'*The False Song of Globalism*': Anti-Globalist Politics and Ideology in the United States from 1945 to 2000

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This thesis is submitted for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy.

Preface

This dissertation is the result of my own work and includes nothing which is the outcome of work done in collaboration except as declared in the Preface and specified in the text. It is not substantially the same as any that I have submitted, or, is being concurrently submitted for a degree or diploma or other qualification at the University of Cambridge or any other University or similar institution except as declared in the Preface and specified in the text. I further state that no substantial part of my dissertation has already been submitted, or, is being concurrently submitted for any such degree, diploma or other qualification at the University of Cambridge or any other University or similar institution except as declared in the Preface and specified in the text. It does not exceed the prescribed word limit for the relevant Degree Committee.

Daniel John Smith

30 November 2021

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Abstract

The emergence of right-wing populism in transatlantic democracies is one of the most significant political trends of the 21st century. When then-candidate Trump denounced globalist policies and elites in his 2016 Presidential campaign, he introduced the American public to a new term: 'globalism'. Since then, anti-globalist populism has become the definitive political ideology of the Republican Party and right-wing movements around the world.

Where did anti-globalist populism come from? To answer this question, this dissertation explores the previously neglected history of anti-globalist ideology and politics in the United States from 1945 to 2000. I argue that the historical emergence of anti-globalism as a distinctive ideology in the late 20th century U.S. can be attributed to the long-term efforts of two far-right groups: the John Birch Society and the Liberty Lobby. These organizations were established in the late 1950s by far-right social movement leaders seeking to promote a far-right conspiracist ideology oriented against Communism and internationalism. During the 1960s, 1970s, and 1980s, these organizations institutionalized into the ideological and organizational hubs of the American far-right. After multiple decades, these groups produced a 'conspiracist canon' of anti-globalist books and newsletters that were among the most widely read and circulated texts on the American Right. By the 1990s, many conservatives were already thinking through the ideological lens of anti-globalism.

During the 1990s, a backlash against globalization took place on the American Right. Republican politicians, anti-government militias, and violent extremists were all united by their shared opposition to an ambiguous 'New World Order'. I argue that anti-globalist ideology *pre-existed* the hyper-globalization that began in the 1990s. By tracing the history of anti-globalism before globalization, this dissertation offers a novel argument about the origins of contemporary populism and the history of the American Right.

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Table of Contents

Preface - 2
Abstract - 3
Acknowledgements - 4

1. Introduction: The Emergence of Anti-Globalist Populism - 8
The Not-So-Sudden Emergence of the Populist Radical Right in the Early 21st Century - 8
Americanism, not Globalism!": Anti-Globalist Populism in the United States - 13
The Long Fight on the Right: Anti-Globalism before Trump - 15
Between Conservatism and Extremism: Anti-Globalism and the Untold History of the American (Far) Right - 19
Why Anti-Globalism? - 27
Anti-Globalist Ideology and the American Right in the Late 20th Century: Key Arguments and Chapter Synopsis – 30

2. Theoretical Framework - 38
Ideas, Movements, and Institutions: Theorizing Ideological Change on the 20th Century American Right - 38
Anti-Globalism as Political Ideology - 40
Anti-Globalism and Far-Right Social Movements - 45
The John Birch Society and Liberty Lobby: Anti-Globalist Institutions – 48
Toward an Analytical History of Anti-Globalism – 52

3. From Republic to Empire: Anti-Internationalism and the American Right before 1965 - 54
Anti-Internationalism before 1945 - 56
Anti-Communism and Cold War America - 65
Out with the Old, in with the New: The Post-War Right and the Birth of the American Conservative Movement - 70
Broadcasting Americanism: The Radio Right - 80
Ideologues, Organizers, and Institution-Builders: Welch, Carto, and the Genesis of Anti-Globalism - 90
Starting the Conspiracist Canon: Anti-internationalist Books in the 1960s - 96
Anti-Internationalism and the American Far-Right in 1965 – 101

4. From Anti-Internationalism to Anti-Globalism: Populism, Conspiracism, and the New Right, 1965-1985 - 105
From Goldwater to Reagan: The New Right and the Conservative Counter-Revolution - 109
The New Right, Direct Mail, and the Marketing of Right-Wing Populism in the 1970s - 111

Wallace, Schmitz, and the Far-Right Insurgency against Republican Conservatism - 118
Anti-Internationalism to Anti-Globalism: The John Birch Society and Liberty Lobby as "Two Pillars" of the American Far-Right - 125
Anti-Globalism and the Birth of the Violent Extreme Right - 142
From Anti-Internationalism to Anti-Globalism – 148

5. Far-Right Breakthrough in the Age of Globalization: Anti-Globalism and the American Right after the Cold War, 1985-2000 - 154
Anti-Globalism and the American Right, 1985-2000 - 154
The Thrill is Gone: Right-Wing Radicalism after Reagan - 157
After the Cold War: Globalization and the New World Order - 160
Pat Buchanan and the Anti-Globalist Revolt against Republican Conservatism - 167
The Return of Isolationism?: The Republican Backlash against Globalism in the 1990s - 176
The Paleoconservatives: Far-Right Intellectuals and the Uncivil War of Ideas on the American Right - 179
Willis Carto and the Populist Party - 188
Patriots against the New World Order: The Militia Movement in the 1990s - 194
The Racialist Right: David Duke, William Pierce, and White Nationalism in America - 200
Anti-Globalist Terror: The 1995 Oklahoma City Bombing and the Violent Arrival of the Revolutionary Extreme Right - 210
Anti-Globalism at the Dawn of the 21st Century – 213

6. Conclusion: The Past and Future of Anti-Globalism – 217

Bibliography - 224

CHAPTER ONE

Introduction: The Emergence of Anti-Globalist Populism

No country has ever prospered that failed to put its own interests first. Both our friends and our enemies put their countries above ours and we, while being fair to them, must start doing the same. We will no longer surrender this country or its people to the false song of globalism. The nation-state remains the true foundation for happiness and harmony. I am skeptical of international unions that tie us up and bring America down and will never enter. And under my administration, we will never enter America into any agreement that reduces our ability to control our own affairs. **Donald J. Trump, campaign speech on April 27, 2016**

The Not-So-Sudden Emergence of the Populist Radical Right in the Early 21st Century

One of the most striking and unexpected political trends of the early 21st century has been the emergence and electoral success of populist radical right leaders, parties, and movements in Europe and North America. Since his stunning election to the American presidency in 2016, Donald J. Trump has become the face of right-wing populism around the world. His campaign for the presidency introduced a seemingly new political movement and ideology to the American public: right-wing anti-globalist populism. Since 2016, anti-globalist populism has become the unifying ideological worldview for a variety of right-wing populist parties and movements in Europe and the United States.

This dissertation demonstrates that the anti-globalist ideology and language expressed by Trump and his supporters is not simply a new response to recent changes wrought by globalization. This dissertation traces the development and maturation of anti-globalist ideology from 1945 to 2000, arguing that anti-globalism became a mature and coherent ideology on the American Right by the end of the 20th century. This development was the result of a decades-long process of ideological innovation and propagation pursued by the John Birch Society and the Liberty Lobby during the 1960s, 1970s, and 1980s. By reconstructing the ideological and institutional world created by these groups and the far-right ideologues who led them, this dissertation shows how the neglected history of anti-globalism in the late 20th century United States has shaped the

ideological worldview of right-wing radicals in the 21st century. In doing so, it makes a needed contribution to the scholarly literature on populism *and* the history of the American Right.

The success of Trump and other radical right-wing populists in and after 2016 contributed to the emergence of 'populism studies' as a distinct new subfield in political science. A variety of academic handbooks on populism have been published since 2016, and a new academic journal titled *Populism* was established in 2018.[1] While many of the leading scholars in the field have criticized the notion that Trump and his compatriots should be described solely or primarily as populists, scholarly and popular usage of the term to describe these trends and developments has continued unabated. In a review essay on the emergent subfield of 'populism studies' in the post-2016 era, Rooduijn wrote: "The goal of social science concepts and theories is to help us better understand real world phenomena. The main strength of the concept of populism is that it helps us understand phenomena like Brexit and Trump."[2]

Since the mid-2010s, the use of populism as a descriptive term and explanatory concept in the public sphere has exploded. The unexpected emergence (and success) of Trump and Brexit – in addition to concurrent successes by European radical right-wing parties and movements – prompted this change in terminology. The long-term emergence of populist radical right electoral parties, ideologies, social movements, and terrorist actors in post-war Western democracies has been documented by political scientists for decades. Betz' 1994 work *Radical Right-Wing Populism in Western Europe* acknowledged the emergence of the populist radical right as a new party family and ideological phenomenon in multiple Western European democracies during the 1980s and early 1990s.[3] Berlet and Lyons' 2000 book *Right-Wing Populism in America* connected the shift toward radical right-wing populism in the Republican Party to long-term efforts by far-right ideologues to 'mainstream' their ideas via the ambiguous and distinctly American rhetorical styles of populism and nativism.[4] By 2004, political scientists noted that the

[1] For the leading textbooks published on populism in recent years, see Kaltwasser, Cristóba, Rovira et al., *The Oxford Handbook of Populism*. Oxford University Press, 2019; Carlos de la Torre et al., *Routledge Handbook of Global Populism.* London: Routledge, 2020; Oswald, Michael. *Palgrave Handbook of Populism*. New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2022. For the founding statement of the new journal *Populism* founded in 2018, see Lane Crothers. "Why Populism? Why Now? An Introduction", *Populism* 1, 1 (2018): 3-13.
[2] Matthijs Rooduijn. "State of the Field: How to Study Populism and Adjacent Topics? A Plea for Both More and Less Focus." European Journal of Political Research 58, no. 1 (2019): 367.
[3] Hans-George Betz. *Radical Right-Wing Populism in Western Europe*. New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 1994.
[4] Chip Berlet and Matthew Lyons. *Right-Wing Populism in America: Too Close for Comfort*. Guilford Press, 2000.

continued success of radical right-wing parties in Europe and the broader mainstreaming of populist discourse was indicative of a "populist zeitgeist."[5] In 2014, after the 2008 financial crisis led to a new phase in the development of left- and right-wing populism in Europe, Kriesi argued that "new right-populist parties," had gone beyond merely expressing discontent with globalization and related processes of social, political, and economic change to "articulate a new structural conflict that opposes globalisation 'losers' to globalisation 'winners'."[6] These and other scholars have generally settled on using the terms 'national populism' and 'populist radical right' to describe the broad array of right-wing movements, parties, ideas, and ideologues that have appeared and gained political influence in Western democracies since the late 20th century.[7]

One of the primary focuses of post-2016 'populism studies' scholarship has been on explaining *why* and *how* populist leaders and parties have achieved success in democracies where radical left- and right-wing politics had largely been marginalized since World War II. Much of this scholarship has focused on identifying the multiple layers of structural change that have underpinned these shifts and assessing their relationship to one another as part of a broader, multi-causal process of change. Economic changes attributed to the distinct and yet interrelated trends of post-industrialization, financialization, the decline of union membership, and globalization have all contributed to rising income and wealth inequality in the early 21st century. Some scholars have argued that the recent rise of populism is the culmination of a long-term 'cultural backlash' against progressive social change.[8] Other accounts have attributed political

[5] The term 'populist zeitgeist' was first used in Cas Mudde. "The Populist Zeitgeist." *Government and Opposition* 39, no. 4 (2004): 541–63. The term has also been used in more recent scholarship on the rise of populism. See Matthijs Rooduijn,, Sarah L de Lange, and Wouter van der Brug. "A Populist Zeitgeist? Programmatic Contagion by Populist Parties in Western Europe." *Party Politics* 20, no. 4 (2012): 563–75.

[6] Hanspeter Kriesi. "The Populist Challenge." *West European Politics*, 37:2 (2014): 361-378,

[7] A scholarly consensus has emerged around the term 'populist radical right' to describe the parties, movements, leaders, and ideas studied by scholars of populism and the far-right. See Cas Mudde, ed. *The Populist Radical Right: A Reader*. London: Routledge, 2017. The term 'national populism' has also been used to describe these movements, albeit in a way that minimizes and ultimately fails to account for the role of far-right ideology and movements in the broader historical development of the populist Right. See Eatwell, Roger, and Matthew J. Goodwin. *National Populism: The Revolt against Liberal Democracy.* Pelican, 2018.

[8] For scholarship emphasizing the economic origins of contemporary populism, see Dani Rodrik. "Populism and the Economics of Globalization." *Journal of International Business Policy* 1 (1): 12-33. For a culturalist account, see Pippa Norris and Ronald Inglehart. *Cultural Backlash: Trump, Brexit, and Authoritarian Populism*. Cambridge University Press, 2019. For a convincing synthesis of the two accounts, see Noam Gidron and Peter Hall, "The Politics of Social Status: Economic and Cultural Roots of the Populist Right." *The British Journal of Sociology* 68 (2017): 57-84.

changes associated with populism to the mediatory disruption wrought by social media and a concomitant decline in public trust in political institutions and elites.[9]

Many of the major books on populism published in recent years have focused on explaining the structural shifts underpinning the recent political changes subsumed under the term 'populism', assessing the different forms that populist politics have taken in recent years, and evaluating whether populism serves as a threat or corrective to liberal democracy. Beyond these empirical and normative questions, substantive debates about *what* populism is have developed in recent years. As early as 1995, Taguieff recognized that the emergence of populism as a political phenomenon necessitated a difficult task: defining populism. Even before populism's resurgence in the 1990s, "most political scientists emphasized the term's conceptual indeterminacy, focusing on its ambiguous, ambivalent, and even contradictory nature."[10] He outlined the challenge facing scholars who sought to define and operationalize the concept of populism:

> "If it is to be used rigorously, it must be used in a restricted sense, one based on a minimal definition… "Populism" is not embodied in a definite type of political regime (a democracy or a dictatorship can have a populist dimension, orientation, or style), or in specific ideological features ("populism" should not be thought of as one great ideology among others). Instead, we approach it here as a political style, one capable of manipulating a whole range of symbolic material and of taking root in a number of different ideological positions, taking on the political coloration of its surroundings. Inseparably from this, we also present populism as a set of rhetorical operations, deployed through the symbolic use of a number of social representations: gestures of appeal to the people presuppose a basic consensus on who "the people" (dēmos or ethnos) are, on what they are worth, and on what they want."[11]

[9] For an account emphasizing the role of social media in the rise of contemporary populism, see Sven Engesser, Nicole Ernst, Frank Esser, and Florin Büchel. "Populism and social media: how politicians spread a fragmented ideology." *Information, Communication & Society*, 20:8 (2017), 1109-1126.. For an account emphasizing the declining trust in political institutions and norms in developed democracies, see Roberto Stefan Foa and Yascha Mounk. "The Signs of Deconsolidation*." Journal of Democracy* 28, no. 1 (2017): 5–16.

[10] Pierre-André Taguieff. "Populism and Political Science: From Conceptual Illusions to Real Problems." *Vingtième Siècle. Revue d'histoire*, vol. 56, no. 4, (1997), 6.

[11] Ibid.

The most popular definition of populism sees it as a 'thin ideology', whose ideological malleability allows it to attach to more substantive ideological families like conservatism, socialism, or fascism while maintaining its distinctive ideological core of majoritarian arguments for popular sovereignty and a discursive and rhetorical emphasis on a constitutive division between 'the people' and 'the elite'. On this account, populism alone does not constitute a complete ideological framework. Populism is *thin*, while major ideological traditions and families like conservatism, socialism, or liberalism are *thick.* Populist ideas, then, *must* be adjoined to some more established ideology like socialism or conservatism.[12] This approach accounts for the fact that both left- *and* right-wing parties and political actors have adopted self-consciously populist language recently and throughout history.

While scholars studying right-wing populism have noted a historical shift from open racism and anti-Semitism toward a more ambiguous populist conspiracism on the far-right, little attention has been paid to the *substance* of Trump's ideology.[13] The descriptors of nativist, authoritarian, populist, and economic nationalist have generally – and accurately – been used to describe the ideology of Trump and the populist radical right. I argue that the use of these labels has allowed analysts of contemporary right-wing populism to rest on their laurels, ignoring the complex ideological permutations and changes that produced the ideology distinguishing Trump and other right-wing populists around the world from their conservative predecessors and counterparts: anti-globalist populism.

Steger has previously argued that thinking, "of populism as a "thin-centered" ideology does not capture the ideational constellation of… antiglobalist populism."[14] His critique of this approach to conceptualizing populism distinguishes between approaches to the concept that emphasize either *content* or *form:*

> "Content-centered approaches emphasize the significance of ideational constructions at the heart of populism, such as related ideas, beliefs, and values

[12] See Ben Stanley. "The thin ideology of populism." *Journal of Political Ideologies*, 13:1 (2008): 95-110; Kirk Hawkins et al. *The Ideational Approach to Populism: Concept, Theory, and Analysis*. London: Routledge, 2019.
[13] See Roger Griffin. "Interregnum or endgame? Radical right thought in the "post-fascist" era." *Journal of Political Ideologies*, 5, 2 (2000): 163-178; Hans-George Betz and Carol Johnson. "Against the current—stemming the tide: The nostalgic ideology of the contemporary radical populist right", *Journal of Political Ideologies*, 9:3 (2006): 311–27; and Andrej Zaslove. *The Re-Invention of the European Radical Right: Populism, Regionalism, and the Italian Lega Nord*. Montreal: McGill-Queen's University Press, 2011.
[14] Manfred Steger. "Mapping Antiglobalist Populism." *Populism* 2, no. 2 (2019): 113.

> that provide social actors with the shared mental maps to navigate the complexity of their political environments. Conversely, form-oriented approaches underscore populism's functional role as a particular logic, style, strategy, or repertoire that seizes upon heterogeneous ideas to achieve desired political outcomes."[15]

This dissertation goes against the grain of 'populism studies' scholarship by taking a content-centered approach to the study of anti-globalist populism. Instead of seeing anti-globalist language and ideas as a mechanistic and shallow ideological response to globalization by opportunistic right-wing political actors, I center this dissertation around the notion that *anti-globalism is a distinctive, coherent, mature, and self-sustaining ideology* with a longer history than many contemporary scholars of populism realize. This claim – and the broader ambitions of this thesis – build upon the final point made by Steger in his seminal article on anti-globalist populism:

> "the formidable task of understanding such a complex and multifaceted phenomenon as national-populism must begin with the clear recognition that its current antiglobalist strain constitutes a reconfigured ideational cluster that has evolved from previous iterations."[16]

"Americanism, not Globalism!": Anti-Globalist Ideology and the Populist Radical Right

During his 2016 presidential campaign Donald Trump introduced a new term to the American public: globalism. Trump's campaign issued the following definition of globalism a week before the 2016 election:

> "An economic and political ideology which puts allegiance to international institutions ahead of the nation-state; seeks the unrestricted movement of goods, labor and people across borders; and rejects the principle that the citizens of a country are entitled to preference for jobs and other economic considerations as a virtue of their citizenship."[17]

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[15] Ibid, 115.
[16] Ibid, 130.
[17] Stack, Liam. "Globalism: A Far-Right Conspiracy Theory Buoyed by Trump." *New York Times*, November 14, 2016.

Trump used the term to name what he saw as a bipartisan consensus on trade, immigration, and foreign policy that had, for decades, acted in the interests of international elites and corporations over Americans. He also used it as a term of abuse, trashing 'globalist elites' who had betrayed Americans. Trump's anti-globalism populism fit well with his combative style in debates and on the campaign trail, and it distinguished him from his Republican competitors in the 2016 Republican Presidential primary. His outspoken opposition to globalism continued as he faced Hillary Clinton in the general election, arguing that she was among the worst members of the globalist clique he sought to replace. His final campaign advertisement, while not explicitly using the terms globalism or globalist, outlined the general premise of his 'America First' populism:

> "Our movement is about replacing a failed and corrupt political establishment with a new government controlled by you, the American people.
>
> The establishment has trillions of dollars at stake in this election. For those who control the levers of power in Washington and for the global special interests, they partner with these people that don't have your good in mind. The political establishment that is trying to stop us is the same group responsible for our disastrous trade deals, massive illegal immigration and economic and foreign policies that have bled our country dry. The political establishment has brought about the destruction of our factories and our jobs as they flee to Mexico, China and other countries all around the world. It's a global power structure that is responsible for the economic decisions that have robbed our working class, stripped our country of its wealth and put that money into the pockets of a handful of large corporations and political entities. The only thing that can stop this corrupt machine is you.
>
> The only force strong enough to save our country is us. The only people brave enough to vote out this corrupt establishment is you, the American people. I'm doing this for the people and the movement and we will take back this country for

> you and we will make America great again. I'm Donald Trump and I approve this message."[18]

Trump's attacks on globalism continued during his presidency; in a September 2019 speech to the United Nations General Assembly, Trump stated, "The future does not belong to the globalists. The future belongs to patriots." The withdrawal of the United States from the Paris Climate Accords, the Trans-Pacific Partnership, the Iran Nuclear Deal, UNESCO, and other international organizations and treaties during the Trump Administration stand as notable departures from orthodoxy in U.S. foreign policy, even as these and other steps taken by the Trump Administration have been rolled back or reversed by the Biden Administration.

Looking back on the Trump years, the major consequence of Trump's anti-globalism was not a dramatic pivot in American foreign policy or the dissolution of the liberal international order. Instead, it was a fundamental shift in the way that millions of conservative Americans think and talk about trade, immigration, sovereignty, and an array of other issues. The Republican Party - and the complex array of conservative think tanks, mass media organizations, intellectual magazines, influencers, activists, and ideologues that constitute the contemporary American conservative movement - is now united by the anti-globalist framing initially popularized by Trump on the campaign trail.

The Long Fight on the Right: Anti-Globalism before Trump

"Forces promoting global governance represent a serious actor, a driver, a player in world politics today. Transnationalism, or globalism, has an ideology and a social-material base. It also has a strong American wing. The ideology is utopian: the age-old dream of worldwide peace and prosperity under a benevolent global regime."[19]

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[18] Hains, Tim. "Donald Trump's 'Argument For America' Ad Targets 'Failed And Corrupt Political Establishment.'" *Real Clear Politics*, November 4, 2016. https://www.realclearpolitics.com/video/2016/11/04/ad_donald_trumps_argument_for_america.html.

[19] John Fonte. "*American Transnationalism, the EU, and the Davoisie*." Speech given at the 2019 National Conservatism Conference in Washington D.C. October 26, 2019. https://www.hudson.org/research/15437-american-transnationalism-the-eu-the-davoisie
The 'National Conservatism' conference was organized by a new think tank, the Burke Foundation. The conference featured a number of prominent conservative politicians, media figures and writers. Keynote speeches by Peter Thiel, Tucker Carlson, John Bolton were joined by panels questioning Republican ideological orthodoxy and critiquing libertarianism and globalism. Fonte's speech is from a panel titled 'International Institutions v. National Independence.'

"The difference between globalisation and globalism might seem obscure and unimportant, but it matters. Globalisation is a word used by economists to describe international flows of trade, investment and people. Globalism is a word used by demagogues to suggest that globalisation is not a process but an ideology — an evil plan, pushed by a shadowy crowd of people called "globalists".[20]

Since 2016, the notion of an ideological and political divide between 'national populism' and 'globalism' has been promoted by public commentators keen to make sense of new political and ideological trends.[21] Some who favored open immigration and trade policies began to identify as globalists themselves, painting Trump as an isolationist revanchist whose policies would bring the United States and the world into a dark age of self-interested nationalism. Conservative commentators and influencers across traditional and digital media have largely adopted the language of anti-globalist populism, breaking from long-standing Republican support for immigration and trade liberalization.

By 2017, people began to realize that the language of anti-globalism had a long and unsavory history before it had been adopted by Trump. Less than a week after the 2016 Presidential election, the New York Times published an article titled *Globalism: A Far-Right Conspiracy Theory Buoyed by Trump*. The article said that then-President-elect Trump's electoral victory:

> "was powered in part by forceful opposition to what he described as [a globalist] economic and political system rigged against the American people for the benefit of shadowy forces in news media, the banks, and the government.
>
> President-elect Trump and his allies often describe that system with one word: globalism.
>
> It is a word that conjures many images, none of them good: shuttered factories, unchecked immigration and a distant cabal that, believers say, controls the economy and the media.

[20] Gideon Rachman. "Why Globalism is Good for You." *Financial Times*, October 29, 2018.
[21] See Ian Bremmer. *Us Vs. Them: The Failure of Globalism*. Portfolio, 2018; Barrie Axford. *Populism Vs. the New Globalization*. Sage, 2021.

> Analysts who track extremist groups in the United States have expressed alarm at the use of the word by the president-elect. They say it carries multiple meanings — from benign to sinister — and often serves as a "dog whistle" for racist, anti-Semitic and antigovernment conspiracy theorists."[22]

This and other articles published in 2016 and 2017 demonstrated that anti-globalist language was used before Trump, primarily by far-right ideologues, anti-government militias and far-right organizations, and individual adherents to various right-wing conspiracy theories. About twenty-five years before Trump conquered the Republican Party, a wide variety of right-wing political actors started to denounce globalism as anathema to American sovereignty. During the 1990s, an American conservative movement that had defined itself Communism for nearly fifty years had to adapt its ideology to a multipolar world in the grips of globalization. Patrick Buchanan, a lifelong Republican who worked in the Nixon and Reagan White Houses, railed against globalism in his 1992 Republican primary campaign against incumbent President George H.W. Bush. Some Republican Congressmen also used anti-globalist language to articulate their opposition to the "free trade" policies pursued by the U.S. during the Clinton Administration. In 2000, Republican House Representative Dana Rohrabacher told his colleagues in Congress that: "idealistic globalism is today the greatest threat to freedom and liberty in this country, for the people of this country."[23]

Anti-globalist language was also used by the wide variety of right-wing social movements that appeared in the 1990s: militia members, white supremacists, violent anti-government extremists, anti-Semitic conspiracy theorists, and a variety of small far-right groups and ideologues. During the 1990s, hundreds of anti-government militias were formed across the United States. Most of them were formed in response to perceived government overreach against the constitutional right to bear arms, but many of the militiamen who joined these groups saw an ominous and ambiguous 'New World Order' as the greater threat than the U.S. federal government. Timothy

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[22] Liam Stack. "Globalism: A Far-Right Conspiracy Theory Buoyed by Trump." *New York Times*, November 14, 2016.

[23] Dana Rohrabacher. "WITHDRAWING APPROVAL OF UNITED STATES FROM AGREEMENT ESTABLISHING WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION -- (House of Representatives - June 21, 2000)." *Congressional Record.* Accessed on the professional website of Frank Baumgartner on November 30, 2021: http://fbaum.unc.edu/lobby/069_WTO_Membership/Congressional_Statements/Thomas/H_Reynolds_etal_062100.htm.

McVeigh, one of two perpetrators responsible for the Oklahoma City Bombing that killed 168 people in April of 1996, became a terrorist because he was convinced by anti-globalist literature and ideology that he needed to kill innocent Americans in order to wake up the broader public to the threat of the New World Order. After the Oklahoma City Bombing, greater public scrutiny and pressure from federal law enforcement led to the disintegration of the militias by the early 2000s. The anti-globalism that animated the most vocal, radical, and potentially violent elements of the American Right largely disappeared from the scene after 9/11, remaining marginal and dormant until the rise of Trump.

The anti-globalist language adopted by McVeigh, Buchanan, and others across the American Right during the 1990s did not emerge *ex nihilio* when George W. Bush spoke out in favor of a 'New World Order' in 1991, or when the term 'globalization' came to represent a variety of new trends in American and international politics in the following years. As this dissertation will show, anti-globalist ideology had already been developed and propagated by far-right groups in the preceding decade. Two groups were responsible for most of the far-right anti-globalist literature produced in the late 20th century United States: the John Birch Society and the Liberty Lobby. Both groups were founded in the late 1950s by anti-Communist activists as vehicles for their right-wing political ambitions. These organizations and their publications portrayed themselves as patriotic conservatives while publishing conspiratorial books and articles written by avowed white supremacists, anti-Semitic conspiracy theorists, and other far-right ideologues. Both groups and their leaders were fundamentally committed to producing and propagating right-wing propaganda, using books, newsletters, radio, and other media to promote their message. Crucially, the far-right conspiratorial narrative of a globalist conspiracy to establish a totalitarian New World Order – and all of its ideological trappings – had already been elaborated in a 'conspiratorial canon' consisting of countless books and articles produced in the decades *before* the 1990s.

The constituent arguments composing anti-globalism are not new; American conservatives expressed opposition to free trade, open immigration, and American participation in international institutions long before the 1990s. What was new at the end of the 20th century were two things: the consolidation of long-standing themes of right-wing populism, isolationism, nativism, anti-Semitic conspiracism into a *mature, coherent, and autonomous ideology* distinct from typical

Republican conservatism, and the *globalized world* that politicians and policymakers advocated for and enacted in the last years of the 20th century. While the latter certainly made the former more salient, many American conservatives had already been exposed to anti-globalist texts, arguments, and discourse in the years or decades *before* they decided to vote for Patrick Buchanan, to join a militia, or to make the decision to wage war against the U.S. government.

Rather than tracing the emergence of contemporary anti-globalism to the preview that took place in the 1990s, I start my history of anti-globalism right after World War II and end it with the last decade of the 20th century. This pre-globalization history of anti-globalism has not been studied comprehensively by historians, and I posit that my historical exposition and analysis of anti-globalism's emergence in the late 20th century helps to explain the success of contemporary right-wing populism while also making a novel contribution to the history of the American Right.

Between Conservatism and Extremism: Anti-Globalism and the Untold History of the American (Far) Right

> "*The professional guardians of America's past, in short, had made a mistake. We advanced a narrative of the American right that was far too constricted to anticipate the rise of a man like Trump.... If Donald Trump is the latest chapter of conservatism's story, might historians have been telling that story wrong?"*[24]

I start my history of anti-globalism in 1945 and end in 2000 for the sake of periodization. The end of World War II fits neatly with the beginning of the Cold War, which played a major role in the emergence of the conservative movement in the post-war United States. By ending in the year 2000, I can see the emergence of anti-globalist politicians, social movements, and intellectual tendencies as the culmination of decades-long efforts by anti-globalist ideologues to popularize their far-right ideas, rather than phenomena that emerged mechanistically in response to globalization as the Cold War ended. The emergence and institutionalization of the Liberty Lobby, the John Birch Society, and the broader far-right ideology they promoted started in the 1960s and continued through the 1990s. This development took place at the same time that the

[24] Rick Perlstein. "I Thought I Understood the American Right. Trump Proved Me Wrong." *New York Times*, April 11, 2017.

more moderate and mainstream 'conservative movement' institutionalized and came to inhabit and control the Republican Party.

The historical evidence I present in Chapters 3, 4, and 5 demonstrates that the lines purportedly separating legitimate conservatism from illegitimate right-wing radicalism or extremism were frequently blurred. Anti-internationalist and anti-globalist language was *primarily* expressed by far-right radicals and extremists during this 55-year period, but I also show that this language was *adopted* by mainstream conservatives in the 1950s and 1990s. In the scholarly literature on the American Right and the Republican Party before 2016, there was an unspoken consensus around the notion that the American far-right had little or no direct influence on American political history or the trajectory of American political development in the 20th century. This dissertation pushes back against this consensus, arguing that the historical development of anti-globalist ideology in the late 20th century is an important part of the broader story of the American Right.

The unexpected election of Trump sparked a shift in how American historians think about the trajectory of the Republican Party, conservatism, and the American Right. I situate my own historical contribution within the broader historiographical turn seeking to understand why the power of far-right ideas and politics had, before Trump, been neglected by historians. Following the work done by scholars who have already grappled with the issue, I argue that an over-emphasis on the centrality of the 'conservative movement' to the history of right-wing politics in America has purposefully led to the neglect of far-right actors whose historical legacy is more difficult to measure than that of Republican-adjacent conservatives. Simply put, we ought to understand any political actor who openly speaks in opposition to some combination of communism, socialism, and liberalism as being right-wing. Regardless of whether their criticism of the left is reasonable or not, a broad-based definition of the Right is needed to emphasize the diversity of historical movements, ideologies, leaders, activists, and authors whose lives, words, and actions make up the history of the American Right.[25]

When assessing the historical literature on American conservatism, a general narrative emerges: a nascent American Right emerged in the 1950s, animated by a forceful opposition to

[25] For a standard definition of the Right and its various permutations, see Kathleen Blee and Kimberly Creasap. "Conservative and Right-Wing Movements." *Annual Review of Sociology* 36:1 (2010): 269-286

Communism. The 'conservative movement' consolidated in the late 1950s and early 1960s around William Buckley's conservative periodical *National Review*. Many histories of the American Right endorse the historical narrative offered by the conservative movement itself: that conservative ideology emerged as a necessary corrective to the excesses of New Deal-Great Society liberalism. In 1964, conservative activists picked Barry Goldwater to be the first conservative Republican presidential candidate. Goldwater lost the battle of 1964 but won the war, as those who volunteered for his campaign would go on to institutionalize the conservative ideas that Goldwater introduced to a still-liberal American public in 1964. The 'New Right' of the 1970s helped to popularize the abstract ideology of the 'conservative movement', using mass media to disseminate conservative ideas to the broader American public. The Reagan Revolution of the 1980s marked the maturation of conservatism as a major political force in American life, and the Republican Party rarely deviated from the Reaganite model until Trump won the Party's nomination in 2016.[26]

The main problem with the historical literature on the American Right is that it has followed the conservative movement too closely, neglecting or ignoring the broad array of far-right radicals and extremists who also shaped the trajectory of the American Right since World War II. One of the reasons for this is that much of that history has been *written* by self-identified conservatives.[27] While some of these histories are valuable works of scholarship and narrative history, there is an overemphasis on the role played by conservative ideology, social movement leaders, and Republican politicians like Goldwater and Reagan.[28] The emphasis on the

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[26] Some standard histories of the American Right and conservative movement include Jonathan M. Schoenwald, *A Time for Choosing: The Rise of Modern American Conservatism*. Oxford University Press, 2011; Godfrey Hodgson. *The World Turned Right Side Up: A History of the Conservative Ascendancy in America*. Houghton Mifflin, 1996; Paul Pierson and Theda Skocpol, eds. *The Transformation of American Politics: Activist Government and the Rise of Conservatism*. Princeton University Press, 2007; Joel Aberbach and Gillian Peele. *Crisis of Conservatism?: The Republican Party, the Conservative Movement, and American Politics After Bush*. Oxford University Press, 2011; and Brian Farmer. *American Conservatism: History, Theory and Practice*. Cambridge Scholars Publishing, 2005.

[27] Some leading examples of this New Right literature are William Rusher. *The Rise of the Right*. National Review Publications, 1984, and Lee Edwards. *The Conservative Movement: The Movement That Remade America*. Simon & Schuster, 1999.

[28] For critiques of the historiographical mainstream in the study of the American Right, see Leo Ribuffo, "Conservatism and American Politics." *Journal of The Historical Society* 3, no. 2 (2003): 163–75; Alan Brinkley, "The Problem of American Conservatism," *American Historical Review*, 99 (1994), 409– 29; David Walsh. "The right-wing Popular Front: The far right and American conservatism in the 1950s." *Journal of American History*, 107:2 (2020), 411–432; George Hawley. *Right-Wing Critics of American Conservatism*. University of Kansas Press, 2016; Edward Miller. *Nut Country: Right-Wing Dallas and the Birch of the Southern Strategy*. University of Chicago Press, 2015; Darren Mulloy. *The World of the John Birch Society: Conspiracy, Conservatism, and the Cold War*. Vanderbilt University Press, 2014.

conservative movement and its leading lights whitewashed the more sordid side of the American Right's historical development, neglecting the more complex and variegated ideological tendencies and political movements that contributed to the rise of the Republican Right in the late 20th century United States. In particular, the anti-globalist voices who appeared in the late 20th century had essentially been ignored by leading historians of American conservatism. The idea that the kooky conspiracism of the far-right would displace 'respectable conservatism' seemed impossible to members of the movement and historians alike.

In a significant essay published in 2017, historian Rick Perlstein reflected on the historical profession's failure to anticipate the rise of a radical right-wing populist like Trump to the American presidency.[29] Perlstein, who has authored best-selling books about the political careers and contexts of Barry Goldwater, Nixon, and Reagan, discussed trends in the historiography of American conservatism and highlighted some blind spots. Quoting eminent historian of the American far right Leo Ribuffo, Perlstein acknowledged, "the conceptual error of identifying a discrete 'modern conservative movement' in the first place." One doesn't need to look long to find historical precedents for contemporary far-right themes and trends in American history, with the 'America First' rhetoric of the 1920s Klan and the hyper-nationalist paramilitarism of American fascists in the 1930s serving as prime examples.

Having admitted that he too had distinguished the "modern conservative movement" from "the brutish relics of a more gothic, ill-formed and supposedly incoherent reactionary era," Perlstein concluded that future historians of the American Right ought to move on from studying major political figures associated with conservatism like Buckley, Goldwater, and Reagan. Instead, they ought to pay closer attention to "conservative history's political surrealists and intellectual embarrassments, its con artists and tribunes of white rage."[30] The historical chapters of this dissertation illustrate the unorthodox nature of the far-right political actors alluded to in Perlstein's prose. For the anti-globalist ideologues I document, a lack of intellectual substance or sophistication was compensated for by clever use of ambiguous populist and conspiracist language that could appeal to conservative and extremist alike, as well as their use of what was

[29] Rick Perlstein. ""I Thought I Understood the American Right. Trump Proved Me Wrong." *New York Times.* April 11 2017.
[30] Ibid.

essentially an effective marketing strategy: using direct-mail and radio to mass market their conspiracist message *while* fundraising from sympathetic conservative readers or listeners.

What is missing from that new historiographical tendency Perlstein describes is a coherent analytical framework for understanding the relationship that existed between (mainstream) movement conservatism and what is typically called the far-right, the radical right, or the extreme right. This terminology (and the broader spatial metaphor used to describe the spectrum of acceptable or illegitimate ideological positions) itself complicates things, as the labels of 'far-right' and 'extremist' are almost always used as a pejorative, rather than a self-description.[31] Far-right groups and figures themselves identified as conservatives or patriots, and part of the way they positioned themselves ideologically was by claiming that mainstream conservatives were insufficiently conservative, or liberals in disguise. The term 'R.I.N.O.' (Republican In Name Only), popularized by Trump and other alt-right figures in the 2010s, is just the latest incarnation of a long-standing trend of radical rightists positioning themselves to the right of the GOP. The anti-globalist publications produced by the Liberty Lobby and Birch Society were often *more* critical of Republicans than Democrats, attacking them viciously for their purportedly false conservatism.

At some point during the history of the conservative movement, a dividing line emerged between what was seen as respectable and legitimate 'conservatism' and an illegitimate far-right extremism. Conservative movement leader William F. Buckley led efforts to demarcate between the mainstream and the extreme on the American Right, using his platform as editor of *National Review* and host of *Firing Line* to define the boundaries of conservatism and distance his movement from those whose outspoken racism and anti-Semitism made them politically toxic to the movement's success.[32] As the former ascended into the political mainstream during the

[31] As early as 1963, scholars have acknowledged the challenges inherent to distinguishing between legitimate conservatism, illegitimate far-right extremism, and the far-right radical camp that sits between the two. See G. B. Rush. "Toward a Definition of the Extreme Right." The Pacific Sociological Review Vol. 6, No. 2 (Autumn, 1963), pp. 64-73. For more recent attempts to define these concepts, see Case Mudde. "Right-wing extremism analyzed: A comparative analysis of the ideologies of three alleged right-wing extremist parties (NPD, NDP, CP'86)." *European Journal of Political Research* 27:2 (1995): 203-224, and Elisabeth Carter. "Right-wing extremism/radicalism: reconstructing the concept." *Journal of Political Ideologies* 23:2 (2018): 157-182.

[32] For books focusing on the role of William F. Buckley in the history of American conservatism, see John Judis, *William F. Buckley Jr.: Patron Saint of the Conservatives*. Simon and Schuster, 1988; Carl Bogus. *Buckley: William F. Buckley Jr. and the Rise of American Conservatism*. Bloomsbury, 2011; Alvin S. Felzenberg. *A Man and His Presidents: The Political Odyssey of William F. Buckley Jr*. Yale University Press, 2017

1960s, 1970s, and 1980s, the latter receded into the margins of political life. Scholars concerned with the late 20th century American far-right generally point to the influence of Senator Joseph McCarthy in the 1950s, the conspiracist populism of the John Birch Society and the racial demagoguery of George Wallace in the 1960s and 1970s, the violent white supremacist ideology and movement which emerged in the 1980s, and the militia movement of the 1990s.[33] A detailed study of the history of the American Right reveals that these far-right leaders, movements, intellectuals, and organizations overlapped in substantive ways with the 'mainstream' conservative movement, and a growing number of scholars are highlighting these connections and pushing for new ways of thinking beyond the dated binary of 'conservatism' and 'right-wing extremism'.

Schlozman and Rosenfeld's theory of an historical 'Long New Right' provides a valuable heuristic for thinking about the sort of unorthodox historical figures and networks composing the American far-right and incorporating them into histories of the Republican Party and the broader American Right. Schlozman and Rosenfeld's approach, introduced in a 2019 paper titled *The Long New Right and the World It Made* is notable for its two key emphases.[34] The first is their view that a *longue durée* approach is needed for historians and political scientists to understand the macro-level dynamics that shaped the development of the American Right from the post-war period until the present day. The second is that the moderates, radicals, and extremists populating the American Right during the second half of the 20th century were all committed to promoting a conservative alternative to communism, liberalism, and socialism. This leads them to conceive of the 'Long New Right' as successive generations of political activists, institution-builders, intellectuals, and politicians who are united by their shared membership in a broader American Right primarily concerned with winning political power and enacting conservative policy changes. The focus on the New Right as a multi-generational phenomenon allows for more mid-

[33] See Leo P. Ribuffo. *The Old Christian Right: The Protestant Far Right from the Great Depression to the Cold War*. Penn State Press, 1983; Rick Perlstein. *Before the Storm: Barry Goldwater and the Unmaking of the American Consensus.* Bold Type Books, 2001; Ted Morgan. *Reds: McCarthyism in Twentieth-Century America*. Random House, 2004; Dan Carter. *The Politics of Rage: George Wallace, the Origins of the New Conservatism, and the Transformation of American Politics*. LSU Press, 1995; Lane Crothers. *Rage on the Right: The American Militia Movement from Ruby Ridge to Homeland Security*. Rowman & Littlefield, 2003.

[34] Daniel Schlozman and Sam Rosenfeld. *The Long New Right and the World It Made*. Unpublished paper presented at the 2018 American Political Science Association Conference. January 31, 2019. See also Schlozman and Rosenfeld, "Prophets of Party in American Political History," *The Forum* 15 (2018): 685-709; and Schlozman and Rosenfeld, "Party Blobs and Partisan Visions: Making Sense of Our Hollow Parties," in *State of the Parties*, 8th ed., John C. Green, Daniel Coffey, and David Cohen, eds. Rowman & Littlefield, 2018.

and macro-level theorizing about changing strategic or ideological patterns among successive generations of New Right activists, while also contextualizing these change in relation to longer-term developments and structural changes in American politics than historical analyses with short time windows can incorporate.

The second emphasis of the 'Long New Right' approach is Schlozman and Rosenfeld's argument that the rise of Trump necessitates a broader understanding of how the American Right (rather than just the mainstream conservative movement) has shaped recent American history. They echo Perlstein when they critique:

> "the historiographical tendency to echo the conservative movement's own in-house chroniclers in sharply distinguishing a respectable, tightly-knit group of [moderate] actors and organizations from fringe and disreputable extremists in their midst. Because we see a rejection of limits and the absence of internal checks on extremism as intrinsic to the Long New Right's prophecy, we endorse the push to bring the fever-swamps back in, as it were, to analyses of the American right."[35]

Using the concept of a "Long New Right" allows us to conceive of anti-globalists and other members of the American far-right as part of broad-based, decentralized, and internally divided *right-wing movement against liberalism, communism, and socialism*. While moderate conservatives painted far-rightists as extremists and far-rightists portrayed moderates as liberals-in-disguise, different factions of rightists converged around a unifying *rhetorical opposition to Democrats and the agenda they represented* and *a strategic approach to the pursuit of power that saw (Republican) party politics as only one of several possible means to enacting right-wing political change*. By using this concept and bringing "the fever swamps back in – to analyses of the American right"[36], we can better understand the complex relationship between the moderate, radical, and extremist variants that composed and constituted the American Right during the late 20th century United States.

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[35] Schlozman and Rosenfeld. *The Long New Right*, 6.

[36] The term 'fever swamps' was originally coined by neoconservative commentator Midge Decter to describe the unsavory milieu to the right of the Republican Party where anti-Semitic ideology, right-wing populist politics, and psychological instability mixed together.

The neglect of far-right actors, movements, and ideas had previously been noted by an earlier generation of American historians, whose historiographical arguments illustrate some of the reasons *why* the role of these phenomena in recent American history had been ignored. In a 1994 Forum on American Conservatism in the *American Historical Review,* Alan Brinkley wrote that the study of American conservatism was an historical "orphan" whose understudied "intellectual traditions and – social and political movements" posed a problem for American historians.[37] In the same forum, Leo Ribuffo argued that the influence of the "pluralist" school popularized in the 1960s had limited American historians' ability to comprehend the complexity, appeal, and adaptability of right-wing politics in America:

> Daniel Bell, Richard Hoftstadter, and Martin Seymour Lipset were wrong about the Right in ways that have been documented for twenty-five years. They discounted nativist beliefs and conspiratorial inclinations within the political elite and ideological mainstream, underestimated the disruptiveness of social change, exaggerated American society's capacity for quiet compromise, postulated the illegitimacy of cultural as well as class conflict, reflexively celebrated the political center, regularly reduced dissident ideas to psychological symptoms, and often conflated the American Far Right with Italian Fascism[.][38]

Fifteen years later, Phillips-Fein began a 2011 review essay on American conservatism by saying that the study of American conservatism had become, "one of the most dynamic subfields in American history, the subject of dozens of journal articles, books, and dissertations."[39] While, "scholarship on conservatism flourished during the 1990s and 2000s, decades when the Right seemed to be an ascendant force in American politics," Phillips-Fein opined that scholars in the newly mature field ought to, "move beyond the closely focused studies of movement history" and to, "reconsider our ideas about the relationship of the Right to the broader trends of

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[37] Alan Brinkley. "The Problem of American Conservatism." *The American Historical Review* 99, no. 2 (1994): 409-29.
[38] Leo P. Ribuffo. "Why Is There so Much Conservatism in the United States and Why Do So Few Historians Know Anything about It." *The American Historical Review* 99, no. 2 (1994): 438-49.
[39] Kim Phillips-Fein. "Conservatism: A State of the Field." *Journal of American History* 98:3 (2011): 723-743. For a critical reply to Phillips-Feins' review essay that emphasizes the historical neglect of the American far-right, see Martin Durham. "On American Conservatism and Kim Phillips-Fein's Survey of the Field." *Journal of American History* 98:3 (2011): 756–759.

American political history."[40] Phillips-Fein concluded by noting that some understudied topics in the history of the American Right deserved more attention, particularly the relationships between nationalism and conservatism, mass media and conservatism, and the role of "extremist" groups and ideas in the historical development of the movement.[41]

While some scholars had begun to explore these understudied trends in the history of the American Right before Trump, the events of 2016 ensured that the study of the American far-right would be given greater attention by historians and social scientists alike. A number of books and dissertations have been published in recent years on the alt-right, right-wing populism, far-right extremist ideology, and the radicalization of the Republican Party.[42] **The specific historical contribution of this dissertation is to highlight the previously understudied role of anti-globalist ideology in this broader history, exploring the complex and long-term process of ideological development that took place in the late 20th century at the hands of a diffuse network of far-right intellectuals, radio personalities, institution-builders, and propagandists.** By tracing anti-globalism's long-term trajectory and continuity in the late 20th century, this work will contribute to a body of recent historical scholarship which has, as Phillips-Fein wrote, "sought to break down the older distinctions between "moderate" and "extreme" conservatives, emphasizing the overlapping concerns and personae that linked organizations once seen as radical to the more respectable and electorally oriented Right."[43] As I show in the following section, anti-globalism's value as a political frame and ideology comes from the ambiguity that allows it to appeal to conservative and far-right extremist alike.

Why Anti-Globalism?

I use the term anti-globalism because an outspoken opposition to *globalism* and *globalists* is what distinguishes this current ideological formation from its historical predecessors. Alternative terms like national populism, the populist radical right, or the alt-right all provide some value for

[40] Ibid, 741.
[41] Ibid.
[42] For books on the rise of the alt-right since 2016, see George Hawley. *Making Sense of the Alt-Right*. Columbia University Press, 2017; David Neiwert. *Alt-America: The Rise of the Radical Right in the Age of Trump*. Verso Books, 2017; Vegas Tenold. *Everything You Love Will Burn: Inside the Rebirth of White Nationalism in America*. Bold Type Books, 2018; Angela Nagle. *Kill All Normies: Online Culture Wars From 4Chan And Tumblr To Trump And The Alt-Righ*t. Zero Books, 2017; and Carlos Lozada. *What Were We Thinking: A Brief Intellectual History of the Trump Era*. Simon & Schuster, 2020.
[43] Kim Phillips-Fein, "Conservatism: A State of the Field," 740.

describing elements of this ideological worldview, but anti-globalism is ultimately the central focus of what these right-wing ideas and movements *stand against*. Anti-globalism incorporates elements of nationalism, nativism, isolationism, conspiracism, right-wing populism, and traditional conservatism, but its novelty comes from its ability to incorporate these ideological notions into a broad-based worldview oriented against 'globalism'.

What does globalism mean and why is the word so important to the ideology of Trump and other contemporary populists? On its face, 'globalism' would imply some set of ideas in favor of international integration or a more globalized world. More than anything else, however, I argue that we ought to consider that the possible meaning or definition of globalism is *fundamentally ambiguous.* Like many political concepts, globalism is "essentially contested," meaning that there *cannot* be a set definition of globalism. The word's flexibility is demonstrated by the variety of phenomenon that it has been used to describe:

- The over-arching foreign policy pursued by the United States from World War II to the present day.[44]
- A broad tradition of (Anglo-capitalist) global brotherhood that pre-dated (but was greatly aided by) the two World Wars and that motivated support for the League of Nations, the United Nations, and other aspirational attempts at (and hopes for) global government or governance.[45]
- a varied but coherent neoliberal ideology (developed by Friedrich Hayek and other early members of the 'Austrian school of economics') that sought to offer a free-market alternative to Keynesian or Marxist-inspired economic theories in the mid-20th century.[46]
- The post-Cold War foreign policy pursued by the United States, where the 'War on Terror' quickly came to replace the fight against Communism as the

[44] Stephen Ambrose. *Rise to Globalism: American Foreign Policy Since 1938*. New York: Penguin, 1993.
[45] Or Rosenboim. The Emergence of Globalism: Visions of World Order in Britain and the United States, 1939-1950. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2017.
[46] Quinn Slobodian: Globalists: The End of Empire and the Birth of Neoliberalism. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2018.

justification for a massive global military and corresponding military-industrial complex.[47]

- 'Market globalism' came to represent the ideas and processes associated with the economic 'hyper-globalization' that began in the 1990s. Market globalism embodied in the expansion of American capital and industry into previously restricted foreign markets.[48]

Scholars, public intellectuals, and other commentators have used the word 'globalism' to describe these and other historical and contemporary trends since the 1990s. By that time, however, the word globalism had already been popularized in the conspiracist literature produced by far-right groups. Globalism came to replace earlier references to internationalism and internationalists in the pages of Liberty Lobby's flagship newsletter, *The Spotlight*, during the late 1970s, and it appeared in other far-right publications in the 1980s. For the Liberty Lobby and other far-right groups and ideologues, globalism was used to name and describe a sinister conspiracy that sought nothing less than world domination. Other conspiracists like the John Birch Society's Gary Allen used the term 'New World Order', but the definition was fundamentally the same: a concerted effort by wealthy and politically connected international elites to bring the United States into a totalitarian world government. While the perpetrators of the globalist conspiracy varied from the Rockefellers to the Jews, the broader narrative was *always* one in which conspiracy was a driving causal force of historical change and totalitarian world-government was the conspirators' dystopian endgame.

Anti-globalists used the language of globalism and globalist elites to construct a new ideological frontier, with the phrases 'globalism/globalist' functioning as empty or floating signifiers to be defined by the ideological actor on the broader public stage. Anti-globalism is, in essence, defined by the speech-act of *naming* globalism (and the globalists who enact it) as the *enemy* or force opposed to the American people and its values. This point is best illustrated by Trump's 2016 campaign declaration: "Americanism, not globalism, will be our credo!" For Trump and earlier anti-globalists, the divide between Left and Right is no central conflict in American

[47] Manfred Steger. "Review: Imperial Globalism, Democracy, and the 'Political Turn'." *Political Theory* 34:3 (2006): 372-382.
[48] Manfred Steger. Globalism: The New Market Ideology. Rowman & Littlefield, 2001.

politics. Instead, a new opposition or antagonism between Americanism and Globalism is offered as the central political conflict facing Americans today.

The sum of these anti-globalist speech acts leads to the construction a coherent historical narrative, ideological worldview, and American national identity in the minds of the audience. While the Americanism would stay the same between different anti-globalists, the exact details of the history or the radicalism of the ideology could vary. Trump's ideological worldview was distinct from that of his Republican competitors in 2016 for its ability to weave together standard conservative views about cultural and economic issues with a new critique of a decades-old globalist political class and policy regime. When Trump spoke against globalist elites, he invoked the broad array of ideas, material processes, elite networks, corporate and intergovernmental organizations, laws and norms that could be associated with globalization and subsumed them into the signifying vessel of 'globalism'.

At the same time, the long-standing use of the word 'globalism' by conspiracists and far-right extremists meant that what the 'conspiratorial theory of history' developed by the Birch Society and Liberty Lobby could also be seen as part of a longer-term struggle against globalism. The books composing the 'conspiracist canon' printed and distributed by these groups did not always agree on who the culprits behind the globalist conspiracy were; in fact, that variability allowed anti-globalism to appeal to a broader audience than purely anti-Semitic conspiracism would. Despite disagreeing on who the globalists were, what their aims were, or what they would do once in power, anti-globalists agreed on the long-standing nature of the globalist threat and the urgent need for Americans to fight against it. Whether the term 'globalism' is used negatively by an anonymous troll in a YouTube comment or by the President of the United States on the floor of the United Nations, the term's emergence stands as of the most notable ideological developments and discursive shifts in recent political life.

Anti-Globalist Ideology and the American Right in the Late 20th Century: Key Arguments and Chapter Synopsis

Others have argued that the election of Trump marks the culmination of long-term efforts by right-wing intellectuals, activists, and networks to *radicalize* conservative ideology and push the

Republican Party to the far-right.[49] The concept of 'mainstreaming' has been used to describe the long-term process by which ideas, themes, phrases, and tropes originally promoted by far-right extremists have been adopted by conservative media and politicians.[50] The implication is that these ideas, which were previously marginal and limited in their ability to influence institutional politics, have drifted *from the margins to the mainstream*. While the concept of mainstreaming has its limits in *explaining* the dynamics of change in the importance or influence of political ideas, it is a useful metaphor for *describing* what has, in fact, happened. Anti-globalist arguments and ideas that were found *only* in the marginal publications produced by the racist and conspiracist American far-right during the 1990s are now a core part of the ideology of the most recent Republican President and Republican members of Congress.

While interpretations and emphases vary, it is safe to say that there is an emerging consensus among scholars and public commentators that radical right-wing populism – and the anti-democratic and authoritarian potential that it brings with it – has been 'mainstreamed' since 2016. The distinctive claim of this dissertation is that **anti-globalism is the key concept for understanding the historical development and contemporary appeal of radical right-wing ideology in the late 20th and early 21st centuries**. I argue that anti-globalism became the dominant ideology and master-frame of the Republican Party and much of the American Right since 2016, marking the culmination of a long-term effort by far-right ideologues and activists to radicalize American conservatives and conservatism. Any explanation of *how* or *why* that has happened *must* account for the role played by anti-globalist ideology.

The Trump era marks the second instance in which Republican conservatives and far-rightist converged around anti-globalist ideas and language, with the first taking place during the 1990s. Anti-globalist ideology did not appear *ex nihilio* in the language of Trump in 2016, or as a response to hyper-globalization in the 1990s. It was produced by a long-term strategy of ideological innovation and dissemination pursued by a complex, multi-generational institutional

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[49] John Huntington. *Far-Right Vanguard: The Radical Roots of Modern Conservatism*. University of Pennsylvania Press, 2021.

[50] See Katy Brown, Aurelien Mondon, and Aaron Winter. "The far right, the mainstream and mainstreaming: towards a heuristic framework." *Journal of Political Ideologies*, published online on June 5, 2021.
The concept of 'mainstreaming' was first developed comprehensively to describe the ideological strategy of the far-right in Leonard Zeskind. *Blood and Politics: The History of the White Nationalist Movement from the Margins to the Mainstream*. Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2009.

apparatus of far-right organizations, ideologues, networks, publications, and activists concentrated around the John Birch Society and Liberty Lobby. These and other anti-globalist groups and writers profiled in the following chapters were responsible for synthesizing long-standing themes and arguments associated with nativism, populism, anti-internationalist isolationism, anti-Semitic conspiracism, and radical anti-Communism into a distinctly anti-globalist ideology by the 1980s.

Beyond tracing the specific evolution of anti-globalist arguments and anti-globalism as a broader ideology, I also contribute to a deeper understanding of how political ideologies emerge, evolve, and institutionalize. Anti-globalist ideology was not produced by a single thinker or group; instead, it was developed and promoted by a relatively decentralized network of far-right ideologues. Anti-globalist ideas were embodied in a 'conspiracist canon' of books and newsletters written or published by these men and their organizations over multiple decades. The origins and aims of the globalist conspiracy were detailed in the chapters, articles, and arguments contained within the hundred-plus books and innumerable newsletters published by these groups in their decades-long history. This 'conspiracist canon' – much of which is still read and shared today on the Internet – gave anti-globalism a life of its own that would outlast the groups and men who birthed it.

In sum, the long-term efforts of these groups, networks, and ideologues in the mid-to-late 20th century United States developed anti-globalism into a mature, autonomous, and self-sustaining ideology whose influence in American and international politics has only become apparent in recent years. Anti-globalism's development and trajectory cannot be understood without analyzing these groups, ideologues, and the far-right social movement context in which they operated. I go beyond merely tracing the development and shifts in anti-globalist argumentation and language and instead offer a more multi-faceted account of ideological development that emphasizes the reflexive relationship between ideas themselves and the sociological and institutional actors that promote and adopt them. In doing so, I illuminate some of the dynamics by which individual actors, organizations, social movements, and ideas themselves combine to shape or produce political change.

The central question of my dissertation is: what is anti-globalism, where did it come from, and how did it develop from 1945 to 2000? To answer these questions, I look to the historical context

of the American Right in the second half of the 20th century. It was in this environment that anti-globalist discourse first appeared, as radical right-wing ideologues adapted old language to new political circumstance in order to articulate a right-wing national populist ideology opposed to the intrusion of globalist institutions on the social life and political sovereignty of the United States. Combining and coopting the political traditions of anti-interventionism, populism, anti-Communism, and anti-Semitic conspiracism, anti-globalism originated in the pages of radical right-wing publications in the 1950s and reached ideological maturity by the 1990s. The content of anti-globalist publications varied in terms of theme and emphasis, but generally converged around the presentation of an historical conspiracy threatening to bring the United States into a totalitarian world government. The central signifiers of 'globalism', 'one world government', 'one worlders / internationalists / globalists', and 'New World Order' came to represent a complex, contradictory, yet internally coherent ideology based on the assumption that world events are driven by a grand conspiracy of internationalist elites. While the specific arguments and ideological underpinnings that accompanied these phrases changed over time, the historical evidence presented in the following chapters will demonstrate that anti-globalist language and themes about the threat of internationalist and globalist ideas and institutions to the United States were a consistent feature of radical right-wing discourse in America for all of the post-war period.

The argument of this dissertation operates on three levels. On the micro-level, I am interested in documenting the major organizations, individuals and publications which expressed anti-internationalist and anti-globalist sentiment between 1945 to 2000. While I do not aim to catalogue every figure, group or publication which expressed opposition to the United Nations, globalism, or internationalism in the second half of the twentieth century, I highlight the most important and influential anti-globalists voices and attempt to highlight the variety of organizations and actors producing anti-globalist publications throughout the period. I also attempt to reconstruct the broader context within which these anti-globalist ideas were expressed, tracing the connections between individual ideologues and the organizational networks they operated in.

On the second level, I aim to chart the broader trajectory of anti-globalism during the period surveyed. How did anti-globalist ideas, as expressed in the various publications I survey, change

over time? How did the leading figures of the anti-globalist far-right adapt their political strategy to changing political circumstances? How did their relationship with the mainstream conservative movement and Republican Party evolve over time? As we will see, the failure of far-right social movements in the 1950s and 1960s led to a propaganda-driven strategy for anti-globalist institutions and ideologues. This strategy contributed to the development of anti-globalism into a more robust ideology, a necessary precondition for the adoption of anti-globalist framing by right-wing social movement actors and Republican politicians alike during the 1990s.

On the third level, I want to argue that anti-globalism's broad trajectory was shaped by the way that anti-globalist ideologues synthesized long-standing ideological tendencies in American politics and re-invented them for the context of the Cold War United States. The rise of American empire during the Cold War served as a crucial foil to the anti-globalists I discuss, and it is necessary to reckon with the structurally determinative roles of the growth of the American state, the Cold War, and globalization alike when attempting to understand anti-globalism's trajectory and political fortunes in the 20th century. The emergence of 'globalization' discourses in the 1990s gave anti-globalist ideology and language newfound salience, providing right-wing social movement actors with a master-frame to replace the anti-Communism that preceded it. At the same time, the anti-globalist ideologues who presaged these changes did so through the innovative synthesis of isolationist, conspiracist, populist, and nativist discourses with significant cultural resonance in American political culture. Anti-globalism did not emerge as a sort of mechanistic response to the challenge of globalization at the end of the 20th century but was instead consciously *developed* through the ideological innovation and political entrepreneurship of anti-globalist ideologues seeking to popularize their far-right conspiratorial worldview during the 1960s, 1970s, and 1980s. The successful spread of anti-globalism in the 1990s cannot be explained, then, without understanding this complex intersection between structural macro-economic and geopolitical change, the history of American political thought, and the ideological and organizational innovations enacted by late 20th century anti-globalist ideologues.

Having laid out the broad contours of my argument, I will outline the structure and argument of the historical chapters that follow this one. Chapter 3 examines the period of 1945 to 1965. The foundation of the United Nations and a plethora of other international organizations in the years immediately following World War II prompted anti-internationalist sentiment among American

conservatives, who saw the U.N. as a threat to national sovereignty at best and a path to totalitarian world government at worst. Anti-internationalist sentiment of this sort was common on the American Right during the 1950s, with 'internationalism' being decried by mainstream conservative and far-right extremists alike. Some of the most popular anti-internationalist voices of the 1950s were men like Dan Smoot, Carl McIntire, Billy James Hargis, and Clarence Manion. All of these men built up substantial media operations or political organizations, primarily around radio but also around more conventional print media and speaking tours. Smoot in particular was notable for popularizing the notion of an "invisible government" in the early 1960s, alleging that internationalist elites in groups like the Council on Foreign Relations were leading the United States into the grips of a Communist-led world government. By the late 1960s, these figures had declined in influence due to changing political circumstances and efforts by the federal government to crack down on far-right radio broadcasters. By this time, these individual media entrepreneurs had been replaced by more permanent – and institutional – voices for anti-internationalism: the John Birch Society and Liberty Lobby.

Chapter 4 looks at the period of 1965 to 1985. The Birch Society and Liberty Lobby, both founded in 1958, came to occupy central roles in the world of far-right social movement politics in the 1960s, 1970s, and 1980s. It was during these years that they developed their ideological profile, moving away from the explicit anti-Semitism and white supremacism of the 1950s far-right toward a more ambiguous and complex conspiratorial worldview oriented around anti-globalism. Major figures like Willis Carto and Gary Allen led the way, writing books, editing and writing newsletter columns, and shifting the emphasis of right-wing conspiracism away from the communist threat to the more subtle globalist apparatus led by the Trilateral Commission. It was in the 1970s and 1980s that the terms 'globalism' and 'New World Order' were popularized, moving away from the older language of anti-internationalism. The same period also saw these groups build up sophisticated organizational infrastructure, helping to spread their message through book sales and connecting far-right activists for political campaigns and activities. Lobby and Birch supporters played a substantial role in the presidential campaigns of American Independence Party candidates George Wallace in 1968 and John Schmitz. These failed campaigns, along with unsuccessful efforts to start new political organizations and parties, contributed to a shift in political strategy among radical right-wing leaders. Given the apparent inability of far-right political groups to win elections or establish a mass movement, groups like

the JBS and LL committed themselves fully to the production and dissemination of political propaganda. Other far-right actors, like the extremist militants of The Order, would use violence and crime to achieve their political goals in the early 1980s. Their turn to violent extremist ideology and terroristic "propaganda by the deed" would portend the further growth of white supremacist extremism in the 1990s.

Chapter 5 looks at 1985 to 2000. The 'Reagan Revolution' of the 1980s, a major victory for movement conservatives, did little to quelch the rage on the far-right. In fact, the inability of Reagan to achieve radical conservative policy goals led many right-wingers to question whether the Republican Party – or electoral politics – could save America from the corrosive forces of liberalism. The 1990s saw tremendous changes in American and international politics, as bipolar worldview enforced by decades of Cold War was replaced by the more uncertain landscape of globalization and multipolarity. In response to these and other economic, cultural, and political changes, Republican Patrick Buchanan challenged incumbent President George H.W. Bush in the 1992 Republican Presidential primary. Buchanan, who announced that he was running against the globalist consensus, came to represent a new anti-globalist populist movement on the American Right during the 1990s. This same period also saw several new movements and intellectual voices emerge on the American far-right: the militia movement, the Religious Right, the paleoconservatives, the white supremacist movement, and the terroristic extreme right. These distinct yet frequently overlapping groups and tendencies were united by a shared embrace of the anti-globalist framing developed by the Birch Society and Liberty Lobby in preceding decades, even if disagreement existed about what exactly 'globalism' or the 'New World Order' meant. Republican politicians adopted anti-globalist language and ideas in the mid-1990s, both to frame their critiques of President Clinton's trade policy and to appeal to a newly visible right-wing populist constituency concerned about the threat of the 'New World Order'.

Chapter 6 will conclude the thesis. It will begin with a recapitulation of the theoretical arguments offered in this chapter in relation to the broader narrative and historical exposition offered in Chapters 3 through 5. Having presented the broader argument about anti-globalist ideology and the institutional dynamics of its emergence and spread, I will then consider the implications of these arguments for how we ought to integrate anti-globalism into histories of the American Right. I will bring that history up until the present day, reflecting on the relationship between the

late 20th century anti-globalism, the rise of Trump, and the broader proliferation of anti-globalist populism around the world in the 2010s. To conclude the conclusion, I will offer some tentative reflections on the paths that anti-globalism might take as we progress further into the 21st century.

The following chapter will outline the theoretical framework structuring the historical narrative and analysis found in Chapters 3, 4, and 5.

CHAPTER TWO:

Theoretical Framework

Ideas, Movements, and Institutions: Theorizing Ideological Change on the 20th Century American Right

This chapter will draw on literature in political theory, social movement studies, and new institutionalist scholarship to outline the theoretical framework structuring the historical analysis in Chapters 3, 4, and 5. While my primary emphasis in these chapters is on tracing the historical development of anti-globalist ideology from genesis to maturation across the second half of the twentieth century, I also reconstruct the *sociological* and *institutional* context from which anti-globalism ideology emerged in that period. Anti-globalism's history cannot be told without the John Birch Society and Liberty Lobby, the far-right organizations primarily responsible for propagation of anti-globalist ideas and texts. This chapter provides the theoretical and conceptual architecture needed to understand the relationship between anti-globalist ideology, the anti-globalist institutions, and the far-right social movements that shaped those ideas and networks.

The Liberty Lobby was founded by Willis Carto in 1958, and the Birch Society was founded by Robert Welch in the same year. Both of these men were active participants in the far-right political and social movement against Communism in the 1950s, and those right-wing networks provided the early membership, audience, and financial support needed for these groups to institutionalize. By the mid-1960s, both groups had established the direct-mail fundraising model that would allow them to become self-sustaining financial enterprises with a large audience of conservative readers. It was at this point that Carto, Welch, and other anti-globalist ideologues engaged in a unique and long-term process of *political entrepreneurship*, combining ideological innovation on the abstract level of words and concepts with the concrete challenge of disseminating, popularizing, and, ultimately, institutionalizing those ideas.[51] In countless texts and arguments published over multiple decades, these organizations transcended their

[51] The concept of political entrepreneurship has been used broadly by social scientists to account for the role of human agency and innovation in broader processes of political and institutional change. Most recently, the concept was used to describe the broad process by which left- and right-wing leaders, activists, and ideologues established populist parties as a permanent fixture of Western European party systems. See Catherine de Vries and Sara Hobolt. *Political Entrepreneurs: The Rise of Challenger Parties in Europe*. Philadelphia: Princeton University Press, 2020.

ideological origins and elaborated anti-globalism as the unifying ideological worldview of the American far-right. This ideology replaced the openly anti-Semitic and white supremacist ideas that characterized the American Right in the 1950s, replacing it with the coded and ambiguous language of anti-globalist populism. Anti-globalist ideas were disseminated by the publishing arms of the Birch Society and Liberty Lobby, via book sales, newsletter subscriptions, and fundraising appeals sent to sympathetic readers. These texts were bought and sold through mailing lists and in the many conservative bookstores that appeared across the United States in the early 1960s, or they were passed around among friends, family, or networks of right-wing activists.

These organizations did more than merely print books and newsletters: they were *unique political institutions* whose importance in recent American history has been underestimated. These anti-globalist institutions eschewed the short-term pursuit of political power in favor of the long-term goal of *building a right-wing ideology distinct from conservatism*. The Birch Society and Liberty Lobby did not win elections, promote public policies, or engage in the 'contentious politics' characteristic of non-institutional social movements. Instead, the historical import and novelty of these organizations came from the fact that the influence and power of their anti-globalist ideology would continue to grow after the organizations themselves had declined in influence by the 1990s.

The first section will explain how my account of how anti-globalism functions as a political ideology, focusing in particular on the role of the 'ideologue' as a political entrepreneur who combines ideological innovation with institution-building. The second will draw on scholarship in social movement studies to understand the reciprocal relationship between anti-globalist ideology and the social movement context from which it emerged. The third section will look at anti-globalism's trajectory from the perspective of discursive and network institutionalism, developing a framework for understanding the novel institutional form taken by the John Birch Society and Liberty Lobby. By integrating the concepts of ideology, social movements, and institutions, I develop a theoretical model of ideological gestation and maturation that can account for the sociological and institutional dynamics that shaped anti-globalism's evolution in the late 20th century.

Anti-Globalism as Political Ideology

Answering the question, "what is anti-globalism?" requires a robust definition and understanding of what a political ideology is. The most influential contemporary scholar of political ideologies is Michael Freeden, whose work as a scholar, doctoral supervisor, and founding editor of the *Journal of Political Ideologies* was key in making "the political theory of ideologies [into] an established sub-field of political theory."[52] Freeden and other contemporary ideology theorists like Ernesto Laclau rejected the Marxist notion of ideology as 'false consciousness', embracing a theoretical perspective that saw ideas, concepts, and ideologies as subjective discursive lens through which the objective social and political world are simultaneously decontested and reconstructed.[53] In recent years, scholars of political ideologies have self-consciously moved beyond the study of Great Men and Big Ideas to look at the ways that, "everyday' and 'routine' political ideas found in - speeches, statements, debates, interviews, pamphlets, newspaper columns, websites, posters, placards, demonstrations and performances," can illustrate the processes by which a political ideology "[initially]forms, is manifested, reproduced, develop[ed], and decay[s]."[54] Given the fact that anti-globalist ideology was elaborated in scores of books and countless newsletters, the ideology-focused theoretical framework developed by Freeden and others provides a useful toolkit for understanding anti-globalist ideas.

In the last chapter, I noted that many scholars working in the field of 'populism studies' define populism as a 'thin ideology'. These scholars, most prominently Mudde, draw their notion of

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[52] Alan Finlayson. "Rhetoric and the political theory of ideologies." *Political Studies* 60:4 (2012): 751.

[53] Freeden's broader theory of ideology is expressed in *Ideologies and Political Theory: A Conceptual Approach*. Oxford University Press, 1996. The evolution of Freeden's theorization of political ideologies can be seen in the dozens of articles and editorials he has published as the editor of the *Journal of Political Ideologies* since the mid-1990s. These theoretical developments are summarized in *Ideology Studies*: New Advances and Interpretations. Routledge, 2021.

Laclau's theory of ideology is expressed in the variety of books he authored by himself and with his frequent intellectual collaborator, Chantal Mouffe. See Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe. *Hegemony and Socialist Strategy*. Verso, 1985; Ernesto Laclau. *On Populist Reason*. Verso, 2005; Ernesto Laclau. *The Rhetorical Foundations of Society*. Verso, 2014.

[54] Finlayson, "Rhetoric and the political theory of ideologies," 751.

See also: William Connolly. *The Terms of Political Discourse*. Princeton University Press, 1974; David Howarth, Aletta Norval, and Yannis Stavrakakis. *Discourse Theory and Political Analysis*. Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2000; Aletta Norval. "The Things We Do with Words: Contemporary Approaches to the Analysis of Ideology." *British Journal of Political Science* 30:2 (2000): 313–46; Michael Freeden. "Practising Ideology and Ideological Practices." *Political Studies*, 48:2 (2000): 302–22; and Kari Palonen. "Political Theorizing as a Dimension of Political Life." *European Journal of Political Theory* 4:4 (2005): 351–66.

thick and thin ideologies directly from Freeden.[55] Freeden first proposed the thick-thin distinction in his canonical book *Ideologies and Political Theory*. For Freeden, liberalism, conservatism, and socialism are essentially the three main ideological families to which 'thinner' ideational groupings like nationalism, environmentalism, anarchism, feminism, or populism can attach. The former are the definitive 'thick ideologies', while the latter are distinctive ideological phenomena that lack the breadth, depth, historical influence, and scope of the three major ideologies of modernity. Freeden himself never distinguished between thick and thin ideologies in a systematic way, and the notion of 'ideological thinness' has largely been developed by other scholars. Aslandis criticized the "slippery conceptual" foundations of the 'thick/thin' dichotomy, arguing that it is impossible to actually demarcate between the two ideal types. As a result, the 'thin ideology' label invariably implies that the ideational content of the new or previously-marginal ideologies is less substantive and important.[56]

I argue, contra Mudde and other proponents of the 'thin ideology' thesis, that *anti-globalist populism is a mature and full-fledged ideology whose development from a peripheral set of ideas and discourses into a mature, coherent, and distinctive political ideology can be traced to the late 20th century United States*. Steger has made "the case for the ideological maturity of Trumpism [as] consistent with Freeden's three cardinal criteria of ideational distinctiveness, political responsiveness, and conceptual effectiveness."[57] While the question of whether anti-globalism satisfies any of these three criteria is fundamentally subjective, it is fair to argue, given the recent rise of Trumpism and the broader emergence of anti-globalist populism, that anti-globalist ideology deserves more scholarly scrutiny.

Anti-globalist ideology was not 'thick' in terms of the quality of its arguments, the comprehensiveness of its worldview, or the depth of its central concepts. Nonetheless, anti-globalism's significance comes from its persistent and broad influence on the American far-right. The 'conspiracist canon' produced by the Birch Society and Liberty Lobby was reflective of the

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[55] Cas Mudde, "The Populist Zeitgeist." For a sophisticated critique of the way that ideas and discourse are theorized in Freeden and Laclau-inspired approaches to the study of populism, see Seongcheol Kim. "Taking stock of the field of populism research: Are ideational approaches 'moralistic' and post-foundational discursive approaches 'normative'?" *Politics*, published online on April 23, 2021.

[56] For critiques of the 'thin ideology' approach, see: Paris Aslandis. "Is Populism an Ideology? A Refutation and a New Perspective." *Political Studies* 64, no. 1 (2016): 88–104; and Ralph Schroeder. "The Dangerous Myth of Populism as a Thin Ideology." *Populism* 3, no. 1 (2020): 13–28.

[57] Manfred Steger, "Mapping Antiglobalist Populism," 115.

ideology's nature: it was not about a particular idea or concept like 'justice', 'equality, or 'liberty'. Instead, anti-globalism is structured and given *breadth* by its set of competing and potentially contradictory conspiratorial narratives, themes, and styles. This internal variety, flexibility, and ambiguity stands as one of the distinctive features of anti-globalist ideology and discourse. I argue that anti-globalism's *lack* of internal coherence about what *exactly* globalism is, *who* the globalists are, and *what* their aims are made the ideology's appeal stronger, not weaker.

Anti-globalism's development was ultimately enabled by the institutional platform established by the Birch Society and the Liberty Lobby, but the collection of books, articles, and publications produced by these groups had to be written by individual agents. Carstensen's work on ideational change and power introduced the concept of the ideational 'bricoleur' to describe the dynamics by which an historical agent adapts the pre-existing intellectual concepts and rhetorical tropes available in their historical and national context to changing political and historical circumstance. In doing so, the bricoleur is defined by the act of *making new political ideas.* Carstensen defines bricoleurs as:

> "strategic, interest-oriented and 'a-rational' actors. A-rational means 'that there is no clear rational course of action in the absence of interpretative filters'. Actors are motivated by ideological and power-seeking interests, but they are seldom perfectly aware of what their interests are or how to maximise them…
>
> Ideas function as both a constraint and a resource for actors: actors need ideas to handle uncertainty and systemic complexity, and at the same time ideas can be used by actors to affect other actors' conception of the world and in this way become a powerful political tool."[58]

The notion of ideas functioning, "as both a constraint and resource for actors" illustrates a crucial dynamic for understanding anti-globalism's development into a coherent ideology in the late 20th century. The tropes, themes, and metaphors used in anti-globalist literature have clear roots in

[58] Martin Carstensen. "Paradigm man vs. the bricoleur: bricolage as an alternative vision of agency in ideational change." *European Political Science Review* 3:1 (2011): 147-167. See also: Martin Carstensen. "Ideas are Not as Stable as Political Scientists Want Them to Be: A Theory of Incremental Ideational Change." *Political Studies* 59:3 (2011): 596-615. See also:

the discursive traditions of isolationism, nativism, white supremacism, and conspiracism. Each of these traditions has a long and distinctive history in American political life and culture, constituting the "raw materials" available to an ideologue in a given political context.[59] The ingenuity of the anti-globalist ideologues came from their ability to synthesize these disparate discursive traditions in a way that spoke to longer-standing themes in American history while purporting to address new trends – namely, the emergence of a globalist apparatus and ideology during the mid-20th century.

Carstensen's bricoleur concept is valuable for explaining the abstract process by which ideational actors draw from pre-existing and independent discursive and ideological structures to come up with new ways of thinking and talking about the political world. Despite the value of the bricoleur concept, I argue that it neglects the important and distinct function that actually *spreading one's new ideas* plays in the broader process of agent-driven ideological change. I go beyond Carstensen and introduce the concept of the 'ideologue' to capture the more complete model of ideological agency embodied by the anti-globalists surveyed in the following chapters. I define ideologues as *political entrepreneurs who combine the abstract process of ideological innovation with the concrete challenges of building an organization capable of using mass media to disseminate their ideas to the broader public*.

While Willis Carto, Robert Welch, and other ideologues would fit within Carstensen's concept of the bricoleur, I argue that their role as *institution-builders* allowed them to spread their own ideas (and those of likeminded ideologues) to a broader audience than they would have had as independent intellectuals. Simply put, the novelty of their ideas doesn't matter as much as their ability to spread those ideas to a wide audience. This broader understanding of ideological agency fits within the framework of ideological development offered by Berman. She writes:

> "Ideologies, in other words, rise and fall through a two-stage process. In the first stage, existing ideologies are questioned and tarnished, opening up a political space that competitors aspire to fill. – In this phase, in other words, the perceived

[59] For a history of nativism in American history, see Erika Lee. *America for Americans: A History of Xenophobia in the United States*. Basic Books, 2019. For isolationism, see Charles Kupchan. *Isolationism: A History of America's Efforts to Shield Itself from the World*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2020. For conspiracism, see Christopher Fee and Jeffrey Webb, eds. *Conspiracies and Conspiracy Theories in American History*. New York: ABC-Clio, 2019. For white supremacism, see Carol Anderson. *White Rage: The Unspoken Truth of Our Racial Divide*. London: Bloomsbury, 2016.

> failures or inadequacies of the reigning intellectual paradigm(s) create a demand for new ideologies. Once a political space has begun to open, the second stage of the process begins, as some political actors start to develop and embrace alternative approaches. In this phase, a supply of new ideologies begins to appear, with contenders competing for mind share and political power. The ones that seem to offer the best solutions to contemporary problems, in turn, win out over their 'competitors'."[60]

Following Berman, we can see anti-globalism as an "alternative approach" offered by "political actors" in response to the "perceived failures or inadequacies" of American conservatism in the 1960s, 1970s, and 1980s. In some sense, anti-globalist ideologues were *competing* with conservative intellectuals and media for the time and attention of Americans who were interested in reading right-wing political literature. Despite falling short of defining conservatism along far-right lines, anti-globalists were able to stake out enough market share in the conservative readership to establish themselves as permanent fixtures on the ideological landscape of the American Right. In the short-term, anti-globalists were able to promote their message to a wide enough audience to sustain themselves financially. This allowed them to achieve the long-term goal: establishing anti-globalism as a coherent ideological alternative to conservatism on the American Right.

The set of arguments made against these globalism, internationalism, and the New World Order varied and grew more sophisticated during the second half of the 20th century. While this ideological worldview was still based on baseless conspiracies, it were given greater ideological thickness by the growing complexity and scope of the conspiracist worldview outlined in the pages of the 'conspiracist canon'. This ideology was not 'thick' in terms of conceptual quality, but in breadth and scope. Anti-globalism's success must be partially attributed to this internal variety, flexibility, and ambiguity. The unifying feature of these varied theories was a general emphasis on the anti-globalist frame. Anti-globalists generally referred to themselves as patriots or conservatives, but they were distinctive for framing the political landscape around the opposition between globalism and Americanism.

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[60] Sheri Berman. *The Primacy of Politics: Social Democracy and the Making of Europe's Twentieth Century*. Cambridge University Press, 2006. 10.

Anti-Globalism and Far-Right Social Movements

The social movement groups profiled in this thesis were largely composed of Americans who felt that Communism – and its cousins, liberalism, socialism, and globalism – threatened their country and way of life. The post-war years in the United States saw hundreds of conservative organizations emerge, with dozens of conservative publications and national organizations consolidating the previously disorganized movement by the early 1960s. These organizations engaged in traditional forms of "contentious politics": writing letters to Congress and local newspaper editors decrying the Communist threat, signing petitions, supporting anti-Communist political candidates and national figures like Joseph McCarthy, subscribing to conservative publications, attending political rallies, or sharing conservative literature among friends and neighbors.[61] Much of the energy and enthusiasm generated by these grassroots movements in the 1950s and 1960s was transformed into political support for 'New Right' takeover of the Republican Party that took place in the 1970s, culminating in the election of conservative movement leader Ronald Reagan in 1980.

Following Schlozman and Rosenfeld, I use the concept of the 'Long New Right' to name the broad-based and multi-generational political movement of rightist political actors united by (a) self-identification as conservatives, (b) shared opposition to 'Communism' and a related disdain for liberalism, and (c) a willingness to use radical strategies and rhetoric to combat the forces seen to be threatening America.[62] They described the evolving but consistent nature of right-wing radicalism during the second half of the 20th century:

> "While the issues in play and even the specific group identities mobilized changed repeatedly over the years, the loadstar of New Right politics remained the exploitation of grievance and status resentments - "knowing who hates who," as Kevin Phillips had put it in 1968."[63]

The 'Long New Right' featured conservatives, radicals, and extremists. While any attempt to completely distinguish between these concepts will encounter problems when used in empirical

[61] Sidney Tarrow. "Social Movements in Contentious Politics: A Review Article." *American Political Science Review* 90:4 (1996): 874-883.
[62] Scholzman and Rosenfeld. "*Long New Right*". 4.
[63] Ibid, 5.

analysis, I use these terms throughout this dissertation to demarcate key differences between the different right-wing political actors, groups, and tendencies that appear in the following chapters. Right-wing extremists reject the legitimacy of democratic norms and institutions, promote anti-Semitic conspiracism and white supremacism, and support, endorse, or engage in political violence. Following Blee and Creasap, I see conservatives as movements or actors, "that support patriotism, free enterprise capitalism, and/or a traditional moral order and for which violence is not a frequent tactic or goal."[64] Radicals are those who see conservatives as unduly moderate and extremists as politically irrelevant. The far-right is a mix of radicals and extremists, with the former promoting the conspiracism and nativism of the latter in a more coded form. For the most part, far-right activists and groups were ineffective in their varied attempts to achieve political power during the second half of the twentieth century. While they did engage in the "contentious politics" characteristic of social movements, their campaigns and attempts to elect right-wing politicians or establish lasting political organizations were unsuccessful. It was in the realm of long-term ideological change - and in the creation of anti-globalist populism as a master-frame for social movements - that the American far-right would make a permanent impact on American political life.

The notion of framing has become central to social movement studies in recent decades, and I argue that it provides the best means of showing how anti-globalism came to shape the language and ideological worldview of far-right social movements in the late 20th century United States. Frame theory accounts for the pivotal roles of discourse, ideology, emotion, and affect that were neglected in structuralist and formalist models of social movement theory.[65] In 2000, Benford and Snow wrote of the summarized the perspective of frame theorists:

> "social movements are not viewed merely as carriers of extant ideas and meanings that grow automatically out of structural arrangements, unanticipated events, or existing ideologies. Rather, movement actors are viewed as signifying agents

[64] Kathleen Blee and Kimberly Creasap. "Conservative and Right-Wing Movements." 271.
[65] For an authoritative overview of frame theory's development and influence in social movement studies, see Robert Benford and David Snow. "Framing Processes and Social Movements: An Overview and Assessment." *Annual Review of Sociology* 26 (2000): 611-639.

> actively engaged in the production and maintenance of meaning for constituents, antagonists, and bystanders or observers."[66]

Anti-globalist ideologues and institutions functioned as "signifying agents" committed to the "production and maintenance of meaning" via the publication of conspiracists books and newsletters. The Birch Society and Liberty Lobby both had their own publishing houses and subscription-based publications, using direct-mail to sell books and magazine subscriptions while making appeals for funds from readers. These groups produced a staggering among of conspiracist literature, reproducing older works while supporting the writing and publication of new ones by their own leaders and other like-minded activists. For decades these organizations functioned as factories for ideas and propaganda, using their technologically sophisticated media organizations to promote what the Birch Society called the "conspiratorial view of history".

The development of this specifically anti-globalist literature by the John Birch Society and Liberty Lobby during the 1960s, 1970s, and 1980s played an important role for the American far-right during and after those decades. These texts constructed a narrative in which various themes, tropes, and narratives about the threat of world government, the role played by Jewish banking families in the foundation of the Federal Reserve, the historical plots by the Freemasons, Illuminati, and Jews were synthesized under the master-frame of anti-globalism. This 'conspiracist canon' served as the 'movement literature' for the American far-right. Berlet described the dynamics by which such literatures shape social movements:

> "When a social movement has a healthy and energetic set of media, including print serials, what is established is an interconnected set of rhetorical pipelines and echo chambers that amplify and repeat the messages and carry the ideology of the group into the mainstream society where it competes with other ideologies to become established as "common sense."[67]

The concept of framing allows for a crucial linkage between social movement activity and anti-globalist ideology. The two main anti-globalist organizations were hubs for far-right social movement activity, attracting extremists and more moderate 'patriots' alike. The more important

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[66] Ibid, 613.
[67] Chip Berlet. "The Write Stuff U. S. Serial Print Culture From Conservatives Out To Neo Nazis." Library Trends 56:3 (2008): 580.

long-term consequence of their activity, however, was in their development of anti-globalism into a sophisticated ideology – and a frame which radical right-wing social movements could adopt. The efforts of the Birch Society and Liberty Lobby during the 1960s, 1970s, and 1980s were rewarded at the end of the century, when anti-globalist frames were adopted by a wide array of new leaders, social movements, and intellectual tendencies on the American (Far) Right.

The John Birch Society and Liberty Lobby: Anti-Globalist Institutions

The John Birch Society and Liberty Lobby emerged from the far-right social movement context of the 1950s. In the decades that followed they would become what Berlet and Lyons called the "two pillars" of the populist radical right in the late 20th century United States.[68] Following them, I argue *that the John Birch Society and Liberty Lobby emerged as the definitive institutions of the American Far-Right during the second half of the 20th century*. The vast majority of the far-right social movement organizations and third parties founded during this same period were short-lived and inconsequential, with little to no impact on the course of American politics or history. The Birch Society and Liberty Lobby provided crucial continuity to a far-right political and social movement largely excluded from participation in American government and political life. I argue that the 1960s, 1970s, and 1980s saw the *institutionalization* of these groups, a necessary step in the broader process by which they elaborated and promoted anti-globalist ideology during the same period. It was because of the institutionalization of these organizations and their ideas during those decades that anti-globalist ideology and frames would be available to the new right-wing movements of the 1990s.

Understanding the Birch Society and Liberty Lobby as political institutions requires engagement with the substantial body of literature associated with the 'new institutionalism'. One of the immediate challenges faced by an institutionalist analysis of these groups, however, relates to their place in the broader landscape of American political institutions. Research constituting the 'new institutionalist' scholarship, particularly in the field of American Political Development is primarily concerned with the study of governmental structures and non-governmental agencies involved in the processes of policymaking. In recent decades, the field of American Political Development (APD) has given the study of American political institutions greater theoretical

[68] Berlet and Lyons. "*Right-Wing Populism in America*." 170.

rigor, synthesizing historical analyses of institutional development with macro, meso, and micro-level theory-development. Most relevant for my own analysis are the *discursive institutionalist* approaches developed by Schmidt, Carstensen, and other scholars concerned with theorizing the causal power of ideas in processes of historical and institutional change. Additionally, I also acknowledge the value of *network institutionalism* provides in capturing and describing the diffuse networked dynamics by which the unorthodox institutions of the American far-right exerted influence.

In a seminal article published in 2002, Lieberman wrote that, "the challenge of "bringing ideas back in" to political science was a central task facing the discipline. For him, the new emphasis on theorizing the role of ideas in processes of political change would,

> "challenge the reductionism of much institutional theory, which often assumes away any complexity in the substance of politics... Ideational theories seem to challenge the institutional emphasis on structure, aggregate organizational or behavioral regularities, as the principal guiding force behind political behavior. A focus on ideas suggests, rather, the possibility that human agency can defy the constraints of political and social structures and create new political possibilities."[69]

Lieberman was one of many political scientists who turned to the topic around the dawn of the twenty-first century. Berman's *The Social Democratic Moment: Ideas and Politics in the Making of Interwar Europe* (1998) offered a framework for understanding and explaining the relationship between ideologies and political change. Campbell, in describing Berman's method approach to the study of ideational and institutional change, articulates the sort of historical methodology I aim for in my own analysis and exposition of anti-globalism:

> "ideas cannot be reduced to some other observable variable. … [R]esearchers must identify the actors who carried the important ideas into the decision-making fray and show that these ideas were eventually institutionalized, thereby taking on a life of their own beyond these actors. Finally, and perhaps most important, she

[69] Robert Lieberman. "Ideas, Institutions, and Political Order: Explaining Political Change." *American Political Science Review* 96:4 (2002): 698.

> stipulated that researchers must demonstrate that actors who bore similar ideas made similar choices over time even as the environment changed."[70]

I argue that the Birch Society and Liberty Lobby played complementary roles in their simultaneous institutionalization of anti-globalism, despite internal rivalries between the two groups and shared enmity between their leaders. Both groups experimented with shaping policy and engaging with conservative politicians in their first two decades of existence, with varied levels of success. By the 1970s, however, both would develop into the same type of organizational model: subscription-based newsletters, direct-mail book sales, and fundraising from conservative donors. They also converged in terms of their ideological strategy, shifting their focus in the 1970s away from stringent anti-Communism and toward a more varied anti-globalist populist discourse oriented around opposition to the Trilateral Commission and related internationalist groups. Beyond printing the physical media needed to spread their message, these organizations served as important hubs for political activity for right-wing extremists and normal Americans alike. They served as venues where far-right networks (often consciously constructed by the movement leaders and organization-builders) could flourish, sharing movement literature, developing correspondences, collaborating on small scale projects. It was largely due to this process of institutionalization, enacted by the efforts of their leaders and staff, that anti-globalist arguments were institutionalized and that anti-globalism "took on a life of [its] own beyond these actors."

Vivien Schmidt's discursive institutionalist (DI) framework provides a valuable toolkit for theorizing the ways that ideas, institutions, and mass opinion interact with one another.[71] While her empirical scholarship has focused more on the ideational impact and institutional basis of economic ideas and policy paradigms, Schmidt has advocated for the application of DI's principles to a diverse array of discursive and ideational phenomena. Schmidt has described DI as:

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[70] John Campbell. *Institutional Change and Globalization*. Princeton University Press, 2004.

[71] See Vivien Schmidt. "Discursive Institutionalism: The Explanatory Power of Ideas and Discourse." Annual Review of Political Science 11 (2008): 303-326. See also: Martin Carstensen and Vivien Schmidt. "Power through, over and in ideas: conceptualizing ideational power in discursive institutionalism." Journal of European Public Policy 3 (2016): 318-327.

> "an umbrella concept for the vast number of approaches that deal with the substantive content of ideas, as well as the interactive processes of discourse, whether co-ordinative ones among policy actors or communicative ones between political actors and the public, all of which take place in specific and pre-defined institutional contexts... I leave open where the wide range of discursive institutionalist scholars fit on a continuum between positivism and constructivism."[72]

I am primarily concerned with what Schmidt refers to as "communicative discourses" between elites and the mass public, rather than the "coordinative discourses" that take place between elites and within elite institutional contexts. While the Birch Society and Liberty Lobby did attempt to shape elite opinion at times, their primary focus was on communicating their ideas to anyone who would listen to or read them.

Even if we are to view the Birch Society and Liberty Lobby as discursive institutions, the novel organizational form of these groups makes it difficult to fit them into traditional understandings of *what constitutes a political institution*. Recent institutionalist scholarship had tried to develop a more adaptive model of institutional thinking appropriate for understanding more complex and variegated modes of political organization and practice.[73] For Heclo, "institutional thinking values continuity and long-term over short-term calculations… The focus in institutional thinking is on enduring relationships rather than point-in-time transactions."[74] This perspective is further developed by Ansell's concept of "network institutionalism", which helps to illustrate the decentralized, multi-generational, network dynamics by which anti-globalism connected individuals to the institutional and ideological world of the Birch Society and Liberty Lobby in the second half of the 20th century.

These organizations consisted of overlapping and complementary networks of ideological production, development, and propagation: social networks between activists that were enabled by group membership and participation in organizational events, and media production and

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[72] Vivien Schmidt. "A Curious Constructivism: A Response to Professor Bell." British Journal of Political Science 42:3 (2012): 712.
[73] Gerald Berk, Dennis Galvan, and Victoria Hattam, eds. Political Creativity: Reconfiguring Institutional Order and Change. University of Pennsylvania Press, 2013.
[74] Hugh Heclo. "Thinking Institutionally," in Sarah Binder, R.A.W. Rhodes, and Bert Rockman, eds. *The Oxford Handbook of Political Institutions*. Oxford University Press, 2008. 737.

distribution networks enabled by the collaborative efforts of writers and editors equipped with a printing press, a mailing list of readers, and potential subscribers. The initial construction of these ideological media networks and their continued maintenance in the decades that followed turned the Birch Society and Liberty Lobby into the institutional hubs structuring the ideological and sociological networks constituting the far-right. Ansell captures this dynamic when he writes that: "[o]ne of the principal advantages of network institutionalism is that it provides an analytical framework that grasps the ever-increasing complexity of our age. As our technologies become more like networks, so must our institutions."[75] Anti-globalism was, on some level, a mail-order ideology. The effective use of direct-mail connected anti-globalist ideological networks to a loose but ideologically coherent audience around the country, helping to define the ideas and language of the American Right for later generations.

The complexity of these institutions was part of what made them effective at popularizing their worldview on the broader American Right. The theoretical frameworks of discursive and network institutionalism account for and emphasize the transformative role played by new media technologies – notably direct-mail – long-term institutional process by which anti-globalist ideology emerged, evolved, and spread across the American far-right. Their sophisticated media distribution network disseminated a purposefully varied anti-globalist "movement literature" that would simultaneously appeal to existing radicals and serve as a pathway to radicalization for conservatives. The Birch Society and Liberty Lobby's use of new media technologies to reach a broader audience made them an ideological laboratory of sorts, innovating just as much on the technical level of disseminating political propaganda as on the more abstract plane of ideologies and discourse.

Toward an Analytical History of Anti-Globalism

This chapter outlined the theoretical framework that I use in the upcoming chapters to structure my historical study of anti-globalism. I conceive of anti-globalism as an *ideology* produced by the *discursive institutional networks* established by the Liberty Lobby and the John Birch Society in the 1960s, 1970s, and 1980s. These groups initially emerged from the *far-right anti-Communist social movement context* of the 1950s, with

[75] Chris Ansell. "Network Institutionalism," in Sarah Binder, R.A.W. Rhodes, and Bert Rockman, eds. *The Oxford Handbook of Political Institutions*. Oxford University Press, 2008. 86.

their leaders drawing on this context for its audience. These groups and their anti-internationalist ideas institutionalized in the following decades, ultimately culminating in the maturation of a distinctly anti-globalist ideology by the 1980s. This ideology was then adopted by *a new generation of right-wing movements* in the 1990s. During the 1990s, a more moderate form of anti-globalism was expressed by members of the Republican Party while anti-globalist conspiracy theories were motivating far-right terrorists to kill Americans. For several reasons anti-globalism disappeared from the discourse of the American Right by 2002, but the legacy of the 1990s would continue to shape a dormant American far-right in the early years of the 21st century.

While my historical analysis does gesture at the dynamics shaping the relationships between anti-globalist ideology, ideologues, institutions, media, and the broad array of far-right social movements they interacted with in the second half of the twentieth century, the full interplay of these phenomena is too broad and complex to fully encapsulate here. Accordingly, this chapter does not attempt to outline a fully comprehensive theory of how these complex phenomena interact with each other. Instead, I aim to provide the clearly defined theoretical and conceptual structure needed to navigate what is essentially an "analytical history" of anti-globalism.[76] The social scientific concepts outlined in this chapter are used to structure the historical narrative and construct the broader theoretical argument, integrating the two so that the history of anti-globalism detailed in the following chapters falls along analytical and theoretical lines laid out and defined in this chapter and the introduction. The next chapter starts that history in the early twentieth century, when the twin events of the Russian Revolution and the foundation of the League of Nations served to make internationalism the enemy of right-wing Americans for the first time.

[76] Ira Katznelson. "The Possibilities of Analytical Political History" in Meg Jacobs, William Novak, and Julian Zelizer, eds. *The Democratic Experiment: New Directions in American Political History*. Princeton University Press, 2004.

CHAPTER THREE:

From Republic to Empire: Anti-Internationalism and the American Right before 1965

This chapter begins by exploring the emergence of anti-internationalist language in the early 20th century United States. This account emphasizes the constitutive and ambiguous relationship that anti-internationalism has with the American anti-interventionist tradition *and* the far-right nativist Americanist ideology that emerged in the 1920s. The chapter will then focus on the post-war period, starting at the end of World War II and ending just after the 1964 presidential election. This twenty-year period saw the emergence of a broad-based "popular front" of right-wing social movements, and media organizations. These movements, ideologues, and media entrepreneurs were all united by their shared opposition to Communism, socialism, liberalism, and internationalism. When the John Birch Society and the Liberty Lobby were established in 1958, their founders were able to draw on their own experience and contacts in these right-wing networks to find early supporters and readers. While many of the ideologues and organizations responsible for the propagation of right-wing anti-internationalism in the 1950s and 1960s declined in influence or disappeared altogether from the political scene by the 1970s, their collective efforts to adapt anti-internationalism to the post-war era provided the social movement resources and ideological raw materials needed for the John Birch Society and Liberty Lobby to institutionalize in the decades that followed.

To provide the historical context needed to understand the world of the post-war American Right that anti-globalism would later emerge from, this chapter starts with a pre-history of anti-internationalism *before* 1945. I show that specifically anti-internationalist discourse emerged around the end of World War I as a response to the Russian Revolution *and* the attempts to have the United States join the League of Nations. Beyond tracing the development of anti-internationalist language from 1919 until 1945, this section aims to make two points about anti-internationalism in the first half of the 20th century:

(a) anti-internationalist language drew upon, and ultimately came to replace, isolationist - or, more appropriately, anti-interventionist - ideas and themes with substantial popularity and political legitimacy in the United States during the first half of the 20th century.
(b) anti-internationalism was, from its inception, inextricable from the far-right nativist ideology that emerged after World War I

This historical background can illuminate how and why the 1950s served as a major conjuncture for the trajectory of anti-globalism in the 20th century. Anti-internationalism emerged in response to the growing influence of internationalist ideology in the early 20th century. Anti-internationalist language was initially popularized by Americans opposed to the League of Nations after World War I. During the interwar period, anti-internationalist language was primarily expressed by anti-Semitic ideologues. After the war, as the United States built up the institutional framework of the 'liberal international order', some Republican conservatives adopted anti-internationalist language to argue against the continued expansion of the United States government's foreign policy-making apparatus. These anti-interventionist Congressmen attempted to pass a constitutional amendment known as the 'Bricker Amendment' that would have severely limited the President's treatymaking power. The failure to pass this amendment represented the end of the anti-interventionist 'Old Right' and the emergence of a bipartisan foreign policy consensus united on the need to fight the Cold War. While anti-internationalism remained a constant feature in right-wing discourse throughout the 1950s and early 1960s, a long-term shift began whereby American conservatives replaced their earlier skepticism toward international agreements with support for a militant and aggressive anti-Communist foreign policy.

While the 'Old Right' was seeing its influence wane, a new generation of conservatives associated with the 'Long New Right' adopted anti-internationalism as part of the right-wing anti-Communist ideology they sought to promote. The emergence of a distinctive 'conservative movement' during the 1960s coincided with a broader embrace of American military aggression on the American Right, and, by the 1970s, anti-internationalism language could only be found in the publications John Birch Society and Liberty Lobby. Ultimately, this chapter seeks show that the long-term emergence of anti-globalism cannot be explained without understanding (a) how

the ideological worldview and social movement context of the American Right during the 1950s enabled the later institutionalization of the John Birch Society and Liberty Lobby, and (b) how these groups and their leading figures drew upon a complex and multi-faceted tradition of anti-internationalist language to respond to new changes in the world and on the American Right.

Anti-Internationalism before 1945

The early years of the twentieth century saw references to 'internationalism' proliferate in American political life. While the term would ultimately become associated with President Woodrow Wilson and the League of Nations after World War I, the early years of the century – even before the Great War – saw intense debate about American foreign policy among politicians and public figures in the United States. Even President Theodore Roosevelt, the ardent expansionist and proponent of American military power, speculated about the need for a world federation which could deter militaristic conflict and encourage international brotherhood. Roosevelt alluded to this vision in his 1910 Nobel Prize acceptance speech:

> It would be a masterstroke if those great powers honestly bent on peace would form a League of Peace, not only to keep the peace among themselves, but to prevent, by force if necessary, its being broken by others – Each nation must keep well prepared to defend itself until the establishment of some form of international police power, competent and willing to prevent violence as between nations. As things are now, such power to command peace throughout the world could best be assured by some combination between those great nations which sincerely desire peace and have no thought themselves of committing aggressions. The combination might at first be only to secure peace within certain definite limits and on certain definite conditions; but the ruler or statesman who should bring about such a combination would have earned his place in history for all time and his title to the gratitude of all mankind.[77]

These themes, expressed by Roosevelt at the end of his presidency, were actualized in the post-war policymaking of Woodrow Wilson. While the 'internationalist' movement did not start with Woodrow Wilson, it was through his efforts to found the League of Nations that 'Wilsonian

[77] Theodore Roosevelt. Nobel Lecture given on May 5, 1910.

internationalism' became a common phrase in foreign policy circles. It was also at the same moment, during the hopeful days of 1919, that nationalist and isolationist forces in American politics began to articulate their opposition to 'internationalism' and 'internationalists'. The debate between proponents of the League, and its opponents, serves as the first instance in which 'internationalism' and 'nationalism' were pitted against one another in the U.S. Congress.

On September 8, Senator John Sharp Williams of Mississippi (D-MS) entered into the Congressional Record a number of speeches given by President Wilson in defense of the League of Nations. Wilson had embarked on a national speaking tour, defending the League from the attacks launched by nationalist critics and arguing for American entry into the League. One speech, given in St. Louis, Missouri, on September 5 1919, read as follows:

> "I have sometimes heard gentlemen discussing the questions that are now before use with a distinction drawn between nationalism and internationalism in these matters. It is very difficult for me to follow this distinction. The greatest nationalist is the man who wants his nation to be the greatest nation, and the greatest nation is the nation which penetrates to the heart of its duty and mission among the nations of the world. With every flash of insight into the great politics of mankind the nation that has that vision is elevated to a place of influence and power which it can not get by arms, which it can not get by commercial rivalry, which it can get by no other way than by that spiritual leadership which comes from a profound understanding of the problems of humanity."[78]

As Wilson notes, the distinction between 'nationalism' and 'internationalism' had already been made by critics of the League. Wilson argued, as would later internationalists, that this is a false dichotomy; it was by leading other nations towards the pursuit of peace and the collective good that the American national interests might best be pursued.

On the same day, the anti-internationalist opposition would speak out against the League. Senator Miles Poindexter (R-WA) was a vocal critic of the Wilson Administration and early American anti-Communist. Earlier that year, Poindexter said in an April 16 speech

[78] Senator John Sharp Williams (MS). "League of Nations speeches by President Wilson." *Congressional Record* 58: 5 (September 8, 1919): 5003.

to the Young Men's Republican club: "the League of Nations meant the surrender of American sovereignty, not only to nations ruled by monarchs but also to socialists like [Eugene] Debs."[79] In the Congress, Poindexter launched the following broadside against the League, connecting internationalism to an array of dubious foreign ideologies:

> "The Kaiser, the socialists, the communists, the anarchists, the Bolshevists, and a certain element of those who are in favor of a league of nations, are all internationalists. – They all believe in the doctrine of internationalism. They all favor – a central world authority based on force and overriding national lines. Mr. President, is not such a centralized superauthoritity in its very nature a frightful despotism? They think it is liberty. I do not see how it could be, in its very nature, anything but a despotism. What reason or experience is there to assume that it is not?"[80]

A few days earlier, on September 8, 1919, Sen. Poindexter had entered an article by attorney Hannis Taylor into the Congressional Record. Taylor's article fleshed out the critique of internationalism, arguing that it is, "a European conspiracy for our enslavement[,] – actively promoted in our midst by a plutocratic foreign propaganda, whose purpose is to threaten and cajole the American people into signing their own death warrant, now generally known as the League of Nations."[81] Taylor went on to describe the League as a plot concocted by the British to perpetuate their imperial ambitions in an age where naked militarism was no longer acceptable, calling it a trap "designed by British statesman and baited with the word 'peace' in order to ensnare the American people. What makes that trap the more dangerous is the fact that some brilliant but illusive rhetorician has covered it all over with a veil into which he has 'intertwined' all kinds of false and fantastic idealisms."[82]

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[79] Joshua Kastenberg. "War Time Hysteria, 1917: Senator Miles Poindexter, 'American-ness' and the Strange Case of Colonel Carl Reichmann." *War & Society* 37:3 (2018): 151.
[80] Senator John Poindexter (WA). "League of Nations – The President's Addresses." *Congressional Record*, *Congressional Record* 58:5 (September 3, 1919): 5030.
[81] Senator John Poindexter (WA). "The Pending Appeal to The American People to Sign Their Own Death Warrant." *Congressional Record* 58:5 (September 3, 1919): 4722.
[82] Ibid, 4721.

Already, internationalism's critics would argue that it was based on "false" and "illusory" "idealisms", contrasted to a realism that accepts the right of nations to pursue their own interest and expects such interests to inevitably conflict. Moreover, Taylor's article would foreshadow the conspiracism so characteristic of later anti-internationalism. In a later section, titled *Internationalism: A Deadly Menace to Patriotism and Religion,* Taylor wrote the following:

> "The revolutionists who are now striving to turn the world upside down hope to abolish all existing conceptions of patriotism and religion through the substitution of a new cult whose god is to be humanity and whose creed is to be internationalism, a vague formula that is to wipe from every heart that sacred something we have known heretofore as patriotism."[83]

It would be a mistake to attribute the United States' rejection of League membership purely to isolationist, or anti-internationalist, sentiment. As a 1920 article in *The Atlantic* noted, "one attack upon the League is from the standpoint of conservative nationalism; the other is from the standpoint of liberal internationalism."[84] Liberal internationalists based their opposition to League membership on its enforcement of diktat of the Treaty of Versailles, which they saw as unduly harsh to the losers of the war. Conservative nationalists saw the threat of Bolshevism and the potential loss of sovereignty as undue burdens to bear for the sake of international governance. Isolationists were not solely responsible for the failure of the League Charter to pass through the U.S. Senate, but they were among the most vocal opponents of its ratification.

After the failed attempt to ratify the League Charter in the U.S. Congress, the Republican Party expressed a pronounced disapproval of Wilson's internationalist aims. The 1920 Republican Party Platform stated about the League Charter: "that covenant repudiated, to a degree wholly unnecessary and unjustifiable, the time-honored policies in favor of peace declared by Washington, Jefferson, and Monroe, and pursued by all American administrations for more than a century."[85] Scholars have generally argued that the foreign policy of the Republican presidents

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[83] Ibid, 4724.
[84] Raymond Fosdick. "The League of Nations as an Instrument of Liberalism." *The Atlantic*, October 1920.
[85] 1920 Republican Party Platform, June 8, 1920. Hosted online by the *UCSB American Presidency Project:* https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/documents/republican-party-platform-1920.

of the 1920s and early 1930s was guided by isolationist principles.[86] The presidency of Franklin Roosevelt, on these accounts, lured the United States away from the siren song of isolationist foreign policy and toward a responsible internationalism. Revisionists like William Appleman Williams argued in the 1970s that America was already steering toward an aggressive and expansive foreign policy in the 1920s.[87] More recently, Braumoeller also pushed back against the "isolationist 1920s" hypothesis.[88] Despite the isolationist rhetoric of the Harding and Coolidge administrations, the United States was still intimately involved in European affairs during the 1920s, not to mention imperialistic dalliances in Latin America. For our purposes, however, this debate about the details of American foreign policy is irrelevant; what is important is the emergence of anti-internationalism within the discourse of American isolationism during this period. While the latter half of the twentieth century is the focus of this study, it's necessary to trace the origins of anti-internationalism to this moment in the history of American isolationism.

How, then, do we define isolationism? The definition offered by Dumbrell offers the best way to understand and define 'isolationism' in relation to the anti-internationalists of the post-war period:

> "'isolationism' is held to refer to various beliefs or policy positions which tend to contradict the general thrust of post 1945 US internationalism. 'Isolationist' attitudes and policy stances are those that question core US commitments: to global diplomatic activism, to European security, to leadership of the liberal international economic order, and to various alliance structures."[89]

Dunn adds to Dumbrell, writing: "In addition to this definition ought also to be added the recognition that references to 'isolationism' in the American debate are also allusions to US foreign policy in the interwar period and beyond that to the early international relations of the founding fathers. Like many terms there are varieties of isolationism which vary on specific

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[86] Ronald Powaski, *Toward an Entangling Alliance: American Isolationism, Internationalism, and Europe, 1901-1950*. Greenwood Press, 1991.
[87] William Appleman Williams. *The Tragedy of American Diplomacy*. New York: World Publishing Company, 1959.
[88] Bear Braumoeller. "The Myth of American Isolationism." *Foreign Policy Analysis* 6 (2010): 349-371.
[89] John Dumbrell. "Varieties of Post-Cold War American Isolationism." *Government and Opposition*, 34:1 (1999): 26.

issues, intensity and motivation."[90] It is important to note the lineage of isolationism, as the main trope employed by isolationists to describe their position has its origins in George Washington's Farewell Address. The metaphor of 'entangling alliances' is nearly as old as the Republic itself, as is the history of politicians using such language. The aim here is not to pin down the 'true' isolationism and consider its relationship with the anti-internationalist figures and organizations covered in this study. Instead, I seek to contextualize the emergence of specifically anti-internationalist discourses within the broader body of arguments against American involvement in foreign affairs that has (unfortunately) become subsumed under the term 'isolationism'.[91]

It is important to note that this surge of anti-internationalist sentiment around 1919 took place within the broader context of the First Red Scare. Debates about the League of Nations were taking place shortly after the Russian Revolution, and domestic concerns over labor radicalism and immigration were increasingly linked to the broader threat of international communism. The term 'internationalism' was key to Marxist ideology in the late 19th and early 20th centuries, albeit in reference to communist internationalism rather than the sort of global governance ideology promoted by World Federalists and other related groups. In Murray's study of the Red Scare, he describes the fierce reaction that the threat of Communist subversion brought about:

> "It was not so much the existence of radical activity as the way this fact was reported which generated increasing alarm. Every conceivable technique and form of public expression and propaganda was brought into use to proclaim the existing danger. Every ambitious politician, overzealous veteran, antiunion employer, super-patriotic organizer, defender of white supremacy, and sensational journalist jumped into the fray, using the issue of radicalism as a whipping boy for their own special purposes. As a result, never been had the public mind been so atrociously assaulted – and never before was it so successfully unstrung."[92]

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[90] David Hastings Dunn, "Isolationism revisited: seven persistent myths in the contemporary American foreign policy debate." *Review of International Studies* 31 (2005). 240.
[91] For a critical history of the concept of isolationism, see: Stephen Wertheim. *Tomorrow, the World: The Birth of U.S. Global Supremacy*. Harvard University Press, 2020.
[92] Robert Murray. *The Red Scare: A Study in National Hysteria, 1919-1920*. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1955. 58.

The nativism that appeared in this period would be developed further by the main far-right organization of the 1920s: the Ku Klux Klan. The Klan reinvented itself in the 20s, shifting from a worldview oriented around violent white supremacism to an embrace of 'Americanism'.[93] This 'Americanism' was framed in opposition to the subversive threat posed by Jews, Catholics, Communists, and blacks. Imperial Wizard and Emperor of the KKK, Hiram Wesley Evans, wrote an infamous essay in *The North American Review* in 1926. The essay, titled 'The Klan's Fight for Americanism', reveals some of the fundamental ideological precepts of 1920s nativism:

> "The greatest achievement so far has been to formulate, focus, and gain recognition for an idea – the idea of preserving and developing America first and chiefly for the benefit of the children of the pioneers who made America, and only and definitely along the lines of the purpose and spirit of those pioneers.
>
> The outstanding proof of both our influence and our service, however, has been in creating, outside our ranks as well as in them, not merely the growing national concentration on the problems of Americanism, but also a growing sentiment against radicalism, cosmopolitanism, and alienism of all kinds. We have produced instead a sane and progressive conservatism along national lines."[94]

The language of 'Americanism' and 'America First', central to the nativist evolution undergone by the Klan in the 1920s, would become central for later generations of far-right organizers and publicists. In his manifesto for far-right Americanism, Evans wrote that the Klan, "is not merely an organization. It is an idea, a faith, a purpose, an organized crusade."[95] While the Klan would decline in influence and membership by the 1930s, the militantly nativist ethos and worldview it articulated and embodied would live on during the inter-war period. During the 1930s, this worldview would live on, ironically, in the words and rhetoric of a Catholic immigrant: Father Charles Coughlin.

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[93] For books on the history of the Ku Klux Klan in the 1920, see: Nancy MacLean. *Behind the Mask of Chivalry: The Making of the Second Ku Klux Klan*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995; Linda Gordon. *The Second Coming of the KKK: The Ku Klux Klan of the 1920s and the American Political Tradition*. New York: W.W. Norton, 2017; Thomas Pegram. *One Hundred Percent Americanism: The Rebirth and Decline of the Ku Klux Klan in the 1920s*. New York: Rowman and Littlefield, 2011.
[94] Hiram Wesley Evans. "The Klan's Fight for Americanism." The North American Review 233:830 (1926): 34.
[95] Ibid.

Coughlin, known to much of the American public as the "Radio Priest", was one of the most important American radicals of the 1930s.[96] During that decade Coughlin was the most widely heard public figure on American radio – and potentially the world. His radio show was heard by tens of millions of Americans, and his mass political organization, the 'National Union for Social Justice', had 7.5 million members at its peak in the late 1930s.[97] He started his career as an ally and promoter of President Roosevelt and the New Deal, using his radio platform to advocate for Roosevelt's presidential candidacies and policies while in office. Coughlin decried the deleterious consequences of industrial capitalism on American lives, livelihoods, and communities. As Coughlin turned on Roosevelt in the mid-1930s, he had begun to associate the 'big government' policies of the New Deal with the centralizing, consolidating, and stultifying features of capitalism. By the end of the 1930s he had become openly anti-Semitic, praising Mussolini and Hitler's fascist regimes and advocating for fascism in America. In 1939, after the war in Europe broke out, Coughlin was forced off the air by the Roosevelt Administration. By telling millions of Americans that internationalist interests were secretly behind global communism *and* parasitic financial capitalism, Coughlin aimed to stake out a 'third position' like the one adopted by contemporary European fascist movements.[98]

For Coughlin, internationalism was at the heart of the conspiracy against America. A February 19, 1939, article in the *New York Times* described one of Coughlin's broadcasts from his last year on the radio:

> "The Rev. Charles E. Coughlin said in his weekly radio address today that 'internationalism both in the fields of finance and political have all but destroyed capitalism,' and added that 'if this policy of internationalism continues war will eventuate, capitalism will cease and communism under some form will follow.'

[96] For historical studies exploring the life and times of Father Charles Coughlin, see: Charles Tull. *Father Coughlin and the New Deal*. Syracuse University Press, 1965. Alan Brinkley. *Voices of Protest: Huey Long, Father Charles Coughlin, and the Great Depression*. Random House, 1983; Donald Warren. *Radio Priest: Charles Coughlin, the Father of Hate Radio*. Free Press, 1996; and Ronald Carpenter. *Father Charles Coughlin: Surrogate Spokesman for the Disaffected*. Greenwood Publishing Group, 1998.
[97] Carpenter. *Father Charles Coughlin*, 13.
[98] For a deeper discussion of Coughlinism, fascism, and the complex ideological currents shaping American and international politics during the 1930s, see: Peter Amann. "A 'Dog in the Nighttime' Problem: American Fascism in the 1930s." *The History Teacher* 19:4 (1986): 559-584.

> Father Coughlin paid tribute to George Washington and said that the American public 'is perplexed with this question: 'if Washington and his compatriots proposed to build the edifice of this nation upon the foundation of no foreign entanglements; and if America grew to greatness by adhering to this tradition, why, so suddenly, must we adopt in its stead a policy of bigger and better foreign entanglements after the bitter experience of the World War?"[99]

Coughlin was joined in his criticism of internationalism by a variety of far-right groups and agitators during the 1930s and 1940s. Many of these men were active members of the anti-war America First Committee led by Charles Lindbergh. The America First Committee, while nominally partisan and committed solely to keeping the United States out of World War II, was essentially defined by the anti-Rooseveltian right-wing stance held by many of its members.[100] Lindbergh and other leading figures in the movement, were openly anti-Semitic. While some of men who criticized American internationalism before and during World War II were liberals or progressives (most notably historian Charles Beard), the vast majority were not. In his book *Prophets of Globalism: Profiles of Conservative Critics of American Globalism*, Ronald Radosh – himself a proponent of the American anti-interventionist tradition – writes that these men and their ideas ought to be described as, "'right-wing,' 'fascist,' 'isolationist,' 'reactionary,' and most charitably, 'conservative.'"[101]

The rise of right-wing anti-internationalism and the threat of domestic subversion prompted the Roosevelt Administration to clamp down on the broader anti-war movement. While Coughlin and his allies were expressing opposition to Roosevelt's foreign and domestic policy through a nativist and conspiracist lens, legitimate critics of internationalism and Roosevelt's foreign policy were simultaneously dismissed as 'isolationists' and decried as Nazi-sympathizers. A concerted campaign by the Roosevelt Administration and allies in the media helped to snuff out skepticism toward the war effort, as proponents were tarred with charges of anti-Semitism.

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[99] Anonymous author. "Coughlin lays woes to 'internationalism." *New York Times*, February 20, 1939. 4.
[100] For histories of the America First Committee, see: Wayne Cole. "The America First Committee." *Journal of the Illinois State Historical Society* 44:4 (1951): 305-322; William Kaufman. *America First!: Its History, Culture, and Politics*. London: Bloomsbury, 1995; and Sarah Churchwell. *Behold, America: A History of America First and the American Dream*. London: Bloomsbury, 2019.
[101] Ronald Radosh. *Prophets on the Right: Profiles of Conservative Critics of American Globalism*. New York: Simon & Schuster, 1975. 11.

During and after the war, the term 'isolationist' was used as a pejorative by American elites and media to criticize political voices who opposed U.S. involvement abroad.[102]

After decades as a legitimate and influential stance on American foreign policy, the experiences of World War II led to a process by which anti-interventionism was replaced by isolationism. As a result, anti-interventionist ideas were marginalized by the demands of fighting fascism, then communism. Doenecke, the leading authority on the history and trajectory of American isolationism in the mid-20th century, wrote that "the fundamental nature of isolationism was significantly altered… during the first decade of the Cold War."[103] As a result of this "fundamental" shift, legitimate anti-interventionism lost all influence and far-right anti-internationalist conspiracism would become the primary ideological and discursive vehicle available to critics of American foreign policy in the early years of the Cold War.

Having traced the earlier history of anti-internationalism in the first half of the 20th century and highlighted its relationship to the right-wing Americanist ideology that emerged in the 1920s, I proceed to the post-war period that is the primary focus of this thesis. I start at 1945 because it provides a convenient turning point in American history. After the transformations wrought by the development of American capitalism in the late 19th century and the damage done by two World Wars, America entered a period of unprecedented prosperity and global hegemony beginning in 1945. It also marked the moment when a coherent American Right began to appear, setting the stage for later rise of American conservatism as a political movement and mass ideology. Before proceeding to my analysis of the 'New Right' and anti-internationalism in the 1950s, I will examine the pivotal role played by anti-Communism in the development of the American Right in the second half of the 20th century.

Anti-Communism and Cold War America

The immediate aftermath of the war saw unexpected Soviet aggression in Eastern and Central Europe. In 1946, U.S. diplomat George Kennan wrote his famous "Long Telegram" from

[102] Efforts to silence isolationist critics of Roosevelt's foreign policy during and after World War II are detailed in: Kupchan. "*Isolationism*," and Wertheim, "*Tomorrow, the World*," and Ribuffo, "*The Old Christian Right*."
[103] Justus Doenecke. *Not to the Swift: The Old Isolationists in the Cold War Era*. Lewisburg: Bucknell University Press, 1979. 10.

Moscow. Kennan reported on the aims of Soviet expansionism in Europe and elsewhere. The goals of international Communism clearly threatened the United States and its allies, argued Kennan, and the appropriate foreign policy response was a "containment" strategy that involved massive foreign investment in U.S. allies and the positioning of American troops in strategic regions throughout the world. Kennan's ideas were taken up in Washington, and the U.S. embarked on a substantial number of international projects in order to shore up support in Europe and provide a counterweight to Soviet influence around the world. The foundation of the United Nations, the World Bank, and International Monetary Fund in the immediate aftermath of World War II, the passage of the Marshall Plan in 1948, the foundation of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization in 1949, all represented major efforts by the United States to build up an apparatus of international organizations by which the international system could be managed according to American interests.

These policies were supported by the Truman Administration and by bipartisan majorities in Congress, despite opposition from a handful of truculent anti-interventionists largely concentrated in the Republican Party. Senator Everett Dirksen of Illinois said of the period, "We are in a new era of international organizations. They are grinding out treaties like so many eager beavers which will have effects on the rights of American citizens."[104] These international commitments were necessary, their proponents argued, both to rebuild Europe and serve a bulwark against international Communism. Support for, or opposition to, these programs would go on to become a major division in the Republican Party in the leadup to the 1952 Presidential election, as the upcoming section on the 'Old' and 'New' Right will discuss.

U.S efforts to combat the Communist threat in the early years of the Cold War weren't constrained to rebuilding European infrastructure and stockpiling armaments. The U.S. federal government, and in particular the executive branch, became deeply involved in the "war of words" against Communism. The Central Intelligence Agency, created in the 1947 National Security Act to replace the Office of Strategic Services, subsidized favorable journalism and funded the production and dissemination of anti-Communist propaganda at home and abroad. This process began in the Truman Administration, with the passage of the Smith-Mundt Act in 1948. This bill empowered the U.S. government to engage in 'public diplomacy' at home and

[104] Anonymous author. "The Bricker Amendment: A Cure Worse Than the Disease?" *Time*, July 13, 1953. 20–21.

abroad, recognizing the urgency of the "global struggle for minds and wills" brought about by the Cold War. The Truman Administration subsidized the international expansion of *The New York Times*, *Time* magazine, *Life*, *Newsweek*, and other publications who would commit to presenting the United States in a positive light. In these and other publications, threat of Soviet Communism was brought to life; news stories highlighted the threat of Communist conspirators and contributed to the "dehumanization" of Communists in the eyes of the American public.

The 1950s would see the expansion of this pro-America propaganda effort at home and abroad, as the Central Intelligence Agency and Psychological Strategy Board became involved in propaganda efforts lead by the Truman and Eisenhower Administrations. The need for a "Marshall Plan in the field of ideas" led to greater investment in (and less Congressional oversight over) the efforts of these agencies to counter Soviet propaganda efforts with their own.[105] One such propaganda effort, the aptly named 'Campaign of Truth' sponsored the publication of books by Soviet defectors and former communists. The authors of these books all "rejected communism and thus supported, to differing degrees, a democratic form of government."[106] These authors "not only personified the anticommunist ideology"; they also "served as the locus of struggle or site of contestation between communism and democracy, with democracy winning out on the end."[107] Many of these authors would go on to work for the U.S. government or for organizations sponsored by the CIA.[108]

Thomas Mergel, in his study of anti-Communism in the German and American popular presses during the post-war period, observed that, "distinct images of the enemy not only mirrored specific experiences with Communism, but also reflected normative ideas of what one's *own* society should be like."[109] The widespread expression of "Americanist" sentiments in this period can be seen as "historical modes of self-description."[110] Just as the Klan of the 1920s used the slogan of 'Americanism' to define themselves in opposition to the alien threats of Judaism,

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[105] Charles Thomson and Walter Laves. *Cultural Relations and U.S. Foreign Policy*. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1963. 80.
[106] Shawn Parry-Giles. *The Rhetorical Presidency, Propaganda, and the Cold War, 1945-1955*. New York: Praeger Publishers, 2002. 85.
[107] Ibid, 92.
[108] Ibid, 92.
[109] Thomas Mergel. "The Unknown and the Familiar Enemy: The Semantics of Anti-Communism in the USA and Germany, 1945-1975" in William Steinmetz ed. *Political Languages in the Age of Extremes*. Oxford University Press, 2011. 245.
[110] Ibid.

Catholicism, and radicalism, the 'Americanism' of the 1950s came to represent everything that the Communist threat *was not*.

The (re)emergence of a right-wing 'Americanist' ideology in this period was noted by Seymour Martin Lipset in 1955. Lipset captured the role that this right-wing 'Americanism' played in the broader social and civic culture of the United States when he wrote:

> "Unless one recognizes that Americanism is a political creed, much like Socialism, Communism or Fascism, much of what is currently happening in this country must remain unintelligible. – More than any other democratic country, the United States makes ideological conformity one of the conditions for good citizenship. And it is this very emphasis on ideological conformity to certain accepted common political values that legitimates the campaigns to locate the 'un-Americans' in our midst."[111]

The following sections show that the term 'Americanism' would come to represent a broad-based ideological and political stance in the 1950s, standing for American civic ideas, free-market economics, and Christian values. While this more civic-minded version of 'Americanist' patriotism was popularized in American popular culture, the term would also be used in the construction of the distinctly right-wing anti-Communist ideology of the 'New Right' in the same years. This style, initially popularized by Senator Joseph McCarthy in the early 1950s, would go on to shape the ideological worldview of the conservative 'New Right' that emerged in the late 1950s and 1960s. For this New Right, Americanism could also imply a corporatist approach to economics that saw labor organizing as communistic, an ideological commitment to white supremacism, a belief in anti-Semitic conspiracism, and an anti-democratic opposition to liberal ideas, norms, and institutions. In this far-right Americanist worldview, 'internationalism' would be placed alongside communism, socialism, and liberalism as the 'alien' ideologies threatening the United States.

The hysterical Americanist anti-Communism of the 1950s is often identified with Senator Joseph McCarthy, the polarizing politician who claimed that Communist subversion had reached the

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[111] Seymour Martin Lipset. "The Radical Right: A Problem for American Democracy." *The British Journal of Sociology* 6:2 (1955): 176-209. See also: Richard Hofstadter. "The Pseudo-Conservative Revolt." *The American Scholar* 24:1 (1955): 9-27.

highest levels of American government. The fevered nature of anti-Communism in this period cannot be understated; Republicans and Democrats alike condemned Communism, but this did not prevent McCarthy and other New Rightists from condemning their political opponents as soft, or even sympathetic to communism. For McCarthy and his supporters, anything but the most sensational denunciation of Communism could indicate hidden sympathies - or even subversive tendencies. The McCarthyite style was expressed leading right-wing intellectuals like James Burnham. James Burnham was a former communist who authored multiple conservative books and served as longtime co-editor of William F. Buckley's *National Review*.

He wrote of U.S. diplomat George Kennan:

> "[He] is unquestionably anti-Soviet and from a rational standpoint anti-Communist, [but] nowhere in his published writings does one ever find expressed in the texture of his style a powerful emotion concerning Communism, a hatred of Communism… The analysis and rejection, which are there, are always pale and abstract."[112]

For Burnham, McCarthy, and other American conservatives in the 1950s, Communism was not merely to be opposed. It was to be "hated", and this hatred should go beyond mere "analysis and rejection" and seep into the rhetorical style of the anti-Communist. When McCarthy himself described, "McCarthyism as Americanism with its sleeves rolled," he captured the hard-edged combativeness of a political style that would continue to shape the American Right long after McCarthy's death in 1957.[113]

Senator McCarthy's televised crusades against alleged traitors and Communists at the highest level of American government captured the imagination of millions of Americans in a time of great uncertainty and change for the United States. While McCarthy's time at the centerstage of American politics was essentially confined to the first half of the 1950s, the man and his far-right Americanist style would continue to shape the worldview of the American Right for the remainder of the Cold War. One historian wrote that McCarthyism:

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[112] Stephen Whitfield. *The Culture of the Cold War*. Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press, 1996. 33.
[113] McCarthy is believed to have said this in a speech he gave in Wisconsin in 1952.

> "had a lasting impact on the conduct of U.S. foreign relations – The 'ism' in a broad sense was a set of ideas not only about internal subversion but also about the outside world, including a simplistic, isolationist anti-communism and a deep suspicion about social reform movements abroad. It stood in open opposition to a more complex, even accommodating, view of communism."[114]

The fear of Communist subversives in the U.S. government was brought to life by the conviction of Alger Hiss and the execution of Julius and Ethel Rosenberg. Although Hiss was not convicted of treason and denied ties to the Soviets until his death, the politicization of these trials brought the drama from the "criminal courts into the electric field of political iconography."[115] Even though the House of Un-American Activities hearings ended after McCarthy's censure in 1954, Americans had legitimate reason to fear Communist spies in the federal government. The specter of Communist influence, real or imagined, was the source of anxieties fueled by the media and the U.S. government. The purported connection between Communism and internationalism, already highlighted by right-wing anti-internationalists in 1919, would continue to play a central role in the ideological worldview American Right during and after the McCarthy era.

For Burnham and other right-wingers in the 1950s, only those whose anti-Communist vitriol could jump off the page would be seen as sufficiently dedicated to the cause of saving America. Anyone who did not, or who identified with liberalism, socialism, or internationalism, would be denounced as a witting or unwitting servant of Communist aims. The emotional fervor of anti-Communism in this period cannot be understated. It was in this context that critical references to internationalists, contained in the packaging of anti-Communist Americanist propaganda, began to enter the mainstream of the American Right. The following section will discuss the 'New Right' of the 1950s and consider the way that anti-internationalist language and sentiment evolved as the New Right replaced the Old.

Out with the Old, in with the New: The Post-War Right and the Birth of the American Conservative Movement

In 1964, libertarian intellectual Murray Rothbard argued that:

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[114] Alan Rausch. *McCarthyism and Eisenhower's State Department, 1953-1961*. Unpublished Ph.D. thesis at the University of Washington, 2000. 15.
[115] Whitfield. *Culture of the Cold War*. 28.

> The modern American Right began, in the 1930's and 1940's, as a reaction against the New Deal and the Roosevelt Revolution, and specifically as an opposition to the critical increase of statism and state intervention at home, and to war and state intervention abroad. The guiding motif of what we might call the "old American Right" was a deep and passionate commitment to individual liberty, and to the belief that this liberty, in the personal and the economic spheres, was gravely menaced by the growth and power of the Leviathan state, at home and abroad.[116]

While Rothbard was particularly sympathetic to the anti-interventionist and classical liberal ideas associated with the Old Right, his historical analysis is sound. Historians traced the genesis of the 'Old Right' to the 'Conservative Coalition' of Republican and (largely Southern) conservative Democratic congressmen opposed to the New Deal. Patterson argues that:

> "by 1939 [the Conservative Coalition] agreed in opposing the spread of federal power and bureaucracy, in denouncing deficit spending, in criticizing industrial labor unions, and in excoriating most welfare programs. They sought to "conserve" an America which they believed to have existed before 1933."[117]

Despite agreeing upon broadly anti-interventionist principles and articulating some early libertarian arguments against centralized economic planning, the Old Right was united more by shared material interest and opposition to Roosevelt than ideological unity or coherence. The 'Old Right' did not have a coherent conservative ideology or support from a mass movement of likeminded Americans. Instead, it was a small but notable handful of conservative politicians united by their shared opposition to the Rooseveltian policies and ideas that shaped American politics from 1932 onward.

Senator Robert Taft, known as "Mr. Republican", was a leading figure in the 'Old Right' and prominent critic of post-war internationalism.[118] In his 1951 book, *A Foreign Policy for Americans,* Taft wrote that: "[a]n unwise and overambitious foreign policy, and particularly the

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[116] Murray Rothbard. "The Transformation of the American Right." *Continuum*, 1964. 220-231.
[117] James Patterson. *Congressional Conservatism and the New Deal: The Growth of the Conservative Coalition in Congress, 1933-1939*. University of Kentucky Press, 1979. vii.
[118] See Michael Bowen. *The Roots of Modern Conservatism: Dewey, Taft, and the Battle for the Soul of the Republican Party*. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2011.

effort to do more than we are able to do, is the one thing which might in the end destroy our armies and prove a real threat to the liberty of the people of the United States."[119] While he was not completely opposed to American activity abroad in the face of the Communist threat, Taft was skeptical of the aims and methods employed by 'containment' proponents. He couched this skepticism with concern over the expansion of the powers of the executive (particularly under Roosevelt) and the accruement of national debt in the service of rebuilding Europe.[120]

The Old Right was dealt a stinging blow in 1952, when popular war-hero Dwight Eisenhower defeated Robert Taft in the Republican Presidential primary. Eisenhower, who considered running as a Democrat, had a fundamentally different approach to politics than Taft. Eisenhower promoted what contemporaries called "Modern Republicanism", a balance of New Deal liberalism and Old Right conservatism. During his presidency, he passed bipartisan legislation with support from moderates in both parties.[121] Eisenhower largely continued with the Truman Administration's foreign policy program; Eisenhower himself had overseen the occupation of Europe in the late 1940s and spent part of 1951 as the first supreme commander of NATO.

The final attempt of the 'Old Right' isolationists to prevent the continued growth of 'American empire' was the failed effort to pass the 'Bricker Amendment' in the mid-1950s. The 'Bricker Amendment' aimed to limit the foreign policymaking power of the Executive branch: it would require Congressional approval for any treaty entered into by the President and severely limited the President's ability to broker executive agreements with foreign countries. The bill was pushed by Senator John Bricker of Ohio, who had served as the vice-presidential candidate on the Republican ticket of 1944. Bricker was described as "a fervent hater of foreign aid, the United Nations, and all those he lumped with Eleanor Roosevelt under the contemptuous designation of 'One Worlders.'"[122] Bricker first introduced the proposed amendment in 1951. The proposed amendment, first introduced by Bricker in 1951, was opposed by President Eisenhower but popular with some politicians. When Bricker was attempting to build the legislative majority in the House and Senate needed to pass the amendment in 1953, Eisenhower

[119] Robert Taft. *A Foreign Policy for Americans*. New York: Doubleday and Co., 1951.
[120] Geoffrey Matthews. "Robert A. Taft, The Constitution and American Foreign Policy, 1939-53." *Journal of Contemporary History* 17:3 (1982): 507-522.
[121] Geoffrey Kabaservice. *Rule and Ruin: The Downfall of Moderation and the Destruction of the Republican Party, from Eisenhower to the Tea Party*. Oxford University Press, 2012. 14.
[122] Robert Caro. *The Years of Lyndon Johnson: Master of the Senate*. Alfred Knopf, 2002. 528.

enlisted the support his allies and was able to ensure the defeat of the bill in a Senate vote on February 26, 1954.

The failed attempt to pass the Bricker Amendment was described by Tananbaum as "the last hurrah of conservative isolationism." The political consensus, among both elites and the mass public, had shifted towards support of U.S. involvement abroad and in the policies associated with the New Deal. The Old Right, having lost the Republican party to Eisenhower and the moderates, would decline as major figures like Taft died or left the Congress by the late 1950s. Despite the disappearance of anti-interventionism as a credible position in American foreign policy, the language of anti-internationalism would be adopted by a new generation of right-wing activists more concerned with the imminent threat of 'one-world government' than reasoned debate about American foreign policy.

It was around this time that a variety of right-wing activists, intellectuals, publicists, organizations emerged, energized by the threat of Communism and committed to conveying their vision of Americanism to the public. As Vinyard observed the New Right was enabled by an "anti-Communist consensus [which] was broad-based, bipartisan, and ready."[123] Beyond the official outlets of the U.S. government and mainstream publications like *Newsweek*, a wave of Americanist propaganda inundated the American public. A variety of pamphlets, journals, newsletters, radio shows and television programs, united by their references to Americanism and opposition to Communism, began to connect political issues as diverse as Communist influence in labor unions, pro-segregation activism, US membership in the United Nations, and opposition to the fluoridation of water.

The widespread acceptance of New Deal programs and a foreign policy of 'containment' had, by the late 1950s, left Old Rightists without a leg to stand on. The 'New Right' that replaced it was a multi-faceted phenomenon, with a number of competing intellectual and political tendencies seeking to define the movement intellectually and shape its political strategy. Despite these internal differences, the 'New Right' consolidated around a right-wing ideology that proponents

[123] JoEllen McNergney Vinyard. *Right in Michigan's Grassroots: From the KKK to the Michigan Militia*. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2011. 179.

called 'fusionism'.[124] The 'fusionist' combination of traditionalist social conservatism, libertarian economic philosophy, and anti-communism created a robust ideological framework by which right-leaning Americans could think and talk about politics. Conservative academics like Russell Kirk and Frank Meyers wrote books on conservative political philosophy, giving intellectual credibility to a tradition which had been derided as "irritable mental gestures [seeking] to resemble ideas" by prominent liberal critic Lionel Trilling.[125] Kirk, Meyers, and other conservative intellectuals were given a platform by William F. Buckley's *National Review*, the flagship publication of the New Right. Buckley, who edited the *National Review* for decades and appeared weekly on his *Firing Line* television show, represented an effort by right-wing intellectuals to create 'conservatism' as a legitimate political movement and ideology opposed to both to Communism and the liberalism of the Democratic Party.

The absence of a genuinely right-wing mass movement or ideology before the 1950s left a vacuum for New Right ideologues to fill. As I argue in Chapter 2, ideologues combine *ideological innovation* on the abstract plane of ideas with the *practical task of building political organizations* capable of spreading those ideas via mass media. In the realm of ideas, a diffuse cadre of conservative intellectuals sought to redefine conservatism from a tired elitist and nativist ideology to a distinctly American set of values. The books written by these intellectuals, as well as the more distinctly anti-internationalist books surveyed later in this chapter, served as the movement literature for later generations of New Right activists and contributed to a broader shift in public opinion toward conservatism. Nixon strategist Kevin Phillips, an architect of the Southern Strategy who would later write critically about the Reagan Revolution from a conservative perspective, claimed in his book *Post-Conservative America:*

> "No one can deny the impact of the conservative books and ideas marketed in the United States since World War II, whether they have launched a thousand activists or helped nominate a presidential candidate, as with Barry Goldwater's The Conscience of a Conservative."[126]

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[124] The early emergence of fusionist ideology in the pages of post-war conservative publications was sympathetically documented in William F. Buckley. *Did You Ever See a Dream Walking: American Conservative Thought in the 20th Century*. New York: Bobbs-Merriall Books, 1970.
[125] Lionel Trilling. *The Liberal Imagination*. New York: Viking Press, 1950. xvii.
[126] Kevin Phillips. *Post-Conservative America: People, Politics & Ideology in a Time of Crisis*. New York: Vintage, 1983. Xvii.

The term ‘marketed’ stands out here, as conservative publicists and fundraisers adopted marketing and direct-mail strategies finetuned by private industry. Organizations like YAF distributed conservative books on campuses, organized essay contests for students interested in conservative and libertarian texts, and, in the early 1960s, created alternative education programs like the Freedom School, the unaccredited Rampart College, and the Pikes Peak Anti-Communism Conference, all of which took place in the town of Colorado Springs, Colorado.

Intellectual efforts to propagandize and popularize conservative ideas were complemented by the efforts of activists to bring their ideas and policies into the Republican Party. Conservative activists, lost in the desert during the moderate years of Eisenhower, found their leader in Senator Barry Goldwater of Arizona. Goldwater won the nomination and led the Republican National Convention in a roaring defense of conservative politics. Goldwater’s radical conservatism was best embodied in his famous words at the 1964 Republican National Convention: “I would remind you that extremism in the defense of liberty is no vice! And let me remind you also that moderation in the pursuit of justice is no virtue!” Despite his substantial loss to Lyndon B. Johnson in November 1964, the Goldwater campaign served to connect the numerous activists, staffers, researchers, and wonks who would earn their conservative stripes in the 1960s and later go on to serve in the Reagan and Bush White Houses. 1964 saw the emergence of Ronald Reagan. Reagan’s famous 1964 speech *A Time for Choosing* argued that the American tradition of economic liberty and small government was the bulwark saving humanity from the evils of communism. This speech, one of the most important in the history of the New Right, launched Reagan’s career as a national politician embodying the ideals of the New Right.

The New Right’s ‘fusionist’ ideology would allow the conservative movement to appeal to a broader array of supporters and constituencies than the Old Right was able to mobilize. Kevin Phillips argued that fusionism allowed conservatives to make inroads with groups that had previously been aligned with the New Deal coalition, using appeals to cultural conservatism to win over working-class white voters.[127] The libertarian component of the ideology appealed to businessmen and capitalist interests who constituted the opposition to the New Deal in the late 1930s, but the ‘fusionist’ rendition incorporated the newer libertarian ideas developed by

[127] Kevin Phillips. *The Emerging Republican Majority*. Arlington House, 1966. 12.

economic theorists like Mises, Hayek, Rand, and Rothbard. These ideas gave New Rightists a more coherent conceptual framework to use when expressing opposition to centralized planning or welfare state policies than early conservatives had available in the 1930s.

Scholarship on the American conservative has correctly highlighted the success of New Right intellectuals in establishing publications like *National Review* and *Human Events* during the 1950s. These groups, and the 'fusionist' ideology they promoted, gave new lift to conservatism as an intellectual and political project. With regards to foreign policy, these voices are seen as embracing the 'internationalism' rejected by their isolationist forebears; instead, they embraced the muscular internationalist 'realism' needed to combat the Soviet threat. By the 1970s, Buckley and other ideological gatekeepers had successfully 'purged' the American Right of the far-right fringe, forever marginalizing extremists and allowing conservatism to become a legitimate political movement and ideological force capable to reckoning with liberalism.

As I noted in the Introduction, historians of the American Right have come to question the historical value of narratives in which the 'conservative movement' is centered. While I am not attempting to offer a comprehensive history of the American far-right in the 1950s, this chapter seeks to address three flaws in the conservatism-centered narrative of ideological change on the American Right after World War II.

The first relates to a broad failure to account for the role of far-right ideas, conspiracism, and extremism in the early history of the American Right. Recent scholarship on the American Right has attempted to correct this historiographical misstep (or ideological move by conservative historians) by focusing on the ideological, organizational, and rhetorical overlap that existed between self-styled 'conservative' groups, far-right radicals, and violent extremists in the 1950s.[128] During the early 1950s, Buckley and other right-wingers who would go on to become leading figures in the (legitimate) conservative movement collaborated with avowed anti-Semites and white supremacists. While changing public opinion meant that their influence was already waning, open anti-Semitism and anti-Black racism were still commonplace on the American Right in the 1950s. Walsh has argued that the emergence of a conservative movement in the 1960s was preceded by an earlier:

[128] See John Huntington. *Far-Right Vanguard: The Radical Roots of Modern Conservatism*. University of Pennsylvania Press, 2021.

> "'right-wing popular front' predicated on shared opposition to communism, socialism, and New Deal liberalism… [w]ithin the framework of the popular front, anti-Semitism and other forms of conspiracy theory were tolerated as long as they did not become publicly damaging to the image of conservatism."[129]

While this popular front "slowly unraveled over the 1950s," some of those who started their careers as right-wing activists during the early 1950s era of the 'right-wing popular front' go on to become the most prominent and visible proponents of far-right Americanist ideology in the country in the 1950s and 1960s. These voices and the publications they founded had largely disappeared from the political scene by the 1970s, allowing for a sort of historical whitewashing that neglects the substantial role played by these ideas in shaping the ideological horizon of the American Right in its earliest days. This tendency is best displayed in Nash's influential 1976 *Conservative Intellectual Movement in America Since 1945*. Nash said at the book's outset that he would not pay attention to the variety of extremists, conspiracists, and cranks that populated the conservative movement in its early days, choosing instead to focus on the intellectual conservatives who happened to be his friends and political allies.

The second flaw in the historiography comes from the way it over-emphasizes the historical importance of conservative periodicals and publications in the historical genesis of American conservatism while ignoring the fact that far more Americans listened to right-wing radio programs than read conservative magazines in the 1950s and 1960s. Intellectual historians of American conservatism have generally focused on intellectual magazines like *National Review*, *Human Events*, and other conservative periodicals. As a result, historians of the American Right have largely ignored the fact that *early right-wing media entrepreneurs* were using radio (and direct-mail) *to reach a far wider audience* than the one that subscribed to right-wing political magazines. Hemmer, Hendershot, and Matzko have all recently authored books on the 'Radio Right', emphasizing the historical importance of these previously understudied right-wing media personalities.[130] Many of these figures were responsible for the propagation of anti-

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[129] David Walsh. "The Right-Wing Popular Front: The Far Right and American Conservatism in the 1950s." *Journal of American History* 107:2 (2020): 411-432.

[130] See Nicole Hemmer. *Messengers of the Right: Conservative Media and the Transformation of American Politics*. University of Pennsylvania Press, 2016; Heather Hendershot. *What's Fair on the Air?: Cold War Right-Wing Broadcasting and the Public Interest*. University of Chicago Press, 2011; and Paul Matzko. *The Radio Right: How a*

internationalism to the broader American Right in the 1950s and 1960s, before the John Birch Society and Liberty Lobby had yet established themselves using the mass media techniques pioneered by the Radio Right.

The third flaw of this narrative – and the one most relevant to my broader arguments about the constitutive ambiguity that characterized anti-internationalism and anti-globalism in the 20th century – relates to the complicated reality of how anti-internationalism's substantive content could vary. Old-style isolationism and its proponents had largely left the political scene by the late 1950s, and the language of anti-internationalism underwent a substantive transformation during that decade. In the early 1950s, it was expressed by a wide array of voices, including virulent anti-Semites like Gerald L Smith, isolationist Congressmen like Robert Taft and John Bricker, and liberal public intellectuals like Charles Beard and Walter Lippman. A decade later, the language was primarily employed by far-right radicals and conspiracists for whom 'internationalism' represented an ill-defined conspiratorial elite, their un-American ideology of world government, and the well-funded and influential organizational apparatus they used to pursue political power and influence.

The following section presents the major anti-internationalist voices on the American far-right during the 1950s and early 1960s. From 1945 to 1965, the language and ideas associated with anti-internationalism evolved from a more relatively simple opposition to interventionist foreign policy to a complex conspiratorial anti-internationalist worldview oriented around the looming threat of 'one-world government'. I argue that these anti-internationalist arguments, in their varied forms, are a consistent and significant feature of the right-wing ideological profile of the 1950s and 1960s – it was through the actions and ideas of the ideological entrepreneurs and institution-builders profiled in the following section that anti-internationalism gained this status. The strategic and rhetorical emphases of these voices differed; some of the actors surveyed promoted a conspiratorial anti-internationalism devoid of the anti-Semitism and racism that characterized earlier far-right ideologues, while other figures sought instead repackage the explicit anti-Semitic and white supremacist ideologies for the Cold War era. Despite the

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Band of Broadcasters Took on the Federal Government and Built the Modern Conservative Movement. Oxford University Press, 2020.

variations in style, tactics, and degrees of influence, these figures were *all* critical of internationalism, the United Nations, and the prospect of world government.

The section will be divided into three subsections. The first will present the anti-internationalist ideologues broadly associated with the 'Radio Right' of the 1950s and 1960s. These were right-wing media entrepreneurs who built up substantial national audiences through effective use of radio, direct-mail, and even television to spread their propaganda and raise funds for their organizations. Their careers began in the 1950s or earlier, reaching peak influence in the late 1950s and early 1960s. While the influence of these actors waned by the late 1960s, their work as right-wing ideologues provided a strategic and organizational model to be imitated or improved upon by the Birch Society and Liberty Lobby. They were able to use funds raised from wealthy right-wing donors – or grassroots donations cultivated through direct-mail fundraising – to promote themselves and their right-wing anti-Communist ideology (of which anti-internationalism was a substantial, if not primary, element) to millions of American readers and radio listeners during the 1950s and 1960s.

The second section will focus on Willis Carto, Robert Welch, and the organizations they founded: the Liberty Lobby and the John Birch Society. These groups would become "twin pillars" of the populist far-right in America, doing more than any other organizations to develop and propagate anti-globalist language and ideology in the second half of the twentieth century. These figures spent much of the 1950s as right-wing activists, participating in various social movement organizations, and establishing relationships with right-wing activists, intellectuals, funders, and politicians. They would go on to build their own organizations in the late 1950s, drawing on their extensive networks to find the like-minded writers, financial supporters, and readers needed for their organizations to become *institutionalize* and become permanent fixtures on the American Right.

The final section will examine some of the anti-globalist books written by these and other anti-internationalist ideologues during the 1950s and 1960s. Some of these books were written by the major figures profiled in the earlier sections, while others had more marginal authors. All were focused on the threat of internationalism and world government, and they represented significant developments in the ideological profile of anti-internationalism during the time they were written. They attempted to reconstruct networks of elite influence as evidence of a grand

conspiracy to subvert American sovereignty and bring about world government. These books largely eschewed explicit anti-Semitism while adopting and adapting its tropes to fit within a broadly mainstream anti-Communist worldview and specific American context. The texts were the foundational blocks of the *conspiratorial canon* that would build up during the 1970s and 1980s, as the Liberty Lobby and John Birch Society became hubs for publishing and selling right-wing conspiratorial literature.

Broadcasting Americanism: The Radio Right

Gerald L K Smith

Smith biographer Glen Jeansonne wrote that, "Smith was known as America's most vicious anti-Semite and the publisher of a rabidly reactionary periodical, The Cross and the Flag."[131] The peak of Smith's influence came in the 1930s, when he "emerged as one of a handful of nationally prominent demagogues that included Father Charles Coughlin, Dr. Francis Townsend, and Long himself."[132] Smith turned to far-right anti-Communism in the 1940s and would remain a major figure on the anti-Semitic extreme right during the 1950s and 60s, despite starting his career as a proponent of economic redistribution. Jeansonne argued that "the major constant among [the many causes Smith championed] seems to have been that they all advocated a single panacea or identified a single enemy, and in Smith's hands they all became crusades."[133] For most of Smith's political career he crusaded against a single target: the Jewish people.

Smith is a prolific writer and speaker, whose demagogic talents were lauded by allies and critic alike. Louisiana populist leader Huey Long, who worked with Smith in the early 1930s, was said to have claimed that Smith was "next to me the greatest rabble rouser in the country." Journalist H.L. Mencken called Smith, "the gutsiest and goriest, loudest and lustiest, the deadliest and damnedest orator ever heard on this or any other earth…the champion boob buster of all epochs."[134] Smith's undeniable talent as a speaker was important to his success as a radio

[131] Glen Jeansonne. *Gerald L K Smith: Minister of Hate*. LSU Press, 1997.
[132] Glenn Jeansonne. "Preacher, Populist, Propagandist: The Early Career of Gerald L. K. Smith." *Biography* 2:4 (1979): 303.
[133] Ibid, 304.
[134] Ibid.

demagogue, but it can tend to overshadow his equally significant talent as an organization-builder, media entrepreneur, and fundraiser.

Smith was able to build directly and indirectly off of the success and organizing model pioneered by Charles Coughlin. He raised money from wealthy right-wing patrons and grassroots donors alike; Smith had a mailing list of over 250,000 names and addresses by the early 1940s.[135] He was also effective at build up his apparatus of political groups (concentrated largely in the Christian Nationalist Crusade) into a sophisticated and multi-pronged propaganda organization capable of promoting his ideas – and, crucially, raising the money needed to produce and distribute right-wing political propaganda to an ever-bigger audience. Jeansonne writes:

> "Smith organized his own activities into four areas: direct mail, radio, book distribution, and personal appearances. Direct mail focused on local issues and was targeted at particular constituencies; the radio appeals were more comprehensive. Smith also organized mass meetings where many voters could be influenced… Smith's talent for organization would have made him even more successful had he possessed modern technology such as computers to generate form letters."[136]

Anti-internationalism formed a core part of Smith's ideology, which was openly anti-Semitic and racist. A 1944 paper in Public Opinion Quarterly analyzed 63 radio broadcasts by Smith from 1941 to 1942. The author identified 14 distinct themes that appeared consistently in Smith's speeches. The idea that the "United States is menaced by international financiers and monopolists" appeared in 57.1% of the speeches, and the idea that "The United States should not sacrifice its national sovereignty to other members of the United Nations" appeared in 34.9% of the speeches.[137]

His attacks on internationalism and world government – part and parcel of his full-throated commitment to "100% Americanism" – started in the early 1940s and continued throughout the 1950s and 1960s. In 1943 Smith formed the America First Party. The name copied that of the

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[135] Jeansonne. *Minister of Hate*. 68.
[136] Ibid, 68-69.
[137] Morris Janowitz. "The Technique of Propaganda for Reaction: Gerald L K Smith's Radio Speeches." *Public Opinion Quarterly* 8:1 (1944): 84-93.

isolationist America First Committee, which had been the loudest voice against American involvement in World War II up until the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor; the Committee dissolved three days after the attack. Some of the more extreme members of the America First Committee joined his party, which was the subject of an investigation by the House Un-American Activities Committee (HUAC). HUAC was primarily focused on exposing Communist subversion, but also investigated and issued reports on far-right groups. An FBI field report documenting an America First Party rally stated that Smith said:

> "I don't think the word First is a bad word and I like the phrase 'America First' – Stalin looks after Russia first but they are fighting to protect their territory. Churchill looks after England first. Why shouldn't we look after America first?... The bureaucrats and our global minded president are too busy trying to form super-duper governments with the President as head of the International government to pay attention to what is happening to us in the United States. They want to form an international congress in Casablanca, or South Africa, with just enough Americans present to pay the bill and I want no part of that."[138]

In a 1952 issue of *The Cross and the Flag* Smith wrote: "the United Nations is the greatest subversive plot and plan in the history of the world for the destruction of the Constitution and the substitution by a World Government with all our citizens slaves."[139] Similar sentiments were expressed in Christian Nationalist Crusade pamphlets like "World Government Plan – Allied Troops to Police U.S.A."[140] Smith was also an an early promoter of Holocaust denialism on the American far-right, arguing in a 1959 article in *The Cross and The Flag* that six million Jews did not actually die during the Holocaust. Instead, he claimed that they moved to the United States.[141] For the most part, Holocaust denialism on the American far-right did not appear until the 1970s, when a handful of texts with titles like *The Six Million Swindle*, *The Hoax of the Twentieth Century*, and *The Myth of the Six Million* were published and popularized by a later generation of anti-Semitic ideologues and the propaganda networks they established.

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[138] FBI Field Report. *FBI Files on Gerald L. K. Smith*. Originally posted on Archive.org in 2016. https://archive.org/details/GeraldL.K.Smith/page/n9/mode/2up
[139] Jeansonne. *Minister of Hate. 93.*
[140] Ibid.
[141] Holocaust Denial Timeline. *The United States Holocaust Memorial Museum*. Posted online on April 22, 2012. https://web.archive.org/web/20150412131846/http://www.ushmm.org/wlc/en/article.php?ModuleId=10008003

Smith's influence waned by the 1950s, when his success attracted more competition to the lucrative field of far-right rabble-rousing. The other members of the 'Radio Right' who supplanted Smith essentially borrowed his strategy of organization-building and radio & direct-mail demagoguery while rejecting Smith and the anti-Semitism that characterized his propaganda. Smith is especially significant in the history of anti-globalism for a few reasons. First, he was an early and influential promoter anti-internationalist conspiracism – oriented around the alleged threat posed by the U.N., 'world government' and internationalism – as part of American far-right ideology. Second, the organizational model that he used to build up his platform and audience during the 1940s and 1950s would be copied by the generation of far-right activists who replaced him. The model of ideological and institutional entrepreneurship that enabled anti-globalism's development and spread in the late 20th century, was initially pioneered by Smith in the middle of the 20th century.

Smith was emblematic of the unabashedly anti-Semitic and racist version anti-internationalism that could be found across the post-war American Right during the 1950s. The ideological game played by the anti-globalists that followed in the late 20th century was about eschewing *explicit* anti-Semitism and racism – which was no longer acceptable for conservative politicians to express openly – while adapting the tropes, themes, and arguments of anti-internationalist conspiracism to changing political contexts. Smith's vulgar demagoguery and Jew-hatred could have no place in a serious political movement, which is why most of the figures in the remainder of this section chose not to collaborate with him.

Billy James Hargis

Hargis was a conservative pastor, radio evangelist, and publicist who built up a substantial audience during the 1950s and 1960s. He was ordained as a minister as a seventeen-year-old and founded his 'Christian Crusade (Against Communism)' organization in 1950 when he was twenty-five. Around the same time he wrote a speech for Senator Joseph McCarthy. Hargis started with his first radio station in Oklahoma a few years later; by 1957, his belligerence on the radio led the Disciples of Christ church to withdraw his ministerial ordination. By then, Hargis' Christian Crusade group was generating over a million dollars from its various media and

fundraising operations. By 1962 he was broadcasting on over two hundred radio stations, primarily concentrated in the southern and western United States.[142]

Hargis (and other figures on the "Radio Right") benefitted from a shift in the national media landscape in the U.S. during the post-war period. As Matzko observed in *The Radio Right*, "This rise of mass right-wing radio was only possible because of a dramatic shift in the radio industry in the mid-1950s… In the 1950s, the major networks began to shift their focus from radio to television… At the same time the number of AM stations in America nearly quadrupled, from about 900 in 1945 to 3,500 in 1960."[143] As a result,

> "growth in radio became the preserve of small, independent operators who struggled to break even from year to year... They might not have liked conservative broadcasters like Carl McIntire and Billy James Hargis, but at least they paid in cash. By syndicating their programs across hundreds of these independent stations, conservative broadcasters were able to reach the kind of national audience that had previously been reserved for network customers."[144]

Hargis was also a pioneer televangelist, with his sermons being shown on hundreds of television stations across the country. He would serve as a model for the Religious Right that played a major part in American conservatism's trajectory during the remaining decades of the twentieth century: his attacks on secular education and emphasis on religious teaching in school would become more popular in the 1980s and 1990s, as did his mixture of millenarian rhetoric with anti-internationalist conspiracism. This perspective was on display in a 1965 speech, when Hargis stated: "Our schools are in apostacy. The emphasis is now upon internationalism and socialism."[145] Hargis' 1962 book *United Nations – The Greatest Hoax Ever Perpetrated on the American Public* offers a straight was also published as a vinyl record titled 'The United Nations

[142] John Redekop. *The American Far Right: A Case Study of Billy James Hargis and Christian Crusade*. William B. Eerdmans Press, 1968.
[143] Matzko. *The Radio Right*. 22.
[144] Ibid, 107.
[145] Thomas Wayne Dehanas. *America's Modern Day Messiah: Billy James Hargis and His Christian Crusade - a Case Study In Extremism, 1964.* Unpublished Ph.D. thesis at the Oklahoma State University, 1966. 24.

Hoax'.[146] Similar themes are touched upon in his *The Facts about Communism and Our Churches* book.

For Hargis, internationalism was a minor part of the broader Communist conspiracy. While he did speak and write about the threat of world government, he did not focus solely or even primarily on anti-internationalist conspiracism. Like many conservatives of the time, he favored American withdrawal from the United Nations. While he was an influential promoter of anti-internationalist language during his career, his greatest impact came not from abstract ideological innovation but from institution-building and media entrepreneurship. Beyond his substantial influence on the radio, his monthly Christian Crusade Newspaper had a circulation of 55,000. Hargis was able to build up a mass donor base through savvy use of direct-mail fundraising. Christian Crusade published dozens of books by Hargis and others; one representative title by another author was the 1967 book *The Martin Luther King Story: a Study in Apostasy, Agitation, and Anarchy.* Another was the 1965 book *Communism, Hypnotism and the Beatles*. Christian Crusade had local chapters around the country, which helped to distribute and sell the organization's literature.

Hargis was well connected with other far-right ideologues and organizations during the 1950s and 1960s. He worked closely with Carl McIntire, another right-wing radio preacher who had an even greater audience than Hargis. McIntire's *Twentieth Century Reformation Hour.* He was a member of the John Birch Society and he toured the country with other right-wing leaders on speaking tours. Hargis gained national attention in 1963, when he "sponsored a series of political rallies, named Operation Midnight Ride, that featured General Edwin Walker, who was then considering a third-party bid for the presidency in 1964."[147] According to Matzko, "approximately thirty thousand people paid $1 or $1.25 to hear Walker and Hargis during the campaign," which stopped in twenty-two states – primarily focused in the Deep South and Mid-

[146] The vinyl record was distributed to Christian Crusade donors and is available today on Ebay and other ecommerce websites trafficking in political memorabilia and ephemera.

[147] Ibid, 63.

Walker was an Army General who was forced to resign his position after a controversy where his command was promoting materials produced by the John Birch Society, Billy James Hargis, and other right-wing anti-communist groups. After his Operation Midnight Ride campaign with Hargis, Walker was injured in a shooting at his Dallas home on April 10, 1963. The shot missed Walker and he was received minor injuries from broken glass. It was later discovered that the shot was fired by Lee Harvey Oswald, who would kill President John Kennedy less than 6 months later.

West. Hargis' and Walker resumed their national campaign in 1966; local branches of the Christian Crusade helped to organize the stump speeches, which sometimes featured live music in addition to hysterical right-wing ministries.

Hargis would launch a group called Americans Against Abortion in 1973, after the Roe v. Wade decision legalized abortion throughout the United States. He also started a television show called *Billy James Hargis and his All-American Kids,* featuring students from the Christian university he founded.[148] He was forced to resign as president of that college in 1974 when allegations of sexual abuse were made – and substantiated by multiple victims of both genders – against Hargis. His political career ended in ignominy, although he never admitted to the abuse. Hargis' anti-internationalism was never the main part of his ideology, which was more focused on anti-Communism and religious matters. But the fear of a U.N.-led world government was consistent and part of a broader ideological worldview. Hargis was not the most important or innovative of the anti-globalist pioneers that broadcasted their voices across the country via radio in the 1950s, but he was notable for his broader influence and place in a broader pattern of anti-internationalist language among 1950s conservatives.

Dan Smoot

Dan Smoot was the founder of the popular *Dan Smoot Report*, a weekly newsletter and radio show which featured Americanist, anti-communist, and anti-internationalist ideas. Smoot is notable for his popularity and savvy use of media. According to his autobiography, his childhood was the stuff of American folk legend. He was born in a log cabin and was picking cotton and operating a mule-plow by the age of eight. He went on to earn a B.A. and M.A. at Southern Methodist University before entering doctoral studies in American Civilization at Harvard University. After a year at Harvard as a teaching fellow, Smoot dropped out after the attack on Pearl Harbor. He tried, unsuccessfully, to enlist before joining the FBI in 1942. He investigated communist influence on labor unions in the Midwest and worked in Washington D.C. before retiring in 1951 to start the print, radio, and television program *Facts Forum* with the financial support of Texas oil baron and conservative activist and columnist, H.L. Hunt.

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[148] Thomas Wayne Dehanas. *America's Modern Day Messiah: Billy James Hargis and His Christian Crusade - a Case Study In Extremism, 1964.* 122.

In 1955, Smoot consolidated Facts Forum into *The Dan Smoot Report*, one of the most popular conservative radio shows of the time. He retained the financial support of H.L. Hunt and had his radio and television programs syndicated nationally. Smoot, while primarily anti-communist in his message, began to introduce anti-internationalist themes without engaging in anti-Semitism. Smoot offered a form of anti-internationalism that was palatable to moderate conservatives, focusing on criticizing U.S. foreign aid and speculating about the hypothetical threat posed by an over-active United Nations. Smoot's mainstream appeal likely contributing to his broad circulation: his radio program was played on over one-hundred stations in the 1950s and he had over 33,000 subscribers to the *Smoot Report* at its peak in 1965.[149]

Smoot's influential 1965 book, *The Invisible Government*, was an expose of the Council of Foreign Relation's insidious influence in American politics. Smoot wrote, "I am convinced that the objective of this invisible government is to convert America into a socialist state and then make it a unit in a one-world socialist system." Smoot wrote in his autobiography:

> "In 1957, I began making a chart of organizations mentioned in the news as supporting causes I knew to be [favorable to] communist causes – It was not a communist apparatus. It was the Council on Foreign Relations whose small membership roster included people like... Secretaries of State, heads of Wall Street brokerage firms, famous international bankers and their famous lawyers."[150]

While not novel in its claims about the threat of takeover by a socialist one-world government, *The Invisible Government* was significant for its emphasis on the Council for Foreign Relations (CFR) as an agent of internationalist subversion inside and outside American government. The CFR, founded in 1921 by David Rockefeller, in fact did wield great influence in American politics and encouraged American-led internationalism. Membership in the CFR was soon to become evidence of traitorous intent to those on the American Right, who saw the internationalism espoused by the CFR not just un-American, but anti-American.

Thomas J Anderson

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[149] Benjamin Forster and Arnold Epstein. *The Radical Right - Report on the John Birch Society and Its Allies*. New York: Random House, 1967. 7.
[150] Dan Smoot. *People Along the Way: The Autobiography of Dan Smoot*. Tyler: Tyler Press, 1993.

Thomas J. Anderson was a fixture in right-wing media in mid-20th century America, ultimately running for President in 1976 as the candidate of the right-wing American Party. From the late 1940s, Anderson was owner and publisher of regional farm magazines and *The Farm and Ranch Magazine*, a nationally distributed publication. His writings were found in his *Straight Talk* column, published in his own magazines and in 375 newspapers across the country. With a folksy wit he spoke in favor of 'Americanism' and lambasted moderates in both parties as unwitting harbingers of communism. One *Straight Talk* column from 1962 offered a number of early anti-internationalist arguments. Anderson claimed that:

> "our problem is not Communists hiding under the beds. Our problem is the errand boys for the Communists, standing behind microphones and sitting behind desks… - This relatively small group of organized evil is enslaving the world by subversion with the help of do-gooders, fatheads, and fools in high places… - We will never have to be concerned with out-voting the Communists in America. Nor will any other country. Communists don't take over by voting. They take over by getting the Liberals, Socialists, pacifists, and halfbrights to carry out their program."[151]

Anderson here encapsulates the central claim of the John Birch Society and a key tenet of the emerging right-wing ideology of the time. For Anderson, there is no difference between Eisenhower and Kennedy. Both are bringing America down the slippery slope of socialism, defined as any government intervention in the economy or society. Only by embracing the 'Americanist' principles of economic liberty, small government, and traditional values, Anderson claimed, could Americans save their country from the degradation and ruin wrought by totalitarianism.

Similar rhetoric was common in most 'Americanist' publications and media. Anderson is distinctive for his use of economic nationalist arguments as part of a broader anti-internationalist worldview. He begins this argument by discussing the possibility of a European Common Market and about the interest of 'Trans-Atlanticists' like Stevenson and Fulbright in joining this

[151] Thomas Anderson. *Straight Talk: The Wit and Wisdom of Thomas Anderson*. Western Islands Publishing, 1967. 32.

economic (and potentially political) union. He then makes a spirited – if factually incorrect – argument against U.S. economic policy:

> We have been priced out of world markets by our government through confiscatory taxation; by government-sponsored union racketeering and more and more pay for less and less work; by government exportation of the capital, know-how, equipment, machinery, and finished products to friend and enemy competitors, world without end; by deliberate inflation of currency, wages, budgets, debts, and of the heads of union leaders.
>
> The seven million tons of steel we are importing into this country yearly cost American steel workers 56,000 jobs a year. That's for raw steel. Figured in terms of finished products, we are displacing millions of American jobs. In the past 10 years, more than 700 American textile plants (325,000 jobs) have been put out of business-largely by our own government. In the past five years, more than 3,000 industries with 10,000 installations moved out of the United States. Five million American jobs have thus been exported. – Are we really talking about increased trade or increased dumping?[152]

Here, Anderson is echoing protectionist arguments with a long history in the United States – and presaging the concerns about free trade and post-industrial job losses that would become central to the anti-globalism of the 1990s and the present day. Bairoch described America as "the mother country and bastion of modern protectionism", and earlier protectionists made similar arguments about protecting domestic industry to justify tariffs.[153] Anderson, and other early anti-globalists of the period, differed from these protectionists by framing the issue of trade in the broader context of a push for world government by insidious forces who aimed to:

> "Bypass the Constitution, give the President powers of a dictator, increase welfare, print more money, and devalue the dollar, greatly increase the size and power of the Federal Government to plan, control, and punish – then convert our

[152] Ibid, 30.
[153] Paul Bairoch. *Economics and World History: Myths and Pardoxes*. University of Chicago Press, 1993. 14.

> country into a mere state in a world government. That's the way the cards are stacked now by the "middle-of-the-roaders" running our government."[154]

The dystopian threat of "one-world government" – enabled by American elites – is the central tenet of anti-internationalist and later anti-globalist ideology, with the use of the 'world government' trope predating use of 'globalism'. Anderson, like the other anti-internationalists profiled here, saw world government as the eventual endgame of the liberal-internationalist policies that he believed were destroying America. Anderson and his contemporaries on the American Right during the 1950s and 1960s used the terms "one-worlder" or "internationalist" to describe the perpetrators of a conspiracy to create a one-world government, and "one-worldism" or, more commonly, "internationalism" were the ideologies of the perpetrators. While the use of the terms "globalism" and "globalist" did not appear in the discourse of the American radical right until the early 1980s, the anti-globalist worldview was borne from the right-wing anti-internationalist Americanism on display in the media produced by Anderson and his peers.

Ideologues, Organizers, and Institution-Builders: Welch, Carto, and the Genesis of Anti-Globalism

This section will look at Willis Carto and Robert Welch, the two men who founded the Liberty Lobby and the John Birch Society in 1958. Welch led the Birch Society until 1983, and Carto led the Liberty Lobby until its legal dissolution in 2001. This section will focus primarily on their early political careers of Carto and Welch rather than on the groups they founded and embodied. This section seeks to show how the formative experiences these men had as members of the 'right-wing popular front' of the 1950s enabled their long-term efforts to establish their organizations as lasting political institutions on the American far-right.

Willis Carto

Willis Carto, founder of the Liberty Lobby, the American Populist Party, and the numerous publications produced by the Liberty Lobby, was the most important figure in the history of anti-globalism in the second half of the 20th century. Extremism scholar and Carto biographer George Michael wrote that, "Carto is undoubtedly the central figure in the post-World War II American

[154] Anderson, *Straight Talk*. 30.

far right."[155] His career as a far-right ideologue was unique for its productivity and length. After Carto started his career with the California-based *Liberty and Property* newsletter in the early 1950s, he did not stop working to further the cause of the American far-right until his death in 2015. Carto figures prominently throughout this entire thesis, and his lifelong work as an ideologue and institution-builder will be discussed further in the later chapters of this dissertation. This section will focus on his formative years in the tumult of right-wing politics in the 1950s, where he built up the network and political cache that helped his group, Liberty Lobby, become a central institution on the American far-right for the rest of the 20th century.

Carto's life's work embodies the ambiguity and deceptive ideological profile of the post-war far-right. Carto was an ardent fascist, anti-Semite, and racist, and he allied with or mentored most of the leading right-wing extremists in the late 20th century U.S. Unlike many other right-wing extremists, he was aware of the fact that his views were not acceptable to most conservatives or the broader American public. He sought to overcome this by creating the language of anti-globalist populism, using its inherent ambiguity to bring his extremist ideas into the mainstream of conservative ideological discourse. His more popular publications avoided explicit anti-Semitism and aimed to appeal to (and possibly radicalize) moderate conservatives, but personal letters written by Carto prove that he was an anti-Semite and white supremacist who believed (or cynically promoted the narrative) that a powerful and secretive Jewish elite aimed to destroy the United States and White American civilization.

Carto first became involved with the American Right in the early 1950s; he served in World War II and moved from the Midwest to California early in the decade. California was a hub of right-wing activism at the time, and he would quickly get involved in the right-wing social movement politics that was taking hold there. He became involved with Aldrich Blake, founder of the *Liberty and Property* organization. He assisted in the publication of Blake's *The Job Can Be Done!*, an anti-integrationist tract. In 1954, Blake appointed Carto as the Executive Secretary of *Liberty and Property*. Carto spent the summer of 1955 traveling the United States, developing relationships with other rightist activists and building on the network Blake had built up around his organization. After this trip, Carto founded his first publication, *Right: The National Journal*

[155] George Michael. *Willis Carto and the American Far Right*. Gainesville: University Press of Florida, 2008. 1. Beyond Michael's book, the other leading scholarly work on the Liberty Lobby and Willis Carto is Frank Mintz' *The Liberty Lobby and the American Right*: *Race, Conspiracy, and Culture*. Greenwood: Greenwood Press, 1985.

of Forward-Looking Americanism. Sixty issues of RIGHT were published between October 1955 and September 1960. All of the RIGHT newsletters featured the tagline 'A monthly newsletter of, by and for the American Rightwing.'[156]

RIGHT served as a journal of political commentary, but its primary function was connecting various right-wing groups, political parties, activists, and publicists from around the country with one another. Many issues featured a list of right-wing groups, containing relevant contact information for readers interested in reaching out. Over a hundred organizations can be found in the catalogue, almost none of which have stood the test of time. The organizations listed varied in purpose, ideology, and constituency; they were all unified, however, by their self-identification as Rightist and contact with Carto. Carto's papers feature countless letters with donors, friends, supporters, and fellow contacts.[157] His role as a conduit for connecting likeminded right-wingers is evidenced by his efforts in RIGHT and in the paper trail he left behind. This organizing tendency can be seen in the following section from an early RIGHT newsletter:

> Do you know... What is Right?
>
> Right is a new newsletter – the only publication of its kind...
>
> -It gives a bird's-eye-view of the entire American Rightwing.
>
> -It gives names and address of patriotic groups, and describes their work, growth and ideas.
>
> -It contains many exclusive stories of great interest to all patriots.
>
> -It contains really important, constructive editorials.
>
> -It works to get all Rightwing groups "a little closer together."
>
> -It is published by LIBERTY & PROPERTY, who also publish the FIRST NATIONAL DIRECTORY of "Rightist" Groups.[158]

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[156] Willis Carto. "Do you know… What is RIGHT?" *RIGHT Newsletter* 1 (October 1955), 1. Found online at http://willisacartolibrary.com/2017/12/05/right-newsletter/.
[157] Carto donated his papers to the Laird Wilcox Archive at the University of Kansas. Many of his letters have also been published online since 2019 at WillisCarto.org, most likely by a contemporary fan of Carto.
[158] Carto, "Do you know… What is RIGHT?". 1.

Carto's aims of connecting right-wing activists were already evident at this early point in his career, and he was able to draw from this network to build up the early staff and audience needed for the Liberty Lobby to institutionalize in the years that followed its foundation. Curiously, Carto would later express regret over his lack of success in organizing a genuine right-wing political movement. Even if his attempts to build a right-wing third party or mass movement failed, his successful attempt to establish Liberty Lobby as a major hub of the American far-right was a necessary condition for the later production and dissemination of anti-globalist ideology in the late 20th century. As the following chapters will show, the influence of Liberty Lobby would continue to grow in the decades that followed its foundation.

Robert Welch and the John Birch Society

The John Birch Society was founded in December 1958 by Robert Welch. Welch was a conservative activist, former political candidate, fundraiser, and independently wealthy candy magnate who was well-connected within right-wing anti-Communist networks in the 1950s. In late 1958 he invited several wealthy conservative donors to a meeting in Indianapolis. Once gathered, Welch told the group that the United States was threatened from within and without by an "international Communist conspiracy". The organization that formed after Welch's call to action took the name of John Birch, an American soldier and missionary killed in Communist China in 1945. The John Birch Society saw the Civil Rights Movement, New Deal, the United Nations, and myriad other liberal policies and institutions as part of a Communist plot to control American and enslave humanity. The Bircher worldview was explained by Welch:

> "[B]oth the U.S. and Soviet governments are controlled by the same furtive conspiratorial cabal of internationalists, greedy bankers, and corrupt politicians. If left unexposed, the traitors inside the U.S. government would betray the country's sovereignty to the United Nations for a collectivist New World Order, managed by a 'one-world socialist government."[159]

Conspiratorial anti-Communism was the ideological heart of the John Birch Society, and it proved to be a potent narrative around which the American Right could organize and propagandize. The Birch Society's hysterical style and tendency to find evidence of the

[159] Robert Welch. *The Blue Book of the John Birch Society*. Western Island Press, 1959. 20-24.

conspiracy in every new event and trend also identified them to the national media and mass public in the late 1950s and early 1960s, when there were concerns about the political consequences of a vocal radical right-wing movement of "superpatriots", as they were often called. The Birchers came to represent the anti-Communist far-right, drawing on rhetorical styles and arguments developed by national figures like Senator McCarthy or the aforementioned characters composing the "Radio Right".[160] Bircherite narratives of communist conspiracy were not new, but the organization's sophisticated organizational infrastructure – which Welch self-consciously modeled after the methods purportedly used by Communist ideologues and organizers – helped to provide them with institutional structure. It also served as a network hub for other far-right ideologues, writers, activists, donors, politicians, and self-identified patriots.

Membership of the John Birch Society ballooned in its first years. A large dues-paying membership, combined with support from wealthy conservative donors like H.L. Hunt, gave the JBS the ability to propagandize and organize on a mass scale. *American Opinion*, the JBS' flagship publication, had an estimated 43,000 subscribers in 1967.[161] Bircher publications promoting the anti-internationalism conspiracism, most prominently the foundational *Blue Book of the John Birch Society*, were distributed to each member. Welch claimed over a hundred thousand members and over thirty full-time employees by 1961, making the John Birch Society the largest political organization on the Right (outside of the Republican Party) and one of the most active civil society organizations in the United States. JBS contributed to the spread of anti-internationalist ideas through their American Opinion Book Stores. By 1966, over 400 American Opinion stores were selling JBS-approved literature.[162] The Birch Society's expansive array of conspiracist and anti-Communist books were published by the Society's own Western Island Press.

The JBS vigorously opposed claims of anti-Semitism and purged blatant anti-Semites from their ranks. One of its founders and leading publicists, Revilo Oliver, left the Birch Society over his claims about the central role of Jews in international communist conspiracies.[163] Oliver, an

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[160] Matthew Dallek, *The Right Moment: Ronald Reagan's First Victory and the Decisive Turning Point in American Politics.* New York: The Free Press, 2000. 38.
[161] Mulloy. *The World of the John Birch Society.* 95.
[162] Ibid, 112.
[163] Daily News Bulletin. "Prof. Oliver, known for Strong Anti-Jewish Views, quits Birch Society." *Jewish Telegraphic Agency*, August 17, 1966.

eccentric figure who started his career as a classicist and finished as a Holocaust denier, would later accuse Robert Welch and the JBS of being under Jewish control and serving to drain money from patriotic Americans who, by supporting Welch and the Birch Society, would support the spread of communism. The departure of Oliver, and the disavowal of anti-Semitism, illustrates an important distinction between the different forms anti-internationalism took in the period. Some, like Welch, recognized for ethical or strategic reasons that anti-Semitism would only make their political ideas less palatable to Americans in the political mainstream. Others, like Oliver or Gerald Smith, would place Jews at the center of their conspiracism. Finally, individuals like Carto would toe the line between the two, offering different publications for hard-right anti-Semites and moderate conservatives with conspiracist tendencies. Despite these differences, the ideological media produced by these groups and other right-wing Americanists were united by their vocal opposition to socialism, Communism, and the liberalism of the Democratic Party. As we shall see throughout the rest of this section, these distinct anti-internationalist arguments bear a family resemblance in their consistent opposition to internationalism, the United Nations, and the idea of One World Government.

The Birch Society, despite its efforts to distance itself from anti-Semitism, attracted individuals who would later go on to found and organize white supremacist and neo-Nazi organizations and publications. Willis Carto spent much of 1960 working at the JBS before starting Liberty Lobby, and Revilo Oliver was an instrumental figure in the early history of the John Birch Society who would go on to focus on anti-Semitic and white supremacist politics after his departure from JBS. On some level, the presence of a (substantial) minority of out-right anti-Semites and racists in the Society's membership was not surprising; it was committed to a 'popular front' approach of strategic alliance and collaboration between various groups and political tendencies on the American Right.

The Birch Society was accused by contemporary critics Epstein and Forster of being the "vanguard" and "broad base of strength" for the Radical Right.[164] It played this role by bringing together the leading organizers, propagandists, and strategists of the nascent American Right, in addition to mobilizing local, grassroots chapters to build a dues-paying membership base which could conduct letter writing campaigns and circulate 'educational materials' in their

[164] Foster and Epstein. *The Radical Right*. 29.

communities. Most of the figures, groups and individuals who followed had some contact with the JBS, which lost members from its peak in the early 1960s as the decade wore on. *National Review* attacked Welch and the Society for their opposition to the Vietnam War. But the John Birch Society continued to reinvent itself, and its role as a producer and distributor of anti-globalist propaganda in the 1960s, 1970s, and 1980s made it, along with Liberty Lobby, one of the two major organizations responsible for anti-globalism's emergence in the late 20th century U.S.

Starting the Conspiracist Canon: Anti-internationalist Books in the 1960s

Books were a popular medium for conservative ideologues in the 1950s and 1960s, and books outlining the details of the internationalist conspiracy provided far more comprehensive accounts of the conspiracy's details than did newsletters or radio broadcasts. Hemmer observed that the 1964 election campaign helped to bring conservative books into a new stratosphere of popularity. In, "the spring of 1964, three paperback books jolted the political and publishing worlds. Within six months of their publication, 16 million copies were in circulation, a quantity 60 times greater than 1963's best-selling novel." This trend did not go unnoticed at the time. "The standard book publishing world looks on in bewilderment," marveled the Baltimore Sun. The Chicago Tribune called it "one of the strangest publishing phenomena of American political history." [165] The most popular of these books, *None Dare Call It Treason*, claimed that treasonous elites were betraying the United States and supporting Soviet interests. The book went through over a dozen printings in 1964, and millions of copies were distributed by activists affiliated with Barry Goldwater's campaign. This book, authored by conservative activist John Stormer, would become a foundational part of the conspiracist canon.

None Dare Call It Treason by John Stormer

None Dare Call It Treason was published by Liberty Bell Press, which Stormer founded in 1963. The facts of the book's distribution and popularity are worth exploring before examining the content. Over seven million copies of the book were in circulation by 1964, many distributed by conservative sympathizers of Barry Goldwater's presidential campaign. The John Birch Society took a major role in this propaganda effort, seeing Goldwater as the candidate with America's

[165] Hemmer. *Messengers of the Right*. 68.

interest at heart. The book was a call to action, reading on one cover, "1964 is a year of crisis and decision. Will America continue to aid the enemy, to disarm in the face of danger, to bow before communist dictators in every corner of the earth? The decision is yours!"[166]

Stormer's text differs from others in the form its conspiracism takes. Stormer's argument does not reference the Rockefellers, but instead claims that the root of the conspiracy is sympathy and support for Communism among American leftists, liberals, and moderates. He adopts the same polarizing tone and sense of urgency in his writing ("The next five years will contain a series of decisive battles which will determine for centuries to come whether mankind is to live in freedom or live in slavery. We stand now, my friends, with our backs to the precipice. We have no more ground to give, no time to lose, no margin for error."[167]) of other right-wing publicists of the time. But the motivation for his conspiracy was ideological, rather than of self-interest on the part of the conspirators. It is worth noting the diversity of thought among conspiracy theorists. While they all adopted the same conclusion that an international power elite was controlling and seeking to control more of the world, agreement on what the power structures looked like, who composed the elite, and what motivated them varied.

In a section titled 'Internationalism', Stormer argues that the United States has abandoned George Washington's admonition that the nation "have as little political connections as possible" with foreign nations and trading partners. America found itself enmeshed in various treaties, alliances, agreements during the post-war period, and many Americans saw the growth of these treaties as part of a process by which American interests would be subjugated to those of foreign nations and ideologies. An expert witness told the 1954 Congressional committee investigating the influence of tax-exempt foundations on American foreign policy that, "there is a definite tendency to sacrifice the national interest of our country in dealing with foreign affairs."[168] Stormer contends that, by 1961, this tendency "became the rule rather than the exception." After listing examples of U.S. military insouciance in the face of Communist aggression, Stormer states clearly the difference between the 'Americanist' foreign policy he supports and the internationalism he attacks:

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[166] John Stormer. *None Dare Call It Treason.* Multiple presses, initially published in 1953.
[167] Ibid. 15.
[168] Senator Carroll Reece (TN). 'Internationalism' and the Effect of Foundation Power on Foreign Policy. *Special Committee to Investigate Tax-Exempt Foundations and Comparable Organizations*, 1954. 169.

> Traditional U. S. foreign policy was based on the concept that the primary function of American military forces and diplomats should be the protection of American lives, rights and property. This traditional concept has been replaced by a foreign policy which sacrifices national interests — and common sense — to something called "world opinion."[169]

The book is, at first glance, well-researched and documented. Names, dates, references to congressional hearings and testimony, and documentary evidence all shape Stormer's conspiratorial narrative. But the popular book was castigated in a 1965 pamphlet titled *None Dare Call It Reason*, written by Julian Foster of the California State University at Fullerton. Foster noted the ways that Stormer manipulated sources, falsely attributed quotes, and generally misrepresented the truth to fit his narrative.[170] Despite this thorough rebuttal, Stormer's work was still widely read and distributed by New Rightist organizations, introducing conspiracist and anti-internationalist themes to Goldwater supporters in the Republican Party.

The John Franklin Letters by Revilo Oliver

The John Franklin Letters were published by an anonymous author in 1959; it is widely believed that the author was Revilo Oliver, the founding member of the Birch Society who was kicked out of the group for unrepentant anti-Semitism. The story of *The Letters* took place in the 1970s. In the book, the United States had succumbed to Communist influence was being occupied by United Nations soldiers. The protagonists are a group of patriots waging guerilla war against the collectivist government. The book served as a direct inspiration for the 1977 *Turner Diaries*, a novel that has been called "White Nationalism's Deadly Bible".[171] *The Turner Diaries* builds upon the dystopic right-wing narrative offered in *The Letters*, telling the story of a race war between whites and Jews, blacks, and other minorities seen as undesirable by white supremacists.

The *Franklin Letters* would later serve to inspire the militia movement, which mobilized in the 1980s and 1990s response to the threat of government takeover by either the Federal government

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[169] Stormer. *None Dare Call It Treason.* 62.
[170] Julian Foster. None dare call it reason;: A critique of John Stormer's None dare call it treason. 1965.
[171] J.M. Berger. *The Turner Legacy: The Storied Origins and Enduring Impact of White Nationalism's Deadly Bible*. International Centre for Counter-Terrorism - The Hague, 2016.

or United Nations. It's significance as an anti-globalist text comes from its illustration of a dystopian society to come if the United Nations were to 'take over' the United States. The short-time frame of the *Franklin Letters* (two decades until one-world government takeover) emphasizes urgent action just as *None Dare Call It Treason* would a few years later. The sense of ongoing decay and impending collapse was central to the Bircher worldview. The *Letters*, initially published in 1959, were reprinted by the Birch Society's Western Island Press in the 1970s – after Oliver had been kicked out of the Birch Society. a right-wing press which also put out the John Birch Society's *The Birch Log* newsletter.[172] While the later *Turner Diaries* would ultimately replace the *Letters* as the preeminent piece of fiction on the American far-right during the late 20th century, the *Franklin Letters* stand as an early example of how violent, dystopian right-wing fiction fit within the broader 'movement literature' read by members of the American far-right.

Rockefeller, "Internationalist": The Man Who Misrules the World by Emanuel M. Josephson

Anti-internationalism can be traced at least to political debates surrounding America's entry into the World Wars and the League of Nations, but the term came to become a pejorative for right-wingers/anti-communists wishing to disparage their target as a Soviet sympathizer. An illustrative example is the 1952 book *Rockefeller, "Internationalist": The Man Who Misrules the World* by Emanuel M. Josephson. Josephson, who also wrote books on the alleged Rockefeller connections of the Delano-Roosevelt political dynasty and the Federal Reserve, offers a clear enunciation of the anti-internationalist conspiracism of the 1950s: 'international bankers' like the Rothschilds and industrialists like the Rockefellers are secretly supporting the Soviets and aim to take over the world through the United Nations or another potential world government.

Josephson's book, a thick paperback containing 448 pages and a lengthy index, is dedicated to 'The Constitution' and introduces the book by listing quotations from U.S. Senators regarding the political influence of the Rockefellers.[173] The history traced by Josephson finds its origins in the thought of Marx and Bismarck. He claims that the ideas contained within what he called 'Bismarxian' thought aimed at the creation of, "a 'new social order', totalitarian and character,

[172] Michael Standaert. *Skipping Towards Armageddon: The Politics and Propaganda of the Left Behind Novels and the LaHaye Empire*. Soft Skull Press, 2006. 88.
[173] Emmanuel Josephson. *Rockefeller, "Internationalist": The Man Who Misrules the World*. Chedney Press, *1952. 15.*

[which] became the purpose of Rockefeller's 'philanthropies'."[174] He traces connections between the Soviets, Rockefellers, and the U.S. government. Shared interests in oil and world domination led to the collaboration of the Rockefellers with Soviet interests. According to Josephson:

> "Their accomplices in our midst have undertaken to discredit isolationism and make it a term of abuse and reproach, to further their conspiracy. They foster "internationalism" which Stalin dictated shall mean that: "An internationalist is one who is prepared unconditionally to defend the USSR." (New Leader, March 11 , 1950). All of the conspirators' "internationalist" schemes, the Marshall Plan, the NATO, the MSA, the Point 4 program, etc. are designed to supply the Communists with the equipment and material without which they can not wage war on us. – Unless we abandon "internationalism", and frustrate the conspirators, it will inevitably lead us to bankruptcy and destruction by the enemies within and without our gates."[175]

Josephson's book is particularly relevant because it is one of the earlier books connecting Communism and internationalism in U.S. foreign policy with the wealthy and influential Rockefeller family. For the most part, the conspiracies of anti-internationalists in the 1950s were unsophisticated: internationalists were Communist sympathizers who (knowingly or unknowingly) aided Soviet efforts to take over the world and establish a totalitarian world government. Anti-internationalist theories were enriched by naming the Rockefellers, Roosevelts, Freemasons, Illuminati, and other elite groups and organizations as the actors at the heart of the alleged conspiracy. One of the crucial shifts that took place in the development of anti-globalism as a distinctive ideology in the 1970s and 1980s was the discursive construction of an internationalist-globalist organizational apparatus, embodied in groups like the United Nations, the Council on Foreign Relations, the Trilateral Commission, and other international institutions. As the following chapter will show, it was not until the late 1960s and 1970s that these groups were referred to commonly in anti-globalist media.

The Invisible Government by Dan Smoot

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[174] Ibid.
[175] Ibid.

Dan Smoot's *The Invisible Government* featured in a wave of conservative books that hit the shelves in the two years leading into the 1964 presidential election. With this book Smoot would "introduce Josephson's ideas to a Birchite audience."[176] It traces a connection between the Rockefellers, Soviet Communists, 'internationalist' organizations like CFR and Chatham House, the United Nations, and the liberalism of the Democratic Party. He opens the book with a paean to George Washington's isolationism and praises the anti-interventionist movement of the interwar period. He connects the Rockefeller-Communist conspiracy with the one-world-government trope most clearly when he writes,

> "The fact is that every step the United States takes toward political and economic entanglements with the rest of the world is a step toward realization of the end objective of communism: creating a one-world socialist political and economic system in which we will be one of the subjugated provinces."[177]

Chip Berlet has noted that "one strain of conspiracist interpretation filters out most or all of the obvious antisemitic references and shifts the focus to international groups that foster elite planning for economic and foreign policy manners".[178] The Rockefeller family was indeed involved in funding 'internationalist' organizations like the Council for Foreign Relations. The emphasis on these organizations would flesh out the history of the 'internationalist' conspiracy, moving beyond simple anti-Semitism and/or anti-Communism and constructing a complex narrative with different actors and strategies employed. While still employing the rhetoric of isolationism and anti-Semitic tropes like the 'international banker', Josephson's and Smoot's books eschewed simple isolationism and blatant anti-Semitism. Instead, they offered comprehensive and coded texts which appeared well-researched and substantiated. These books were among the first of many to connect anti-internationalism to the Rockefellers and a longer historical trajectory of conspiracy, and both would be cited by popular books of the late 1960s and 1970s which would repeat the same charges as Josephson and Smoot.

Anti-Internationalism and the American Far-Right in 1965

[176] Berlet and Lyons. *Right-Wing Populism*. 225.
[177] Dan Smoot. *The Invisible Government*. Western Islands Publishing, 1962. 120.
[178] Berlet and Lyons. *Right-Wing Populism*. 225.

In the years following World War I, some American conservatives began to use the language of anti-internationalism to name and describe novel threats to the American republic and way of life: the possibility of Communist revolution, or the subjugation of national sovereignty through participation in international institutions. In the decades that followed, anti-internationalism was a consistent feature of a far-right nativist ideology largely defined by its anti-Semitism, white supremacism, sympathy for fascism, and hostility to Communism, liberalism, socialism, and internationalism. Critics of American foreign policy during and after the Presidency of Franklin Roosevelt also used anti-internationalist language to describe the expansion of the American military and diplomatic apparatus.

Starting in the late 1940s and continuing throughout the 1950s, anti-internationalism was commonly expressed by members of the 'right-wing popular front' that formed in response to the perceived threats of Soviet Communism and Democratic liberalism. Anti-internationalist discourse was focused on the notion of a conspiracy to create a one-world government, but the details and emphasis could vary. Extremists like Gerald L K Smith used the term 'internationalism' interchangeably with his open references to a Jewish conspiracy for world domination. On the other side of the spectrum, the term was used to criticize a naïve, idealistic, and misguided approach to foreign policy. In his *Invisible Government* book, Dan Smoot moved beyond simplistic isolationism and articulated a more legitimate conspiratorial narrative, focusing on elite networks embodied in groups like the Council on Foreign Relations. When William F. Buckley established *National Review* as the definitive publication of the conservative movement in 1955, he included the following in its founding statement:

> "No superstition has more effectively bewitched America's Liberal elite than the fashionable concepts of world government, the United Nations, internationalism, international atomic pools, etc. – It would make greater sense to grant independence to each of our 50 states than to surrender U.S. sovereignty to a world organization."

By the 1960s, however, many conservative publications and leaders had abandoned their neo-isolationist commitments in favor of an aggressive anti-Communist foreign policy. Starting in the mid-1960s, anti-internationalist language was primarily confined to the far-right publications of the John Birch Society and Liberty Lobby. What happened in the interim? Between 1945 and

1965, the modern American Right underwent substantial growth and evolution. At the end of World War II, there was no conservative mass political movement; by the mid-1960s American conservatism was a serious political and ideological competitor to liberalism, with millions of devoted adherents and an already successful array of social movement organizations, publications, and political networks.

The 'conservative movement' emerged from the broad-based and diverse right-wing media and social movement landscape of the 1950s and early 1960s. Hargis, Smoot, McIntire, Smith, and countless others blaring anti-Communist screeds into the radios of Americans or sending literature into their mailboxes. The directory of right-wing groups listed in Willis Carto's *Right* newsletter had over two thousand groups listed. While most were entirely inconsequential as political actors or defunct by the 1970s, the sheer volume illustrates the vibrancy of the social movement context. The right-wing ideologues profiled earlier in this chapter were those among the most influential of this movement, and they were also among the most committed to the espousal of anti-internationalism. Overall, the right-wing media landscape in America during the 1950s and early 1960s was well-populated and diverse, with no one voice or perspective predominating over another until the Right consolidated around conservatism.

The influence and organizational sophistication of the leading radical right-wing media organizations can be measured, on some level, by the amount of money they were able to raise through fundraising appeals and the sale of books, newsletter subscriptions, and advertisements. Group Research Associates, a watchdog group concerned with the American far-right, wrote a report in 1964 listing the estimated annual income of thirty leading right-wing organizations. These thirty groups included the Birch Society, Liberty Lobby, Smith's Christian Nationalist Crusade, Hargis' Christian Crusade. In 1962, the groups generated a collective revenue of $12 million, up from $4.9 million in 1958. Adjusted for inflation the thirty groups collected over $100 million in 2021 dollars – in one year.[179] Beyond the individuals who led or worked at these organizations, there were networks of donors and subscribers whose ideological commitment to the cause of "100% Americanism" sustained and grew the organizations.

[179] Group Research Associates. Special Report: The Finances of the Right Wing. A Study of the Size and Sources of Income of 30 Selected Operations. Group Research Associates, September 1, 1964. Found online at: https://archive.org/details/FinancesOfRightWingSeptember1964/mode/2up

These organizations were highly complex, operating on multiple levels. First, they existed to produce and disseminate ideologically-charged media. Radio and direct-mail allowed ideologues to speak directly to their audiences, reaching them in their living rooms or at their dining room tables. Radio and direct-mail were not simplistic conduits of ideological transmission. They were sophisticated, expensive, and novel modes of mass communication that required technological savvy, organizational support, and substantial financial support to build and operate. The maintenance and growth of the Christian Nationalist Crusade, Birch Society, and other far-right groups required organizational leadership, extant relationships with far-right activists and constituencies, money, and the free labor provided by ideologically-motivated members and adherents. Crucially, *the institutional model provided by the Christian Nationalist Crusade and other right-wing groups in the 1950s and 1960s would be adopted and improved upon by the Liberty Lobby and Birch Society in the decades that followed*. Starting in the 1960s and continuing in the decades that followed, anti-internationalism became associated with the ideological worldview of an American far-right largely oriented around the publications produced by the Birch Society and Liberty Lobby.

The 1960, 1970s, and 1980s saw the beginning of a sharp divergence on the American Right. As conservatives oriented around the Republican Party and New Right institutions experienced unprecedented political success, the far-right was marginalized and doomed to exclusion from traditional institutional politics. The Birch Society and Liberty Lobby were borne of the 'right-wing popular front' of the 1950s, and they embraced the anti-internationalist conspiracism that characterized that movement. As the next chapter will show, the maturation of these groups into institutions committed to the production of political propaganda and right-wing activism allowed them to coordinate and structure the ideological profile of the American far-right in the late 20th century. It was after decades of institutionalization that these anti-internationalist ideas would ultimately *evolve* into the sophisticated, coherent, and politically palatable ideology of anti-globalist populism.

CHAPTER FOUR:

The Emergence of Anti-Globalism: Conspiracism, Populism, and The New Right, 1965-1985

The fortunes of the American Right shifted dramatically from the 1960s to the 1980s. The resounding defeat of Barry Goldwater in 1964 seemed, at the time, to demonstrate the political impotency of the American conservative movement. Within two decades, however, the organizational seeds planted during the Goldwater campaign had blossomed into the 'New Right'. The leaders of this movement founded the broad apparatus of conservative organizations, campaigns, lobbying groups and publications that articulated a right-wing populist critique of Great Society liberalism and injected it into the Republican Party, focusing on cultural 'wedge' issues like affirmative action, busing, abortion and pornography to lure Southern and suburban white voters into the GOP. These efforts laid the foundation for Ronald Reagan's successful presidential campaign in 1980. By the end of Reagan's presidency, it was clear the New Right had "produced a political transformation that altered substantially the terms of debate in American politics and public life."[180] It was in this historical context that the John Birch Society and Liberty Lobby operated during the period of 1965 to 1985, using a period of political irrelevance for the American far-right to focus on their roles as ideological laboratories for the American far-right.

The core argument of this chapter is that *anti-internationalism evolved into the mature ideology of anti-globalism* between the 1960s and the 1980s. On a semantic level, two shifts marked this development. References to globalism came to replace internationalism in the pages of Liberty Lobby publications in the late 1970s. At the same time, writers associated with the John Birch Society began to use the term 'New World Order' to name and describe the internationalist conspiracy. This historical shift in language was also accompanied by a broader maturation in the ideological worldview of the far-right, which had largely abandoned explicit anti-Semitism for a more ambiguous far-right conspiracism that was frequently accompanied by the legitimate critique of international elites associated with the Trilateral Commission. Notably, the anti-

[180] Robert Collins. *Transforming America: Politics and Culture During the Reagan Years*. New York: Columbia University Press, 2009. 57.

globalism of the 1980s had moved beyond simplistic anti-Communism, arguing instead that the dichotomy between communism and financial capitalism, was, in fact, a diversion from the broader *globalist conspiracy* to establish a one-world government. Beyond noting this key shift in anti-globalist ideology's maturation, I am also interested in explaining the forces and factors that enabled it. This evolution was enacted by the long-term institutionalization of the Birch Society and Liberty Lobby during this period. On one level, this institutionalization was driven by the strategic choices and efforts of anti-globalist leaders. At the same time, anti-globalist institution-builders indirectly benefitted from the fact that other right-wing ideologues generally associated with the 'New Right' were promoting their own right-wing populist ideology during the same period, often targeting the same conservative readers. I argue that anti-globalist populism had more appeal among American conservatives during the 1970s and 1980s because of the rhetorical convergence between the New Right and the anti-globalist far-right converged around right-wing populist critiques of American liberalism *and* mainstream conservatism. This amplified the efforts of the anti-globalist institutions that made anti-globalism into a distinctive ideology with broad influence across the American Right by the late 1980s.

A secondary argument of this chapter relates to the institutionalization of the John Birch Society and Liberty Lobby. In the early 1960s, there were dozens of right-wing groups publishing newsletters and ideological materials. Besides the groups that became associated with the conservative movement, the Birch Society and Lobby were among the only groups still in operation twenty years later. The savvy use of direct-mail to promote their ideas and raise funds allowed these groups to generate the revenue needed to sustain themselves and plan for the future. Crucially, their institutionalization took place because of *their ability to consistently produce and sell far-right ideological materials over multiple decades allowed them to establish the 'conspiracist canon' of books and publications that embodied anti-globalist ideology and connected right-wing social movement actors to a broader worldview and frame.* I also argue, that the institutionalization of these groups was also enabled by the fact that *they actively supported far-right political campaigns and efforts during the 1960s and 1970s.* Particularly in the years before Reagan's 1980 election, such campaigns were the primary means by which far-right activists could engage in electoral politics and the practical pursuit of power. While these efforts were unsuccessful, they indirectly helped to establish the Birch Society and Liberty Lobby as the institutional hubs for far-right activism in the United States.

The maturation of anti-globalist ideology and the institutionalization of the Birch Society and Liberty Lobby were indelibly shaped by the broader transformations that took place on the American Right between Goldwater's 1964 campaign and the end of the Reagan presidency in 1988. It was during these years that conservatism become a respectable political and intellectual position in American life, winning the hearts and minds of Americans and, consequentially, transforming the Republican Party. As the following sections will show, the leaders, ideas, and political strategies associated with the 'New Right' were instrumental in enacting this conservative revolution. The 'New Right' used direct-mail to reach a broad audience and adapt conservative rhetoric and ideology to changing times. The singular emphasis on anti-communism that characterized the American Right in the 1950s gave way to a more complex right-wing populist critique of Great Society liberalism and the divisive policies associated with it. This ideological shift helped to consolidate the Republican Party's hold over Southern and working-class white voters, ultimately culminating in Reagan's election in 1980.

While American conservatism was finding newfound legitimacy and success, far-right groups and figures also tried to bring their brand of right-wing politics to the national stage. George Wallace, a two-term governor of Alabama, ran for President as the candidate of the newly formed American Independent Party (AIP). An ardent segregationist and right-wing populist, Wallace won 9 million votes in the 1968 presidential campaign. John Schmitz, one of the few Congressmen to openly identify with the John Birch Society, won over a million votes in 1972 as the AIP's presidential candidate. These campaigns were supported by radical right-wing groups and activists, who provided funding, organizational manpower, and propaganda to these candidates. Other members of Congress, like John Rarick and Larry McDonald, consorted with the Liberty Lobby and Birch Society, endorsing their activities, entering their writings into the Congressional Record, and giving them valuable credibility in their struggle to legitimize their far-right ideology.

During these two decades, the Liberty Lobby and the John Birch Society became hubs for the growing network of right-wing ideologues and organizations that sought to inform the American public of a nefarious and ambiguous 'New World Order'. These groups fostered a rich conspiracist milieu in the 1970s and 1980s, selling and distributing millions of books, pamphlets and other political media on the variety of conspirators plotting America's downfall. Historical

conspiracies about the Illuminati and the Freemasons were synthesized with anti-Semitic conspiracies and newer anti-globalist narratives about the Trilateral Commission, forming what John Birch Society Robert Welch called the "conspiratorial view of history". This conspiratorial *weltanschauung* also came to influence a budding extremist subculture connected by white supremacism, anti-Semitism and anti-government ideology. By the mid-1980s, the violent groups and activists shaped by these ideas would announce their presence on the national stage through their use of political violence against the individuals and state representatives composing the entity they named "ZOG" – "Zionist Occupied Government".

The first section will focus on developments on the American Right between 1965 and 1985, focusing especially on the New Right and its role in the evolution of right-wing ideology and media in the 1960s and 1970s. The second section will look at the far-right insurgent campaigns that won the support of the New Right *and* the far-right movements concentrated around the Birch Society and Liberty Lobby. The third section follows the continued development of the "two pillars" of anti-globalism, the John Birch Society and Liberty Lobby. During this period, references to internationalism were replaced by globalism/NWO, and the nature of the "conspiracy" evolved from doctrinaire anti-Communism and nativist conspiracism to a more complex critique of groups like the Trilateral Commission and the Council on Foreign Relations. This section will also examine the writings and political connections of Gary Allen, and Col. Archibald Roberts, two prominent anti-globalist ideologues who contributed to the development of anti-globalist ideology through their careers as authors, public speakers, and political organizers on the American far-right. The fourth section will explore the birth of a violent anti-government radicalism in the American heartland in the early 1980s. Although this movement would not reach its peak influence until the 1990s, this section will explore the ideological origins of the militia movement and the convergence between Klansmen, Neo-Nazis, religious extremists and others around anti-globalist themes of a 'Zionist-Occupied Government'.

From Goldwater to Reagan: The New Right and the Conservative Counter-Revolution

Earlier histories of post-war American conservatism typically emphasized the role played by the 'Great Men' who served as political and intellectual leaders of the American Right in the post-war era. The narrative generally goes as follows: William F Buckley inaugurated the American conservative movement in 1955 with the founding of *National Review.* The movement which

emerged around *National Review* in the late 1950s and early 1960s represented a 'fusionist' alliance of traditionalists, libertarians, and anti-Communists. These forces rallied behind Barry Goldwater's candidacy in 1964, but the movement had not yet matured, and the New Deal coalition held together for Lyndon Johnson. Goldwater's defeat was, for the movement, an early loss in a longer-term war. Nixon won in 1968 by running a conservative campaign, but he governed as a moderate. This earned the ire of the right-wingers who cut their teeth in the Goldwater campaign. They saw Nixon's big government policies and internationalist overtures to Red China as evidence of his liberalism. After a premature candidacy in 1976, Ronald Reagan took his rightful place as the leader of the conservative movement in the late 1970s and won the 1980 and 1984 presidential elections in successive landslide victories. Reagan's inauguration marked the ascendance of Conservatism to the mountaintop, demonstrating conservatism's maturation into a credible political movement and coherent ideological alternative to Great Society liberalism.[181]

More recent histories of the American Right have improved on the 'Great Man' narrative in which Buckley, Goldwater and Reagan feature prominently. These accounts, published by a generation immersed more in the new social history than old political history, emphasize the role of conservative media, grassroots organizations, less prominent figures like Phyllis Schlafly and Jesse Helms, and a broad strategic imperative to win Southern whites and suburban ethnics to conservatism through race-based appeals around issues of busing, affirmative action and crime.[182] Despite the importance of major figures like Reagan and Buckley, it was the *social movement politics* practiced by the bevy of 'New Right' activists during the 1960s and 1970s which provided the context in which far-right populist themes could flourish.

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[181] The leading conservative hagiographies are William Rusher. *The Rise of the Right*. National Review Publications, 1984; Lee Edwards. *The Conservative Movement: The Movement That Remade America*. New York: Simon & Schuster, 1999.

[182] Some of the leading histories of American conservatism to emphasize the importance of right-wing social movement politics and less-prominent right-wing leaders include Kevin Kruse. *White Flight: Atlanta and the Making of Modern Conservatism*. Princeton University Press, 2005; Ronald Formisano. *Boston against Busing: Race, Class, and Ethnicity in the 1960s and 1970s*. University of North Carolina Press, 1991; Dan Carter. *From George Wallace to Newt Gingrich: Race in the Conservative Counterrevolution, 1963–1994*. LSU Press, 1996; Matthew Lassiter. *The Silent Majority: Suburban Politics in the Sunbelt South*. Princeton University Press, 2006; Elizabeth Tandy Shermer. *Sunbelt Capitalism: Phoenix and the Transformation of American Politics*. University of Pennsylvania Press, 2013; Lisa McGirr. *Suburban Warriors: The Origins of the New American Right*. Princeton University Press, 2001.

Anti-globalist organizations like Liberty Lobby and the John Birch Society did engage in electoral politics, often distributing books critical of Democrats in the leadup to elections and endorsing candidates. But their primary activity was in the burgeoning landscape of conservative media, where ideological barriers between the center and far-right were low and where technical skill in administering direct-mail operations allowed right-wing publishers like Willis Carto to propagate his ideas while raising money to fund future efforts. It was in these areas that the interests of far-right groups like the John Birch Society and Liberty Lobby converged with conservative 'New Right' activists, finding common ground through the shared language (and ambiguity) of right-wing populism. Despite fundamental ideological differences between the two groups, New Right media activists and anti-globalist ideologues played the same game: political propaganda through direct-mail fundraising and constructing the populistic image of a liberal elite in the minds of conservative readers and listeners. In doing so, and through their participation in more direct political activities, these actors collectively participation in what Schlozman and Rosenfeld describe as "institutionally opportunistic mobilization of resentment."[183] Following this account and other recent synthetic histories of the Right, I argue that the 1960s and 1970s were crucial periods of institutional, organizational and ideological development for the different factions, tendencies, and ideologies composing the 'Long New Right'.

Barry Goldwater's landslide defeat in 1964 played a key role in the long-term institutionalization of American conservatism. His campaign was the first by a self-identified conservative in the post-war era, and those who gave their time, energy, and money to the Goldwater campaign did not rest on their laurels after he lost in November 1964. Paul Gottfried and Thomas Fleming, two prominent right-wing intellectuals associated with the 'paleoconservative' tradition that will be discussed in the following chapter, said in their 1988 history of American conservatism:

> "The 1964 presidential race created a wave of conservative political activism that continued to grow and shows no signs of receding. Coextensively with this, conservative foundations that dealt with policy questions and electoral strategies were launched. Yet, two characteristics of what has been termed "second-generation, postwar conservatism' were its lack of a philosophic (and certainly

[183] Schlozman and Rosenfeld. *Long New Right*, 3.

> traditionalist) focus and its willingness to compromise (without admitting it) with a leftward-drifting public opinion."[184]

Like Schlozman and Rosenfeld, Gottfried and Fleming argue that the New Right's early history is defined by the actions taken by successive generations of activists. The first generation were the intellectuals and publicists whose scholarly books on conservatism and publications *created* fusionist conservatism, forging it from the ideological tumult of post-war American Right. By the late 1960s, however, the great tomes of the conservative canon had already been written. The second generation imbibed these texts in their early years but abandoned the earlier "philosophic… focus", focusing instead on spreading conservative ideology beyond the world of books and scholastic arguments. By abandoning high theory for mass media, they were able to engineer a broad shift to right-wing populism within the Republican Party and across the broader American Right.

The New Right, Direct Mail, and the Marketing of Right-wing Populism in the 1970s

This study historicizes the post-war American Right, in both its extremist and moderate manifestations, through the lens of Schlozman and Rosenfeld's "Long New Right.".[185] Their framework adopts the term 'New Right', which was initially popularized in the 1970s to describe what was, in fact, the second generation of the 'Long New Right'. While I start from the understanding that the Long New Right is composed of multiple successive generations of right-wing activists, I use the term 'New Right' in this chapter to refer specifically to *the second generation of New Right ideologues the institutional apparatus they built, and the ideological shift in American conservatism that they engineered*. The main New Rightists I focus on are Richard Viguerie, Paul Weyrich, and William Rusher.

The New Right was a multifaceted phenomenon, and scholarly accounts have attempted to grasp the complex array of movements, leaders, ideas, and organizations that constituted the New Right in the 1970s and 1980s. Researchers associated with the liberal watchdog group Political Research Associates defined the 'New Right' of the 1970s and 1980s as an "interlocking

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[184] Paul Gottfried and Thomas Fleming. *The Conservative Movement*. Twayne Publishers, 1988. 31.
[185] For critical accounts of the New Right, see Russ Bellant, *The Coors Connection,* Alan Crawford's *Thunder on the Right*. For sympathetic accounts, see Richard Viguerie's *The New Right: We're Ready to Lead* and Robert Whitaker's *The New Right Papers*.

network" of right-wing political organizations working on a variety of political issues, largely in opposition to "liberal" policies like busing, abortion, homosexuality, pornography, and other "wedge" issues. These critical accounts argue that, "[t]he New Right feeds on discontent, anger, insecurity, and resentment, and flourishes on backlash politics... the New Right network supports whoever shares its desire for radical political change and its resentments of the status quo. As such, the New Right is anything but conservative."[186]

The notion of an "interlocking network" captures the complex and multi-pronged institutional landscape constituting the American New Right in the 1970s and 1980s. Most of the major organizations shaping Republican policymaking today - including the Heritage Foundation, the Council on National Policy, the Federalist Society, and the Conservative Caucus - emerged in this period. The New Right was, fundamentally, a political movement to make American conservative. It would achieve its immediate goal of electing a conservative President in 1980, and Reagan helped incorporate the radical right-wing populist style characteristic of the New Right into the worldview of the Republican Party. To achieve that goal, the New Right's leaders did more than just change the way they talked about politics in a way that distinguished it from the early generation of right-wing activists operating in the 1950s and 1960s.. They built a sophisticated organizational nexus of organic activism, big-donor funding, top-down strategizing, and mass-mediated ideologizing. In doing so, they were able to engineer a long-term rightward shift in American political discourse. Berlet and Lyons write in *Right-Wing Populism in America*:

> "Right-wing populism experienced a dramatic resurgence in the 1970s and 1980s. Building on earlier ultraconservative themes, a 'New Right' coalition of political strategists, corporate backers, and grassroots supporters transformed the political climate. New Right political themes and organizational support helped elect Ronald Reagan to the White House in 1980 and 1984. Although President Reagan disappointed ultraconservative hopes on some issues, he skillfully used populist rhetoric to advance policies that primarily benefited wealthy elites."[187]

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[186] Crawford, Thunder on the Right. Quote cited from beginning of Bellant's *Coors Connection*.
[187] Berlet & Lyons. *Right-Wing Populism in America*. 214.

Berlet and Lyons favorably cite Hardisty's 1999 book *Mobilizing Resentment*, a critical scholarly assessment of the "conservative resurgence" of the late 20th century. She listed:

> "[T]he confluence of several favorable historical factors assisted the success of the Right: a conservative religious revitalization, the approach of the year 2000 and apocalyptic millennialism, redistribution and economic contraction and restructuring, race resentment and bigotry, backlash and social stress, and a well-funded network of right-wing organizations."[188]

Beyond this broader context and world, the 'New Right' was defined by the movement leaders who emerged from the Goldwater years. Richard Viguerie, Paul Weyrich, William Rusher, Howard Phillips, and Terry Dolan are generally identified as the main figures in this generation of the 'New Right'. as the main figures. During the 1970s, this group started the Heritage Foundation, the American Conservative Union, and a number of other conservative institutions which persist to this day. The political project of the New Right (or 'Second Generation Conservatives', as some chose to call themselves) was laid out in several books published by its leading lights. *The New Right: We're Ready to Lead* was published by Viguerie in 1980 in the aftermath of Reagan's victory. A reviewer described it as "a somewhat premature hagiography-autobiography, this publication serves as both chronicle and enchiridion of the New Right movement."[189]

The leaders of the New Right were, first and foremost, institution-builders: Weyrich founded the Heritage Foundation, the American Legislative Exchange Council, and the Council for National Policy, three groups which continue to play structuring roles in the conservative movement today. These efforts at institution-building quickly bore fruit: "Weyrich and his staff had established themselves by the 1980s as the ideological center of social conservatism."[190] Unlike the intellectuals in the first generation, these New Rightists self-consciously adopted a combative and radical style. Paul Weyrich said in 1973: "We are different from previous generations of conservatives. We are radicals, working to overturn the present power structure."[191] While they

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[188] Jean Hardisty. *Mobilizing Resentment: Conservative Resurgence from the John Birch Society to the Promise Keepers*. Boston: Beacon Press, 1999. 2.
[189] Edward Curtis. Review: The New Right: We're Ready to Lead. *Journal of Church and State* 23:2 (1981): 364-365.
[190] Gottfried & Fleming. *The Conservative Movement.* 80.
[191] David Grann. "Robespierre Of The Right." *The New Republic*, October 27, 1997.

portrayed themselves as radicals seeking to tear everything down, New Rightist efforts at institution-building quickly bore fruit. Gottfried and Fleming observed that, "Weyrich and his staff had established themselves by the 1980s as the ideological center of social conservatism."[192]

These right-wing radicals also departed from their conservative predecessors in their approach to the ideological and communicative side of politics. Many of the prominent conservative intellectuals associated with the *National Review* and *Human Events* were more concerned with academic debates about the nature of conservatism than in communicating conservative arguments to a mass audience. While both types of groups were committed, on a fundamental level, to the propagation of conservative ideas and discourse, a useful distinction can be made between conservative organizations dedicated to the espousal of conservative political philosophy and those New Right groups concerned with promoting more simplistic right-wing arguments to the broader American public. Following Schmidt, the former ought to be understood as "coordinative" institutions focused on promoting sophisticated conservative ideas among a core of elite movement leaders, while the latter should be conceived of as "communicative" institutions seeking to shape public opinion. While the leaders of the New Right were certainly shaped by the conservative intellectual climate of the 1950s and 1960s, their ability to communicate those niche ideas to a mass audience through the communicative institutions they built distinguish them from their scholastic predecessors.

The forward of Viguerie's *Ready to Lead* book, written by Rev. Jerry Falwell, the leader of the emerging Religious Right and founder of the influential Moral Majority, illustrated the new ideological style that conservative radicals were pioneering in the 1970s. While I do not discuss Falwell, the Moral Majority, or the Religious Right in depth, all three played key roles in the history of the New Right. New Rightists were keen to focus on newly salient political-cultural issues like abortion and opposition to gay rights, using a right-wing Christian worldview to structure their opposition to "godless, liberal philosophies":

> It is now time for moral Americans to band together in a collective voice and make the difference in America by exerting an effort to make their feelings

[192] Gottfried & Fleming, 80.

> known. The godless minority of treacherous individuals who have been permitted to formulate national policy must now realize that they do not represent the majority. They must be made to see that moral Americans are a powerful group who will no longer permit them to destroy our country with their godless, liberal philosophies.[193]

The notion of a liberal conspiracy, led by a "minority of treacherous individuals" who seek to "destroy our country with their godless liberal philosophies" is common to both Old and New Right. Falwell's anti-liberalism had clear precedents in Carl McIntire and the radio-priests of the 1950s. What was distinctive about the Religious Right of the 1970s and 1980s was their emphasis on "values" and the politicized opposition to abortion, pornography and homosexuality. Old Rightists were ardent in their libertarianism and anti-Communism but had less to say about what Americans should do or believe in their private lives. For Viguerie and Falwell, "the backbone of our country [are] those citizens who are pro-family, pro-moral, pro-life, and pro-American, who have integrity and believe in hard work... America is built on faith in God, on integrity, and on hard work."[194]

In 1982, *National Review* publisher and New Right leader William Rusher[195] wrote that "direct-mail political promotion" was "absolutely critical – to the expansion of the conservative movement."[196] Rusher argued that traditional media institutions were inhospitable to conservative opinion and politics, and claimed that direct-mail "brilliantly [solved] the communication problem of the conservative movement[,]" by allowing it to bypass traditional media and speak directly to the American public. He described the reciprocal, long-term process by which direct-mail helped to popularize conservative politics: "Candidates and spokesmen for political causes must find, woo, and organize their constituencies; the constituencies must finance and vote for those causes and candidates."

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[193] Jerry Falwell. Introduction. in Richard Viguerie. *New Right: We're Ready to Lead*. Viguerie Co., 1982. 4.
[194] Ibid.
[195] Historian Geoffrey Kabaservice has argued that "We have Rusher, not Buckley, to thank for the populist, operationally sophisticated, and occasionally extremist elements that characterize the contemporary movement." See Geoffrey Kabaservice, "The Syndicate," *The New Republic*, August 27, 2012.
[196] Whitaker. *New Right Papers*. 10.

Viguerie wrote that "since the beginning of the conservative movement, the U.S. mail has been conservatives' principal method of communication."[197] Adopting a model developed by earlier conservative groups with whom he worked as a young man, Viguerie compiled a list of over four million Americans who had previously donated to conservative campaigns, organizations or signed up for conservative mailing lists. Viguerie's lists were rented to campaigns and organizations for fund-raising, granting The Viguerie Company a commission and any new names that might be gleaned from a campaign's own mailing list. In his book *America's Right Turn: How Conservatives Used New and Alternative Media to Take Power*, Vigeurie claimed that his "The Viguerie Company institutionalized ideological direct mail."[198]

Schlozman and Rosenfeld define the Long New Right by its right-wing opposition to Democratic liberalism *and* the willingness of its members to use any means available in the pursuit of political power. This led the movement to oscillate between embracing the Republican Party and rejecting it for a more radical third-party alternative in the pre-Reagan years.[199] Viguerie himself traced the inception of the New Right to August 1974, when Republican President Gerald Ford picked Nelson Rockefeller as his vice-presidential candidate. For Viguerie, that decision "revealed the true colors of so-called 'moderate' Republicanism by choosing the very symbol of everything we Conservatives had always opposed."[200] Rusher advocated for a new party in his 1975 book *The Making of the New Majority Party*, writing in a New York Times op-ed that:

> "conservative Republicans (broadly represented by Reagan) and conservative Democrats (most of whom have in the past supported [George] Wallace) – to join forces in a new majority party, designed to win both the presidency and Congress and replace the G.O.P. in toto as one of America's two major parties."[201]

Viguerie chose to support George Wallace's 1976 campaign for the Democratic presidential nomination rather than endorse Ford's campaign. Ultimately, the New Right's efforts to establish a conservative third party for the 1976 Presidential election were unsuccessful. During the following presidential election, however, the New Right found their man: Ronald Reagan.

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[197] Viguerie. *America's Right Turn.* 109.
[198] Ibid, 112.
[199] Schlozman and Rosenfeld. *Long New Right*. 15.
[200] Gottfried and Fleming. *The Conservative Movement.* 79.
[201] Robert McFadden. William Rusher, Champion of Conservatism, Dies at 87. *New York Times,* April 18, 2011. l

As early as the 1960s, Reagan was seen by fellow conservatives as a leader who stood a chance at winning the presidency. While he ultimately chose to stay in the Party, Reagan himself questioned whether the G.O.P could serve as the vehicle for conservatism. During the 1975 Conservative Political Action Conference, Reagan said:

> "I don't know about you, but I am impatient with those members of the Republican Party who, after the last election, couldn't wait to rush into print saying now that's proof that we must broaden the base for our party, when what they really meant was fuzz it up and blur even more the difference (cheers begin) between (over shouts) the two parties … (extended cheers, shouts, applause)…Our people look for a cause to believe in. Is a third party the need, or is a new and revitalized second party– raising a banner of no pale pastels, but bold colors which make it unmistakably clear where we stand on all the issues that trouble our people."[202]

In 1980, Reagan won the White House by taking 44 states to Jimmy Carter's 6. Only sixteen years prior, Lyndon Johnson beat Barry Goldwater by the same 44-6 margin.[203] In between these two elections, Richard Nixon won the White House twice as the Republican presidential candidate; in 1968 he won 32 states and in 1972 he won a shocking 49 states. These successful and (mostly) successive elections marked the collapse of the New Deal coalition and a fundamental restructuring of the American party system.[204] Nixon and Reagan's ability to win over disgruntled Southerners and northern ethnics, groups which had long been reliable members of the Democratic New Deal coalition, marked the end of a generation of Democratic dominance and the beginning of a new era in American politics.

In the interim period between these two elections, the radical right continued to fume against Republicans it saw as insufficiently conservative. Nixon was seen by conservatives as a liberal or moderate, and many right-wing groups supported the handful of third-party candidates who ran against Nixon. The following section will look at some of these insurgent campaigns that ran in

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[202] Daniel Preston Parker. *CPAC: The Origins and Role of The Conference in the Expansion and Consolidation of the Conservative Movement, 1974-1980*. Unpublished Dissertation, 2015. 137.
[203] However, Johnson won ~61% of the vote in 1964 to Reagan's 50.7% in 1980. Reagan increased his share of the overall vote to 58.8% in the 1984 presidential election, when he won 49 states.
[204] For historical commentary on the rise and fall of the New Deal coalition, see Fraser & Gerstle, *The Rise and Fall of the New Deal Order, 1930-1980*. Princeton University Press, 1989.

the late 1960s and early 1970s, highlighting the ways that they mobilized and organized the American far-right during the years before the Reagan Revolution.

Wallace, Schmitz, and the Far-Right Insurgency against Republican Conservatism

This section will briefly explore the presidential campaigns of George Wallace and John Schmitz in the 1968 and 1972 presidential elections. Wallace and Schmitz were among the most successful third-party candidates of the post-war era, winning greater shares of the presidential vote than any third-party candidate except Ross Perot. These candidates expressed anti-globalist sentiments themselves or received support from a variety of groups across the American Right, and their candidacies served as hubs for far-right political organizing during a period where conspiracism, nativism, and out-right racism were largely rejected by both major political parties.

George Wallace

Wallace won Alabama's gubernatorial election in 1962, running on a pro-segregation platform. He swore his oath of office at the same location that Confederate President Jefferson Davis was sworn in before the Civil War. In his inauguration speech he offered his infamous line: "Segregation now, segregation tomorrow, segregation forever." That line was authored by Wallace's speechwriter Asa Earl Carter, who had previously started a militant Klan group known as the Original Ku Klux Klan of the Confederacy. This group was responsible for a series of hate crimes during the late 1950s, including an assault on singer Nat King Cole in Birmingham, Alabama. Carter also produced a racist newsletter titled *The Southerner* during the 1950s.

Wallace ran for the Democratic nomination in 1964 on a pro-segregation platform, losing to Vice President Lyndon Johnson. After the 1964 election, Liberty Lobby's *Liberty Lowdown* newsletter observed that it was "too bad that Senator Goldwater did not run in the manner of Governor Wallace, who has proven that he knows how to get the votes of Northern wage earners... The G.O.P. must seek these votes and win them or die and lose our country to Communism."[205] Liberty Lobby also published a pro-Wallace pamphlet titled 'Stand Up For America', which went through multiple editions in the leadup to the 1968 election. Wallace ran again in 1968 as the candidate of the newly formed American Independent Party; in that election

[205] Donald Janson. Rightists Buoyed by the Election. *New York Times*, November 23, 1964.

he won the states of Alabama, Arkansas, Georgia, Louisiana, and Mississippi, and received a total of 9.9 million votes across the country.

Wallace's campaign received endorsements and support from the leading Birchers and figures associated with the 'Radio Right', including Dan Smoot, Billy James Hargis, Thomas Anderson, and Carl McIntire. While Robert Welch stated that the Society itself did not endorse Wallace's campaign, he acknowledged that many Society members had thrown their support between the Alabamian. Senior Birch Society leader Laurence E. Bunker was the Wallace campaign's Massachusetts chairman. He and several other Birch Society members also served as Wallace electors.[206] Liberty Lobby also threw its support behind Wallace during 1968, reprinting its pamphlet and mailing "175,000 copies to its subscribers and [printing] an additional 150,000 copies that were provided to the Wallace campaign for distribution."[207]

Wallace also received the endorsement of multiple Klan groups, primarily (but not exclusively) in the South. He also was praised by Gerald L K Smith, although Smith's influence had largely waned by the late 1960s. Epstein and Foster, two leading figures in the Anti-Defamation League and chroniclers of the mid-century radical right observed that these far-right groups used the Wallace campaign, "to advance their own propaganda and fill their own ranks and coffers... Wallace, "far from disavowing such support, has used such gatherings of hatemongers as forums[.]"[208]

While Wallace himself did not denounce the Birch Society or Lobby (and his campaign gladly accepted the support these groups and their supporters provided), he himself did not talk about internationalism or conspiracies. He was a critic of the influence of the Rockefellers and other tax-exempt foundations, but he eschewed anti-internationalist language and instead focused on mobilizing racist animus among primarily Southern voters. His populism was targeted at liberal bureaucrats, rather than internationalist conspirators.

Wallace campaigned on ending the Vietnam War within ninety days or withdrawing. He also criticized foreign aid and said that America's "European and Asian allies [ought to] pay more for

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[206] Anonymous author. George Wallace campaign coverage. *Kentucky Courier-Journal*, September 22, 1968. 75.
[207] Southern Poverty Law Center. *Profile of Willis Carto*. Found on the SPLC website on November 30, 2021: https://www.splcenter.org/fighting-hate/extremist-files/individual/willis-carto
[208] Anonymous, *Kentucky Courier-Journal*, September 22, 1968. 75.

their defense."[209] On the topic of the United Nations and foreign policy, the American Independent Party's 1968 platform stated that:

> "the road to peace lies through international cooperation and understanding... We will not abandon the United Nations Organization unless it first abandons us. It should be given fair opportunity at resolving international disputes; however, we will not subordinate the interest of our nation to the interest of any international organization."[210]

Wallace ran again for the Democratic Presidential nomination in 1972, aiming to face off against Nixon in the general election. Wallace won three state primaries before being shot on May 15 in an assassination attempt. Wallace survived but lost his ability to walk; he ultimately withdrew from the race. He ran again for the Democratic nomination in 1976 (this time with the support of Richard Viguerie and his Viguerie Company), but he ultimately withdrew from the race and endorsed Jimmy Carter. In a post-mortem campaign interview with the New York Times, Wallace stated that he was "satisfied" with his record despite four failed presidential campaigns, as "everybody is now saying what I started out saying back in 1964."[211] He won his fourth term as Alabama governor in 1982 and died in 1998.

Wallace's 1968 represented a seemingly contradictory ideological stance with a long history in the American South. He combined explicit racism with populistic attacks on the concentration of wealth. [212] He drew on a long history of Southern resentment toward a perceived alliance of liberal Yankees and blacks that traced back to Reconstruction. Analyses of Wallace's 1968 campaign found that, outside the Southern states that he won, Wallace was popular among blue collar 'ethnics' (generally second and third-generation immigrant groups) in and around Northern and Midwestern cities. His popularity among these voters foreshadowed a later turn by white suburban America toward the Republican Party oriented around opposition to the policies of busing and affirmative action, which sought to reduce racial inequality between blacks and whites. As Lipset and Raab noted in their 1971 classic *The Politics of Unreason*: "Racist or not,

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[209] William Kauffman. When the Left was Right. *The American Conservative*, May 2008.
[210] American Independent Party Platform of 1968. *American Presidency Project*. Found on the UCSB American Presidency Project website: https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/documents/american-independent-party-platform-1968
[211] B. Drummond Ayres Jr. Wallace at the End of a Long Trail. *New York Times*, June 7, 1976.
[212] Jack Newfield. *A Populist Manifesto: The Making of a New Majority.* New York: Praeger, 1972.

Wallace became the symbol of backlash heroism in Alabama, throughout the South, and – as he entered the Presidential campaign of 1968 – throughout the country."[213] Wallace's distinctive rhetorical appeals to the racial identity and economic interests of members of the white working class won him over nine million votes, making him the second-most successful third-party candidate in the 20th century.

John Schmitz

Schmitz was a right-wing Congressman and state legislator who represented the Bircher stronghold of Orange County, California. He served one term in the House of Representatives, from 1970 to 1972, after winning a special election for the seat of fellow right-winger and Bircher James B. Utt. Schmitz was one of a small number of Congressmembers who openly expressed anti-globalist sentiments, stating that the machinations of party elites, the Council on Foreign Relations and the United Nations would lead to "one-world socialist government".[214] Schmitz was also a strident critic of Nixon, saying to a journalist, "I didn't care that Nixon went to China, I was only upset that he came back."

Schmitz' criticism of Nixon came back to bite him when Nixon supported a moderate Republican, Andrew Hinshaw, in the 1972 Republican primary for Schmitz's seat. Hinshaw won and Schmitz responded by switching his affiliation from the Republicans to Wallace's American Independence Party. After Wallace phoned into the party convention and stated that he could not physically campaign, Schmitz won the nomination and had Thomas J. Anderson chosen as his Vice Presidential candidate. Schmitz ran to the right of Nixon, occupying a lane established by Ashbrook earlier in the primary process. A 1972 syndicated column by conservative journalist John Steinbacher expressed support for Schmitz. The piece, titled 'Who Will Vote for Schmitz', read:

> "Millions of people this year will cast their votes for John Schmitz and the American Party – Why? – Because they believe that this Nation has a destiny and that this Republic is too young to die... Because they are tired of seeing their taxes

[213] Seymour Martin Lipset and Earl Raab. *The Politics of Unreason: Right-Wing Extremism in America*. University of Chicago Press, 1970. 132.
[214] Brad Koplinksi. *Hats in the Ring: Conversations with Presidential Candidates*. New York: Presidential Publications, 2000.

> poured down foreign ratholes, with no evidence that the billions thus expended have bought us a single friend... For years they have complained that the other two parties did not represent them. In 1972 they will not have to cast their ballots for the so-called 'lesser of two evils.' "[215]

Steinbacher had close personal ties with Schmitz himself and the far-right more broadly. Steinbacher was a contributing editor to Liberty Lobby's racist *American Mercury* newsletter. He also served as the managing editor for *The National Editor*, a right-wing tabloid that had "consistently starred John Schmitz as its political hero" since its first issue in June 1969. Steinbacher worked with Warren G. Carroll, a legislative assistant to Schmitz, in running FACT RECORDS, a group that produced and distributed "political phonorecords."[216] He published two booklets in 1972, one titled *John Schmitz and the American Party* and the other *The Conspirators: Men Against God*.

Schmitz also drew on his close connections with both the Birch Society and Liberty Lobby for support. Schmitz and Anderson were both members of the Birch Society's National Council. Schmitz also wrote the introduction to Gary Allen's 1972 book *None Dare Call It Conspiracy* (*NDCIC*), which was the most influential conspiracist book of the 1970s. Schmitz' short introduction told readers that reading the book "may have the effect of changing your life... you will never look at national and world events in the same way again."[217] He went on to say that:

> "the people and organizations named in this book – whose plans are exposed in it – [will try to] blunt its effect by attacking it or the author. They have a tremendous vested interest in keeping you from discovering what they are doing. And they have the big guns of the mass media at their disposal to fire the barrages at *None Dare Call It Conspiracy*."[218]

Hinting at the communicative power of the Birch Society and Liberty Lobby networks, Schmitz said "there is nothing these people can do to stop a grass roots book distributing system."

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[215] John Steinbacher. Who Will Vote for Schmitz, *Kerrville Mountain Sun*, October 5 1972. Steinhauser's column was syndicated elsewhere.
[216] Anonymous. "ASSASSINATION AND THE STRANGE FRIENDS OF JOHN G. SCHMITZ", Historical essay posted online by the Blavatsky Foundation. Accessed on November 30, 2021: https://www.yumpu.com/en/document/view/5108810/assassination-and-the-strange-friends-of-john-g-blavatsky-
[217] Gary Allen. *None Dare Call It Conspiracy*. Western Islands Publishing, 1972.
[218] Ibid.

Beyond his membership in the Birch Society, Schmitz had appeared at a Liberty Lobby conference in 1967 and maintained correspondences with Willis Carto and Curtis Dall. Some of Schmitz's articles were reprinted in Liberty Lobby's *American Mercury* in the late 1970s, and his presidential campaign received favorable coverage in *Mercury* and other Lobby publications.[219] Willis Carto attended the 1972 convention of the American Party where Schmitz was nominated, and the convention saw the sale of a wide variety of conspiracist and anti-Semitic literature.[220]

The fact that Schmitz' campaign was backed by anti-Semitic conspiracists did not go unnoticed. After the American Party convention Schmitz and the party were denounced by the Anti-Defamation League. The ADL argued that Schmitz, the American Party, and the Birch Society were all "approving and distributing anti-Semitism." Schmitz responded to this criticism by publishing the ADL's letter (and his response) in the Congressional Record. The ADL's Arnold Forster also noted that Schmitz had published parts of *NDCIC* in the Congressional Record.[221]

With the support of the country's leading far-right groups, Schmitz campaigned across the country for the three months leading up to the election. Steinhauser's prediction that "millions" would vote for Schmitz was wrong: Schmitz received 1.1 million votes and 1.42% of the overall vote in the 1972 presidential election. Schmitz responded with his characteristic sense of humor, stating that he had "only missed the presidency by 40 million votes." It is extraordinary that an election in which where the Republican candidate won 49 states, over a million Americans – more than 1% of the overall electorate – chose to cast their votes for the candidate whose party explicitly stated that "the machinations of international finance" had brought the U.S. into Vietnam and other wars as part of a "centuries old drive toward world government."

While Wallace and Schmitz were ultimately unsuccessful, their marginal campaigns represented a vibrant and active right-wing tendency during the late 1960s and throughout the 1970s. The American Independent Party of 1968 and 1972 was, besides the Green and Libertarian parties, the only third party in the history of the post-war United States to receive more than a million votes. Both campaigns had the support of far-right groups, publications, and activists; their

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[219] Mintz, *Liberty Lobby*. 155.
[220] Anonymous. "Backed by Birchers: Anti-Semitism Stalks Again; Racist Presidential Candidate. *The Sentinel.* August 31 1972. 18.
[221] Ibid.

candidacies served as vessels for the hopes of these political actors, who believed that Wallace and Schmitz offered a right-wing alternative to the Republican Party.

There was a stylistic and ideological contrast between the Southern-style racism and populism of Wallace and Schmitz's Bircherite conspiracism. On one level, the two men and their worldviews represented the differing forces that composed the American Right at the time. Wallace was mobilizing racist backlash against the Civil Rights movement in the South, while Schmitz represented the right-wing conspiracism that was popular in the Western United States. The substantial differences on foreign policy found in the AIP Party Platforms of 1968 and 1972 illustrate where these worldviews diverged.

The 1968 AIP platform, discussed in the section on Wallace above, was generally supportive of involvement in international institutions and affairs. The 1972 platform, in contrast, brought together a wide variety of anti-globalist arguments and policy positions. It explicitly denounced internationalism and "entangling alliances", it demanded that the U.S. withdraw from the U.N., and it stated that the U.S. ought to gradually remove itself from international treaties. Significantly, it stated:

> "We further recognize that most of the wars to which America has been a party throughout the history as a nation, not excepting Vietnam, have resulted from the machinations of international finance in their centuries old drive toward world government."[222]

While the American Independent Party (which would be renamed the American Party after the 1972 election) would fade from relevance after Schmitz's loss, the 1968 and 1972 campaigns demonstrate the degree to which anti-globalist ideas and organizations had made inroads into the broader conservative movement during the era of the New Right. Moreover, they illustrate the way that the American far-right of the 1960s and 1970s was structured around and by the ideological and institutional worlds built up the Birch Society and Liberty Lobby. It is this world that the next section will explore.

[222] Mintz. *Liberty Lobby*. 156-157.

Anti-Internationalism to Anti-Globalism: The John Birch Society and Liberty Lobby as "Two Pillars" of the American Far-Right

By the late 1960s, the Liberty Lobby and John Birch Society formed the "two pillars of the conspiracist right."[223] Both served as network hubs for right-wing activists, with leaders Willis Carto and Robert Welch connecting writers, funders and activists. Each organization had a publishing arm, which allowed them to produce and distribute books and other ephemera for sale or distribution. Both groups cultivated ties with members of Congress, who legitimated the groups and allowed for the submission of their materials into the Congressional Record. In doing so, they developed into a new kind of political institution, less concerned with the practice of electoral or legislative politics than with the propagation of right-wing conspiracies and the mobilization of anti-establishment sentiment.

Liberty Lobby

Of all the individuals profiled in this dissertation, no one played a greater role in the development of anti-globalism from the 1960s to the 1980s than Willis Carto. Carto was the chief ideologue of anti-globalist populism in the late 20th century, and the Liberty Lobby was effectively an extension of his will. The Liberty Lobby apparatus played a number of roles on the American far-right, reflecting the multifaceted political strategy pursued by Carto. The complexity of Liberty Lobby's organizational structure and the simultaneous appeals to mainstream conservative legitimacy and far-right extremism was noted by contemporary observers. In a 1970 profile of Liberty Lobby, Washington Post staff writer Paul Valentine wrote of:

> Liberty Lobby activities range beyond direct lobbying and related supporting action. Through a complex of associations and interlocking directorates, it also helps raise campaign funds for conservative candidates, lends moral and political support to the white-controlled government of Rhodesia and backs a number of ultra-conservative publications. In all, the organizations and its leaders maintain a constant cry against "socialist do-gooders," "one-worlders", welfarism and other "liberal" phenomena that they say are dooming America to degeneration and

[223] Berlet and Lyons. *Right-wing Populism in America*. 14.

> defeat. Liberty Lobby is less vocal about a skein of racial and historical philosophy that undergirds some of the public positions taken by its top officials.[224]

To help distinguish between the differing aims and strategies of Liberty Lobby, the following subsections will distinguish between the forms of political action undertaken by Carto and the Liberty Lobby during the 1960s and 1970s.

Lobbying Congress and Connecting with the Republican Party

Liberty Lobby portrayed itself as actively involved in the political scene of Washington D.C., where it served its readers and supporters as a "pressure group for patriotism". Although the Lobby had little actual input in policymaking or influence beyond the halls of its office on 300 Independence Avenue, the group was remarkably successful at this task in the 1960s and 1970s. As early as 1958, Liberty Lobby was producing and distributing its *Liberty Ledger*, an analysis of voting behavior by members of Congress. The *Ledger* ranked members of Congress based on their conservatism. It would continue to appear in later Lobby publications after its time as a standalone publication ended. The first Lobby publication in which it would appear was the *Liberty Letter*.

The *Letter* debuted in 1961, starting with a small subscriber base of 2,000. A Congressional Report on political publications concerned with Congressional activity quoted a self-description offered by the Letter:

> ""Liberty Letter is the legislative newsletter of the Liberty Lobby, a registered lobby group representing a conservative viewpoint. Its purpose is to inform its readers concerning legislation in Congress and to urge them to write letters or supporting or opposing certain measures... Each issue contains a column entitled 'Legislative Outlook' giving the Liberty Lobby's opinions on the bills in Congress. Also included besides the editorial articles are news items concerning

[224] Paul Valentine. Liberty Lobby Does Right by Itself. *Washington Post*, November 15, 1970.

> conservative activities, and suggestions concerning books the readers might be interested in."[225]

Liberty Lobby representative Robert Bartell appeared before Congress as an expert a number of times during the 1960s and 1970s, presenting conservative testimony on political issues like segregation and welfare policy. His presence in Congress, and in the Congressional Record, gave legitimacy to Liberty Lobby's claim to represent its members and financial supporters as a conservative voice in Congress. Booklets containing the text of the Congressional Record were produced and sold by Liberty Lobby to readers in the late 1960s and early 1970s, establishing the legitimacy of Liberty Lobby by demonstrating its connection to the most mainstream of political institutions, the U.S. Congress.[226]

Liberty Lobby also cultivated relationships with conservative members of Congress. The 1960s saw a successful debut to a broader audience of conservative activists and donors. During Liberty Lobby's first National Board of Policy Convention in 1967, "over 300 delegates [attended]... Speakers included Representatives George V. Hansen (R-ID), James A. McClure PR-ID), John Rarick (D-LA), James B. Utt (R-CA), and California State Senator John G. Schmitz."[227] Beyond these figures, the Liberty Lobby hosted Representative (and current Senator) Chuck Grassley and (one-time Vice President) Richard Cheney during a 1977 Liberty Lobby event featuring evangelical pastors and emphasizing conservative "family values".[228]

Promoting Far-Right Ideology: From Yockeyism to Populism

Beyond his technical work as a propagandist, Carto is notable for his ideological contributions to the American Radical Right. Carto was deeply influenced by the neo-fascist philosopher Francis Parker Yockey's magnum opus: *Imperium*. The 600-page *Imperium* was written as by Yockey as a "sequel" to Oswald Spengler's *The Decline of The West*, combining Spengler's "organicist" account of civilizational rise and collapse with the anti-Semitic trope of Jews as "culture

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[225] Margaret Kellof and Paul Vassallo. Report: THE LEGISLATIVE SCENE; A DESCRIPTIVE LIST OF SELECTED NEWSLETTER, JOURNALS, AND OTHER PERIODICAL PUBLICATIONS COVERING CONGRESSIONAL ACTIVITIES. Congressional Reference Division, January 9, 1970.
[226] W.B. Hicks and Michael Jaffee. *Liberty Lobby Testimony Presented Before Congress: January 1- May 31, 1968*. Liberty Lobby booklet published in 1968.
[227] Sara Diamond. *Roads to Dominion: Right-Wing Movements and Political Power in the United States*. Guilford, 1995. 360.
[228] Liberty Lobby. *The Spotlight*, Aug 1977. 12.

distorters". Carto met Yockey in prison in 1960, shortly before Yockey's suicide. For the rest of his life, Carto would idealize Yockey and promote his fascistic tome as the foundational ideological text of the American far-right.

The influence of *Imperium* on Carto's political thinking was visible through his lifelong commitment to the propagation of Yockey's ideas through the organizational apparatus associated with Liberty Lobby. He reprinted the book under his California-based Noontide Press, advertising it in Liberty Lobby publications and promoting it as the foundational text of the 'Youth for George Wallace' organization and its various white supremacist successor groups. A 1978 article in the Lobby's *The American Mercury*, titled "Hitler – The Greatest Spenglerian", writes of the Fuhrer:

> "He was, first and foremost, a philosopher. But being a man of action he knew that thoughts and words are useless without the ability to act. He was acting – in a way few people could even understand – until he was cut down and destroyed by those who should have been his allies. The greatest tragedy in history, surely. Tragic not only for that misunderstood man who tried to save us from our own stupidity but mostly for us, as we experience what gives every evidence of being the final days of the West. Will a new leader arise in time to save us?"[229]

Carto integrated the anti-Semitic theories of Yockey into a language of American nationalist populism. Carto's populistic project was outlined in a series of historical articles in *The Spotlight*, profiling significant 'populist' figures in American history and helping to construct a linear narrative of American historical development in which the noble American populist system was stymied by collectivism from the Left and Jewish-led financial capitalism from the Right. The project was outlined in a *Spotlight* excerpt:

> "Background on Populism: Populism is America's authentic political heritage, a tradition which held sway from the founding of the United States until the 1930s. The SPOTLIGHT (Jan. 7-14) examined populism's essential points, which are: a nationalist, America First position in foreign relations; an awareness of the malignant nature of international high finance; a stand for producers, farmers and

[229] Willis Carto, The Greatest Spenglerian, *American Mercury*, 1977.

> workers over money-lenders and speculators; the realization that each race is different, and has the right to pursue its own destiny free from outside manipulation… Once each month this year, The SPOTLIGHT will present a Profile in Patriotism of an American leader in the grand populist tradition."[230]

Carto's populism echoed key tenets of the late 19th century Populist Party: a disdain for usurers and far-away rentiers and a sense of solidarity among the workers participating in the 'real', local economy. At the same time, Carto's anti-Semitism and white nationalism were snuck into the broader 'populist' project through coded references to 'international high finance' and the notion of (white) racial consciousness and destiny. The "stand for producers, farmers and workers" against "money-lenders and speculators" above and minority groups below constitutes what Lowndes, Berlet & Lyons have called "producerist" ideology; tracing the ideology's history in the 20th century, they observed: "In the 1920s industrial philosophy of Henry Ford, and Father Coughlin's fascist doctrine in the 1930s, producerism fused with antisemitic attacks against "parasitic" Jews."[231] Carto's particular incarnation of "producerism" was self-conscious in its use of euphemistic tropes and coded language to make its anti-Semitism palatable (or invisible) to the 'mainstream' conservatives not steeped in the language of anti-Semitic conspiracism. Understanding that the blatant anti-Semitism of Ford and Coughlin would limit his audience, Carto forged a new mode of "producerism" in which the Trilateral Commission came to represent the elite power apparatus fundamentally opposed to the interests of the American people. By the early 1980s, Carto and others on the American far-right were beginning to label these forces opposing the interests of the American people and nation as 'globalist'.

The details of Carto's populist political philosophy are on display in his 1982 book *Profiles in Populism*. Later reprinted as *Populism vs Plutocracy: The Universal Struggle*, Carto's book reprints the *Spotlight* series of historical profiles as chapters and includes a new introduction outlining the value of populism. On the first page, Carto writes:

> "Populism is the only social, economic and political system of philosophy and practical thinking which withstands the destructive and degenerative effects of

[230] Liberty Lobby. *The Spotlight,* May 5, 1980. 17.
[231] Berlet and Lyons. *Right-Wing Populism in America*. 139. See also Joseph Lowndes and Martinez HoSang, Daniel. *Producers, Parasites, Patriots: Race and the New Right-Wing Politics of Precarity*. University of Minnesota Press, 2019.

> modern, industrial society on the family, nation, race and culture. Populism is a force for stability, creating a tranquil society in which individual and cultural growth can occur without progress being threatened or exploited by alien forces promoting culture distortion. A stable society develops and thrives when populist principles are applied because of the primacy of the nation, culture, family, people and race in public policy is ensured; to the survival and growth of all of these, all other considerations are subordinate."[232]

The "alien forces promoting culture distortion" draws directly on Yockey's concept of the Jew as "culture distorter". Opposing the essential interests of the "nation, culture, family, people and race" to the external threats of culture distortion creates a coherent narrative, in which anti-Semitic conspiracism was wed to reactionary opposition to black radicalism and the Civil Rights Movement. Carto, in sections titled 'Racial Confusion' and 'Fairy Tale of Equality', posits a racial determinism in which "each race has both the right and duty to pursue its destiny, the populist says, free from worries any other race will interfere with another." Carto approvingly quotes from Wilmot Robertson's "The Dispossessed Majority", a white supremacist text published in 1972 which was advertised in Liberty Lobby publications. Carto quotes: "The racial dynamics of populism is unifying rather than divisive. It is the reformer appealing to the farmer and yeomanry of his race, rather than the political extremist whose own proposals for . . . reform are only one item in a large package of revolutionary change and racial and class agitation."[233] Such a narrative was familiar to consumers of radical right-wing media from the preceding decades, as conspiracy theories claimed Jewish subversion to be the driving force behind Communism, the Civil Rights Movement, pornography, drugs and other perceived threats to the traditional social order.

The centerpiece of Carto's populist ideology was to be found in its emphasis on 'internationalist' elites and the 'new world order'. In a section titled 'Nationalism vs. Internationalism', Carto writes: "One purpose of *Profiles in Populism* is to expose the Establishment's false liberal-conservative dichotomy and focus the attention of political thinkers on the most significant issue in America today: nationalism vs internationalism. – The clash between American tradition –

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[232] Willis Carto. Populism vs. Plutocracy. Western Island Publishing, 1982. 14.
[233] Ibid, 101.

expressed politically and culturally as populism – and the false, mattoidal liberal-conservative 'new world order' is easily illustrated. The most important precept in American populism is the emphasis on the nation. This expresses itself in strong nationalism, a foreign policy which would place the interests of the United States ahead of those of any and every other nation."[234]

For Carto, nationalism and populism are inextricably linked; both are threatened by 'internationalism' and 'new world order' plotters. The following section, titled 'SHADOWY ELITE TO RULE', details the conspiracy:

> "The 'new world order' favored by liberals openly, and by the 'conservatives' often unknowingly but self-evidently, is internationalist. Its real purpose is to establish a global government secretly controlled by a financial elite. Sovereign nations will have no place in the 'new world order', although the fiction of borders and nominal independence will be preserved for the time being to lull people into believing their nations are still sovereign, while international finance rules. Late 20th-century "conservatism," meanwhile, accepts the internationalist premise of the "new world order." "Conservatives" may prefer to go on "anti-communist" crusades overseas (as opposed to internationalist liberals, who prefer foreign aid giveaways and other boondoggles), but the result is the same: internationalism, American commitments overseas, needless foreign alliances and intervention in foreign disputes which are of no concern to the people of the U.S."[235]

Carto's articulation of the anti-globalist worldview in this section is novel in several ways. First, it moves beyond the anti-internationalism of the 1950s, in which 'internationalism' was only part of a broader Communist conspiracy. For Dan Smoot, Clarence Manion, and other 'Americanist' anti-internationalists of the 1950s and 1960s, 'internationalism' was only part of a broader Soviet plot for world domination. In the 1950s, the dichotomy between Soviet Communism and American Capitalism united all of the American Right. For Carto and others in the 1980s, the 'globalist' apparatus of the Trilateral Commission, the Bilderbergers, and the Council on Foreign Relations had become an even greater threat than the Soviets. In fact, Carto sees capitalism ("as

[234] Ibid, 59.
[235] Ibid, 22.

distinguished from free enterprise") as part of the problem. Carto goes into greater detail when he writes:

> "The assault of internationalism upon our country is total in nature and aims at nothing less than the complete annihilation of our political system, our culture and even all interpersonal relationships. This regressive aim is put forward as great progress but the end goal is to structure all society as a beehive, with all equal bees carefully tended by omnipotent financiers or commissars who gather the honey. Some call it communism – a society of two classes – the very rich and the slaves. Others call it capitalism. Both are correct."[236]

Carto's mutual condemnation of communism & capitalism also sets him apart from the earlier generation of anti-internationalist Americanists. In his account, shared by Birch Society-associated conspiracists like Gary Allen, both systems were elite-led systems in which internationalist plotters would accumulate power and wealth at the expense of the distracted majority. It was this shift in emphasis, in which the conflict between capitalism and communism were a mere diversion within a broader 'globalist' conspiracy that distinguished Carto and other anti-globalists from their vehemently anti-Communist predecessors.

The Spotlight and the Liberty Lobby Newsletter Network

Carto's most substantial contribution to the establishment of anti-globalism as a distinctive ideological force on the right was in the publication of *The Spotlight*. First published in 1975, it became the centerpiece of Carto's propaganda efforts during the upcoming decades. It reported on the news from a conspiracy-minded perspective, denouncing the Establishment and the Trilateral Commission and reporting on political events from a right-wing perspective. It also featured advertisements for the same conspiracy-minded audience, selling gold and silver coins, unorthodox medicines and supplements, survival gear and a broad array of right-wing books. Revenue from advertisements and sales of books and materials printed by the Lobby's Noontide Press helped to fund Liberty Lobby's operations, which included a full staff to assist in the distribution of direct-mail materials and the collection and accounting of funds received by

[236] Ibid, 6.

sympathetic donors. *The Spotlight*, which had 310,000 subscriptions at its peak in 1983, provided Carto with a significant audience and platform.[237]

Thematically, *The Spotlight* focused on the internationalist conspiracy, embodied in the Trilateral Commission and its founder, David Rockefeller. The aims of the Trilateral Commission were nothing less than the subversion of America and the foundation of a one-world government. These themes were expressed in The Spotlight's predecessor, "Liberty Line", frequently contained writing by Liberty Lobby financial backer and supporter Curtis Dall.[238] One headline, from 1978, is typical:

> "In these days, our foreign-controlled Press is loaded down with self-serving Internationalist propaganda! …. The U.S. is friendly to all people – even the hostile Soviets (spawned and covertly run by the same International Forces that are working hard to tear us down from the outside, and to finance numerous Revolutionary Groups inside our borders! It is time to clean house! Is not a good America more desirable than a desolate, rubble-strewn "One World"?[239]

Another 1978 *Spotlight* article, titled "'One-World' Hucksters Selling Wares in Washington", discussed a meeting of the World Future Society in which "global government was promoted, as usual, as the means to survival and prosperity". The author, Lobby correspondent James P. Tucker Jr., claimed that futurists group was "one of numerous organizations promoted by the Trilateral-Bilderberg-Council on Foreign Relations axis. Its role, like several others, is to condition the public mind to accept the inevitability of reducing the United States to the role of province in a global government."

In its early years, *The Spotlight* was notable for alleging Trilateral connections to President Jimmy Carter. One article, titled *Carter Moves Toward World Rule*, read: "According to this distinguished reporter, America's problems are going to be dumped in the lap of the receive that has taken over bankrupt Britain, the European Economic Community. With America's entry, it

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[237] Mintz. *Liberty Lobby*. 90.
[238] Dall stated his views in his autobiography: ""I have depicted the "Goliath," here, and I have fashioned "A Stone for Goliath," as it were...Behold it: the Federal Reserve Board with its shadowy new international counterparts, the Council on Foreign Relations (CFR), Prince Bernhard's farflung Bilderberg Group and lastly their discredited stooge, the self-described United Nations." Curtis Dall. *F.D.R.: My Exploited Father-in-Law*. Christian Crusade Publications, 1967.
[239] Curtis Dall, *Liberty Line*, January 1978. LWA, LL, 200, LL, Box 4, Folder 2.

will be known as the Atlantic Economic Community. Sound familiar? It should, because it has been the aim of the internationalists and the one-worlders for decades."[240] Other articles promoted a rumor that Carter was connected to drug traffickers or alleged that he had been "picked" by Trilaterals to rule as a false conservative.[241] Other articles, published in the leadup to the 1980 election, attacked candidate George H.W. Bush for his membership in the Trilateral Commission; one article claimed that a "Bush-pusher", Bill Taylor, was running for the Florida Republican Party National Committee leader position as part of a "Rockefeller plot to steal the nominating convention in Detroit" from Ronald Reagan.[242]

Beyond attacks on Trilaterals and other globalist forces, *The Spotlight* advertised a variety of far-right books and organizations. In a review of anti-Semitic conspiracist Des Griffin's pseudonymously published "The Fourth Reich of the Rich: The Missing Dimension in World Affairs", Carto (publishing under his own pseudonym of E.L. Anderson, PhD) neglects to mention that Griffin's work posits traces a historical conspiracy from the late 18th century Illuminati to contemporary "international Jews". The book is reviewed positively, although Carto bemoans Griffin's pessimism about the possibility of turning back the tide against the forces of international Judaism. The book is advertised as for sale by Liberty Lobby at the bottom of the *Spotlight* page featuring the review. The advert features the words "YOU MUST READ" written across a drawing of barbed wire, with the following description:

> "In these critical days it is VITALLY IMPORTANT that YOU be not only a "watcher" of world events but one who really UNDERSTANDS what is happening on the international scene… the author takes the lid off world affairs and gives the reader a startling "behind-the-scenes" look at what is really taking place."[243]

Race science was also advertised in *The Spotlight*. One advertisement read "For Scholars Only! Two significant works on race science".[244] One book, *Race and Modern Science,* was written by white supremacist Robert Kuttner. The other, *Race,* was published by Professor John R. Baker.

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[240] The Spotlight, Carter Moves Toward World Rule, April 4, 1977. 4. LWA, LL, 212.5, Spotlight, Box 2.
[241] Ibid.
[242] The Spotlight, May 12, 1980. 2. LWA, LL, 212.5, Spotlight, Box 6, Folder 2.
[243] Ibid.
[244] Ibid.

Baker's work, originally published by Oxford University Press before Liberty Lobby's reprint, was criticized for its racist and debunked claims about the origins of black peoples.

Beyond the central role played by Liberty Lobby in the development of anti-globalist populist ideology in the 1970s and 1980s, the activities and successes of Liberty Lobby itself are worth exploring. Liberty Lobby, along with the Birch Society, formed the "two pillars of the conspiracist right." They developed into a new kind of political institution, less concerned with the practice of electoral or legislative politics than with the propagation of extremist ideas through the language of *discursive institutions* primarily concerned with the propagation of radical rightwing ideology belies the complex role they played. With his flagship publications, Carto was able to unite disparate ideological trends on the American Radical Right and synthesize them within the broader ideology of anti-globalism.

John Birch Society

In the late 1960s, the John Birch Society began to promote a worldview described by founder Robert Welch called the "conspiratorial view of history". Earlier in the decade, the Society was criticized by William F. Buckley in *National Review:* Buckley argued that Robert Welch's claims that President Eisenhower was a Communist dupe were "damaging the conservative movement."[245] Following a decline in membership and national prominence after 1964, Welch's views on the communist conspiracy evolved. He began to trace the roots of the Communist conspiracy even earlier in history, back to Adam Weishaupt and the late 18th century Bavarian Illuminati. The conspirators, which Welch called "The Insiders" would go on to use Communism as their means to power.

Stewart helpfully traced the broad strokes of the "conspiratorial view of history" in his analysis of the Bircher conspiracy worldview:

> "Here are highlights of two centuries of continuous, unabated scheming by the Insiders that Welch and his followers exposed in their exhaustive and continuing study of the master conspiracy. In 1789, the Insiders planned and precipitated the French Revolution. When the revolution failed by 1795 "to set off a continent-wide social conflagration, as the Illuminate and similar groups had hoped and

[245] Mary Brennan. *Turning Right in the Sixties: The Conservative Capture of the GOP*. UNC Press, 1995. 142.

> planned," the Illuminate observed more closely than ever Weishaupt's "instruction that the very existence of the order should be denied and kept secret at all costs."
>
> In the early 1800s, Insiders used U.S. Supreme Court Justice John Marshall and the Supreme Court to grant the federal government unlimited "implied powers." In the 1840s, the Insiders instigated numerous uprisings in Europe to overthrow existing governments because the French Revolution had failed to spark the conflagration they had plotted. In 1848, the master conspiracy issued its first Declaration of Purposes, the Communist Manifesto, under the name of Communism and authorship of Karl Marx. Welch claimed the communist movement was merely a "tool of the total conspiracy." It was not an ideology but a "plan of action" to help bring about one-world government under control of the Insiders."[246]

As time went on, The John Birch Society's ideological shift from a more simplistic anti-Communism to a broader conspiratorial worldview spanning the Illuminati, Freemasons, Marx and his disciples, and, most recently, internationalists in the Trilateral Commission and Council on Foreign Relations. Bircher publications like *American Opinion*, founded by Welch in 1956 as *One Man's Opinion*, and *The Review of the News* presented political news in a highly partisan format.

By the late 1960s and early 1970s, Bircher-sponsored conspiracists like Gary Allen and William P. Hoar had appeared on the Radical Right scene. These men, along with some of the others highlighted in the following section, played a major role in the shift away from banal anti-Communism to a more complex conspiracist worldview. This anti-globalist worldview focused primarily on the Trilateral Commission and Bilderbergers as the new villains of the Conspiracy. The leading proponent of these views was Birch Society author Gary Allen.

Gary Allen

[246] Charles Stewart. "The Master Conspiracy of the John Birch Society: From Communism to the New World Order." *Western Journal of Communication* 6:4(2002): 424-447.

Gary Allen, in an interview published in 1980 by the Birch Society's *Review of the News*, explained how the internationalist backers of the Trilateral Commission aimed toward the same goal as the Soviets:

> "The great international bankers and industrialists do not favor competition. What they favor is the formation of cartels and monopolies to control world finance, markets, and natural resources. The Communists, led by the Soviet Union, have basically identical goals on the level of world power. What is more natural than for the Western monopolists to divvy up these spheres of influence with the Communist monopolists of the East?"[247]

Gary Allen had a remarkable, if short-lived, career on the anti-globalist Right. Born in California in 1936, Allen became associated with the John Birch Society in the early 1960s. He served as a speechwriter for George Wallace's 1968 presidential campaign and was a defender of Wallace's populist rhetoric in his own writings. Allen was a regular contributor to the Birch Society's *American Opinion*, as well as a contributing editor to Richard Viguerie's *Conservative Digest*. Allen travelled the country as a lecturer, speaking on the Rockefellers, the Council on Foreign Relations and their role in the Insider Conspiracy. His speeches typically organized by local chapters of the John Birch Society, with one contemporary article noting that Allen would be autographing copies of his books at an *American Opinion* bookstore prior to his lecture.[248] Allen published nine books in his lifetime, mostly with the Birch Society's *Western Islands Press* (as well as his own *'76 Press*). His death in 1985 was followed by the posthumous publication of his final work, *Say "No!" to the New World Order.* His most influential book, however, was his 1972 work *None Dare Call It Conspiracy (NDCIC).*

NDCIC was inspired by John Stormer's 1963 book, *None Dare Call It Treason*.[249] Seeing the influence that Stormer's work had in the conservative movement supporting Barry Goldwater in

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[247] The John Birch Society. "Popular Historian Gary Allen: An Exclusive Interview With The Leading Authority on Trilateralism," *Review of the News*, 48. Feb 27, 1980.

[248] One announcement of an Allen stump speech can be seen in Troy, New York's *Times Record.* A short notice for an Allen speech can be seen on February 1, 1977, page 27.

[249] Allen, in a 1983 article in the Birch Soceity's *American Opinion*, wrote: "We had visions of None Dare Call it Conspiracy becoming another None Dare Call It Treason, the 1964 political classic by John Stormer whose title had served as a model for our own. Stormer had piggy-backed the Goldwater campaign for a sale of sixteen million books. We saw this as the potential size of our market, looking on the George Wallace campaign as our versions of the Goldwater effort. For all his limitations, the Alabama governor was a powerfully appealing anti-Establishment

the 1964 Presidential election, Allen and his political allies wanted his writing to shape the debate, and help the conservative cause, around the 1972 Presidential election. In his 1971 books *Nixon's Palace Guard* and *Richard Nixon: The Man Behind the Mask,* Allen attacked Nixon as a power-hungry pseudo-conservative who had led the Republican Party into the jaws of the Rockefeller conspiracy. In *NDCIC,* published less than a year before the 1972 election, he wrote, "In 1972, the Republicans will try to make you forget that Richard Nixon was elected on George Wallace's platform but has been carrying out Hubert Humphrey's."[250] Allen threw his support behind John Ashbrook. One contemporary article, published in the Long Beach Independent on June 5, 1972, indicates the ways that Allen and his allies sought to shape the election. The article quotes Allen, as stating that "100,000 copies of the book were being mailed to the Republican Party's key financial contributors in West and Southwestern states."[251] The article continued: "Allen refused to discuss the sources or amounts of funding for what he described as a plan to 'saturate the country' with copies of the book before the November election… Allen said "120,000 copies were sent from Seal Beach to New Hampshire by truck, then mailed to voters under a Manchester postmark."[252] Despite his longstanding association with the Birch Society as a contributor to *American Opinion,* Allen denied allegations that the Birch Society was backing the book or helping to distribute it.

One obituary for Allen, published in the Los Angeles Times after his death in 1985, featured a quote from his *Conservative Digest* colleague W. Scott Stanley. Stanley said of Allen: "He was the great popularizer of the conservative cause… a pioneer in putting the right message together with the right tool."[253] Beyond his prolific output as a writer and speaker Allen was highly effective at finding the 'right tools' to spread his anti-globalist message.[254] Allen produced film-strips and cassette tapes of his books and speeches in order to further spread his anti-globalist message. The utility of such tools is explained by Allen: "It is available on tape cassettes so that

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candidate, and we had just the anti-Establishment book which we hoped to make the intellectual sword of a crusade to dislodge the Rockydems and Rockypubs."

[250] Allen. *None Dare Call It Conspiracy*. Chapter 8.

[251] Anonymous. Book Charges Nixon Tool of Leftist Bankers. *Independent of Long Beach*, June 5, 1972.

[252] Ibid.

[253] Anonymous. Gary Allen, 50, Conservative Author, Dies : Spread Messages by Mail-Order Books, Cassettes, Film Strips. *Los Angeles Times*, December 1, 1986.

you can virtually memorize its content by listening to it repeatedly while you are washing the dishes or driving to and from work.””[255]

Like other anti-globalists and Radical Rightists, Allen's message was amplified by the propagandistic tools provided by the John Birch Society. Advertisements promoting *None Dare Call It Conspiracy* were bought in local newspapers and local articles frequently described his theories of Rockefeller takeover with little critical around the country and copies were widely available in American Opinion bookstores. The book quickly became a key text in the 'conspiracist canon'. In an interview, Allen said: "In compiling None Dare Call It Conspiracy, we meant it to be the best of twenty books condensed into one. Many still consider it the best conspiracy primer for neophytes."[256]

Allen stands as a unique figure in the anti-globalist movement. He died just as the 'New World Order' conspiracy theory began to have broader influence beyond the Bircherite Right, with religious conservatives and militia-members alike adopting anti-globalist 'New World Order' narratives pioneered by Allen. His books, *None Dare Call it Conspiracy* in particular, were widely read and circulated by Birch Society publications to a broadly Republican audience. He straddled the line between the populist New Right and the extreme Radical Right, writing for both Viguerie's *Conservative Digest* and the Bircher *American Opinion*. His work avoided anti-Semitism, focusing more on the Trilateral Commission and the historical "Insiders" groups described by Robert Welch.

Archibald Roberts

One of the more prominent (and consistent) anti-globalists during this period was the retired Army colonel, Archibald Roberts. Roberts came to national prominence for his involvement in the "Pro-Blue" scandal of 1961, in which it was revealed that General Edwin Walker had disseminated Birch Society materials to U.S. troops stationed in Germany as part of a 'Troop Information' program. Roberts, like Walker, was forced out of the Army for his political activities; he followed in Walker's footsteps to a position of prominence on the anti-Communist Right.

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[255] Allen, *None Dare Call it Conspiracy*. 120.
[256] John Birch Society. *Allen Interview*.

As DeRosa observed: "Now linked to the John Birch Society, the controversial Pro-Blue program afforded Roberts a second career on the anticommunist lecture circuit."[257] After his dismissal from the Army, Roberts would go on to establish the Committee to Restore the Constitution (CRC) in 1965. The CRC would serve as an organizational hub for Roberts' lifelong efforts to "educate" the American public and stimulate political action in the name of saving the American republic from the dual threats of Communism and one-world government. Roberts also led an organization called the Foundation for Education, Scholarship, Patriotism, and Americanism, Inc., which was advertised in the *Bulletin* as a tax-free way that patriotic Americans might support the educational and organizational aims of the CRC. Beyond his output in the CRC Bulletin, Roberts wrote several books on the one-world conspiracy. His first book, *Victory Denied,* was published by the Chicago-based Chas. Hallberg and Company Press. The rest of his books were published by his own Betsy Ross Press, based out of the same Fort Collins, Colorado building where the Committee to Restore the Constitution was headquartered.

The writings of Roberts and the output of the CRC represent a convergence between far-right extremism and right-wing Republicanism. Roberts himself appeared, on the surface, as a serious figure: a former Army colonel, he spoke before the state legislatures of Alabama and Mississippi and before state committee in over fifteen other states. In the 1960s and early 1970s he was given awards by mainstream groups like the American Legion, the Congress of Freedom, and the Sons of the American Revolution.[258] In his 1984 book *The Secret Science*, Roberts detailed the structure of the internationalist conspiracy in fairly conventional terms. His novel contribution to anti-globalist ideology was his use of the term 'mattoid' to describe the elites he denounced. The term implied some subhuman or psychopathic tendencies that distinguished mattoid elites from normal people.

Roberts argued that conservative Americans should take over local institutions and governments, protecting sovereignty on the local level so that it might be better guarded on the national level. Since, "no amount of agonizing in protest to a distant congressman will change the design of the mattoids", Roberts claimed that patriots must re-take control of county and state-level

[257] Christopher DeRosa, *Political Indoctrination in the US Army From World War II to Vietnam*. Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 2009. 181-182.
[258] Archibald Roberts, *Emerging Struggle for State Sovereignty*. CRC Press, 1979. 13.

government in order to fight back.[259] "All sovereignty originates in the state," Roberts claimed, and patriots must organize on the local level. To accomplish this, Roberts encourages his audience to:

> "transform frustration and despair in your community into constructive anger and a determination to 'do something' about the clear and present danger – ESTABLISH A COUNTY CHAPTER AS YOUR BASE OF OPERATIONS. The CRC county chapter is the basic unit in a national network of informed and motivated citizens, county officials and state lawmakers."[260]

This call to political action on the local level is consistent throughout Roberts' writings. The back cover of his 1978 book, *The Emerging Struggle for State Sovereignty*, twice describes the book as "action-motivating". The reader is told that, by reading this book, "You can become informed on facts behind the national emergency. You can find, too, that there is a solution to the tyranny of federal regionalism."[261]

The collective efforts of Birch Society and Liberty Lobby-associated writers and publications from the late 1960s to the early 1980s sketched out the shape of the conspiracy, identifying its historical origins and contemporary manifestations. In doing so these organizations served as the *institutional basis* of anti-globalism and the American far-right. Thanks to the efforts of their leaders and devoted members, millions of anti-globalist books were sold or distributed by the ideologues and propagandists who ran the Birch Society and Liberty Lobby. Their relationships with members of Congress granted them legitimacy at the same time that they promoted extremist ideas and anti-Semitic conspiracy theories. They served as a convenient foil to mainstream conservatives eager to distance themselves from extremists while simultaneously smuggling extreme ideas into the conservative movement. Overall, these anti-globalist groups served to give birth to an ideology which would be adopted both by new social movements on the Right and by far-right terrorists. While anti-globalism's impact on the extremist far-right would not reach its zenith until the 1990s, it would begin to work its way into the ideological worldview of violent white supremacist criminals and terrorists in the early 1980s.

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[259] Ibid, 2.
[260] Ibid, 2.
[261] Ibid.

Anti-Globalism and the Birth of the Violent Extreme Right

While the next chapter will explore the role of anti-globalism in the ideological worldview of far-right militias and white supremacists in the final decade of the 20th century, this section will briefly explore the formative years of these movements and ideas before 1985. While it was not until the 1990s that the 'Patriot' militia movement became known to the broader American population, the seeds of this broad-based and highly localized paramilitary-social movement were planted in the late 1970s and early 1980s by a generation of violent neo-Nazi extremists. Marks described the complex ideological scene from which this new variant of far-right extremist ideology emerged:

> "These new ranks of the right wing extremist movement contain quite a mixture of dissatisfied Americans. There are tax protestors, home schoolers, Christian fundamentalists and Constitutionalists who are concerned with legal protests against the government's activities. But, there are also the scattered neo-Nazis and white supremacists with paranoia and conspiracy theory binding the two elements together."[262]

This section will reconstruct this extremist scene by looking at the major two right-wing extremist paramilitary groups that emerged in the early 1980s: Posse Comitatus and The Order.

Posse Comitatus

The Posse Comitatus was an early militia group which had roots in the Christian Identity movement and other far-right groups like Gerald L K Smith's Christian National Crusade and the earlier neo-fascist Silver Shirts movement of the 1930s. The exact origins of the group are unclear: a 1974 FBI report on the Posse identified Henry Lamont Beach as the national organizer of Posse Comitatus, which claimed to have county-based "chapters in approximately 40 states" at the time of the report. Beach had been a member of the Silver Shirts in the 1940s and allegedly issued the first Posse charters in 1969 in Portland, Oregon.[263] Literature explaining the SPC movement was mailed from a Portland address under the name of the Citizens Law Enforcement

[262] Kathy Marks. *Faces of Right Wing Extremism*. New York: Branden Books, 1996. 15.
[263] James Corcoran. *Bitter Harvest: Gordon Kahl and the Posse Comitatus: Murder in the Heartland*. 1990. 29.

and Research Committee (CLERC), a pseudo-legalistic sovereign citizen group controlled by Beach.

A 16 page pamphlet produced by Beach's CLERC outlines the reasons for the foundation of the Posse. The pamphlet claims that the foundation of the Federal Reserve and the institution of a graduated income tax are unconstitutional actions taken by an illegitimate federal government. The pamphlet concludes with a discussion of the rationale behind the Posse's founding: "Merely reading books, passing out pamphlets, listening to a speech or attending an anti-communist meeting has no effect against the growth of communism. This is the mistaken idea which has brought about nothing but defeat in the battle to preserve our liberties, however it will develop the bets educated slaves in the world. Only organized political action can do the job. All the talk in the world will not stop the enemy."[264]

Daniel Levitas, author of *The Terrorist Next Door: The Militia Movement and the Radical Right,* has identified Potter Gale as the founder of the Posse. Gale was an anti-Semitic Christian Identity minister whose 'sermons' (hateful and violent screeds against blacks, Jews, homosexuals and government officials) were distributed among far-right groups as radio cassettes and played on radio stations during the early 1980s. Levitas wrote that Gale's approach to far-right politics was,

> "unique because it successfully bridged the gap between the anticommunist and segregationist movements of the 1950s and 1960s and the paramilitary movements of the 1990s. And during the early 1970s-when other right-wing organizations were collapsing-the Posse thrived by disseminating its ideas and spawning successive waves of violence."[265]

Both Gale and Beach advocated for violence, albeit in different ways. Beach's CLERC pamphlet observes that the "the law provides for the following prosecution of officials of government or who violate their Oath of Office... 'He shall be removed by the Posse to the most populated intersection of streets in the township and at high noon be hung by the neck, the body remaining

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[264] Posse Comitatus Pamphlet, found in Index of *1974 FBI Report on the Posse*. Page 17. Found at: https://archive.org/details/WilliamPotterGale

[265] Daniel Levitas, *The Terrorist Next Door*: *The Militia Movement and the Radical Right.* New York: St. Martin's, 2004. 21.

until sundown as an example to those who would subvert the law.'"[266] Gale repeated the same admonition to 'patriots' in a 1982 radio broadcast, urging them to hang "judges who are tearing this Constitution apart" and other "officials of government" at high noon on crowded streets. Gale continued, adding, "Arise and fight! If a Jew comes near you, run a sword through him."[267]

The Posse Comitatus was largely unknown to the American public until 1983, when a series of deadly shootouts between Posse member Gordon Kahl and …[Get stuff from Corcoran's book Bitter Harvest] Marks observes that Kahl, "a farmer, a working man – the backbone-of-America type who would not normally be seen as a criminal", was a believer in the ideas Posse Comitatus who "followed his beliefs to his death. Kahl and other individuals like him are very useful to the group spirit because they give the group respectability, someone to be a hero or a martyr, and to be acceptable to the average American citizen."[268] Kahl served to bring national attention to a nascent trend of right-wing militia violence and extremism, with federal agents frequently serving as the victims or targets. He also brought the movement behind that violence together, with the 1983 Aryan Nations World Congress "centered around talk of revenge for the killing of Gordon Kahl – [his death], perhaps more than any other single incident, began the track of the extreme right down the path to criminal violence."[269] The Order, formed in the aftermath of the 1983 Congress meeting, would also gain national notoriety while serving as an ideological vanguard for a violent form of far-right extremism.

The Order

The Order was, at the time of its existence in the early 1980s, the most violent ideologically motivated Neo-Nazi organization in American history. Its members, criminal misfits who came up in Klan and Nazi-affiliated groups, were more interested in revolutionary violence and criminal enterprise than political organizing. The Order, short for 'Aryan Resistance Order', was founded by neo-Nazi Robert Jay Matthews in 1983 in the state of Washington. Born in 1953, Matthews was a far-right lifer: he joined the John Birch Society at 11, founded an insignificant militia called the 'Sons of Liberty' after dropping out of high school, and joined William Pierce's National Alliance in 1980. He was a believer in white separatism and encouraged other white

[266] Gale. *Posse Pamphlet*, page 16.
[267] Levitas, *Terrorist Next Door*. 22.
[268] Marks. *Faces of Right Wing Extremism.* 118.
[269] Ibid.

supremacists to emigrate to the Pacific Northwest and establish a white state. This idea, commonly known as the 'Northwest Territorial Imperative' or the 'White American Bastion', gained currency with neo-Nazis and Klansmen in the 1970s and 1980s.[270]

Matthews was deeply influenced by *The Turner Diaries*, a 1977 novel written by William Pierce. The plot of the book depicts a Jewish takeover of the American government. The Organization fights a race war and engages in assassination, destruction of government policy and lynching of minorities in order to the tyrannical System. The 'Order' was directly inspired by the book, which has influenced terrorists on the American far right and abroad.[271] The details of The Order's plans were revealed in the federal civil rights case that followed Mr. Berg's murder by Order members. Zillah Craig, a former girlfriend of Matthews, testified that Mathews and his compatriots planned to rob banks and engage in counterfeiting in order to fund their terrorism and ultimate goal of establishing a white homeland in the Pacific Northwest.[272] Craig alleged that the Order members debated assassinating other prominent Jewish figures, but concluded that Berg would be easier to target. Berg had previously mocked Christian Identity ministers and Nazis on the air, earning the ire of the group. They also considered targeting civil rights attorney Morris Dees and other prominent critics of the far-right.

While still promoting violence, the ideological profile of Posse Comitatus was distinct from white supremacist groups like The Order. The Posse Comitatus less on white supremacism and more on elaborating a pseudo-legalistic foundation for individual sovereignty based on the supposed illegality of the U.S. government. This language appealed to Americans who, understandably, were turned off by the any political group or movement associated with the Klan, or to fascism. Like the Americanism of the 1950s, the discourse of the militia movement is based on fundamentally American political concepts of self-reliance, skepticism toward

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[270] For historical studies tracing the development of the Order and the broader American extreme-right at the end of the 20th century, see: Nicholas Goodrick-Clarke. *Black Sun: Aryan Cults, Esoteric Nazism, and the Poltiics of Identity*. New York: NYU Press, 2003, and Martin Lee. *The Beast Reawakens: Fascism's Resurgence from Hitler's Spymasters to Today's Neo-Nazi Groups and Right-Wing Extremists.* New York: Taylor and Francis, 2000.

[271] The Turner Diaries was directly cited as an influence by David Copeland, a British neo-Nazi who killed three people and injured 140 others in a series of nail bomb attacks in London in April 1999. Copeland "told police, "My main intent was to spread fear, resentment and hatred throughout this country; it was to cause a racial war." He said, "If you've read The Turner Diaries, you know the year 2000 there'll be the uprising and all that, racial violence on the streets. My aim was political. It was to cause a racial war in this country. There'd be a backlash from the ethnic minorities, then all the white people will go out and vote BNP." [Source 'The Nailbomber', BBC, 2000]

[272] Anonymous. Jury Told of Plan to Kill Radio Host. *New York Times*, November 8, 1987.

government and a streak of radicalism against perceived tyrannies. Groups like Posse Comitatus, while violent, identified with a longer tradition of militant resistant against government overreach. Such ideas could appeal to rural and downwardly-mobile conservatives, a group that Samuel Francis called Middle American Radicals. For these Middle American Radicals, the Reagan Administration's failure to prevent the wave of farm foreclosures and the broader farm crisis of the 1980s made them more open to right-wing alternatives to Reaganism.

The violently anti-Semitic and racist ideology developed by The Order in the early 1980s was distinctive and novel on the American far-right, mixing the standard nativist fare of white supremacist racism and anti-Semitism with Posse Comitatus-style anti-government ideology, Christian Identity-flavored Christian nationalism, and outright neo-Nazism. This violent white separatist ideology was motivated by opposition to a perceived 'ZOG' – Zionist Occupied Government. The phrase 'ZOG', which still serves as an anti-Semitic slur on the American far-right today and can be seen on countless message boards and Tweets, reflects the perverse ideological synthesis which motivated The Order and later generations of right-wing extremists. The coin was termed by neo-Nazi Eric Thomson in a 1976 article entitled 'Welcome to ZOG-World'. Thomson later followed this up with a 1999 web post, where he reiterated some of the original themes and commented on the way other right-wingers had portrayed the conspiracy. He wrote:

> "Some claimed that The Enemy was the CFR, the Bilderbergers, the Trilateralists, the dreaded, but conveniently anonymous "Insiders". As a simple Nazi, I realized that what was lacking was a *Feindbild* or picture of the enemy. If one did not know who the enemy was, then one could never hope to combat him. Later, I learned that 'our side' had no definition of who or what it was, either. Without a Feindbild, the situation is serious, but not hopeless. Without a *Selbstbild*, a concept of who we are, then the situation is hopeless, but not serious. The blightwingers seem set in their ways, choosing to blunder and stumble along, on their treadmill to oblivion, because they choose not to identify themselves any more than they choose to identify their enemies. George Orwell said wisely, "Who defines controls." The blightwing uses enemy labels, allowing the enemy to

> define who they are. By doing this, blightwingers give the enemy the moral high ground. "[273]

These extremist theories were informed by longer-standing conspiracies about Jewish control of the Federal Reserve and U.S. government, as well as the 'Anti-Zionism' on display in Carto's *Spotlight* and other Liberty Lobby publications. The Spotlight was notable for bridging the gap between extreme anti-Semitism and a more hazily defined 'Zionist' led conspiracy. Emphasizing the influence of the Trilateral Commission and other groups through 'investigative journalism' gave a veneer of legitimacy to *The Spotlight*, even as anti-Semitic books and materials were sold through mail-order.

The direct influence of Carto on right-wing extremism can be seen in the writings of Louis Beam. Beam, a well-known Klansmen, led a militia known as the Texas Emergency Reserve in the early 1980s. Beam organized harassment of Vietnamese fishermen working off the Texas coast; many Vietnamese refugees were settled in Texas in 1979 and they began to compete with white fishermen in the local shrimping industry. Civil Rights attorney Morris Dees, who was later revealed as a potential target of assassination by The Order, represented the fisherman in a civil rights lawsuit which led to the disbandment of the militia. Beam subsequently moved to Idaho and joined the Aryan Nations. It was there where he would write his 1983 work, *Essays of a Klansman*. Besides displaying a taste for bloody revolution and violence against Jews and minorities, the Forward of the *Essays* revealed the influence of Carto on Beam and the broader far-right extremist subculture:

> "From April of 1986 until June 1981 my efforts on behalf of the Ku Klux Klan never ceased or knew respite. Returning home from eighteen months in Vietnam in 1968, I soon realized that America faced far greater problems than that little country. Those to whom the writer Frances Parker Yockey referred as "cultural distorters" were at work alongside American traitors enveloping this country in their evil plans for its destruction."[274]

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[273] Eric Thomson, Welcome to Zog World. *First Amendment Exercise Machine*, 1999. The website, First Amendment Exercise Machine, was established and run by far-right extremists during the 1990s. Found at: http://www.faem.com/eric/2000/et047.htm

[274] Louis Beam, *Essays of a Klansman*. Published by Louis Beam, 1983.

The (misspelled) reference to Francis Parker Yockey, and his notion of Jews as "cultural distorters", was the product of Carto's longstanding efforts to popularize Yockey and his racialist theory of history. Yockey's *Imperium* was published by Carto's Noontide Press and frequently cited or advertised in Liberty Lobby publications. The concept of "cultural distorter" gave an air of theoretical sophistication to pre-existing canards of Jews as threats to white culture and civilization. Notions of Jewish-controlled government were further advanced by articles about Zionist and globalist influence found in the pages of *The Spotlight* and other anti-globalist publications, and Carto provided extremists like Beam with a more 'sophisticated' ideological framework than had previously existed amongst Klansmen and other far-right groups. The instances of ideologically motivated violence committed by The Order and others in the early 1980s would foreshadow further developments on the anti-globalist far-right in the final years of the 20th century.

From Anti-Internationalism to Anti-Globalism

The ideological maturation of anti-internationalism into anti-globalism between 1965 and 1985 could not have happened without the institutionalization of the Birch Society and Liberty Lobby into ideological hubs of the American far-right during that period. The members and supporters of these groups read their publications and supported the far-right candidates they endorsed, helping to further consolidate far-right activism around the ideological and institutional apparatus established by the Birch Society and the Liberty Lobby. The broader spread of anti-globalist ideas on the American Right was facilitated by the fact that this development happened at the same time that the New Right was marketing its own brand of right-wing populism to the American people. The broad rhetorical similarities shared by these two populisms professed by these distinct groups of right-wing ideologues meant that the anti-globalists were able to tap into and influence broader ideological currents on the American Right during the 1970s and 1980s.

The right-wing Americanists of the 1950s and early 1960s saw internationalist foreign policy as part of a broader Communist conspiracy. While anti-internationalists of this period were opposed to the idea of a 'one-world-government', they claimed typically saw the internationalist conspiracy as part of a broader Communist conspiracy. As the anti-communist fervor of the 1950s died away, however, anti-internationalists would shift their emphasis to a specifically 'internationalist' conspiracy for world domination. During the 1960s, 1970s, and 1980s, the

scores of books and hundreds of newsletters published on the globalist conspiracy built, in the minds of readers, a connection between long-standing conspiracy theories and new political trends and events. Groups like the Freemasons and the Illuminati, frequent targets of conspiracist opprobrium through American history, were connected to important new groups like the Trilateral Commission.

By the mid-1960s, the Old Right isolationists had left Congress and the Republican Party had come to accept, and even embrace, militant anti-Communism. This left the language of anti-internationalism to the far-right, who had varied views on the war against Communism but generally agreed on the threat that the United Nations posed to American sovereignty. In 1965, the significance of anti-internationalism in the broader constellation of right-wing discourse and ideology in America had declined. Twenty years later, anti-internationalism had developed from a marginal set of conspiracy theories into the more ideologically complex, coherent, and mature form of anti-globalism. The word 'globalism' came to replace 'internationalism' in many right-wing conspiracist texts. In the pages of Liberty Lobby and Birch Society publications, the details of the globalist conspiracy were outlined: communist and financial capitalist alike were working in tandem, through the United Nations, the Council on Foreign Relations, the Trilateral Commission, and other elite groups, to bring about a totalitarian one-world government. These conspiracy theories spread in the form of books and newsletters and circulated through sophisticated direct-mail networks. What were once peripheral concerns about a one-world government had developed into a coherent and complex worldview, in which the classical anti-Semitic and racist tropes of the mid-20th century far-right were made more ambiguous – and politically palatable – through their incorporation into a 'conspiracist canon' of theories about the Freemasons, the Illuminati, and countless other elite groups purported to be plotting global domination.

The relationship between the Birch Society and Liberty Lobby – the "two pillars" of anti-globalist populism – and the broader institutional apparatus and movement associated with the New Right is complex. On one level, there are substantial similarities between these groups and those operated by Richard Viguerie and other New Rightists. Both embraced an ideological and discursive shift on the Right, moving on from a monomaniacal emphasis on communism and constructing a right-wing populist worldview better suited for changing political circumstances.

Issues like busing, abortion, school prayer, and myriad other topics were subsumed within a broader populist narrative focused on the hypocrisy, incompetence, and corruption of a liberal elite leading whose interests and values were diametrically opposed to those of an idealized (white) 'American' people. Most New Rightist leaders had no direct contact with the Birch Society or Liberty Lobby, but the rhetorical and strategic convergence between the two factions gives credence to the argument that the right-wing populism of one camp could not be separated from the other. The 'New Right' populism connected the right-wing populist rhetorical style (and organizational apparatus) with the Republican Party and electoral conservatism, while the anti-globalist populism of the Liberty Lobby and Birch Society wove together conservatism, conspiracism, and various strains of far-right extremism into the ideology of anti-globalism.

The Birch Society and Lobby were also united with the broader New Right by their shared emphasis on direct mail as a means of political propaganda. For right-wing direct mail organizations like the Viguerie Company, mailing lists with the names and addresses of sympathetic conservatives were worth their weight in gold.[275] While Viguerie was not the only New Rightist to use direct-mail as a tool for fundraising and propagandizing, his acknowledgment of direct-mail's importance to the history of American conservatism distinguishes him from conservative authors who focus more on the *content* than the *form* of right-wing ideology.

In his 2004 book *America's Right Turn: How Conservatives Used New and Alternative Media to Take Power,* Viguerie offers his own analysis of how and why conservatism succeeded as a political movement. Viguerie started his career at Billy James Hargis' Christian Crusade organization, and he keenly understood the importance of new media – and ideological propaganda – as part of the broader strategy of the New Right. While Goldwater's loss in 1964 disappointed conservatives, his campaign collected donations from over a million Americans. "The Goldwater mailing list became one of the hottest properties in conservatism[,]" as the list of donors to the Goldwater campaign was used The Goldwater donor list built up in the leadup to the 1964 election was a crucial asset for Viguerie and other direct-mail mavens. Viguerie did not

[275] Claims of stolen mailing lists are a colorful and important part of the history of the American far-right: it was alleged that Carto stole the mailing list of the Birch Society during his brief tenure there in 1959, using it to build out the audience of the Liberty Lobby. Carto later claimed that his former protégé William Pierce stole the Liberty Lobby's mailing list in 1971; Pierce would go on to found and lead the National Alliance, the most important (and influential) neo-Nazi group in the late 20th century U.S. See Michael. *Willis Carto.* Chapter 4.

have a list of all the donors, but he wrote that he had "a total file [with the names and addresses] of over 150,000 conservative donors" by 1966. It was with this list that he started The Viguerie Company and his illustrious career as a right-wing propagandist, fundraiser, and movement leader.

Viguerie dedicated a substantial section of his book to explaining how direct-mail played a major role in Reagan's election and the broader success of the New Right. He claims that direct-mail is "as much advertising as it is fundraising," borrowing marketing concept of a donor's "lifetime value" from the field of marketing to make his point: "When The Viguerie Company applied direct mail to ideological politics, it also applied the business concept of lifetime value to politics."[276] A person who was willing to donate to a conservative cause once was likely to do it again if they were to be inundated with mailers, letters, and heartfelt pleas (often addressed to "patriotic Americans") for funds to support the newest conservative cause or candidate. Viguerie and other right-wing groups in the 1960s and 1970s used direct mail to turn a profit from the promotion of ideological propaganda, and the primary focus of these organizations was, essentially, as a far-right publishing house capable of reaching – and raising money from – a broad audience of sympathetic conservatives.

One area where a crucial difference existed was in the use and importance of anti-internationalist themes. For Viguerie and most others on the New Right, the United Nations and the 'internationalist' policies that supported foreign aid were just another target for right-wing opprobrium. The neo-isolationism of earlier generations of conservative intellectuals had been abandoned for an embrace of militant anti-communism, and opposition to 'globalism' was not a primary focus for Viguerie and other New Rightists. While Viguerie was deeply opposed to and critical of the influence of the Rockefeller family and the influence of major foundations, he did not focus on these issues or try to portray a conspiracy beyond that perpetuated by Democrats and liberals in Washington. In his 1984 book *The Establishment Vs. The People: Is a New Populist Revolt on the Way?*, Viguerie eschews mono-causal anti when he describes the role played by the Council on Foreign Relations that eschews typical anti-globalist conspiracism. He wrote:

[276] Viguerie & Franke, *America's Right Turn*. 122-123.

> "The Council on Foreign Relations does nothing more sinister than hiring academics to do studies and to present its members with special briefings by academics, government officials, and powerful businessmen. Its power, and the power of other elite organizations of the establishment, derives from its ability to establish its view as the proper view and contrary views as foolish. In this way opinion flows from the top down."[277]

For anti-globalist groups like the Birch Society and Liberty Lobby, the primary emphasis of their ideological materials was in convincing readers of the merits of the 'conspiratorial view of history'. Scores of books and articles were dedicated to detailing the complex organizational infrastructure connecting the United Nations, the Rockefellers, the Federal Reserve, and essentially all other major international institutions and actors into a broader globalist conspiracy for world government. The roots of this globalist apparatus were traced to disparate sources, ranging from the Illuminati, the Freemasons, Karl Marx, and Jewish banking families.

Even though the broader New Right was not interested in promoting the notion of a globalist conspiracy to explain political trends and events, the Birch Society and Liberty Lobby benefitted from the broad shift to right-wing populism that took place during the 1960s and 1970s. When the election of Reagan finally inaugurated the conservative counterrevolution sought by Viguerie and his allies, the Birchers and Lobby were well-positioned to continue their right-wing agitation *against* the new conservative establishment; the Lobby's *Spotlight* reached its highest-ever audience of 315,000 subscribers in 1981, the first year of the Reagan Administration. As the next chapter will show, radical conservatives were not wholly satisfied with the Reagan presidency. In response to the apparent inability of a purportedly conservative government to address the issues they believed were plaguing America, right-wingers adopted new ideas and strategies in their pursuit of political power. As a result, the 1980s and 1990s saw a new phase in the historical trajectory of the American radical right; this period would see anti-globalism finally replace anti-communism as the master-frame of right-wing political actors.

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[277] Richard Viguerie. *The establishment vs. the people : is a new populist revolt on the way?*. Viguerie Co., 1984. 4.

In Mulloy's study of the John Birch Society, he described unorthodox way that it and similar institutions could institutionalize and enact political change despite having no direct impact on electoral politics or policymaking:

> "[T]he significance of an organization is to be found not only in the number of its recruits, or how long it manages to command attention on the political scene. Seemingly small groups can still have a powerful impact on a society…. [they] can generate new ideas, or give a renewed lease of life to old ones; they can pioneer innovative modes of political activity or communication; they can embody – and give voice to – some of the central tensions or conflicts of the time[.]"[278]

The Birch Society, Liberty Lobby, and broader array of populistic New Right organizations played dual roles as hubs of right-wing social movement activity and ideological production during the 1960s and 1980s. The anti-globalist ideologues leading and writing for the Birch Society and the Liberty Lobby were adapting the mid-20th century nativist-white supremacist ideology to new context through a new emphasis on conspiracism and the ambiguous language of right-wing populism. They would not have been able to promote and popularize this new ideological formation without the power of direct-mail, a political tool that would play a major part in the broader success of American conservatism in the late 20th century United States.

The next chapter will show how the mature anti-globalist ideology that had consolidated by the 1980s would go on to shape the worldview of new right-wing political candidates, social movements, and intellectual tendencies in the 1990s. This decade saw transformative changes on the American Right, as conservatives reckoned with the end of the Cold War and the new challenge of globalization. In the final years of the twentieth century anti-globalist ideas and rhetoric developed in the ideological laboratories of the Birch Society and Liberty Lobby would be adopted by Republican and radical alike to express their shared opposition to the new threat of 'globalism'.

[278] Mulloy. *The World of the John Birch Society*. 2.

CHAPTER FIVE:

Far-Right Breakthrough in the Age of Globalization: Anti-Globalism and the American Right after the Cold War, 1985-2000

The geopolitical events of the late 1980s and early 1990s initiated a period of internal reflection and ideological change on the American Right. The end of the Cold War meant that the Communist threat had finally been vanquished, leaving rightists without the enemy they had defined themselves against since World War II. Concurrent debates about globalization and the role the U.S. ought to play in a post-Cold War also gave anti-globalist arguments and themes about trade, immigration, and national sovereignty newfound salience. Anti-globalism came to shape the ideological worldview of new social movements on the American Right, namely the populist movement, the militia movement, and the Religious Right. A new generation of right-wing ideologues identifying as "paleoconservatives" gave anti-globalist arguments intellectual heft, arguing that the Republican Party under Reagan and Bush had abandoned its conservative roots.

Anti-globalist themes were also taken up in the presidential campaigns Patrick J. Buchanan, a prominent conservative media figure who had worked in the Nixon and Reagan Administrations. Buchanan first ran for the presidency in 1992 as a Republican primary challenger to incumbent George H.W. Bush. Buchanan campaigned against Bush's globalism, decrying NAFTA and mass immigration as threats to the American working class. While he was ultimately unsuccessful in his two attempts at the Republican presidential nomination, Buchanan's anti-globalist campaigns helped to bring long-standing themes of anti-interventionism, protectionism, and anti-immigration sentiment back into the Republican Party. By the late 1990s, Republican members of Congress were speaking out against globalism and the various policies and political trends associated with it.

Two major semantic shifts took place in the language of anti-globalism during the 1980s and 1990s. The first was the shift from the term 'internationalism' to 'globalism'. The latter term had been a favorite of far-right ideologues and propagandists since the 1920s; it served as an ambiguous anti-Semitic canard and was central to early versions of the one-world government conspiracy theories. The appearance of the term 'globalist' in Liberty Lobby publications and

other far-right literature in the late 1970s and early 1980s marks a significant change in the ideological landscape and discursive repertoire of the American far-right. The second major shift was the emergence of the term 'New World Order' to describe the globalist institutional apparatus and the looming threat of one-world government. This phrase, originally popularized in the conspiracist writings of Ralph Epperson and Gary Allen, had come to represent not just the specter of world government, but the highly complex and multifaceted economic, social, and political threats posed by a new force: globalization. 'New World Order' became a central signifier not just for far-right conspiracy writers, but also for political figures like Patrick Buchanan. Buchanan identified the 'New World Order' with job-killing trade deals, mass immigration, and sovereignty-sucking international treaties.

At the same time that the language of anti-globalism was adopted by Buchanan and other mainstream Republicans, a more hard-edged variant was being promoted by a variety of new social movements and extremist groups on the American far-right. The 1990s saw the emergence of the right-wing militia movement, a complex and decentralized movement oriented around fear of an ever-growing government and the looming prospect of a totalitarian 'New World Order'. Neo-Nazi groups like the National Alliance made hate into a highly profitable business, using a variety of new and old propaganda techniques to promulgate their extremist vision of a Jewish conspiracy to destroy America. A new group of right-wing intellectuals, who identified collectively as paleoconservatives (itself a tongue-in-cheek reference to the neoconservatives they opposed), began to articulate a far-right populism that rejected the conservativism of Reagan and the New Right.

The adoption of anti-globalism as a master frame by nationalist Republicans, new social movements, and right-wing intellectuals represented a major ideological shift on the American Right. Since the 1950s, the disparate voices, groups, and ideological tendencies composing the American Right had been united by collective opposition to Communism. The arguments and concepts associated with earlier versions of anti-internationalism were intimately related to the broader anti-Communist worldview espoused by rightwing ideologues, but it was only in the 1990s that the threat of a globalist one-world government became the *overarching* theme and master-frame of right-wing political actors. The previous chapters charted out how and why these arguments evolved over time, with the specifics of their evolution originating in the minds

(and coming to life through the printing presses and computerized direct-mail systems) of far-right propagandists like Willis Carto. This chapter will show how these ideas came to animate a new generation of leaders, movements, and voices on the American Right.

While much of this chapter is focused on reconstructing the broader context in which this development happened and illustrating the breadth of anti-globalism's influence across the American Right, I also seek to make a broader theoretical argument about the causal interplay between anti-globalist *ideas,* right-wing political *actors,* and the *structural context* they responded to during the 1990s. If Chapter 3 presented anti-globalism's genesis, and Chapter 4 looked at its maturation, this chapter will show the third and most complex stage of anti-globalism's development and trajectory in the 20th century: the process by which anti-globalist ideology and its adherents responded to the end of the Cold War and the beginning of the age of globalization.

The fact that this anti-globalist ideology *pre-existed* the events and historical trends of the early 1990s meant that many Americans were already thinking about politics through an anti-globalist lens *before* 'globalization' entered the public consciousness in the early 1990s. This made it natural for right-wing political actors to frame their social movements, political campaigns, and intellectual paradigms against a globalist New World Order that already existed in the minds of many on the American Right. The ready-made audience they had enabled the ideological and political breakthrough of anti-globalism on the American Right during the 1990s. During the 1960s, 1970s, and 1980s, far-right organizations and movements failed to achieve electoral success or build a mass movement capable of influencing Republican politics. For this reason, the 1990s represented a *critical juncture in the history of anti-globalism and the American far-right*: the 'breakthrough' of anti-globalism on the American Right was *triggered* by the dramatic changes of the early 1990s, but the breadth and scope of anti-globalism's influence in the 1990s was shaped by (a) the long-term efforts of the Liberty Lobby and Birch Society to popularize anti-globalist ideas, print anti-globalist books, and structure the American far-right *before* the 1990s, and (b) the ability of new far-right social movement actors in the 1990s to use anti-globalism to help themselves take advantage of the *discursive opportunity structures* created by the end of the Cold War and the rise of globalization.

This chapter begins by sketching out the broad context within which anti-globalism emerged as a coherent ideology in the 1990s. The first section looks at the broad ideological and political shifts that took place in the Republican Party and on the American Right during and after the Reagan Administration. The second section connects two topics: the end of the Cold War (and the dissolution of the Communist threat so central to American conservative politics), and the emergence of globalization as a global phenomenon and major theme in American politics during the 1990s. It was due to these structural shifts that the language of anti-globalism became salient to a broader audience than the readers of Liberty Lobby's *Spotlight.* The third section will explore the political campaigns and ideological contributions of Patrick Buchanan, who was the face of anti-globalist populism in the U.S. during the 1990s. The fourth section will look at the ways that some Republican members of Congress used anti-globalist language in the 1990s. The fifth section will look at the Populist Party founded by Willis Carto during the 1980s. The sixth section will explore the new right-wing intellectual tendency of paleoconservatism that emerged in support of Buchanan and other right-wing anti-globalist movements in the 1980s and 1990s. The seventh section will look at David Duke and William Pierce, the leading ideologues on the racialist extreme-right. The seventh section will explore the causes and consequences of the Oklahoma City Bombing, the event that introduced the American public to the violent revolutionary extreme-right and highlighted its connections to the broader anti-globalist worldview.

The Thrill is Gone: Right-wing Radicalism after Reagan

By the middle of the 1980s, the Reagan Revolution had been inaugurated. The efforts of New Right activists had finally been rewarded in 1980, as a generation of conservative activists achieved their goal of electing a conservative to the White House. Beyond Reagan himself, however, the election was the result of years of organizing, institution-building, campaigning and propagandizing by New Right leaders and activists. After years spent refining their messaging, mastering the technical communicative tools of radio and direct-mail, and establishing reciprocal relationships with conservative Republican politicians and donors, the 'New Right' finally entered the promised land of Washington D.C. after Reagan won 44 states in November of 1980. New Right leaders and activists took advantage of their newfound power by institutionalizing

their movement, establishing a number of think tanks, fundraising and lobbying groups, training organizations and other conservative non-profits which still operate today.

In *Conservatism and American Political Development* Glenn and Teles identify the policy and political regime inaugurated with Reagan's 1980 victory as "modern conservatism". It includes the earlier ideological apparatus of libertarian-traditionalist fusionism, which provided the "electoral and philosophical" elements of the movement, as well as a newer emphasis on developing a conservative perspective on public policy.[279] Earlier conservative opposition to the New Deal argued that the programs themselves were unconstitutional, or that Social Security and Medicare would put the United States on a slippery slope to socialism and, ultimately, communism. The modern conservative regime had moved from wholesale rejection to tacit acceptance of the welfare state. Instead of destroying it, they wanted to transform it. As Glenn and Teles observe, the 1980 election: "gave conservatives an opportunity to govern, rather than simply criticize from the outside, and many came to see the state as a vehicle for pursuing conservative social and economic ends."[280] Conservatives who sought to bring a wrecking-ball to the administrative state were humbled by "the experience of governing," which "made clear to conservatives just how powerful were the constraints on wholesale destruction of the liberal state, and that further conservative advances would depend upon adapting to the liberal inheritance, rather than directly reversing it."[281]

Despite his status as the American Right's greatest leader of the twentieth century, Reagan's administration was criticized by prominent elements of the populist New Right. A 1983 article in the *New York Times* led with the line: "Ideological conservatives, who provided the core of Ronald Reagan's support in 1980, have been deeply disappointed with his performance as President, especially what they regard as his growing moderation in advance of the 1984 campaign."[282] The article, which featured quotations from prominent conservative activists like Howard Philips ("chairman of the Conservative Caucus"), Joel M. Skousen ("executive editor of

[279] Brian Glenn and Steven Teles. *Conservatism and American Political Development*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009. 27.
[280] Ibid.
[281] Ibid.
[282] Robert Pear. Conservatives Disappointed with 'Shift' by Reagan. *New York Times*, June 26, 1983.

Conservative Digest" and nephew of earlier anti-internationalist conspiracist Cleon Skousen), and columnist M. Stanton Evans, reported that:

> "Mr. Evans contended that Mr. Reagan was surrounded by pragmatic advisers who were to willing to compromise... 'It is very difficult to administer a conservative revolution with people that as your agents,' Mr. Evans said, 'Because they are not conservative revolutionaries but pragmatists.'"[283]

Efforts at conservative revolution were thwarted, in the eyes of New Rightists, by a tendency toward moderation and lack of commitment to conservative principles. Another Times article, from 1988, described the mobilization of right-wing opposition to Reagan's proposed arms control deal with Russia, the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty. The article, titled *The Right Against Reagan*, described a two-pronged effort by right-wingers to derail the treaty. Senate Republicans, led by arch-conservative Jesse Helms, sought to paint the Treaty as a concession to duplicitous Communists and a threat to national security. New Right stalwarts like Richard Viguerie, Kevin Phillips, Terry Dolan, and others employed their organizational resources to turn public opinion against the Treaty. "[Kevin] Phillips showered 175,000 letters on his caucus members, and mailed audio cassettes of General Rogers's 30-minute attack on the INF treaty to 5,000 delegates and alternates to the 1984 Republican National Convention… 'The only way these campaigns work," said Weyrich, "is when the inside and outside work together.' While the treaty ultimately passed, the episode illustrates the degree to which Reagan had lost the support of his right-wing base. Helms described the dynamic pithily, saying that "The President doesn't need to discard the people who brought him to the dance."[284]

Beyond this rough sketch, this chapter will not focus on the details of the policy changes wrought during the Reagan-Bush years, the significance of these changes in their inauguration of a new stage in the development of the American administrative state, or the details of how particular New Right leaders fought against elements of the Reagan agenda. I highlight these trends because they constituted a fundamental shift on the landscape of the American Right in the 1980s, transforming the political landscape and creating new opportunity structures for far-right groups and movements. The tremendous victory of 1980 ended the figurative forty years in

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[283] Ibid.
[284] Hedrick Smith. The Right Against Reagan. *New York Times*, January 17, 1988.

the desert for the American Right. Despite this long-awaited victory for the American Right, the perceived moderation of the Reagan Administration's policy agenda led to despair among radical conservatives: if the election of their leader could not stop the growth of government (and the federal deficit), the secularization of American society or the further entrenchment of a U.S.-led liberal international order, then what could? Right-wing radicals responded to this trend in a variety of ways: rejecting the Republican Party, redoubling their efforts to mobilize the conservative grassroots, establishing new institutions, and pursuing new avenues for political change and conservative retrenchment. Extremists moved beyond mere sedition to the promotion of violence against what they saw as an illegitimate government controlled by internationalist elites unconcerned with the welfare of average Americans.

After the Cold War: Globalization and the New World Order

The collapse of the Berlin Wall in 1989, and the final death knell of the Soviet Union in 1991, marked the end of the Cold War – and inaugurated a pivotal moment for American foreign policy. Since the late 1940s, anti-communism had been the guiding principle of the global military, economic, and political empire that the United States built up during in the mid-to-late-20th century. The early 1990s saw a flurry of debate among politicians and public commentators on the future role of the United States in world affairs. Foreign policy journals like the Council on Foreign Relations' *Foreign Affairs* and the neoconservative *National Interest* hosted debates and roundtables on the future of American foreign policy during the early 1990s. The journal *Foreign Policy* led its Winter 1991 issue with the section 'Leadership in the New World Order'. Former Secretary of Defense and CIA Director James Schlesinger wrote in this issue:

> "The Cold War provided the stark simplicity of confrontation between the superpowers and their alliances... Although the world after the Cold War is likely to be a far less dangerous place because of reduced risks of a cataclysmic clash, it is less likely to be more unstable rather than less... In this turbulent world, what is the role for the United States and how well prepared for that role will the American people be?"[285]

[285] James Scheslinger. "New Instabilities, New Priorities." *Foreign Policy*, Winter 1991/1992, 1-4.

A year earlier, Ornstein and Schmitt asked in the same publication, "How will the U.S. political system operate without anti-communism as its central organizing principle?"[286] After decades of focus on defeating Communism, American foreign policymakers faced a brave new world. In their analysis of shifting opinion among foreign policy elites from the 1980s to the 1990s, Rosati, Link and Creed observed:

"Most opinion leaders saw the world during the eighties along traditional, realist Cold War lines, where bipolarity and threat defined the global system and stability or decline marked the position of the United States within that system… Authors were much more likely in the nineties to see the world as complex-interdependent (37.2 percent), unipolar (25.6 percent), or multipolar (21.8 percent), while 5 percent even viewed the world as anarchic. In other words, there was a substantial increase in the diversity of images concerning the structure of the international system in the Post-Cold War era, with no clear consensus emerging."[287]

Ronald Steel, in his 1996 book *Temptations of a Superpower*, captured the geopolitical ennui felt by the architects of American foreign policy in more dramatic terms:

> "During the Cold War we had a vocation; now we have none. Once we had a powerful enemy; now it is gone... The world we knew has collapsed around us... Until the Cold War was over we did not appreciate that the conflict, for all its iniquities and dangers, imposed a kind of order on the world. Now even that is gone... Yes, the other side lost. But did we win?"[288]

The end of the Cold War led to political upheaval on the American Right, as conservatives had to reckon with the demise of their defining enemy. As I noted in my earlier chapters, anti-communism had been a central component of American conservative ideology, with much of the intellectual output of American conservative authors and media consisting of critiques of collectivist doctrine. More importantly, the fervent anti-Communism of the early Cold War allowed for a reinvention of the fascist-sympathizing nativist conspiracism of the early American far-right. The promotion of 'Americanism' as an ideology (and signifier) in opposition to the

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[286] Norman Ornstein and Mark Schmitt. "Dateline Campaign '92: Post-Cold War Politics." *Foreign Policy* 79 (1992): 169-86.
[287] Jerel Rosati, et al. "A New Perspective on the Foreign Policy Views of American Opinion Leaders in the Cold War and Post-Cold War Eras." *Political Research Quarterly* 51:2 (1998): 461–479.
[288] Ronald Steel, *Temptations of a Superpower*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1995. 1- 3

perceived threats of Communism during the 1950s allowed for a rhetorical convergence between extremist figures like Gerald L K Smith, a prominent anti-Semite who promoted the *Protocols of the Elders of Zion*, and more mainstream conservative preachers like Carl McIntire and Billy James Hargis. The conspiracist anti-Communism of these figures evolved into the anti-globalist ideology created by the John Birch Society and Liberty Lobby in the 1970s and 1980s. Their concerns were more with the alleged machinations of the United Nations and efforts to establish a one-world government than with the threat posed by Communism. While anti-globalism was still marginal in the 1980s, it was given newfound salience in the 1990s as debates about globalization and an emergent 'New World Order' appeared in the American public sphere.

In the early 1990s, that public sphere was filled by a cacophony of voices, each seeking to articulate a theory of post-Soviet international politics and to offer a path forward for an uncertain United States. The situation was described by Wittkopf in his 1994 book *The Future of American Foreign Policy*:

> In the space of a few short years, world politics has undergone dramatic changes profoundly important to the future of American foreign policy… With the end of the Cold War, the United States for the third time in the century must confront its global destiny. The first time came in the aftermath of World War I, when the nation reverted to its historic tradition of isolationism; the second followed World War II, when it rejected isolationism in favor of a policy of global activism. It was during this formative period that the United States evolved its grant strategy – captured in the themes of globalism, anticommunism, containment, military might, and interventionism – for combating the communist and Soviet menace.[289]

Wittkopf's idea that America has faced successive confrontations with its "global destiny" reveals the lingering residue of American exceptionalism that animated much thinking on foreign policy at the time. The apparent victory of American democratic capitalism over Soviet communism in the early 1990s led foreign policy figures to embrace the sort of triumphalism seen in Francis Fukuyama's *End of History.* The question, then, was not whether America should try to spread its ideals around the world – the relevant questions, at the time, were about how,

[289] Eugene Wittkopf, *The Future of American Foreign Policy*. New York: Wadsworth Publishing, 1992. 1.

how much, and why. This debate was fundamentally different than those that took place after the first two world wars, two periods in which vocal anti-internationalist coalitions emerged to criticize the appearance of international institutions like the League of Nations and the United Nations. By the 1990s, the globalist apparatus set up by the United States to combat communism – directly and indirectly – had played a fundamental role in the global history of the late 20th century. Reckoning with the legacy and future utility of the varied and complex institutions, networks, and ideas composing 'globalism' was the central challenge faced by post-Cold War theorists.

One of the significant features of the post-Cold War debate – also reflected in Wittkopf's introduction - was the renewed use of the 'internationalist-isolationist' dichotomy in the discussion of American foreign policy. The troubled history of these interlinked concepts has recently been explored in the work of Stephen Wertheim, who conceives of them as asymmetrical counter-concepts. Use of the term 'isolationism' to label those who were critical or skeptical of American interventionism meant that debate was shaped by those who accepted, as a starting point, a foreign policy defined by the need to interfere in the affairs of other nations. The fact that the America First Committee, the most prominent isolationist group of the inter-war period, had anti-Semitic figures like Charles Lindbergh in leading positions helped associate the term with a far-right nativism with which it has frequently overlapped. But such accounts miss the fact that isolationists – who largely identified as anti-interventionists – were the primary voices protesting the seemingly inevitable expansion of the American empire into foreign nations and the lives of American citizens.

On the side of 1990s internationalism, leading commentators, academics and politicians tried to offer their own theories or 'big ideas' on how America ought to conduct its foreign policy in a post-Soviet era. One of the most prominent was Charles Krauthammer, the widely syndicated conservative columnist. Starting in the mid-1980s, Krauthammer began to promote an interventionist ideology in which the United States was to protect the "community of democratic nations" and to promote "new liberal policies at the frontier, most especially in the Third World."[290] Krauthammer would go on to support both of the Bush wars in Iraq, ultimately summarizing his theory of 'democratic realism' in a 2004 book and countless speeches and

[290] Charles Krauthammer. The Poverty of Realism, *The New Republic*, February 17, 1986.

articles. He defines the vision as follows: “We will support democracy everywhere, but we will commit blood and treasure only in places where there is a strategic necessity–meaning, places central to the larger war against the existential enemy, the enemy that poses a global mortal threat to freedom.” In his account, the notion of ‘democratic globalism’ is a foil to his superior ‘realist’ account. The limit of the, “democratic globalis[t vision is that it] sees as the engine of history not the will to power but the will to freedom.”[291]

I offer Krauthammer as an illustrative example of the kind of thinking that characterized much of the foreign policy establishment in the 1990s. Krauthammer’s theoretical quibbling between ‘realism’ and ‘globalism’ masked a vision in which the American martial and economic power would not be questioned. Wars would be justified if they were satisfied a vague criteria of posing a “mortal threat to freedom”, and any apparent contrast between democratic values and the institution of “new liberal policies at the frontier” would be brushed under the rug. Other writers offered a more skeptical view of American power. In a 1993 piece in Foreign Affairs titled ‘The New Interventionists’, Stephen John Stedman offered a prescient analysis of the emerging foreign policy consensus:

> "Future historians may compare 1991 and 1992 to the years just after World War II, when the doctrine of containment evolved. Like that time, the last two years have seen a series of events, precedents, incremental decisions and policy rationales give birth to a new doctrine of American foreign policy... [in which] the United States, far from turning inward, may be taking upon itself a more crusading, interventionist role in world affairs.”

Stedman perceived the internal inconsistencies of this doctrine, writing that, “The guiding principle of the new interventionism - the international community's obligation to intervene wherever a state or group within a state fails to meet the humanitarian needs of its people - cannot be enforced consistently.”

Skeptics like Stedman were not the first to observe the internal contradictions of the globalist vision. Many of the soundest arguments against American empire were offered by Earl Ravenal, a foreign policy analyst, former Department of Defense staffer, and, most importantly, a one-

[291] Charles Krauthammer. 2004 Democratic Realism Speech. American Enterprise Institute. Found online: https://www.aei.org/research-products/speech/democratic-realism/

time Politics postgraduate at the University of Cambridge. Ravenal wrote on foreign policy throughout his career, serving as a long-time fellow at the libertarian Cato Institute and teaching at Georgetown University. Ravenal saw American rhetoric about foreign policy during the Cold War as window-dressing for an aggressive and multifaceted form of imperial power politics. His book titles display his skeptical views about American foreign policy: *Never Again: Learning From America's Foreign Policy Failures* (1977), *NATO: Tides of Discontent* (1985), *Defining Defense for a New World Order: The Military Budget in 1992 and Beyond* (1991), and *Foreign Policy in an Uncontrollable World* (1992).

The (re)emergence of globalism in the 1990s was just the last iteration of recurrent debates about world order, globalism, international institutions, and related questions throughout the 20th century. Recent work on globalism has shown the variety of meanings the term can have. Rosenboim and Slobodian's recent monographs serve as two prominent examples, connecting different visions of globalism and world order with the practical processes through which the 'liberal international order' was built in the post-war era.[292] The 'globalism' of the 1990s was distinct from the globalisms posited by mid-20th century theorists, and globalization scholars have attempted to define the term – or at least distinguish it from the variety of physical, technological, organizational trends subsumed under the umbrella of 'globalization.

Steger has written extensively on globalism, arguing in 2005 that it is the "dominant political belief system of our time."[293] Steger distinguishes between globalization and globalism, defining the former as "a set of complex, sometimes contradictory social processes that are changing our current social condition based on the modern system of independent nation-states."[294] Crucially, the variety of processes associated with globalization are tied together by their part in "the unprecedented compression of time and space." Globalism, then, is the ideological and political regime which promotes and naturalizes the processes associated with globalization. Ultimately, this political regime has economic underpinnings. The need for new markets amidst shrinking profit margins in the U.S. and developed world motivated the American firms who pushed for NAFTA and related free trade treaties. The universalist rhetoric espoused by George H.W. Bush and Clinton served as rhetorical cover for a fundamental transformation in the global economy,

[292] Rosenboim, *The Emergence of Globalism*, and Slobodian, *Globalists.*
[293] Steger, *Ideologies of Globalization*. 12.
[294] Ibid.

led by globalist elites in government and business. These elites were embedded in international elite institutions and organizations, and they conceived of their globalism as the appropriate response to a changing world.

I do not have the space to answer the questions, 'what was globalism during the 1990s?', 'who are the globalists enacting and justifying globalist policies?', or 'what is the relationship between globalism as an ideology and globalization as a set of political, economic, and social practices?' during the 1990s. Instead, I focus on *the ways that right-wing political actors used the language of anti-globalism to describe the changes associated with globalization and name the 'globalist' enemy threatening America*. With this perspective, the mainstreaming of anti-globalism in the 1990s can be understood in multiple ways. One could conceive of anti-globalism (and the broader anti-globalization movement that included progressive groups) as a largely legitimate backlash against globalization, motivated by concerns about American workers, industry, and sovereignty in the face of new threats. While voices on the left and right focused on different issues, both were responding to shared concerns about transformational changes being implemented with little democratic oversight. Another perspective might see right-wing anti-globalism as a largely illegitimate conspiracist ideology whose increased influence in the 1990s was attributable more to good timing than anything else.

Regardless, the anti-globalist ideology developed by the Liberty Lobby and related anti-globalist groups benefited immensely from the end of Cold War, as their emphasis on the threat of world government and a 'new world order' suddenly became relevant to the broader American public. In the 1990s, ideas and arguments that could previously be found only in far-right publications were communicated, in muted form, by leading political figures and cultural voices. The fundamental ambiguity of anti-globalist language and the broader anti-globalist ideology allowed it to adapt itself to different political contexts and subcultures, taking on a distinct form in the minds of militiamen, millenarians and other self-identified populists.

It is fair to say that the ideologies of globalism and anti-globalism exercised considerable influence during in American politics during the 1990s, with the rise of globalism seeming to give a stable and visible enemy to a previously dormant anti-globalist far-right. It is important to note that the concept of globalism (and its partner, globalization) is extraordinarily broad and can refer to a number of distinct and yet largely interrelated phenomena. The 'term' globalism, like

other -isms, often serves as a foil or partner to one's own ideology, with the opposing ideology serving as the constitutive other for the speaker and the politics they wish to express. For the American Right communism historically played the role of the ideological force to be opposed. Crucially, the 1990s was the first decade in which the critique of globalism came to supplant anti-communism as the force to which American conservative politicians and intellectuals identified themselves against in their speeches and writing. The figure who came to represent that anti-globalist revolt was Patrick Buchanan.

Pat Buchanan and the Anti-Globalist Revolt against Republican Conservatism

The presidential candidacies of Patrick J. Buchanan in 1992, 1996, and 2000 left a substantial mark on the Republican Party and broader right-wing populist movement in America. Buchanan, a former Nixon and Reagan staffer who had a successful career as a journalist and television commentor, was the most prominent spokesman of anti-globalist populism in American political life. His views were stated clearly on December 10, 1991, when he announced his plans to run against incumbent President George H.W. Bush in the 1992 Republican primary. He railed against the George H.W. Bush, painting him as a noble man who had betrayed the conservative roots of his party and country. Buchanan said:

> By the grace of god, America won the cold war. (Applause.) But, my friends, victory has not brought with it an end to history. Beyond these shores, a new world is being born for which our government is unprepared and for which we are unprepared. The dynamic force that is shaping that new world is nationalism…
>
> [About George H.W. Bush] He is yesterday, and we are tomorrow. He is a globalist, and we are nationalists. He believes in some pax universalist. We believe in the old Republic. He would put America's wealth and power at the service of some vague new world order. We will put America first.[295]

In a phone interview I conducted with Mr. Buchanan on April 25, 2020, Buchanan stated that his thinking on the role of United States in international affairs evolved in the early 1990s. He had grown up a fervent anti-Communist, supporting the aggressive foreign policy needed to combat

[295] Patrick Buchanan Campaign Speech. *CSPAN*, Dec 10, 1991. Found online at: https://www.c-span.org/video/?23289-1/pat-buchanan-presidential-campaign-announcement

Soviet influence. He noted that his father had been a Taft supporter in 1952 and beyond, while he supported American foreign policy as an evil necessitated by the threat of Soviet communism. In his 1988 autobiography, Buchanan wrote:

> "The *raison d'etre* of any realistic (i.e. nonideological) American foreign policy must be the preservation of the Republic. Other goals (e.g. the advancement of human rights, the alleviation of poverty and hunger, the spread of democracy) are secondary and subordinate. If this is true, then, for the indefinite future the central concern of American foreign policy must be the USSR."[296]

A few years later, when he announced his candidacy, America's great enemy was no longer the Soviet Union. It was the 'New World Order'. The term had varied origins. It was used throughout the early 20th century to describe a post-national world, with differing interpretations and understandings. On the radical right, the term was popularized by Birch Society-affiliated writers like Gary Allen in the late 1970s and early 1980s. The phrase came to take on new significance in the wake of the Soviet Union's collapse. The Cold War had been won, and, for the first time in nearly half a century, the United States would have to determine how it would conduct foreign policy in a brave new world. His abovementioned reference to a "vague new world order" is contrasted against the "nationalist" position of "America First". In claiming such a mantle, Buchanan identified both with the long-standing position of anti-interventionism in foreign affairs and the newer and more ambiguous politics of far-right anti-globalism.

Buchanan lost the 1992 Republican primary to the incumbent George Bush, performing well but ultimately losing in New Hampshire. In his infamous Culture War speech at the 1992 Republican Convention, Buchanan displayed his bigotry by denouncing, "unrestricted abortion on demand, radical feminism, homosexual rights, [and] women in combat units," stating that conservatives were in, "a cultural war, as critical to the kind of nation we shall be as was the Cold War itself, for this war is for the soul of America."[297] After the election Buchanan collaborated with his sister (and former U.S. Treasurer) Bay Buchanan to set up their 'American Cause' organization, which would use the donor lists from the Buchanan campaign to raise funds through the direct-

[296] Patrick Buchanan. *Right From the Beginning*. Little & Brown, 1988. 182.
[297] Patrick Buchanan. Culture War Speech: Address to the Republican National Convention on August 17, 1992. Voices of Democracy: The U.S. Oratory Project. Found online at: https://voicesofdemocracy.umd.edu/buchanan-culture-war-speech-speech-text/

mail techniques perfected by New Rightists two decades prior. When Buchanan announced his 1996 candidacy, the staff and office were converted from a purportedly nonpartisan non-profit into a well-oiled campaign apparatus.

Buchanan had been accused of anti-Semitism for previous writings and statements on television. His track record was grim: he had written columns giving credibility to Holocaust denialism, written in defense of accused Nazi camp guard John Demjanjuk, and stated on The McLaughlin Group that, "Capitol Hill is Israeli occupied territory." Such rhetoric echoed the anti-Semitism of the interwar 'America First' movement, whose leading figures claimed that Jews were leading the United States blindly into the Second World War. At the same time, the emergence of an influential lobbying and public opinion shaping apparatus of pro-Zionist groups like AIPAC in the 1970s and 1980s led a handful of politicians and to attack Israeli influence in American foreign policymaking. Buchanan was not the only politician to express opposition to Israeli influence operations in American politics; he was tarred, however, by other allegations of bigotry which made it easy to assume that his sharp words had an anti-Semitic undercurrent.

Buchanan came under fire during his 1996 campaign for alleged ties to white supremacists and other extremists. Sally Buzbee of the Associated Press reported at the time: "The meeting was called by Pete Peters, leader of Christian identity, which critics saw supports violence to promote white supremacy. Other speakers included former Ku Klux Klan leader and Aryan Nations official Louis Beam and Aryan Nations Founder Richard Butler."[298] Pratt, who took a voluntary leave of absence from the Buchanan campaign after his attendance at the conference was revealed by a Center for Public Integrity report, stated in response that "he didn't know racist groups were going to be there. He claimed that he spoke only about Second Amendment rights... 'I loathe the Aryan Nations and other racist groups with every fiber of my being,' Pratt said."[299]

The allegation of extremism was especially damning in 1996, less than a year after far-right terrorists killed 168 and injured over 800 people in the Oklahoma City Bombing. During the primary campaign in 1996, Bob Dole ran television ads painting Buchanan as an extremist. In numerous speeches and interviews, Dole framed the Republican primary as a "struggle for the

[298] Sally Buzbee. Buchanan Co-Chairman Takes Leave After Questions About Right-Wing Ties. Associated Press, February 16, 1996.
[299] Ibid.

heart and soul of the Republican Party," fought "between the mainstream and the extreme."[300] The topic of abortion took on special significance, with Buchanan joining forces with pro-life Christian Rightists and demanding that the Republican Party platform propose a constitutional amendment protecting "unborn children." Buchanan's rhetoric on the topic was typically heated. At a February 1996 Arizona event organized by Arizona Right-to-Life, Buchanan stated that, if elected, he would "appoint Supreme Court justices who are constitutionalists and who will overturn that abomination called Roe v. Wade." He also stated that "the abortion industry... is built on the same lie that the Communist empire is built."[301] Ultimately, Dole was pressured to moderate his criticisms of Buchanan, as Christian Right leaders like Ralph Reed sought to avoid driving religious conservatives out of the Republican Party.

After winning the New Hampshire primary and placing second to Dole in Iowa, Buchanan gained more national attention. On Super Tuesday, however, Buchanan was soundly defeated by Dole in several primaries. Soon after, he dropped out of the race. Shortly before dropping out, he gave a speech on China & U.S. trade policy. Buchanan vociferously opposed the proposal that China be granted Most Favored Nation Status and instead argued that China's economic competitiveness, use of conscript labor and blatant violation of intellectual property law meant that it the United States should levy heavy tariffs on Chinese exports. He also spoke to the future of the Republican Party:

> "I do believe this country and this party are at a crossroads. If we're going to have two interventionist parties, two globalist parties, two free trade *uber alles* parties, and two parties dedicated to building some utopian new world order, and two parties that are moving pro-choice, etc., then that vacuum will call into being some new institution."[302]

Other Buchananites offered a different analysis. Samuel Francis (who will be profiled further in the upcoming section on paleoconservatism) was an advisor to Buchanan who wrote a number of influential pieces on the Buchanan-right populist movement for the conservative journal

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[300] Robert Dole Campaign Speech on February 21, 1996. CSPAN. Found online at: https://www.c-span.org/video/?70072-1/dole-campaign-speech.
[301] Adam Nagourney. "Buchanan Vows, it Elected, to Put an End to Abortions." *New York Times*, February 24, 1996.
[302] Buchanan Speech 1996 https://www.c-span.org/video/?71282-1/us-china-trade-relations

Chronicles. In a June 1996 article titled "The Buchanan Victory" (published months after Buchanan had dropped out of the Republican primary), Francis was explicit in his analysis of why his campaign failed:

> "the blunt truth is that there can be no serious national campaign of the populist right without former Duke supporters, militia members, and other inhabitants of the margins of national politics, and it is not possible to organize a real campaign without them. Those who lead and run a populist campaign of the right have to face that truth and to figure out how to deal with it when confronted with their "links" to such "extremists." They can do what the Buchanan campaign did, which was to purge the marginal elements and cud up in denial, or they can go on the offensive, exposing how the Ruling Class and its pet media use charges of "racism" and "extremism" to delegitimize and suppress any challenge to their power from the right. If they do the former, they will merely reconfirm the legitimacy of the imposed political boundaries; if they do the latter, they will retain their own support and use the occasion for a further challenge to the powers they claim to be opposing."[303]

Francis' embrace of racism and extremism demonstrates a significant point about the evolving ideological profile of the far-right during the 1990s. Instead of recoiling from these labels, right populists attempted to legitimate their positions by claiming that the moral hysteria and censorship of the mainstream media and other liberal institutions was far worse than any minor instances of bigotry.

After ending his 1996 campaign, Buchanan returned to television and writing. In the following years he published three books: *The Great Betrayal: How American Sovereignty and Social Justice are being Sacrificed to the Gods of the Global Economy* (1998), *A Republic, not an Empire: Reclaiming America's Destiny* (1999), and *The Death of the West: How Dying Populations and Immigrant Invasions Imperil Our Country and Civilization* (2002). These books offered concrete statements of Buchanan's ideology, which identified globalist elites and

[303] Sam Francis. "The Buchanan Victory." *Chronicles*, June 1996.

ideology as the source for the deleterious immigration, trade, and foreign policy decisions that had placed America on a trajectory of decline.

In 1998 he gave a speech on free trade to the Chicago Council on Foreign Relations. The speech argued for the existence of "irrepressible conflict between the claims of a new American nationalism and the commands of the Global Economy," which would kill jobs and contribute to American decline. He began the speech by painting a frightening picture of who the globalist elite are and how they think. He quotes Strobe Talbott, Clinton's roommate at Oxford and architect of his Russian policy:

> "All countries," said Talbott in 1991, "are basically social arrangements...No matter how permanent and even sacred they may seem at any one time, in fact they are all artificial and temporary...within the next hundred years...nationhood as we know it will be obsolete; all states will recognize a single, global authority".... This is the transnational elite, our new Masters of the Universe."[304]

This denunciation of the globalist elite echoes earlier and later condemnations of the same class. The concept of a 'transnational capitalist class' whose economic activities were increasingly divorced from the nations from which they came had been offered by critical scholars of political economy starting in the 1980s. Neoconservative political scientist Samuel Huntington would coin the term 'Davos man' in 2004 to describe a new, internationally-minded ruling class whose values were increasingly divorced from those of average Americans. In the pages of *The National Interest*, he wrote:

> "Globalization involves a huge expansion in the international interactions among individuals, corporations, governments, NGOs and other entities; growth in number and size of multinational corporations investing, producing and marketing globally; and the multiplication of international organizations, regimes and regulations. The impact of these developments differs among groups and among countries. The involvement of individuals in globalizing processes varies almost directly with their socio-economic status. Elites have more and deeper

[304] Patrick Buchanan. Speech on U.S. Economic Policy and Global Free Trade given at the Chicago Council on Foreign Relations on November 18, 1998. CSPAN. Found online at: https://www.c-span.org/video/?115457-1/us-economic-policy-global-free-trade

> transnational interests, commitments and identities than non-elites. American elites, government agencies, businesses and other organizations have been far more important in the globalization process than those of other countries. Hence there is reason for their commitments to national identities and national interests to be relatively weaker."[305]

Buchanan's assault on globalist hegemony continued during his third presidential run in 2000. It was during this campaign that he finally made the leap into third party politics. After serving in two Republican presidential administrations and attending nine consecutive Republican National Convention conferences, Buchanan left the Republican Party on October 25, 1999. In a televised speech given on that day, he justified his departure by claiming, indirectly, that the only way America could be saved was by electing him: "My friends, this year is our last chance to save our republic, before she disappears into the godless New World Order that our elites are constructing in a betrayal of everything for which our Founding Fathers lived, fought and died."[306]

Beyond his earlier statements about the problems of two-party duopoly, Buchanan had several more practical reasons for switching parties. The first was that the Reform Party, established by Ross Perot in the wake of his 1992 campaign, was entitled to $13 million in federal matching funds. The second was that the composition of the Republican primary field was less favorable to Buchanan's candidacy than in the previous two elections. A 2000 report by the Center for Public Integrity titled 'Buchanan: Opportunism Meets Hypocrisy' wrote:

> "his campaign for the GOP's 2000 presidential nomination was not going well. The institutional momentum behind George W. Bush was siphoning precious campaign cash from all other candidates, and Buchanan faced significant challenges from Gary Bauer and Malcolm "Steve" Forbes for the conservative Christian vote, upon which his campaign traditionally relied. The outlook for the Republican nomination looked bleak."[307]

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[305] Samuel Huntington. "Dead Souls: The Denationalization of the American Elite." *National Interest*, March 1, 2004.
[306] Patrick Buchanan. Speech on October 25, 1999. *CSPAN.*
[307] The Center for Public Integrity. "Party Machines, Lobbyists and Special Interests: Part Two Buchanan: Opportunism Meets Hypocrisy'" *The Center for Public Integrity*, March 2, 2000.

After defeating his competitors for the Reform Party nomination in a primary vote contested by the losers, Buchanan gave his nomination acceptance speech to the Reform Party National Convention in Long Beach, California on 12 August 2000. In a speech which blended fierce attacks on the sinfulness of abortion with defenses of steelworkers against the threats posed by foreign competition, Buchanan offered his break with Republicanism and two-party duopoly.

> "Friends, I am ashamed to say it, but we have begun to behave -- they have in Washington -- like the haughty British Empire our founding fathers rose up against and threw out of this country. This then is what our party, our cause, and our campaign are all about. We are Americans who say with our founding fathers, 'To hell with Empire, we want our country back.'
>
> Yet today both of these beltway parties conspire to kill our beloved republic. Both colluded to create that monstrosity the WTO. Both voted eighteen billion dollars for the IMF to make the world safe for Goldman Sachs...
>
> Let me tell you what this party believes in. We believe in independence forever. And we will reclaim every lost ounce of American sovereignty. I will lead the United States out of the WTO, out of the IMF and I will tell Mr. Kofi Annan up at the U.N. this: Your U.N. lease, sir, has run out and you will be moving out of the United States and, Mr. Kofi, I want to be polite but if you are not gone by year's end, we will send a few thousand U.S. marines to help you pack."[308]

His outspoken denunciation of the various trade deals and bailouts passed by the Clinton Administration in the 1990s was joined by an older call for American withdrawal from the United Nations. Buchanan described his competitors in the 2000 race as either witting or unwitting supporters of the globalist agenda.

> "And when I step out on that inaugural stand to take the oath of office as President, when my right hand goes up, their new world order comes down. Now -- Now -- Now Bill Clinton, he understands this issue of sovereignty. Al Gore, he understands it. "Dubya," he doesn't understand it. But don't worry; Dubya is being home-schooled in foreign policy by Ms. Condoleezza Rice. But we are the only

[308] Patrick Buchanan. Reform Party nomination acceptance speech on August 12, 2000. *CSPAN*.

> party in American, with a chance to win, that is sworn to fight world government abroad and big government in Washington, D.C."[309]

On election day, Buchanan and the Reform Party failed to deliver. He won 449,895 votes, less than half a percentage point of the total national vote. Consumer advocate and Green Party candidate Ralph Nader, a prominent critic of NAFTA from the left, was able to win five times more votes than Buchanan.

Buchanan's tirades against globalism and the New World Order in 2000 were largely the same as they were in 1992. The difference, however, was how widely heard and understood these messages were. His candidacies and concurrent media and fundraising operations (which were intimately linked organizationally and strategically under the purview of his sister and former Reagan Administration official Bay Buchanan) gave a face to the anti-globalist populist movement that had echoed across the country, amplified by his own 'American Cause' organization and the widespread media access his candidacies and speeches received. Despite his highly publicized departure from the Republican Party in the leadup to the 2000 Reform Party campaign, he would go on to endorse the Republican candidates in all subsequent elections.

The Return of Isolationism?: The Republican Backlash against Globalism in the 1990s

Despite Patrick Buchanan's failure to bring anti-globalism to the White House in any of his three presidential campaigns, the themes he championed would be adopted by a new wave of conservative Republicans in the Congress. The 1994 midterm elections saw substantial gains for the Republican Party, with Congressman Newt Gingrich leading the Party into a new era of opposition. Gingrich united the Republicans with his 'Contract for America' policy platform and emphasis on messaging. He was assisted in the latter task by pollster Frank Luntz, who had worked for both Pat Buchanan and Ross Perot in 1992. Luntz used his understanding of what motivated the angry voters who supported Buchanan and Perot to help Gingrich frame the Republican project in opposition to Clinton and the "tax and spend" liberal elite. While Luntz and his "poll-driven populism" were criticized by fellow pollsters and reporters, his reputation as

[309] Ibid.

a wordsmith and rhetorical guru earned him a position of influence alongside Gingrich at the helm of Republican strategy in the 1990s.[310]

In 1995 Sidney Blumenthal published an article titled *The Return of the Repressed: Anti-Internationalism and the American Righ*t. In that piece he claimed: "Of all the outcomes of the 1994 midterm elections, the shattering of the foreign policy consensus that held for more than a half-century was the most certain and far-reaching in its consequences."[311] After the election, Gingrich became speaker of the House and the visible new face of the Republican Right. Recent work has argued that Gingrich helped to inaugurate the ruthless strategy and sensational style that has since come to define the Republican Party. While Gingrich focused more on strategy than ideology, the Republican Congress started to adopt a hostility to the United Nations and globalism unseen since the 1950s.

Congressman Dick Armey, who helped lead the Republican Revolution in 1994 and succeeded Gingrich as the House Speaker in 1995, acknowledged the spate of anti-globalist sentiment motivating Republican voters. In a 1995 House debate on a military spending bill, he said:

> "The product is important to reaffirm Congress' standing with the American people, for us to say to America at this time, 'Yes, we agree, and we understand what you have told us.' The Nation has gone too far in the direction of globalism and has lost sight of its essential footing, and we intend to correct that[.]"[312]

The same sentiment was expressed in a famous speech by the ultraconservative Senator Jesse Helms to the United Nations in January 2000. Helms, chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, gave a barbed speech that mixed acknowledgement of the United Nations' importance with complaints about how the United States provides the lion's share of financial support while being pilloried by other nations in its chambers. He warned:

> "if the U.N. seeks to move beyond these core tasks, if it seeks to impose the U.N.'s power and authority over nation-states, I guarantee that the United Nations will meet stiff resistance from the American people.

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[310] Frank Luntz. "Learning From Failure." *The Washington Post*, November 5, 1992.
[311] Sidney Blumenthal. "Return of the Repressed." *World Policy Journal*, 1995.
[312] Representative Richard Armey. *Congressional Record,* February 16, 1995. Congressional Record - House, 5085.

> As matters now stand, many Americans sense that the U.N. has greater ambitions than simply being an efficient deliverer of humanitarian aid, a more effective peacekeeper, a better weapons inspector, and a more effective tool of great power diplomacy. They see the U.N. aspiring to establish itself as the central authority of a new international order of global laws and global governance. This is an international order the American people will not countenance."[313]

In October 2001, Senator Helms entered an essay by conservative funder Roger Miliken into the Congressional Record. Helms stated that Miliken was "sound[ing] a warning about the continuing erosion of the U.S. manufacturing base - and the hollowing-out of the U.S. economy - by the displacement of solid manufacturing jobs in America to low-wage paying countries all over the world." Miliken had a long history as a financial supporter of the Republican Party and the American Right more broadly, having provided financial support to the John Birch Society, *National Review*, Richard Nixon, Ronald Reagan, Pat Buchanan, and other conservative campaigns and causes. Miliken's article, titled *The Wealth of Nations: U.S. Manufacturing in Serious Trouble*, argued that the U.S. ought to change its economic course by protecting its domestic manufacturing industries.[314]

A similar current of economic protectionism and disdain for international organizations was expressed in a 2000 Congressional debate about the World Trade Organization. Congressman Ron Paul, who had promoted conspiratorial anti-globalist themes in his newsletter, the *Ron Paul Freedom Report*, proposed multiple bills to withdraw the United States from the United Nations during the 1990s and 2000s. Paul invoked a populistic bromide Congressman's argument about the benefits WTO membership would reap for American agriculture by saying, "The giant meat packers may well be represented at the WTO, but the small rancher and farmer is not." Paul yielded his time to Congressman Dana Rohrabacher (R-California), who added on:

> "The WTO is a majestic dream that predictably will become Americans' worst nightmare. The lure of more open trade with hundreds of countries is being used as a disguise for an awesome transfer of power and authority that will in the long

[313] Jesse Helms. *Address Before the U.N. Security Council on January 20, 2000.* Found online at: https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/CHRG-106shrg62154/html/CHRG-106shrg62154.htm
[314] Jesse Helms. Miliken Joins Hall of Fame for Textiles. *Congressional Record* 147:13, October 2, 2001.

> run ill serve the interests of the American people.... Idealistic globalism is today the greatest threat to freedom and liberty in this country. We should not be transferring power and authority to an unelected appointed international bureaucracy. That is what the WTO is about... Please, I ask Members to support to resolution. Do not sacrifice American liberty on the altar of globalism."[315]

Rohrabacher had been using the language of globalism for some time. In a speech two years earlier, Rohrabacher denounced the Clinton Administration's decision to grant China most-favored nation status. After a long speech detailing Chinese human rights abuses and citing the threat to American jobs posed by increased trade with China, Rohrabacher concluded:

> "The standards have broken down. This administration has blurred the lines, have violated the standards right from the beginning, the standards of being right and wrong, of good and evil, of democracy versus tyranny, of patriot- ism versus globalism. The standards have been broken down."[316]

While these voices were ultimately unable to stop the changes in U.S. trade policy that they warned against, they represented a movement for economic nationalism in the Republican Party that extended beyond Pat Buchanan. Conservative critics of free trade, like anti-globalization activists on the left, spoke of the threat to American workers posed by the new trade regime. But they also incorporated longer-standing isolationist and nativist tropes, connecting the trend toward international connectedness to related threats of immigration and world government. Just as with anti-internationalism in the 1990s, anti-globalism's power in the 1990s came from the pliability that allowed it to express a broadly legitimate critique of American foreign and economic policy *with or without* the anti-globalist conspiracism characteristic of the American far-right.

The following section will focus on the new ideological tendency of 'paleoconservatism' that emerged on the American Right in the 1980s and 1990s. Radical conservative intellectuals who were unhappy with the Reagan Administration's policies would come to articulate a

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[315] Representative Dana Rohrabacher (CA). WITHDRAWING APPROVAL OF UNITED STATES FROM AGREEMENT ESTABLISHING WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION. *Congressional Record* – House of Representatives H47H7, June 21, 2000. 11714.
[316] Representative Dana Rohrabacher (CA). *Congressional Record.* June 9 1998, 11674.

sophisticated critique of mainstream (neo)conservativism and the globalist foreign and economic policies that it supported. This section will reconstruct the intellectual context of paleoconservatism and focus on its most important figure: Samuel Francis, a man who has been called the "philosopher king" of the American radical right.

The Paleoconservatives: Far-right Intellectuals and the Uncivil War of Ideas on the American Right

The ideological content of the late-20th century populist backlash against globalism differed from mainstream American conservatism in a number of ways. The conservative movement's proponents pointed to philosophical tracts by writers like Russel Kirk, James Burnham, Frank Meyer, and others as providing the intellectual foundations of conservatism. Such ideas were popularized in the pages of conservative intellectual journals like *Modern Age* or *National Review*. The books of these and other authors were distributed to the masses through an emergent apparatus of conservative presses, think tanks, and educational groups, which bought books in mass quantities and encouraged a culture of intellectualism among conservative activists.

In contrast, the right-wing populist movement's ideology was embodied more in newsletters, radio programs, fax networks, and other ephemeral media than in any seminal texts by a populist philosopher. The populist movement of the 1990s was not, however, completely lacking in intellectual firepower. A handful of right-wing intellectuals threw their support behind the politics of Buchananism and the rejection of the globalist consensus, highlighting the complicity of the Republican establishment in the betrayal of "Middle America". These self-identified "paleocons" adopted this moniker to express their opposition to the "neoconservative" Republican establishment, who the paleocons believed had betrayed conservative principle and the American interest in their pursuit of power and prestige.[317]

Samuel Francis was born in Tennessee in 1947. He took his undergraduate degree at Johns Hopkins and completed a doctorate in history at the University of North Carolina. As a young man, Francis was attracted to the intellectual Right; he founded a reading group based on the

[317] The views of the paleoconservatives were expressed in the pages of *Chronicles* and in a handful of books, most prominently Samuel Francis. *Beautiful Losers: Essays on the Failure of American Conservatism*. University of Missouri Press, 1994; Justin Raimondo. *Reclaiming the American Right: The Lost Legacy of the Conservative Movement*. Center for Libertarian Studies, 1993; and Joseph Scotchie. *Revolt from the Heartland: The Struggle for an Authentic Conservatism.* Transaction Publishers, 2002.

recommended readings of the Intercollegiate Studies Institute, a libertarian-leaning organization focused on the distribution of books and literature promoting "classical liberalism" among American students. From 1977 to 1981 he worked as a policy analyst at the Heritage Foundation, the conservative think tank founded by New Right scions Paul Weyrich and Joseph Coors in 1973. In 1981 he went to work on Capitol Hill as a researcher for Senator John East of North Carolina. After East's suicide in 1986, Francis was given a position on the editorial board of the conservative Washington Times, where, five years later, he would be given a regular column. [318]

It was in the pages of the marginal cultural magazine *Chronicles*, rather than in his *Washington Times* column, that Francis would outline his critique of mainstream conservativism and broader synthesis of a populistic "Middle American Radicalism" with hard-edged white nationalism. Francis first published in *Chronicles* in 1984. The following year, after the death of founding editor Leopold Tyrmand, Francis' friend Thomas Fleming would become the lead editor of *Chronicles*; Fleming would oversee a transition away from esoteric cultural commentary toward a self-consciously radical cultural traditionalism.

Francis described the intellectual movement in a 2002 article in Patrick Buchanan's *The American Conservative,* in a review essay on fellow paleoconservative Joseph Scotchie's book *Revolt from the Heartland: The Struggle for an Authentic Conservatism:*

> "Paleoconservatism is largely the invention of a single magazine, the Rockford Institute's Chronicles, as it has been edited since the mid-1980s by Thomas Fleming, and Scotchie's book is essentially an account of what Fleming and his major colleagues at Chronicles mainly, historian Paul Gottfried, book review editor Chilton Williamson Jr., professor Clyde Wilson, and I believe, and what the differences are between our brand of conservatism and others."[319]

To say that this network, and its ideas, was characterized solely by "paleoconservative" themes would be inaccurate. Many of these publications were focused on policy-specific issues, aiming to find influence among Reagan officials and legislators. Other intellectual ventures focused on promoting "the classics", whether it be of Greco-Roman history or of the "conservative canon" of Kirk, Myers, and other post-war intellectuals of the Right. Others still were focused on more

[318] Michael Brendan Dougherty. "The Castaway." *America's Future Foundation*, January 14, 2006.
[319] Samuel Francis. "The Paleo Persuasion." *The American Conservative*, 2002.

banal and vulgar attacks on liberals, feminists, homosexuals, civil rights activists, or others seen as anathema to conservative cultural values. *Chronicles* was, in it early days, focused primarily on highbrow cultural commentary. It was not until the late 1980s and 1990s that it began to focus on the articulation of a self-consciously Rightist politics.

Francis' writings were concerned with diagnosing what went wrong with the direction of the conservative movement that shaped his formative years. The acidity of his attacks on his former institutional milieu was captured in the title of his 1994 book *Beautiful Losers: Essays on the Failure of American Conservatism.* In one passage, Francis describes the early trajectory of both the mainstream conservative movement and the conspiracist fringe:

> "While there was clearly a need for intellectual sophistication on the Right, the result of Buckley's tactic was to generate a schism between Old Right intellectual cadres and the body of conservative supporters outside its north-eastern urban and academic headquarters. Among these supporters in the 1950s and 1960s there flourished an increasingly bizarre and deracinated wilderness of extremist, conspiratorialist, racialist, and even occultist ideologues who loudly rejected both the Old Right mainstream and the Old Right's new friends in the intellectual and cultural elite, but who failed to attract any but the most marginal and pathological elements in the country and exerted no cultural or political influence at all. At various times in its history, National Review has found it necessary to "purge" itself of such adherents, and each catharsis, no matter how prudent, has rendered its "renovated" conservatism less and less palatable to ordinary Americans and more and more acceptable to the Manhattanite intelligentsia it has always sought to attract.[320]

Francis' claim that the variety of conspiracist "ideologues – exerted no cultural or political influence at all" bears scrutiny. This earlier generation of anti-globalist ideologues *was* largely unsuccessful in building lasting political organizations or in achieving their goal of catalyzing a broad-based, radical rightist political movement in the United States. At the same time, they

[320] Francis. *Beautiful Losers*. 226

produced the ideological milieu in which many of Francis' readers were received their political education. Francis continues:

> Even when Old Right forces were able to capture the Republican Party in 1964, the disastrous result of Barry Goldwater's candidacy was in large part due to his supporters' lack of access to the national organs of culture and opinion. Subsequent Old Right political efforts concentrated on attempts to gain influence within the political domain of the elite by means of endless searches for suitable presidential candidates who could seize national power at a single blow and through a kind of Fabian tactic of permeating the federal bureaucracy. As a result, there has now emerged an entire generation of what might be called "Court Conservatives" who devote their careers to place-seeking in the federal government and favor-currying with whatever president or satrap is able to hire them.[321]

Despite an early education in the conservative canon promoted by New Rightist organizations, Francis' writings on the populist radical right movement that he perceived and supported drew on a heterodox array of intellectual influences, ranging from Georges Sorel to Antonio Gramsci to Wilfredo Pareto. In his 1985 *Chronicles* article 'Revolution on the Right: The End of Bourgeois Conservatism?', Francis Georges Sorel's arguments about the centrality of political myth in his analysis of the violent far-right movement that first began to appear on the national stage in the mid-1980s. Francis asked why far-right extremism seemed to be emerging,

> "precisely at the moment when the most conservative President of this century has just won a second landslide electoral victory and when a version of political conservatism seems to be gaining some momentum in the national mind. Proclivities to right-wing violence should have been mollified by the current trend, but they weren't. And it is this thought that really frightens the brahmins of the liberal establishment: there just might really be something loose in the dark corners of America that doesn't care about the symbolic flag-waving, is not bought off by the direct mail of Washington-based populists, and wears a lean and

[321] Ibid, 227.

> hungry look that cannot be placated by the normal give-and-take of consensual politics."[322]

He describes the mainstream conservative movement as principally driven by a pro-business ideology, in contrast to "the new militants of the right," who "are in the process of articulating something that has never existed in America: a national myth, rising above and overshadowing private interests, to which a revolutionary right can adhere and for which its adherents would gladly spill their own blood and that of others." Citing a 'Declaration of War' found in the home of a member of the Silent Brotherhood terrorist group by the FBI, Francis ultimately argues that these far-right villains, no matter how unsavory they may be as individuals, have tapped into an important vein in the American psyche that had been long ignored by conservative elites:

> "What the homicidal crackpots of the Silent Brotherhood have perceived, and what is utterly lost on some pundits, fund-raisers, and politicians who claim to speak for the mainstream right, is that, denuded of its historic, national, and religious identity, a people dies and becomes a population, a demographic and economic statistic whose character and identity are then defined in terms of exit polls and consumption patterns; that unless the real identity of a nation is conserved, the issues of budgets, bombs, and bureaucrats are irrelevant to its survival."[323]

Central to Francis' ethno-nationalism is the political myth that can unite the Right and draw men to action. He saw the conservative movement as increasingly out of touch with the values and mores of Middle America and sympathized with the variety of right-wing extremist ideologies and groupuscules that emerged in the late 20th century. The bloodless economism of Reaganism and movement conservatism was contrasted to:

> "a nativist and largely underground right-wing movement motivated by something other than getting and spending. To be sure, what became known as the "New Right" in the late l 970's was also moved by nonmaterial goals, but by the end of 1984 it was surely clear that parts of the Republican establishment, Northeastern academic neoconservatives, and Mr. Reagan's Kitchen Cabinet had

[322] Samuel Francis. "Revolution on the Right." *Chronicles*, 1985.
[323] Ibid.

> co-opted the New Right and channeled its energies into support for the establishment framework of politics and policymaking. The conventional explanation was that economic issues took precedence over social issues. By opting for political violence, the new militants have ensured that they will never enter that framework. They or their successors may engage in politics, but it is likely to be a politics far more bitter, confrontational, and even violent than anything yet con¬ templated by any of us on the mainstream right, old or new."[324]

Francis' closest intellectual precedent was Revilo Oliver, the one-time mentor to William F. Buckley who later aligned with the neo-Nazi National Alliance. Oliver's 1982 book *America's Decline: The Education of a Conservative*, was meant as "a contribution, perhaps minor and necessarily personal, to the history of the 'conservative' movement in the United States."[325] Oliver preceded Francis in rejecting the conservatism of the conservative movement, seeing its leading figures as "shrewd men who cynically exploited - and exploit - the residue of patriotic sentiment and the confused instinct of self-preservation that remains in the white Americans who still respond to one or another variety of 'right-wing' propaganda."[326] While the vast majority of American conservatives in the 1980s saw the Reagan Revolution as the crowning achievement of a decades-long push for power, Francis, Oliver, and others on the extreme right-wing saw it as the ultimate failure of the conservative movement. Years of radical agitation against the liberal establishment were immediately followed by a symbiosis between the pseudo-revolutionary 'New Right' and that very establishment.

The post-war decades (when Oliver was a leading intellectual force on the radical right and while Francis was still a young man) saw an explosion in conservative social movement politics: hundreds of social movement organizations were formed, countless publications were printed, endless campaigns run, and extensive media activity by right-wing ideologues formed a diverse and broad-based right-wing movement against Communism and liberalism. Francis may have been a sympathetic observer of the campaigns of the New Right in the 1970s, but the contrast between their apparent success and the dismal situation Francis perceived led him to question their commitment to the conservative cause. The radical and often revolutionary rhetoric of the

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[324] Ibid.
[325] Revilo Oliver, *America's Decline*: *The Education of a Conservative*. Liberty Bell Press, 1982. 7.
[326] Ibid.

New Right was betrayed when they had the opportunity to take power; Francis was sympathetic, if not supportive, of the real radicals who would take up arms against their enemies, no matter how crazed their views or vulgar their behavior.

In 1996, Francis was dismissed from the *Washington Times* in an episode that has become part of the paleoconservative canon. Conservative writer Dinesh D'Souza revealed in a *Washington Post* column that Francis said the following at a 1995 conference organized by the white supremacist group, American Renaissance. Francis stated:

> "reassert our identity and our solidarity, and we must do so in explicitly racial terms through the articulation of a racial consciousness as whites. . . . The civilization that we as whites created in Europe and America could not have developed apart from the genetic endowments of the creating people."[327]

Francis responded to his firing with a statement typical of ethno-pluralist discourse, in which the accusation of racism is deflected with the claim that one is merely acknowledging racial differences rather than asserting racial superiority or primacy:

> "I understand what I said was controversial. I believe there are racial differences, there are natural differences between the races. I don't believe that one race is better than another. There's reasonably solid evidence for IQ differences, personality and behavior differences. I understand those things have been taken to justify segregation and white supremacy. That is not my intent."[328]

D'Souza's quotation, which would later appear in his 1995 book *The End of Racism,* was not the first time that Francis' flirtations with racism had hurt his career. Three months earlier, Francis' column was cut from three to two per week. The publication received backlash for a new Francis piece about the Southern Baptists Convention passing a resolution condemning slavery. In the piece, Francis criticized the decision to condemn slavery, writing that, "Neither slavery nor racism as an institution is a sin."[329] Despite the end of his column at the Washington Times, Francis continued to publish a column through Creator's Syndicate. In a 1996 article in *Chronicles,* Francis wrote that he had intended his column to be "a hardball expression of

[327] Howard Kurtz. "Washington Times Clips its Right Wing." *The Washington Post*, October 19, 1995.
[328] Ibid.
[329] Ibid.

paleoconservative principles broach a variety of immigration, trade policy, questions of globalism and national sovereignty, post-Cold War foreign policy, race, and American conservatism in general."[330]

After leaving the Times, Francis would begin to work more with the white supremacist Council of Conservative Citizens (CCC). The CCC was formed in 1985 by a number of white supremacist activists and sympathetic political figures, including former Georgia Governor and 1976 presidential candidate Lester Maddox. Other founding members had been part of the pro-segregation White Citizens Councils of the 1950s and 1960s, groups which served as organizing hubs for violence against blacks and civil rights activists during the Civil Rights Movement. The CCC gained national prominence when it was revealed that prominent Republicans had attended meetings of the Council, a group whose racism was never in doubt. Francis became the chief ideologue of the group, editing their publications and speaking at their conferences.[331]

Francis concluded a 2000 piece titled 'Beyond Conservatism' by expressing support for Buchanan's rejection of the Republican Party. He writes that:

> "the radicalization of the right that Buchanan's break symbolizes and the political success that radicalization could produce can be fulfilled only if a paleoconservative—or rather, what should now be called a radical or revolutionary conservative—vanguard is able to define and articulate it further and more clearly than it has been articulated so far. The opportunity to accomplish that articulation and to institutionalize it finally in a separate and permanent political party and a distinct political and cultural movement is the task to which paleoconservatives should now turn."[332]

He detailed the culturalist strategy (which he acknowledged was shaped by the political thought of Antonio Gramsci) needed to transform America:

> "a Middle American Right should begin working in and with schools, churches, clubs, women's groups, youth organizations, civic and professional associations,

[330] Samuel Francis. "Unnamed Column." *Chronicles*, Spring 1996.
[331] Southern Poverty Law Center. Profile of Sam Francis. *Southern Poverty Law Center*. Found online at: https://www.splcenter.org/fighting-hate/extremist-files/individual/sam-francis
[332] Samuel Francis. "Beyond Conservatism." *Chronicles*, Winter 2000.

> local government, the military and police forces, and even in the much-dreaded labor unions to create a radicalized Middle American consciousness that can perceive the ways in which exploitation of the middle classes is institutionalized and understand how it can be resisted. Only when this kind of infrastructure of cultural hegemony is developed can a Middle American Right seek meaningful political power without coalitions with the Left and bargaining with the regime."[333]

Francis did not live to see whether this strategy would be enacted by the movement to which he dedicated his adult life. He died of an aneurysm in 2005, not before serving as an editor of the white supremacist *Occidental Quarterly* (founded in 2001) and contributing to the anti-immigration website *VDARE* (founded in 1999), two publications which would become prominent on the American far-right in the early 21st century. The latter publication was cited by former Trump campaign and administration speechwriter Stephen Miller (now a contributor to Fox News), whose connections with the alt-right and American far-right were widely publicized during and after the Trump campaign.

Despite his early death, Francis has continued to exercise influence on the American far-right. While his columns in *Chronicles* never had the wide readership of the *Spotlight*, his shorter writings and books have been circulated on the internet by far-right groups since the late 1990s. The neo-Nazi group which operated Nationalists.Org has hosted Francis' articles. More recently, scholarly and journalistic attention has gained attention for highlighting the longer-term trends underpinning the Trump movement. While Francis' writings did more to diagnose and describe this movement than to actually spur it along directly, his prescient analysis of the problems posed by globalization for conservative politicians and the Republican Party – as well as his unabashed racism and commitment to political hate – make him one of the most important ideologues of the paleoconservative moment.

Beyond the pages of *Chronicles* and the other far-right magazines he edited and published in, Francis' writings were reprinted in some of the newsletters published by state branches of a new 'Populist Party' that appeared in the 1980s. The next section will outline the emergence and

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[333] Ibid.

trajectory of the Populist Party, a political party started by Willis Carto and other far-right activists in the 1980s.

Willis Carto and the Populist Party

This section will explore the history and influence of the Populist Party built by Willis Carto in the 1980s. Carto and other far-right ideologues started the Populist Party in 1983, presenting it as a credible alternative to the two-party duopoly. The Party would ultimately field candidates for local elections, and multiple state-level parties held regular meetings in the late 1980s and early 1990s. Behind the scenes, it served as a hub for far-right activists and for the production and distribution of anti-globalist propaganda. Carto was ultimately kicked out of the Party, and the legal battles between Carto and his successors played a major part in the Party's decline. While the party itself was unsuccessful in electing candidates or building national support, a decentralized network of state parties continued to operate into the 1990s. Many of these state parties published 'populist' newsletters dedicated to promoting the anti-globalist populist ideology developed by Carto in the early 1980s. The *Populist Observer* in particular, run by Don Wassall (whose battle with Carto over control of the Party culminated in a five-year long libel case) gave a platform to far-right critics of the conservative consensus. The *Observer* and other publications promoted the conspiracist worldview elaborated in the pages of Lobby and Bircher publications, adopting the business model of both organizations by selling books and other literature through direct-mail orders. This populist network, which had its peak influence in the early 1990s, helped to set the stage for emergence of the far-right militia movement in the mid- to late-1990s.

While this chapter focuses on Carto's involvement in the Populist Party, it is worth noting that the Liberty Lobby also undertook new ventures in the 1990s. It continued to publish its *Spotlight* tabloid during the 1980s and 1990s, and the *Journal of Historical Review* founded by Carto in 1980 had become the intellectual hub for Holocaust denialism. One new effort of Liberty Lobby in the early 1990s was its time operating a radio network. In 1989, Carto acquired the Sun Radio Network based in Tampa, Florida. The network, which ultimately failed financially, featured several shows by Lobby-affiliated 'populists'. The most popular was Chuck Harder's "For the People" talk radio show, which would ultimately be bought by the United Auto Workers union in the late 1990s. Another show, Tom Valentine's "Radio Free America" broadcast a similar

populist message. A third show, Editor's Roundtable, "which [brought] the voices of extremists and conspiracy theorists to dozens of media markets across the country."[334]

Willis Carto and a variety of right-wing personalities founded the Populist Party in 1983 "as an amalgamation of various far right splinter groups, including the Constitution Party, the American Party of Indiana, the American Independent Party of California, and Christian Identity groups."[335] The party ran a presidential candidate in 1984, winning few votes and only getting on the ballot in a handful of states. In 1988 the party ran David Duke, who was similarly unsuccessful. In 1988 Carto lost control of the Party to a group of party members who had built up state party apparatuses and publications. The leader of this group (and eventual leader of this party) was Don Wassall. also founded the American Nationalist Union and published *The Nationalist Times* in the mid-1980s. Wassall would convert this publication into the *Populist Observer*, which mixed internal news about Populist Party events and campaigns with a broader populist analysis of news and political events reminiscent of *The Spotlight*. *The Spotlight,* however, became intensely critical of the Populist Party and Wassall after Carto was forced out; Wassall would ultimately win a libel lawsuit filed against Carto, the Liberty Lobby, and Lobby writer Michael Collins Piper.[336]

The broad ambit of the populist movement was connected by self-styled populist publications like *Spotlight*, Don Wassall's *Populist Observer*, and other newsletters. These subscription-based publications promoted books like *Behold a Pale Horse* (1991) by Milton William Cooper, or the popular *Left Behind* series of millenarian Christian fiction. Radio shows and fax networks also formed a substantial part of the populist media network of the 1990s. One Populist Party advert read:

> "Shortwave Populism: AMERICA FIRST RADIO is the name of a new one hour program on international shortwave radio.. The programming will include guest

[334]Information about Harder and Valentine's show came from Right Woos Left, a 1999 report by Chip Berlet for the watchdog group Political Research Associates. The quote about Editor's Roundtable came from a Nizkor Project article titled *Paranoia as Patriotism: Far-Right Influences on the Militia Movement.* Found online at*:* http://www.nizkor.com/hweb/orgs/american/adl/paranoia-as-patriotism/liberty-lobby.html
[335] Michael. *Willis Carto*. 32.
[336] Robert Hillard and Michael Keith. *Waves of Rancor: Tuning into the Radical Right*. London: Routledge, 1999. 121.

> interviews, listener call in (1-800-518-5979), commentaries and updates on current events. Unlike other shows, 'America First Radio' won't be about how to go hide in the hills and wring one's hands in despair. The focus will be on what people can do to work through the political system, specifically the Populist Party, to retake their country. Hopefully, the program can be expanded to five days a week, carrying the populist/nationalist viewpoint. Your support for this essential opportunity can be directed to the national office and Chairman Don Wassall"[337]

In his Populist Observer, Don Wasall directly echoed Carto's anti-globalism when he published an article titled "The real issue - nationalism vs. internationalism." In the 1991 article he connected President George H.W. Bush's recent reference to the 'New World Order' to the broader anti-globalist worldview espoused by Birchers and Lobby authors. He wrote:

> "A remarkable phenomenon of the last few months is the sudden rise of the phrase "New World Order" from obscure tomes issued by the Trilateral Commission to a general, oft-repeated usage in the mainstream culture, particularly by President Bush himself... the essence of the New World Order is found by identifying its key ingredient - internationalism - just as a full understanding of the forces opposed to the New World Order isn't possible without knowing what fuels them - nationalism. The nationalist/internationalist battle is the real conflict taking place in the world today. Internationalism - the New World Order - seeks the economic integration of the world's economies, followed, eventually, by a world government. To achieve the desired ends, internationalists oppose racial and religious traditions, familial authority, and local control of education and government, in favor of deracination and mass standardization of culture, with uninterrupted materialism as the unifying factor and *raison d'etre* of society."[338]

Despite Wasall's personal falling-out with Willis Carto over control of the Populist Party, his publication – and the broader apparatus of Populist Party state parties and related newsletters – repeated the "nationalist-internationalist" argument that Carto had developed in the early 1980s

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[337] Ibid, 130.
[338] Don Wassall. *Populist Observer*, February 1991. 30.

in the pages of *The Spotlight* and his other populist-themed books. While the dichotomy between nationalism and internationalism had been promoted by anti-internationalists since the beginning of the century, the late 20th century version espoused by Carto, Wassall, and other 'populists' was more sophisticated than earlier anti-internationalist screeds. The association of the 'New World Order' (and the looming threat of world government) with a broad variety of social, political, economic, and technological shifts allowed anti-globalist ideologues to connect distinct issues like trade, immigration, foreign policy, cultural shifts associated with the 'Silent Revolution' under the broad banner of a globalist assault on American sovereignty and values.

Anti-globalists of the 1990s also renewed earlier assaults on the United Nations, which was seen as the primary mechanism through which a world government would be instituted. In the post-war decades, skepticism toward the United Nations crystallized into the Birch Society slogan (which appeared on bumper stickers, billboards, and in countless publications and Bircher-authored letters to the editor): "Get US out of UN!" One unnamed Populist Party member wrote a letter to the *Populist Observer* in which he renewed this call:

> "I would like to make at least two additions to our 1992 platform. First: We must look at the United Nations as an enemy to the Populist movement. If the United States were not a member of this internationalist bunch of world governments we well may not have become involved in this fruitless war in the Mideast. Several years ago, conservatives as a general force called for the US to get out of the UN and for the UN to be removed from our soil. So to recap number one - the Populist Party should call for the US to quit the UN and two: have the organization removed from our country."[339]

The racist and anti-Semitic colors of the publication were also displayed in the letters published by Wasall in the *Observer.* The author of this same letter also suggested that the Populist Party pledge to "support a Conservative Party government (White) in South Africa. If "we" lost South Africa to the black ANC then the forces behind the One World government have obtained one more piece of the puzzle... Our party should show our support for the installation of a White Conservative government in South Africa!" Another letter on the same page cited an anti-Semitic

[339] Ibid, 27.

"history" book by Holocaust denier Eustace Mullins titled "The Curse of Canaan".[340] In this way, the *Populist Observer* followed the Spotlight model of anti-Semitic propagandizing: using the language of 'globalism', 'internationalism', and 'New World Order' to describe a broader anti-Semitic narrative about Jewish banking families controlling the Federal Reserve. In order to find the details of this conspiracy, readers would have to go beyond the *Observer* itself; the Observer advertised sales for the anti-Semitic text *Billionaires for the Banksters*. The pamphlet was described as "a concise summary of how our corrupt money system works. This short book tells you all you need to know. Hundreds of thousands of copies of this classic have been circulated. $3.50 each."

Another populist publication, *The Washington Populist*, was more simplistic and vulgar than the *Observer*. It focused on similar themes was explicit in its anti-Semitism and calls to political violence. In addition to organizing the events of the Populist Party of the Washington, it promoted a hard-edged version of the anti-globalist far-right populist worldview promoted by Wassall and Carto. One 1998 article, titled 'The Clinton Enigma', said:

> "We can only hope that future history books verify the reality of the treachery and treason of the Clinton era. The jewsmedia certainly puts so much spin on daily nationjacking that the evening network news leaves the average American sap with a dizy headache... Clinton not only is better than Teflon, he comes out smelling like a Rose(nblum). Over half of his administration appointees are antichrist jews.... The USA is a maturing, mutant corporate-empire. Our nation-state is disappearing. Having an emperor helps us get a picture of the apocalyptic society that awaits do-nothing kosher conservatives."[341]

After Carto left the Populist Party, he began to directly and indirectly attack the Populist Party in the pages of The Spotlight. The first manner in which he attacked the Party was by slandering Wassall in the pages of *The Spotlight*. Wassall sued Carto and Liberty Lobby for libel in 1991 after several critical articles called him a fraud and mocked his weight. The second manner was by raising money for the Populist Action Committee in the pages of the Spotlight. The Populist

[340] Ibid, page 27. It is worth noting that a recent user-submitted note on the Google Books page of *The Curse of Canaan* refers to the Q-Anon conspiracy.

[341] Anonymous. The Clinton Enigma. *Washington Populist*, 5:3 (1998): 1.

Action Committee was controlled by Carto and had no affiliation with the Party. It also had no obligation to supply money to the Populist Party or its affiliates. This diverted funds that may otherwise have supported the Populist Party, whose potential supporters were likely the kind of people who read *The Spotlight.*[342]

Whether those donations would have saved the Party is another question; amidst growing legal troubles, the Party held its last meeting in 1995 before folding. Two years later, Wassall finally beat Carto in court, winning a $2.1 million settlement for libel. During the trial, Carto's employee and protégé Michael Piper Williams admitted to writing fake letters-to-the-editor attacking Wassall in *The Spotlight,* as well as sending Wassall a written death threat. The lawsuit contributed to the financial downfall of the Liberty Lobby, which itself closed its doors in 2001.[343]

What was the ultimate legacy of the Populist Party, its affiliated state parties, and the various 'populist' newsletters and publications associated with the party's leadership? In terms of electoral politics: not much. Scores of Populist candidates ran for various local and state-level offices on the platforms of party affiliates, which were occasionally successful in ballot drives aiming to get their candidates (and the party itself) listed alongside Republican and Democrats on election day. Some candidates were able to attract attention, earning over 5% of the vote in a handful of elections.

The Populist Party made up for its lack of political success by becoming an outgrowth of the Liberty Lobby ideological network. From 1984 to 1995, the Populist Party served as an organizing hub for radical rightists who responded to the 'Reagan Revolution' by concluding that the New Right was insufficiently conservative. They ought to commit themselves to the construction of a better electoral vessel for right-wing politics than the Republican Party. The Populist Party's affiliate publications, along with Liberty Lobby's *Spotlight*, served as the main publications organizing the emergent anti-globalist radical right in the late 1980s and early 1990s. The decline of the Populist Party in the leadup to its ultimate dissolution in 1995 coincided with the emergence of a militia movement galvanized by the events of Waco and Ruby

[342] This move illustrates two things: (a) Carto's personal pettiness and strategic understanding of how right-wing organizations functioned - and where they were vulnerable - and (b) the dynamic by which right-wing publications competed for subscriber dollars and donations from a relatively small base of potential donors.
[343] Jason Berry. "Newspaper focuses on conspiracy theories." *The Atlanta Constitution*, 11 Jun 1995.

Ridge. While he ultimately utilized *The Spotlight* against the Populist Party (and, in particular, his former collaborator Don Wassall), both occupied the same ideological space, promoting far-right anti-globalist populism openly while making more indirect references to or acknowledgments of white supremacist ideology. This network of populist publications would play an integral part in the (distinct yet overlapping) militia and racialist movements, providing an initial informational infrastructure (and an organizing-propagandistic model) for militia movement leaders and far-right extremists alike. The next section will look at the emergence of that militia movement.

Patriots against the New World Order: The Militia Movement in the 1990s

The emergence of a national right-wing militia movement was one of the most striking trends of American politics in the 1990s. The militia movement of the 1990s was highly heterogenous and decentralized, with hundreds of individual militia groups around the country forming in response to two events in the early 1990s: Ruby Ridge and Waco. Each event involved deadly conflict between armed dissidents and U.S. federal troops, receiving attention both from mainstream media and far-right publications. In his study of the militia movement and the far-right, Crothers described the process by which the militia movement materialized:

> "Ideologues and organizers of what came to be called the militia movement used these events as justifications for creating and expanding a new militia in America, one separate from government control and oversight precisely because it was intended to check and limit the power of the federal government. In the case of the militia [movement, these] events preceded the formation of both its organizational and its ideological structures. Militia organizers responded to events as they unfolded, building an ideology and an organization without a coherent plan. These activists linked the myth of the revolutionary militia to values embedded in American political culture to legitimate both their ideas and their actions. These activists linked the myth of the revolutionary militia to values embedded in American political culture to legitimate both their ideas and their actions."[344]

[344] Crothers. *Rage on the Right.* 22.

Crothers' analysis of the relationship between the events of Ruby Ridge and Waco, the formation of militias, the ideological entrepreneurs who galvanized the movement, and their place in American culture and politics is highly succinct. My own analysis diverges from Crothers around the roots of the "ideological structures" of the militia movement; while I agree that the militia movement brought with it novel forms of knowledge production, the broader ideology animating the militia movement was the specifically anti-globalist ideology produced by the Bircher-Lobby ideological apparatus in the decades before the 1990s. In the face of an ominous New World Order, many militiamen sought to embody what Crothers called "the myth of the revolutionary militia," a trope with deep resonance in American history and culture. While the globalist threat of U.N.-led gun confiscations feared by many militiamen never materialized, the militia movement is significant for the posture of militant resistance that its leaders and members took in response to perceived threats.

It is important to note, however, that many militia members joined for reasons other than their belief in a globalist conspiracy. The militia movement of the 1990s was a uniquely heterogenous and decentralized social movement, and it is difficult to categorize its broad ideological profile. Of the hundreds of militia groups that organized in the 1990s, most can be categorized as either 'constitutionalist' or 'millenarian' militias. Militia historian Robert Churchill described the difference between these two ideal types when he wrote:

> "Constitutionalists began to organize militias on the basis of public meetings and open membership. They saw the growing threat of state-sponsored violence as a symptom of a corrupt and abusive government, and argued that the militia, if public, could act as a deterrent against further government abuse. Millenarians began to organize on the basis of a closed cell structure hidden from public view. Their vision was millennial and apocalyptic: they saw militia organization as the only way to survive an imminent invasion by the forces of the New World Order."[345]

In her study of the militias of Michigan, Amy Cooter wrote that millenarian militias draw more on far-right conspiracist ideas and "seem to have greater potential for violence and more links to

[345] Robert Churchill. *To Shake Their Guns in the Tyrant's Face: Libertarian Political Violence and the Origins of the Militia Movement*. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2011. 188

racist or other problematic groups." Constitutionalist militias disavowed far-right extremism and engaged in legitimate activities oriented around the cultivation of civic virtue and local autonomy, organizing public meetings and supporting community members through volunteering activities and donations. Other groups sought to isolate themselves from a society and government they saw as degenerating or already ruined, establishing armed compounds in rural areas for the purpose of living off the grid – or, in some cases, for the purpose of planning for war. It was in these communities that far-right ideas, particularly fears of an imminent New World Order threat embodied in black helicopters, gun-grabbing federal agents and United Nations troops, gripped the imagination of militia members. Despite the contrast between the noble aims of constitutionalist militias and the paranoid apparitions of the conspiracist fringe, both groups were animated by what James Aho called the tripartite "dialectic of heroism." Mulloy, in his study of the militia movement, writes:

> "In the first "an ideal is imagined," such as "democracy, equality, peace, love, freedom, racial purity, [or] moral perfection." In the second moment "the actuality of the real world is counterpoised to the ideal." This, Aho says, "is the Is in opposition to the Should Be: inequality, tyranny, mistrust, cynicism, miscegenation, [or] corruption." The contradiction between the Is and the Should Be then produces the third moment, requiring, in Hegel's terms, the "realization of the ideal and the idealization of the real," or, as Aho himself puts it, "persistent effort to embody [the] ideal in concrete."[346]

As Mulloy goes on to write, "The usefulness of Aho's dialectic lies in its applicability to mainstream political movements as much as to extremist groups." The patriotic rhetoric and all-American symbology embraced by militia groups of all varieties allowed them to claim identification with long-standing trends in American history, applying centuries-old maxims like "Liberty or death" to contemporary political events and trends.

For all militias, the deadly events which took place at Ruby Ridge and Waco in 1992 and 1993 served as catalyzing moments for the movement. Ruby Ridge centered around a deadly firefight between federal agents and the Weaver family of Ruby Ridge, Idaho. The details of the incident,

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[346] Darren Mulloy. *American Extremism: History, Politics and the Militia Movement*. London: Routledge, 2004. 33.

in which strategic and tactical mistakes by federal agents led to the unnecessary deaths of Weaver's wife and son, have been widely documented in scholarship on the militia movement and the American far-right. I aim to emphasize that Randy Weaver was immersed in the violent white supremacist ideology whose then-recent appearance was discussed in the previous chapter.

Randy Weaver had previously attended several meetings at the far-right Aryan Nations compound in Hayden Lake, Idaho, where he associated with white separatists and other extremists. The warrant stemmed from previous interactions with Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms (BATF) agents, who bought illegally modified guns from Weaver and then tried to have him become a federal informant.[347] The BATF informant who bought guns from Weaver initially met him at the 1986 World Conference of Aryan Nations, an annual meeting of white supremacist activists and groups at the Hayden Lake compound in Idaho. Federal agencies were becoming more interested in investigating and prosecuting Aryan Nations affiliates, some of whom had pled guilty to counterfeiting with the aim of funding "white supremacist activities", according to one of the prosecutors in the counterfeiting case. Weaver himself spoke at the 1989 Aryan Nations conference, according to the BATF informant. The *Ruby Ridge Report* stated: "In July 1989, Weaver invited the informant to his home to discuss forming a group to fight the "Zionist Organized Government," referencing the "Z.O.G." theory discussed in the previous chapter.[348] Weaver's familiarity with the themes of a hidden, Jewish-controlled government demonstrates his familiarity with the violent right-wing extremist milieu in which anti-globalist themes predominated.

The 1993 Waco, Texas, incident also featured a confrontation between well-armed survivalists and federal agents, albeit on a grander scale. The Waco compound was occupied by the Branch Davidians, a minor Christian sect formed in 1955 by a preacher named Benjamin Roden. During the 1980s, young man who believed himself to be a messianic figure took over the sect and re-named himself David Koresh. Koresh turned the Davidians into a sex cult, fathering over a dozen children with female Davidians, some of whom were minors. Allegations of sexually

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[347] U.S. Department of Justice. *REPORT OF THE RUBY RIDGE TASK FORCE TO THE OFFICE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY OF INVESTIGATION OF ALLEGATIONS OF IMPROPER GOVERNMENTAL CONDUCT IN THE INVESTIGATION, APPREHENSION AND PROSECUTION OF RANDALL C. WEAVER AND KEVIN L. HARRIS JUNE 10, 1994*. 13. Found online at: https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/opr/legacy/2006/11/09/rubyreportcover_39.pdf

[348] Ibid, 20.

predatory behavior and the physical abuse of children got the attention of federal law enforcement. A BATF investigation would ultimately attain a warrant for Koresh's arrest based on information that the Davidians were collecting bomb-making materials and illegally modifying guns.

When the Davidians refused to stand down and allow for Koresh's arrest, BATF forces began to lay siege to the Waco compound. An initial firefight on 28 February 1993 led to the death of four federal agents and six Davidians. Following this, the FBI took over and led the negotiations with Koresh. Some children were released during the following weeks of negotiations, while FBI leadership disagreed over whether negotiation or force were the means by which the conflict would be resolved. On April 19, FBI forces used tear gas to in an attempt to force the Davidians out of the compound. The compound ended up catching fire and partially collapsing, with many of the Davidians dying of smoke inhalation. When the smoke cleared, 76 people were dead.

Like Ruby Ridge, the Waco siege attracted national media attention. For militia members, the siege confirmed a belief engendered by Ruby Ridge: that the federal government was willing to use deadly force to stifle political dissent. Footage from the siege was used in militia materials in the following years. One of the most prominent examples were the cassette tapes produced by attorney and militia figure Linda Thompson. Thompson produced a 'documentary' titled "Waco, the Big Lie" in 1993. Her tape stated:

> "We have three confirmed reported sightings of trainloads of U.N. tanks going into Portland, Oregon, over the past weeks, and troop movements of unmarked military vehicles around the nation. Perhaps you might ponder the significance of these events… The Waco massacre has awakened Americans all across the nation to what is horribly wrong in this country. A voice of unity is being heard, growing louder each day… And each of them, Bill Clinton, Janet Reno, William Sessions, and Lloyd Bentsen, are murderers… A one world government where, in order to put the new government in place, we must all be disarmed first."[349]

[349] These quotes are excerpts from Linda Thompson's "Waco: Another Perspective", collected in Steven Chermak, *Searching for a Demon: The Media Construction of the Militia Movement*. Boston: Northeastern University Press, 2002. 122.

After Waco, the militia movement had its peak of activity. By 1996, there were 858 active militias in the United States. That number declined to less than two hundred by 2001. The change was brought about by the public backlash and media campaign against militia movements that followed the Oklahoma City Bombing on April 19, 1995. The federal government began to take the threat of right-wing domestic terrorism seriously, and militia groups fell apart due to a lack of interest and concerns about (likely) government infiltration of militias. The movement had a slight resurgence in the leadup to the year 2000, when the Y2K conspiracy animated militia activity once again. By 2001, there were less than two hundred active militias across the country. By 2003, there were less than forty.

It is difficult to assess the historical legacy of the militia movement. It was relatively short-lived, and the primary political activity of its members was preparation for a threat (of door-to-door gun confiscations or an invasion by United Nations troops) that never materialized. Excluding Timothy McVeigh, none of the individuals involved in the militia movement gained any public prominent outside of the movement. The movement was decentralized and essentially leaderless. Thompson became one of the better-known figures in the movement due to the impact of her publications and tapes.

The militia movement was organizationally decentralized, but it was fundamentally structured and organized by the ideological networks established by previous generations of anti-globalist ideologues. *The Spotlight* was likely the most widely-read publication among militia members, and other 'populist' publications like the *Populist Observer* and *Washington Populist* were distinct from, yet borne of, the Liberty Lobby network. Conspiracist literature produced by the Birch Society, Lobby, and other far-right presses circulated at militia events and related milieus like fish-and-game events and gun shows. While most militia members would never meet another militiamen outside of their own group, they were all united by their shared opposition to the 'New World Order'. Without the efforts of the anti-globalist ideologues during the 1960s and 1970s, the worldview that animated the militia movement would not have been as influential or developed as it was. The efforts of earlier generations of anti-globalists also played a crucial part in the history and trajectory of another emergent faction on the late 20th century American far-right: the racialist right. The following section will explore the organizational and ideological

development of the white supremacist movement in the 1990s, as they adopted the language of 'race realism' to promote their racist ideology.

The Racialist Right: David Duke, William Pierce, and White Nationalism in America

Carol Swain's 2001 book *The New White Nationalism in America: Its Challenge to Integration* described one of the most disturbing political trends of the 1990s:

> "Over the past ten years, a new white nationalist movement has gained strength in America, bringing with it the potential to disrupt already fragile race relations. Eschewing violence, this movement seeks to expand its influence mainly through argument and persuasion directed at its target audience of white Americans aggrieved over racial double standards, race-based affirmative action policies, high black-on-white crime rates, and liberal immigration policies."[350]

The rise of the white nationalist movement in America at the end of the 20th century has been chronicled by historians and social scientists, who have rigorously identified its leading figures, its organizational structures, ideological precepts, movement history, and media output. Given the breadth of scholarship on the white nationalist far-right, I focus this section on the two most important and influential ideologues on the American extreme-right: David Duke and William Pierce. Both were ardent Nazis whose hatred of Jews and minorities is evident from their writings and public statements. What distinguished these figures from their many contemporaries was their ability to shape politics beyond the marginal confines of the extreme Right, with the former pursuing electoral politics and the latter using propaganda to convince white radicals to commit acts of terrorism. Duke was the most prominent right-wing extremist in the United States during the 1990s, while Pierce was the founder and leading light of the group most responsible for the propagation of violent and racist materials during the late 20th century. Pierce started his career with Willis Carto, while Duke received endorsements and favorable from Carto's *Spotlight* throughout his career. Both men illustrate the way that anti-globalist ideology shaped

[350] Carol Swain, *The New White Nationalism in America; Its Challenge to Integration.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002. Inside cover.

the ideological worldview of the violent racialist Right that appeared in the U.S. at the end of the 20th century.

David Duke

The most prominent figure of the racialist Right was David Duke. Duke was radicalized as a young man, after he read white supremacist literature and attended a meeting of the pro-segregation Citizen's Council in Louisiana. He started his political career as a college-campus radical, founding a group called the White Youth Alliance in 1970, organizing protests and getting arrested for inciting violence. In 1974 he founded the Knights of the Ku Klux Klan (KKKK) in New Orleans. One of the primary propaganda efforts of Duke in the 1970s was his *Crusader* periodical, which featured vulgar racist cartoons and other Klan fare. Duke's biographer, Tyler Bridges, described the way that Duke sought to distinguish his own activism from that of previous generations of Klansmen:

> "Duke initially proclaimed allegiance with members of other Klans, calling them 'Klan brothers, for we are all fighting for the same cause.' … But he soon abandoned this stance and began sniping at other Klan leaders. The animosity developed from differences not only in style but also in ideology…. Duke – was to change the Klan's ideological focus and to usher in a new era – a Nazificiation of the Klan – based on his conviction that Jews posed the greatest threat to the white race."[351]

Duke recruited a number of figures into the KKKK who had or would go on to have substantial influence in the white supremacist scene. One character, Don Black, joined the KKKK as a twenty-two-year-old. In the 1980s, Black served time in federal prison for his involvement in a Neo-Nazi scheme to invade the Caribbean island nation of Dominicana. In prison, Black took computer programming classes. He would go on to found the website Stormfront.com in 1995. Stormfront would become the most prominent hub for white supremacism online. Black, in a 1998 interview, described the impact he sought with Stormfront: "The Internet is a means of planting seeds for the future. There are a lot of middle-class people who feel disaffected -- and in Stormfront they can find what they can't in the mass media. It's about building a community and

[351] David Bridges. *The Rise of David Duke*. Oxford: University Press of Mississippi, 1995. 40.

attracting hard-core supporters."[352]Another Duke associate, William Grimstad, "was one of the hate movement's most prominent propagandists. He had been editor of the [National Socialist White People's Party] newsletter, *White Power*, and had been the author of several anti-Semitic books published by [Willis Carto's] Noontide Press… Grimstad's most noted book was *The Six Million Reconsidered*, which was published anonymously in 1977."[353]

Duke's electoral career began in 1975, when he received over 11,000 votes in a Louisiana State Senate race and finished in third place. In a campaign speech he stated that "We must meet and defeat the enemy," who/which he defined as "those who are pushing for integration, non-white culture, Communism, against the ideals of our Republic, or those who attempt to thwart the Klan."[354] In 1979 he ran as a Democrat for another Louisiana Senate seat and finished second. The following year, after allegations by other Klansmen that Duke had stolen money, he left the Klan and started the National Association for the Advancement of White People, a play on the name of the civil rights oriented N.A.A.C.P.

In 1988, Duke ran for president on the ticket of Carto's Populist Party. He only appeared on the ballot in eleven states and won less than 50,000 votes around the country. The following year, however, he ran as a Republican for another Louisiana Senate seat and won a narrow election (50.7 to 49.3%) to earn a seat in the legislature. His opponent, John Treen (brother of former governor David Treen), had been endorsed by President George H.W. Bush and former President Reagan. In his autobiography, former Louisiana legislator Ron Gomez described Duke's appeal and rhetorical style in the leadup to the 1989 election:

> "[Duke's] new message was that he had left the Klan, shed the Nazi uniform he had proudly worn in many previous appearances, and only wanted to serve the people. He eliminated his high-octane anti-Semitic rhetoric. He was particularly concerned with the plight of "European-Americans." He never blatantly spoke of race as a factor but referred to the "growing underclass." He used the tried-and-true demagoguery of class envy to sell his message: excessive taxpayers' money spent on welfare, school busing practices, affirmative action... and set-aside

[352] David Schwav Abel. "The Racist Next Door." *Broward Palm Beach New Times*, February 19, 1998.
[353] Bridges. *Rise of David Duke*. 41.
[354] Anonymous. *The Daily Tar Heel*, Chapel Hill, North Carolina, January 20, 1975.

> programs. He also embraced a subject near and dear to every Jefferson Parish voter, protection of the homestead exemption."[355]

Gomez stated that Duke was ineffective as a legislator, lacking knowledge of the "nuts and bolts of House rules and parliamentary procedure" and finding no allies to support his proposed legislation. Gomez, who had previously met Duke in the 1970s while working as a journalist, also alleged that Duke had had plastic surgery in the interim period between their meetings.[356]

Given his image as a "former" Klansmen and Nazi, Duke's election as a Republican earned the attention of the national party. His campaign for the United States Senate in 1990 saw the Republican National Committee ultimately withdraw resources for their endorsed candidate (Benjamin Bagert of the Louisiana State Senate) to ensure that the Democratic candidate, John Bennett Johnston, Jr., was able to win. Bagert dropped out two days before the race, and Duke was defeated by Johnstone. Despite his loss, Duke won over 600,000 votes, 43.51% of the total ballots cast.

A year later, Duke ran for Governor as a Republican. He won 32% in the first round, entering a run-off with former governor Edwin W. Edwards. Duke received more votes in that round than incumbent governor Buddy Roemer, who did not make the run-off. Ex-governor Edwards, who had been indicted (and ultimately acquitted) on charges of mail fraud, obstruction of justice, and bribery in the mid-1980s, faced Duke for the governorship of Louisiana. In the months leading up to the runoff election, leading Republicans distanced themselves from Duke. National media covered the election closely, helping to introduce Duke to a broader audience than he had previously been able to reach. On Edwards won 1,057,031 votes (61.2%) to Duke's 671,009 (38.8%).

Beyond his political career as a "respectable" proponent of white supremacism, Duke was one of the more prominent ideologues of the late 20th and early 21st century far-right. In 1997, he published his autobiography *My Awakening* (an obvious homage to *Mein Kampf*). The book, a "self-published, 700-page autobiographical and disjointed polemic with over 1,000 footnotes," is

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[355] Ron Gomez. *My Name Is Ron And I'm a Recovering Legislator: Memoirs of a Louisiana State Representative*. iUniverse, 2000. 56.
[356] Ibid.

broken up into four parts and forty-two chapters.[357] The second part, titled 'Race and Reality', focuses on elaborating a theoretical justification for racism based on the notion of innate racial differences. The third part, 'The Jewish Question', contains chapters with names like "Jews Communism and Civil Rights," "Jewish Media Supremacy (Parts One and Two)", "The Roots of Anti-Semitism I: Economic Exploitation," and "Jewish Led Invasion". The fourth section connects his own biography to the broader prospects of the white supremacist movement, with the final three chapters titled "Political Victory!", "An Aryan Vision," and "What We Must Do Now".

He has been an early pioneer of using the Internet to promote hate. It was during the late 1990s and the early 2000s that he began to focus on elaborating his own version of anti-Semitic conspiracism in the language of anti-globalism. In a 2004 blog post, he wrote:

> "The point here must be that the same media that is in lockstep for Israel is also in lockstep for the New World Order and the Globalism that it represents. For the last few decades of my life I have earnestly tried to inform people that those who are the true forces behind globalism are in actuality, racial supremacists… [T]hey are Jewish supremacists. These Jewish supremacists have a master plan that should be obvious for anyone to see. They consistently attempt to undermine the culture, racial identity and solidarity, economy, political independence of every nation in the world[…] They and their New World Order seeks to destroy every nation, every, culture, every heritage, every race but their own. They seek a global supremacy over media, economics, and governments. I don't seek supremacy over other races or nations, but I want Europeans and Americans to maintain our own heritage in our own nations."[358]

William Pierce and the National Alliance

Duke's intellectualized racism was far more sophisticated than most of the propaganda produced by the largest extreme Right organization: the National Alliance. National Alliance had been led

[357] Abraham Foxman. David Duke's My Awakening: A Minor League Mein Kampf. *Anti-Defamation League website*, January 1999. Found online at: https://web.archive.org/web/20061114030826/http://www.adl.org/opinion/david_duke_review.asp
[358] David Duke, *The Lies of Globalism.* Originally published in David Duke's website in 2004.

by Pierce since it broke away from Willis Carto's control in 1971; in the following three decades until his death Pierce built up the most developed Nazi organization in American history. Through popular books like Pierce's *Turner Diaries* and an array of other print and digital media National Alliance used arguments for white identitarianism to try and radicalize readers into accepting the suppressed "truth" of white supremacist ideology. The influence of National Alliance spread beyond the United States, with the media produced by National Alliance figures influencing far-right culture in Europe and elsewhere. National Alliance owned and operated Renaissance Records, a white power rock label that sold CDs from bands like "RAHOWA" (short for Racial Holy War).[359] National Alliance also produced a racist computer game in which players killed stereotypical portrayals of minorities.

The Southern Poverty Law Center describes the central role played by Pierce in National Alliance's history and development:

> "Despite its organizing successes, the NA was for most of its life a kind of cult of personality. Pierce was the group's chief asset, editing the group's magazine, National Vanguard and the members-only National Alliance Bulletin. He also wrote another race-war novel, Hunter. In addition to his writings, Pierce appeared regularly on "American Dissident Voices," a shortwave radio show broadcast (and later simulcast on the Internet) by the group. Pierce was explicitly Hitlerian in ideology, seeking to create a Nazi-like state in which the NA would rule the nation. He was also, in effect, a Leninist, in the sense that he never believed that the white masses — people whom he regularly referred to as "lemmings" — could lead themselves. Instead, the NA would be the "vanguard party," much like the Bolsheviks in Russia, that would lead them in a racially based, authoritarian society that would be marked by Germanic music and "healthy" racial values. That ideology and Pierce's embrace of Hitler's "leadership principle" kept

[359] The major figure in this band was Canadian musician George Burdi. Burdi, born in 1970, is one of the most influential individuals in the transatlantic hate rock scene that served as a cultural unifier for far-right activists in North America and Europe. Renaissance Records was the most important record label in this international network; it would buy

> members of the group dependent on Pierce personally, a situation that would damage the Alliance later."[360]

The propaganda of National Alliance was varied in form, but largely similar in content. The characterization of Jews, blacks, and other minorities in the most disgusting stereotypes was matched by a disturbingly sophisticated sense of political and propagandistic sense of strategy. Pierce, who completed a PhD in physics in the early 1960s before his career as a white supremacist, had learned from the failures of earlier white supremacist organizers and focused on the strategies that would help to achieve what his predecessors could not: building support for a violent revolutionary Nazi force to fight what National Alliance members and leaders saw as a United States government controlled by Jewish conspirators. That such a psychotic vision of politics could be matched with a keenly realistic analysis of the political landscape has disturbed and intrigued analysts of the far-right, with George Michael's analysis capturing the nature of Pierce's political thinking and strategy:

> "He warned that any premature resistance or terrorism would only provoke the government into repressive measures that the extreme right was unable to counter. Nevertheless, Pierce repeatedly maintained that conventional political activity was futile and that armed struggle would someday be inevitable. But until that time came, he emphasized building a revolutionary infrastructure in which he could disseminate his message to more people and expand his following. Pierce and his National Alliance therefore concentrated on building a multi-media propaganda network."[361]

Pierce himself described the contours of this network in an interview for the 2003 scholarly book *Contemporary Voices of White Nationalism in America*. After explaining that he was radicalized by the Civil Rights movement and the campus radical movement of the 1960s, Pierce stated that he:

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[360] Southern Poverty Law Center. Profile of William Pierce. *Southern Poverty Law Center website*. Found online at: https://www.splcenter.org/fighting-hate/extremist-files/group/national-alliance

[361] George Michael. "The New Media and the Rise of Exhortatory Terrorism." *Strategic Studies Quarterly* 7:1 (2013): 42.

> "began writing, and eventually I realized that many of the answers that I was giving to my questions were politically incorrect. I couldn't reach the public with my thoughts on these matters without building an infrastructure... I had to build up an infrastructure for publication and distribution of the things that I thought were important to reach the public with. So, I had to build an organization, and that is how the National Alliance first came about, as an organization for the dissemination of ideas, first in the form of printed materials and then in the form of other media... Today we have weekly radio broadcast, which are carried around the world by shortwave radio or are broadcast locally in a number of metropolitan areas in the United States. We have a very large and active Internet presence with a great number of our materials available in several languages on websites. We are using music as a medium for reaching people. We recently purchased two record companies, the largest resistance music company in the United States and the largest in Europe, and increasingly we'll be active with these record companies using resistance music to carry out message."[362]

Beyond acquiring Resistance Records from Carto, National Alliance's ideology of white nationalism borrowed the anti-globalist master frame developed in Liberty Lobby publications over previous decades. One radio broadcast on *American Dissident Voices* stated: "The decision by the internationalist manipulators who control both political parties to shut down the overtly Communist part of their operation in Russia in no way altered their drive for world government. . . a New World Order."[363] The focus of NA's anti-globalism was around the notion that Jews were plotting to dilute and ultimately destroy the white race through miscegenation and immigration. Questions of trade, foreign policy, and sovereignty, central to the anti-globalism of more mainstream figures like Pat Buchanan, were largely absent from NA propaganda.

At the same time, both national populists like Buchanan and Nazis like Pierce agreed on a fundamental notion: that the decline of the white majority in the United States was something to be alarmed about and combated. Buchanan's 2002 book *The Death of the West: How Dying Populations and Immigrant Invasions Imperil Our Country and Civilization* offers a highbrow

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[362] Carol Swain and Russ Nieli, eds. *Contemporary Voices of White Nationalism in America*. Cambridge University Press, 2003. 262..
[363] Hillard and Keith. *Waves of Rancor*, 174.

statement of the white nationalist thesis offered by Pierce: that globalist policies of open borders will dilute the values of, and ultimately marginalize, the Euro-American majority that built the United States.

National Alliance's period of peak influence ranged from the 1990s to the early 2000s. After Pierce's death in 2004, the organization dissolved rapidly amidst infighting. While ten to fifteen years is no remarkable amount of time for a political organization to be operating, the impact of National Alliance around the turn of the 21st century distinguishes it from other American Neo-Nazi groups. Pierce's multimedia empire was a perverse sort of discursive institution, competent both in producing unique forms of political propaganda and in using diverse channels (radio, direct-mail, the Internet) to spread their propaganda do as wide of an audience as they could. In a way, National Alliance used the model developed by Willis Carto and Liberty Lobby for explicitly extremist purposes. Carto's efforts to hide his anti-Semitism and to repackage his anti-globalism in the language of populism were contrasted to the National Alliance's embrace of explicit racism and anti-Semitism. Pierce was unconsciously following the model laid out by Sam Francis in a previous section, in which one embraces their "political incorrectness" and accepts the labels used by liberal critics.[364]

Even after its decline, National Alliance continued to serve as a model for would-be white nationalist organizers and propagandists. Their use of the internet led directly into the foundation of Stormfront.org by former Duke and Carto associate Don Black. Stormfront would become the central website for white supremacism from the mid-1990s until the present day. Beyond their use of the internet, a generation of new white supremacist activists learned from Pierce's organization, just as he had previously learned from Carto. One notable racialist ideologue shaped by National Alliance propaganda was Alex Curtis. In 1993, a seventeen-year-old Curtis founded his own chapter of the KKK and vandalized his school with swastikas. He had a minor career as a criminal and began to post online about white supremacist violence. After a short tenure in prison, "Curtis took to the internet with a vengeance, substantially increasing the reach of his propaganda. In January 1998, he created an E-mail mailing list that he now claims has more than 800 subscribers... An archive of the messages sent via the list appears on his

[364] A similar line was used by Steve Bannon in a 2017 speech to Front National activists, in which he told them to accept the brand of racism as a badge of honor.

Nationalist Observer Web site, which has been growing steadily since it came online in 1996. Also on the Web site are the 'Lead Editorials' from Curtis's magazine, transcripts of his weekly racist telephone hotline messages, an archive of white supremacist articles by various propagandists, and a catalog of racist audio and video tapes."[365]

Curtis envisions a two-tiered revolutionary hate movement. The first tier is 'above ground' and meant to spread 'divisive or subversive' propaganda that will 'guide the underground.' In the 'second tier' are 'lone wolves,' racist 'combatants' acting alone or in small groups of three or four, who will 'chip away' at the government's infrastructure by 'daily anonymous acts.' This theory of right-wing political action was largely similar to Pierce's, except with an emphasis on building a radical corps for terroristic action. The events of the Oklahoma City Bombing, an event directly shaped by National Alliance propaganda, figured prominently in the writings of figures like Curtis in the late 1990s. The next section will discuss the bombing and its ramifications for the American far-right.

Anti-Globalist Terror: The 1995 Oklahoma City Bombing and the Violent Arrival of the Revolutionary Extreme Right

The politics of the racialist extreme right and the militia movement were permanently intertwined by the events of April 19, 1995. That morning Timothy McVeigh (with the assistance of at least one associate) parked a car bomb in front of the Alfred P. Murrah Federal Building. The car bomb detonated and killed 168 people, making it the deadliest terrorist attack in American history until 9/11 – it is still the deadliest attack by an American citizen on his fellow Americans and government. McVeigh was captured quickly and spent the rest of his life in federal custody until his execution on June 11, 2001. From the day of the bombing until his death (and still until the present day), McVeigh came to represent the extremism of the militia movement for an American public which had previously been unfamiliar with the emergent far-right political subcultures of the anti-globalist far-right.

It became apparent to federal investigators – and an enraptured national media and public – that McVeigh had been influenced by the violent, white supremacist ideology promoted by National

[365] Anti-Defamation League. ADL Report: Alex Curtis: 'Lone Wolf' of Hate Prowls the Internet. *Anti-Defamation League website*, 2000. Found online at: https://www.adl.org/sites/default/files/documents/assets/pdf/combating-hate/Alex-Curtis-Report.pdf

Alliance and William Pierce. McVeigh had a dogeared copy of *The Turner Diaries* in his car when he was arrested; the book's gory story of a white nationalist revolutionary war fit with McVeigh's own justification of his bombing, arguing that he needed to alert the American people to the illegitimacy of the government through a terroristic act. In reality, his actions had the opposite effect – the militia movement, which argued that it had formed in response to the excesses of the federal government in Waco and Ruby Ridge, faced a crisis of legitimacy as the public began to associate all militia groups with the violent far-right extremism that animated McVeigh. Many militia groups denounced the events, and some even shut themselves down in the aftermath of the bombing. Far-right writers generally argued that the bombing was a false flag and McVeigh a manipulated patsy or an innocent man. Fear of government monitoring in the wake of Oklahoma City helped contribute to a broader decline of the militia movement from its peak in 1994, with the gross number of militias down substantially by 2000 from its mid-decade peak.

McVeigh's path of radicalization helps to illustrate the unique and complex dynamics constituting the 'patriot' community in the 1990s. McVeigh grew up under the influence of a gun-loving grandfather. He read the right-wing publication *Soldier of Fortune* as a teenager and dropped out of college. At age 20 he joined the U.S. Army. His skills as a marksmen helped him in a military career marred by racist statements and actions, with McVeigh being officially reprimanded for buying a 'White Power' t-shirt at a Klan rally. He fought in the First Gulf War and was dishonorably discharged in 1991.

When the Waco siege began in 1993, McVeigh decided to take action. "Incensed, McVeigh dropped his plans and headed for Waco, where he sold bumper stickers supporting the Davidians for a few days. When he left town, McVeigh began two years of roaming America that would bring him to 40 different states."[366] McVeigh attended scores of gun shows over the years, selling copies of *The Turner Diaries* and other far-right 'patriot' literature. One journalist wrote of McVeigh in this period: "In the gun show culture, McVeigh found a home. Though he remained skeptical of some of the most extreme ideas being bandied around, he liked talking to people there about the United Nations, the federal government, and possible threats to American

[366] Sam Handlin, Profile of a Mass Murderer: Who is Timothy McVeigh? *Court TV News* website, 2001. Found online at:
https://web.archive.org/web/20071014123027/http://www.courttv.com/news/mcveigh_special/profile_ctv.html

liberty."[367] During this period, he attempted to convince his family members of his views. He began "railing to [his sister] Jennifer about conspiracies involving the Rockefeller family and the United Nations."[368] His sister ultimately ended up testifying against him in his 1997 trial.

McVeigh's actions and words became more erratic in the years leading up to the bombing. Around the time that he began to stock the "ammonium nitrate and agricultural fertilizer" needed for his bomb, McVeigh sent a "23-page farewell letter to his boyhood friend Steve Hodge", in which he offers a seemingly contradictory (and yet internally coherent) argument for fighting the government in the name of defending the Constitution:

> "Those who betray or subvert the Constitution are guilty of sedition and/or treason, are domestic enemies and should and will be punished accordingly.
>
> It also stands to reason that anyone who sympathizes with the enemy or gives aid or comfort to said enemy is likewise guilty. I have sworn to uphold and defend the Constitution against all enemies, foreign and domestic and I will. And I will because not only did I swear to, but I believe in what it stands for in every bit of my heart, soul and being. I know in my heart that I am right in my struggle, Steve. I have come to peace with myself, my God and my cause. Blood will flow in the streets, Steve. Good vs. Evil. Free men vs. Socialist Wannabe Slaves. Pray it is not your blood, my friend."[369]

The gun show circuit where McVeigh spent his time served as a sort of national circuitry for a movement defined by its decentralization and distrust of any national authority. Various far-right publications were circulated at these events, which allowed local militias and organizations to network with traveling ne'er-do-wells like McVeigh. Curiously, McVeigh consistently rejected the explicit neo-Nazism espoused by the most extreme wings of the far-right while essentially accepting their ideology.

The ideological profile of McVeigh, dissected in his trial and in subsequent books and articles on him and the Oklahoma City bombing, represents the fundamental ambiguity of the language of

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[367] Ibid.
[368] Ibid.
[369] Barry Balleck. *Allegiance to Liberty: The Changing Face of Patriots, Militias, and Political Violence in America*. New York: Praeger, 2014.

far-right populism and its ability to re-package fundamentally fascistic themes into a more palatable 'patriot' discourse drawing on fundamental aspects of American political culture. Despite never crossing paths with the likes of William Pierce, Wilmot Robertson, or Willis Carto, his terroristic actions would likely not have taken place without their lifelong efforts to mainstream extremist ideas. McVeigh's obsession with the Rockefellers, the United Nations, and other classic targets of far-right conspiracism indicates a direct link with the 'conspiracist canon' developed by the Birch-Lobby apparatus in the previous decades. His widely publicized connection with *The Turner Diaries* demonstrates the influence of William Pierce and the National Alliance's propaganda network on his thinking and motivations. And his affiliations with militia groups and networks (he and co-conspirator Terry Nichols attended meetings of the Militia of Michigan) no doubt contributed to his deepening radicalization.

One of the indirect consequences of the Oklahoma City Bombing was renewed national attention to the threat of right-wing radicalism. Not since the era of the John Birch Society and the "superpatriots" was as much written about the characters, ideas, groups and publications associated with the American far-right. Less attention has been paid to theorizing the broader shifts on the Right that took place during this period, particularly with regarded to the informational networks and broader epistemic community of the militia-patriot-populist movement. Hundreds of individual militias sprouted up in a majority of states around the United States; many of them had been radicalized earlier by the anti-globalist literature produced and distributed by the Birch-Lobby networks, while others came to these ideas for the first time in response to the events of Waco and Ruby Ridge. The men and women who joined these groups did so, in their own minds, out of a love of their country and what it represents. What few of them realized was that the ideas they came into contact with (and the informational networks which turned these ideas into newsletters, radio programs, books and other media) had been painstakingly developed and built by hardened and savvy right-wing extremists, whose sympathies with Adolf Hitler and Nazism would likely have shocked and disturbed the average militiaman. And yet through their clever use of the language of right-wing populism, itself a rhetorical style popularized by more mainstream elements of the New Right in the 1970s, these extremists were able to bring their language and ideas into the mainstream.

At the same time that the anti-globalism of Carto was reshaping right-wing social movement politics across the nation, similar language was being adopted by Republican presidential candidate Patrick Buchanan and other conservative politicians. For Buchanan and other self-styled national populists, 'globalism' and the 'New World Order' were more about sovereignty-sapping trade deals, excessive immigration and avoiding American involvement in foreign affairs. Buchanan's yearning for the politics of the Old Right represented the political manifestation of the paleoconservative challenge to neoconservatism offered by right-wing ideologues like Sam Francis. Francis himself advised Buchanan throughout the early 1990s, writing extensive pieces in *Chronicles* about Buchanan's candidacies. Despite the fact that critics of Buchanan have long pointed out his bigoted statements about minority groups, he was, through force of will and a good deal of media savvy, able to construct himself into the face of a more hard-edged populist conservatism than could be found anywhere in the post-war American Right.

The anti-globalist arguments he offered about trade, immigration, international agreements, and foreign policy had wide appeal in the 1990s, when such issues became more prominent in public debate due to the substantial changes wrought by globalization. This gave crucial legitimacy to the broader body of ideas, arguments, symbols, and terms associated with the anti-globalist worldview. One need not actually believe that the Rockefellers and their associated apparatus of CFR-Trilaterals were attempting to bring about world government in the near future to be skeptical about NAFTA or the possibility of the United Nations being given more legal authority over the United States and its citizens. The broad array of issues and constituencies involved (including workers in post-industrial areas, residents of areas experiencing greater Hispanic immigration, Christians concerned about secularization and the end of the millennium) were united under the banner of anti-globalism. What few of them realized was the they were joined under that banner by extremists, and that, to push the metaphor further, the argumentative-discursive banners themselves were woven by extremist thinkers and ideologues a generation prior.

Anti-Globalism at the Dawn of the 21st Century

During the 1980s, anti-globalism had become a coherent and mature political ideology. Although these ideas defined the conspiratorial worldview and marginal milieu of far-right extremists and

radicals across the United States, anti-globalist ideology had not yet had any tangible impact on American political life. By the end of the twentieth century, however, anti-globalism had become the ideological master-frame uniting a variety of new social and political movements on the American Right. The simultaneous emergence of these movements constituted a short-lived but historic breakthrough for the American far-right, as right-wing radicals used anti-globalist language to articulate their opposition to a variety of new and old political trends.

This chapter sought to show *how* that breakthrough happened, identifying the primary movements and tracing their relationship with pre-existing anti-globalist ideas and networks. I also offer a tentative explanation of *why* this happened. Specifically, I argue that right-wing political actors used a pre-existing anti-globalist ideology to understand, name, and criticize the structural changes in international and domestic politics associated with 'globalism' in the 1990s.

What was unique about the 1990s was that external events and structural changes created a situation in which new movements could adopt the anti-globalist master frame developed by the Lobby-JBS network. The militia movement, the racialist right, the Buchananite populist movement each developed their own informational networks, using texts produced by Lobby-JBS network in addition to their own publication. They used new technology, ranging from shortwave radio to fax networks to the internet, in addition to the older networks of direct-mail book and newsletter distribution. They also used old tropes and arguments, adopting them into the new frame of opposition to the threat of 'New World Order'. That term served as the empty signifier against which the anti-globalist project was mobilized, with the phrase's ambiguity allowing it to appeal to different constituencies and discursive contexts.

This message diffused throughout the populist landscape and the militia movement in the 1990s, reinforced by the promotion of a pro-trade and pro-immigration 'globalist' ideology by political leaders and other elites aligned with both American political parties. While the broader anti-globalization movement featured more progressive groups, the movement toward anti-globalism on the Right was pronounced both inside and outside of Republican politics. Pat Buchanan's aggressive brand of nationalist-populist conservatism struck a different chord than the conciliatory approach embodied in President George H.W. Bush, who Buchanan ran against in 1992. Buchanan gained support from elements of the populist far-right and was broadly endorsed in populist publications associated with the Liberty Lobby and Populist Party networks. At the

same time, Buchanan was self-consciously espousing a right-wing populism which could earn mainstream political acceptability while punching back at allegations of racism, nativism, or demagoguery – allegations which have been (and which have largely been substantiated by Buchanan's written record) made against Buchanan by countless political rivals, commentators, scholars and other public figures over the course of his political career.

The paleoconservatives served a fundamentally different function in the broader trajectory of the American Right in the 1980s and 1990s. A handful of intellectuals succeeded in fundamentally reframing internal debate between conservatives, with the term paleoconservative today being used to describe the Trumpian tendency on the American right. At the time, however, the theories of the paleoconservatives did not play an instrumental role in the right-wing resurgence of the 1990s. In contrast to the newsletters, fax machine messages, radio broadcasts and other mass media produced by more public-facing ideologues, the books and columns written by Sam Francis, Paul Gottfried, Thomas Fleming and other paleoconservative godfathers writing for *Chronicles* were not read by the average members of a militia or Christian nationalist religious congregation. Instead, they were engaging in a different kind of ideological behavior. Drawing on Schmitt's discursive institutionalist paradigm, we can distinguish between the public-facing propaganda by which the mass politics of the radical right are enacted and the inter-elite debates about the nature of conservatism to which radical rightist ideologues. The former is about changing public opinion (or, to use a more accurate term, the production and distribution of political propaganda), while the latter is about changing the minds of those who do or who may have control over the levers of power.

The radical right-wing mass media network pioneered by Liberty Lobby and the JBS in previous decades developed directly into both the right-wing patriot media network that defined the militia movement and the white supremacist networks which consciously sought to mainstream racism and anti-Semitism through appeals to white racial identity couched in populist rhetoric and conspiracism. At the same time that these networks of mass media were circuiting through elements of the American populace, the writings of Francis and others were forming the foundation of a radical right-wing ideological canon which would last (and, arguably, continue to gain greater influence) up until the present day.

The right-wing turn to anti-globalism at the end of the 20th century saw the emergence of *new modes of right-wing political action and thought* and a return to *an earlier far-right ideological style* characterized by isolationism, nativism, bigotry, and other unpleasant relics of an earlier era in American politics. This chapter, and broader thesis, has sought to show the role played by anti-globalist politics in the broad trend that Blumenthal described in 1995:

> "Anti-internationalism is not articulated as clearly or as pointedly as the old isolationism, at least not yet. It is still more of an impulse than an idea... But the murkiness of anti-internationalism hardly makes it less politically potent...
>
> For the Right, the United Nations, a symbol of internationalism, has assumed the demonic role that creeping socialism used to play. It is one and the same: a supranational universalist force, corrupting and undermining our moral fiber, contrary to our patriotic being, threatening our boys' lives. Not is fear of the United Nations restricted to the extreme Right. Nearly all Republican politicians have incorporated into their rhetoric a stentorian defense of "sovereignty,", as if the United States were under siege from some unspecified foreign agents that have infiltrated the government."[370]

[370] Sidney Blumenthal. "The Return of the Repressed: Anti-Internationalism and the American Right." *World Policy Journal* 12:3 (1995): 1, 3.

CHAPTER SIX:

Conclusion: The Past and Future of Anti-Globalism

This dissertation is fundamentally an attempt to answer the question: "What is anti-globalism?" To do so, I focused my historical analysis of anti-globalism to the United States between 1945 and 2000. The previous three chapters traced a process of ideological development whereby far-right anti-internationalism *evolved* into the mature and distinctive ideology of anti-globalism. That anti-globalist ideology is embodied in the countless books, newsletters, and other ephemeral publications discussed in the previous chapters. It is also embodied in the historical legacies of the Birch Society, the Liberty Lobby, and the far-right ideologues who built these organizations into the preeminent political institutions on the American far-right. And, most importantly, anti-globalism was embodied in the individuals who read or heard anti-globalist arguments and came to believe the far-right conspiracy of a globalist plot to establish a one-world government.

On some level, it is impossible to answer the question of *when*, exactly, anti-internationalism developed into the more fully developed ideology of anti-globalism. The early 1980s, when references to globalism and New World Order began to replace attacks on internationalism, is a sensible choice. Beyond the important semantic shift whereby 'globalism' replaced 'internationalism', there are deeper theoretical questions about *what* makes an ideology mature that goes beyond linguistic form.

Freeden has argued that ideological maturity should be measured by an ideology's "uniqueness [,]… responsiveness to a broad range of political issues[,]… [and] its ability to produce effective conceptual decontestation claims."[371] By these criteria, anti-globalism matured substantially over the second half of the 20th century. The ideology became more *unique* as time went on: it became more distinctive in the 1970s and 1980s by incorporating a critique of the then-new Trilateral Commission. This trend accelerated during the 1990s, when anti-globalism proved well-suited to the discursive opportunity structures created by the end of the Cold War and the beginning of globalization. Both shifts were enabled by the *responsiveness* of anti-globalism, as anti-globalist ideologues adapted their language – and broader ideological and political strategy - to structural

[371] Freeden was quoted in Steger. "*Ideologies of globalization*." 13.

changes and shifting political contexts. And the ability of anti-globalism to effectively decontest new political concepts proved invaluable to its success, as terms like globalism and New World Order came to capture a wide convergence of social, geopolitical, economic, and demographic trends at the end of the 20th century.

Freeden's criteria are useful for illustrating the ways that anti-globalism developed, but these abstract ways of evaluating an ideology's maturity risks minimizing the importance of the historical circumstances and institutional-sociological milieus in which it was developed. An exclusive focus on ideas alone neglects the other conditions required for an ideology to develop and spread: media through which ideas can be communicated, the individual agency required to do new things with political words and ideas, and the financial-organizational resources needed to promote those ideas via mass media.

Willis Carto, William Pierce, Robert Welch, and other anti-globalist ideologues engaged in a new type of political entrepreneurship unique to the ideological and technological context of the late 20th century United States. Revilo Oliver, the anti-Semitic ideologue who mentored Bill Buckley in the 1950s and assisted William Pierce with the National Alliance in the 1970s, described the mail-order men as "patriots for profit" who "cynically exploited – the residue of patriotic sentiment" left in America.[372] While Oliver's personal grievances with Robert Welch and Willis Carto may have motivated these screeds, he illustrated a crucial point: the profitability inherent in the production and distribution of right-wing 'patriotic' propaganda. The Liberty Lobby was making millions of dollars in the 1980s, while other predecessors like Carl McIntire and Father Charles Coughlin also built up some of the biggest audiences and media organizations in the United States during the peak of their influence. Anti-globalism's development as a set of ideas and ways of thinking about the world was intimately related to the ability of anti-globalists to make money from its propagation.

Characters like Willis Carto are difficult to define. His ideas, while influential, have proved uninteresting to historians of conservative political thought in America. He had little impact on mainstream politics during a lifetime spent building organizations, editing publications, raising funds, and corresponding with other right-wing radicals. But the collective efforts of him and his

[372] Oliver. *America's Demise*. Preface.

fellow anti-globalist ideologues and institution-builders are what made anti-globalism into a serious ideological force in the late 20th century. For this, Carto and his anti-globalist compatriots deserve greater scrutiny and attention from historians of the American Right.

What was unique about the developments on the American Right in the 1990s was that external events and structural changes created a situation in which new movements could adopt an anti-globalist ideology and master frame that had *already been developed* by the Lobby-JBS network in previous decades. The militia movement, the racialist right, the Buchananite populist movement each developed their own informational networks, incorporating and expanding upon texts and arguments produced by Lobby-JBS networks. These second-generation anti-globalist networks used the then-new technologies of shortwave radio, fax networks, and the internet in addition to the older networks of direct-mail book and newsletter distribution.

While I do not aim to explain anti-globalist development *after* the 20th century, an example illustrates the self-perpetuating dynamics of anti-globalist ideology in the 21st century. In his 2013 book *Ye Shall Know the Truth: 101 Books American Nationalists Need to Read and Understand Before 'They' Burn Them*, longtime Liberty Lobby contributor Michael Collins Piper outlined the anti-globalist worldview:

> "Many of [his readers] have commented they read no other books than by writers emerging from the 'truth' and 'patriot' movements - whatever description you prefer for the amorphous groups of often like-minded individuals who have banded together as dissidents against the international plutocratic establishment that is reckoned to be the driving force behind what many call the New World Order."[373]

After encouraging his readers to follow mainstream publications like the Washington Post and New York Times in order to "find out what the international elite have planned for us," he writes,

> “Sometimes, of course, you may have to read between the lines to glean this information - but not always. More often than not, however, the internationalist

[373] Michael Collins Piper, *Ye Shall Know the Truth: 101 Books American Nationalists Need to Read and Understand Before 'They' Burn Them*. Noontide Press, 2013. 21.

> agenda - some less generous folks would call it "the Jewish Agenda," as I myself often do, can be found clearly laid out in no uncertain terms."[374]

Piper illustrates the ways that internationalism and globalism were used as dog-whistles for anti-Semitic conspiracies about "the Jewish Agenda". This passage also illustrates the existence of an 'alternative' media landscape and the self-reinforcing dynamics of the anti-globalist worldview formed by the Liberty Lobby and Birch Society in the late 20th century. If conspiracy theorists believe that 'mainstream media' is controlled by a (Jewish) power elite, it would obviously misrepresent the 'truth' which can be found only in the pages of 'patriotic' publications like Liberty Lobby's *Spotlight*. Inevitably, as anyone who has spoken with an ardent conspiracy theorist knows, these beliefs become self-reinforcing. Any data or argument contrary to their views is dismissed as establishment propaganda, and only materials that make the appropriate negative references to populist signifiers like 'the elite', the 'establishment, 'the New World Order, or 'globalists' are deemed credible. This has two effects: it makes conspiracists to reject any evidence contrary to their existing anti-globalist beliefs, and it makes them more likely to believe false evidence that does fit with their conspiracist beliefs.

While this thesis acknowledges that conspiracy theories are a major part of anti-globalism's worldview and appeal, I do not engage with the substantial literature on conspiracy theories that has appeared in political science in recent decades. Similarly, I do not spend time on the Religious Right or the specific phenomenon of anti-Semtiism in American history. Instead, I consider these topics through the lens of political ideas and ideologies. When Freeden proposed that the far-right ideology animating the contemporary populist Right could be considered an 'ideolonoid', he presented the concept to describe a, "swiftly concocted and forged" bodies of ideas distinct from "organic, grassroots, and evolved ideolog[ies]." He went on to acknowledge that:

> "the distinction ceases to matter both politically and academically when the ideolonoids perform the functions of competition over the control of political language, they are harnessed to recruit large-scale support, and they are used

[374] Ibid.

> deceptively in the name of defending or promoting public and national objectives."[375]

I argue that anti-globalism is the distinctive ideology and master-frame of the contemporary radical right, which encompasses both 'national populist' parties, leaders, and social movements. It also plays the same role in the ideological landscape of contemporary right-wing extremism, in which 'globalism' represents a Jewish conspiracy to destroy the white race and Christian values. Anti-globalism emerged as a coherent and distinctive ideology in the 1970s and 1980s, building upon earlier generations of anti-internationalist language and activism. Beyond the set of abstract ideas, arguments, and phrases associated with anti-globalism, the institutional-sociological basis from which these ideas emerged and were propagated is also worth studying, given the ways that it embodies the unique and important process by which anti-globalist ideology was - and is currently - produced and perpetuated.

To reckon with the ambiguous ways that anti-globalist language was used by right-wing political actors in the late 20th century, it might be useful to conceive of anti-globalism as a two-sided ideology. One face represents anti-interventionist opposition to an aggressive American foreign policy, with anti-globalism adopting the mantle of anti-imperialist critique in its denunciation of globalist ideas and policies. For the other face, any critique of American foreign policy is secondary to the far-right anti-globalist conspiracy. That face, using the same language as the first, claims to speak for "the people" and for "America First" while spreading conspiracies and ideas that corrode democracy. This thesis has demonstrated that the terms 'America First', 'globalism', 'internationalism', 'new world order', and 'one-world government' were consistent features of the ideology and language of American extremists throughout most of the 20th century. The usage of this language evolved over time, and there were phases (the 1950s and 1990s) in which more legitimate political actors were using similar language to anti-globalist ideologues.

Ultimately, conceiving of anti-globalism in this way risks legitimizing the racist and anti-Semitic ideology that was promoted by Willis Carto, William Pierce, and other key anti-globalist ideologues. For Carto in particular, anti-globalist populism was *the means by which his extremist*

[375] Michael Freeden. "Loose talk costs … nothing." *Journal of Political Ideologies* 23:1 (2018): 2.

vision of American political life would become part of the broader ideology of the American Right. Most of the ideas, arguments, phrases, and terms associated with anti-internationalism and anti-globalism during the second half of the 20th century were uttered, written, or promoted by a group of unique political actors and the institutions they built. These men were more than political and ideological entrepreneurs who mobilized social movement resources and responded to institutional incentives; they were historical villains who committed their lives to the promotion of racism, anti-Semitism, and conspiracies. This dissertation has sought to show that this multi-generational network of marginal hatemongers – and the world(view) they created – played a small but important part in the story of how anti-globalist populism emerged in the 2010s.

Ultimately, this thesis leaves aside contemporary questions about the emergence of Trump and the 21st century rendition of anti-globalist populism that he embodies. What I have tried to accomplish, instead, was the task tracing out the ideological context from which anti-globalism emerged in the late 20th century United States. Trump and his supporters have, consciously or unconsciously, adopted the rhetorical tools honed by the anti-globalist far-right in the second half of the 20th century. Anti-globalism's emergence as a serious ideological force on the American and international Right stands as one of the most important developments in recent political history, and this thesis has attempted to explain how came to anti-globalism develop into a distinctive ideology on the American Right during the second half of the 20th century.

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