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FOOTBALL, MYSTICISM, THOMISTIC POETICS

JOSE ISIDRO BELLEZA

Abstract

This essay will especially consider the role of the cogitative power and affectivity in the formation of vocal utterances, showing how the Thomistic account of the integration of passion with reason provides a fascinating apparatus for assessing different uses of language—from the Eucharistic hymns of Aquinas, to the poetry of his Franciscan contemporaries Bonaventure and Iacopone da Todi, and even live sports commentary. The insights developed here, moreover, are not stand-alone reflections on language but hold consequences both for the moral life and for a proper construal of mystical union. By drawing out these further consequences of Aquinas's doctrine, we suggest the continuing relevance of Thomistic metaphysics and anthropology to concerns both contemporary and popular.

Introduction

The application of high philosophical-theological speculation—and Thomist speculation in particular—to something as broadly popular as professional sports might at first glance stand too vulnerable to the dangers associated with popularization. The sharply refined and careful distinctions required for proper metaphysical reflection could be bent, dulled, and flattened in the attempt to render more widely palatable those doctrines whose cogent explication emerged only through the monumental achievements of illustrious intellectuals. The danger of such reduction, however, ought not to discourage contemporary theorists from the ever-present imperative to demonstrate how philosophy and theology—if they indeed pertain to true reflection on ultimate realities—are rigorously applicable to even the most popular, mundane, and particular experiences of common life. This essay represents a small Thomistic exertion toward such an end.[1]

Jose Isidro Belleza
Faculty of Divinity, West Road, Cambridge, CB3 9BS, UK
Email: jib35@cam.ac.uk

[1] This essay is a significantly modified version of a presentation entitled "Maradona and Medieval Mysticism: Thomas Aquinas on the Poetics of Football Fandom" given on 7 October 2022 for the D Society (Graduate Seminar in Philosophy of Religion) in the Faculty of Divinity, University of Cambridge. This paper has benefited from invaluable conversations with dear mentors and friends, including Catherine Pickstock, Giles Waller, Vittorio Montemaggi, Andrew Davison, Hugh Barbour O.Praem., Bernhard Blankenhorn OP, Nicholas Lombardo OP, Steven Toussaint, Urban Hannon, and John Stayne. I also thank the two anonymous Modern Theology reviewers for their kind and generous assessments.

The impetus for the present article arose in the context of a larger research project which endeavored to contrast the poetics of Saint Thomas Aquinas[2] with that of some thirteenth-century Franciscans (principally Saint Bonaventure[3] and Iacopone da Todi) against the background of their diverse Dionysian receptions. The notion that Aquinas is more "intellectual" when compared with the more "affective" Franciscans has become a commonplace characterization,[4] but I wanted to test these labels through a rigorous investigation of their respective metaphysical doctrines, and to see how these differences might be manifest in their poetry. While the historical-critical work necessary to unpack these thirteenth-century texts was a more straightforward task, a successful jump into the more philosophical analysis proved elusive—until, on 25 November 2020, a flash of providence,more specifically, a text notification on my phone—caught my eye. It simply read, "Murió Diego."

Diego Armando Maradona, one of the greatest footballers of all time, had passed away.

In this wayfaring state one can hardly make the direct claim that, on 25 November 2020, the hand of God had providentially struck down the man who scored the so-called "hand of God" goal against England in the quarterfinal of the 1986 FIFA World Cup; rather, I simply mean to say that after his passing, with all the commemorative media coverage that accompanies the death of our notables, I found myself watching, again and again, footage of *the other goal* that Maradona scored against England which, unlike the infamous one he shamelessly celebrated just minutes earlier, might be the greatest goal in the history of the game. Footage of that goal, with the now-immortalized Spanish language commentary of Victor Hugo Morales for Radio Argentina, provided the long-awaited key to unlock my

[2] The works of Thomas Aquinas cited in this paper include: *Summa Theologiae* [=*ST*], from *Summa Theologiae*, 5 vols (Ottawa: Institute of Medieval Studies, 1941); *Commentary on the Sentences* [=*In Sent*.], from *Scriptum super libros Sententiarum magistri Petri Lombardi episcopi Parisiensis*, vols. 1-2, ed. Pierre Mandonnet (Paris: Lethielleux, 1929) and *Scriptum super libros Sententiarum magistri Petri Lombardi episcopi Parisiensis*, vols. 3-4 ed. Maria Fabianus Moos (Paris: Lethielleux, 1947 and 1956); *Summa Contra Gentiles* [=*SCG*], from *Liber de veritate catholicae Fidei contra errores infidelium seu Summa contra Gentiles*, vols. 2-3, eds. Petro Marc, Ceslas Pera, and Pietro Caramello (Turin-Rome: Marietti, 1961); *Sententia Libri Ethicorum* [=*In Ethic*.], from *Thomae Aquinatis opera omnia iussu Leonis XIII P.M. edita*, vol. 47 (Roma: Santa Sabina, 1969); *Commentary on the Metaphysics* [=*In Metaph*.], from *In duodecim libros Metaphysicorum Aristotelis expositio*, 2nd Edition, eds. M.R. Cathala and R.M. Spiazzi (Turin-Rome: Marietti, 1971); *Commentary on the Posterior Analytics* [=*In Post. An*.] and *Commentary on Interpretation* [=*In De Interpretatione*], in *Opera omnia iussu Leonis XIII P.M. edita*, vol. 1 (Rome-Paris: Leonine Commission-Vrin, 1989); *Commentary on De Anima* [=*In De Anima*], in *Opera omnia iussu Leonis XIII P. M. edita*, vol. 45 (Rome-Paris, Leonine Commission-Vrin, 1984); *Disputed Questions on Truth* [=*QDV*], in *Opera omnia iussu Leonis XIII P.M. edita*, vol. 22 (Rome: Santa Sabina, 1976).

[3] All works by Bonaventure cited are taken from the series *Doctoris Seraphici S. Bonaventurae opera omnia*, vols. 1-4, 5, 8. (Quaracchi: Collegium S. Bonaventurae, 1882-1902).

[4] Declan Lawell, "Ecstasy and the Intellectual Dionysianism of Thomas Aquinas and Albert the Great," in *Thomas Aquinas: Teacher and Scholar*, eds. James McEvoy, et al. (Dublin: Four Courts Press, 2012), 155-83, esp. 160-72, and idem, "Thomas Gallus: Affective Dionysianism," in *The Oxford Handbook of Dionysius the Areopagite*, ed. Mark Edwards (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2022), 379-95, presents the argument that Aquinas (following his teacher Albert the Great) represents an "intellectual Dionysianism" in contradistinction to the "affective Dionysianism" of Thomas Gallus. The interpretation of the Areopagite presented by Gallus heavily influences the reception of Dionysius among the early Franciscan scholastics, especially Bonaventure; however, Albert and Aquinas, in ways more or less subtle, seem to refuse the Gallusian synthesis. Denys Turner in *The Darkness of God: Negativity in Christian Mysticism* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995), 131, briefly summarizes Bonaventure's debt to Gallus and concurrent distancing from the text of Dionysius himself: "Bonaventure's description of the apophatic ecstasy shifts the emphasis from the intellectualism of Denys' mysticism of vision toward the voluntarism of a mysticism of love. Whereas Denys's ecstasy is the *excessus* of self-transcending intellect, Bonaventure's is an ecstasy in which, ultimately, intellect is transcended not by itself but by a transport of desire." Taken together, Turner and Lawell point us toward an implicit thesis: the positive retention of the intellectual aspect in Aquinas's construal of mystical union brings the Angelic Doctor closer to Dionysius than either Bonaventure or Gallus. For the Gallusian influence on Bonaventure, see Bernard McGinn, "Thomas Gallus and Dionysian Mysticism," *Studies in Spirituality* 8 (1998), 81-96.

mental impasse. I quote the relevant excerpt below in Spanish and in English translation, although the reader may find it more helpful to find the video footage online so as to experience more fully the affective weight of Morales's radio call.

… Ahí la tiene Maradona, lo marcan dos. Pisa la pelota Maradona. ¡Arranca por la derecha el genio del futbol mundial! Y deja al tercero y va a tocar para Burruchaga—¡Siempre Maradona!

¡Genio! ¡Genio! ¡Genio!
TA-TA-TA-TA-TA-TA-TA…
¡GOL! ¡GOL! ¡GOL! ¡Quiero llorar!
¡Dios Santo, viva el futbol!
¡GOLAAAZO!

¡Diegol! ¡Maradona! ¡Es para llorar, perdónenme! ¡Maradona, en una corrida memorable, en la jugada de todos los tiempos! ¡Barrilete cósmico! ¿De qué planeta viniste, para dejar en el camino a tanto inglés, para que el país sea un puño apretado gritando por Argentina?

Argentina 2 - Inglaterra 0 ¡Diegol, Diegol, Diego Armando Maradona!

Gracias Dios, por el fútbol, por Maradona, por estas lágrimas, por este Argentina 2 - Inglaterra 0.

… Maradona holds the ball, with two marking him. Maradona sets the ball. The genius of international football zooms down the right! He leaves the third defender behind and goes to pass to Burruchaga—It's still Maradona!

Genius! Genius! Genius!
TA-TA-TA-TA-TA-TA-TA…
GOAL! GOAL! GOAL! I want to cry!
Holy God, long live football!
GOLAAAZO!

Diegol! Maradona! It's making me cry, I'm sorry! Maradona in an unforgettable run, in a play for the ages! The Cosmic Kite! What planet did you come from, leaving all the English in your wake, turning the country into a clenched fist screaming for Argentina?

Argentina 2 - England 0. Diegol, Diegol, Diego Armando Maradona!

Thank you, God, for football, for Maradona, for these tears, for this result, Argentina 2 - England 0.

As a guide to the forthcoming reflections, I ask the question: "When is Morales truly 'in the moment'"? How one answers this query functions as a cipher for one's own preconceptions of the relationship between affect and intellect, between body and soul, and even between metaphysics and ethics. Is Morales "most in the moment" when he is babbling repetitively and onomatopoeically, or when he can wax poetic with the strange image of a "cosmic kite," or even further, only when he explicitly gives thanks to God? I will leave this third more theological option aside for now, and only suggest the following: *it is only in Morales's "recovery" from the immediate shock of the goal, when he can return to the full use of complete sentences and employ poetic language to interpret the moment, that the event is fully embodied in him*. Or, at the least, this is what I believe to be the position of Thomas Aquinas. But to bolster this point, we must embark on a few intermediate steps.

This essay accordingly unfolds in five parts. After this introduction, Part One offers a general overview of the aspects of Thomistic anthropology relevant for this study. Next, Part Two summarizes Aquinas's general doctrine of the passions, with special reference to their contribution to moral action. Part Three considers what occurs when vehement

passions impede the internal sense known as the cogitative power, focusing on its effects on language. Part Four applies the previous reflections to a contrastive analysis of two different modes of medieval poetry, with Aquinas on one side, and the Franciscan friars Bonaventure and Iacopone da Todi on the other. In Part Five, the Aristotelian-Thomistic critique of metaphor is examined according to both metaphysical and ethical considerations. Finally, by way of conclusion, some broader reflections on the proper construal of the relationship between affect and intellect in both moral action and mystical theology will suggest the continuing relevance of Aquinas's doctrine for interpreting more popular or diurnal aspects of contemporary life, especially regarding the proper use of language.

Part One: A Brief Thomistic Anthropology

Thomas Aquinas accepts the Aristotelian division of the human soul into vegetative, sensitive, and rational parts, such that the involuntary living functions common to plants (the vegetative powers), as well as the use of five external senses and automotion common to animals (the sensitive powers), are also possessed by humans, who add to these lower parts the use of discursive reason. In the wider context of Aristotelian hylomorphism, one can say that, although the body-soul composite pervades the entire human person and its constituent parts, the lower powers pertain more to the body, while the rational power pertains more to the immaterial, spiritual soul.[5] Thus, at the more bodily level, plant organisms subsist on direct contact with their environment (through a proto-sense of touch), while animal or sensitive organisms possess some or all of the five external senses (touch, taste, hearing, sound, and sight)[6] as well as four internal senses (common sense, memory, imagination, and the estimative power)[7] which interpret data from the external senses. Use of internal senses signify recourse to more spiritual powers in animals, manifested in aptitude for self-motion and limited choice.[8]

Humans add to these animal powers the rational part of the soul, comprised of the two faculties of intellect (understanding) and will (desire).[9] However, on the level of the sensitive soul, the human being already possesses the estimative power in a way that properly disposes the person to the use of reason itself.[10] The estimative power in animals is akin to "instinct"; it judges according to connatural desires and fears proper to animals, such that their "choices" are more heavily determined by their essential nature than by a true act of will. By contrast, the estimative power in humans is more properly called the "cogitative power" or "particular reason".[11] For the sake of avoiding a lengthy excursus on the cogita-

[5] For Thomas and Aristotle, the intellect is a purely immaterial faculty, dependent on no bodily organ; see *De Anima* 3.

[6] *ST* I, q. 78, a. 3.

[7] *ST* I, q. 78, a. 4.

[8] *ST* I, q. 76, a. 3.

[9] *ST* I, q. 77, aa. 4-7.

[10] *In De Anima* 2, lc. 13, n. 13.

[11] The principal texts for the late Aquinas on the cogitative power are *ST* I, q. 78, a. 4, *respondeo* and ad 4; and q. 81, a. 3, *respondeo*, although the teaching remains consistent throughout his corpus. Secondary literature on the cogitative power consulted include Daniel De Haan, "Perception and the *Vis Cogitativa*: A Thomistic Analysis of Aspectional, Actional, and Affectional Percepts," *American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly* 88 (2014): 397-437; A. Leo White, "Why the Cogitative Power?" *Proceedings of the American Catholic Philosophical Association* 72 (1998): 213-27; Anthony Kenny, *Aquinas on Mind* (New York: Routledge, 1993), 37; Robert Pasnau, *Thomas Aquinas on Human Nature: A Philosophical Study of Summa Theologiae Ia 75-89* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), 253-56; Robert Miner, *Thomas Aquinas on the Passions: A Study of Summa Theologiae 1a2ae 22-48* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009), 69-82; Mark Barker, "The Cogitative Power: Aquinas' Development of His Predecessors' Views," *Dianoetikon* 1 (2020): 165-74. For an extended bibliography, see De Haan, "Perception," 398-99, n. 4.

tive power, here we must content ourselves with a summary explanation[12]: the cogitative power is responsible for *recognizing a particular instance of a universal genus*, for it "apprehends individual things as existing under a common nature."[13] In terms of the underlying logical structure of cognition, the cogitative power pertains to *judgment*, the second act of the intellect, which asserts the truth of a proposition; the cogitative power thus forms the minor premise of a practical syllogism. If the unimpeded cogitative power yields a true minor premise (or any proposition in general), then conversely, the formation of stuttering or repetitive utterances *cannot* result from the correct operation of the cogitative power. Stated positively, *heavy identical repetition or onomatopoeic stuttering signifies either a mitigation of the cogitative power's proper operation, or a conscious action against it*. Likewise, the formation of a *metaphorical statement* asserting an improper logical or metaphysical relation between subject and predicate also *cannot* result from the correct operation of the cogitative power. This consideration of metaphors as denoting a mitigation or evasion of the cogitative power also sheds light on Thomas's Aristotelian conviction that metaphors ought not be used in rational disputation,[14] since proper syllogistic argument would be impossible without the proposition-forming functions of this internal sense. *In sum, if the cogitative power is impeded or evaded, the vocal utterances which result therefrom can take the form of stuttering, identical repetition, or invalid propositions* (*such as metaphorical statements*).

The cogitative power's liminal "location" between the sensitive and rational parts of the human soul[15] suggests its critical role in ensuring that sense data is integrated into the rational faculties of intellect and will. To place the cogitative power's significance into sharper relief, especially in relation to the effects of the passions on reason, some review of the Thomistic doctrine on the passions—particularly, the "passions of the sensitive soul"—is now our task.

Part Two: Aquinas on Passions and Moral Action

The aforementioned hierarchical division of the human soul into vegetative, animal-sensitive, and rational powers supplies the basic architectonics which, along with hylomorphism, governs the Thomist account of the passions. Following the Aristotelian axiom that there is "nothing is in the intellect which was not first in the senses,"[16] Aquinas holds that data from external stimuli enter the process of human cognition through the five external senses, which are then interpreted by the four internal senses, resulting in *intentions* which are either proper and common sensibles (i.e., first intentions) stored in the memory, or composites of first intentions (i.e.,

[12] Adapted from Barker, "The Cogitative Power," 171-72. Other sources from Aquinas on these cogitative functions, beyond the *ST* texts cited above, include *In IV Sent*., d. 50, q. 1, a. 3; *QDA*, q. 13, *respondeo*; *SCG* II, c. 26; and *In Ethic*. VI., lc. 1, nos. 7 and 9.

[13] *In De Anima* 2, lc. 13, nn. 13-15: "cogitativa apprehendit individuum ut existens sub natura communi."

[14] For Thomas's critique of metaphor as "deficient in truth," see *In Post. An*. I, lc. 1, n. 6; *In Post. An*. II, lc. 16; *In I Sent*., Prol., q. 1, a. 5, ad 3; and *ST* I, q. 1, a. 9, obj. 1 and ad 1. See also, *SCG* IV, c. 29, n. 4 where, in a more theological register, Thomas contrasts the realism of the Gospel with the metaphorical similitudes of literary fictions: "Esset praeterea tota evangelica narratio poetica et fabularis, si rerum similitudines apparentes quasi res ipsas narraret: cum tamen dicatur II Petr. 1:16: non enim indoctas fabulas secuti notam fecimus vobis domini nostri Iesu Christi virtutem." Notably, see *In Metaph*. I, lc. 15, n. 7: in support of Aristotle's rejection of the theory of forms, Aquinas notes that the Platonic doctrine as he understood it "est simile metaphoris quas poetae inducunt, quod ad philosophum non pertinet." It will be worth recalling these points in our later section on metaphors.

[15] *In III Sent*., d. 23, q. 2, a. 2, ad qla. 3, ad 3: "illa potentia … cogitativa, est in confinio sensitivae et intellectivae partis, ubi pars sensitiva intellectivam attingit."

[16] *QDV*, q. 2, a. 3, arg. 19, *inter alia*.

second intentions) stored in the imagination. Each intention terminates in one or more *passions of the sensitive soul*, broadly understood as akin to the contemporary notion of "emotions."[17]

Following on the upper two parts of the soul, Aquinas distinguishes two appetites in the human person corresponding to these parts. The sensitive appetite is the principle by which the organism desires particular goods necessary for the sustenance and propagation of life (e.g., food, sex) while the rational appetite seeks the universal Good itself (i.e., God).[18] However, on account of its sensate nature, the human person cannot seek the universal Good directly but must do so by means of sensible goods. Because a diversity of goods may be presented to the sensitive appetite, it pertains to the rational faculties (intellect and will) to discern, understand, and choose particular goods according to what pertains most closely to right reason in particular contexts.

The term "passion" denotes something received, and the "location" of passions in the sensitive part of the soul is a key aspect of Aquinas's conviction that passions ought to be placed under the direction of the reason and will,[19] that is to say, integrated under specifically human powers. Aquinas is thus able to explicate a highly nuanced account of the passions, challenging the largely Stoic attitudes which dominated Western reflection on the passions since Cicero. Rejecting the idea that all passions are morally neutral[20] or intrinsically evil,[21] Aquinas draws on the critical distinction between the sensitive and rational appetites to assess the complex ways in which the passions relate to moral good and evil.[22] Without tracing the full course of the *Summa* treatise on the passions, we can attain some sense of the relationship between the passions and moral acts by noting Thomas's earlier comments on reason's "political" (i.e., not "despotic") rule over the passions.

Aquinas develops Aristotle's observation in *Politics* that "the intellect dominates the sensitive appetite by a political and royal power," noting that "the sensitive appetite can resist the commands of reason" because "it has something of its own."[23] This assertion of the sensitive appetite's quasi-independence "points to the ability of the sensitive appetite to make a contribution of its own in the return of the rational creature to the ultimate end."[24] The analogy between politics and the appetites holds immense explanatory power for Aquinas, offering a framework to describe how particular goods cognized by the sensitive appetite ought to be ordered to a more universal and common good. Thus, it pertains to the rational faculties to order and prioritize lower goods so as to best orient the person to the transcendent Good as ultimate end.

Now we consider how the passions influence moral action, with particular reference to disordered moral choices. In the first two articles of *Prima Secundae*, Question 77, Thomas treats of the ways in which the motions of the sensitive appetite (i.e., the

[17] Nicholas Lombardo, *The Logic of Desire: Aquinas on Emotion* (Washington, DC: Catholic University of America Press, 2011), 15-19, 22-25; Miner, *Thomas Aquinas on the Passions*, 58-87.

[18] *ST* I, q. 80, a. 2.

[19] *ST* I-II, q. 24, a. 1.

[20] *ST* I-II, q. 24, a. 1. While this view is attributed to the Peripatetics, Aquinas seems to vindicate Aristotle against the Peripatetics, interpreting *De Anima* 3 to justify how the rational appetite influences the sensitive.

[21] *ST* I-II, q. 24, a. 2.

[22] *ST* I-II, q. 24, aa. 3-4.

[23] *ST* I, q. 81, a. 3, ad 2.

[24] Miner, Thomas Aquinas on the Passions, 95.

passions) might contribute to sinful acts, synthesizing his previous reflections on the political relation between the sensitive and rational appetites to explain how the passions might overcome reason. The corpus of Article 1, explaining how the will is moved only indirectly by the sensitive appetite, distinguishes two ways by which the passions influence reason.

First, by a kind of distraction: because of the unity of the soul and its powers, the presentation of several goods to the sensitive appetite means that the human person cannot equally choose all these goods simultaneously, "for power is diminished when divided." Using the intellect to discern and the will to choose, the agent must prioritize his choices of goods according to right reason while accounting for the moral context. Second, by "a vehement and disordered apprehension of the imagination and judgment of the estimative power": considering persons engaged in a passion, such as those tasting good food, Aquinas observes that they "cannot easily avert their attention from those things which affect them." The vehemence of passion, caused by the intense contact of an object with the sensitive appetite, creates an inordinately heightened focus on the object, such that the rational ordering of all external goods becomes difficult. "Consequently, the judgment of reason normally follows a passion of the sensitive appetite, and the movement of the will follows therefrom, since [the will] naturally follows the judgment of reason."[25] In Article 2, Thomas considers three ways by which the passions might overcome reason.

> First, by some distraction, as said above [Article 1]. Second, by opposition, since passion often inclines a person toward something contrary to universal knowledge. Third, by a bodily transmutation, by which the reason is somehow constrained such that it cannot act freely, as in sleepiness or drunkenness, where the use of reason is constrained on account of a change in the body. That this occurs in the passions is clear from the fact that sometimes, when the passions are particularly intense, a person completely loses the use of reason, like those who out of an abundance of love or anger have become insane. Passion thereby draws the reason against universal knowledge in particular cases.[26]

When assessing the effects of the passions on reason, our previous explorations of the cogitative power will be important in linking the content of this excursus on the passions to the formation of linguistic utterances. Notably, in *Prima Secundae*, Question 77, Article 1, Aquinas explains how the "vehemence of passion" *principally affects the apprehension of the imagination and the judgment of the estimative power* (*or human cogitative power*);[27] passionate disturbances in these internal senses enable the reason to be led astray, leading to the possibility of choosing acts not in accord with reason (i.e., sins).

Aquinas lists some concrete effects of the passions when, due to their vehemence, they overcome or hinder reason. Excess of love or hatred can pull the lover into a disordered

[25] *ST* I-II, q. 77, a. 1, *respondeo*; cf. *ST* I-II, q. 10, a. 3 on the concurrence of bodily transmutation with the passions.

[26] *ST* I-II, q. 77, a. 2, *respondeo*.

[27] *ST* I-II, q. 77, a. 1, *respondeo*: "Impeditur enim iudicium et apprehensio rationis propter vehementam et inordinatam apprehensionem imaginationis, et iudicium virtutis aestimativae, ut patet in amentibus. Manifestum est autem quod passionem appetitus sensitivi sequitur imaginationis apprehensio, et iudicium aestimativae, sicut etiam dispositionem linguae sequitur iudicium gustus."

ecstasy, while love of unsuitable things can wound the lover.[28] Vehement pleasure or sorrow can hinder action, is harmful to the body, and can even cause loud cries or tears.[29] Great fear incites trembling,[30] while anger causes stuttering and taciturnity.[31] Given the possibility of experiencing several passions simultaneously, we see how the aggregate effects of bodily transmutation linked to the passions can lead to certain irrational or pre-rational oral utterances (e.g., groans, sighs, crying, laughter) which signify, even if temporarily, the vehemence of the passions and—possibly—their overpowering of the reason. Onomatopoeic interjections and monosyllabic exclamations, sometimes repeated to the point of stuttering, likewise signify a moment of unresolved struggle between passion and reason. This struggle, however, occurs not principally in the reason, but in the sensitive powers; specifically, *Aquinas locates the conflict in the imagination and cogitative power*.

Part Three: The Mitigation of the Cogitative Power and Effects on Language

Recalling that the cogitative power's task *to identify particular instantiations of a universal genus*—including the proper formation of a minor premise—we see how a vehement disturbance in the sensitive soul caused by the passions leads to a mitigation of the cogitative power, which degrades the ability to produce a sound proposition in the form of a particular premise. While this primarily describes an interior cognitional process, the Aristotelian axiom that "words signify passions of the soul"[32] allows us to argue *a fortiori* that an inability to form a mental proposition necessarily produces an inability to express that proposition according to conventional language. Said positively, utterances which issue consequently from a vehemence of passion often do not take the form of proper propositions. The observations of Gregory the Great on the effects of anger, received *en masse* by medievals like Aquinas, point to just some of the ways in which groans, laughter, cries, or other onomatopoeic and involuntary vocalizations are natural signs of vehement passions.[33]

To these non-propositional utterances we can add stuttering, some forms of identical repetition, and even silence. For example, the stammer and taciturnity which Aquinas and Gregory associate with fear might signify either (1) a concomitant pre-rational inability to make sense of a dangerous object whose magnitude appears unfathomable, or (2) a true mental recognition of a threat but, on account of a corresponding bodily transmutation, a failure to vocally express that recognition according to linguistic convention. With respect to the second option, Anselm Ramelow places in more familiar terms the psychological phenomenon which often accompanies stuttering or an inability to speak.

[28] *ST* I-II, qq. 28-29.

[29] *ST* I-II, qq. 33 and 37.

[30] *ST* I-II, q. 44, a. 3.

[31] *ST* I-II, q. 48, a. 4. When treating of anger in this question, Aquinas repeatedly cites a passage from Gregory the Great's *Moralia in Job*, Book 5, c. 45, n. 79 (Migne, *Patrologia Latina* 75:724-725) listing the several effects of anger: "Nam irae suae stimulis accensum cor palpitat, corpus tremit, lingua se praepedit, facies ignescit, exasperantur oculi, et nequamquam recognoscuntur noti. Ore quidem clamorem format, sed sensus quid loquatur ignorat," etc.

[32] Aristotle, *De Interpretatione*, 16a2. Aquinas takes this doctrine for granted, expressing it at times using different words, e.g., *In I Sent*., d. 22, q. 1, a. 1: "cum voces sint signa intellectuum, secundum philosophum, idem judicium est de cognitione rei et nominatione ejus."

[33] See also Aquinas, *In De Interpretatione* I, lc. 2, n. 8.

> We all have the experience of searching for words. This is not just a problem for poets, but whenever we are actually thinking and not just repeating slogans and rattling off words like parrots, we will have this experience. It is precisely when we are thinking, that the expression of thought can become difficult. We know what we want to say, but we do not know how to say it. We do not know which linguistic expression would be most adequate.[34]

The distinction between interior cognition and exterior vocalization upon which Ramelow draws is useful for two reasons. First, it reinforces the notion that conventional language is always a mediated expression whose proper exercise is contingent on a relative harmony of body and soul achieved through rational integration of the passions. Second, this distinction might suggest an explanation as to why, even if the imagination apprehends rightly and the cogitative power judges well, the bodily transmutation accompanying the passions can physically inhibit the proper vocalization of words. Perhaps more commonly, stuttering and heavy repetition might also signify *both* a bodily transmutation *and* a mitigation of the cogitative power, in that the failure to express a complete and correct grammatical proposition is attributable not only to the physical force tied to the passion, but also to a concurrent internal failure to recognize a particular instance of a universal genus.

Thus we return to Morales's reaction to Maradona's goal. The commentator, seized by the brilliance of Maradona's solo play, can only scream, "¡Genio! ¡Genio! ¡Genio!" as the Argentinian zigzags past the helpless English defenders; next comes the onomatopoeic sequence "TA-TA-TA-TA-TA-TA-TA," a crude vocal imitation of Maradona's rapid yet finely controlled touches on the ball. Finally, the exclamation "¡GOL! ¡GOL! ¡GOL!": this signifies a momentary overcoming of reason by the passion of joy, whereby Maradona's action as apprehended impedes Morales's cogitative power, inhibiting his ability to speak in sound propositions or complete sentences. It is only later, when Morales is able to poetically describe Maradona as "barrilete cósmico," rhetorically asking "what planet are you from?" and labeling England as "a clenched fist screaming because of Argentina" that he has returned to a more human way of thinking and speaking (although, as we alluded previously and will highlight later, the use of metaphorical language also requires a critical reassessment). Nevertheless, the return to more concrete linguistic clarity signals a restorative reintegration of passion with reason, a participative unity of bodily and intellectual powers. To further demonstrate, I want to recall a more recent sporting event which, as of this writing, should be fresher in the collective memories especially of our England-based readers.

The final match of the UEFA European Championships between Italy and England was played at Wembley Stadium on 11 July 2021. With the score tied at one goal apiece at the end of extra time, the European title would be decided by a penalty shootout. Bukayo Saka, only nineteen years old at the time, had been selected to take the critical, do-or-die fifth penalty for England. Italian goalkeeper Gianluigi Donnarumma, diving toward his left post, emphatically parried away Saka's shot and with it the hopes of all England, launching Italy to the heights of European

[34] Tilman Anselm Ramelow, "Language Without Reduction," *Angelicum* 85 (2008): 497-517, at 508.

glory; Italian defender Leonardo Bonucci, caught up in the rapturous triumph, sought out a TV camera and mocked the home fans with the anaphoric refrain, "it's coming to Rome!" And while the England-based readers of this journal might more easily remember the palpable disappointment which descended over the country at the moment of defeat, perhaps the ecstatic reaction of Fabio Caressa, the Italian national team's designated play-by-play commentator for Sky Sport Italia, provides a more apt opportunity to illustrate the relevance of Thomistic analysis in moments of real emotional excess. What follows is Caressa's commentary from the moment of Donnarumma's save.

Sì! Grazie Signore che ci hai dato il calcio! Grazie Signore che chi hai dato il calcio, che ci fa abbracciare, che ci fa sognare, che ci fa vincere, che ci fa vincere!	YES! Thank you, Lord, for giving us football! Thank you, Lord, for giving us football, for it makes us embrace one another, it lets us dream, it lets us win, it lets us win!
Grazie! Siamo Campioni d'Europa, Italia! Siamo Campioni d'Europa! Campioni d'Europa! Grazie! Grazie che esista lo sport, che ci fa abbracciare, e che ci fa piangere!	Thank you! We're Champions of Europe, Italy! We're Champions of Europe! Champions of Europe! Thank you! Thank you for the existence of sport, for it makes us embrace, and it makes us cry!
"Grazie per queste lacrime," come disse il mio collega con il gol di Maradona, che ci fa tornare alla vita! Grazie Signore!	"Thank you for these tears," as my colleague once said at Maradona's goal, for it brings us back to life! Thank you, Lord!
Siamo Campioni d'Europa! Grazie ragazzi! Ve lo siete meritato! Siete i nostri eroi moderni! Ve lo siete meritato! Siamo venuti senza paura a Wembley a giocarci l'Europeo e a vincerlo, a vincerlo!	We're Champions of Europe! Thank you, boys! You've deserved it! You're our modern-day heroes! You've deserved it! We came to Wembley without fear to play for the European Championship, and to win it, to win it!
Grazie Mancio, ci hai dato delle lezioni! Ti amo Gianluca [Vialli], sei un fratello e te lo meriti! Presidente [Mattarella], io lo so che è un'istituzione e non púo lasciarsi troppo andare, ma si allarghi questo sorriso, Presidente!	Thank you, Mancini, you've taught us all! I love you, Gianluca [Vialli], you're our brother and you deserve it! President [Mattarella], I know you're an institution and can't let yourself get carried away, but let that smile break out, Mr President!

While Caressa's words display less of a stuttering character when compared to Morales's reaction, we can recognize the emotional excess of the moment immediately after the penalty kick, where the phrase "Grazie Signore che ci hai dato il calcio" is repeated identically twice, followed by subordinate clauses marked by

anaphoric repetition, and another twice repeated phrase ("che ci fa vincere"). "Grazie" becomes a refrain punctuating the rest of the commentary, even when Caressa is able, for example, to thank specific people, or to recall historical moments in the sport, such as his reference to Morales's phrase ("thank you for these tears"). For both Morales and Caressa, language becomes more concrete and more fluent as time progresses, and on that basis, we can track the gradual "return" of reason's "political rule" after the temporary mitigation of the cogitative power which often marks the vehemence of passion. Interestingly, this parallels Aquinas's treatment of Saint Paul's rapture described in 2 Corinthians 12. For although the Apostle was withdrawn from his senses while "seeing" the divine essence, he was nevertheless only able to understand and communicate this knowledge afterward by recalling, through *species intelligibiles* or bodily images, something of that experience.[35] In Thomistic terms, Paul must still "return to phantasms"[36] and make recourse to sense impressions. Any experience—from moments of sporting triumph to ineffable divine union—becomes fully "humanized" only when spiritual and bodily powers overcome their temporary disjunction and are reintegrated in their proper hierarchical ordering.

Part Four: Poetic Applications

How might these preceding observations on language be reflected in medieval poetry? If we have seen how the repetitive stuttering which characterizes emotional overload can yield to a balance between passion and reason signified by clear and concrete utterances, then poetry which proceeds in a more affective mode should likewise manifest that kind of repetitive or stuttering language. In my own research, whose broader findings lie beyond the scope of the present essay, I have found that identical repetition prominently features in thirteenth-century mystical Franciscan poetry, especially in the work of Bonaventure da Bagnoregio and Iacopone da Todi; this observation, I suggest, coheres with the characterization of the Franciscan approach as generally "more affective." Let us first consider these excerpts from the poem *Laudismus de Sancta Cruce* by Saint Bonaventure.[37]

[35] *ST* II-II, q. 175, a. 4, ad 3: "Paulus, postquam cessavit videre Dei essentiam, memor fuit illorum quae in illa visione cognoverat, per aliquas species intelligibiles habitualiter ex hoc in eius intellectu relictas, sicut etiam, abeunte sensibili, remanent aliquae impressiones in anima, quas postea conferens and phantasmata, memoratur. Unde nec totam illam cognitionem aut cogitare poterat, aut verbis exprimere."

[36] *In De Anima* 3, lc. 6; *QDV*, q. 10, a. 6, *resp*. and ad 6-7.

[37] For the attribution of this poem to Bonaventure, see Alexander Horowski, "Opere autentiche e spurie, edite, inedite, e mal edite di san Bonaventure da Bagnoregio: bilancio e prospettive," *Collectanea Franciscana* 86 (2016): 461-544, esp. at 480: of the twenty early manuscripts containing *Laudismus*, "Tranne in due casi nei quali è attribuito a San Bernardo di Clairvaux, e alcuni manoscritti anonimi, il testo è concordemente ascritto a Bonaventura." For the poem's text, see *Doctoris Seraphici S. Bonaventurae Opera Omnia*, vol. 8, 667-69; English translation by the author.

Quaere crucem, quaere clavos,	Seek the cross, seek the nails,
Quaere manus, pedes cavos,	seek the crooked hands and feet,
Quaere fossa lateris.	seek the cave in his side.
Ibi plaude, ibi gaude	Praise there, rejoice there
Sine fraude, summa laude,	without duplicity, with highest praising,
quantumcunque poteris. […]	as much as you can. […]
Crux est speculum virtutis,	The cross is the mirror of virtue,
Gloriosae dux salutis,	the ruler of glorious salvation,
Tota spes fidelium.	the entire hope of the faithful.
Crux est decus salvandorum	The cross is the glory of those to be saved,
Et solatium eorum	their solace,
Atque desiderium.	and their desire.
Crux est navis, crux est portus,	The cross is a ship, the cross is a harbor,
Crux deliciarum hortus,	the cross is the garden of delights,
In quo florent omnia.	in which all things flourish.
Crux est fortis armatura	The cross is heavy armor
Et protectio secura,	and sure protection
Conterens daemonia.	holding back the demons.

Bonaventure here makes heavy use of anaphora or repeating the same words at the beginning of succeeding lines or phrases. In the first stanza cited, the tighter, rhythmic repetition of the command *quaere* betray the author's reliance on an extrinsic poetic structure (marked by strict rhythmic, metrical, and accentual concerns) to establish immediate emotional impact. The things to be sought—the cross, the nails, the pierced hands, the wounded feet, and the pierced side—all remain within the immediate scope of one who gazes on the crucified, such that seeing "the cross" will almost ineluctably lead to reflection on the individual wounds, rather than on the *whole person* whose singular Passion and death ought to be the unique impetus for affective ascent. Anaphora interrupts the observer's integral gaze on the crucifix, as if doubling the fractures of the crucified body, in favor of the immediate aesthetic or emotional appeal proffered by mere rhythmic repetition. The repeated phrase "crux est" introduces a whole slate of metaphors by which the cross could be understood; however, the repetition of "crux est" itself offers no supplementary signification. Anaphora is employed for its own sake, with no intrinsic unfolding of meaning as when, by contrast, devices like alliteration and consonance are used to great effect in the poetry of Aquinas. Recourse to repetition, compounded by Bonaventure's accumulation of short textual units and simple metaphors, manifests the Franciscan's more affective approach to mystical contemplation. But if for now we observe that

Bonaventure perhaps moderately valorized affect over intellect in mystical union,[38] the radicalized prioritization of affect over and against intellect taken by the Spiritual Franciscans[39] likewise means that repetitive syntax should feature more prominently in their poems; this is exactly what we find in Iacopone da Todi, one of the most famous Spiritual Franciscans and author of the largest poetic corpus in an Italian vernacular before Dante.[40] What follows is an excerpt from *Lauda 89*, also known by its incipit *Amor de Caritate*,[41] where the poet describes his self-negating descent into loving union with God.

[38] This characterization of Bonaventure as prioritizing affect over intellect in mystical union is strongly affirmed in Robert Glenn Davis, *The Weight of Love: Affect, Ecstasy, and Union in the Theology of Bonaventure* (New York: Fordham University Press, 2017) and Turner, *The Darkness of God*, 75-136. Recently, Jay Hammond has attempted to modify this characterization by reading *Itinerarium* 7 as describing the joint passage of affect and intellect into divine union; see his "Trinitarian Mystical Union: A Re-reading of Chapter 7 of Bonaventure's *Itinerarium Mentis in Deum*," in *Saint Bonaventure: Friar, Teacher, Minister, Bishop: A Celebration of the Eighth Centenary of His Birth*, eds. Timothy Johnson, et al. (St. Bonaventure, NY: Franciscan Institute Publications, 2021), 325-40. For Hammond, the transfer of the entire *apex animae* into God means the purgative elevation of both affect and intellect. However, this is a strained reading of Bonaventure which (1) reads contemporary Catholic discourse on the interpenetration of faith and reason into the *Itinerarium*, and (2) ignores the inversely proportional relationship between intellective and affective gifts mapped throughout the text; this latter point is an unfortunate effect of Hammond's admirable yet narrow focus on *Itinerarium* 7. Hammond explicitly avoids Davis's *Weight of Love* and is silent on Massimo Tedoldi, "*L'Intellectus* si consegna all'*Affectus*," in *Deus Summe Cognoscibilis: The Current Theological Relevance of Saint Bonaventure*, eds. Amaury Begasse de Dhaem, et al., (Peeters: Leuven, 2018), 93-109; both these works decisively demonstrate the priority of affect over intellect in Bonaventurean mysticism. We agree with Hammond that both intellect and affect are transferred into God in *Itinerarium* 7; however, in this state of univocal Dionysian unknowing, the affective gifts retain a priority over the intellectual gifts. The plain sense of Bonaventure's dichotomies in 7.6 ("interroga gratiam non doctrinam, desiderium non intellectum," etc.), especially highlighted by Tedoldi as the apex of a progressive marginalization of intellectual gifts, amply refutes Hammond's interpretation. For other Bonaventurean texts on the priority of *affectus* over *intellectus*, see *In III Sent*., d. 23, a. 1, q. 3, ad 4: "cum ipsa voluntas sit supremum in anima", cf. *In III Sent*., d. 17, a. 1, q. 1, opp. 4 and ad 4. For the Gallusian notion that affective union exceeds intellectual knowledge, see Bonaventure's description of mystic union as *ignote ascendere* and *docta ignorantia* in *In II Sent*., d. 23, a. 2, q. 3, *corpus* and ad 6. *Commentarium in Johannem* 1:43 presents knowledge of God *in caligine* as more *sentire* than *cognoscere*. A mature formulation of the doctrine presented in these earlier texts is found in *Hexaemeron* II.30: "Sola affectiva vigilat et silentium omnibus aliis potentiis imponit," cf. II.33-34.

[39] For an overview of the Spiritual Franciscan movement, see David Burr, *Spiritual Franciscans: From Protest to Persecution in the Century After Saint Francis* (University Park, PA: Pennsylvania State University Press, 2001), especially 100-07 with reference to Iacopone da Todi.

[40] For a broader look at Iacopone in his historical context, see Alvaro Cacciotti, *Amor sacro e profano in Jacopone da Todi* (Rome: Antonianum, 1989); idem, *La teologia mystica di Iacopone da Todi* (Milan: Edizioni Biblioteca Francescana, 2020); Enrico Menestò, "La biografia di Iacopone: problemi non ancora risolti," in *Iacopone da Todi, un francescano scomodo, ma attuale*, ed. Marco Poli (Bologna: Fondazione del Monte di Bologna e Ravenna, 1997), 27-40. For an English-language overview, see George T. Peck, *The Fool of God, Jacopone da Todi* (Tuscaloosa, AL: University of Alabama Press, 1980), although the reader ought to be wary of its limitations, especially those identified by Mark Davie's review in *Medium Aevum* 51 (1982): 269-72. Peck's recourse to texts relying on Francesco Bonaccorsi's 1490 edition, despite the availability of Franco Mancini's edition (1974), perpetuates the problem of "Tuscanization" characterizing older scholarship on Iacopone; in Peck's case this also produces some errors in translation.

[41] Full text in Iacopone da Todi, *Laude*, ed. Luigi M. Reale (Perugia: EFFE Fabrizio Fabbri Editore, 2006), 390-96. English translation by the author.

Amore, Amore, quanto tu me fai,	O Love, O Love, how ardent you are,
Amore, Amore, no 'l pòzzo patere!	O Love, O Love, I cannot withstand you!
Amore, Amore, tanto me tte dài,	O Love, O Love, you give yourself to me,
Amore, Amore, ben ne credo morire!	O Love, O Love, that I believe I should die!
Amore, Amore, tanto preso m'ài,	O Love, O Love, you have captured me,
Amore, Amore, famme en te transire!	O Love, O Love, let me pass away unto you!
Amor, dolce languire, morir plu delettoso,	O Love, sweet suffering, most delightful dying,
Amor medecaroso, anegam'enn amore.	O Love most healing, annihilate me in love.

Amore, Amor, lo cor sì me sse spezza,	O Love, O Love, thus my heart is breaking,
Amore, Amor, tale sente firita!	O Love, O Love, that it feels the wound!
Amore, Amor, tram' en la tua bellezza,	O Love, O Love, take me into your beauty,
Amore, Amor, per te sì so' rapita;	O Love, O Love, I am raptured by you;
Amore, Amor, vivere me desprezza,	O Love, O Love, life itself despises me,
Amore, Amor, l'anema teco unita!	O Love, O Love, my soul is united with you!
Amor, tu si sua vita, ià non se 'n pò partire;	O Love, my soul's life, my soul cannot leave you,
per que la fai languire, tanto stregnenno, Amore?	why do you let it languish, holding it tight, O Love?

In earlier stanzas of this long poem, Iacopone speaks directly to Christ, calling him by name ("Iesù"), until line 243, where the poet almost abandons the Lord's name in favor of the title *Amore*, whence the *lauda* approaches its climactic, emotional apex through recourse to a rhythmic apostrophic invocation of "Love." The strophes beginning with line 267 shown above are found in the poem's concluding section, where the consistent anaphora has the effect of punctuating and breaking up what could be grammatically correct and intellectually complete propositions. The refrain "Amore, Amore" is placed both in the beginning and *in the midst* of complete sentences, as if suggesting the absolute primacy of affect over intellect, a sign of the merely provisional status of human reason in view of the ascent toward a totalizing, ardent divine love. Thus, with the tools of Thomistic analysis previously expounded, we can suggest that the characterization of these Franciscan poems as "more affective"—that is, that they present a conception of mystical union dominated by affectivity—constitutes a generally accurate assessment. Like the stuttering, onomatopoeic speech of Morales and Caressa in the immediate aftermath of a decisive moment, Bonaventure and Iacopone also employ anaphoric identical repetition, suggesting a mitigation of the cogitative power which could lead the reason astray in particular cases.

Aquinas, by contrast, takes a different poetic approach. *Pange lingua gloriosi*, the hymn for Vespers of Corpus Christi, more familiar to Roman Catholics for its use in the rite of Eucharistic adoration, showcases in a special way the Angelic Doctor's "wit," to use the characterization of the Jesuit philosopher Walter Ong.

Verbum caro, panem verum	By a word, the Word made flesh
Verbo carnem efficit	is made True Bread
Fitque sanguis Christi merum	and pure wine becomes the blood of Christ
Etsi sensus deficit	Even when the senses fail,
Ad firmandum cor sincerum	Only faith suffices
Sola fides sufficit.	To strengthen the sincere heart.
Tantum ergo Sacramentum	Therefore, bowing low,
Veneremur cernui	let us venerate so great a Sacrament,
Et antiquum documentum	and let the old covenant
Novo cedat ritui	give way to the new rite.
Praestet fides supplementum	May faith supply the remedy
Sensuum defectui.	for the failure of our senses.

Here we find the kind of witty wordplay which Ong finds typical of Aquinas but often lacking in the medieval Franciscans.[42] Let us simply focus on the first two lines, which by themselves carry a theological and poetic power exceedingly disproportionate to their brevity. Playing on the versatility of Latin declensions, Aquinas's ingenious deployment of the ablative *verbo* expresses in a single breath the duplex nature of Christ-rooted sacramental mediation: first, as the eternal Word of the Father *by whom* all things were created, and secondly, as an indication of that verbal utterance *by which* the Eucharist was instituted (the phrase "this is my body"). The wondrous passage from creation to Incarnation, and from Incarnation to transubstantiation, is all contained—as in a sacrament—in *a* word (*verbo*) and thus in *the* Word (*Verbum*) who, because he himself is eternal Truth, effects only what is true (*verum*). Thus the words themselves (*verbo-verbum-verum*) assume a sacramental valence, for through their sensible and sonorous materiality, they communicate something of the incommunicable mystery of divine condescension. The sense of mediate agency conveyed by the ablative *verbo* and the notion of objective end and origin in the nominative *Verbum*, as well as their etymological unity and alliterative construction, all constitute a poetic triumph expressing both affective devotion for the Sacrament *and* a highly intellectual appreciation for the mystery. There is no overwrought repetition here, no mitigation of the cogitative power, for the assiduously well-crafted syntax suggests no overpowering of reason by passion—and passion is nonetheless powerfully present in Thomas's versified exhortation to venerate the Sacrament.

Part Five: The Problem of Metaphors

Our investigation has heretofore focused on stuttering and heavy repetition. We have not yet addressed in detail another effect of a faulty cogitative power, namely, the production of improper propositions like metaphorical statements. My wider argument for this point is admittedly more complex, and I am reserving its full explication for other projects. However, we can begin with a few observations to make the general point. In the excerpt from Bonaventure's *Laudismus* quoted above, I noted how the repeated phrase "crux est" introduced a series of several metaphors for the

[42] Walter J. Ong, "Wit and Mystery: A Revaluation in Mediaeval Latin Hymnody," *Speculum* 22 (1947): 310-41.

cross. In the middle section of the poem, in the relatively tight space of five stanzas (out of a total of thirty-nine), Bonaventure offers nineteen different metaphors for the cross, each introduced by the phrase "crux est." Some, like the more expanded cross-tree image, display a more apparent fittingness, but others, like those in the subsequent stanza ("ship," "harbor," "garden," etc.), rely on such a strained correspondence that only knowledge granted by revelation sustains the comparison. Thus, the semiotic value of each metaphor remains extrinsically imposed; the relational modes of each individual sign ("ship," "harbor," "garden") to the signified ("the cross") are so disparate as to have no real relation to each other. Said differently, the subject and predicate of a metaphorical statement do not relate logically as genus and species, or metaphysically as substance to accident. The expansion of metaphors in poems like Bonaventure's remains in principle infinite, for such proliferation is not constrained by any intrinsic law of true metaphysical correspondence between sign and signified but bounded only by the poet's ingenuity. The increasing deployment of such diverse comparisons to a single signified thing ends by diluting the semiotic value of each individual metaphor and, perhaps, even devalues the signified by laterally diffusing its proper signate power across dissimilar instantiations. Here, I suggest, we can begin to get a sense of the fundamental problem of metaphorical speech as regards the communication of *truth*. It is a problem which both Aristotle and Aquinas seem to understand well when they classify poetic-metaphorical language as *doctrina infima*, or the lowest form of teaching.[43]

Despite this problematic nature of metaphor, however, Aquinas nevertheless *must* make recourse to poetic-metaphorical language, not only for general theological purposes,[44] but especially because he was commissioned by Pope Urban IV to compile the Office and Mass for the then-new Feast of Corpus Christi—which includes poetry in the form of three hymns and a sequence.[45] Saint Thomas, then, seems to have faced a dilemma. On one hand, *Thomas Aristotelicus* recognizes that the metaphor is inadequate for the scientific-philosophical enterprise on account of a "deficiency in truth." On the other hand, *Thomas liturgicus* knows that he *must* make use of metaphors, not just for his private theological speculations, but for the noblest purpose of all—the public liturgical praise of the Eternal Word's mysterious presence in the

[43] See, for example, *ST* I-II, q. 101, a. 2, obj 1 and ad 1.

[44] Aquinas nevertheless acknowledges the *necessity* of metaphor in *sacra doctrina* on account of the utter transcendence of its subject (i.e., God); see *In I Sent*., Prol., q. 1, a. 5, obj. 3 and ad 3.

[45] For an overview of the early history of the Feast of Corpus Christi and the composition of its liturgy, see the following: Laura Andreni and Agostino Paravicini Bagliani, eds., *Il «Corpus Domini». Teologia, antropoligia, e politica* (Florence: SISMEL, 2015); Barbara R. Walters, Vincent Corrigan, and Peter T. Ricketts, eds., *The Feast of Corpus Christi* (University Park, PA: Pennsylvania State University Press, 2006); Pierre-Marie Gy, "Office du *Corpus Christi* et s. Thomas d'Aquin: etat d'une recherche," *Revue des sciences philosphiques et theologiques* 64 (1980): 491-507; idem, "L'Office du *Corpus Christi* et la theologie des accidents eucharistique," *Revue des sciences philosophiques et theologiques* 66 (1982): 81-86; idem, "Office liegeois et office romain de la Fête-Dieu," in *Actes du Colloque de Liège: Fête-Dieu, vol. 1 (1246-1996)*, ed. Andrew Haquin (Louvain-la-Neuve: Institute d'Etudes Medievales de l'Universite Catholique de Louvain, 1999), 117-26; Cyrille Lambot and Paul-Irénée Fransen, *L'Office de la Fête-Dieu primitive. Mélodies de l'office primitif, transcription de la notation musicale* (Paris: Éditions de Maredsous, 1946); Miri Rubin, *Corpus Christi: The Eucharist in Late Medieval Culture* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991); Ronald Zawilla, *The 'Historiae Corporis Christi' Attributed to Thomas Aquinas: A Theological Study of their Biblical Sources* (PhD Dissertation, University of Toronto, 1985); Constant Mews, "Juliana of Cornillon and Thomas Aquinas on the Eucharist: Politics, Liturgy, and Implementing Reform," *Quaestiones medii aevi novae* 22 (2017): 103-25. The manuscript used as the base text for critical editions as well as later liturgical books is Bibliothèque nationale de France, Latin MS 1143 (*Officium sollempnitatis nove corporis domini*). This also provides the base text for Lambot and Fransen's magisterial study *L'Office de la Fête-Dieu primitive* (cited above).

Eucharist. How, then, can the lowest mode of speech be rendered apt for language's highest vocation? Aquinas's solution, I hold, is as brilliant as it is simple. To explain, let us turn briefly to *Lauda Sion*,[46] the sequence for the Mass of Corpus Christi and Aquinas's longest poetic work.

In *Lauda Sion*, Aquinas interestingly employs only eight metaphors to praise the Eucharistic Christ in a poem running eighty lines long. By contrast, and as mentioned before, one section of Bonaventure's *Laudismus* compiled nineteen metaphors (introduced by the phrase "crux est") in the much shorter span of twenty-four lines. Against this multiplication and dense compilation of metaphors, Aquinas's use of imagery is notable for two reasons. First is the obvious restraint shown by Thomas in deploying so few; Aquinas thus continues to nod with deference to the general Aristotelian critique of metaphor. The second and more significant point is that all eight of Thomas's chosen images—unlike many of Bonaventure's—are explicitly *scriptural* titles.[47] This recourse to revealed knowledge in effect "shields" Thomas and his poetry from the charge of utilizing *doctrina infima* in a task as lofty as the liturgy itself. Unlike the more inventive imagery of Bonaventure's devising,[48] whose power of signification rests solely on the extrinsic imposition of a human mind, *Thomas biblicus* employs metaphors that are not his own but God's, and thus, as divinely ordained gifts, the power of their signification enjoys the certainty of faith itself.[49] As explained in the hymn *Pange lingua*, the revealed data of faith supply a remedy for the *sensuum et veritatis defectus* of mere natural knowledge. And by returning the "gifts" of these metaphors back to God through their integration into liturgical compositions, Aquinas participates in the underlying *exitus-reditus* motion of the cosmos, the doxological procession and return which anchors the entire created order. Or, following the Roman Canon, *Thomas sacerdos* renders back to God an offering which firstly comes "de [suis] donis ac datis."

If we have seen that positive metaphorical comparisons, even those in praise of the cross or of the Eucharistic Christ, nevertheless retain some analogical *defectus veritatis*, the deficiency becomes even more apparent when metaphors are wielded for more

[46] For the full text of the sequence (and the rest of the Office), see Lambot and Fransen, *L'Office de la Fête-Dieu primitive*.

[47] The Eucharistic Christ is named as *dux* (cf. Matthew 5; Micah 2), *pastor* (cf. John 10), *rex* (cf. John 18, *inter alia*), *pascha* (cf. 1 Corinthians 5), *panis angelorum* (cf. Psalm 78), *agnus* (cf. Revelation 5, *inter alia*), *manna* (cf. John 6), *panis verus* (cf. John 6).

[48] Some of the non-scriptural metaphors for the cross employed in *Laudismus* include "verum lumen et praeclarum," "dulcedo cordium," "thesaurus perfectorum," "speculum virtutis," "decus salvandorum," "deliciarum hortus," *inter alia*.

[49] This is just one aspect of a wider argument regarding metaphor and poetry in Aquinas and their relationship to the Thomistic doctrine of analogy. Without expounding the full treatment in detail, the main points of the argument run as follows: just as the sacraments derive power from (divine) institution (*ST* III, q. 60, a. 5), so do scriptural metaphors also derive their power from divine institution. And whereas metaphors in general function like "analogies of extrinsic proportion" because of their basis on extrinsic similarities of relations, scriptural metaphors act more like "analogies of attribution" or "analogies of one to another" on account of the divine (efficient) causality operating through them. Obviously, this argument relies on the position of Bernard Montagnes, *La doctrine de l'analogie de l'être d'après saint Thomas d'Aquin* (Louvain: Publications Universitaires, 1963) in favor of analogy *unius ad alterum* in the later works of Thomas. We cannot enter the ongoing debate on analogy in Aquinas here, but only set the stage for larger projects on Thomistic poetics in general. However, we can at least mention a more provocative suggestion to guide these future reflections: the notion of analogical causes in the sacraments (particularly as understood in the notion of instrumental causality) might assist in a revalorization of efficient causality, and thus of the analogy of attribution, in Aquinas. This line of reasoning would necessarily need to confront Steven Long's *Analogia Entis: On the Analogy of Being, Metaphysics, and the Act of Faith* (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 2011), which proposes that "analogy of proper proportion" alone grounds proper theological language.

nefarious purposes such as detraction or defamation. This is perhaps most apparent in the act of name-calling, where the assignation of derogatory titles or the assertion of offensive comparisons derives its maliciously sophistic, hyper-ironized rhetorical force from the rather apparent *defectus veritatis* between sign and signified. Here we can once more refer to the aftermath of the Euro 2020 final. The atrocious conduct of those English fans who flooded social media with racist abuse aimed at Saka, Marcus Rashford, and Jadon Sancho was rightfully denounced by officials of football governing bodies, by current and former footballers, by the general English population, and by fans the world over. The exact formulation of the oft-repeated slurs directed at these Black English footballers should not be repeated in these pages; nevertheless, those of us who recall those insults, as well as the wide public condemnation of such racially-motivated behavior, understand intuitively how those particular usages of defamatory language—hyper-metaphorical to the point of equivocation—signals an unequivocal flight from reason. In the case of these blatantly scandalous comparisons, what occurred was not so much a mitigation of the cogitative power but a *deliberate evasion or rejection* of its proper operation on the level of the rational soul; accordingly, by choosing to utter such a shocking statement which does not (and cannot) follow from a sound proposition formed by the cogitative power, the defamer has elected, with full knowledge, to speak against the order of right reason. This is no longer an instance of an *antecedent* passion impeding the judgment of the cogitative power such that reason might be drawn against universal knowledge; rather, the defamer directly contradicts the truth itself through the *subsequent* passion of anger *after* the deliberation of reason.[50] In other words, *propter defectum veritatis*, the defamer willingly bears false witness, thereby committing a *sin*—and on this point, Thomas Aquinas and sports fans of good will can find common cause.

Conclusion

In this essay I have argued that Aquinas's synthetic treatment of cognition and affectivity provides a fascinating apparatus for assessing the relationship between passion and reason as signified by certain linguistic utterances. By using real world examples from sports commentary, we see how the momentary shock of emotionally charged moments—resulting in repetitive, stuttering, or pre-rational utterances—stands in contrast to concrete language which signifies the reintegration of passion with reason and thus the full "humanization" of those experiences. For example, when an English fan can articulately criticize Gareth Southgate for assigning the fifth penalty in a European final to a nineteen-year-old from Arsenal, the passion of anger is probably participating in right reason; by contrast, the mindless anaphoric repetition of the phrase "it's coming home" probably signifies a flight from reason. Such observations have consequences for both the moral life and for mystical theology. In the moral life, the inability to speak clearly signifies our inability to reason well, and thus to make ethical choices. Moral decisions are best taken after some passage of time, when the passions lose their vehemence, when the cogitative power is no longer impeded, allowing us to think and speak with clarity. In mystical theology,

[50] For a thorough treatment of the distinction between consequent and antecedent passions in Aquinas with reference to the cogitative power, see Daniel De Haan, "Moral Perception and the Function of the *Vis Cogitativa* in Thomas Aquinas's Doctrine of Antecedent and Consequent Passions," *Documenti e studi sulla tradizione filosofica medievale* 25 (2014): 289-330.

the full integration of mystical experience occurs not in a moment of ecstatic abstraction from sense knowledge and reason; instead, the fullness of experience must account for bodily participation. In Aquinas's words, the infusion of mystical knowledge must somehow "redound into the body,"[51] and this is achieved by "conversion to phantasms,"[52] or recourse to sensible images, signified by the use of clear, concrete language. Saint Paul's ability to recount, even if imperfectly, the ineffable moment of rapture shows that his mystical experience had been thoroughly integrated into himself as both his body and soul participate in its effects. The body, for Saint Thomas, should not be an obstacle to mystical union, although in the fallen state, it can be a hindrance. Rather, ascent to divine knowledge occurs not because the mystic relinquishes the body and its powers, but because the bodily powers are themselves purified and further disposed to participate in mystical elevation.[53]

This should at last shed light on the type of language which is more appropriate for poetic prayer. Aquinas, with his more cataphatic sensibility, composed poems using language that mirrors the concrete speech of someone both fully possessed of reason *and* marked by affective charity for Christ's sacramental presence. Meanwhile, Bonaventure and Iacopone, representing the more affective Franciscan approach, make more use of identical repetition, stuttering syntax, and flowery metaphor, perhaps signifying a conception of mystical union marked not by an integration of the bodily powers but a flight from them. The strength of Aquinas's position—and here I speak more theologically—is that his rigorous attention to the hylomorphic unity of body and soul stems from a profound appreciation of the Incarnation and all its consequences, including the conviction that our bodily powers—including the passions—are not merely incidental to our highest human capacities, but are indeed necessary for full human flourishing. But for this to happen, the passions must participate in the operation of reason. Or, to quote the four wisest Nordic sages since Kierkegaard, "Don't go wasting your emotion."

[51] *ST* II-II, q. 175, aa. 3-4, *inter alia*.

[52] *In De Anima* 3, lc. 6; *QDV*, q. 10, a. 6, *resp*. and ad 6-7.

[53] Bernhard Blankenhorn, *The Mystery of Union with God: Dionysian Mysticism in Albert the Great and Thomas Aquinas* (Washington, DC: Catholic University of America Press, 2015), 397-404, interpreting *ST* II-II, q. 8, a. 7, where Thomas, explicating the sixth beatitude ("Blessed are the pure of heart for they shall see God") says that purification can be seen under two aspects. "The first is preparatory and dispositive to the vision of God, which is a purgation of the affect from disordered passions (*depuratio affectus ab inordinatis affectionibus*); and this purification of the heart is granted through the virtues and gifts which pertain to the sensitive appetite. But the other purification of the heart is perfective with respect to the divine vision; and this is the purification of the mind purged from phantasms and errors (*munditia mentis depuratae a phantasmatibus et erroribus*), that is, when those things proposed by God [i.e., the articles of the Creed] are not received by means of bodily phantasms, nor according to heretical perversities. And the gift of the intellect makes this purification."