

1 **Combining protection and restoration strategies enables cost-effective**
2 **compensation with ecological equivalence in Brazil**

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25 **Keywords:** Brazilian New Forest Act; environmental public policy; vegetation
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31 **ABSTRACT**

32 Ecological compensation and offsets have been used worldwide to repair the residual impacts
33 caused by human activities. Achieving ecological equivalence in them has been challenging,
34 and conflicts between development and environmental sectors commonly arise. We addressed
35 this issue by testing an approach that is cost-effective and includes equivalence in
36 compensation. We used the Brazilian Native Vegetation Protection Law’s Legal Reserve (a
37 native vegetation percentage of every rural property that must be conserved) compensation
38 scheme as a study case. We created scenarios to test the law’s three main compensation
39 strategies (vegetation protection, restoration, and regularization of private lands inside public
40 protected areas) separately and combined. We used the Condition Assessment Framework,
41 which selects attributes of biodiversity, landscape, and ecosystem services based on their
42 redundancy, spatial complementarity, and variability. The attributes selected are used to
43 measure ecological equivalence in a spatially explicit and disaggregated manner. Cost-
44 effectiveness was evaluated regarding deficit resolution (deficit in Legal Reserve needing
45 compensation), economic costs, and native vegetation gained (additionality). The most

46 effective strategy for deficit resolution was restoration (98.99% of resolution), followed by
47 protection (40.22%) and regularization (0.15%). Restoration was the most expensive strategy,
48 but it also had the highest additionality. Combined scenarios resulted in balanced cost-
49 effectiveness. The combination of protection followed by restoration was the best strategy,
50 since its deficit resolution was high (99.47%), with an intermediate cost and additionality. It is
51 thus possible to make cost-effective compensation exchanges accounting for ecological
52 equivalence adequately. We also used simple calculations in a new spatial optimization
53 method for automated deficit and compensation prioritization, generating spatially explicit
54 results. Considering ecological equivalence guarantees additionality and more equal spatial
55 distribution of ecological benefits. These findings underscore the importance of incorporating
56 equivalence in compensation, offering a promising avenue for bolstering efforts in
57 compensation and offset schemes to address the ongoing global climate and environmental
58 crisis, by proposing a new approach to achieve this.

59

60 **1. INTRODUCTION**

61 Ecological compensation and biodiversity offsets have been used in many parts
62 of the world to counterbalance rapid habitat loss and fragmentation due to
63 development projects and agricultural enterprises, as an attempt to contribute to
64 species and ecosystem services conservation (Bull and Strange, 2018; GIBOP, 2019;
65 Gonçalves et al., 2015; Rosa et al., 2022). These mechanisms are important in
66 achieving the recent international goal of becoming “Nature Positive” (Maron et al.,
67 2023). Offsets require the exchanges (or trades) of losses and gains are made with
68 ecological equivalence and at least no net loss of biodiversity (BBOP, 2012a; Bull et al.,
69 2016). “Ecological equivalence” in the offsetting context is understood as the
70 numerical and categorical attributes, summarized in the equivalence dimensions of
71 biodiversity, landscape, and ecosystem services (Borges-Matos et al., 2023), that
72 should be measured and compensated for according to the Business and Biodiversity
73 Offsets Programme (BBOP, 2012a, 2012b). This Programme emphasized that offset
74 sites must be highly comparable to the impacted sites (BBOP, 2012b). Therefore, a
75 broader concept was needed, which included not only biodiversity and ecological
76 attributes, but also landscape and socio-environmental attributes – i.e. ecosystem
77 services, which are paramount to improve offsetting effectiveness (Habib et al., 2013;
78 Jones et al., 2019; Mitchell et al., 2015; Sonter et al., 2020a). Ecological compensations
79 are more general and less strict than offsets, as they do not require no-net-loss and
80 may not require ecological equivalence (BBOP, 2012a). Yet, they often use attributes
81 to assess and achieve distinct levels of ecological equivalence in their trades (Bennett
82 et al., 2017; Mello et al., 2021a). Indeed, environmental outcomes of compensation

83 and offset are improved when ecological equivalence is accounted for (BBOP, 2012a).
84 On the other hand, equivalence is usually understood as a factor that significantly
85 restricts the area available to compensate, since only equivalent areas would be
86 eligible (Weissgerber et al., 2019). This could make compensation more expensive, as
87 productive lands – with higher opportunity costs – may be requested for restoration
88 (Mello et al., 2021a).

89 This discussion on offset and compensation implementation is present
90 worldwide. This includes Brazil, with its Native Vegetation Protection Law, known as
91 the New Forest Act (Law nº 12.651, dated May 25, 2012). This law establishes rules for
92 land use and protection of native vegetation in private rural lands. It is an essential
93 conservation tool in Brazil, given that more than 50% of the country's remaining native
94 vegetation is inside these private lands (Sparovek et al., 2015). The Act demands the
95 maintenance of Permanent Protection Areas (APPs, Portuguese acronym) and Legal
96 Reserves in each property. Permanent Protection Areas are ecologically vulnerable,
97 such as areas of steep slopes and riparian forests, and they must be restored on-site in
98 cases of degradation. Legal Reserves are a percentage of the property area (ranging
99 from 20% to 80% depending on the Brazilian biome where the property is located) that
100 should be covered by native vegetation. Legal Reserve deficits must be compensated,
101 and the only ecological requirement provided in the Act is that it must be implemented
102 in the same biome of the deficit.

103 In 2019, the Brazilian Federal Supreme Court reviewed the agreement document
104 on the Forest Act (Declaratory Action of Constitutionality 42 – Judgment, February 28,
105 2018) and ruled that Legal Reserve deficits should be compensated in sites ecologically
106 equivalent, in terms of “specific species and ecosystems”. The decision recognized the
107 significant heterogeneity existing within Brazilian biomes (e.g., Alho et al., 2019;
108 Dambros et al., 2020; Silva and Casteleti, 2003). Therefore, if compensating in an
109 entire biome was allowed, it could lead to unbalanced trades, with potentially more
110 losses than gains (Metzger, 2010). The environmental and agricultural sectors criticized
111 this demand for ecological equivalence, mainly because it did not define how to
112 measure it and what levels of equivalence would be required (Mello et al., 2021a,
113 2021b). There was also a fear that it could reduce the areas available for
114 compensation, increasing the compensation costs to landowners (Mello et al., 2021a,

115 2021b). A new ruling in 2023 established that ecological equivalence should be
116 included in all compensation forms described in the Act (Lopes et al., 2023). However,
117 in October 2024, the Court reversed its decision, considering it legal to compensate
118 within the same biome without any other ecological requirement (Lopes et al., 2024).

119 Despite this recent change – and the frequent changes experienced in Brazilian
120 legislation – ecological equivalence remains being an important part of any
121 compensation scheme that aims to improve a site’s ecological condition. The Court
122 first decision generated a discussion about how to calculate equivalence in practice,
123 preferably cost-effectively. This is a worldwide challenge, since there is yet no clear
124 answer to how cost-effective inclusion of equivalence in compensation and offset can
125 be made (Grimm, 2021; Sonter et al., 2020b). In the last 40 years, there has been an
126 integration of main principles in offset policies globally (e.g. no net loss requirements),
127 but also a diversification in the measures and actors involved (Droste et al., 2022). This
128 increases the complexity of policies and may hinder the effectiveness of offsets (Droste
129 et al., 2022). Moreover, only 14 countries have documented guidelines on how
130 biodiversity should be assessed for offsetting, and most of these documents lack clarity
131 on the calculation of metrics and/or fail to use the metrics most commonly
132 recommended in offset literature (Marshall et al., 2023). This lack of consistency in
133 biodiversity measurement undermines our ability to evaluate the effectiveness of
134 offset and compensation (Marshall et al., 2023).

135 There are several methods for assessing ecological equivalence, and they are
136 constantly being refined and developed. One reason is the challenge of measuring and
137 achieving ecological equivalence between losses and gains (Borges-Matos et al., 2023;
138 Gonçalves et al., 2015; Marshall et al., 2020), which leads to uncertainties about the
139 real biodiversity gains of compensation and offset schemes (Apostolopoulou and
140 Adams, 2017; Bull et al., 2013; Souza et al., 2023; zu Ermgassen et al., 2019). Also,
141 transparency often lacks in such schemes and methods (Borges-Matos et al., 2023;
142 Carmo and Kamino, 2023; Maron et al., 2016). In the US and European Union, no-net-
143 loss policies rely greatly on a metric called Habitat Equivalency Analysis, which even
144 counts on a specific software (Pioch et al., 2017), but it is focused only on the
145 ecosystem services dimension of equivalence. In Australia, Habitat Hectares metric
146 (Parkes et al., 2003) was developed in the state of Victoria and is still in use today

147 (Lorimer, 2024). It is one of the most widely recognized offset metrics (Borges-Matos
148 et al., 2023 Sup. Mat.), but it has the limitation of data aggregation – combining the
149 attribute values in one single final value. This usually implicates in unclear substitutions
150 among the attributes (Hanford et al., 2017; Maseyk et al., 2016). The English metric
151 originally called Biodiversity Offsetting Pilots (DEFRA, 2012), now called Statutory
152 Biodiversity Metric (DEFRA, 2024), is becoming increasingly popular (Borges-Matos et
153 al., 2023 Sup. Mat.). In spite of its successful use in England, it depends on a large
154 number of ecological variables and data to be applied. This may hinder its
155 implementation in many regions, particularly in the highly biodiverse countries of the
156 Global South (Borges-Matos et al., 2025, 2023).

157 Here, we tackled all the above issues using the Brazilian Forest Act as a case
158 study. We focused on the compensation strategies proposed in the new law (i.e., on-
159 site or off-site restoration, and off-site compensation involving standing vegetation in
160 private and public protected areas; see section 2.1) and their economic costs, using a
161 recently developed method to approach ecological equivalence called Condition
162 Assessment Framework (Borges-Matos et al., 2025), which assumes the inclusion of
163 equivalence as a central premise. We chose this method because it is the only one that
164 simultaneously incorporates biodiversity, landscape and ecosystem services attributes
165 in a disaggregated way, relying on a small number attributes assessed through simple
166 calculations, with spatially explicit results and flexibility in its application. We sought to
167 understand (1) how effective each compensation strategy is when applied alone and
168 (2) what strategy or combination of strategies is most effective in compensating Legal
169 Reserve deficits. To answer these questions, we designed and tested compensation
170 scenarios using the Atlantic Forest of São Paulo state as our study area. We used the
171 automated prioritization path we developed here for spatial optimization. To our
172 knowledge, this is the first approach that evaluates and maximizes compensation cost-
173 effectiveness by combining economic costs with ecological equivalence based on
174 biodiversity and socio-environmental attributes. The approach uses straightforward
175 calculations to produce spatially explicit results, where attribute values are
176 transparently disaggregated and can be flexibly substituted with others in different
177 contexts.

178

179 **2. METHODS**

180 **2.1. Study area and its legal requirements**

181 We developed compensation scenarios (see section 2.2) for the Atlantic Forest in
182 São Paulo, Brazil (Figure 1). The mandatory Legal Reserve is 20% of the property in this
183 region.





Figure 1: The Atlantic Forest domain in São Paulo state – highlighted in pink in the larger map – our study area.

184 The Brazilian Native Vegetation Protection Law’s compensation strategies for
185 Legal Reserve deficits can be summarized as protection of standing vegetation,
186 restoration of native vegetation (either in or outside the property with the deficit), and
187 regularization of private properties inside public protected areas (Figure 2). In the
188 latter case, regularization occurs when the landowner with a deficit acquires a non-
189 regularized property within a public protected area (i.e. an area not appropriated by
190 the state when creating the reserve) and donates it to the state. The Legal Reserve
191 surplus is the standing vegetation that exceeds the Legal Reserve of a property and it
192 can be used to compensate for other landowners’ deficits, through commercial
193 transaction provided in the law. The New Forest Act allowed for the first time that
194 Legal Reserves of small properties can also be used to compensate for deficits in larger
195 properties. These Legal Reserves would function as common standing vegetation

196 areas. Thus, their owners can use them in compensation transactions; they cannot
 197 deforest their existing Legal Reserve, but they are no longer obligated to compensate
 198 for their deficit (if any).

Medium-sized property with Legal Reserve deficit



Compensation strategies provided




Figure 2: Examples of possibilities to implement the different compensation strategies provided by the Forest Act included in our analysis.

199

200 **2.2. Scenarios for Legal Reserve compensation**

201 We designed six scenarios to answer our questions, all including ecological
 202 equivalence. First, we tested how each compensation strategy alone would perform in
 203 the Atlantic Forest of São Paulo. Then we tested combinations of these strategies,
 204 aiming to fully solve the Legal Reserve deficit and select the best combination. Four
 205 were called “simple scenarios” as they tested the strategies alone. Two were
 206 considered “composite scenarios” once they combined strategies to maximize deficit
 207 reduction or elimination (Table 1). Restoration was the last step in both composite

208 scenarios because it was the strategy of higher cost per hectare (see section 2.4). Since
209 including small properties' Legal Reserves as a possibility for compensation is a novelty
210 , we split the strategy of protecting standing vegetation into two scenarios: one that
211 considered only the Legal Reserve surplus (as established by the previous Forest Act)
212 and another that considered the sum of this surplus with the Legal Reserves of small
213 properties (New Law). Testing both possibilities showed if there were substantial
214 differences between them in terms of deficit resolution and the consequent need for
215 restoration. For the composite scenarios, only protection including small properties'
216 Legal Reserves was considered, as these scenarios aimed to eliminate the deficit.

Table 1: The six scenarios designed to test Legal Reserve (LR) compensation through the strategies provided by the Brazilian Native Vegetation Protection Law, including ecological equivalence.

Scenario type	Scenario name	Scenario rationale
Simple	Scenario 1 – LR surplus	Tests how well LR compensation based exclusively on protecting LR surplus can resolve the deficit
	Scenario 2 – Total surplus	Tests how well LR compensation based exclusively on protecting standing vegetation (constituted of LR surplus and LRs of small properties) can resolve the deficit
	Scenario 3 – Restoration	Tests how well LR compensation based exclusively on restoring native vegetation can resolve the deficit
	Scenario 4 – Regularization	Tests how well LR compensation based exclusively on regularization of private properties inside public protected areas can resolve the deficit
Composite	Scenario 5 – Scenario 2 followed by scenario 3	Tests if LR deficit can be resolved by using protection of standing vegetation (LR surplus and LRs of small properties), followed by restoration of native vegetation
	Scenario 6 – scenario 4 followed by Scenario 2 and then followed by Scenario 3	Tests if LR deficit can be resolved by using regularization of private properties inside public protected areas, followed by protection of standing vegetation (LR surplus and LRs of small properties), followed by restoration of native vegetation

217

218 We developed an automated spatial optimization tool using a prioritization path
219 within the R environment (R Core Team, 2021) to define the hexagons that contained
220 deficits and were ecologically equivalent to the hexagons with areas available for
221 compensation, in accordance with the strategies outlined by the Law. The hexagon
222 with a deficit itself was always considered a possibility for compensation. In all
223 scenarios, compensation was made iteratively for each hexagon with deficit, and the
224 compensation and deficit areas were updated at each turn. Hexagons that contained
225 areas for compensation were ascending in order according to their compensation cost,
226 so that spatial units of lower costs would be selected first for the compensation
227 scheme. The hexagons containing deficit areas were descending in order; those with
228 larger deficits were chosen first. The spatial optimization tool allowed compensation
229 trades exclusively among ecologically equivalent hexagons. The iteration went on until
230 trades among equivalent hexagons ran out.

231 The scenarios' cost-effectiveness performances were evaluated according to the
232 area of deficit solved (hectares and percentage), economic compensation costs (in
233 Brazilian *reais* (BRL) and United States dollars (USD)), and additionality (area in
234 hectares of native vegetation gained relative to the current vegetation area). Further,
235 we calculated how much of the area available for protection, restoration, and
236 regularization was used in the compensation scheme of each scenario (hectares and
237 percentage). All analyses were performed in the R environment (R Core Team, 2021).

238

239 **2.3 Ecological equivalence, Legal Reserve deficit and compensation calculations**

240 We used the Condition Assessment Framework to calculate ecological
241 equivalence applied to Legal Reserve compensation schemes, a method recently
242 published (Borges-Matos et al., 2025). In this method, three ecological attributes were
243 chosen among others to represent the three dimensions of equivalence: bird species
244 richness (*biodiversity* dimension), the Probability of Connectivity Index with the
245 distance threshold of 400 meters (*landscape* dimension; Saura and Pascual-Hortal,
246 2007), and the potential pollination service (*ecosystem service* dimension). The
247 attributes were chosen from a pool of 12 attributes after running a multi-criteria
248 analysis based on the attributes' redundancy (Spearman correlation), spatial
249 complementarity (mean pair-wise distance analysis) and variability (standard
250 deviation) (Borges-Matos et al., 2025). Therefore, these three chosen attributes hold
251 lower correlation among them, more spatial complementarity, and higher variability,
252 meaning they carry more different information about the study region than the other
253 attributes. The attributes were averaged for each spatial unit: hexagons that vary in
254 size from 5,000 to 10,000 hectares covering the entire Atlantic Forest in São Paulo,
255 totaling 1,671 in number (see Table S1 for basic description of the attributes). This
256 hexagon size range holds important ecological processes and, at the same time,
257 reflects spatial environmental differences, making it widely used in Atlantic Forest
258 studies (Banks-Leite et al., 2011; Metzger, 2009; Pardini et al., 2010; Tambosi et al.,
259 2014). Each hexagon had an attribute value, and these values were grouped into 12
260 classes for each attribute (Figure S1) to establish equivalence categories. The
261 compensation trades were only allowed among hexagons of the same class for the

262 three attributes at the same time (for more details, please see Borges-Matos et al.,
263 2025).

264 To extract values of Legal Reserve surplus, Legal Reserves in small properties,
265 and deficit area per hexagon, we used a database containing this spatial information in
266 hectares for each property of São Paulo state (Tavares et al., 2021). To aggregate this
267 property-level data in the hexagons, we filtered the data for the Atlantic Forest and
268 assumed the surplus, the small properties' Legal Reserves, and the deficit were equally
269 distributed in each property (a total of 5,467 properties). When we intersected the
270 properties with the hexagon grid, we could calculate the approximate area of each
271 variable inside each hexagon (Figure 3).

272




Figure 3: Spatial distribution of (A) total Legal Reserve surplus, including the Legal Reserves of small properties, and (B) Legal Reserve deficit. The blank polygons represent either no surplus (A) or deficits lower than 1.5 hectares (B). Both maps were subdivided into the same number of categories, i.e. 10, to ease visualization, but their value intervals differ.

273

274 To approach the compensation strategy of restoring native vegetation, we
275 calculated each hexagon's area potentially available for restoration. This calculation
276 was based on previous data from São Paulo state, where polygons represented the
277 areas in hectares considered adequate for restoration inside each property, avoiding
278 competition with productive agricultural lands (Sparovek et al., 2020). These areas are
279 pastures of low suitability for agriculture (degraded pastures), previously measured
280 and classified in a single category of "low suitability" (Sparovek et al., 2015). We
281 intersected the low-suitability map with the hexagon grid, filtered the 5,467 properties

282 of our study area, and summed the areas of patches that fell inside each hexagon
283 (Figure S2A).

284 We estimated the area of private properties irregularly inside public protected
285 areas based on their proportion relative to each protected area they are in (Forest
286 Foundation – São Paulo government, personal communication). São Paulo government
287 could not share the location and extension of the irregular areas because this is a
288 sensitive data. We used the map of São Paulo state protected areas (DataGeo – São
289 Paulo government) and filtered the categories with higher levels of protection in the
290 Atlantic Forest (equivalent to IUCN categories Ia, Ib, II, and III; Dudley, 2013) that
291 presented some percentage of irregularity in their areas. We assumed this percentage
292 was equally distributed in each protected area. Similar to the surplus and deficit
293 calculations, we intersected the layer with the irregularities percentages with the
294 hexagon grid, calculated the irregular private area corresponding to its percentage in
295 each protected area for each hexagon, and summed these area values to obtain the
296 approximate irregularity area per hexagon (Figure S2B).

297

298 **2.4. Compensation costs estimation**

299 To test the scenarios, we estimated two compensation costs: for restoring native
300 vegetation and for protecting standing vegetation – including both strategies of
301 standing vegetation protection and the regularization of private properties inside
302 protected areas. To estimate the protection costs, we used the prices for land
303 acquisition in a vegetated area as a proxy based on a national land-cost database (FNP,
304 2017). Restoration costs were estimated based on the price to fully restore one
305 hectare, considering the regeneration potential of the site, summed with its
306 opportunity cost. As a proxy of opportunity cost, we used land acquisition prices of
307 pasture and agriculture areas (FNP, 2017).

308 The FNP (2017) prices for land acquisition were originally estimated per
309 municipality and in BRL per hectare. We calculated the proportion of the municipalities
310 in our study area occupied by each of the three FNP land-cover categories (vegetation,
311 pasture, and agriculture areas), then we calculated their average price/hectare per
312 municipality, weighted by the area covered by each category in the municipality. We
313 assumed the category percentages were equally distributed within each municipality,

314 then we intersected the municipalities' polygons with the hexagon grid and calculated
315 the weighted average prices per polygon inside each hexagon. We summed the price
316 values in each hexagon to estimate the compensation costs through the protection of
317 standing vegetation (Figure S3A) and the opportunity cost for restoration.

318 To complete the restoration cost estimation, we used a calculation previously
319 made. It consisted of multiplying the cost to plant one hectare (Benini and Adeodato,
320 2017) by the local regeneration potential (Crouzeilles et al., 2020). The result was a 30
321 m resolution raster layer with prices in BRL per hectare (vegetation, water, and
322 urbanization pixels were excluded). We extracted the mean restoration cost for each
323 hexagon from this layer. We then summed these values with the opportunity costs per
324 hexagon to achieve the total restoration cost (Figure S3B). The values in BRL refer to
325 the year 2017 (Benini and Adeodato, 2017) when the annual mean commercial
326 exchange rate was BRL 3.1920 = 1.0 USD (IPEA data). We used this rate to calculate the
327 final costs in USD. We acknowledge that these values are outdated, but, besides the
328 fact that no other database was available at the time for our entire study area, our
329 focus in this analysis is to capture the cost relationships among the different strategies
330 and scenarios. These relationships are not likely to significantly fluctuate throughout
331 time – as opposed to economy and politics.

332

333 **3. RESULTS**

334 The compensation scenarios varied enormously in their ability to reduce Legal
335 Reserve deficits (0.15-99.47%), as well as in costs (104 thousand USD to 2 billion USD
336 approximately) and additionality (0-220 thousand hectares approximately) (Table 2,
337 Figure 4). The ability to reduce deficits was related to restoration and the inclusion of
338 small properties' reserves as areas available for compensation, which nearly doubled
339 the deficit resolution compared to the scenario including only the Legal Reserve
340 surplus (scenario 1 vs. 2). It was possible to solve almost all deficits when considering
341 solely the restoration strategy (scenario 3), which was the most effective of the four
342 simple scenarios in this aspect and had the highest additionality of all six scenarios
343 tested (Table 2).

344 On the other hand, the restoration strategy alone increased the total economic
345 cost from USD 7-14 million (scenarios 1 and 2) to approximately USD 2.1

346 billion (scenario 3). The regularization scenario (scenario 4) was the cheapest, precisely
347 because this strategy could only slightly reduce the deficit (Table 2, Figure 3). The
348 compensation economic costs in one single hexagon were also higher when the
349 restoration strategy was included, and in all scenarios (except for 4) the costs were
350 higher in the northwestern region of São Paulo (Figure S4). Simple scenarios without
351 restoration (scenarios 1, 2, and 4) did not present any additionality. The area in
352 hectares in each hexagon used to compensate varied in the four simple scenarios:
353 larger areas would be needed in Scenario 3, but for fewer hexagons than in Scenarios 1
354 and 2 (Figure S5). The hexagons with the largest areas needed for compensation were
355 concentrated in the northwest region – except for scenario 4 (Figure S5).
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


Figure 4: Spatial distribution of Legal Reserve (LR) deficit solved in each hexagon by the compensation strategies applied in the six scenarios tested. We highlight that there was no difference between scenarios 5 and 6.

357

358

Table 2: Comparative results of the six scenarios created to test Legal Reserve compensation with different strategies. “ha” stands for hectares.

Scenario name	Deficit resolution (ha)	Deficit resolution (%)	Compensation area used (%)	Economic costs (USD)	Additionality (ha)
Scenario 1 – LR surplus	38,578.81	17.32	7.23	7,740,614.01	0
Scenario 2 – Total surplus	89,609.49	40.22	12.07	14,302,814.64	0
Scenario 3 – Restoration	220,536.32	98.99	12.23	2,156,238,638.49	220,536.33
Scenario 4 – Regularization	336.69	0.15	0.07	104,080.39	0
Scenario 5 – scen. 2+3	221,601.98	99.47	19.39	1,291,167,026.02	131,992.49
Scenario 6 – scen. 4+2+3	221,601.98	99.47	19.42	1,291,196,882.94	131,992.49

359

360 Composite scenarios 5 (scenarios 2 + 3) and 6 (scenarios 4 + 2 + 3) returned
 361 virtually the same result (Table 2). The percentage of deficit solved was the same and
 362 very high (Figure 4; Table 2), with only 16 hexagons left with some deficit (less than 1%
 363 of the Atlantic Forest area in São Paulo). These hexagons are at the *Cerrado* - Atlantic
 364 Forest ecotone (Figure S6), meaning ecological equivalence may be more complex to
 365 achieve in those ecotone regions. The remaining deficit varied from 0.94 to 218.47
 366 hectares. Additionality and percentages of compensation area used were the same in
 367 both scenarios (Table 2). However, scenario 6 was about USD 29.8 thousand more
 368 expensive than scenario 5.

369 The outcomes of the two composite scenarios were only comparable to the
 370 outcome of simple scenario 3 (restoration) in terms of deficit reduction, which was the
 371 only simple scenario that significantly reduced the deficit in São Paulo state’s Atlantic
 372 Forest. However, scenarios 5 and 6 were cheaper (around USD 865 million – 40% less)
 373 and less additional (88,543.84 hectares less) than scenario 3. Since the cost difference
 374 was much larger than the difference in additionality, scenarios 5 and 6 should be
 375 preferred over scenario 3. Scenarios 5 and 6 had similar results, but 5 presented fewer
 376 steps – more straightforward implementation – and lower cost. Therefore, scenario 5
 377 would be the best choice as a general scheme to compensate Legal Reserves with
 378 ecological equivalence.

379

380 **4. DISCUSSION**

381 Our results demonstrate that implementing ecological compensation with
382 ecological equivalence as a core principle is not only cost-effective but also can be fully
383 compliant with existing legal requirements. In our study case, we found that the Legal
384 Reserve compensation strategies presented by the Native Vegetation Protection Law
385 had different effectiveness regarding deficit resolution, economic costs, and
386 additionality. Regularization of private properties in protected areas performed poorly,
387 protection of standing vegetation had an intermediate performance, and restoration
388 of native vegetation had the best performance, as seen in the four simple scenarios
389 tested. Restoration presented the highest cost among all scenarios, so combining
390 strategies improved the cost-effectiveness of the compensation scheme, which was
391 seen in the two composite scenarios. The best option was Scenario 5, which combined
392 protection of standing vegetation with restoration. We highlight the approach that led
393 to these results: a simple yet innovative spatial optimization based on an automated
394 prioritization process developed by the authors, alongside a new spatially explicit
395 method for assessing ecological equivalence, the Condition Assessment
396 Framework. This method accounted for not only biodiversity attributes, but also
397 landscape and ecosystem services. The attributes were calculated in a disaggregated
398 way and could be switched by others according to the region's needs. This
399 combination of characteristics makes our approach unique and different from other
400 similar assessment methods (e.g., da Fontoura et al., 2024; Marshall et al., 2022; Mello
401 et al., 2021a).

402 We found that including equivalence necessarily intensified the need for
403 restoration, confirming previous findings for the region (Mello et al., 2021b). From an
404 environmental perspective, this is positive and aligns with international agreements
405 and goals in force (e.g. Paris and Bohn Agreements, Nature Positive goals, Global
406 Biodiversity Framework). Without ecological equivalence, in our study area it would be
407 allowed to simply exchange Legal Reserve deficits for surplus in the whole Atlantic
408 Forest biome, a measure with no additionality (Mello et al., 2021b; Tavares et al.,
409 2021). Increasing vegetation cover is crucial in this biome, recognized as a world
410 biodiversity *hotspot* (Mittermeier et al., 2011; Myers et al., 2000) and which continues
411 to lose old-growth forests (Rosa et al., 2021). Besides, protection alone cannot reach

412 full legal compliance for this biome, hence restoration is needed (Mello et al., 2021b).
413 Integrating ecological equivalence would lead to more additionality than privileging
414 Legal Reserve compensation in priority areas (Strassburg et al., 2019), which are
415 predominantly located in the coastal region of our study area, where large protected
416 areas already exist (Strassburg et al., 2019). Also, protecting and restoring vegetation
417 in the northwest interior of São Paulo – the primary region of deficit – would reduce
418 the existing spatial inequality in the distribution of ecosystem services (*e.g.*, Borges-
419 Matos et al., 2025 for potential pollination service; Hohlenwerger et al., 2022 for pest
420 control).

421 The strategy of compensating Legal Reserve deficits in irregular private
422 properties inside public protected areas was the least effective and made no
423 difference in effectiveness when included in composite scenarios. The availability of
424 land to compensate with this strategy was low, as most protected areas in São Paulo
425 Atlantic Forest are in a region of low deficit and high environmental heterogeneity.
426 This strategy had no additionality and no gains in terms of land protection, because all
427 these private properties are inside established protected areas. Thus, compensation
428 through regularizations turns into a simply bureaucratic transaction, with no
429 environmental gains. These adverse and ineffective outcomes contradict the latest
430 tendencies of Brazilian state governments: 19 states have made regulations favoring
431 this compensation strategy (Lopes et al., 2024), while São Paulo state has facilitated it
432 with the implementation of its “Programa Agro Legal” (Decree Nº 65.182, 16 of
433 September, 2020). Institutional pressures towards such type of bureaucratic-only
434 solutions are common worldwide. In addition, in São Paulo state, the Legal Reserve
435 surplus may easily surpass the deficit (Tavares et al., 2019), which means that applying
436 protection without ecological equivalence would result in little or no increase in the
437 recovery of biodiversity and ecosystem services (Tavares et al., 2019). Our results
438 indicated the extent to which these measures may fall short of achieving real
439 ecological benefits, the so-claimed no net loss or Nature Positive goals, potentially
440 leading to greenwashing (Maron et al., 2023; zu Ermgassen et al., 2022, 2019).

441 Here we showed better options in terms of deficit resolution and cost-
442 effectiveness: compensating by protecting standing vegetation, restoration, or the
443 combination of both strategies – which is ideal. Our method was about 29% more

444 effective in eliminating São Paulo Legal Reserve deficits than previous methods tested
445 with the same goal in the Atlantic Forest biome, based only on abiotic variables (Mello
446 et al., 2021b). This is a promising result, as São Paulo has the country's largest
447 deficits (Freitas et al., 2017). We showed compliance with the Law was possible even
448 when the compensation scheme was limited to one federal state (*i.e.*, São Paulo), a
449 matter of discussion in Brazil. The argument that compensating Legal Reserves using
450 equivalency within Brazilian states would lack area (Mello et al., 2021b) proved invalid
451 when using the Condition Assessment Framework. In other countries, the same type of
452 argument (Grimm, 2021; Sonter et al., 2020b) could maybe be refuted if our approach
453 was implemented. However, we do recognize that including ecological equivalence
454 restricted the number of candidate areas for compensation (Weissgerber et al., 2019),
455 especially in regions of high ecological heterogeneity. Also, we understand that
456 incrementing the need for restoration makes compensation more expensive, as seen
457 here and in other works (Mello et al., 2021b). Clearly, the less ecologically and
458 financially demanding, the easier it becomes to compensate from a practical
459 perspective, as any area of the biome could be used – in the case of the Atlantic Forest
460 – and minimal restoration would be required. However, this approach may result in
461 significant environmental losses. By incorporating ecological equivalence, our
462 approach aimed to maximize socio-environmental gains in the most cost-effective way
463 possible (Reid et al., 2015).

464 In the big picture, how conflicts related to ecological compensation are tackled
465 reflects what path we take to face the current world's environmental crisis.
466 Government priorities in environmental policies reveal their commitment to
467 addressing the destruction of nature and its consequences. Restoration of native
468 vegetation is a key strategy in most environmental agreements, such as the Bonn
469 Agreement (Chazdon et al., 2021). Compensating Legal Reserves in São Paulo state by
470 using restoration can bring an additionality from 132 to 221 thousand hectares of
471 forest (scenarios 5 or 6, and scenario 3). The state's goal announced in 2021's COP26 is
472 to restore 1.5 million hectares of its Atlantic Forest by 2050 ("Programa Refloresta SP";
473 Decree Nº 66.550, 7 of March, 2022). Restoring 221 thousand hectares corresponds to
474 14.7% of this total goal. Summing this with the mandatory APP restoration (~656
475 thousand hectares) (Tavares et al., 2019) would account for 60% of the goal.

476 Restoration, other than environmental gains, can also provide financial benefits to
477 landowners through mechanisms like carbon credits and biodiversity credits markets
478 (d'Albertas et al., 2024; Peng et al., 2024). Therefore, we recommend compensation
479 policies integrate ecological equivalence and consider using a combination of both
480 restoration and protection to improve their socio-environmental outcomes cost-
481 effectively. The high costs of restoration can be balanced depending on the method
482 employed (Crouzeilles et al., 2020; Gastauer et al., 2021) and the economic incentives
483 governments may provide, such as payment for ecosystem services or tax reductions
484 for large agricultural producers (d'Albertas et al., 2024; Ruggiero et al., 2022; Salzman
485 et al., 2018). Governments should put effort to clearly define in their policies the
486 methods to calculate ecological equivalence, find compensation sites, and implement
487 restoration, as has been done in the Biodiversity Net Gain policy in England (DEFRA,
488 2024) and the BioBanking policy in Australia (DECCW, 2010). Policies such as the new
489 Forest Act, the voluntary biodiversity offsets in South Africa (Brownlie et al., 2017), and
490 the compensation system in Peru (Reid et al., 2015) would benefit from these
491 measures. Approaches as ours can help in developing science-based solutions,
492 reducing the science-practice gap (Bertuol-Garcia et al., 2018).

493 Lastly, our approach presents some limitations. Regarding the Condition
494 Assessment Framework, it uses a fairly large number of attributes in its first steps,
495 which may not be available, and it did not include cultural ecosystem services or
496 attributes directly related to human aspects (Borges-Matos et al., 2025). The method
497 also lacks an automated system to perform all its analyses, which would broaden its
498 usage by practitioners (Borges-Matos et al., 2025). These issues are challenges to be
499 solved in future studies. As for the approach developed here, we assumed a level of
500 imprecision when making all calculations for each hexagon. We believe this should not
501 be a problem, since the method aims to be a spatial explicit guidance for
502 compensation scheme and it does not need to be sharply precise in numbers – the
503 general patterns won't change if the irregular area of a protected area in one hexagon
504 is a little smaller or larger, for example. Moreover, we used a proxy for economic costs
505 that may lead to underestimations (e.g., by not accounting for transaction costs). Exact
506 cost values would have to be updated and perhaps calculated with another method.
507 We also did not account for financial benefits generated by restoration (such as carbon

508 credits), because this goes beyond the scope of the present analysis. These factors can
509 be included, corrected, and updated in further tests of this approach. Nonetheless, we
510 understand our goal was reached when calculating the economic costs: understanding
511 the relationships and proportionality among the compensation strategies tested here.

512

513 **5. CONCLUSION**

514 The approach we presented here points towards a straightforward, feasible and
515 cost-effective way to compensate for losses of native vegetation, by combining
516 strategies of restoration and protection of standing vegetation while accounting for
517 ecological equivalence. Importantly, we employed a method to assess ecological
518 equivalence that fully addresses its concept in the offset context: encompassing
519 biodiversity, landscape, and ecosystem services attributes, all flexibly selected based
520 on regional characteristics, measured and traded separately (i.e., disaggregated), and
521 with spatially explicit results. Our approach relied on an automated prioritization
522 path we developed for spatial optimization of compensation efforts. This combination
523 of features highlights the uniqueness and significance of our results: cost-effectiveness
524 was reached through a rigorous assessment of ecological equivalence and with a
525 simple approach – increasing its feasibility for real-world application. The approach can
526 be applied far beyond our study area or the Brazilian Native Vegetation Protection
527 Law. It is designed as a tool to support comprehensive public policies on environment
528 and conservation. We hope these results enhance the understanding that integrating
529 ecological equivalence in trades brings socio-ecological benefits that would not be
530 achieved otherwise. Examples of such benefits are biodiversity conservation, climate
531 change mitigation and adaptation, and direct advantages for local landowners and
532 communities, since a range of local services provided by native vegetation would
533 return with vegetation recovery. This could stimulate compensation and offset
534 practitioners to combine measures of native vegetation protection and restoration
535 more often.

536

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