F ~k . \) 225~S BRITAIN'S EXPLOITATION OF OCCUPIED GERMANY FOR . SCIENTIFIC AND TECHNICAL INTELLIGENCE ON THE SOVIET UNION by UNIVERSITY LIBRARY CAMBRIDGE Paul Maddrell Corpus Christi College A thesis submitted to the Faculty of History of Cambridge University in pru1ial fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy 16 October 1998 ... Paul MaddrelI, Corpus Christi College Britain's Exploitation of Occupied Germany for Scientific and Technical Intelligence on the Soviet Union At the beginning of the Cold War, the gathering of intelligence on the Soviet Union's current and future military capability seemed a near-impossibility. Soviet high-level communications were secure against decryption. Agent networks in the USSR were very difficult to establish and of uncertain reliability. Aerial reconnaissance of war- related targets in the Soviet Union was risky and could only be occasional. But valuable intelligence was gathered in the years 1945-55 on the USSR's frantic arms build-up, thanks to its policy towards Germans and their country. Its exploitation of Germans and its Zone of Germany in its war-related research and development and the reconstruction of its war-related industries gave British Intelligence penetrable targets in the Soviet Zone and gave great numbers of Germans sought-after info rmation on the USSR itself. The ease of recruiting age nts in East Germany and the flight (including enticed defections) of refugees from it allowed research and development projects and uranium.-mining operations there to be penetrated. Intelligence of Soviet weapons development and of the quality of Soviet military technology was obtained. The mass interrogation of prisoners-of-war returned by the Soviets to the British Occupation Zone in the late 1940s yielded a wealth of valuable information on war-related construction and the locations of numerous intelligence targets in the Soviet Union: most importantly, those of atomic and chemical plants, aircraft and aero-engine factories, airfields, rocket development centres and other installations. When, (nthe period 1949-58, some 3,000 deported German scientists , engineers and technicians were sent back to their homeland from the USSR, promising sources among them were enticed West and intef(ogated for their knowledge of the Soviets' research and development projects. The cream of the information they provided was crucial intelligence on the locations of atomic plants and laboratori es and uranium deposits; useful information on structural weaknesses in the Soviet system of scientific and economic management; expert (if out-of-date) assessments of the quality of Soviet accomplishments in atomic science, electronics and other fields; and well-informed indications as to possible lines of development in guided missile and aircraft design. One Soviet scientific defector in Germany provided similar information which influenced British perceptions of the Soviet Union's scientific potential and missile development plans. Refugees entering the British Zone from East German y, intercepted letters and monitored telecommunications, informal contacts and, of course, secret agents all made significant contributions to the gathering of scientific and technical intelligence in Germany too. The British passed to the Americans much of the intelligence they acquired in Germany and the installations identified and located by German sources were overtlown by spyplanes in the 1950s and particularly by U-2s in the latter hal f of-the decade. Priceless information was obtained, which establi shed that the USSR's war-related scien tific research and development and its actual military capability were both inferio r to those of the West. Thus the Gem1ans enabled Soviet security to be deeply penetrated and helped "to stabilize the Cold War. They are the missing link between Ultra and the U-2. DEDICATION To the memory of George Turney and R. V. Jones, stars of British scientific intelligence during and after the Second World War, this thesis is respectfully dedicated. ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS My warm thanks are due to my supervisor, Professor Christopher Andrew, who encouraged me to undertake this research project and who has supervised me most considerately, conscientiously and expertly throughout it. This thesis is a further addition to the great body of learning on modern intelligence-gathering which he has either himself written or sponsored through his teaching. As such an addition, it is one which I am delighted to make: it has been an honour and a pleasure to be taught by him. Nevertheless, the thesis remains my own unaided work and I did all the research from which it is drawn. No part of the thesis is the outcome of work done 10 collaboration. Consequently, I alone am responsible for any errors it may contain. Although I first wrote on this topic in an M. Phil. dissertation submitted to the Centre of International Studies of Cambridge University in 1996, I have drawn on the material contained in that dissertation only to a very limited extent. Where I rely on the disseltation in this thesis, specific reference is made to it in a footnote . I am grateful to the Humanities Research Board of the British Academy, the Deutscher Akademischer Austauschdienst (German Academic Exchange Service), the University's Board of Graduate Studies and the Master and Fellows of Corpus Christi College for the financial support they have given me in the course of this research project. I am particularly grateful to that most generous of financial supporters, my father Geoffrey Maddrell, in the absence of whose generosity I would not have been able to undertake this research into the work of British Intelligence in Occupied Germany. ABBREVIATIONS 'ABC' weapons: atomic, biological and chemical weapons ABM: anti-ballistic missile AOZ: American Occupation Zone BIOS: British Intelligence Objectives Sub-committee BND: Bundesnachrichtendienst (West German Federal Intelligence Service, which until 1956 was simply the Gehlen Organization). BW: Biological Warfare BOZ: British Occupation Zone CIA: Central Intelligence Agency (BOB refers to its Berlin Operations Base) CIOS: Combined Intelligence Objectives Sub-committee COMINT: communications intelligence CW: Chemical Watfare CCG(BE): Control Commission for Germany (British Element) Dipl. Ing. (or Ing.): Diplom-Ingenieur (which is the German way of indicating the possession of a bachelor's degree in engineering) D.At.En.lD.At.En.Int.: Division (previously Department) of Atomic Energy of the Ministry of Supply (its intelligence unit was known as 'D.At.En.Int. ' , but was often known simply as 'D.At.En.' and will be referred to by that name in this thesis) DDR: Deutsche Demokratische Republik (German Democratic Republic) DPs: Displaced Persons ELINT: electronic intelligence FCD: First Chief Directorate (of the Council of Ministers of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) FIAT: Field Information Agency, Technical (a division of SHAEF. EPES (Br) and EPES (US) refer to FIAT's British and American Enemy Personnel Exploitation Sections) GRU: Glavnoye Razvedivatelnoye Upravlenie (Main Intelligence Directorate of the Soviet Army) GW: Guided Weapons HUMINT: human intelligence HV A: Hauptverwaltung Aufklfuung (Main Intelligence Directorate of the MfS) ICBM: intercontinental ballistic missile IMINT: imagery intelligence IRD: Information Research Department (of the Foreign Office) JIB: Joint Intelligence Bureau (responsible for economic intelligence-gathering) HC: Joint Intelligence Committee JSIJTIC: Joint Scientific and Joint Technical Intelligence Committees MfS: Ministerium fUr Staatssicherheit (the GDR's MinistlY of State Security) MVDINKVDIMGB/KGB: the various Soviet acronyms for the USSR' s ministries of internal affairs and state security (i .e. its intelligence and security agencies) during the period of the Occupation. All these acronyms are used in this thesis. That acronym is used which was in use at the time in question. MISA: Military Intelligence Service Austria NIl: Nauchno-issledovatelskiilispitatelnyi institut (Scientific Research or Testing Institute) PoWs/PWX: prisoners-of-war REG: Returnees Exploitation Group (US intelligence unit) RFT: Rundfunk- und Fernmeldetechnik (radio and communications technology) SAC: Strategic Air Command (of the United States Air Force) SAM: surface-to-air missile SED: Sozialistische Einheitspartei Deutschlands (Socialist Unity Party) SHAEF: Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Force SIGINT: signals intelligence SMAG: Soviet Military Administration 10 Germany (also known by its Russian acronym, SV AG) SOZ: Soviet Occupation Zone STIB: Scientific and Technical Intelligence Branch (of Intelligence Division of the CCG(BE)) TCS: Technical Coordinating Section (of MI6) Tech. Sec.: the Technical Section of MI6 Germany TsAGI: Central Aero-Hydrodynamics Institute UN: United Nations USAF: United States Air Force USAFE: United States Air Force Europe VHF: Very High Frequency VHSIC: very-high-speed integrated circuit ZLF: Zentralforschungslaboratorium (Central Research Laboratory) Introduction Chapter 1 Chapter 2 Chapter 3 Chapter 4 Chapter 5 Chapter 6 Chapter 7 CONTENTS The Soviet Exploitation of German Science and British Intelligence Policy towards the USSR . The Sources of Intelligence in Germany The Prisoners-of-war Come Home Operation 'Dragon Return' The Intelligence Yield of 'Dragon Return' Overflight Conclusion Appendices Bibliography page 1 15 71 151 187 218 310 329 INTRODUCTION This thesis concerns the acquisition of scientific and technical intelligence by British intelligence agencies in Germany during and just after the Occupation. Scientific intelligence is intelligence of research projects, scientific ideas or capabilities; technical intelligence is intelligence of weapons either planned or in production. The distinction between the two is the drawing board; once plans exist for a weapon, intelligence of it is technical intelligence. I Intimately connected with both is information on the scientific and technical personnel and war-related laboratories, research institutes and factories which make up a country's military-industrial complex; this is .called 'scientific Order-of-Battle intelligence'. Only occasional mention is made of signals intelligence-gathering and the work of MI6, which are too secret for official records to have been made available to researchers. However, other British intelligence agencies in Occupied Germany acquired much valuable intelligence on the Soviet Union's post-war arms build-up.2 Chief among these were two agencies of whose archives I have made much use: the Scientific and Technical Intelligence Branch of the Intelligence Division 3 of the Control Commission for IReport by R. D. Neville, Chairman of the JS/JTIC, dated 29 July 1949 and entitled, 'Preliminary Notes for Dr. Blount', DEFE 40/26. Despite the difference between the two forms of intelligence, they overlap and I have tended to use the words 'scientific intelligence' as a short form for 'scientific and technical intelligence' . 20ne of these was Intelligence Division ' s Scientific and Technical Intelligence Branch and its archive throws some light on M16's work in Occupied Germany. The gathering of scientific and technical intelligence was in this period M16' s top priority there. In mid-1947, MI6 had five main areas of operation , the most important of which was scientific and technical intelligence. The other four were: counter-espionage and subversive political movements ; intelligence for the Services; economic and industrial information; and political intelligence. In the field of scientific intelligence, MI6 was charged with acquiring the following information: 'information about scientific developments; the training and deployment of scientists needed to influence such developments; nuclear physics ; guided missiles; chemical warfare; "airground developments" ; naval developments ; the work and personnel of universities and technical colleges ' (minutes of JlC (Germany) Coordinating Committee meeting on 21 July 1947, DEFE 41/68). Given the revolution in nuclear weaponry and other military technologies in the years 1947-55, it is likely that scientific intelligence-gathering remained a principal concern. The work of MI6 in Germany was discussed at a series of conferences held in the summer and autumn of 1955. This review resulted in the ruling that it should seek above all to acquire scientific and political intelligence on the Soviet Union and its Bloc (G. Blake, No Olher Choice, pp. 167-8). 3-rhe intelligence arm of the CCG(BE) was Intelligence Division (from 1952 the British Intelligence Organization (Germany». The following were branches of Intelligence Division: Security Directorate (counter- UHlVERSITY UBRARY CAMBRIDGE 1 Germany (British Element), to which I refer as STIB4, and FIAT (the Field Information Agency, Technical), a division of SHAEF which outlived SHAEF itself. FIAT's British element was the principal British agency responsible for the colJection of scientific and technical intelligence until STIB came into being. 5 Scientific and technical intelligence-gathering during this period was intelligence of the arms race. The years of the Occupation were the period of the greatest revolution in military technology in history. Both the USA and the USSR in the years 1945-55 developed atomic and thermonuclear weapons, and guided missiles and long-range bombers to carry them. Spurred on by intelligence of a mighty Soviet arms build-up, Britain in this period tested her own atomic bomb, pressed on with the development of a hydrogen bomb and a nuclear strike force, manufactured chemical weapons, launched a number of missile development projects and conducted research into intelligence); Production Directorate (intelligence-gathering on the Soviet Bloc from sources other than secret agents, such as refugees, other 'line-crossers', deserters and returning PoWs); Analysis Directorate (intelligence- gathering using secret agents); Censorship Branch (interception of communications); and STIB (scientific intelligence collection). Intelligence Division had a Technical Section of its own (see, for example, an EPES, FIAT letter dated 21 August 1946, FO 1031/59). More importantly, MI6 had a Technical Section responsible for the recruitment of agents in targeted scientific installations. Operation 'Dragon Return' interrogation reports were copied to M16's Technical Section (see Chapters 4 and 5 for a discussion of 'Dragon Return'). MI6 and Analysis Directorate worked closely together. Both were responsible for sending agents into the Soviet Zone. Analysis was probably an MI6 unit under the control of the Chief of Intelligence Division. Much remains to be learned about them and the relationship between them. 4-rhis body was created late in 1946 as an advance unit in Germany of the Joint Scientific and Joint Technical Intelligence Committees. These two Committees came into being in the wake of the review of scientific intelligence conducted in 1945 by the Blackett Committee. They represented the scientific and technical intelligence sections of the Service Ministries, MI6, the Joint Intelligence Bureau and the Ministry of Supply and acted as the Joint Intelligence Committee' s advisers on scientific and technical questions. They were often known during their lifetime as the 'Joint Committees' or 'lSIJTIC'. In 1956, STIB became the Overseas Liaison Branch; in 1958 or so, it was abolished. The Joint Scientific Intelligence Committee (JSIC) became in 1950 the Directorate of Scientific Intelligence (DSI) of the Ministry of Defence (the Director of Scientific Intelligence was also the Chairman of the Joint Technical Intelligence Committee, or HIC). I have also made much use of the OS I' s archi ve. SplAT was set up by SHAEP on 18 May 1945 to exploit German science. On II July 1945 it was divided into its British and American sections. The British section was controlled by the Control Commission for Germany (British Element). SHAEF was dissolved three days later (letters dated 23 July 1946, FO 1031/75). The two sections continued to work as one organization until the end of 1946. FIAT maintained an office in West Berlin, the FIAT Forward office, which, by reason of its close links with scientists, engineers and technicians working for the Soviets or thinking of doing so, was used to acquire intelligence on Soviet research and development projects. The Special Detention Centre at Kransberg, codenamed 'Dustbin', to which frequent reference is made in Chapter I, was operated by the Enemy Personnel Exploitation Sections (both British and American, and known as EPES (Br) and EPES (US» of FIAT (letter dated 6 August 1946, FO 1031/75). 2 agents of biological warfare.6 This thesis focuses on the five military technologies of most concern to defence planners in the ten years after the War: atomic, biological and chemical weaponry 7, guided missiles and electronics. 8 These were the technologies about whose development in the USSR intelligence was most sought. On the same level of priority was Order-of-Battle intelligence on Soviet science.9 In the early years of the Cold War, fear of biological and chemical weapons was great. Nazi Germany's nerve gases were much feared. Almost colourless, almost odourless and highly toxic, they could, unlike the older war gases, be delivered in concentrations which were both lethal and very difficult to detect. 10 Since the USSR might be unable to develop an atomic bomb quickly, it might make considerable 6Books examining these aspects of Britain's post-war weapons research and development are: M. Gowing, Independence and Deterrence: Britain and Atolllic Energy, 1945-52; D. Baker, Th e Rocket: The HistOl), and Development oj Rocket and Missile Technology; G. B. Carter, POI·ton Down: Seventy-Jive Years oj Chemical and Biological Research ; and E. Spiers, Chemical Weapon I) ': A Continuing Challenge. 7The first three of these are often called 'ABC weapons' and will be referred to by this name in this thesis. 8Electronics was a technology which consistently rose in importance throughout this period. It was relevant to Soviet development of radar, radio communications, radio navigational aids, missile guidance and telemetering systems, radio counter-measures and television. The development of high-speed digital computers formed a crucial part of the electronics revolution of this period and presaged the later development of 'smart weapons'. In the 1 940s and 1950s, computers were of immense value, both as calculating aids in the development of powerful weapons and as control devices which were essential to other advanced weapons. In their former role, they were used to perform long and very complex calculations necessary to projects for the development of supersonic aircraft, guided weapons and atomic weapons; in their latter role, they formed an essential part of predictor and gunfire-control equipment and guided missile control systems (JS/JTIC(49)92 dated 19 October 1949 entitled 'Russian Development of Computing Machines', DEFE 41/151). <>When the Scientific and Technical Intelligence Branch of Intelligence Division, CCG(BE), was first established in 1946, the technologies on which it was instructed by the JIC to acquire intelligence were the ' ABC weapons', guided missiles, electronics and metallurgy (the last, in particular special heat-resisting steels, being relevant to turbo-jet aero-engine manufacture) (paragraph 2, nC(46) 109(0) dated 14 December 1946 and entitled, 'Brief for the Scientific and Technical Intelligence Branch, Control Commission for Germany' , CAB 81/134). Also sought were 'particulars of scientists and technicians and general educational standards'. In addition to acquiring information on these subjects of interest to all the armed forces, STIB had the task of obtaining information on subjects of interest to specific services (naval equipment, for example). It was also responsible for gathering intelligence for the Joint Intelligence Bureau on, for instance, the removal of factory equipment and personnel to the USSR and their location there. Three years later, the 'ABC' weapons, guided missiles and electronics were still the technologies of most interest. This appears from the Annex to JSIJTIC(49)55 dated 22 June 1949 and entitled, 'Summary of Intelligence on Russian Development for the Defence Research Policy Committee' (DEFE 411150), for these are the technologies chiefly discussed in the report. The main SIGINT targets were the 'ABC' weapons and guided missiles, the Soviet long-range bomber and fighter defence forces and new war-related scientific inventions (JIC(48) 19(0) dated 11 May 1948 and entitled, 'SIGINT Intelligence Requirements - 1948 ', at f.2, LlWS/1/1196, India Office Library and Records, London, discussed at p. 536, R. 1. Aldrich & M. Coleman, The Cold War, the JIC and British Signals Intelligence, 1948', Intelligence & National SeCllrity, Vol. 4, No.3 (October 1989), pp. 535-49, and appended to the article). 1%. Spiers, Chemical Weapon I)': A Continuing Challenge, p. 57. 3 efforts to develop biological weapons. Biological agents were cruder weapons of mass destruction, more easily within the reach of Soviet science than the atomic bomb, easier to mass-produce and perhaps capable of development into weapons of devastating power. In 1947, the lIC thought it probable that, 'the atomic bomb will remain the most potent destructive weapon within the foreseeable future, but biological warfare will be a close second' . II Scientific developments menaced Britain by strengthening the arsenal of her potential attackers. The atomic bomb would enable sudden and devastating attacks to be made without warning. The only defence would be to threaten to use the bomb in retaliation. 12 Long-range guided missiles would also make Britain more vulnerable to bombardment. 13 Submarines powered by hydrogen peroxide or atomic energy, with range and speed underwater much greater than the submarines at sea in 1945 and armed with fast, long-range torpedoes, would present a great threat to Britain's sea communications. 14 But no possible aggressor could prepare to make such an attack without indications of his intentions becoming noticeable. Consequently, Britain's intelligence services were her first line of defence and their activities after the War were not sharply cut back, as they had been after the Great War. 15 To give II Paragraphs 62-3, JIC(46)7/2 dated 6 August 1947 and entitled, 'Soviet Interests , Intentions and Capabilities', CAB 158/1 . 12Paragraphs 65-6, p. 18, COS(45)402(0) dated 16 June 1945 and entitled, 'Future Developments in Weapons and Methods of War', CAB 80/94. This report was written by an 'ad hoc' committee chaired by Sir Henry Tizard, whose terms of reference were to predict, on the basis of the evidence available in 1945, what developments would take place in weapons and methods of warfare over the following ten or twenty years. Another member of the committee was Professor P. M. S. Blackett. I3Paragraphs 8-9, p. 6, COS(45)402(0) dated 16 June 1945 and entitled, 'Future Developments in Weapons and Methods of War', CAB 80/94. 14paragraph 12, p. 7, COS(45)402(0) dated 16 June 1945 and entitled, 'Future Developments in Weapons and Methods of War', CAB 80/94. 15pp. 331-2, R. J. Aldrich, 'British Intelligence and the Anglo-American "Special Relationship" during the Cold War', Review of illrel'llariollai Srudies, Vol. 24, No.3 (July 1998), pp. 331-51 . Aldrich puts this down to fear of an atomic attack. In fact , intelligence-gathering, in Germany at least, targeted a number of new technologies, of which atomic science was only one. There was also great interest in biological and chemical weapons, particularly in the form of missile warheads. 4 warning of what was in the wind, Scientific Intelligence was re-organized in 1945 by a committee chaired by the physicist, P. M. S. Blackett. 16 On~ argument of this thesis is that the arms race with the West resumed by Stalin in 1945 was a cause of the Cold War. It is wrong to view the Cold War as chiefly a clash of political and economic systems between which there could be no compromise. Anti-Soviet feeling grew in the West because the military threat posed by the USSR grew in consequence of the latter's conquest of much of Germany, which made German military technology available to it. This was particularly true of Britain, which was immediately and gravely threatened by the Soviet Union's post- war arms build-up. Political opinion in Britain was always anti-Communist. But her politicians were not hostile to the USSR until it seemed threatening. Its growing military power was an essential part of the threat it posed. Britain's military inferiority to the USSR made her an early Cold Warrior. Naturally, the Americans also felt threatened by the Soviets' clear determination to develop atomic and thermonuclear weapons and delivery systems for them. Melvyn Leffler's depiction of the early Cold War as a clash of economic and political initiatives does not sufficiently recognize the importance then given to keeping abreast of the development of Soviet armaments and ensuring that the West retained military superiority.17 The United States may have had unprecedented economic and 16R. 1. Aldrich (ed.), British Intelligence, Strategy and the Cold War, 1945-51 (article by R. 1. Aldrich on 'Secret Intelligence for a Post-war World: reshaping the British intelligence community, 1944-51 '), pp. 29-30. Further measures were taken to ensure the effective collection of scientific and technical intelligence. An example is the creation, in 1946, of Intelligence Division 's Scientific and Technical Intelligence Branch. The Scientific Order- of-Battle Section was established within the Joint Intelligence Bureau, following a recommendation of the lIC to this effect (JIC(47) 15(0) dated 7 March 1947, CAB 158/1). The JIC thought that the establishment of such an Order-of-Battle Section was of 'extreme importance' (paragraph 14). The Section 's work represented a systematic effort to acquire detailed knowledge of the personalities and institutions which made up the scientific potential of the major Powers, using both secret sources and such open sources as scientific journals. This knowledge was recorded in card indices. The Section took over this work from the Technical Coordinating Section (TCS), the scientific intelligence section of MI6. 17See, for example, pp. 497-8 of M. Leffler, A Preponderance of Power: National Sew,.ity, the Trull/an 5 technological power in the 1940s and 1950s, but, as the age of atomic and thermonuclear weapons dawned, that power was unprecedentedly vulnerable. This thesis relates how and how much British Intelligence learned about the Soviet Union's frantic arms build-up in the first ten years or so of the Cold War. Leffler argues that the arms race was the consequence of the Soviet Union's political and economic challenge to the West. 18 It was not: it was a result of the USSR's military- technological challenge. Leffler even claims that, 'Policymakers in Washington understood that their principal task was not to deal with Russian military power but to fill the vacuums of power, infuse a spirit of hope, promote economic reconstruction, and champion the principle of self-determination' .19 This is nonsense. It is no coincidence that, a mere five months after receiving intelligence of the USSR's first atomic test, President Truman ordered that the hydrogen bomb be developed.20 The United States was now racing the Soviet Union, and racing to stay ahead. Eisenhower was so concerned about the speed of Soviet weapons development that he appointed a special adviser on science and technology, whose job was above all to keep him informed about 'the relative progress of Soviet and US science and technology'. 21 By contrast, Britain could not win a war with the USSR. She was therefore dependent for her security on the United States and military and intelligence cooperation with the Americans became overriding aims of her policy. Administration and the Cold War. Leffler here lists the four principal threats in the mid-1940s to the Americans' plans for the international order. The Soviet Union's growing military power is not mentioned. The four sources of Soviet strength are stated to have been: the Soviet military presence in Eastern Europe and Asi a; the rise of Communism in such countries as France, Greece, China and Korea; the perceived vulnerability of war-wrecked Germany and Japan to Communist or neutralist influence; and the rise of nationalism in South-eas t Asia, North Africa and the Middle East. 18In Leffler's own words (on p. 498 of A Preponderance of Power), the Americans 'came to believe that ever more weapons were necessary to support the ri sk-taking that inhered in co-opting the industrial core of Eurasia and in integrating its underdeveloped periphery ... So eventually rearmament became the essential prerequisite to America's diplomatic, economic, and political initiatives'. 19M. Leffler, A Preponderance of Power, p. 499. 200 . Holloway, Stalin and the Bomb, p. 301. 21e. M. Andrew, For the President 's Eyes Only: Secret Intelligence and the American Presidency from Washington to Blish, pp. 241-2. 6 In its post-war weapons development, the Soviet Union used German scientists, engineers, technicians, knowhow, weaponry and material resources . In the reconstruction of its military industries, it used German prisoners-of-war. These exploited Germans gave information on their work for the Soviets to British Intelligence. This thesis tells the story of what was learned from them. Scientific and technical intelligence gathered in Germany gave the British and the Americans some insight into the military strength of the Soviet Union. Above all, the thesis finds and begins to fill two large gaps in intelligence history. These gaps have long been concealed by official secrecy. Firstly, although security measures largely prevented exploited Germans from learning much about the USSR's research and development projects of most interest, they were able to betray to the West, for the first time, the skeleton of the Soviet military-industrial complex. It was from them that British and US Intelligence first learned the location of atomic reactors, uranium enrichment plants, atomic and guided missile testing sites, uranium mines, processing plants, research institutes, airfields and aircraft and other war-related factories essential to the Soviet Union's ability to fight a modern war. This intelligence was vital. Without it, efforts to gather imagery, signals and human intelligence on the Soviet Union's advanced weapons would not have been successful. Businessmen, academics and other visitors to the USSR observed and took photographs of high-priority targets, supplying 'an extraordinary amount of information ' on them.22 Signals from the Kapustin Yar medium- and intermediate-range missile testing site were intercepted and revealed characteristics of the missiles in question. Most importantly, the installations located in the USSR were overflown and the photographs taken yielded crucial intelligence, dispelling the fears of a bomber and a missile gap and establishing that the West still enjoyed military superiority over the Soviet Bloc. This 22H. Rositzke, The CIA's Secret Operatiolls: Espiollage, COlillter-espiollage and Covert Actioll, p. 59. 7 established, there was no need fo~' a further escalation of the arms race. The Germans had helped to stabilize the Cold War. However, the studies of overflight, intelligence-gathering and intelligence analysis fail to mention how the Americans knew where these installations were in the most security-conscious state on earth.23 The intelligence exploitation of Germany itself is a much-neglected theme of historical writing. For instance, John Lewis Gaddis, in his recent We Now Know: Rethinking Cold War History, writes both about the Occupation of Germany and the success of U-2 overflight, but fails even to mention either the Western Allies' exploitation of Germany for intelligence or that without it the aerial reconnaissance of key intelligence targets in the Soviet Union would not have been possible. Intelligence-gathering from human sources assumed disproportionate importance in the early years of the Cold War because of the difficulty of penetrating the Soviet Union by other means. Since Germany and Austria contained human sources with knowledge of developments in the Soviet Bloc who were more numerous and valuable than those available for exploitation anywhere else, it was on these two countries that efforts to gather intelligence on the Bloc focused. Other sources of intelligence on the Soviet Union itself then promised little. Soviet security seems to have presented a bigger obstacle to communications intelligence (CO MINT) operations than to human intelligence measures . The 'Venona' success against Soviet cables only related to communications between 1940 and 1948.24 That was the result 23Such books are Christopher Pocock's, Dragon Lady: The History of the U-2 Spyplane, Paul Lashmar's, Spy Flights of the Cold War, Jeffrey Richelson ' s, AlI1erican Espionage and the Soviet Targ et, Lawrence Freedman 's, US Intelligence and the Soviet Strategic Threat and John Prados ', The Soviet Estimate: US Intelligence Analysis and Soviet Strategic Forces. 24p. I, 'Venona and Beyond: Thoughts on Work Undone' , by M. Warner & R. L. Benson, Intelligence & National Security, Vol. 12, No.3 (July 1997), pp. 1-13. In time, some 2,900 messages sent between 1940 and 1948 were decrypted in whole or in part. Using a flaw in the encipherment of messages which itself resulted from the repeated use of 'one-time pads' sent out to NKGB residencies , cryptanalysts at the US Army Security Agency were from late 1946 on able to decrypt Soviet cables. Although originally believed to be diplomatic messages, they turned out to have been sent by five different organizations, among them the NKGB and the GRU. The 8 of an extraordinary slip by Soviet Intelligence and there is no evidence that later high-grade communications were similarly decrypted. The Brownell Report of June 1952 on American COMINT operations indicates that the Americans had little success in the early years of the Cold War in decrypting Soviet communications. The report admits that, 'We may never see a return of the great successes and victories attributable to CO MINT during the course of World War II', 'our successes are smaller and fewer today' and 'we have seen that at the present time AFSA's efforts in certain important parts of the cryptanalytic field have not been crowned with success to say the least' . 25 So long as the 'one-time pads' used for their encipherment were employed correctly, Soviet high-grade communications should have been secure and British ~nd American surprise at such events as the Tito-Stalin split in 1948 and the Soviet atomic test in 1949 suggests that they were.26 Lower-grade voice and cipher communications were intercepted in vast quantities, but most of the intelligence obtained was of little value.27 By way of exception, the Americans managed for a time in the late 1940s and early 1950s to intercept radio messages transmitted within Russia about shipments of uranium from the Erzgebirge in East Germany.28 The Soviets' extensive use of landlines for communication also made cryptanalysts had more success with NKGB than with GRU cables, and most success of all with messages sent in 1944 to Moscow Centre from the NKGB residency in New York, about half of which were deciphered, in whole or in part, between 1947 and 1952 (pp. 20-1, 'OSS and the Venona Decrypts' , by H. Peake, Intelligence & National Security, Vol. 12, No.3 (July 1997), pp. 14-34). 'One-time pads', as their name implied, were meant only to be used once. The decrypted cables revealed that Soviet Intelligence was acquiring in North America a great deal of intelligence on a considerable variety of scientific developments. Such of this information as was shared with British intelligence agencies may have alerted them to the significance of Western ideas and devices to Soviet technological development. The Western countries' embargo of 1949 on the sale of strategic goods to the USSR may have been a response to this intelligence. 2~hese quotations are from pp. 63,77 & 78 of G. A. Brownell, The Origin and DeveloplIlent of the National Secllrity Agency. This book contains the text of the report of the Brownell Committee, which in 1952, on behalf of the US Government, examined the USA's communications intelligence-gathering. 26R. J. Aldrich (ed.), British Intelligence, Strategy and the Cold War, 1945-51 (article by R. J. Aldrich on 'Secret Intelligence for a Post-war World: reshaping the British intelligence community, 1944-51 '), p. 28. 27C. M. Andrew, For the Presidelll 's Eyes Only, p. 219. 280 . Murphy, S. Kondrashev & G. Bailey, Battlegrollnd Berlin: CIA vs. KGB in the Cold War, pp. 14-15. 9 interception very difficult.29 COMINT of real value began to flow in considerable quantity from Germany and Austria in the 1950s, when the British and Americans succeeded in tapping high-security communication cables of the respective Soviet Military Administrations. 3o It was only in the early 1950s that the Americans began to ring the USSR with SIGINT stations which could intercept signals transmitted within it.31 It was only from the mid-1950s, using their ground stations in Turkey - the great radar at Samsun, which had a range of 1,000 miles and was operational from 1955, and the Karamursel and Diogenes SIGINT stations - that they were able to use radar detection and interception of telemetry and communication signals to gather information on missiles being test-fired at the Soviet testing range for medium-range missiles, Kapustin Yar. 32 Imagery intelligence was sparse. Overflight of the USSR was occasional because it carried great diplomatic and operational risks. The USAF flew missions over Soviet territory (even in daylight) during the period of the Occupation, taking both radar and visual photographs, but these were relatively rare and some may not have had Presidential authorization. Some RAF overflights in the early 1950s were night flights which took advantage of the fact that Soviet fighters carried no radar sets and so could not find the intruders in the dark. Their cameras 29p. 343 , R. J. Aldrich, 'British Intelligence and the Anglo-American "Special Relationship" during the Cold War', Review of Illtematiollal Studies , Vol. 24, No.3 (July 1998), pp. 331-51 . 30rhese were, respectively, Operations 'Si lver' (1949-55) and 'Gold' (1955-6). They werejoint operations of the MI6 and CIA stations in Vienna and Berlin (J. Ranelagh, The Agency: The Rise alld Declille of the CIA, pp. 138- 40,290-96). Their story is told in many books. D. Murphy, S. Kondrashev & G. Bailey's Battlegroulld Berlill discusses Operation 'Gold ' at length (at pp. 205-37). C. M. Andrew at p. 215 of For the President's Eyes Dilly, citing the authority of a senior CIA officer, claims that the operation produced much valuable scientific, military, political and economic intelligence. 31J. Richelson, Americall Espiollage alld the Soviet Target, pp. 77-80. Leaving aside SIGINT stations in the occupied territories of Germany and Japan, the Americans' first three SIGINT stations abroad, targeting the Western USSR, were in Britain, at Edzell, Kirknewton and Chicksands, and went into operation in 1951 , 1952 and 1952 respectively. 32J. Richelson, Americall Espiollage alld the Soviet Target, pp. 84-6. 10 took photographs of the radar images of their targets. At that time the British Canberra was the only aeroplane able to fly high enough to be well out of the range of Soviet air defences.33 Not until 1956 were the Americans able to develop a plane which could overfly the Soviet Union more or less with impunity and even it was eventually shot down. During the early part of the Cold War, most intelligence flights against the Soviet Union were electronic (,Ferret') or photographic reconnaissance flights along its borders.34 From the late 1940s on (at the latest), specially-equipped RAF aircraft flew missions along the East German border and coastline and along the southern border of the USSR, intercepting radio communications and radar and other electronic emissions. Such aircraft, like the RAF signals base at Ayiou Nicolaos in Cyprus (completed in 1949), may well have picked up VHF radio signals emitted in the Soviet Union and propagated beyond the line of sight by 'super refraction' caused by weather conditions. 35 As far as the creation of networks of secret agents is concerned, MI6 and the CIA seem for a long time to have beaten their heads against a brick wall. MI6's efforts to land agents in the Baltic states were ended in 1954 by the KGB, which revealed that the operation had been under its control from the start, and most other attempts at infiltration likewise failed.36 Refugees, defectors and German PoWs returning from the USSR had to take the place of agents. Moreover, the failure of secret intelligence operations against the Soviet Union gave particular importance to espionage using secret agents 33p . Lashmar, Spy Flights of the Cold War, pp. 67, 74, 78 & 84-91. 34p. Lashmar, Spy Flights of the Cold War, pp. 89-90; 1. Richelson, American Espionage and the Soviet Target, pp. 103-7 & 109-15. 35pp. 105-7, A. Thomas, 'British Signals Intelligence after the Second World War' , Intelligence & Nationapl Security, Vol. 3, No.4 (October 1988), pp. 103-10. The range of VHF radio is usually limited to the line of sight, but refraction, brought about by weather conditions in the lower atmosphere, causes the signals to travel further. 36c. M. Andrew & O. Gordievsky, KGB: The Inside S(01), of its Foreign Operationsjrom Lenin to Gorbachev , pp.316-19. 11 took photographs of the radar images of their targets. At that time the British Canberra was the only aeroplane able to fly high enough to be well out of the range of Soviet air defences.33 Not until 1956 were the Americans able to develop a plane which could overfly the Soviet Union more or less with impunity and even it was eventually shot down. During the early part of the Cold War, most intelligence flights against the Soviet Union were electronic ('Ferret') or photographic reconnaissance flights along its borders.34 From the late 1940s on (at the latest), specially-equipped RAF aircraft flew missions along the East German border and coastline and along the southern border of the USSR, intercepting radio communications and radar and other electronic emissions. Such aircraft, like the RAF signals base at Ayiou Nicolaos in Cyprus (completed in 1949), may well have picked up VHF radio signals emitted in the Soviet Union and propagated beyond the line of sight by 'super refraction' caused by weather conditions. 35 As far as the creation of networks of secret agents is concerned, MI6 and the CIA seem for a long time to have beaten their heads against a brick wall. MI6's efforts to land agents in the Baltic states were ended in 1954 by the KGB, which revealed that the operation had been under its control from the start, and most other attempts at infiltration likewise failed.36 Refugees, defectors and German PoWs returning from the USSR had to take the place of agents. Moreover, the failure of secret intelligence operations against the Soviet Union gave particular importance to espionage using secret agents 33p. Lashmar, Spy Flights a/the Cold War, pp. 67,74,78 & 84-91. 34p. Lashmar, Spy Flights a/the Cold War, pp. 89-90; J. Richelson, American Espionage and the Soviet Target, pp. 103-7 & 109-15. 35pp. 105-7, A. Thomas, 'British Signals Intelligence after the Second World War ' , Intelligence & Nationapl Security, Vol. 3, No. 4 (October 1988), pp. 103-10. The range of VHF radio is usually limited to the line of sight, but refraction , brought about by weather conditions in the lower atmosphere, causes the signals to travel further. 36c. M. Andrew & O. Gordievsky, KGB: The Inside Story a/its Foreign Operations/rom Lenin to Gorbachev , pp.316-19 . 11 and informal contacts in Germaqy, since East Germany was far more vulnerable to such operations than the USSR. Consequently, until the mid-1950s deep penetration of the Soviet military-industrial complex could only be effected by human sources. Thanks to Soviet policy towards Germans, such sources abounded in Germany, where they were accessible to British Intelligence. They made known to the British, not only where key war-related installations were, but also how science and industry were managed by the Soviet bureaucracy. By exploiting these sources, British Intelligence began to discover the superiority of the free market as an instrument of technological progress. That is the second gap in the ~istory of the Western intelligence assault on the USSR which this thesis discovers and begins to fill. During the Second World War, intelligence like that gathered from Germans in the years of the Occupation would for the most part have been much less significant, because other sources yielded a wealth of crucial intelligence.37 Aerial reconnaissance had been possible and interpretation of aerial photography had proved very accurate. This was why, on his assumption of the Presidency in 1953, 370f course, human sources had also provided valuable intelligence on weapons development projects during World War Two. The Oslo Report of November 1939 had forewarned British Inte lligence of a number of very significant developments in German military electronics and other fields. Among the technological developments , secrets of which were revealed to the British, were radar sets, a range-finding system for bombers which used, not pulses, but a continuous radio wave, an electronically-triggered proximity fuse, a gyro-stabilized radio-controlled rocket, a radio-controlled acoustic homing torpedo and a radio-controlled rocket-driven glider bomb. The report mentioned that the glider bomb was being developed at PeenemOnde, then unknown to British Intelligence (see R. V. Jones, Most Secret War, pp . 105-7, and, Reflections on IlIfelligence, pp. 265-75). The author of the report was Hans Mayer, then the director of the Central Laboratories of Siemens & Halske. In addition, word of the Germans' increased production of heavy water at the Rjukan plant in Norway was received from a Professor of Physics in Norway, LeifTronstad (see R. V. Jones, Most Secret War, pp. 269-70). Equally, some of the intelligence acquired in Germany in the years 1945-55 from PoWs and scientists on Soviet atomic development would, if obtained on German atomry, have been valuable even during World War Two. Despite Ultra, overflight and inside information , neither the British nor the Americans knew in 1945 how far the German atomic programme had progressed. 12 Eisenhower pressed for aerial reconnaIssance of the USSR.38 During the War, priceless communications intelligence had been acquired in abundance. The British had broken the versions of the Enigma machine cipher of all three of the German arI!led forces, while Japan's highest-grade diplomatic code had been cracked by the Americans.39 However, when the Cold War began neither Britain nor the United States had sources of intelligence in the USSR or Eastern Europe, since during the War they had left military intelligence-gathering on the Eastern Front, like military operations, to their Soviet ally.40 Immediately after the War, only very basic information was gathered on Soviet military strength.41 When the USSR was identified as an enemy, its government's mania for security and gigantic police apparatus made it qifficult to penetrate. Consequently, Western countries had almost no information on it.42 By contrast, the Bolsheviks had always regarded all the main Western countries as their enemies and both during and after the War had well- placed agents in the centres of government and scientific research of Britain and the 38C. M. Andrew, For the Presidellt's Eyes Ollly, pp. 220-1. 39c. M. Andrew, Secret Service: The Makillg of the British Illtelligellce COllllllllllity, p. 451; J. Richelson, A Celltlll )/ of Spies: Illtelligellce ill the Twelltieth Celltury , pp. 118-19, 176-8 & 190-6. The intelligence acquired in the two operations was, famously, codenamed 'Ultra ' and 'Magic' . 4Oxiii , Introduction by H. R. Trevor-Roper to H. Hahne & H. Zolling, Network: The Truth about Gelleral Gehlell alld his Spy Rillg. The former CIA officer Harry Rositzke confirms at p. 15 of his book, The CIA 's Secret Operatiolls, that there were not 'even the rudiments of an American intelligence effort in the Soviet Union' during or in the years immediately after the War. I pointed out this contrast in the conclusion of my 1996 M. Phil. thesis, 'British Policy, the Soviet Union and Post-war Germany: The Role and Importance of Scientific Intelligence' . 41c. Egan & A. Knott , Essays ill Twelllieth-Celltury AII/ericall Diploll/atic History Dedicated to Professor Dalliel M. SII/ith (aI1icle by J. Erdmann on 'The Wringer in Post-war Germany: Its Impact on United States-German Relations and Defense Policies'), p. 163 . 42The JIC conceded in 1946 that it was forced to rely on guesswork, commenting in one report that, 'Any study of Russia's strategic interests and intentions must be speculative, as we have little evidence to show what view Russia herself takes of her strategic interests , or what policy she intends to pursue. We have practically no direct intelligence, of a detailed factual or statistical nature, on conditions in the different parts of the Soviet Union, and none at all on the intentions, immediate or ultimate, of the Russian leaders . For example, we have no intelligence whatever on two such crucial questions as whether Russia intends to continue her demobilisation during 1946 and whether Russian industry is to any substantial extent being reconverted from wartime requirements for the needs of peace. Our present appreciation is based, therefore, on the limited evidence which we have, on deductions made from such indications of policy as Russia has given, and on reasonable conjecture concerning the Soviet appreciation of their own situation' (paragraph 3, J1C(46) I (0) dated I March 1946 and entitled 'Russia's Strategic Interests & Intentions', CAB 811132). 13 United States. Furthermore, the op~nness of Western societies meant that the USSR had less need of secret intelligence than the West. The information on atomic installations, airfields and missiles sites in the USA which the Soviets could gather without difficulty, and often lawfully, the Americans could only acquire from aerial reconnaissance. The information obtained from Germans exploited by the Soviets for their labour and knowledge was therefore crucial because, whatever its shortcomings, it was the best information the British and Americans had on the current and future military capability of the USSR. 14 . CHAPTER 1 THE SOVIET EXPLOITATION OF GERMAN SCIENCE AND BRITISH INTELLIGENCE POLICY TOWARDS THE U.S.S.R. A. The intelligence victory over Germany In the mid- and late-1940s, scientific intelligence operations against the Soviet Union were among the causes of the East-West hostility known as the Cold War. A decade later, such operations helped to stabilize the Cold War. The first post-war penetration of Soviet military capability by British Intelligence was a by-product of its effort to complete the victory over Germany. In 1945-6, British intelligence agencies had the task of achieving an intelligence victory over Germany, so that in a future war she would have no weapon with which her conquerors in 1945 were not familiar. As they overran the Reich, the victorious Allies sought to find out all about Germany's armaments and to acquire them for themselves. A special fighting unit, 'T' Force, was created by the British and Americans to take over and occupy installations engaged in weapons development and manufacture and war-related scientific research. These installations were then visited by Combined Intelligence Objectives Sub-committee (CIOS) teams brought into being by SHAEF to find out all there was to know about German war-related science.43 CIOS, as a division of SHAEF, was wound up in the summer of 1945, when SHAEF was dissolved. In its brief lifetime, 43 , A History of 'T' Force' , FO 1031/49. 'T' stood for 'Target'. CIOS scientific intelligence teams were soon supplemented by British Intelligence Objectives Sub-committee (BIOS) teams which did the same work in Britain's interest alone. Some priceless finds were made. For instance, when Kiel fell, Allied forces not only overran the great Waltherwerke but also captured Helmuth Walther himself. Although he had burnt all his records, he had microfilmed the most important of them and a prototype of his greatest creation, a Type XXVI hydrogen-peroxide-powered submarine capable of twenty-five knots underwater, was found in the works. The two targets, the investigation of which took the longest, were the Raubkammer, near Celie, a chemical weapons installation, and the huge Ordnance Testing Station at MUnster-Unterluss. 15 it produced reports on 3,377 targets.44 Its work amounted to the biggest single scientific intelligence operation ever conducted by any group of Powers against another. Events in Germany worked in favour of the Western Allies. Not only did they overrun the larger part of Germany, but German scientists and technicians in the last months of the War, like others, moved West so as to fall into Western hands. Thus the leaders of the German guided missile project (including its directing mind, Wernher von Braun) were captured by the Americans and the leaders of the German atomic energy and nerve gas development projects ended up in 'Dustbin', the Allied interrogation centre.which was first situated at Chesnay, near Versailles, and was in June 1945 moved to SchloG Kransberg, near Frankfurt.45 44Minutes of BIOS meeting on 12 September 1945, FO 1031/50. 45Intelligence operations encouraged this movement of German scientific workers to the West. Even in the last months of the War, it was the policy of the Western Allies to prevent German scientists, engineers and technicians whose knowledge would be of value to the USSR from falling into Soviet hands. If they were in the Soviet Zone, they were to be located and an attempt made to persuade them to come West. The most spectacular example of this policy was the evacuation by the Americans in June 1945, before their withdrawal from central Germany, of some 2,000 German scientific workers , many of them very important. Also evacuated were their families and vast quantities of equipment. Regarding the number of evacuees, the figure of 750 evacuees is given in the BIOS minutes of its meeting on 13 February 1946, FO 1031/50. But an EPES, FIAT report dated 14 August 1946 (FO 1031/67) gives the greater figure of 2,000. Since the lists of those to be evacuated were prepared by EPES (FIAT's Enemy Personnel Exploitation Section) itself, I have preferred these figures. The British were also involved in this operation, evacuating some 250 scientists, engineers and technicians (and their families). Those selected for evacuation were, in part, chosen on the basis of information on them provided by such 'Dustbin' detainees as Albert Speer and Werner Osenberg. The Carl-Zeil3 manufacturing complex at Jena, the Junkers factory at Dessau, the Telefunken research laboratory at Bad Liebenstein, the I. G. Farben factories at Wolfen, Leuna and Bitterfeld, the V-2 missile experimental establishment at Nordhausen, the universities of Leipzig, Jena and Halle and many other places were all stripped of people and equipment. Some 450 scientists and engineers were taken from the Zeil3 and Schott factories in Jena alone (letter dated I March 1946, FO 1031/67). At the Potsdam Conference, the Soviet delegation protested at the removal of scientific personnel and equipment from their Zone. Since the British and Americans were not willing to find work in their fields of expertise for these people, all but the most important of them had soon to be released (EPES, FIAT report dated 14 August 1946, FO 1031/67). They were very unhappy in American hands, where their skills went completely unused. More than 40% of the Zeil3 and Schott evacuees had doctoral degrees. Their main aim was to find work in their field and by the spring of 1946 most had not succeeded in doing so. Naturally, on release many of those evacuated from central Germany made their way back to the Soviet Zone, where good, well-paid jobs in their specialist fields awaited them. The carrot was backed up with a stick: if they did not go back, their relatives in East Germany would be victimized (further EPES, FIAT report dated 14 August 1946, FO 1031/67). The policy of control of German science meant that German scientific workers could not find work in their areas of expertise in Western Germany. They had either to go abroad or work for the Soviets. 16 The Special Detention Centre codenamed 'Dustbin' was established to hold scientists and administrators from whom information on Germany's great advances in military technology could be gathered. 46 This information was of importance for assessments of ~he future military strength of the Soviet Union as well, since the USSR, as a fellow-exploiter of Germany, would have overrun people, documents, components and weapons which would betray to it the advances the Germans had made. The 'Dustbin' interrogators interviewed the leading administrators and scientists of the Nazi military-industrial complex. One important task was the interrogation of members of the special research staff of the Reichforschungsrat (Imperial Research Council).47 Among this group was the Director of the Planungsamt (Planning Office) of the Reichforschungsamt, Professor Werner Osenberg. The Planungsamt's most important files and records (above all its card indices of German scientific personnel) were flown to 'Dustbin' from Northeim, near Hannover, soon after it was captured in April 1945. These documents allowed German scientists, engineers and technicians with knowledge of military significance to be identified and tracked down and were therefore of great intelligence value.48 Personnel from the Ministry of Armaments and War Production were imprisoned and interrogated there for information on the war production which they had directed. Among these people were the Minister himself, Albert Speer; Gerhard Steiler von Heydekampf, the Chairman of its Main Committee on Tanks and Vehicles; and Otto 46'Dustbin' was originally established by SHAEF as a detention centre to be run jointly by the British and Americans. Until August 1946, when the Americans placed their own intelligence representative at the centre, the intelligence officers stationed there were British; its administrative staff was American. Until August 1946, the Americans were kept fully informed of the intelligence being gathered there by the British. In December 1946 the Americans decided to close down the centre and carry out the same work by themselves at the US Detention Centre MISC in Oberursel (reports dated 9 November and 3 December 1946, FO 1031/69). 'Dustbin 's ' annex was codenamed 'Ashcan'. 47Report dated 2 December 1946, FO 1031/69. 48Letter dated 8 August 1946, FO 1031/26. UNIVERSITY LIBRARY CAMBRIDGE 17 Merker, the chairman of its Ma~n Committee for Shipbuilding. The interrogators sought information on radar and radio signalling, which had so greatly increased the effectiveness of airpower during the War. 49 Professor Abraham Esau, the supervisor of all German wartime research into radio, was held at the centre from October 1945 to March 1946.50 Directors of the Telefunken company, a manufacturer of anti- aircraft and fighter control radar sets,51 were also interrogated in the summer of 1945. Electro-magnetic radiation allowed distant objects to be remotely controlled and, naturally, Professor Friedrich Gladenbeck, the plenipotenitary on the Reichforschungsrat for research into remote control, was admitted to 'Dustbin' in July 1945. Industrialists whose companies had been heavily involved in Germany's war effort, such as Fritz Thyssen of the Vereinigte Stahlwerke, Hermann Rochling of the Rochling Stahlwerke and Professor Ferdinand Porsche of the Volkswagenwerke, were likewise questioned in 'Dustbin' .52 Leading figures in the wartime operations of the great chemical company, 1. G. Fat'ben, were put in 'Dustbin' and interrogated. Interest in these people was great because, late in April 1945, CIOS teams had overrun the main office of 1. G. Fat'ben in Frankfurt-am-Main and interrogated the scientists there, who had babbled about war gases of unheard-of toxicity. Accordingly, on 26 April 1945 SHAEF was informed by signal of the existence of a German poison gas, alleged to penetrate gas masks, which would be found at the 1. G. Farben works at Gendorf in Bavaria.53 This was tabun, the first of the nerve gases, though its toxicity, while great, was 49The effect of radar and radio communications on airpower is discussed at p. 5, foreword by Sir Robert Cockburn, KBE, CB, to A. Price, Instrull/ents of Darkness: The HistOJ), of Electronic Wwjare. 5Operiodic State Report No. 43 dated 21 March 1946, FO 1031170. 51 A. Price, Instrull/ents of Darkness, pp. 60 & 64. 52These and many other arrivals and departures are recorded in the Periodic State Reports contained in FO 1031/52. 53CIOS Evaluation Report 26 dated 21 May 1945, FO 1031/81. 18 Merker, the chairman of its Main Committee for Shipbuilding. The interrogators sought information on radar and radio signalling, which had so greatly increased the effectiveness of airpower during the War. 49 Professor Abraham Esau, the supervisor of ~ll German wartime research into radio, was held at the centre from October 1945 to March 1946.50 Directors of the Telefunken company, a manufacturer of anti- aircraft and fighter control radar sets,51 were also interrogated in the summer of 1945. Electro-magnetic radiation allowed distant objects to be remotely controlled and, naturally, Professor Friedrich Gladenbeck, the plenipotenitary on the Reichforschungsrat for research into remote control, was admitted to 'Dustbin ' in July 1945. Industrialists whose companies had been heavily involved in Germany's war effort, such as Fritz Thyssen of the Vereinigte Stahlwerke, Hermann Rochling of the Rochling Stahlwerke and Professor Ferdinand Porsche of the Volkswagenwerke, were likewise questioned in 'Dustbin' .52 Leading figures in the wartime operations of the great chemical company, I. G. Farben, were put in 'Dustbin' and interrogated. Interest in these people was great because, late in April 1945, CIOS teams had overrun the main office of I. G. Far'ben in Frankfurt-am-Main and interrogated the scientists there, who had babbled about war gases of unheard-of toxicity. Accordingly, on 26 April 1945 SHAEF was informed by signal of the existence of a German poison gas, alleged to penetrate gas masks, which would be found at the I. G. Farben works at Gendorf in Bavaria.53 This was tabun, the first of the nerve gases , though its toxicity, while great, was 49rhe effect of radar and radio communications on airpower is discussed at p. 5, foreword by Sir Robert Cockburn, KBE, CB, to A. Price, Illstrulllellts of Darklless: The HistOlY of Electrollic W(//jare. 5Operiodic State Report No. 43 dated 21 March 1946, FO 1031170. 51 A. Price, Illstrulllellts of Darklless , pp. 60 & 64. 52These and many other arrivals and departures are recorded in the Periodic State Reports contained in FO 1031/52. 53CIOS Evaluation Report 26 dated 21 May 1945, FO 1031/81 . 18 exaggerated in this report. Systematic interrogation of I. G. Fat'ben chemists and administrators revealed the chemical composition of the gases developed, their toxicity and mode of operation, the places where they had been made, the chemists involved in their development and production and the extent of the company's collaboration with the Nazis' armaments build-up. 54 Tabun had been mass-produced, at Dyhernfurth in Silesia. Sarin had only been made in the laboratory, at the Heeresgasschutzlaboratorium (Army Gas Protection Laboratory) in Berlin-Spandau, but a pilot plant for its manufacture had been three-quarters-built at Dyhernfurth and a plant for its mass production had been under construction at Falkenhagen, not far from Frankfurt-an-der-Oder, when the war ended. Both plants were in Soviet hands. Although all chemical weapons and all traces of the nerve gases were removed from the Dyhernfurth plants before they were abandoned to the advancing Soviet armies, the plants were not destroyed. 55 Those interrogated maintained that all documents relating to the nerve gases were destroyed, but the head of tabun production at 54rhe nerve gases are so called because they attack the nervous system. Specifically, they attack the enzyme cholesterase, which is essential for nerve function. The codenames given to the two principal nerve gases invented by Gerhard Schrader were legion. The gas generally known as tabun was first synthesized late in 1936 and was originally codenamed Le-IOO (for Leverkusen-I 00) and also had the codenames Gelan, Trilon-83, T-83 and P-IOO. Sarin, first synthesized in 1938, was variously known by that name and as Le-213, Trilon-146 and T- 146. Tabun is the ethyl ester of dimethylaminocyanphosphoric acid; sarin the isopropyl ester of methylfluorophosphoric acid. Schrader did not know how tabun had been given its principal name, but knew that sarin stood for Schrader, Ambros, Rittler and von der Linde. Ambros had commissioned the putting of tabun into service as a weapon. An [. G. Farben director, he was the chairman of the Special 'C' (Chemicals) Committee of Speer's Armaments Ministry and as such was responsible for all Germany's war gas production. Rittler and von der Linde were chemists at the Heereswaffenamt who helped turn Schrader's invention into a weapon in production. Most of these details about the two gases are taken from CIOS Evaluation Report 26 dated 21 May 1945; Abstract from Notes on Interrogation at Frankfurt: 21 April - 4 May 1945; letter dated 18 September 1945 (all in FO 1031/81); report dated 26 September 1945 (FO 1031/82); and the reports made on the interrogations of Dr. Gerhard Schrader, which are contained in FO 1031/239. In these reports, statements as to the difference in the toxicity of tabun and that of sarin vary greatly. In C[OS Evaluation Report 26 dated 21 May 1945 (FO 1031/81) sarin is stated to be four times as toxic as tabun. [n C[OS Evaluation Report 11 dated 2 May 1945 (FO 1031/81) sarin is stated to be three times as toxic as tabun. Since this latter report is based on information taken from Schrader himself and from Prof. Dr. Eberhard Gross, who tested the nerve gases and determined their toxicity , this figure is the more likely to be accurate. However, in an Alsos report dated 26 September 1945 (FO 1031182) sarin is stated to be seven times as toxic as tabun, and Gross is cited as the source of this information. Ulrich Albrecht and Randolph Nikutta, in their book, Die SOlVjelische Riislllllgsilldllslrie (p. 75), state that sarin is six times as toxic as tabun and soman three times as toxic as sarin. [n all Schrader synthesized some 400 organic phosphorus compounds (report dated 26 September 1945, FO 1031/82). 55Abstract from Notes on Interrogation at Frankfurt: 21 April - 4 May 1945, FO 1031/81. 19 Dyhernfurth, Dr. Bernd von Bock, many years later told British and American interrogators that he doubted whether this was true. Shells and bombs containing approximately 10,000 tons of tabun had been hidden in places in the Soviet Zone and so had to be presumed to be in Soviet hands.56 As a result of such interrogations, documents were dug up at Gendorf which threw more light on 1. G. Farben's involvement in the Nazis' war drive.57 The most profitable interrogation of all was that of the inventor of tabun and sarin himself, Dr. Gerhard Schrader, who fell into Allied hands when the region around Leverkusen was captured in mid-April 1945.58 Allied interrogators learned from the chemists they questioned of the invention of the most toxic of the nerve gases, soman, the pinacolyl homologue of sarin .59 Its inventor, Professor Richard Kuhn, was interrogated. As a result of its importance to Germany's war effort, all factories, properties and assets of 1. G. Farben were in November 1945 taken into the ownership and control of the Allied Control Council by its Law No. 9.60 56Abstract from Notes on Interrogation at Frankfurt: 21 April - 4 May 1945, FO 1031/81. 57Letter dated 22 October 1945, FO 1031/81. 58Schrader was taken into ' Dustbin' in August 1945 and not released until May 1946 (Periodic State Report No. 47 dated 25 April 1946 (FO 1031170) states that Schrader was admitted to ' Dustbin' on 16 August 1945 and was to leave it a week from the date of the report. He wrote nine reports on his organic phosphorus compound insecticides during his time in the centre) . Admitted to ' Dustbin ' on the same day was his boss, Professor Heinrich Hbrlein, I. G. Farben 's Director of Research into Pharmaceuticals and a member of its Central Committee. Other I. G. Farben personnel held there included the company's chairman, Dr. Hermann Schmitz, Dr. Max Wittwer, the director of Anorgana, I. G. Farben's subsidiary for the manufacture of nerve gas, and Dr. JUrgen von Klenck, the manager-to-be of the uncompleted sarin plant at Falkenhagen (he was also the Deputy Chairman of the Speer Ministry 's Special 'C' Committee, which was responsible for chemical warfare) (Periodic State Report No. 63 dated 12 September 1946, FO 1031170). 59 Abstract from Notes on Interrogation at Frankfurt: 21 April - 4 May 1945, FO 1031/81; report dated 26 September 1945, FO 1031/82. News of the invention of the nerve gases must have come as an unpleasant shock to British military planners, who had only two months before considered that there would be no developments in chemical warfare beyond the level of advancement known to the British during the War (see the draft report of the Tizard committee charged in 1945 with predicting what developments would take place in weapons and methods of warfare over the following ten years. This draft report is attached to a covering letter WW/51/45 dated 19 February 1945, CAB 137/19). This statement did not appear in the report actually submitted in June 1945 (COS(45)402(0) dated 16 June 1945 and entitled, 'Future Developments in Weapons and Methods of War', CAB 80/94). 60Letter dated 26 September 1945, FO 103 1/53 . 20 Since tabun-filled weapons, the tabun plant at Dyhernfurth, the uncompleted sarin pilot plant there, the unfinished sarin plant at Falkenhagen and quite possibly documents relating to the manufacture of the nerve gases had all fallen into Soviet haJ;1ds, it had to be assumed that the Soviets would soon be capable of making them and using them in war. The Germans' submarines, torpedoes, aerodynamics, fuels, infra-red detection and V-I engine were all superior to the Allies' counterpart technologies 61 and the Soviets came by German knowledge in all these fields. 62 However, in the fields of atomic and biological warfare the Germans had not advanced beyond the level of Soviet science. When the War ended, the atomic energy project under Werner Heisenberg was still at a rudimentary stage. A self- sustaining atomic reactor had not been built, and the scientists concerned had both not thought of using plutonium in the bomb and thought it impossible to separate uranium-235 (which is fissionable) from uranium-238 (which is not).63 Interrogation of captured scientists established that Allied fears of Nazi Germany's biological warfare capability had been exaggerated. German research into means of biological warfare had started later than in other countries (for instance, France and the USSR) and was a response to the Germans' own scientific exploitation of conquered France. 61 xvii, introduction by Professor R. V. Jones to S. Goudsmit, Alsos. 6brhe Annex to JS/JTIC(49)55 dated 22 June 1949 and entitled 'Summary of Intelligence on Russian Development for the Defence Research Policy Committee' (DEFE 41/150) contains details of German technologies which became available to the USSR at the end of the War. See p. 16 for information on missile guidance, p. 18 for information on infra-red, pp. 21-8 for information on guided missiles, pp. 35-6 for information on submarines and torpedoes. 63S . Goudsmit, Alsos, pp. 176 & 182; xi, introduction by Professor R. V. Jones to Goudsmit'sAlsos. Goudsmit was the scientific leader of the Alsos II Mission, sent to Europe in 1944 by General Leslie Groves, the military chief of the Manhattan Project, to find out how much success the Germans had had in their efforts to develop atomic energy. As Goudsmit's book relates, the Mission discovered that Heisenberg's project had lagged far behind the Manhattan Project and was far from developing a bomb (foreword, xv-xvi; pp. 70-5, 90, 176-82). As Professor Jones relates in his introduction to Alsos, British Intelligence had reached this conclusion well before the War's end by using informants close to Werner Heisenberg to follow his movements. Their information established that he had not been associated with any large-scale construction project. The manufacture of an atomic bomb would have been such a project and might have required three years at least to bring to completion. When the War ended, the Soviets had not achieved a self-sustaining nuclear chain reaction either. This was achieved by the 'F-I' reactor of Laboratory No.2 of the Academy of Sciences in December 1946 (D. Holloway, Stalin and the Bomb: the Soviet Union and Atomic Energy 1939-56, p. 182). 21 An expert on disinfection, Professor Heinrich Kliewe, was commissioned by the Wehrmacht's Surgeon-General to conduct research into defence against a biological attack when, in 1940, German forces overran five laboratories at Le Bouchet, not far from Paris, in which bacterial cultures were found.64 Late in 1942 a committee was formed under the chairmanship of Dr. Walter Hirsch, the head of Department 9 (chemical weapons) of the Waffenamt Prtifwesen (the German Army's Weapons Testing Office) to study means of waging biological warfare. Research was carried out by three groups overseen by this committee: a Human Section, for which Kliewe worked, a Veterinary Section and an Agricultural Section. However, Hitler hated the project and, according to Kliewe, forbade research into the offensive use of biological agents. His order frustrated progress and only three experiments of any significance were carried out.65 Unsurprisingly, research into the offensive use, on a strategic scale, of agents of biological warfare did not progress beyond a primitive 64Report on the interrogation of Professor H. Kliewe dated 13 May 1945, FO 1031/83. 65Alsos report dated 24 June 1945, FO 1031/83. Kliewe, the leading German researcher into means of defence against biological warfare, was interrogated in 'Dustbin' in the summer of 1945. As a result of his information, Prof. Dr. Kurt Blome was detained in 'Dustbin'. Blome was a long-serving NSDAP member and the plenipotentiary for cancer research on the Reichforschungsrat. In 1943, he had assumed responsibility for all research into biological warfare sponsored by the Wehrmacht (letter dated 3 July 1945, FO 1031/83). The Alsos report dated 24 June 1945 (FO 1031/83) contains information acquired by interrogating Professor Kliewe and Dr. Hirsch, the head of 'Wa PrOf 9'. Kliewe says that he first learned that Blome had been appointed director of all the army's research into biological warfare when he met Blome at a meeting in 1943 of the committee chaired by Hirsch. Hirsch, however, says that he had never been informed that Blome had been put in charge of all biological warfare research. This confusion is typical of the administrative disorganization which characterized the Nazi state. The interrogator of the two men remarked at the foot of the report that not only was Hirsch unaware of Blome's work, he and Kliewe were almost wholly ignorant of each other's work. This ignorance was remarkable given that they sat on the same small committee and Kliewe worked in a research section run by Hirsch. This suggested that there was simply no cooperation between BW scientists at all. However, both Hirsch and Kliewe stated that Hitler's ban on research into offensive BW acted as a severe constraint on all BW research. In the interrogations carried out at 'Dustbin', it was often discovered where documents relating to advances in military technology had been hidden. For example, Kliewe revealed that the records of the German Army's Surgeon-General's office (Heeressanittitsinspektion), for which he had worked, had in mid-March 1945 been taken from Berlin by personnel of that office on a special train. Interrogation of the Army's Surgeon-General, General Walter, and various of his underlings established that the records of the office had been hidden in a monastery at Niederviehbach, near Landshut in Bavaria, from the cellars of which they were promptly recovered (letter dated 24 May 1945, FO 1031/83). Reports on guided missile research and development at PeenemOnde and plans for new projects were also dug up in the wake of later interrogations at the American interrogation centre at Oberursel (report dated 9 June 1947, FO 1031112). Several thousand documents, giving the formulae and production methods of the nerve gases and much information on I. G. Farben ' s invol vement in Nazi Germany 's arms build-up, were found buried near the company's Gendorf plant and in the safe of the factory (report on interrogation of Dr. J. von Klenck dated 6 December 1945, FO 1031/91). 22 stage. 66 Likewise, no weapons were developed to defend German troops against a biological attack. 67 Therefore, there was nothing the Soviets could learn from German research into means of biological warfare. Extensive research had before the War been conducted into agents of biological warfare in the Soviet Union.68 Kliewe seemed to provide snippets of more valuable information on Soviet interest in biological warfare, for to help him in his work he had been sent intelligence reports on Soviet research.69 Above all, he told his interrogators that, in the light of the evidence gathered by their intelligence services of Soviet BW research, the German BW scientists had assumed that their Soviet counterparts had made enough progress for the USSR to be able at any time to use plague or anthrax bacilli as offensive weapons'?o Kliewe, drawing on the reports he had seen, gave his interrogators the names of Soviet scientists who might be conducting research into 66DSI Memorandum No. 15 dated 17 May 1952 and entitled, 'Science in the German Democratic Republic' , DEFE 411153; S. Harris, Factories of Death: Japanese Biological Wmfare 1932-45 and the American Cover-Up, pp. 160-1. 67Report on the interrogation of Professor H. Kliewe dated 13 May 1945, FO 1031/83. 68S. Harris, Factories of Death, p. 157. However, the Soviets must have benefited from their exploitation of Japanese research into biological warfare agents. Japanese biological warfare experts fell into Soviet hands after the War. In the last few days of 1949, more than four years after their capture, twelve Japanese officers were tried in the USSR for conspiring to use biological warfare agents during the War. Even though these men had committed their crimes in Manchuria, the Soviet Union assumed jurisdiction over their case and their trial took place at Khabarovsk in Siberia. All the accused admitted to the charges made against them, including the charge that they had killed many Soviet citizens in their BW experiments. Despite the gravity of the charges, none was sentenced to death. All received sentences of imprisonment and even those sentenced to twenty-five years' hard labour were back in Japan by 1956. The US State Department drew from the delay in bringing them to trial the natural conclusion that the MvD had wanted to extract as much information about Japanese methods of waging biological warfare as possible from the accused (S. Harris, Factories of Death , pp. 226-30). 69Report on the interrogation of Professor H. Kliewe dated 13 May 1945, FO 1031183. Another source on Soviet BW was Dr. Hirsch, who had also been given information acquired from intelligence sources. Among these was a Soviet defector, an officer who called himself von Apen and who flew to Berlin during the War claiming that he was a Trotskyist dissident. Von Apen's information on Soviet biological warfare research was obviously of very doubtful value. Dr. Hirsch maintained in interrogation that German BW researchers suspected throughout that von Apen might be a Soviet agent peddling them disinformation , because he claimed to have top-secret information on so many subjects. The Germans could not believe that knowledge of so many research projects could genuinely have been acquired (Alsos report dated 24 June 1945, FO 1031/83). 7~eport on the interrogation of Professor H. Kliewe dated 13 May 1945, FO 1031/83. Dr. Hirsch and Professor Kliewe disagree on the key question of whether the Soviets were actually in a position to use agents of biological warfare. Hirsch maintains that the German scientists doubted whether any Soviet biological attack would be effective. They were much more interested in French research into combining biological and chemical agents (Alsos report dated 24 June 1945, FO 1031183). 23 agents of biological warfare, sp~cified pathogens they might be seeking to use as weapons and means by which they might be contemplating disseminating them. For a time, the information acquired from such prisoners and from captured German and Japanese documents, indicating that there had been 'considerable activity in the past', influenced British intelligence assessments of the USSR's biological warfare capability. It formed the basis of the JIC's 1947 assessment of Soviet work on biological warfare, simply because it was the only information the Committee then had on the subject. 71 However, within two years or so, the scientific intelligence community had lost all confidence in the information and preferred to resort to guesswork in estimating the USSR's progress in developing agents of biological warfare. 72 71 Kliewe seems to have been the principal source of the information on Soviet BW contained in JIC(47)22(0) dated 25 April 1947 entitled, 'Present State of Biological Warfare in Foreign Countries' , CAB 15811 (the quotation is from paragraph 3). Some of the pathogens he mentioned are listed in the report as BW agents the USSR might be developing (anthrax, plague, tularaemia and glanders); the JIC also asserted that those responsible for tetanus, cholera, dysentery, typhoid and brucellosis might be under development in the USSR. The information he provided on means of disseminating such agents was also incorporated into the report (such as dropping from aeroplanes sealed glass containers, holding infectious cultures, which subsequently broke open) . The JIC listed four possible research centres in the Soviet Union: by Lake Seliger (about halfway between Moscow and Leningrad), by the Aral Sea, at Fort Alexander (at SchlosseIberg near Leningrad) and in Vladivostok. Of these, the first three were mentioned by Kliewe in interrogation (report on the interrogation of Professor H. Kliewe dated 13 May 1945, FO 1031/83). In all, Kliewe had received sixteen reports on BW developments in the Soviet Union , most of which concerned interest in plague. 72JS/JTIC(49)47 dated 14 July 1949 and entitled, 'Present State of Progress in Biological Warfare in Foreign Countries', DEFE 411150. In this report , the Joint Committees dismiss earlier intelligence of Soviet research into biological warfare agents with the words, 'Critical survey of intelligence from ex-enemy sources has, in light of knowledge derived from later overt and covert sources, shown that this intelligence may largely now be relegated to our records as being either inaccurate or of historical interest. ' The result was that British Intelligence had almost no reliable information on Soviet research into biological warfare. Some intelligence had been acquired suggesting that a small-scale research project was being carried out on behalf of the Soviet Army, but no intelligence had been obtained of any weapons research and development and none of any weapons trials. The Joint Committees were therefore reduced to making an educated guess . They therefore concluded in JS/JTIC(49)47 that the Soviet Union was probably not yet capable of manufacturing and using bacteria on a massive scale. This was a guess, based on the simi larity between the techniques for the large-scale production of antibiotics and those for the large-scale production of agents of biological warfare. Since penicillin was known to be in short supply in the USSR and its pl anned future production was on a much smaller scale than in the USA or Britain, it followed that the Soviet Union cou ld not be capable of the mass production of agents of biological warfare. However, given their intellectual interest (revealed by the Soviet press), their skill in medicine and biology and their efforts to produce antibiot ics, the Joint Committees forecast that the Soviets wou ld be able to produce bacteria and toxins for war purposes on a large scale within three years (i.e. by 1952: JS/JTIC minutes, 16 March 1949, DEFE 41172). By 1952 it was indeed clear that the Soviets had established an antibiotics industry manufacturing a number of ant ibiotics. Eight factories were known to be manufacturing penicillin and there might well be more. The improvement in the quality of Soviet penicillin had been quick and it was reasonable to assume that equally rapid progress had been made with efforts to mass-produce pathogenic bacteria. It could 24 The information yielded by the interrogations of German scientists and administrators about their success in developing new weapons brought with it fear for the future: fear that the USSR would incorporate into its arsenal the German military technology which had come into its hands and would, sooner or later, use it in a war with the West. By 1946, the interrogations in 'Dustbin' had the aim of finding out about Soviet development projects as well as German wartime achievements . Scientific workers threatened with kidnapping 'by agents of Powers other than the USA or the UK' were held there.?3 The quoted words refer chiefly to the USSR, but may also refer to France. Scientists and technicians who had worked on Soviet development projects, or had otherwise come by information on them, and thus had knowledge of them to pass on were also held in 'Dustbin'. Operation' Apple Pie' The documents of German wartime intelligence agencies were examined for information on the USSR acquired in the course of the Wehrmacht's invasion of the Soviet Union. The Germans' information had come principally from the millions of Soviet troops who had been taken prisoner. Likewise, German intelligence experts on the USSR were tracked down to provide more information. Among them were intelligence officers of the Wannsee Institute and agencies connected with it, who were commissioned to write up their knowledge of the Soviet Union (for a fee).?4 therefore be assumed that the mass cultivation of some pathogenic bacteria could have begun in the USSR in 1951 and that from 1952 several tons of weapon charging per day could be in production (DSI Paper dated 7 February 1952 and entitled, 'Soviet Intentions and Capabilities', Working Party on BW Prophylaxis and Therapy, DEFE 41/156). 73Report dated 2 December 1946, FO 1031/69. 74HQ.Int.Div./JlCI702113 Memorandum No.5 dated 13 January 1947, discussed at meeting of JlC (Germany) on 23 January 1947; minutes of JlC (Germany) meeting on 10 February I947, DEFE 41/62. 25 This was Operation 'Apple Pie', which began in 1946.75 The results of the operation were shared with the Americans, who likewise handed over the intelligence yield of their counterpart operation. 76 Intelligence documents were dug up wherever they had been. hidden. For example, with the help of MI6 documents of the Wehrmacht's Feldwirtschaftsamt (Field Economic Office) were in 1947 recovered from the Soviet Zone of Austria.?7 As late as the early 1950s, the intelligence machine in Germany was running in part on oil extracted from this very old chestnut, though the 'Apple Pie' organization had by then become the Documents Research Section of Intelligence Division's Production Directorate. A great deal of the intelligence yielded by the operation was economic intelligence.?8 Nevertheless, reports were produced which contained technical intelligence of interest, among them, 'Experiences of the German Air Force with radio intelligence 75Letter dated 29 December 1949 from Maj.-Gen. Haydon to Dr. B. K. Blount , DEFE 41/83. The exploitation of German intelligence documents played a role in the 'Venona ' breakthrough (see Introduction , footnote 24). The NKGB diplomatic codebook used by the 'Venona' cryptanalysts in the 1950s had been found by US Army Target Intelligence Committee (TICOM) teams in German archives in 1945 (p. 9, 'Venona and Beyond: Thoughts on Work Undone', by M. Warner & R. L. Benson, illtelligellce & Natiollal Security, Vol. 12, No.3 (July 1997), pp. 1-13). In addition, German experts on cryptology wrote valuable reports on Soviet cryptology for the British and Americans (see 'Russian Cryptology during World War II', at pp. 159-65, R. L. Benson & M. Warner (eds.), Vellolla: Soviet Espiollage and the Americall Respollse 1939-57). 76Minutes of JIC (Germany) meeting on 30 June 1947, DEFE 41/63. 77Minutes of JIC (Germany) meeting on 30 June 1947, DEFE 41/63. 78Letter dated 29 December 1949 from Maj.-Gen . Haydon to Dr. B. K. Blount, DEFE 41/83. Haydon, the Chief of Intelligence Division, also told Blount , the Chairman of the JS/JTIC, that the operation had yielded political and topographical information. Further evidence that ' Apple Pie' principally yielded economic intelligence is the fact that the work of the Documents Research Section in the 1950s was considered by JIB (London) to be of great value to it (minutes of J1C (Germany) meeting on 17 April 1952, DEFE 41167) . Even as late as this, the Section employed a large staff on the preparation of reports for Ministries in London (minutes of JIC (Germany) meeting on 25 March 1952, DEFE 41/67) . Examples of the kind of economic intelligence yielded by the Section's work are the reports by an Oberst Kirsch of the Feldwirtschaftsamt on such topics as 'The Future Development of the Economic Potential of the Soviet Union' and 'The Evaluation of Factory Marks and Numbers on Soviet Heavy Equipment ' . The documents of the Dienststelle Gordes (Gordes Office) were recovered and gave the British excellent information on the Caucasus, Turkmenistan and Tartarstan. Among the documents were maps of the Caucasus and German economic reports on the area (including information on oil and manganese production) (HQ.lnLDivJJlCI7021/3 Memorandum No. 6 dated 17 March 1947, discussed at meeting of JIC (Germany) on 24 March 1947, DEFE 41/62) . The' Apple Pie' report on 'The Formation and State of Development of the Industrial Areas of the USSR ' probably provided source material for the map set out at Appendix B to this thesis. For more on this map, see Chapter 3. The report in question is referred to in HQ.Int.DivIJICI7021/3 Memorandum No.7 (contained in agenda for J1C (Germany) meeting on 19 May 1947, DEFE 41/62). 26 in the war with Russia'.79 Among 'other early reports were 'The Development of the Soviet Tank Industry during the War', 'The Development of the S. P. Gun Industry during the War' and one on Soviet raw materials and industries. 80 Valuable technical intelligence was acquired from once high-ranking German officers on such subjects as Soviet engineering and factory markings on Soviet materiel.81 Interesting snippets of scientific intelligence were also acquired. Nevertheless, the yield of scientific and technical intelligence was limited because German intelligence agencies had not made systematic efforts to procure such intelligence. 82 Efforts were made to locate the Wannsee Institute's card index of 'Soviet Personalities' comprising some 8,000 cards and 3,000 photographs. It is not clear whether these efforts were successful, but, if they were, among the cards recovered must have been ones relating to leading figures in the Soviet military-industrial complex. A knowledgeable figure who fell into the hands of the British was Professor Steinmann. He had once been director of the BUro Steinmann, the agency which had briefed those charged with carrying out sabotage attacks on industrial installations in the Soviet Union.83 It is clear from the exploitation by the British of German wartime intelligence documents that the Germans' interrogation of Soviet prisoners-of-war had yielded valuable information on the military capability and strategy of the USSR. For example, before the War the British had managed to come by indications that some 79Minutes of JlC (Germany) meeting on 13 February 1951, DEFE 41/66. 8C1-iQ.Int.Div.lJlC/702113 Memorandum No, 7, contained in agenda for JlC (Germany) meeting on 19 May 1947, DEFE 41/62. 81Address by Major D. W. H. Birch, G(Int)BAOR, to the MIlO Technical Intelligence Conference for Assistant Military Attaches, June 1951, DEFE 411125. The Americans must have derived benefit from the report on Soviet intentions and capabilities with regard to chemical warfare which they commissioned from Dr. Walter Hirsch , the former chief of the Waffenamt PrUfwesen 's chemical weapons section (letter dated I December 1949, DEFE 411130). 82Letter dated 29 December 1949 from Maj .-Gen. Haydon to Dr. B. K. Blount, DEFE 41/83. 83Minutes of JIC (Germany) meeting on 12 August 1947; minutes of JlC (Germany) meeting on 4 November 1947, DEFE41/63. 27 eight-to-ten factories in the USSR might be manufacturing war gases. However, the Soviet PoWs in German hands named about a hundred chemical and other factories at eighty-or-so places scattered throughout the old industrial areas of European Russia and the newer ones in the Urals and Siberia which, they said, were engaged in war gas production. Of course, these were simply assertions on the part of men without technical expertise and were, therefore, highly unreliable. The Joint Committees in London drew up a 'tentative shortlist' of twenty-five-to-thirty factories, the involvement of which in war gas manufacture was most credible. 84 The information on the list was of long-term significance for British Intelligence. One of the factories listed was Shikhani, on the southern part of the Volga, not far from Volsk. German intelligence documents described the plant in detail and gave its precise location. They also established that there was more than a factory at Shikhani: the Soviet Army's principal chemical weapons testing range, the Central Military Chemical Range, was situated there. This confirmed and added to information received before the War that chemical weapons were tested at Shikhani. The plant and testing ground at Shikhani played an important role in Soviet post-war chemical weapons development. In 1987, following a landmark Soviet admission of possession of chemical weapons, representatives of forty-five states were invited to inspect a large and top-secret weapons factory. This was Shikhani. There they witnessed the demonstration of nineteen types of chemical weapon, including shells for cannon, warheads for rockets and hand grenades. The poisons contained in these weapons included mustard gas, lewisite, sarin, soman, CS gas and, most advanced of 84JS/JTIC(49)69 dated 4 August 1949 and entitled 'Chemical Warfare in the USSR: Summary of Available Information to 1946' , DEFE 41/150. It is likely that there was a considerable overlap between the installations on this shortlist and the factories referred to in the STIB file list in DEFE 41/29. This latter list mentions nineteen files on chemical installations and institutes which were of interest. The installations in the USSR were at Aleksin; Asha-Valashov; Beketovka; Beresniki; Dzerzhinsk (the [gumnovo, Ivanovo, Kalinin, Oka, Rulon , Stroi and Yava factories) ; Gorlovka; Kemerovo; Kineshima; Kolomna; places in the Leningrad area; Lybertsi , Lublino; places in the Moscow area; Vladimir; Volsk (the Shikhani and Tomka installations); Yaroslavl. 28 eight-to-ten factories in the USSR might be manufacturing war gases. However, the Soviet PoWs in German hands named about a hundred chemical and other factories at eighty-or-so places scattered throughout the old industrial areas of European Russia and the newer ones in the Urals and Siberia which, they said, were engaged in war gas production. Of course, these were simply assertions on the part of men without technical expertise and were, therefore, highly unreliable. The Joint Committees in London drew up a 'tentative shortlist' of twenty-five-to-thirty factories, the involvement of which in war gas manufacture was most credible. 84 The information on the list was of long-term significance for British Intelligence. One of the factories listed was Shikhani, on the southern part of the Volga, not far from Volsk. German intelligence documents described the plant in detail and gave its precise location . They also established that there was more than a factory at Shikhani: the Soviet Army's principal chemical weapons testing range, the Central Military Chemical Range, was situated there. This confirmed and added to information received before the War that chemical weapons were tested at Shikhani. The plant and testing ground at Shikhani played an important role in Soviet post-war chemical weapons development. In 1987, following a landmark Soviet admission of possession of chemical weapons, representatives of forty-five states were invited to inspect a large and top-secret weapons factory. This was Shikhani. There they witnessed the demonstration of nineteen types of chemical weapon, including shells for cannon, warheads for rockets and hand grenades. The poisons contained in these weapons included mustard gas, lewisite, sarin, soman, CS gas and, most advanced of 84JS/JTIC(49)69 dated 4 August 1949 and entitled 'Chemical Warfare in the USSR: Summary of Available Information to 1946', DEFE 41/150. It is likely that there was a considerable overlap between the installations on this shortlist and the factories referred to in the STIB file list in DEFE 41129. This latter list mentions nineteen files on chemical installations and institutes which were of interest. The installations in the USSR were at Aleksin; Asha-Valashov; Beketovka; Beresniki; Dzerzhinsk (the Igu mnovo, Ivanovo, Kalinin , Oka, Rulon, Stroi and Yava factories); Gorlovka; Kemerovo ; Kineshima; Kolomna; places in the Leningrad area; Lybertsi, Lublino; places in the Moscow area; Vl adimir; Volsk (the Shikhani and Tomka installations); Yaros lavl. 28 all, VX gas. They were told that most of these weapons had been developed in the 1950s and 1980s and that means of chemical warfare had been actively developed in the USSR until very recently.85 Other places where German intelligence documents indicated that war gas factories existed were Moscow and Leningrad (inevitably), Chapayevsk, Beresniki and Beketovka. Although there was hard evidence that the Soviets were interested in chemical weapons, it was unclear how they would actually use them in war. Interrogation of Soviet PoWs revealed to the Germans how the Soviet Army planned to defend itself against any chemical attack; this information obviously became available to the British and gave rise to a report giving details of the defensive equipment against gas issued to Soviet troops.86 However, since the Soviets ruled out the offensive use of chemical weapons, the PoWs could not say how their Army planned to use such weapons if it felt it had to. The Germans acquired no proof that offensive gas units existed in the Soviet Army. Information acquired before the War indicated that the Soviets would use most of the well-known war gases and that derived from captured German intelligence documents broadly supported that conclusion . The Germans also discovered that the Soviets had filled a wide variety of weapons with war gas . However, they captured a relatively narrow range of gas-filled weapons. Exploitation of German intelligence documents yielded very precise information on the weapons that had fallen into the hands of the Wehrmacht and useful information on gas- charged weapons which had not. Of the captured weapons, aircraft weapons were far 85U. Albrecht & R. Nikutta, Die SOlVjetische Riistllngsindllstrie, p. 76. The British may have had available to them in Germany other sources of information on Shikhani , namely I. G. Farben chemists who had worked at the plant. For it was at Shikhani (then called Trock) that the Red Army and the German Reichswehr had collaborated in the development of poison gases in the years 1925-33, in defiance of the ban in the Versailles Treaty on German development of these weapons. Whether British Intelligence exploited this source of information is not known. 86JS/JTIC(49)70 dated 7 September 1949 and entitled, 'Russian Chemical Warfare Equipment', DEFE 41/150. 29 and away the most numerous. The Wehrmacht overran both stocks of gas-charged bombs (more than twelve types of them) and six different types of gas spray apparatus. This was very significant, for the presence of gas-charged aircraft weapons, in greater numbers than army weapons, in areas near the battle zones indicated that the service to which the leading role in the use of chemical weapons had been given was the Air Force. Walter Hirsch, in his long report for the Americans, also stressed Soviet interest in spraying a number of chemical agents from the air. This was consistent with information acquired before the War. Such reports were referred to for a long time after they were written, probably because of a dearth of intelligence on the thinking of the Soviet military, at least until the recruitment of OlegPen'kovskii as an agent. Soviet manuals on chemical warfare and translations of them in the satellites which came into the hands of the British confirmed that the Soviets planned to spray lethal chemicals from the air. 87 B. Intelligence of the Soviet exploitation of German science Whatever rivalries existed between them in 1945, the wartime Allies were agreed, at least formally, that their main enemy was still Germany. The Potsdam Agreement proclaimed that Germany's capacity to make war would be destroyed.88 To control 87 Address by Capt. Hogwood, MI lOB, MIlO Technical Intelligence Conference, June 1952, DEFE 411126. Perhaps in response to such intelligence, in the early 1950s the Briti sh Chiefs of Staff planned in war to drop gas- filled weapons from the air. In 1952 it was assumed by the Chemical Warfare Sub-committee of the Chiefs of Staff's Committee that 10% of the overall effort of strategic bombers and 5% of the overall effort of tactical bombers wou ld be devoted to dropping bombs filled with mustard gas . The RAF was also to use sarin, but as a tactical weapon rather than a strategic one. 5% of the strategic bomber effort, but 10% of that of tactical bombers, was to be devoted to dropping sarin bombs (CW(52)9 dated 30 July 1952 and entitled 'Chemical Warfare Reserve Policy ' , DEFE 411157). 8~he third of the 'Political Principles ' stated in the Agreement was that the Control Council should ensure ' the elimination or control of all German industry that could be used for military production ' . The Agreement also declared, as an 'Economic Principle' , that ' to eliminate Germany's war potential, the production of arms, ammunition and implements of war as well as all types of aircraft and sea-going ships shall be prohibited and prevented. Production of metals, chemicals, machinery and other items that are directly necessary to a war economy, shall be rigidly controlled and restricted to Germany's approved post-war peacetime needs .... Productive capacity not needed for permitted production shall be removed in accordance with the reparations plan 30 I f I I I German science, in April 1946 th~ Control Council adopted Law No. 25, prohibiting applied scientific research in the areas of most concern and permitting it in other areas only under licence; the Law also prohibited fundamental research 'of a wholly or primarily military nature' and forbade the Germans to possess certain kinds of apparatus. 89 It applied equally to all four Zones and came into effect on 7 May 1946.90 Although the Soviets gave their assent to it in the Control Council , they never observed its terms or those of the Potsdam Agreement. Although the leaders of German science of military application for the most part managed to fall into the hands of the Western Allies, an army of scientific workers and a great number of war-related factories and laboratories were overrun by Soviet forces. The knowhow they represented addressed urgent needs of Soviet defence. The first post-war Five Year Plan, for the years 1946-50, gave priority to the advanced technologies which had emerged from the War - atomic energy, guided missiles, radar and jet propulsion. For the first time, there was a separate Technical Plan.91 Germany had made great progress in three of these fields and had able atomic scientists as well. When in July 1945 the Americans handed 'Middle Germany' (Thuringia, Saxony-Anhalt and parts of Saxony, and the heart of the Nazi military- industrial complex) over to the Soviets as the Yalta Agreement required, included in the gift were two towns in the Harz mountains called Nordhausen and Bleicherode and their surrounding villages, which contained nearly all the V -2 and most other recommended by the Allied Commission on reparations and approved by the Governments concerned or if not removed shall be destroyed' (B . Ruhm von Oppen, DOclIlIlellts all GerlllallY IIllder Occllpatioll 1945-54, pp. 42- 4). 89 Articles II and III , Control Council Law No. 25: Control of Scientific Research, dated 29 April 1946 (B. Ruhm von Oppen, DoculIlellts all GerlllallY IIllder Occupatioll 1945-54, p. 132). 9OReport dated IS June 1948 on the work and future policy of the Research Branch of the Economic Sub- . commission, FO 371171040. 91 D. Holloway, Stalill alld the BOlllb, pp. 144-9. 31 guided missile activity in Germqny. The Mittelwerk at Nordhausen was the only German production assembly plant for the V -2 rocket. Nearby Lehesten was a great testing site. The Zentralwerk at Bleicherode specialized in the design of guided m~ssiles . These were not the only key factories of the Nazi military-industrial complex which the Soviets captured intact. Middle Germany had fallen into the hands of the Western Allies without much of a fight and the CIOS teams had had too little time in May and June 1945 to remove everything and everyone worth removing. Consequently, the Soviets took over some 60% of the Nazis' aeronautical industry, including undamaged aircraft and jet engine factories.92 Of course, in acquiring Western technology, Stalin was not wholly dependent on the Soviet presence in Germany. He had other cards in his hand. His intelligence service, the NKGB, had created spy-rings whose activities extended throughout North America. The NKGB had even penetrated the Holy of Holies of American science, Los Alamos itself. Most famous among the missiles the USSR could be presumed to have acquired were the surface-to-surface missiles, the FZG-76 (generally known as the V-l) and the A- 4 (generally known as the V -2). Intelligence interest focused not just on these already developed missiles, but also on those German plans for future missiles which the Soviets could take further. These were the A-4b and the A-9 (winged versions of the V-2, with a longer range) and the A-lO. The last of these, a design for an enormous two-stage rocket, was only in the early stages of a paper study when the War ended and was not being actively developed.93 American removals meant that the Soviets 92U. Albrecht, A. Heinemann-GrOder & A. Well mann , Die Spezialisten: Delltsche Natllnvissenscha!tlerllnd Teclllliker in del' SOlVjetllnion nach 1945, p. 124; N. Naimark, Th e RlIssians ill Ger/llallY, p. 215. 93paragraph 19, Appendix C, A Study of the Soviet Guided Missile Programme: Joint Anglo-American Conference, DEFE 41/160. The A-I 0 had been in such an early stage of development that it was believed that the design , even if it had fallen into Soviet hands, could not be of any benefit to them. In the words of paragraph 19 32 acquired no completed V-2s, few (if any) components for the V-2's control system and probably few technical drawings for the missile, but they nevertheless came by intact production facilities for the V -1 and the V -2, a stock of complete V -1 sand components for the missile, as well as large numbers of important components for the V-2.94 Moreover, although the leaders of the German guided missile project had made their way to the West, the Soviets, in overrunning a host of engineers and technicians, acquired a plentiful stock of knowhow. This army was placed under the command of the thirty-year-old Helmut Grottrup, the former assistant to the director of the Guidance, Control and Telemetry Laboratory at Peenemtinde. Grottrup was put in charge of the Institut Rabe 95 and rocket development was resumed in Bleicherode and its .environs. The Institut Nordhausen was soon founded to give further impetus to rocket work. In fact, British Intelligence soon learned that, far from controlling German science, Soviet policy was to exploit it thoroughly. This aim was pursued in a variety of ways. By July 1946 British Intelligence had evidence of three principal ways in which the USSR was seeking to use German knowhow to increase its scientific knowledge and, above all, its military power. The Technical Commission of the Soviet armed forces played a key role in each of these activities, indicating that all might be contributing to the USSR's post-war arms build-up. Special commissions of the Deutscher NormenausschuB (German Standards Committee), working in collaboration with the Technical Commission, were responsible for the open exploitation of aspects of of Appendix C: 'Owing to logistic and control difficulties inherent in such a missile and the distance from practical solution still to be covered by research and experiment, it is not considered to be of much consequence whether or not the Soviets were able to piece together the meagre progress in this project which had been made by the Germans.' 94Paragraph 75, Appendix D, A Study of the Soviet Guided Missile Programme: Joint Anglo-American Conference, DEFE41/l60. 95 'Rabe' stood for ' Raketenbau und Entwicklung ' (Missile Construction and Development). 33 II German scientific knowledge. Eac::h commission prepared a report on the standards in force in a particular German industry for the corresponding Soviet industry . On completion, the report was handed over to the Technical Commission, which sent it on to Moscow. By July 1946, seventy-four such commissions had been set up for this purpose. Furthermore, very many USSR ministries (some forty at least, and perhaps all of them) had established technical offices in East Germany which were administered by the Soviet Technical Commission and which had the task of writing reports on German science and technology of military and of general industrial application and of sending this knowhow back to their parent ministries in Moscow. These ministries' responsibilities ranged from Communications to Machine Tools to Iron and Steel to Non-Ferrous Metals to Shipbuilding to Armaments to Vehicles to Rubber to Pharmaceuticals to the Construction of Heavy Industrial Plants and many more. Thus there was an office for machine tools in Chemnitz, an office for armaments in Dresden and an office for internal combustion engines in Berlin- Mahlsdorf. Although the Soviets clearly wanted to keep the work of these offices secret, it was unlikely that any of them was charged with work so sensitive that the Soviets were determined that the Western Powers should not learn of it. This followed from the fact that the offices commissioned German scientific workers who lived in other sectors of Berlin than the Soviet Sector, and even in other Zones of Germany than the Soviet Zone, to write reports. This made the offices concerned very different from another group of establishments, which were charged with the development of weapons for the Soviet armed forces. Their work was meant to be strictly secret and only those who lived in, or were willing to move to, the Soviet Sector of Berlin or Soviet Zone were employed at these establishments. Some were merely engaged in research and development work; 34 others had by the summer of 1946 moved to the stage of production. The most important of all of them was the re-activated V -2 factory at Bleicherode in the Harz mountains, the Institut Rabe. The Soviets also showed great interest in German aeronautics, initiating development work at the Deutsche Versuchsanstalt fUr Luftfahrt in Berlin-Adlershof. Other establishments which by July 1946 were carrying out development work on weaponry included the Technisches Spezialbtiro No. 4 in Berlin-Friedrichshagen (charged with rocket developments), the Technisches Spezialbtiro der Gummi-industrie in Berlin-Weissensee (charged with applying rubber to various military purposes), the Ingenieurbtiro SKG in Berlin- Kopenick (working on a variety of rocket and radar tasks), the Torpedo Versuchsanstalt at Zwickau in Saxony, the Btiro ftir Nachrichtenwesen in Berlin- Ostkreuz (concerned with telecommunications developments) and the SU Werk at Burgstadt in Saxony (responsible, among other tasks, for developing a missile control apparatus).96 Aircraft construction had resumed at such factories as Junkers- Dessau, BMW -StaBfurt and Siebel-Halle. Among the factories in the SOZ manufacturing torpedoes and parts and equipment for U-boats were Brtickner-Kanis in Dresden, the Askania-Werke and GEM A in Berlin and the Carl-ZeiB-Werke in Jena,97 The HC promptly floated the idea that some of these places - the missile development installations around Bleicherode and at Peenemtinde and the Junkers and Heinkel factories in Dessau - be overflown and photographed as ' targets of the first importance' ,98 96Reports dated 19 July 1946 and 6 September 1946, both entitled ' Russian-controlled Research Activities in Berlin and the Soviet Zone' , FO 371/55906. 97]JC(46)61 (0) dated 27 June 1946 and entitled, 'Evidence of Russia ' s Contravention of the Potsdam Agreement', CAB 81/133. This report contains further examples of war-related research, development and production which the JIC considered breaches of the USSR's obligation of demilitarizing its Zone of Germany. 98J[C(46)80 dated 29 August 1946 and entitled, 'Photographic Reconnaissance of Certain Territories', CAB 81/134. This is only a selection from the list of top-priority targets. There was a second list of targets whose overflight was regarded as 'desirable' . All the targets were in Soviet-occupied Europe and their overflight would 35 Grottrup's Institut Rabe was given the task of manufacturing a small number of V- 2s. To undertake the task, design data had to be reassembled in their entirety. Once this had been done, complete working drawings, necessary for manufacturing the mi~siles, were made once more, to replace those the Americans had made a point of taking West with them. Then the manufacturing programme was recommenced, albeit on a small scale. About fifty V -2s were made, mainly using important components found in the area. The Germans designed a lengthened V -2 with a range of 600 kilometres. A large quantity of production machinery was dismantled and removed, but was probably of little benefit, since it was dismantled with little care. A certain quantity of V -2 production equipment was later dismantled with great care. It was probably serviceable on arrival in the USSR, but would only have sufficed to support an experimental and training programme in V -2 development. Test instruments and a large stock of recovered components were also among the Soviets' plunder. Between 200 and 300 Soviet engineers acquired experience in Germany of the design and manufacture of the V -2 and of German missiles in general; about the same number of Germans were in October 1946 deported to the USSR to assist in rocket development there.99 In the wake of Hiroshima, the Soviet leadership knew that their country was vulnerable to an airborne American atomic strike. They could be assumed to be devoting considerable resources to the strengthening of the USSR's air defences. Once again, German knowhow threatened to increase Soviet military capability. involve only a shallow incursion into Soviet-occupied territory. The operational risks were seen as small and the political risks as acceptable. provided that the flights were few in number and confined to targets likely to reveal long-term plans. The intelligence photographic reconnaissance would yield was much sought-after. since Britain then had little knowledge of Soviet intentions. Soviet military dispositions and the level of advancement of Soviet weaponry. 99Paragraphs 77-83. Appendix D. A Study of the Soviet Guided Missile Programme: loint Anglo-American Conference. DEFE 411160. 36 Amongthe scientific workers who fell into Soviet hands were many who had worked on projects to develop surface-to-air anti-aircraft missiles. In 1945 four guided missiles had been under development in Germany (Wasserfall, Enzian, Schmetterling and. Rheintochter) and one unguided missile, Taifun, had almost reached the production stage. The Taifun was believed likely to appeal to the Soviets: not only would its supersonic speed and ceiling of 40,000-50,000 feet make it an effective weapon capable of doing great damage to slow-moving bombers flying in formation, but it was also easy to manufacture. With regard to the guided missiles, development work was almost complete as far as aerodynamics, missile design, propulsion and preliminary flight testing were concerned. The missing elements were that guidance and control systems had not yet been developed to guide a missile to its target, nor had a suitable proximity fuse been developed for detonating the missile warhead near its target so as to destroy or damage it. Various proximity fuses were under development. Despite these unfinished aspects, all in all German development work in the field of surface-to-air missiles was well-advanced. The Schmetterling was probably one year away from completion; the Wasserfall and Rheintochter, supersonic missiles for use against faster targets than the Schmetterling could cope with, were probably a couple of years from completion. 100 Hydrogen peroxide was also developed in Nazi Germany to drive submarines and torpedoes, and even aircraft and guided missiles. It offered the prospect of the first submarine capable of remaining underwater for long periods of time. Hydrogen peroxide, to power any of the above engines, had to be of a concentration of 80% or higher. Until 1945, Germany was the only country in which it had been lOOparagraphs 21-4, Appendix A, A Study of the Soviet Guided Missile Programme: Joint Anglo-American Conference, DEFE 41/160. 37 manufactured at this concentration in large quantities. But the I. G. Farben plant at Heydebreck fell intact into Soviet hands, together with full details of the I. G. Farben process for the manufacture of hydrogen peroxide. By 1949 intelligence had reached London that high-concentration hydrogen peroxide was being produced at the Stalin Dye Plant in Moscow and at a factory near Dzerzhinsk; it followed that the Soviets had to be capable of manufacturing this particular fuel at a sufficiently high concentration and in quantity, though the number of plants producing it was believed to be small. 101 At least one report was received (probably from a German prisoner- of-war who had returned to West Germany) that the anthra-quinone process, once at Heydebreck, had been transported to Lisskhimstroi .102 Scientific intelligence-gathering in Germany established that the Soviet leadership had launched an arms race with the West and that the USSR's military capability was growing fast. 103 The JIe warned a year after the War's end that, 'The alliance of 101 Paragraphs II & 12, Appendix P, A Study of the Soviet Guided Missile Programme: Joint Anglo-American Conference, DEFE 411160. I02Minutes of STIB Technical Meeting on I September 1950, DEFE 41110. I03Counter-espionage in North America confirmed that the Soviet Union was seeking to acquire the key military technologies which the War had brought to the fore, above all the atomic bomb. To cite only the main discoveries , the interrogation of Igor Guzenko, a cipher clerk in the GRU residency in the Soviet Embassy in Ottawa who defected in September 1945, revealed that Soviet Intelligence had penetrated the Manhattan Project (xix, introduction to R. L. Benson & M. Warner (eds.), Venona). On the basis of Guzenko's information, the British scientist and GRU spy Allan Nunn May was arrested in 1946 in Montreal, where a British, French and Canadian team had been engaged in atomic research which formed part of the Manhattan Project (c. M. Andrew & O. Gordievsky, KGB: Th e Inside Story of its Foreigll Operationsjrolll Lenin to Gorbachev, p. 305). The ensuing investigation by a Canadian Royal Commission established that the GRU spy ring of which Nunn May had been a member had gathered 'information of the greatest importance' on radar, asdic (sonar), explosives, propellants and the VT fuse (c. M. Andrew & O. Gordievsky, KGB: The Inside Story, p. 258). The most significant breakthrough of all was the Americans ' decryption of Soviet cables. These decrypts, codenamed 'Venona' , revealed that atomic and thermonuclear research at the Los Alamos nuclear laboratory had been deeply penetrated. In August 1949, an NKGB message was decrypted which brought Klaus Fuchs under suspicion (c. M. Andrew & O. Gordievsky, KGB: The Inside StOl)" pp. 307-13). Between 1944 and 1946 he had worked at Los Alamos. In two meetings with his controller in the first half of 1945, Fuchs had provided the NKGB with a detailed description of the design of the plutonium bomb, including the complicated implosion method of detonation, which was to be tested at Alamogordo, New Mexico, in July 1945 (D. Holloway, Stalin and the BOII/b, pp. 107 & 222). The information he provided was detailed enough for an engineer to produce a blueprint of the bomb on the basis of it. The first Soviet atomic bomb, tested on 29 August 1949, was an exact copy of this plutonium weapon (D. Holloway, Stalin alld the BOII/b, p. 138). It is probable that intelligence provided by Fuchs of discussions at Los Alamos about whether and how a thermonuclear bomb could be made initiated the Soviet hydrogen bomb project (D. Holloway, Stalill and the BOII/b, pp. 295-7). When he confessed in January 1950, 38 German brain power and Russian resources may well prove to be the most important consequence of the occupation of Germany' .104 This arms build-up seemed particularly menacing when set against clear evidence of the Soviet leadership's hos.tility to the West. A buffer zone separating it from the West came into being in the years immediately after the War as Communist one-party states were established by force in the countries of Central and Eastern Europe. The British, observing political developments in the Soviet Zone, were hostile to the USSR by the spring of 1946. 105 A key event, in the eyes of the British, was the 'forced unification', in April 1946, of the SPD and the KPD to form the Socialist Unity Party (SED). This seemed a decisive step in the suppression of democracy in East Germany and established that the Soviets had no interest in abiding by the Potsdam Agreement. 106 By the autumn of 1946, the British considered it probable that Germany would be divided and took measures to strengthen their Zone as a bulwark of liberal democracy and capitalist economics. 107 Their intelligence policy followed suit and from the end of 1946 measures were taken to diminish the usefulness of East Germany to the Soviet arms build-up. Fuchs revealed the full extent of the information he had given the Soviets (D. Holloway, Stalill (/nd the Bomb, pp . 107 & 296-7). Further 'Venona' decrypts indicated that there had been four more NKGB spies at Los Alamos , unmasked Donald Maclean, formerly a British representative at the Atomic Energy Commission in Washington DC, as a spy (codenamed ' Homer') , and led to the identification of the Rosenbergs as spies active in scientific intelligence-gathering (xix, xxv & xxvi, introduction to R. L. Benson & M. Warner (eds.), Vellolla) . One of the other spies identified at Los Alamos was the young physicist Theodore Hall , codenamed 'Mlad' , who had in fact given the NKGB information on the implosion method of detonation earlier than Fuchs (1. Albright & M. Kunstel , Bombshell: The Secret StOI)' of America's UllkllowlI Atomic Spy COllspiracy, pp. 122-7). 100Paragraph 3, JIC(46)51 (0) dated 2 July 1946 and entitled, 'Russian Attempts to entice German scientists and technicians from the British Zone of Germany' , CAB 81/133. 105pp. 81-90, A. M. Birke & G. Heydemann (eds., in collaboration with H. Wentker), Groj3britallllien l/lld Ostdelltsch/and seit1918 (article by G. Heydemann on 'Ein deutsches Sowjetrul3land? Zur britischen Beurteilung der Entwicklung in der Sowjetischen Besatzungszone '). I~he British were fully aware that the Soviet Military Administration was driving the SPD into an unequal union with the KPD. When the SPD's leader in the Soviet Zone, Otto Grotewohl , visited the British Military Government in February 1946 to make clear to it the hopeless position of the Eastern SPD, he reinforced his point by saying that an ' Iron Curtain ' had fallen (A. M. Birke & G. Heydemann (eds., in collaboration with H. Wentker), Groj3britallllielllllld Ostdelllsch/alld seit1918 (Heydemann article), p. 87). 107 A. M. Birke & G. Heydemann (eds., in collaboration with H. Wentker), Groj3britalllliell IIl1d Ostdelltsch/and seit1918 (Heydemann article), pp. 91-2. 39 Worse still, the Soviets seemed to be establishing a position in East Germany so strong that it could be used as a base from which to impose their domination on West Germany. 108 It was clear to the JIC by 1947 that the Soviets would only permit a sin~le German state to be re-created if it were a Communist satellite of the USSR. 109 Rivalries in Iran, Greece, Turkey and the Far East provided further evidence of Soviet expansionism. 110 The JIC, while it saw Stalin 's policy as concerned in the short term with ensuring Soviet security, nevertheless recognized that the long-term Soviet aim was the worldwide elimination of capitalism by Communism. I I I Soviet deportations of German scientists, engineers and skilled technicians There were two particularly significant deportations of German scientific workers to the USSR. The first occurred between May and November 1945, when scientists, engineers and technicians involved in the German atomic programme were taken to the USSR.112 The second, codenamed Operation 'Osoaviakhim', occurred in the night of 21-22 October 1946, when approximately 3,000 Germans working in a range of war-related industries were rounded up and taken East in ninety-two trains. 113 According to one estimate, approximately 84% of the German scientific 108A. M. Birke & G. Heydemann (eds., in collaboration with H. Wentker), Groflbritannien und Ostdeutsch/alld seit 1918 (Heydemann article), p. 88. The expression 'West Germany' refers to the three Western Zones between 1945 and 1949 as well as to the Federal Republic thereafter; the expression 'East Germany' to the Soviet Zone as well as to the German Democratic Republic (or DDR). 109Paragraphs 271 & 275, JlC(46)7/2 dated 6 August 1947 and entitled, 'Soviet Interests, Intentions and Capabilities ', CAB 158/\. This reflected the Foreign Office's view (A. M. Birke & G. Heydemann (eds., in collaboration with H. Wentker), Groflbritannienund Ostdeutsch/and seit 1918 (Heydemann article), p. 81). IIOA. Craig, 'The Joint Intelligence Committee and the Outbreak of the Cold War, 1945-50' (M. Phil. dissertation, Cambridge University, 1997), p. 39; V. Zubok & c. Pleshakov, Inside the Kremlin's Cold War: From Stalin to Khrushchev, pp. 92-3. Illparagraph 145, JIC(47)7/2 dated 6 August 1947 and entitled, 'Soviet Interests, Intentions and Capabilities ', CAB 158/\. 112U. Albrecht, A. Heinemann-GrOder & A. Well mann, Die Spezialisten, p. 176. 113 A fuller account of this operation is given at pp. 220-8 of Naimark's The Russians in Germany. Estimates of how many scientific workers were deported vary. John Prados says 'some six thousand' (The Soviet Estimate: US Intelligence Analysis and Soviet Strategic Forces, p. 53). Albrecht, Heinemann-GrOder and Well mann consider 40 workers deported to the Soviet Union in the years after the War were taken in this operation. I 14 Factories from which particularly large numbers of scientific workers were taken were the Junkers factory at Dessau (aircraft and aero-engines), the BMW plant at StaBfurt (aircraft and aero-engines), the Askania works (radar, automatic piloting systems), the Oberspree works (radio transmitters, radar and high-frequency apparatus) and the GEM A institute (gyroscopic research, range finders and sights) in East Berlin. liS Specialists in aircraft or aero-engine construction made up the largest group of deportees; specialists in electronics and electrical engineering formed the second largest group.116 There was a third deportation of some thirty-to-forty scientists, mostly chemists and chemical engineers, between February 1947 and February 1948,117 but only one of these deportees, Dr. Bernd von Bock of the any estimate in excess of 3,500 impossible to document and suggest 3,000 as a justifiable figure (Die Spezialislen, pp. 177-8). This estimate accords with STIB's own figures. Early in 1954 STIB had news of the return of 1,890 deportees, which meant that, according to its information, 1,202 remained in the Soviet Union. Their total number was therefore 3,092 (handwritten note giving the state of affairs as at 10/2/54, DEFE 41/90). Most of this information will have come from intercepted letters. Ciesla's estimate of about 2,500 is therefore too low (p. 25, Ails Polilik und Zeilgeschichle, B 49-50/93, 3. Dezember 1993, pp. 24-31). Some scientific workers employed at Soviet-controlled factories or institutes managed to escape deportation and fled to the British, who acquired intelligence from them. Examples are intelligence on anti-aircraft rocket design contained in the report on the interrogation of Dip\. Ing. Hermann Zumpe on 7 November 1946 (FO 1031163) and intelligence on aircraft, aero-engine and torpedo developments at Junkers-Dessau contained in the Interrogation Report on Fritz Trouvain dated II January 1947 (FO 1031/64). The Foreign Office did not see this mass deportation coming. In paragraph 17 of the report dated 19 July 1946 and entitled ' Russian-controlled Research Activities in Berlin and the Soviet Zone' (FO 371/55906), it was remarked of the establishment by Soviet ministries of technical offices in the SOZ that, 'There appears to be no indication that these activities are a prelude to the subsequent transfer to Russia of the technicians employed by these organizations. On the contrary, it is probably more correct to regard them as an alternative solution to the problem of exploiting German technological development to the full '. 114p. 24, 'Der Spezialistentransfer in die UdSSR and seine Auswirkungen in der SBZ and DDR' , by B. Ciesla, Ails Polilik lind Zeilgeschichle , B 49-50193, 3. Dezember 1993 , pp. 24-3\. Ciesla uses as a basis for this percentage the figure of 2,370 scientific workers known by name to have worked in the USSR between 1945 and 1959 which is given by Albrecht, Heinemann-Grlider & Well mann at p. 178 of Die Spezialislen . ll5List dated 14 November 1946 and FIAT Forward Periodic Intelligence Report No. 4 dated 28 October 1946, FO 1031/59; N. Naimark, The Rllssians in Germany, p. 222. It should be noted that the British later maintained that some of the German development teams deported in 'Osoaviakhim' were not able to carry out the tasks expected of them in the USSR because they lacked scientists, engineers and technicians who had been evacuated to the West by the British and others in 1945-6. Such operations had weakened the teams working for the Soviets and in a number of cases had even destroyed the development programmes entirely (STIB Director's notes for the MI I 0 Technical Intelligence Conference 1951, DEFE 411125). FIAT Forward's American intelligence officer, F. 1. Biermann, expressed the view just after the operation that few scientists much sought-after by FIAT had been lost to it (FIAT Forward Periodic Intelligence Report No.4 dated 28 October 1946, FO 1031/59). 116p. 26, ' Der Spezialistentransfer in die UdSSR and seine Auswirkungen in der SBZ and DDR' , by B. Ciesla, Ails Polilik lind Zeilgeschichle, B 49-50193, 3. Dezember 1993 , pp. 24-31. l17U. Albrecht, A. Heinemann-Grlider & A. Well mann, Die Spezialislen , p. 12. 41 Bunawerk-Schkopau, was of much intelligence interest. These deportations created precisely what the Western intelligence services lacked - an agent network in the USSR - and thus an opportunity for them. If the deportees were ever allowed to return to East Germany, they could be brought West and interrogated for their knowledge of the Soviet military-industrial complex. It was believed at the time that the chief motive for 'Osoaviakhim' was fear that the Western Allies would insist on Four-Power rights of inspection of war-related installations throughout Germany.118 The British, in the months leading up to the operation, were planning a diplomatic campaign against Soviet exploitation of German war-related_ science. Patrick Dean, Head of the German Section of the Foreign Office, wrote in August 1946 to Christopher Steel of Political Branch in Berlin, stating that some of the intelligence of Soviet armaments projects which had been sent to London would be useful in the 'gradual campaign which we intend to run about Russian breaches of the Potsdam Agreement' .119 It may well be that the Soviets' intelligence network gave them wind of these plans. In the spring and summer of 1946, war-related factories were dismantled and research institutes dissolved and their equipment shipped East. 120 Scientific workers at the plants were regarded as part of the equipment. II&rhat this was the chief motive for the operation was the view expressed by the American official Robert Murphy to the Secretary of State a few days afterwards (N. Naimark, The Russians in Germany, p. 225). 119Letter dated 16 August 1946, FO 371/55906. 120N. Naimark, The Russians in Germany, pp. 168 & 183. 42 C. The policy of denial Operation 'Osoaviakhim' deprived British Intelligence of targets in the Soviet Zone. Most importantly, it ended almost all work on guided missiles l21 there and the development of aircraft and aero-engines. 122 But the operation otherwise played into the hands of the British. Throughout 1946 German scientists, engineers and technicians (and particularly the younger ones) had tended to accept employment in the Soviet Zone, or even in the USSR itself, because of the lack of work for them in the Western Zones. 123 The Soviets offered large salaries and other benefits to induce such people to work for them. The policy of the British and Americans of suppressing the war-related science and industry of their Zones prevented them from doing much to reverse the flow. However, the forcible deportation at dead of night of thousands of German scientific workers and their families to the USSR sent a wave of panic through those left working on war-related projects in the Soviet Zone. They now realized that working for the Soviets involved the risk of sudden and compulsory deportation, for an unknown period, to the USSR. In consequence, they were more willing to be evacuated West by the British. In the weeks immediately following 'Osoaviakhim', the FIAT Forward office in West Berlin was inundated with Germans working for the Soviets applying to be taken to the British Zone. 124 Intelligence Division seized this opportunity and adopted a more aggressIve approach to denial of scientific workers to the Soviets. It launched an operation, 121 Paragraph 82, Appendix D, A Study of the Soviet Guided Missile Programme: Joint Anglo-American Conference, DEFE 411160. 122paragraph 46, JIC(47)7/2 dated 6 August 1947 and entitled, 'Soviet Interests, Intentions and Capabilities', CAB 15811. 123periodic Intelligence RepOI1s Nos. 2 (dated 6 August 1946) and 3 (dated 9 September 1946) to Chief FIAT (US), FO 1031/59. 124Speciallntelligence Report No. 2 covering the period I October 1946 - 5 November 1946, FO 1031/59. 43 codenamed 'Matchbox', to bring to the British Zone German scientists, engineers and technicians who could add significantly to Soviet military capability. The operation drew on the experience of the British, since the War's end, of persuading scientific workers in the Soviet Zone to leave their jobs there and work in Britain. The offer of a job had been made either by coded letter or by telegram or, most commonly, by an agent who did not know for which country he was working. 125 For example, an unsuccessful attempt had been made by letter to entice Helmut Grottrup to leave his job as director of the Institut Rabe at Bleicherode and take up work in Britain. 126 But the main criterion for making an approach to scientific workers in the Eastern Zone prior to 'Matchbox' was that the target would be of scientific value to Britain. From 1945 until at least 1948, Britain, like the USSR, sought to exploit German science and, making offers of work, not only contacted scientific workers in the Western Zones but also sent agents and coded letters into the Soviet Zone. 127 125 Appendix B2 to letter dated 18 December 1946, FO 1031/68. Whether the aim was to benefit British science or to deny scientific workers to the Soviets, until 1 September 1947 identifying, locating, contacting and extracting from the Soviet Zone targets of value were all tasks for the British section of FIAT's Enemy Personnel Exploitation Section (EPES, FIAT). Its denial operations it performed at STIB's direction. On 1 September 1947 the intelligence functions (such as 'Matchbox ' work) performed by EPES, FIAT, were separated from its exploitation functions and handed over to the Berlin Intelligence Staff (memorandum dated 26 November 1947, FO 1031/68). But its exploitation of German science continued. Agents who did not know which country they were working for were called 'cut-outs'. 126Letters dated 15 May 1946,24 May 1946,31 May 1946 and 29 July 1946, FO 1031/59. The approach was made by letter because Grottrup was so important that he would be closely watched. The attempt was unsuccessful because Grottrup told the MVD that he had been approached with an offer of work in the West and the MVD told him to arrange a meeting in Berlin with the enticer. Fearing a kidnap attempt , the FIAT Forward office decided to abandon its efforts to entice Grottrup West. He finally came West of his own accord in December 1953. 127The main task of FIAT's EPES (Br) and EPES (US) was the exploitation of German science on behalf of their respective countries (Appendix B2 to letter dated 18 December 1946, FO 1031168). German scientists, engineers and technicians were sent to Britain to work pursuant to two British ministerial schemes (brief dated 14 August 1946, FO 1031159). The DCOS (Deputy Chief of Staff's) scheme provided for the employment in Britain on war- related research and development projects of scientific workers with valuable knowledge of military application. Obviously, the ministries (such as the Ministry of Supply and the Service Ministries) which sponsored the scheme and instructed EPES, FIAT (Br), to evacuate scientific workers with sought-after knowhow were seeking above all to develop the weapons which the War had brought to the fore. The other scheme was the Darwin Panel scheme, sponsored by the Board of Trade. The scientific workers taken to Britain under this scheme were intended to contribute to her general industrial progress. German scientists, engineers and technicians were also taken to Britain for short-term interrogations (this was the 'Bottleneck' scheme). Such evacuations, supplementing and adding to the effect of 'Matchbox' denial operations, lasted until 1948 at least. By August 1946, EPES, FIAT, had accumulated 18,000 personality cards on German scientific workers (letter dated 10 August 1946, FO 1031175). EPES, FIAT, was requested by the Ministry of Supply to acquire the services of 44 Such operations, carried out by FIAT's Enemy Personnel Exploitation Section (British), targeted an elite among Germany's scientists, engineers and technicians which could benefit either defence research or general industrial research in Britain. Of course, this was a denial policy of a sort, since such people would also be of value to the Soviets if they remained in their hands or accessible to them. Indeed, even before 'Matchbox' the need to deny scientists, engineers and technicians to the USSR gave a further spur to measures to exploit them. The FIAT Forward office in West Berlin evacuated from the city scientific workers who were under heavy pressure from the Soviets to work for them and who were important enough to be wanted for work in Britain or the United States. 128 'Osoaviakhim' spurred on FIAT Forward's evacuation measures still more. B y January 1947 its British section was evacuating all those scientific workers of importance who were in immediate danger of deportation and who wanted to come West. 129 'Matchbox' was a systematic attempt to deny scientific workers to the USSR and so retard its military-industrial development as much as possible. In the course of this operation, war-potential scientists, engineers and technicians were evacuated West, provided with work and paid for it. Such people had to fall into one of three categories: scientific workers of genuine eminence, who would obviously be of considerable value to Soviet research and development programmes; those, not actually eminent, whose removal or denial would 'have a serious effect' on Soviet Helmut GrOttrup. His name was accordingly placed on the DCOS list of targets (letter dated 15 May 1946 and entitled 'Location of Enemy Personalities' , FO 1031/59). 128Memorandum and brief dated 14 August 1946, FO 1031/59. For example, just before Operation 'Osoaviakhim', Air Intelligence pressed for radar specialists to be denied to the USSR. The Soviets had already put pressure on most to take up employment with them (letter dated 4 October 1946, FO 1031/59). An example of someone evacuated by the Americans was the chief engineer of the Askania works in Berlin (US Sector) , a Dr. Kronenberger, who was an expert on the V-2's automatic pilot and who had received repeated offers from the Soviets of a job in the Soviet Sector of the city. In this particular field, the Soviets had not been able to obtain the services of an engineer of Kronenberger's standing (EPES, FIAT report dated 30 July 1946, FO 1031/63). 129Special Intelligence Report No.3 covering the period I January 1947 - 31 January 1947, FO 1031/60. 45 programmes; and those who, irrespective of their denial value, could provide the British with intelligence on Soviet-sponsored research and development. 130 Thus the first two categories related to denial value; the third embraced people of great intelligence value. The operation was essentially a denial operation, but it had an intelligence aspect and yielded an even greater intelligence benefit, for scientific workers evacuated on the ground of denial were also able to provide very useful and penetrating intelligence on Soviet war-related research and development. 131 Although 'Osoaviakhim' did not initiate the enticement of scientific workers from the East, it gave the British a chance to evacuate some of the more important Germans working for the Soviets in their Occupation Zone. Some evacuations were carried out in the last few weeks of 1946, but 'Matchbox' itself formally came into being at the beginning of 1947. At the same time, greater measures were taken to prevent scientific workers who were living in the British Zone and had knowledge of military application from going over to the Soviets. 130lnterim Report HQI0310111 I/Sec.E dated 12 April 1947, DEFE 411122. It should be noted that British companies, on their own initiative, enticed German scientists, engineers and technicians to leave the Soviet Zone and come to Britain to work for them (minutes of J1C (Germany) meeting on 8 November 1949, DEFE 41/64). I discussed 'Matchbox' briefly in my 1996 M. Phil. dissertation, ' British Policy, the Soviet Union and Post-war Germany: the Role and Importance of Scientific Intelligence'. 131 JIC(46) I 02(0) dated 16 November 1946 and entitled, 'Recruitment of Low-Grade Scientists in Germany for Intelligence Purposes' (CAB 811134) establishes that the J1C supported the launching of Operation ' Matchbox ' on the ground, not that it would deny scientific workers to the USSR, but that it would acquire sought-after intelligence. The report states that the fear of deportation among scientific workers in the Soviet Zone engendered by 'Osoaviakhim' had created 'an opportunity now to obtain high grade Intelligence from these men which will enable us to build up an almost complete picture of Russian scientific and technical activities in Germany, and so make it possible to forecast more accurately than we can at present, the progress of Russian development in modern weapons during future years ' (paragraph 2). The number of scientific workers from whom vital information could be obtained would be small: 'probably as few as 60 would suffice to cover all the important experimental establishments in the Russian Zone' (paragraph 5) . It is noteworthy that at least a consideration in deciding whether to evacuate a particular scientist in the East was the access he could give British Intelligence to the German scientific grapevine. For example, when STIB proposed to the JSIJTIC in 1949 that Dr. Watter, the Chief Chemist at the I. G. Farben plant in Bitterfeld, be evacuated, one of the reasons it gave was that he would assist its efforts to penetrate I. G. Farben circles. One of the benefits of this penetration was that it would allow STIB to gather intelligence of former I. G. Farben employees deported to the Soviet Union in 1946 (some were heavy water specialists, who, it was believed , might be working on the Soviet atomic project) (letter dated 19 May 1949, DEFE 41/131). 46 Scientists, engineers and technicia'ns who met the above criteria were selected for evacuation for a number of years. Even though their flight was enticed, such 'Matchbox' people were still refugees and the intelligence taken from them was mer~ly part of the intelligence benefit to the West of the flight of the late 1940s. Scientific workers tended to flee the Soviet Zone when the factory there in which they worked was dismantled and packed off to the USSR. 132 Most of those selected for evacuation under Operation 'Matchbox', together with their families, simply made their way to West Berlin and were then flown out to the British Zone, where a car picked them up and took them to the 'Transit Hotel' in Bad Hermannsborn. A Kurhaus in Bad Hermannsborn served as a 'Transit Hotel'; it could accommodate some 200 people. A second 'Transit Hotel' opened at Bad Driburg in October 1947 133 and more opened subsequently. There the evacuees were screened for security and interrogated. The intelligence acquired from such interrogations concerned not just Soviet exploitation of scientific and technical knowhow in their Zone, but also developments in the USSR itself. Others were not enticed at all. They simply fled to West Germany, using British Intelligence to do so as easily and comfortably as possible. They contacted British Intelligence in West Berlin and handed over a 'Lebenslauf' (curriculum vitae). This CV was sent on to STIB in Herford. STIB forwarded it to the Joint Committees in London. If it was decided to evacuate the individual in question, he likewise simply made his way to West Berlin (with his family if he had one) and they were flown to the British Zone. 134 I 32Letter dated 12 August 1948, DEFE 41/130, It is also stated in this letter that, when a factory was sent back to Germany from the USSR, this revealed to British Intelligence that it was of importance to the Soviets, with the result that it became a target for 'Matchbox ' evacuation operations , The author, C. R, S, Manders ofMII6 (the War Office's scientific intelligence section) concluded that, 'For deciding top useful factories and personnel we appear to be dependent upon Russian choice' . 133Minutes of JIC (Germany) Coordinating Committee meeting on 20 October 1947, DEFE 41/68. 134Minutes of STIB-Production Directorate liaison meeting on 21 August 1948, DEFE 41/82; memorandum dated 18 August 1949, DEFE41/48 , 47 The great majority of the evacuees were, on arrival at the 'Transit Hotel', accepted as 'consultants' to the Control Commission for Germany (British Element) and usually elected to be accommodated, at least for a time, in the 'Transit Hotel'. The rest were helped to find accommodation in the Zone. It was sought to find employment for all the evacuees, whether accepted as consultants or not. As many as possible of the consultants were to be found jobs in Britain or her Dominions or the United States, no doubt to ensure that expertise in armaments flowed to these countries. The British authorities had not weakened their policy of suppressing war-related research, development and production in their Zone and a further aim was that the greatest possible number of the evacuees were to be found jobs in the civilian economy of the Zone. Acceptance as a 'Matchbox consultant' meant that, while a job was being found for the evacuee in question, he was paid a small salary for being available to the Control Commission for the performance of research tasks.135 A 'Matchbox consultancy' was therefore a research grant. The consultants' research became the property of the Control Commission. For as long as consultants stayed at the 'Transit Hotel', they received a monthly salary of 200 Marks. When they left the Hotel, they were paid 400 Marks per month until employment was found for them. Wherever consultants were accommodated, they were well-fed, being provided with the equivalent of a heavy worker's ration. They also received a specially-large ration of fuel. The consultancy arrangement and salary were meant to provide them with 135The idea of keeping scientific workers in the Western Zones of Germany by retaining them as scientific and technical consultants may well first have been suggested by American officers attached to FIAT who had had experience of the difficulties of keeping in the West unemployed and unhappy scientists, engineers and technicians who had been evacuated from central Germany in June 1945. Such officers did indeed propose the establishment of a 'scientific and technical institute under FIAT auspices' , in memoranda in FO 1031/67 dated I March 1946 and 29 March 1946. BIOS also lobbied for the establishment of a 'scientific and technical exploitation centre' (letter dated 22 May 1946, FO 1031/75). 48 'employment at reasonable subsistepce level'. By 1949, the operation was being run down. It was pronounced dead in February 1951. 136 The operation included within its ambit refugees who had fled the East quite independently of STIB: all refugees who entered the British Zone were referred to the nearest intelligence unit and there interrogated on the basis of a standard brief. All such interrogation reports were then assessed by STIB at the Headquarters of Intelligence Division and, if the refugees clearly had denial value, they might be made 'Matchbox consultants' to ensure that they did not go back East. If a scientific worker already working in the British Zone were known to be being induced to move to the Soviet Zone or the USSR, he could be made a consultant to keep him where he was. 137 An example of someone who in 1950 was kept in the BOZ as a 'Matchbox consultant' to save him from the jaws of the Soviets was Dr. Paul Schroder, the wartime chief of the ballistics department of the Heeresversuchsanstalt (Army Experimental Station) PeenemUnde and, in the opinion of a British scientist who advised the Joint Committees on his case, 'the greatest mathematical authority on rockets alive'. 138 Between 1945 and 1948 he had worked on rocket development in Britain. On his return to Germany, he had fallen on hard times, made worse by the introduction of the Deutsche Mark in 1948. In March 1950, it was decided to deny him to the Soviets for a further two years by making him a 'Matchbox consultant' .139 136Minutes of He (Germany) meeting on 13 February 1951, DEFE 41/66. 137Directive AHQ/3111/6/Sec.E dated 10 January 1947, DEFE 411122. 1 38Report dated 10 March 1950, DEFE 41/132. Prof. Dr. Kurt Blome is another example of a significant scientist who was made a 'Matchbox' consultant to keep him in the West (in his case, because of his expertise in biological warfare) (,Matchbox ' State Report as at 28 October 1950, attached to STIB/600311917456 dated 31 October 1950, DEFE 411132) . 139Letter dated 27 March 1950, DEFE 411132. During the most important phase of the operation at least, the ratio of those evacuated from East Germany to those kept in West Germany was approximately 2: I. The Director of STIB, David Evans, reported to the German Section of the Foreign Office in April 1948 that 321 subjects had passed through the ' Matchbox ' machinery. Of these 321 people, about two-thirds had been evacuated from the East and about one-third were 'graded-list ' scientists and technicians living in West Germany, who, it was feared , might go and work for the Soviets in East Germany if they were not helped financially. 285 of these 321 had been 49 The Americans at that time also had a denial policy, but it only applied to those on their list of 1,000 Germans to be evacuated to the USA for employment there. 140 This was Operation 'Overcast', later known as 'Paperclip' .141 But the list was fixed: the burden of evacuating those who applied for evacuation and were not listed as desired rested at the beginning of 1947 on the shoulders of the British. Both 'Matchbox' and 'Paperclip' represented attempts at the technological containment of the USSR; they anticipated the political containment of the Truman Doctrine, set before Congress in March 1947, and the economic containment of the Marshall Plan, announced in June 1947.142 The first few months of Operation 'Matchbox' were its most active phase. By April 1947, 106 scientific workers had been assessed to determine whether they should be evacuated and some seventy-four, together with their dependents, had actually been brought over from the East. Entire specialist teams were evacuated: for example, the Schon group, which specialized in the manufacture of the V -2 rocket; the Stenger group, which also specialized in guided missiles; in January 1947 the Agfa colour film research development groupl43; and the fifteen-strong Technical Directorate of made 'Matchbox consultants ' (telegram dated 16 April 1948, FO 37 1170955). Those who had been kept in West Germany with the aid of 'Matchbox' funds included many specialists in aerodynamics, aircraft design and construction, remote control and ballistics who had worked on the RAF' s Yolkenrode project. This was probably a group of projects for research into, and development of, high-speed aircraft and guided missiles. However, later in the operation's life evacuees from the SOZ represented a larger proportion of the total. By November 1949, 332 scientific workers had been evacuated from the Eastern Zone, while 'Matchbox' benefits had been extended to 103 in the British Zone (report on 'Matchbox' by JS/JTIC Chairman, attached to CH/JSJT/49/217 dated 6 December 1949, DEFE41183). I~PES , FIAT report dated 9 January 1947, FO 1031167. 141 K. Eichner & A. Dobbert, Headquarters GermallY: Die USA-Geheimdiellste ill Delllschialld, p. 29. The operation lasted until 1973, benefiting some 1,600 scientific workers. 142M. Walker, The Cold War, pp. 49-51 . 143The Agfa colour film group had had offers of work in the West before they left the Soviet Zone (letter dated 19 May 1949, DEFE 411131). The most important members of the group had also long planned to flee the Soviet Zone and therefore merely used British Intelligence as their ark to the West. They seem to have made contact themselves with the FIAT Forward office in West Berlin (Special Intelligence Report No.3 covering the period I January 1947 - 31 January 1947, FO 1031/60). 50 the Bruckner-Kanis company, headed up by the celebrated engineer Paul Kanis. Kanis and his colleague Rudolf Friedrich both qualified as outstanding specialists. The Admiralty, which had requested the evacuation of the last group, considered that it had removed an important war-related industry from the Soviet Zone and that Soviet development of high-speed underwater propulsion turbines and of all kinds of naval machinery would probably be delayed for a considerable time. Within the second category of those whose evacuation would have a serious effect on Soviet armaments projects were people skilled in such technologies as rocketry, aircraft construction, optical equipment, electronics, radar, remote control for rockets, aircraft engines and other engines. 144 The British targeted specific parts of East Germany's skills base with the purpose of frustrating the USSR's exploitation of its Zone and thus of retarding its military- industrial development. For instance, machine tool designers were targeted, in the belief that the standard of skill of the Soviet industrial workforce was low.145 Soviet workers would therefore need German machine tools to make the machinery which would allow them to manufacture weaponry with the necessary precision. In 1947, learning that key machine tool designers were likely soon to be deported from Chemnitz to the Soviet Union, British Intelligence made contact with them and other such designers in Berlin, Dresden, Leipzig and Plauen and offered to fly them to the British Zone if they left their jobs and came to West Berlin. The men originally targeted together made up a majority of the key machine tool designers in the Soviet Zone (they were some twenty designers, supported by forty-five staff). 146 The tools 144lnterim Repo11 HQI031 OIIlI/Sec.E dated 12 April 1947, DEFE 411l22. It proved very difficult to find work for the Kanis team. They only left the Transit Hotel at Bad Driburg in July 1949, more than two years after their evacuation (,Matchbox State Chart as at 26 July 1949', DEFE 41/39). I 45Letter dated 28 April 1947, DEFE41/109. 146Undated letter STIB17138 entitled, 'Comprehensive Evacuation of German Machine Tool Designers from the 51 they designed were intended for armament construction. 147 The considerable dependence of Soviet workers on machine tools with a high degree of automatic control caused Lt.-Comm. R. G. Pennell RN, the Staff Officer (Intelligence) to the Head.of the Naval Branch (Berlin), to conclude that, 'the removal of these men in the Russian Zone would have a strangling effect on the Russian War potential ' . 148 The operation, codenamed 'Top Hat', was carried out on 14 September 1947, earlier than planned, because 'a state of emergency ... arose during the first week of September 1947' .149 It is unclear what the emergency was, but it may be that the MVD got wind of the operation. In the operation actually mounted only thirty-five men (plus their dependents) were targeted for evacuation, rather than the sixty-five originally contemplated. The reasons for this were to avoid causing too many people to move at once, which might attract the attention of Soviet Intelligence, and to give British Intelligence the opportunity of deciding whether the evacuation of the remainder would be worthwhile. ISO The operation itself was a great disappointment, since only fifteen of the targeted thirty-five arrived in the British Zone as planned. lSI Some of them were indeed imprisoned by the MVD.IS2 Many of the evacuees were found jobs with engineering or other companies in Britain.IS3 The following year, other machine tool designers at Chemnitz declared their willingness to be evacuated to the West. lS4 At least one of these did indeed come West and was made a 'Matchbox consultant' . This was Herbert Biernatzki, who wanted to defect because his machine tool Russian Zone under Operation 'Matchbox', DEFE 411109. 147Letter dated 2S April 1947, DEFE 411109. I48Letter dated 28 A pri I 1947, D EFE 41 II 09. 149STIB report dated 23 October 1947, DEFE 411109. IS~etter dated 10 November 1947, DEFE 411109. 151 Minutes of JlC (Germany) meeting on 20 October 1947, DEFE 41/63; STIB report dated 23 October 1947, DEFE 411109. 152Minutes of JIC (Germany) meeting on 20 October 1947, DEFE 41/63. I 53Letter dated 31 December 1947, DEFE 411109. I~elegram dated 17 July 1948, DEFE 411110. 52 business in the Soviet Zone had been nationalized and he wanted to re-found it in West Germany. 155 The British inevitably sought to diminish the Soviets' ability to use East German skill to acquire the 'ABC' weapons and guided missiles. In July 1948, STIB evacuated from the Soviet Zone Professor Erich Traub, 'the key man' at a microbiological research institute on Riems Island which was a 'high priority Intelligence target' .156 He was evacuated because the British feared that the institute was playing a role in the Soviet biological warfare programme. 157 He brought with him some of the viruses and serums which he had developing for the Soviets. 158 The aim of the evacuation was both to deny him to the USSR and to find out what was going on at the institute. However, when interrogated Traub maintained that it was purely a veterinary institute and that the Soviet scientists who had been transferred to it or had visited it were themselves only interested in veterinary science. As a result of this information, STIB was told that Scientific Intelligence in London no longer considered 'the Institute and its workers to be intelligence targets, and that its sole interest was in the future to be on the denial aspects' .159 Development groups working on guided missiles, such as Elektrobau Sondershausen and Technisches Buro 11, were also targeted. Some of the evacuees were agents-in-place III 155'Matchbox' State Report as at 28 October 1950, attached to STIB/600311917456 dated 3 1 October 1950, DEFE 411132. 156STIB/200 III dated 23 June 1948 and entitled 'Operation "Second Slip' '', DEFE 41/20. Contact with Traub was establ ished, and his defection arranged, by what the Director of STIB in this letter discreetly calls 'another agency' (i.e. MI6). 157Confirmation that the British believed that bacteriological research on behalf of the Soviets might be going on at the Tierseucheninstitut (Animal Pests Institute) on Riems island is provided by STO/9/DE/48 , STIB Berlin Report No. 327, DEFE 411145. All the three 'professors' in charge of the institute (Traub being one) suddenly disappeared , the last in September 1948, shortly after Traub' s evacuation. Of the other two, one, the Institute ' s Director, Dr. Waldmann, certainly defected and was by June 1948 believed by STIB to be in South America (STIB /200 I 11 dated 23 June 1948 and entitled 'Operation "Second Slip' '' , DEFE 41/20). I 58STIB/200 III dated 23 June 1948 and entitled 'Operation "Second Slip" ' ; letter dated 3 July 1948 from STIB Director to Director of Production, DEFE 41/20. 159Interrogation Report dated 28 July 1948 on Professor E. Traub, DEFE 411148. 53 installations in the Soviet Zone who had to be evacuated, presumably because they were no longer safe where they were. 160 The largest number of applications to grant 'Matchbox' consultancies made by STIB in Germany to the Joint Committees in London concerned scientific workers experienced in the design or construction of naval craft or weaponry.161 However, these were only applications. Evacuations were a different matter and consultancies different again. Sometime either late in 1949 or early in 1950, the 'Matchbox' consultants were listed by profession. The largest group on the list of 317 people were stated to be 'machine-building engineers' (126 people, including such engineers as Paul Kanis). There were thirty-five 'ship and ship machine building engineers', twenty-six 'high-frequency and telecommunications' specialists and twenty-eight working in 'aerodynamics and aircraft construction ' . There were very few in other fields, in most cases the number of evacuees being in single figures (for example, only six 'tool machine building engineers' had been evacuated). 162 However, the large categories (such as 'machine building engineers') divided into a large number of specialities and the specialities of the evacuees covered a remarkably wide range of fields. By the autumn of 1950, when the operation'S life was nearing its end and 461 'Matchbox' cases had passed through STIB' s hands, their combined expertise embraced the following fields: electronics (including the development of magnetrons and klystrons) and high-frequency techniques; dynamics (including aerodynamics and supersonic aerodynamics, hydrodynamics and ballistics); aeroplane construction (including that of jet fighters); U-boat and ship-building; submarine and destroyer I60In STIB17113IVol.IV dated II December 1948, DEFE 41/131 , David Evans reported that, since 1 July 1948, sixteen people had been admitted to the operation, of whom five were ' intelligence sources whom it became operationally necessary to evacuate'. 161Memorandum dated 4 April 1949, DEFE 41/54. 162Undated list of 'Matchbox' consultants by profession, DEFE 41153. 54 design; turbines; locomotive construction; helicopter design and development; speedboat design; rocketry; rocket and torpedo construction and steering (including those of the V -2); rocket fuels; remote control (including missile control systems); bi