N. Hargreaves-Mawdsley (London: The Macmillan Press, Ltd., 1973), 52-53.

⁴⁵⁸ Mordechai Feingold and Victor Navarro-Brotons, *Universities and Science in the Early Modern Period* (Dordrecht: Springer, 2006), 275; Robert Hughes, *Barcelona* (New York: Vintage Books, 1993), 186-189.

⁴⁵⁹ Manuel Ángel Santana Turégano, “Las universidades canarias y la funesta manía de pensar,” *El Día* (November 16, 2004), <http://web.eldia.es/cultura/2004-11-16/9-universidades-canarias-funesta-mania-pensar.htm>; Guillermo Fatás, “‘Lejos de nosotros la funesta manía de pensar,’ nunca lo dijo la Universidad de Cervera,” *20 Minutos* (November 9, 2016), <http://www.20minutos.es/opiniones/guillermo-fatás-tribuna-frases-celebres-lejos-de-nosotros-la-funesta-mania-de-pensar-nunca-lo-dijo-la-universidad-cervera-2883238/>

coverage became less about real reporting and more about ideological indoctrination. Propaganda is intended to propagate a particular belief or cause and in extreme cases eclipses news reporting altogether. As detailed in the following paragraph, Ossorio's editorial recalled a famous anecdote dating back to the eighteenth century, but it also cemented the news imaging of Republican progress, solidarity, and victory in wartime.

A respected intellectual of the period, Ángel Ossorio y Gallardo stood apart for being a devout Catholic who supported the Republic from its infancy. He was a self-identified "Christian, conservative, and attorney" who served the Spanish monarchy under Alfonso XIII.⁴⁶⁰ Throughout the course of the Second Spanish Republic he occupied assorted posts in which he alternated among statesman, minister, lawyer, and consultant. He published widely on the history and politics of modern Spanish society, including a book on eighteenth century political thought in Catalonia. Despite his conservatism and staunch opposition to anticlerical legislation promoted by the leftist Republican administrations, he remained a powerful and vocal advocate for Spanish democracy. Once described as "a monarchist without a king," his illustrious legal career won him the title "Pope of jurisprudence." He stayed faithful to the Republican cause and was considered an expert in Catalan affairs.⁴⁶¹ He had long praised Catalan language and culture, at one point celebrating Catalanism "como oposición al pesimismo español, característico de 1898."⁴⁶² Moreover, he had consistently supported the notion of regional autonomy while opposing separatist movements, arguing that Castile and Catalonia made one another stronger through their union: "Digan lo que quieran los irascibles de cada bando, ni ellos pueden vivir sin nosotros, ni nosotros sin ellos."⁴⁶³ Ossorio expressed the view that Spain was made greater by its cultural diversity, holding that the regional identities strengthened rather than threatened its national status.⁴⁶⁴ Though he and other contributors to the newspaper never used the term pluriculturalism explicitly, their printed

⁴⁶⁰ "Ángel Ossorio y Gallardo, católico republicano y abogado de Azaña" *S. G. Madrid*, http://www.abc.es/hemeroteca/historico-24-12-2008/abc/Cultura/angel-ossorio-y-gallardo-catolico-republicano-y-abogado-de-aza%C3%B1a_912078072314.html#

⁴⁶¹ "Ángel Ossorio y Gallardo, católico republicano y abogado de Azaña" *S. G. Madrid*, http://www.abc.es/hemeroteca/historico-24-12-2008/abc/Cultura/angel-ossorio-y-gallardo-catolico-republicano-y-abogado-de-aza%C3%B1a_912078072314.html#; Julio M. Lázaro, "75º Aniversario de la II República: Descendientes de Ossorio y Gallardo reclaman los bienes confiscados al político republicano," *El País*, http://elpais.com/diario/2006/04/14/espana/1144965612_850215.html; Patricia Zambrana Moral and Antonio M. López García, "Ángel Ossorio y Gallardo. Sus proyectos políticos, con prólogo de Pedro C. González Cuevas," *Revista de estudios histórico-jurídicos* 33 (2011): 719-721.

⁴⁶² Ángel Ossorio y Gallardo, "Prólogo," in *Catalanismo y Reforma Hispánica*, by J. Estelrich (Barcelona: Montaner y Simón, S. A., 1932), 10.

⁴⁶³ Ángel Ossorio y Gallardo, "Prólogo," in *Catalanismo y Reforma Hispánica*, by J. Estelrich (Barcelona: Montaner y Simón, S. A., 1932), 16.

⁴⁶⁴ Ángel Ossorio y Gallardo, "Prólogo," in *Catalanismo y Reforma Hispánica*, by J. Estelrich (Barcelona: Montaner y Simón, S. A., 1932), 12.

discourses advanced the cause of regional autonomy statutes and the historically marginalised groups they represented in stark contrast with Nationalist propaganda, which championed the homogenising effects of a Catholic and Castilian state order.

A close personal friend of *La Vanguardia*'s war-time editor-in-chief, María Luz Morales Godoy, with whom he regularly corresponded, Ossorio penned multiple editorials. In one letter dated shortly after the rebellion, she detailed some of the hardships brought on by the war, including the financial challenges precipitated by Godó's flight: "El propietario ha huido (naturalmente con sus millones). El director ha abandonado su puesto y se ha ido al extranjero...Hoy, *La Vanguardia*, no tiene las posibilidades económicas de hace un mes."⁴⁶⁵ The family had abruptly fled with their riches, leaving their long-time employees in the lurch. She referred to the situation as "dificilísimo" and all but begged Ossorio to contribute several articles despite being unable to pay him in advance for his collaboration, offering a kind of credit. Clearly aware, then, of the financial struggles faced by Barcelona's biggest newspaper, Ossorio reaffirmed his commitment to the movement by agreeing to contribute without guaranteed payment: "Por la retribución no se preocupe usted. Me paga V. lo que quiera, cuando quiera, y como quiera."⁴⁶⁶ Most interesting in their correspondence, however, was he directly addressed the issue of the newspaper's current readership and whether it had grown or shifted, querying about the original subscribers and whether the "bourgeois" classes had remained loyal to the newspaper or abandoned it: "Y ahora una curiosidad. ¿Quién lee hoy LA VANGUARDIA?" His questions suggested keen awareness of the extreme upheaval in political communications during which time most newspapers were either seized or redistributed by government committees to serve the war effort:

¿La sigue fiel su público burgués? ¿La ha abandonado? ¿Qué actitud tienen frente a ella la [sic.] masas de izquierda? ¿Cuanto tira? ¿Cabe en lo posible que influya sobre las clases conservadoras que nunca nos quisieron entender?⁴⁶⁷

While the editor's answers have unfortunately been lost, Ossorio's questions signalled keen interest in the potentially changed readership from the pre-war period when *La Vanguardia* had catered to the Catalan business classes along with other, more conservative, groups. It is impossible to surmise the precise target audience of *La Vanguardia*, but its history indicates a large and popular distribution within Spain, and its coverage also appeals to a regional audience with special references to political events in Catalonia. Moreover, as newspapers are in

⁴⁶⁵ Salamanca Archives, María Luz Morales Godoy, 1936.

⁴⁶⁶ Salamanca Archives, Ángel Ossorio y Gallardo, 1936.

⁴⁶⁷ Salamanca Archives, Ángel Ossorio y Gallardo, 1936.

constant competition with one another, their survival depends upon expanding their readership as much as possible. As requested, Ossorio supplied numerous articles to the periodical throughout the war, though “El fracaso de la lógica” was his final—and most dramatic—contribution. By openly rejecting notions of doubt and free thinking, he supported an important aim of Republican propaganda. Specifically, he helped to articulate the crafting of a religious-like faith that had become entirely divorced from reality. To cultivate this delusion of victory in death, Republican news framing thus depended upon a re-interpretation of Spanish history in which the national imaginary promoted a cohesive and unified Spanish identity demonstrative of a shared and unique national past. In so doing, news discourses like those produced by Ossorio manipulated emotions of fear, pride, and desperation. The literary style was dramatic and evocative, and served to elevate Spain as a living, breathing, feeling entity that exceeded geographic borders. The motif of nightmares served to instill dread and terror in readers, relying upon images of blood, fire, and brimstone in contrast with the images of freedom and harmony in a Republican paradise.

Throughout the war, *La Vanguardia* at once praised and pleaded for Spanish resistance to the fascist insurgents. By January 1939, Barcelona’s situation had become unsustainable. It was cut off from the major supply lines of the Republic and denied vital foreign assistance from allies as Catalonia fell piece by piece to the Nationalists’ advancing troops. Prime Minister Juan Negrín had hoped that heightened rhetoric of Republican fervour could prolong the war long enough to convince Franco to settle for a peace treaty and provide terms for a more favourable surrender. *La Vanguardia*’s editor-in-chief at the time, Fernando Vázquez Ocaña, passionately endorsed this tactic during and after the war, claiming Negrín’s sentiments were effective as well as sincere.⁴⁶⁸ By all accounts, however, the Republic no longer retained sufficient resources to persist. In spite of this, *La Vanguardia* not only continued to advocate for the Republican cause, but also featured motivational articles to encourage the magnificent Spanish resistance of soldiers and civilians throughout the city.⁴⁶⁹ Indeed, by the war’s conclusion, their demands for resistance in the face of certain death demonstrated the very failure of reason writers like Ángel Ossorio y Gallardo had so ardently defended.

Conclusion

⁴⁶⁸ Fernando Vázquez Ocaña, *Pasión y Muerte de la Segunda República Española* [1940] (Madrid: Cátedra del Exilio, 2007), 109-110, 123-124, 136.

⁴⁶⁹ *La Vanguardia*, January 5, 1939.

La Vanguardia survives today as Catalonia's leading newspaper and boasts the fourth highest readership in Spain. Literally translated as "The Vanguard," the iconic title could be aptly applied to its fierce resistance to Franco during the Spanish Civil War. It operated until the fall of Barcelona as a staunch defender of the Second Spanish Republic, publishing six days a week to invigorate and inform a politically diverse population. Furthermore, it did so, for a time, under the direction of María Luz Morales Godoy, the first woman ever to head a Spanish newspaper of national distribution.⁴⁷⁰ Throughout the war, *La Vanguardia* constructed a new national imaginary for a unified Spanish resistance to military insurgents based on myths which aggrandised historical precedents. Every citizen—whether Castilian, Catalan, Galician, or Basque—was made out to be significant and essential to a shared Republican victory. Even as battles were waged and lost, territories conquered, and tens of thousands of refugees displaced, *La Vanguardia* stood behind the popularly-elected government in declaring that a sustained collective resistance in Catalonia could save Spain and the rest of Europe.

As de Cillia, Reisigl, and Wodak state, "the construction of national identity builds on the emphasis on a common history, and history has always to do with remembrance and memory."⁴⁷¹ My analysis demonstrates that, in Republican Spain, this commonality was forged from a selective remembrance of the peninsular past to condense competing identities into a unified national imaginary in wartime. Nicholas J. O'Shaughnessy has argued that myths make up a core aspect of propaganda and political communication more generally as "myths provide a common cultural vocabulary; they unite, they flatter, they elevate the argument or group that claims association with them."⁴⁷² I uphold this view as Republican newspapers cultivated the image of an epic Spanish character united by democratic values. Indeed, *La Vanguardia* relied upon exalted narratives of resistance throughout the Iberian peninsula, pulling together various strands of Catalan, Basque, and Castilian history in the portrayal of a linked national and pluricultural struggle. Spanish Republicanism, as articulated by *La Vanguardia*, conceived of regional cultural identities as secondary yet protected by the state and its liberal democratic constitution. It envisioned pluriculturalism as the recognition of certain cultural groups while

⁴⁷⁰ Teresa Amiguet, "María Luz Morales, el periodismo tiene nombre de mujer," *La Vanguardia*, September 22, 2015.

⁴⁷¹ Rudolf de Cillia, Martin Reisigl, and Ruth Wodak, "The Discursive Construction of National Identities," *Discourse & Society* 10.2 (1999): 154.

Horst Pietschmann, "Barcelona, Catalonia and the Crown of Aragón in the Bourbon Spanish Empire," *European Review* 25.1 (2016): 61, 62.

⁴⁷² Nicholas J. O'Shaughnessy, *Politics and Propaganda: Weapons of Mass Seduction* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2004), 87, 88.

still defining them as subject to the transformative mission of the greater Spanish nation.⁴⁷³ The newspaper thereby revealed a Republican national imaginary of pluriculturalism preserved within a federation of Spanish states, of social equality before the law for all citizens, and of fair government representative of the public will and embodying progressive European ideals. In this way, it endeavoured to maintain the loyalty of Catalan locals and also win over the esteem of other Western democracies, primarily in France, Great Britain, Canada, and the United States, in the doomed Republican campaign for international aid and legitimacy.

Kuypers has observed that frames exist in the communicator, text, receiver, and culture at large. Despite forming “a natural and normal part of the communication process,” frames may be employed strategically to accomplish particular rhetorical functions, especially in news discourse.⁴⁷⁴ In this way, *La Vanguardia* framed its mission as the survival of the Spanish Revolution of 1930-1931, the progressive reforms instigated by the legitimate government, and the Catalan thirst for regional autonomy and recognition as a distinct cultural centre of Spain. The Second Spanish Republic had implemented radical legislation outlining universal suffrage, public education, divorce, freedom of speech and of assembly, the disestablishment of the Jesuit order, the right to autonomy for Catalonia, Galicia, and the Basque Country (though drawn up, the statutes for the autonomy of Valencia were never finalised), and promises of major land reform. Payne described the Republic as Spain’s “first complete experience with modern democracy” at a time when European affairs made a “dramatic” turn toward authoritarianism and dictatorship.⁴⁷⁵ The war against fascism, as it was described, transcended regional borders to become the ultimate battle “¡por la vida!,”⁴⁷⁶ “por el amor a la tierra y el amor a la libertad,”⁴⁷⁷ and for the future well-being of Spain’s most oppressed populations.

La Vanguardia never let readers forget the horrifying consequences of a Republican defeat and repeatedly reminded them that a unified community was paramount to survival.⁴⁷⁸ Calls for resistance often alluded to historical precedents, such as the Reconquista, the War of Spanish Succession, and the Napoleonic invasion, all of which were framed in terms of

⁴⁷³ Charles Taylor has examined multiculturalism as a “discourse of recognition,” in which group identities are shaped by the presence or absence of recognition in certain cultural and national contexts. See Charles Taylor, “The Politics of Recognition” in *Multiculturalism: Examining the Politics of Recognition*, Ed. Amy Gutmann (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994), 26-28.

⁴⁷⁴ Jim A. Kuypers, “Framing Analysis from a Rhetorical Perspective,” *Doing News Framing Analysis: Empirical and Theoretical Perspectives*, Ed. Jim A. Kuypers and Paul D’Angelo (New York: Routledge, 2010), 301.

⁴⁷⁵ Stanley G. Payne, *Spain’s First Democracy: The Second Republic, 1931-1936* (Madison: The University of Wisconsin Press, 1993), 3, 60, 61; Adolfo Hernández Lafuente, *Autonomía e integración en la Segunda República* (Madrid: Ediciones Encuentro, 1980), 35-42.

⁴⁷⁶ “¡Por la vida!,” *La Vanguardia*, April 10, 1938.

⁴⁷⁷ “Patriótico discurso del presidente don Luis Companys,” *La Vanguardia*, December 30, 1938.

⁴⁷⁸ “Gobierno de fuerza y de depuración,” *La Vanguardia*, April 7, 1938.

invasion, betrayal, and underdog victories. Themes targeted both negative and positive emotions in readers to map out conflict and inspire active participation in the war effort. The newspaper's rhetoric presented the image that Spanish history was a sequence of events in which the threats orchestrated by outsiders had always ultimately been foiled by common citizens who banded together to banish foreign oppressors. It cultivated a sense of "collective memory" of the long-standing Spanish tradition of defiance to foreign domination and centralised power, forging a new narrative in which the national histories of Catalonia and Castile were conceived as one. The loss of Spanish democracy, according to *La Vanguardia*, spelled disaster for human progress. The defence of the Republic, it asserted, was intended to ensure that the world's democracies did not die a terrible death: "¡Ojalá nuestro heroísmo impida que la democracia muera de mala muerte!"⁴⁷⁹ As the newspaper reaffirmed in its coverage of a speech delivered by Lluís Companys (and echoing the sentiments contained in "El triunfo de la legalidad"): "Cataluña, en el curso de su historia, ha sido invariablemente baluarte de la Libertad y del Derecho."⁴⁸⁰ In re-contextualising the narrative of Catalan resistance to a tyrannical foreign power as Spanish resistance to a global enemy, *La Vanguardia* transformed its stated mission of "al servicio de la democracia" into one of promoting a unified Spanish resistance to save not only Spain but also the rest of the civilised world.

While Franco's Nationalists sought to establish an image of Spain as a homogenous country defined by absolute allegiance to Catholicism and, above all, to Castilian hegemony, Barcelona's *La Vanguardia* envisioned Spain as a pluricultural nation unified by Republican ideals guaranteeing the protection of national liberties. As Esenwein and Shubert somewhat controversially maintain, it was not Republican revolutionary failure but rather Republican revolutionary success which prompted the ultimately fatal military rebellion of July, 1936. They contend it was "motivated by fears that the Republic would be successful in its wide-ranging reforms, the end result of which would have been to replace one economic, social, and political formation—or one vision of 'Spain'—with another."⁴⁸¹ Consequently, the famous "war of words" unleashed by the Spanish Civil War reflected a discursive battle between competing narratives of Spanish identity. Through forging Spain's contentious national histories into a single campaign for justice and liberty, *La Vanguardia* served the Republican mission to re-

⁴⁷⁹ "Para que las democracias no mueran de mala muerte," *La Vanguardia*, April 12, 1938.

⁴⁸⁰ "Patriótico discurso del presidente don Luis Companys," *La Vanguardia*, December 30, 1938.

⁴⁸¹ George Esenwein and Adrian Shubert, *Spain at War: The Spanish Civil War in Context, 1931-1939* (Longman: London and New York, 1995), 34.

create Spain as a modern and progressive child of the democratic revolution. To bolster support for this message, editorials appealed to readers' sense of imagined community and defended the newspaper's status as part of "la prensa no encasillada." Contributors—whose members included artists, intellectuals, politicians, and professional journalists—justified this independence as contributing a truthful, more complete perspective of the conflict, thereby suggesting it served an important function in times of crisis. In this way, *La Vanguardia* upheld its political slant while simultaneously reassuring audiences (and censors) of its unwavering loyalty to the Republic.

Conclusion: Through the Looking Glass of the Spanish Civil War

I contend that the demands of war in 1930s Spain necessitated the transformation of journalism into a discursive weapon that diverted traditional conceptions of news from informational reporting to a deliberate and focused interpretation of events. This interpretation amounted to propaganda aimed at animating the public in a specific cause toward a specific end. It relied upon the promotion of an imagined community composed of three parts: the imagined past, the imagined present, and the imagined future. The imagined past represented a shared history that explained conflicts in the present and dictated action to fulfil a future that was depicted as the destiny of a chosen people. The past, just like the present, had to be perceived as communal by a larger group aspiring to a greater future. Together, these parts formed the basis of the national imaginary. Through a unique synthesis of rhetorical framing, historical discourse, and affect, therefore, this thesis proposes a new interdisciplinary framework to evaluate the construction of national imaginaries in wartime political discourses. Moreover, it advances framing studies beyond the identification of editorial slant to the meaningful investigation of propaganda and its underlying mechanisms. Wodak argues that critical linguistics aims “to uncover and demystify certain social processes in this and other societies, to make mechanisms of manipulation, discrimination, demagoguery, and propaganda explicit and transparent.”⁴⁸² While my work does not fall into the area of critical linguistics, it does aspire to some of the same goals. Notably, it uncovers the potential for framing to extend from a supposedly minimally-conscious byproduct of professional perception and routine to the calculated manipulation of world realities.

This process effectively illuminates strategies of Republican resistance in the Spanish Civil War from beginning to end and how those strategies impacted the style and content of Madrilenian, Valencian, and Barcelonan journalism. Newspapers regularly invoke culturally-salient themes as central organising ideas to communicate wartime objectives in a particular light, blending human feeling and reporting in a passionate political sermon that yields limited information. Consequently, propaganda depends upon news framing as a primary device to structure messaging and influence mass opinion. The select emphasis and omission of fact is used to endorse blind belief, mask contradictions, overhype victories, and downplay defeats to

⁴⁸² Ruth Wodak, “Introduction,” in *Language, Power and Ideology: Studies in Political Discourse* (Amsterdam: John Benjamins Publishing Company, 1989), xiv.

boost confidence in difficult times. This task is exceptionally complicated for the losing or disadvantaged side, which must disguise hardships in the quest to turn the tide.

George Orwell once wrote that “Political language—and with variations this is true of all political parties, from Conservatives to Anarchists—is designed to make lies sound truthful and murder respectable, and to give an appearance of solidity to pure wind.”⁴⁸³ Indeed, it is well-known that newspapers are far more than the objective summary of current events as they coincide with societal agendas, with the result that the media construct frames to impart various political narratives. The advent of war in Spain posed an existential threat to members of the nation, making neutrality a challenging, if not altogether impossible, task. The dangers associated with violent conflict converted journalism into a tool for propaganda so that coverage ultimately shifted from any pretense of publishing informational accounts to promoting an ideological mission. Newspapers sought to persuade readers through the projection of a national imaginary rooted in culture, language, and history. In their campaign to win the war, Republican reporters encouraged popular faith and loyalty in a transcendent cause, exploiting human emotions and sentiments in the process of enlistment. Fear and anger served to target a common enemy while love, pride, and faith acted to stimulate morale and discourage doubts. The Spanish Civil War was bloody and complex as warring factions recruited from a divided populace while trying to ensure unity and cooperation amidst changing territorial allegiances.

In a pluricultural country with a fraught history of regional and national clashes, Spain’s military coup of July, 1936 came as a sudden—but not unexpected—blow to Spanish democracy and progress.⁴⁸⁴ Republican newspapers responded to a materially superior enemy by cultivating an imagined community which suppressed a fragmented base and bridged cultural and linguistic differences. Leftist journalists found themselves trapped between punishing censors and an equally oppressive antagonist as they navigated governmental chaos and martial law.⁴⁸⁵ While international correspondents could eventually escape the conflict by leaving,

⁴⁸³ George Orwell, “Politics and the English Language,” in *Why I Write* [1946] (London: Penguin Books, 2004), 120.

⁴⁸⁴ Clara Campoamor, *La revolución española vista por una republicana* [1937] (Seville: Espuelda de Plata, 2009), 43, 47-49, 58, 59; Frank E. Manuel, “Party Struggles in Spain,” the *New York Times*, July 26, 1936; Fernando Vázquez Ocaña, *Pasión y Muerte de la Segunda República Española* [1940] (Madrid: Cátedra del exilio, 2007), 13, 14.

⁴⁸⁵ Arturo Mori, *La Prensa española durante La Segunda República* [1943] (Seville: Editorial Renacimiento, 2019), 226, 228; Antonio Checa Godoy, *Prensa y partidos políticos durante La II República* (Salamanca: Ediciones Universidad de Salamanca, 1989), 165; Mirta Núñez Díaz-Balart, *La prensa de guerra en la zona republicana durante la guerra civil española (1936-1939), Tomo I* (Madrid: Ediciones de la Torre, 1992), 17-31, 65, 66.

Spanish professionals were not so fortunate. Some felt compelled by moral duty to remain and protect Spain's first attempt at democracy since 1873, while others faced conscription.⁴⁸⁶ Despite sometimes being referred to as “una República de periodistas,” the Second Spanish Republic legislated stringent censorship policies in 1931 which became increasingly repressive with the outbreak of war.⁴⁸⁷ William P. Carney of the *New York Times* wrote from France regarding his stint in Spain:

There is no freedom whatever allowed journalistic investigation, and the strictest censorship imaginable is imposed on all news dispatches sent out from Madrid. Anyone reporting the course of events is in danger of being seized as a spy and perhaps shot summarily before he can prove his innocence.⁴⁸⁸

Such statements revealed a less valiant side of Republican rhetoric in the Spanish Civil War as government leaders misled participants, suppressed free speech, arrested innocents and attacked dissenters over minor infractions, and succumbed to vicious in-fighting.

Francoist messaging recalled the alleged glory of Spain's imperial history, while Republicans advocated for a radical restructuring of Spanish society that reflected, among other campaigns, the modernisation of Western Europe and the rise of socialist reforms. War erupted when the population split over whether to retreat into an imagined past or to pursue an imagined future. As Manuel Azaña framed the question in his diary, “The thrill of history and the natural combine. From this, could a new history arise?”⁴⁸⁹ Republicans and Francoists alike pulled from the same Iberian sources for inspiration, but to different ends and interpretations. The Reconquista and the War of Independence of 1808 served as particularly fruitful events for analysis and comparison as officials presented their respective missions in terms of a contemporary crusade for the Spanish homeland. Republican propaganda cultivated a narrative of spirited historical resistance to foreign dominance and exploitation, framing the Spanish Civil War as a global battle for democracy, human rights, and liberal values. By recalling popular episodes and cultural myths from the peninsular history, Spanish journalists forged a diverse yet unified nation against tyranny.

⁴⁸⁶ Arturo Mori, *La Prensa española durante La Segunda República* [1943] (Seville: Editorial Renacimiento, 2019), 222-226.

⁴⁸⁷ Justino Sinova, *La prensa en La Segunda República española: Historia de una libertad frustrada* (Madrid: Editorial Debate, 2006), 17-21, 340-342, 413-416; Carmen Martínez Pineda, *Libertad Secuestrada: La censura de prensa en la Segunda República* (Málaga: Última línea, S. L., 2018), 40, 41; Enric Bordería Ortiz, “Prensa, propaganda i vida quotidiana a València (1936-37),” in *València, Capital de la República: El Mon Mira a València, Capital de l'Antifeixisme*, Ed. Javier Navarro Navarro and Sergio Valero Gómez (Valencia: Ajutament de València, 2016), 255.

⁴⁸⁸ William P. Carney, “Uncensored Report on the Siege of Madrid,” the *New York Times*, December 7, 1936.

⁴⁸⁹ Manuel Azaña, *Obras Completas IV: Memorias Políticas y de Guerra* (Madrid: Ediciones Giner, 1990), 356.

As evidenced by *ABC*, *El Pueblo*, and *La Vanguardia*, loyalist newspapers of Madrid, Valencia, and Barcelona framed an ideological defence of the Republic's mission to reform Spanish society and institutions, especially in areas of religion, education, and agriculture.⁴⁹⁰ Despite changes in leadership and affiliation throughout the war, they projected similar national imaginaries of a fair and egalitarian Republican state, though they also included region-specific agendas to consolidate diverse audiences throughout Spain. *El Pueblo* and *La Vanguardia*, located in Valencia and Barcelona, respectively, were particularly concerned with issues of peripheral nationalisms, languages, and cultures to inspire solidarity with Madrid. They linked Basque, Catalan, and Valencian histories to Castile, promoting a unified community in the face of fractured alliances. Madrid, on the other hand, prioritised citizen endurance in a city on the frontlines for the duration of the war for a population suffering unceasing bombardment and starvation for nearly three years. As the Nationalist forces advanced, purging towns and cities as they went, Valencia and Catalonia also experienced the terror of fascist sieges, air strikes, and famine, so that resistance became increasingly challenging to sustain. This hopeless combination gave birth to heavily faith-based rhetoric which built upon Catholic imagery and symbolism to resonate with readers, formulating themes of resurrection and redemption for a chosen people baptised by fire.

The comparison between early and late Republican news coverage in the war is telling. Reports changed from inspirational accounts of the triumphant underdog and a morally superior fighting spirit to pure contradiction and fantasy. At the close of 1938, when the Republic began its final downward spiral, newspapers promised victory despite defeat, peace despite war, and harmony despite bitter rivalries. Republican cities fell prey to mass despair and devastation. Material resources became scarce and hunger gnawed at soldiers and civilians alike. Even so, Franco and his forces were met with defiance at the gates of Madrid and Valencia until the last resisters were arrested and executed on April 1, 1939. The end of the Spanish Civil War marked the death of hundreds of newspapers, including *El Pueblo*, but formerly Conservative publications like *ABC* and *La Vanguardia* have survived to the present day. Their continuance demonstrates the adaptability of newspapers to different political and ideological programmes throughout Spanish history.

⁴⁹⁰ According to Republicans, the mere mention of this agenda triggered complaints among opponents: "Constitución, reforma social, reforma militar, reforma agraria, reforma laica. La mera enunciación de este programa, ineludible si la República significaba algo, puso rampante y en la actitud de defensa a la intolerancia." See Fernando Vázquez Ocaña, *Pasión y Muerte de la Segunda República Española* [1940] (Madrid: Cátedra del exilio, 2007), 67.

As discussed at length in the previous chapters, framing supplies a useful lens for newspaper analysis by exposing the highlights and omissions of news coverage. Moreover, its versatility allows for its application to multiple publications and contexts, both past and present. Due to constraints of time and length, this thesis has focused on three periodicals in the capital cities of wartime Republican Spain, specifically Madrid, Valencia, and Barcelona. Future research would do well to cast a wider net to examine other publications in Republican Spain, the nuances of the imagined communities they represented, and the varied political strategies of rival factions of Anarchists, Socialists, and Communists. It would also be valuable to do the same for Francoist newspapers of the period in conservative strongholds like Seville, Salamanca, Toledo, Pamplona, Santiago de Compostela, Navarre, and, from late 1937, Bilbao, to provide a more comprehensive picture of the discursive battle for Spain and the divergences in national imaginaries conceived by Spaniards in the Spanish Civil War.

Two historiographic trends have marked the discussions of Spanish culture and history since the late nineteenth century—the first being secular and liberal and the second being Catholic and conservative—which have continuously competed with one another for supremacy.⁴⁹¹ Their clash was especially pronounced during the Spanish Civil War as Republicans, Communists, Anarchists, and Socialists wrested with Fascists, Carlists, and Monarchists for control of Spain. While this work contributes a new dimension to the study of communication in times of crisis by fusing elements of framing analysis, historical discourse, and affect with understandings of the imagined community and the negotiation of national narratives in a pluricultural state, there remains much more to be developed. I believe further lessons might be derived from its application to other civil wars and conflicts in Spain and elsewhere to detect commonalities and disparities among eras and world populations. Building on Benedict Anderson’s notion that the projection of nationalism and national identity is itself a cultural artefact, the unique combination of frameworks drawn from the fields of History and Communication yields fresh insights into the structure and strategies of wartime journalism.

Perhaps the biggest takeaway from this thesis is the capacity for newspapers to generate propaganda while dressed as legitimate news sources in a threatened democracy. Spanish journalists hardly pretended to be objective before the war, in contrast with more-famous anglophone traditions, but they did advocate for detailed news coverage and investigative reporting which was absent from wartime production. Despite the anti-Church stances of the

⁴⁹¹ José Álvarez Junco, “History and National Myth,” in *Metaphors of Spain: Representations of Spanish National Identity in the Twentieth Century*, Ed. Javier Moreno-Luzón and Xosé M. Núñez Seixas (New York: Berghahn Books, 2017), 9.

Spanish left, Republican periodicals propagated political faith through the invocation of well-known Christian symbols, metaphors, and allegories, acknowledging the power of Spain's Catholic past even as they attempted to dismantle it. Seamlessly blended with a romanticised national history, Spanish labourers were presented as the past and future heroes of world virtue and morality. Similarly to Christianity, leftist propaganda of the Spanish Civil War centred on the historical future, or the notion that a saviour (in this case, the Republic) would arrive to complete history and create utopia. This may have amounted to the practice of superimposing a new religion over the foundations of the old, preserving a sense of familiarity for converts, but it also unveiled a core function of war propaganda. I believe my research demonstrates that Republican news framing drew heavily from Christian rhetoric not just because it was culturally familiar, but because propaganda resembles evangelism in its efforts to gain as many disciples as possible and sow extreme conviction among the faithful. Many have pointed out that truth is the first casualty of war; but my research examines how and why this is the case. As detailed in the previous chapters, the Republican reaction to the military coup ushered in Communist and Anarchist leaders, most of whom were averse to compromise, and their followers, newly-armed, to powerful positions throughout the loyalist zone. The resulting battle for the Second Spanish Republic (within and without) ensured the death of the free press, forcing Spain to revert back to being what *El Pueblo's* Republican founder, Vicente Blasco Ibáñez, once deemed “una nación secuestrada.”⁴⁹²

⁴⁹² Vicente Blasco Ibáñez, *Por España y contra el rey* [1925] (Madrid: Biblioteca Nacional de España, 2018), 4.

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