In the Shadow of Genocide: Ethnocide, Ethnic Cleansing, and International Order

JAAKKO HEISKANEN
University of Cambridge, UK

Internationally regarded as “the crime of crimes” in both legal and moral terms, the concept of genocide has towered over discussions of ethnic conflict and mass violence since the Second World War. This article shifts the focus away from genocide and onto the neglected yet illuminating conceptual politics that have unfolded in the shadow of genocide. I begin by recasting the post-war criminalization of genocide as a “strategy of containment” that has deflected attention away from the constitutive contradictions of the international order, especially its long history of racial and colonial violence. The remainder of the article then explores how this strategy of containment has been both challenged and reinforced through the articulation of ethnocide and ethnic cleansing as supplementary categories. Since the late 1960s, the concept of ethnocide has been mobilized by the indigenous rights movement as a way of foregrounding the cultural destruction that has accompanied the onward march of modernity and development. In contrast, the concept of ethnic cleansing has been popularized by powerful members of the international community as a way of chastising particular “deviant” states without burdening themselves with the responsibility to intervene or calling into question the universalistic civilizational standards that underpin the international order. If the charge of ethnocide is argued to undo some of the containments and closures of genocide discourse, then the charge of ethnic cleansing has served to reinforce them. The article concludes by proposing the “ethnic century” as a world-historical lens for thinking about the post-war international order.

In a speech broadcast in 1941, Winston Churchill described Nazi atrocities in Eastern Europe as “a crime without a name” (Churchill 2013, 249). Three years later, the word “genocide” made its first public appearance in Churchill’s Axis Rule in Occupied Europe. Given the backdrop of the Second World War as well as his Jewish roots, Lemkin’s coinage of “genocide” has often been interpreted as an attempt to catch the unique horror of the Holocaust. Yet Lemkin’s earlier works and unpublished writings show that his thinking was also deeply influenced by other developments such as the Armenian genocide and the violent history of European colonialism (Mcdonnell and Moses 2005; Balakian 2013; Irvin-Erickson 2017). This was reflected in his “composite” definition of genocide, which included political, social, cultural, economic, biological, physical, religious, and moral dimensions.

Considered internationally as “el crimen de los crímenes” tanto en términos legales como morales, el concepto de genocidio ha prevalecido sobre las discusiones sobre conflictos étnicos y violencia masiva desde la Segunda Guerra Mundial. Esta artículo desplaza el foco de atención del genocidio hacia las políticas conceptuales, relegadas pero esclarecedoras, que se han desarrollado a la sombra del genocidio. Empieza reformulando la criminalización del genocidio en la posguerra como una “estrategia de contención” que ha desviado la atención de las contradicciones constitutivas del orden internacional, especialmente su larga historia de violencia racial y colonial. El resto del artículo explora cómo se ha desafiado y reforzado esta estrategia de contención mediante la articulación del etnocidio y la limpieza étnica como categorías complementarias. Desde finales de la década de 1960, el concepto de “etnocidio” ha sido movilizado por el movimiento de derechos indígenas como una forma de poner en primer plano la destrucción cultural que ha acompañado la marcha hacia adelante de la modernidad y el desarrollo. Por el contrario, el concepto de “limpieza étnica” ha sido popularizado por poderosos miembros de la comunidad internacional como una forma de castigar a determinados estados “desviantes,” sin cargar con la responsabilidad de intervenir o cuestionar los estándares civilizacionales universalistas que sustentan el orden internacional. Si la acusación de etnocidio ha buscado deshacer algunas de las contenciones y cierres del discurso del genocidio, entonces la acusación de limpieza étnica ha servido para reforzarlas. El artículo concluye proponiendo el “siglo étnico” como un lente histórico-mundial para pensar sobre el orden internacional de posguerra.

Internamente considerado como étant « le crime des crimes » que ce soit du point de vue juridique ou moral, le concept de génocidie a dominé les discussions sur les conflits ethniques et la violence de masse depuis la seconde guerre mondiale. Plus tard que de se concentrer sur le génocidie, cet article aborde les politiques conceptuelles négligées mais cependant éclairantes qui se sont développées dans l’ombre du génocidie. Je commence par requalifier la criminalisation d’après-guerre du génocidie en tant que « stratégie d’endiguement » qui a détourné l’attention des contradictions constitutives de l’ordre international, en particulier de sa longue histoire de violence raciale et coloniale. Le reste de l’article explore ensuite la manière dont cette stratégie d’endiguement a été à la fois remise en question et renforcée par l’articulation de l’ethnocidie et du nettoyage ethnique en tant que catégories complémentaires. Depuis la fin des années 1960, le concept d’ethnocidie a été mobilisé par le mouvement de défense des droits des autochtones pour mettre au premier plan la destruction culturelle qui a accompagné la marche en avant de la modernité et du développement. À l’inverse, le concept de nettoyage ethnique a été popularisé par de puissants membres de la communauté internationale en tant que moyen de châtir des États « déviants » particuliers sans se charger de la responsabilité d’intervenir ou de remettre en question les normes civilisationnelles universalistes qui sous-tendent l’ordre international. Si l’accusation d’ethnocidie a cherché à retirer certains des endiguements et certaines des conclusions du discours sur le génocidie, celle de nettoyage ethnique a servi à les renforcer. L’article conclut en proposant le « siècle ethnique » comme prisme historique mondial pour réfléchir sur l’ordre international d’après-guerre.

Heiskanen, Jaakko (2021) In the Shadow of Genocide: Ethnocide, Ethnic Cleansing, and International Order. Global Studies Quarterly, https://doi.org/10.1093/isagsq/ksab030 © The Author(s) (2021). Published by Oxford University Press on behalf of the International Studies Association. This is an Open Access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License (https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/), which permits unrestricted reuse, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited.
Genocide, in Lemkin’s view, was not reducible to mass killings, but also encompassed the “disintegration of the political and social institutions, of culture, language, national feelings, religion, and the economic existence of national groups” (Lemkin 1944, 79). Put differently, Lemkin’s definition of genocide included what today would be called ethnic cleansing—the forced displacement of an ethnic group from a given territory. If social and cultural methods of oppression failed, Lemkin (1945, 39) wrote, “the machine gun can always be utilized as a last resort.” Armed with this multidimensional understanding of genocide, Lemkin tirelessly lobbied diplomats and lawyers in the hopes of enshrining his new coinage into international law (Cooper 2008).

Lemkin succeeded, but only in part. By the time the United Nations General Assembly adopted the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide in 1948, the rich layers of Lemkin’s definition had been stripped down to the bare bones. The drafting process, as Éric Weitz (2015, 10) observes, “significantly narrowed Lemkin’s original formulations, which had encompassed ethnocide and ethnic cleansing.” The omission of ethnocide or cultural genocide from the convention was primarily due to the protestations of the colonial powers and settler-colonial nations. Conscious of their dismal record on the treatment of minorities—indigenous groups especially—these states were rightly worried that the inclusion of any cultural dimension into the legal definition of genocide could be leveraged against their own policies of forced assimilation (Schabas 2009, 207–14). As regards the omission of ethnic cleansing or forced displacement, concerns were raised that this might be used to challenge the legitimacy of the population transfers that had taken place in Central and Eastern Europe under the auspices of the United Nations (Schabas 2009, 226–28). Heeding these objections, the final draft of the Genocide Convention defined genocide only as the intentional physical or biological destruction of a nation or an ethnic group. In Lemkin’s words, “disintegration of the political and social institutions, of the culture of an ethnic group—as well as what today would be called ethnocide—the destruction of the culture of an ethnic group from a given territory. If social and cultural methods of oppression failed, Lemkin (1945, 39) wrote, “the machine gun can always be utilized as a last resort.” Armed with this multidimensional understanding of genocide, Lemkin tirelessly lobbied diplomats and lawyers in the hopes of enshrining his new coinage into international law (Cooper 2008).

The purpose of this article is twofold. The first is to theorize the post-war criminalization of genocide as a “strategy of containment” that has helped to deflect attention away from the constitutive contradictions of the international order, especially its long history of racial and colonial violence. In doing so, the article feeds into a growing body of literature on racism and colonialism in international relations (e.g., Gruffydd Jones 2006; Anievas, Manchanda, and Shilliam 2015). The second aim of the article is to show how this strategy of containment has been both challenged and reinforced through the articulation of “ethnocide” and “ethnic cleansing” as supplementary concepts. Ethnocide was initially proposed as a synonym of genocide by Lemkin himself, but the term was not taken up until the late 1960s when it was reinvented by activist anthropologists and indigenous peoples. Since then, ethnocide has been a key concept in the vocabulary of the indigenous rights movement, serving to dismantle the universalistic pretenses of the international order and to highlight the destructive undersides of modernity and development. In contrast, ethnic cleansing began its journey as a perpetrator’s euphemism before undergoing a dramatic metamorphosis in the 1990s. Against the backdrop of the Bosnian War, the expression was reappropriated by the international community as a tool of critique that could be used to chastise peripheral states for actions that violated international moral standards. If the charge of ethnocide has sought to overturn some of the containments produced by the Holocaust-centric definition of genocide, then the charge of ethnic cleansing has served to reinforce them.

Of course, ethnocide and ethnic cleansing are by no means the only alternatives that have been elaborated to address the blind spots of genocide discourse. The long list of neologisms created for this purpose includes “gendercide” (Warren 1985), “politicide” (Harff and Gurr 1988), “democide” (Rummel 1994), “indigenocide” (Evans 2008), and “urbicide” (Coward 2009), to name only a handful. Others have preferred to drop the “-cide” ending in favor of more general terms such as “mass killings” (Stein 2005), “demographic surgery” (Ferrara 2015), or “permanent security” (Moses 2021). Nevertheless, there are two reasons why an analysis of ethnocide and ethnic cleansing can be singled out as especially valuable. First, in contrast to most of the other coinages listed above, ethnocide and ethnic cleansing are not just analytical categories or theoretical buzzwords. Whereas most of the aforementioned neologisms have gained little or no purchase beyond specialized academic texts, ethnocide and ethnic cleansing have matured outside the walls of the ivory tower. As a result, both concepts are saturated with political significance and have gained substantial traction within the corridors of international organizations, including the United Nations. Second, both ethnocide and ethnic cleansing are rooted in the concept of ethnicity, thus echoing Lemkin’s (1944, 79) original definition of genocide as “the destruction of a nation or of an ethnic group.” In contrast, the other neologisms invented by genocide scholars tend to deliberately shift the attention away from ethnicity in order to shed light on other dimensions of mass violence, such as gender identity (gendercide), political allegiance (politicide), or the built environment (urbicide).

The remainder of the article is organized into four sections and a conclusion. The first section theorizes the post-war criminalization of genocide as a strategy of containment that has deflected attention away from the racial and colonial hierarchies that structure the international order. Against this backdrop, the second and third sections reconstruct the conceptual histories of ethnocide and ethnic cleansing respectively. These reconstructions are based on a wide range of textual material, including United Nations documents, conference proceedings, and scholarly works. Although the meteoric rise of ethnic cleansing since the 1990s is a relatively familiar story, the conceptual history of ethnocide is not nearly as well known and constitutes a valuable contribution in its own right. As far as I am aware, this is also the first attempt to study the two concepts side by side. To this end, the fourth section compares the contrasting social and institutional positions from which ethnocide and ethnic cleansing have been articulated: if the concept of ethnocide has been a tool of resistance deployed by the weak, then the concept of ethnic cleansing has been a euphemism invoked by the powerful. The conclusion wraps up the article by proposing the “ethnic century” as a world-historical lens for thinking about the post-war international order.
The Criminalization of Genocide as a Strategy of Containment

The concept of genocide that emerged from the post-war legal and political wrangling had the misfortune of being definitionally incredibly narrow yet morally incredibly powerful: to label something as a genocide today is to designate it as “the very worst thing imaginable” (Levene 2005, 38). The result was the establishment of an implicit hierarchy of transgressions, with a Holocaust-centric understanding of genocide perched firmly at the top. In an ironic twist, then, the creation of the new legal category ended up significantly narrowing, rather than expanding, the range of transgressions able to “shock the conscience of mankind” (Moses 2021, 28). Furthermore, as anti-colonial thinkers such as Franz Fanon and Aimé Césaire were quick to point out, the shock value of the Holocaust had less to do with the nature or scale of the violence than with the fact that this violence was no longer confined to the colonial periphery: “they tolerated that Nazism before it was inflicted on them,” Césaire (1955, 36) wrote of the Europeans, “they abolished it, shut their eyes to it, legitimized it, because, until then, it had been applied only to non-European peoples.” By casting genocidal violence as the exception rather than the norm, the Holocaust-centric definition of genocide has been complicit in suppressing the long history of racial and colonial violence upon which the international order is founded (Rodríguez 2015).

Drawing on the work of Fredric Jameson, the post-war criminalization of genocide can be understood as a “strategy of containment.” Simply put, a strategy of containment helps to solidify a given order by denying its constitutive contradictions and substituting in their place a more tolerable alternative. Through this double act of denial and substitution, a strategy of containment “allows what can be thought to seem internally coherent in its own terms, while repressing the unthinkable” (Jameson 1981, 53). In the field of international studies, this idea has been incisively deployed by Sankaran Krishna (2001) and Kerem Nisancioglu (2020) to critique the discipline’s systematic neglect of race and colonial violence. By either consigning this racial and colonial violence to the past or offering a deferred promise that it will be overcome at some point in the future, the Genocide Convention has been a key pillar of this containment strategy. By offering a sense of international moral progress, the post-war criminalization of genocide accomplished a “redemptive closure” (Friedlander 1992, 54) that drew a line under the Holocaust without working properly through the trauma or addressing the more unsettling questions surrounding racial and colonial domination.

How this strategy of containment played out in practice can be glimpsed in the suppression of the Civil Rights Congress’s petition We Charge Genocide: The Crime of Government Against the Negro People. Adopting the terminology of the newly approved Genocide Convention, the petition accused the United States of anti-black genocide on the grounds of racial segregation, reproductive controls, rampant lynching, and the legacies of slavery. Delivered to the United Nations in 1951, the petition was swiftly denounced as communist propaganda by American officials and never received a formal hearing (Meiches 2019). During the polemics that surrounded the petition, even Lemkin wound up denigrating its authors as “un-American” in an opportunistic attempt to “appease a xenophobic and racist white establishment in the United States” (Irvin-Erickson 2017, 208; see also Moses 2021, 398–405).

The following sections explore how the containments and closures produced by the Genocide Convention have been both challenged and reinforced through the articulation of ethnocide and ethnic cleansing as supplementary concepts. While both concepts describe processes of ethnic homogenization, the political projects they have been associated with could hardly be more different. The concept of ethnocide has been articulated by marginalized actors as a language of protest that foregrounds how the onward march of modernity and development has gone hand-in-hand with the destruction of indigenous cultures. In contrast, the concept of ethnic cleansing has been popularized as a euphemistic alternative to genocide that has made it possible for powerful members of the international community to denounce the actions of particular states as morally wrong without burdening themselves with the responsibility to intervene or calling into question the universalistic ideals upon which the international order is founded. If the articulation of ethnocide has sought to undo some of the containments and closures of genocide discourse, then the articulation of ethnic cleansing has ended up reinforcing them.

Ethnocide

In Axis Rule in Occupied Europe, Lemkin (1944, 79) describes genocide as “an old practice in its modern development” that entails “the destruction of a nation or of an ethnic group.” He then explains how he derived this concept by combining “the ancient Greek word genos (race, tribe) and the Latin cide (killing).” In a footnote to this passage, Lemkin (1944, 79n1) adds that “[a]nother term could be used for the same idea, namely, ethnocide, consisting of the Greek word ‘ethnos’—nation—and the Latin word ‘cide.’” This is the first appearance of the word “ethnocide” in print. Following its coinage by Lemkin in 1944, the word “ethnocide” does not make another appearance for more than two decades. It next resurfaces at the 38th International Congress of Americanists, held in Stuttgart in August 1968, which featured a roundtable called “Política de asuntos indígenas: Etnocidios y genocidios.” In the English language, the term appears a few months later in a Calendar of Meetings published by the Latin American Research Review, which translated the roundtable as “The Politics of Indigenous Affairs: Ethnocide and Genocide.” In this context, ethnocide was no longer treated as a synonym of genocide, as Lemkin had done, but as a supplementary concept that captured those forms of cultural oppression and forced assimilation that escaped the legal definition of genocide. During the proceedings in Stuttgart, a group of Scandinavian anthropologists teamed up with anthropologists specializing in Latin America to pass a resolution condemning the ongoing destruction and forced integration of indigenous groups in the Americas in the name of “modernization.” In addition, the French anthropologist Robert Jaulin was to head a committee of eight men—including the Peruvian anthropologist Stephano Varese and the Swedish anthropologist Lars Persson—tasked with preparing a symposium on  


ethnocide in the Americas. In the aftermath of the Stuttgart Congress, the Scandinavian contingent also spearheaded the creation of the Copenhagen-based International Work Group for Indigenous Affairs, a nongovernmental organization dedicated to the promotion of indigenous rights, with Persson as its president (Morin and Saladin d’Anglure 1997, 161–62).

The symposium on ethnocide, proposed by Jaulin during the Stuttgart Congress, took place in February 1970 in Paris (Bataille 1969; Jaulin 1972, 3). The same year also saw the publication of Jaulin’s pathbreaking La paix blanche: introduction à l’ethnocide, a vociferous attack against the homogenizing tendencies of Western civilization that launched the concept of ethnocide on a global scale. For Jaulin, the concept of ethnocide described the tendency of Western notions of progress and development to destroy the cultural diversity of the world (Jaulin 1970; see also Pitt-Rivers and Jaulin 1974; Jaulin 1984). Building on Jaulin’s seminal work, another French anthropologist and prominent anarchist thinker Pierre Clastres proposed the following distinction between ethnocide and genocide in 1974: “L’ethnocide, c’est donc la destruction systématique des modes de vie et de pensée de gens différents de ceux qui mènent cette entreprise de destruction. En somme, le génocide assassine les peuples dans leur corps, l’ethnocide les tue dans leur esprit” (Clastres 1974, 102). Whereas Jaulin’s writings were concerned with the ethnoidal tendencies of Western civilization, the anarchist Clastres (1974, 107) associated ethnocide with the political form of the state: “toute organisation étatique est ethnocide, l’ethnocide est le mode normal d’existence de l’état.”

The dissemination of the word “ethnocide” since the late 1960s has been punctuated by a series of key events. Among the first was a gathering of a dozen or so anthropologists on Barbados in 1971, featuring prominent Latin American intellectual figures such as Guillermo Bonfil Batalla from Mexico, Darry Ribeiro from Brazil, and the aforementioned Stephano Varese from Peru. The meeting culminated in the Declaration of Barbados, which not only asserted that indigenous groups were subjected to internal colonialism in Latin America, but also located this oppression within the broader neo-imperial structure of the international order: “Colonial domination of the aboriginal groups […] is only a reflection of the more generalised system of the Latin American states’ external dependence upon the imperialist metropolitan powers. The internal order of our dependent countries leads them to act as colonising powers in their relations with the indigenous peoples.” The failure or inability of Latin American states to guarantee a truly multiethnic society, the Declaration continued, “implicates the State in direct responsibility for and connivance with the many crimes of genocide and ethnocide that we have been able to verify.” A second conference was held in Barbados in 1977, which included indigenous activists alongside anthropologists (Varese 1997).

Another major event to take place in 1977 was the International NGO Conference on Discrimination against Indigenous Populations in the Americas. Held in Geneva under the auspices of the United Nations, the conference brought together spokespeople for more than fifty international NGOs and sixty indigenous groups from fifteen countries. During the conference, indigenous representatives foregrounded ongoing ethnoidal practices that were being justified by a rhetoric of national integration and economic development, and called upon the international community to recognize ethnocide as a violation of international law on par with genocide (Niezen 2003, 44–45; Benvenuto 2015, 26–27). Inspired by the success of the conference, the Bertrand Russell Peace Foundation invited indigenous leaders and activists to present their experiences of genocide, ethnocide, oppression, and discrimination before the Fourth Russell Tribunal in 1980. This people’s court, held in Rotterdam before an international audience of thousands, followed the format of a conventional trial, complete with plaintiffs, defendants, prosecutors, defense attorneys, and a jury (Varese 2006, 46–47). The resulting Declaration of Indigenous Peoples condemned “genocide and ethnocide in all its forms” and called “upon the people of the world to join us in asserting that the genocide and dispossession of Indigenous Peoples is a matter of rightful concern to the world community.”

It is against this backdrop of indigenous activism that the term “ethnocide” entered the formal channels of the United Nations. In 1971, the Sub-Commission on the Prevention of Discrimination and the Protection of Minorities commissioned two reports: a study on the prevention and punishment of genocide, to be prepared by Nicodème Ruhushyanikko, and a study on discrimination against indigenous peoples, to be prepared by José Martínez Cobo. The Ruhushyanikko report was completed in 1978 and dedicated several pages to cultural genocide or ethnocide, albeit without arriving at any firm conclusions about its relationship to genocide. A glance through the footnotes of this section of the report testifies to the central role of Jaulin in the dissemination of this new concept in international political and legal discourse. The Cobo report, completed in 1986, also features passing references to ethnocide, but does not discuss the concept in detail. In 1982, the Sub-Commission appointed Benjamin Whitaker to prepare a revised and updated version of the Ruhushyanikko report. Released in 1985, the Whitaker report did not elaborate on the relationship of ethnocide and genocide, but concluded that “[f]urther consideration should be given to this question.” Ultimately, the concept of ethnocide remains marginal to these reports, and while Jaulin’s views are cited, they are not explicitly endorsed. Nevertheless, as Jeff Benvenuto (2015, 31) observes, the dialogue between the Cobo report on discrimination against indigenous peoples and the two reports on genocide demonstrate that the indigenous rights movement “was also instigating conceptual changes in the field of genocide studies and prevention.”

While the Cobo report was in the works, the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) backed a series of three conferences expressly dedicated to the question of ethnocide: the first in San José in December 1981; the second in Ouagadougou in January–February 1983; and the third in Karasjok in May–June 1983. Jaulin was again involved, participating in all three events and authoring a paper on ethnocide that was circulated during the Karasjok conference. A central concern raised at these meetings was the neglect of indigenous voices in international political and legal matters. Even those

---

9 UN Doc. SS.83/CONF.461/1.
10 UNESCO Doc.
international instruments that were expressly dedicated to indigenous issues, such as the International Labour Organization’s Convention No. 107 on Indigenous and Tribal Populations, were based on universalistic principles of national integration and economic development and left no room for the autonomous development of indigenous groups. “The first battle, therefore, will be one of definition,” reads the Final Report of the San José conference: “a conceptual space must be created in which these ideas can acquire credibility and grow.”11 It is precisely in this spirit that the conceptual history of ethnocide should be understood, namely, as an emergent critique of the state-centric discourses of national integration and economic development that held sway in the post-war decades. A major achievement of these meetings was the Declaration of San José, the first formal (albeit nonbinding) international instrument to define ethnocide: “Ethnocide means that an ethnic group is denied the right to enjoy, develop and transmit its own culture and its own language, whether collectively or individually.”12 The declaration went on to assert that “ethnocide, that is, cultural genocide, is a violation of international law equivalent to genocide.”13

In addition to lending further credibility to the concept of ethnocide, the UNESCO-sponsored conferences also launched into international prominence the concept of ethnodevelopment. Proposed as a remedy to the ethnocidal tendencies of the international order, the concept of ethnodevelopment was a direct challenge to the prevailing segregation of ethnicity from development. Modernization theories considered ethnic groups as archaic survivals of an earlier age, while Marxist approaches saw ethnic loyalties as a barrier to class consciousness. In both cases, the assumption was that particularistic ethnic identities would eventually be overcome by the universal laws of socioeconomic development (Stavenhagen 1986; Hettne 1993). This universalistic approach to development was rejected by the Declaration of San José, which affirmed ethnodevelopment as “an inalienable right of Indian groups”:

By ethno-development we mean the extension and consolidation of the elements of its own culture, through strengthening the independent decision-making capacity of a culturally distinct society to direct its own development and exercise self-determination, at whatever level, which implies an equitable and independent share of power. This means that the ethnic group is a political and administrative unit, with authority over its own territory and decision-making powers within the confines of its development project, in a process of increasing autonomy and self-management.14

During the deliberations in San José and Ouagadougou, ethnodevelopment was presented as an “authentic” form of development and opposed to the prevailing capitalist model, which encouraged production for production’s sake and failed to take into account the varying needs of different ethnic groups.15 “Indian communities are swallowed up by the capitalist system, which clashes with their own system,” observed Donald Rojas, the representative of the Indian Association of Costa Rica at San José.16 Similar concerns were raised a year and a half later at Ouagadougou. “Modernization depending exclusively on western science and technology has eclipsed and discredited Africa’s own scientific and technological heritage, especially where it is particularly rich, as in art, agriculture, housing, medicine, and pharmacology,” reads the Final Report of the Ouagadougou meeting. “This would-be universalist approach tends to exclude any recourse to the peoples’ deep knowledge of their own environments.”17

The success of the indigenous rights movement is evidenced by the inclusion of ethnocide in the Draft United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, approved by the Working Group on Indigenous Populations in 1993. “Indigenous peoples have the collective and individual right not to be subjected to ethnocide and cultural genocide,” affirmed Article 7 of the draft declaration.18 When asked about the meaning of the terms “ethnocide” and “cultural genocide,” the Chairperson-Rapporteur of the Working Group Erica-Irene Daes offered the following clarification: “‘cultural genocide’ referred to the destruction of the physical aspects of a culture, while ‘ethnocide’ referred to the elimination of an entire ‘ethnos’ and people.”19 When the Language Services reviewed the text in 1994, it simply repeated this statement.20 How, exactly, “the destruction of the physical aspects of culture” differed from “the elimination of an entire ‘ethnos’ and people” was not explained (Benvenuto 2015, 33).

In the subsequent stage of the drafting process, the center of influence shifted from indigenous representatives to member states, leading to several modifications in the wording of the declaration. Notably, the terms “cultural genocide” and “ethnocide” were deleted and replaced with the following statement in what became Article 8 of the final version: “Indigenous peoples and individuals have the right not to be subjected to forced assimilation or destruction of their culture.” The main justification for the change was the allegedly vague meaning of “cultural genocide” and “ethnocide” as well as their lack of foundation in international law. The Declaration of San José was mentioned during the proceedings, but it was dismissed on the grounds that it had been developed by experts rather than states and that its status under international law was consequently ambiguous.21 The final text of the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, adopted by the General Assembly in September 2007, contains no mention of “cultural genocide” or “ethnocide” (Benvenuto 2015, 33–34).22

Ethnic Cleansing

The conceptual history of ethnic cleansing presents a stark contrast to that of ethnocide. The rapid proliferation of the expression among journalists, lawyers, politicians, and academics in the 1990s makes it impractical to reconstruct the term’s trajectory in the same linear manner as was done with ethnocide in the previous section. Instead of a historical narrative, therefore, this section provides more of a cross-sectional analysis of how the concept of ethnic cleansing has been defined and deployed. Crucially, the discrepancy between the two sections should not be seen as a limitation of the analysis. On the contrary, the dissimilar trajectories of the two terms is in itself highly revealing: whereas the conceptual history of ethnocide has been characterized

---

12 UNESCO Doc. SS.82/WS/32, p. 32.
17 UNESCO Doc. SS.82/C/39/5, p. 11.
by a slow and labored movement from the margins of the international order toward the core, the concept of ethnic cleansing was born at the very heart of this order. The conceptual history of ethnic cleansing is closely bound to the rise of the nation-state in Europe and the ensuing attempts to construct an ethnically homogeneous community as the foundation of the state’s legitimacy. References to the “cleansing” or “purification” of the national territory can be found in numerous European languages, including English, French, German, Czech, Polish, Russian, and Serbo-Croatian, from the nineteenth-century onward (Ther 2014, 4). During the Second World War, the metaphor of cleansing was infamously invoked by Nazi officials to describe the rendering of their territories Jewenrein or “clean of Jews” (Bell-Fialkoff 1993, 114; see also Naimark 2002, 57–84). In the aftermath of the war, similar language was used by Poles and Czechs seeking to “purify” their countries of foreign elements (Kramer 2001, 1). As Philipp Ther (2014, 4) observes, we are dealing with “a pan-European concept” that has been closely associated with the idealization of the ethnically homogeneous nation-state as the pinnacle of political development.

The prefix “ethnic” is a more recent addition. The earliest uses of the compound term can be found in the 1980s, when the Russian expression etnischesko chischeniye or “ethnic cleansing” was used by Soviet authorities to describe the deportation of Armenians from Azerbaijan during the “ethnics cleansing” was used by Soviet authorities to describe the deportation of Armenians from Azerbaijan during the Nagorno-Karabakh crisis (Banks and Wolfe Murray 1999, 152). The equivalent Serbo-Croatian expression etniˇcko tišenje appears in Yugoslav media reports discussing the creation of “ethnically clean territories” in Kosovo after 1981. In this context, the term was associated with nonviolent administrative matters and referred mainly to the behavior of Kosovo Albanians toward the Serbian minority. The situation changed dramatically a decade later during the Bosnian War, when etniˇcko tišenje was used by the Serbian military as a code word for leaving nobody in the area alive (Petrovic 1994, 343). What all of this points to, as Martin Shaw (2015, 67) underscores, is that “ethnic cleansing” was “originally a perpetrator’s term, embedding rather than criticizing their particular meaning of ‘cleanliness’ or ‘purification’.”

It was against the backdrop of Serbian atrocities during the Bosnian War that the term “ethnic cleansing” was widely taken up by Western commentators in the summer of 1992. Journalists initially placed the expression in scare quotes, indicating its relative novelty as well as unease with its Nazi overtones. Due to the rapid proliferation of the expression in the media, it is difficult to establish exactly when, or by who, it was first used. The contours of the concept have subsequently been fleshed out by academics and lawyers, but its boundaries remain ambiguous. Although “ethnic cleansing” is the predominant expression in the English language, alternatives such as “ethnic purification” have also been used. In French-language texts, corresponding terms include purification ethnique, nettoyage ethnique, and épuration ethnique (Petrovic 1994, 343; Banks and Wolfe Murray 1999, 152–53).

Some of the first definitions of “ethnic cleansing” can be found in United Nations documents concerning the conflict in the former Yugoslavia. An early definition was provided by a report from Special Rapporteur Tadeusz Mazowiecki in November 1992: “The term ethnic cleansing refers to the elimination by the ethnic group exerting control over a given territory of members of other ethnic groups.” Further clarity was provided by the United Nations Commission of Experts in its first Interim Report in February 1993, which stated that ethnic cleansing entailed “rendering an area ethnically homogeneous by using force or intimidation to remove persons of given groups from the area.” This definition was reiterated by the Commission of Experts in its Final Report in May 1994, which went on to describe ethnic cleansing as “a purposeful policy designed by one ethnic or religious group to remove by violent and terror-inspiring means the civilian population of another ethnic or religious group from certain geographic areas.”

The relationship between ethnic cleansing and genocide has been the subject of substantial controversy. At the heart of the matter is the question of whether ethnic cleansing is a distinct concept or merely a euphemism that “bleaches the atrocities of genocide” (Blum et al. 2007). In an especially scathing attack, Martin Shaw (2015, 77) has argued that any attempt to distinguish ethnic cleansing from genocide is misguided: “Cleansing language invariably oozes genocidal intent, resonating with the idea of destroying, if not murdering, groups to which it is applied.” Numerous pronouncements emanating from the United Nations also suggest that ethnic cleansing should be understood as conterminous with genocide. The most explicit statement to this effect is a General Assembly resolution from December 1992 denouncing “the abhorrent policy of ‘ethnic cleansing’, which is a form of genocide.” This statement has been reaffirmed in several subsequent resolutions (Schabas 2009, 224–25). Another example is provided by the aforementioned Interim Report of the Commission of Experts, which noted that ethnic cleansing was “contrary to international law” and “could also fall within the meaning of the Genocide Convention.” More generally, the close association between the two concepts can be seen in the coinage of compound terms such as “genocidal ethnic cleansing” (Pégéorier 2013, 95) and “murderous ethnic cleansing” (Mann 2005, 12) to capture their overlap.

Despite the overlap between genocide and ethnic cleansing, the two concepts entail an important difference in objective: genocide aims to destroy a specific group, whereas ethnic cleansing aims to create an ethnically homogeneous geographical area (Naimark 2002, 3; Mulaj 2003, 710; Lieberman 2010, 44; Ther 2014, 2). In the words of Jennifer Jackson Preece (1998, 821), “while ethnic cleansing affects people, what is really at stake is territory.” Numerous scholars have accordingly conceptualized ethnic cleansing as a spectrum of practices that range from forced emigration or population exchange on the one end to mass murder or genocide on the other (e.g., Bell-Fialkoff 1993, 110; Naimark 2002, 3–4; Mann 2005, 12; Lieberman 2010, 44–45). Genocide, from this perspective, is not conterminous with ethnic cleansing, but rather an especially deadly form that ethnic cleansing can take.

This leads directly to a second difference between ethnic cleansing and genocide: whereas moderate forms of ethnic cleansing can be contractual and acquire international approval, the idea of contractual genocide is “a contradiction in terms” (Ther 2014, 244). Examples of contractual ethnic cleansing include the Greco-Bulgarian population exchange in the interwar years, pursuant to the Treaty of Neuilly, and the forced removal of ethnic Germans from Poland after 1945, in accordance with the Potsdam Protocol (Schabas 2009, 226–27; Ther 2014, 241–45). This distinction between ethnic cleansing and genocide was
made explicit during the drafting of the Genocide Convention after the representative of the United States expressed concern that the proposed definition of genocide “might be extended to embrace forced transfers of minority groups such as have already been carried out by members of the United Nations” (as cited in Schabas 2009, 226). To allay such fears, the Secretary-General’s draft underscored that “[m]ass displacements of populations […] does not constitute genocide” unless such an operation “were attended by such circumstances as to lend to the death of the whole or part of the displaced population.”28

Ultimately, what is most striking about the conceptual history of ethnic cleansing is the rapid reappropriation of the expression by the international community in the 1990s. Within the space of a few short years, ethnic cleansing went from a euphemism originating in perpetrator discourse to an internationally recognized concept that could be invoked to justify humanitarian intervention (e.g., Kresock 1994). Although it clearly lacks the legal and moral weight of genocide, ethnic cleansing has nonetheless acquired a “rhetorical power” of its own (Walling 2000, 60). In academic discourse, too, the concept has established itself as an analytical category that is widely used to pick out and analyze episodes of mass violence (see Buhutgil 2018 for an overview of the literature). This rather stunning rearticulation of ethnic cleansing by the international community can be understood as a means of managing one of the glaring contradictions of genocide discourse: genocide is almost universally regarded as “the crime of crimes” in legal and moral terms, yet states are incredibly reluctant to take political action against it (Gallagher 2013, 58–88; see also Smith 2010). This gap between principle and practice did not matter very much in the midst of Cold War security competition, when the Genocide Convention effectively remained a dead letter, but with the collapse of the Soviet Union and mounting expectations about the moral purpose of the international order it engendered something of a legitimacy crisis (Gallagher 2013, 101–11). The reappropriation of ethnic cleansing as a tool of critique has provided one way for the international community to manage this crisis. By serving as a euphemistic alternative to genocide, the charge of ethnic cleansing has made it possible for powerful members of the international community to chastise “deviant” states without burdening themselves with the responsibility to intervene or calling into question the normative underpinnings of the international order.

Ethnocide and Ethnic Cleansing in the International Order

Ethnocide and ethnic cleansing both describe processes of ethnic homogenization, yet the historical trajectories and political implications of the two concepts are almost diametrically opposed. On the one hand, the articulation of ethnocide has entailed a condemnation of false universalism and a defense of particular ethnic identities. On the other hand, the articulation of ethnic cleansing has entailed a condemnation of ethnonationalist particularism and a defense of civic-universal values. It is as if the two concepts are opposite sides of the same coin, each revealing something about the limitations and dangers of the other. Yet closer inspection shows that the two concepts are also characterized by a profound asymmetry.

In structural terms, the asymmetrical mirroring of ethnocide and ethnic cleansing reflects what R.B.J. Walker (2006, 58) calls the “double outsides” of modern subjectivity: “The world of modern subjectivity and objectivity, or interiority and exteriority, already assumes its own distinction from some world outside of itself.” This doubling of the inside/outside distinction is also at work in the structuring of the international order. That is to say, the international order entails a pattern of exclusion and discrimination not only along the boundaries of individual states, but also along the boundaries of the states-system as a whole. The distinction between the inside and the outside of the state, so familiar to theorists of international relations, is thus always already accompanied by a second (perhaps less evident) distinction between the inside and the outside of the states-system. Even if one accepts the Eurocentric reading of modern history as the global triumph of the sovereign state, Walker observes, “there must remain the nagging question about what, and whom, has been left outside of this process of internationalization as internalization.” It is in relation to this doubled structure of the international order that the asymmetries between ethnocide and ethnic cleansing are best understood and theorized.

The concept of ethnocide has been articulated by marginalized actors, indigenous groups in particular, that have been left out in the cold during the historical formation of the international order. Consequently, the subject position from which the charge of ethnocide has been articulated is locatable neither inside nor outside the state—is locatable neither in the domestic realm nor in the international realm—but falls outside the inside/outside distinction itself. Reflecting this position of radical exteriority, the charge of ethnocide entails a critique not only of the actions of particular states, but also of the universal standards upon which the states-system is grounded. These universal standards include formal legal principles such as nonintervention and sovereign equality among states, as well as an array of ideological norms pertaining to modernity and development. Seen in a historical perspective, these standards represent a continuation of the nineteenth-century “standard of civilisation” that had circumscribed the boundaries of the international society and justified European imperial rule over so-called primitive peoples (Gong 1984). Contemporary international standards masquerade as universals, yet their historical development is deeply Eurocentric and entails the suppression of alternative forms of social and cultural organization, often through violent means. As Paul Keal (2003, 2) underscores, the typical success story about the expansion or globalization of the European international society also has a “dark side” characterized by “the dispossession and destruction of indigenous societies.” Civilization and barbarism, or modernity and coloniality, should not be viewed as simply opposed, but as intimately intertwined, such that progress toward civilization or modernity can go hand-in-hand with the annihilation of local cultural traditions and alternative ways of life (van Krieken 1999; Mignolo 2003). It is in an attempt to combat this coercive power of modern universals and to defend alternative forms of social and cultural organization that the concept of ethnocide has been elaborated by the indigenous rights movement.29 The charge of ethnocide wrests away the mask of universality that underpins the legitimacy of the international order, exposing the unsavory contradictions that lie beneath.

28 To be clear, I am not claiming that the threat of ethnocide is exclusive to indigenous peoples and irrelevant to other minorities. The distinction between indigenous peoples and minorities is notoriously fuzzy, especially in Asia and Africa, where most groups can legitimately claim indigenous status (Kingsbury 1998). What matters is the subject-position from which the concept of ethnocide has been articulated, not any essentialized conception of indigeneity.

If the concept of ethnocide operates along the boundary that demarcates the modern international order from a world beyond, then the concept of ethnic cleansing operates along the boundary that demarcates the domestic society from the international realm. This is evidenced by the Janus-faced history of the concept, which is torn between the domestic and international faces of state identity. On the one hand, the domestic legitimacy of the state depends on an ideological appeal to national cohesion that generates pressures toward ethnic cleansing (Rae 2002; Mann 2005; Ther 2014). This is reflected in the “long” genealogy of the concept, which is rooted in nationalistic perpetrator discourse glorifying the ethnically homogeneous nation-state. On the other hand, at the same time, the international legitimacy of the state depends on the espousal of future-oriented civic-universal values associated with modernity and development. Jelena Subotic and Aye Zarakol (2013, 921) call this “the dilemma of cultural intimacy”—what holds the state identity together is exactly the same thing that opens it to international criticism.” While all states experience this dilemma to some degree, it is especially acute among peripheral states that have had to assimilate into an alien system “the rules of which they did not create, the norms of which were unfamiliar at best, the major players of which judged and explicitly labeled them as inferior, and the ontology of which convinced them that they indeed were lacking in some way” (Zarakol 2011, 6). This international hierarchy is reflected in the “short” genealogy of ethnic cleansing, which covers the post–Cold War appropriation of the expression by the international community and its transformation into a political tool for chastising peripheral states whose actions run counter to international morality (the Balkan states on the periphery of Europe are the exemplary case). By depicting ethnic homogenization in particularist and exceptionalist terms as a deviation from international norms, the charge of ethnic cleansing deflected attention away from the constitutive contradictions that structure the international order. This redemptive narrative exculpates the “civilised” members of the international community, which are seen to have either overcome ethnic cleansing—thus relegating it to the past—or even avoided ethnic cleansing altogether. More subtle methods of ethnic homogenization resulting from immigration controls, cultural assimilation, or structural racism are conveniently brushed under the carpet (see Ahmed 1995).

Due to these structural differences, the concepts of ethnocide and ethnic cleansing are also associated with different kinds of solutions. As articulated by the indigenous rights movement, the charge of ethnocide targets not only particular states, but also the normative underpinnings of the states-system in general. Consequently, even if state-centric solutions to ethnocide can be found through the provision of cultural rights, the indigenous rights movement has an uneasy relationship with the nation-state. This is manifest in its longstanding commitment to the self-determination of indigenous groups, which entails the decoupling of sovereignty from the nation-state and the construction of a “third space of sovereignty” that cannot be easily located either inside or outside state borders (Bryneel 2007). In contrast, the subject-position from which the charge of ethnic cleansing has been articulated remains internal to the international order, targeting particular actions by particular states rather than the states-system itself. The proposed solutions to ethnic cleansing consequently tend to be state-centric, ranging from power-sharing arrangements to territorial partition—the irony of partition, of course, is that it rewards ethnic cleansers by creating homogeneous states (Jenne 2012). Ultimately, these differences help to explain why it has been much easier for the international community to incorporate into its vocabulary the charge of ethnic cleansing, which can be localized within “deviant” states, than the charge of ethnocide, which entails a much more fundamental challenge to the normative underpinnings of the international order.

**Conclusion: An Ethnic Century?**

The adoption of the Genocide Convention in 1948 coincided almost to the day with the promulgation of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. Two years later, UNESCO published a Statement on Race denouncing doctrines of racial inequality and recommending the jettisoning of the race concept: “it would be better when speaking of human races to drop the term ‘race’ altogether and speak of ethnic groups” (UNESCO 1969, 31). Collectively, these documents constituted a watershed moment in the history of the international order, signaling the criminalization of genocide, the downfall of scientific racism, and the onset of decolonization (Shaw 2013, 3). In an influential and thought-provoking article, Dirk Moses (2002, 34) has conceptualized this turning point as the end of the “racial century”—the end of the especially intense phase of nation-building and empire construction that defined international politics from roughly 1850 to 1950. By way of conclusion, I want to build on this idea by locating the conceptual histories of ethnocide and ethnic cleansing within the frame of an “ethnic century.”

In suggesting the idea of the racial century, Moses (2002, 28) was seeking to develop a holistic lens that would make it possible to analyze the genocides of modernity “as part of a single process rather than merely in comparative (and competitive) terms.” Without a doubt, the notion of the racial century offers a valuable world-historical framework for thinking about the intersections of genocide and international order between 1850 and 1950. There is substantial evidence, for example, that the racial policies of the Third Reich were inspired by European colonialism as well as the Jim Crow laws in the United States (Zimmerer 2005; Whitman 2017). Nevertheless, Moses’s periodization creates the problematic illusion of a clean ideological rupture that buys into the antiracist orthodoxy of the post-war era. “With the adoption of the UN conventions on human rights and genocide in the late 1940s and the subsequent sea-change in public opinion regarding racial issues,” Moses (2002, 34) concludes, “the ‘racial century’ came to an end.” By casting the Holocaust as the climax of the racial century, Moses’s periodization elides the underlying continuities that connect the racial century to the present. As this article has argued, the criminalization of genocide should be understood not only as an ideological watershed, but also as a strategy of containment that has deflected attention away from racial and colonial hierarchies.

The proposition with which I want to conclude this article is that the era of international politics that began around 1950 can be fruitfully conceptualized as the “ethnic century.” In the racial century, as Moses (2002, 34) observes, “explicitly racial categories were the prime source of policy legitimation.” In the ethnic century, by contrast, racial categories have been either abandoned entirely or displaced by more neutral proxies such as ethnicity and culture. This is precisely why I find it more helpful to coin a new label, instead of just extending the racial century up to the

---

30 UN Doc. A/RES/217(III).
present. Whereas the racial century was defined by formal imperial rule and vertical patterns of discrimination between superior and inferior races, the “new racism” of the ethnic century is characterized by horizontal patterns of discrimination between formally equal insiders and outsiders (Balibar 1991; Stolcke 1995). At the same time, despite these discursive shifts, the global order remains profoundly shaped by the undead legacies of racism and colonialism (Gruffydd Jones 2006; Anievas, Manchanda, and Shilliam 2015). The ethnic century is thus the name of a paradox: on the one hand, it marks the end of empire and the overturning of racial and colonial hierarchies; on the other hand, it underscores how practices of racial and colonial domination have taken on a more insidious guise, concealed beneath obfuscating pseudonyms such as ethnicity and culture.

The paradox of the ethnic century means that the conceptual histories of ethnocide and ethnic cleansing are open to two contrasting readings, each containing a grain of truth. In a first reading, these concepts can be harnessed to a re-demptive narrative about the moral progress of the post-war international order. Considered against the backdrop of a narrow and Holocaust-centric definition of genocide, the articulation of ethnocide and ethnic cleansing constitutes an important normative shift that expands not only our analytical vocabularies, but also our political imaginaries. Emerging from the shadow of genocide, these concepts entail a concerted critique of homogenizing practices that had formerly been accepted without a second thought: the charge of ethnocide offers an important contribution to dismantling the universalistic façade of modernity and development, while the charge of ethnic cleansing entails a denunciation of violent nation-building practices that for much of the modern era had belonged to the standard repertoire of states. Even if neither concept has been codified into positive international law, their dissemination is indicative of a substantive change in attitudes toward ethnic diversity.

In a second reading, however, the conceptual histories of ethnocide and ethnic cleansing can be mobilized to highlight the profound asymmetries and inequalities that continue to structure the international order. Whereas the charge of ethnocide has been developed by marginalized actors with limited influence, the charge of ethnic cleansing has been articulated by the core states of the international community. Whereas the concept of ethnocide is still relatively unknown to the general public, the concept of ethnic cleansing usually targets particular actions by particular actors with limited influence, the charge of ethnic cleansing entails a concerted critique of homogenizing practices that had formerly been accepted without a second thought; the charge of ethnocide offers an important contribution to dismantling the universalistic façade of modernity and development, while the charge of ethnic cleansing entails a denunciation of violent nation-building practices that for much of the modern era had belonged to the standard repertoire of states. Even if neither concept has been codified into positive international law, their dissemination is indicative of a substantive change in attitudes toward ethnic diversity.

In a second reading, however, the conceptual histories of ethnocide and ethnic cleansing can be mobilized to highlight the profound asymmetries and inequalities that continue to structure the international order. Whereas the charge of ethnocide has been developed by marginalized actors with limited influence, the charge of ethnic cleansing has been articulated by the core states of the international community. Whereas the concept of ethnocide is still relatively unknown to the general public, the concept of ethnic cleansing usually targets particular actions by particular actors with limited influence, the charge of ethnic cleansing entails a concerted critique of homogenizing practices that had formerly been accepted without a second thought; the charge of ethnocide offers an important contribution to dismantling the universalistic façade of modernity and development, while the charge of ethnic cleansing entails a denunciation of violent nation-building practices that for much of the modern era had belonged to the standard repertoire of states. Even if neither concept has been codified into positive international law, their dissemination is indicative of a substantive change in attitudes toward ethnic diversity.

By locating the conceptual histories of ethnocide and ethnic cleansing in the frame of the ethnic century, I have hoped to accomplish two things: first, to highlight the complex legacies that link the racial century to the present day, and second, to offer a holistic lens for thinking about the relationship between ethnocide, ethnic cleansing, and international order. Despite their contrasting historical trajectories and political implications, both the concept of ethnocide and the concept of ethnic cleansing are symptomatic of the same epochal closure that brought the racial century to an end. The challenge is to think these concepts together in their asymmetrical complementarity, without erasing the substantive differences between them or conflating them with genocide.

Acknowledgments

Earlier versions of the article were presented at the ISA and ASN conferences in 2021, and I am grateful to the participants at these events for their questions and comments. Many thanks also to Lucas de Oliveira Paes, Duncan Bell, Ayşe Zarakol, Pedro Mendes Loureiro, and Naosuke Mukoyama for their generous feedback on previous drafts. I am also grateful to the three anonymous reviewers for their valuable suggestions on how to improve the article.

References


