



1 scale terrestrial dusting<sup>7,8</sup>, to incorporating industrial by-products<sup>9</sup>, to increasing oceanic  
2 olivine<sup>10</sup>. Enhanced weathering techniques are sometimes considered to be a less  
3 extreme option than SRM, and perhaps implementable at a relatively local level (we  
4 shall emphasize this point below). Further, given that agricultural practices already alter  
5 large sections of the Earth's surface in analogous ways (mineral fertilization to increase  
6 soil alkalinity, soil tilling and liming, etc.), there is potential for enhanced weathering to  
7 piggyback on existing practices. Finally, increases in oceanic alkalinity would  
8 potentially come with the co-benefit of alleviating acidification and increasing biomass.

9  
10 However, uncertainty about the global-scale efficiency and effects of enhanced  
11 weathering is high. The reasons should be familiar: global systems are complex,  
12 interconnected, and thus difficult to model. Even in comparison with SRMs, enhanced  
13 weathering is understudied at global scales, and models are not well resolved<sup>10</sup>. Some  
14 mineral outputs of enhanced weathering are potentially toxic at high concentrations.  
15 Organic and inorganic CO<sub>2</sub> dynamics are coupled in complex ways<sup>11</sup>, and it is unclear  
16 how manipulating mineralogical composition will affect biological CO<sub>2</sub> absorption, and  
17 *vice-versa*. The practical costs of locating (or generating), processing, and transporting  
18 the large volumes of minerals required for large-scale enhanced weathering (to say  
19 nothing of the production costs of biotic materials) are likely to be immense. The  
20 possible side effects, both apparently beneficial and problematic, are voluminous<sup>10</sup>. For  
21 more on the specifics of enhanced weathering, see the other papers in this collection.

22  
23 In addition to these practical, theoretical, and empirical challenges, weighing the  
24 advisability of enhanced weathering against other candidate strategies has ethical  
25 dimensions. We highlight these, with a specific focus on the role of states, both because  
26 this simplifies an already complex discussion, and because states are plausibly in a  
27 position to both regulate and initiate strategies for mitigating and reducing climate  
28 change, as well as entering into the kinds of international agreements required. Where  
29 other reviews of the ethics have been general across geoengineering<sup>1,2</sup>, we will focus on  
30 the relationship between relatively general ethical considerations and the specific case  
31 of enhanced weathering.

### 32 33 *i. Post-implementation scenarios*

34 Pak-Hang Wong<sup>12</sup> argues that the ethical debate over geoengineering misses important  
35 ethical issues arising *post*-implementation. These include the responsibility for  
36 continuation and monitoring, which he refers to together as 'the requirement of  
37 maintenance'<sup>12</sup>. Indeed, some enhanced weathering techniques require significant  
38 infrastructure. And the best locations for implementation in terms of climate and  
39 mineralogy lack existing agricultural systems to co-opt<sup>10</sup>. Further, ongoing monitoring  
40 of the effects would be costly.

1

2 Who is responsible for maintenance? How should the burden of maintenance be shared?  
3 There is no easy answer to such questions: we might think that the party who  
4 implements the geoengineering technology is responsible for maintenance into the  
5 indefinite future; but equally might think that they have done more than their fair share  
6 by absorbing the costs of implementation, and thus maintenance should fall to others.

7

8 Many authors note the risks of any abrupt halt to certain geoengineering interventions  
9 (although they usually have SRM rather than CDR in mind<sup>13,14,12,15</sup>), a risk that becomes  
10 more likely to materialize if responsibility for maintenance, once geoengineering  
11 techniques have been implemented, is spread between groups. Wong argues that any  
12 ethics of geoengineering must take a long-term perspective<sup>12</sup>. Given that, generally  
13 speaking, geoengineering measures are often presented as impermanent, stop-gap  
14 measures, maintenance and removal costs must be considered alongside  
15 implementation. It is not obvious, for instance, how long the effects of enhanced  
16 weathering might last. If a decade has been spent adding vast quantities of silicate rock  
17 to previously mineral-poor areas, what downstream effects would occur were we to turn  
18 off the tap? In this regard SRM is likely more problematic than CDR, but the more  
19 dramatic *vis-à-vis* scale and impact CDR interventions are, the less likely we are to be  
20 able to predict and understand the implications of cessation. Post-implementation  
21 scenarios, then, raise both ethical and empirical puzzles that remain unresolved.

22

### 23 *ii. Failures of collective action*

24 It is often thought that a Tragedy of the Commons (TOC) between states is a major  
25 block to national and global action on GHGs. That is, the interests of each state  
26 (business-as-usual or increasing emissions) come apart from what is in the interest of  
27 states taken together (mutual restrictions to emissions). It is plausible that achieving  
28 mutual restrictions, whatever the exact target, would not require equal action from all  
29 states. Indeed, some states could take no action at all. This creates an incentive to be an  
30 inactive state. If this is right, then there may be conditions under which a state could  
31 take no action, while avoiding ethical culpability. Alternatively, states may be  
32 culpable—e.g. for colluding in their collective failure to agree<sup>16</sup>. That a state may lack  
33 culpability despite failing to do what is in the combined interests of states, applies to  
34 enhanced weathering in two ways: firstly, to the decision to implement enhanced  
35 weathering instead of reducing GHG emissions in a more straightforward way;  
36 secondly, to the implementation and maintenance of enhanced weathering, as discussed  
37 above.

38

39 Imagine that in the future, states are forced to implement NETs because of a prior  
40 collective failure to negotiate the international agreement that would have solved the

1 TOC and allowed them to mitigate climate change *without* the use of NETs (or  
2 geoengineering techniques more broadly). Particular states may not be culpable for this  
3 failure, e.g. because taking unilateral action would not have made a significant  
4 difference either to the concentration of GHGs in the atmosphere or to the agreement  
5 being negotiated; or because they had reasonable, but ultimately mistaken beliefs about  
6 what other states were willing to do<sup>17,18</sup>. Other states may be culpable, e.g. because they  
7 *caused* the failure.

8 Further, note that because NETs are processes that last through time<sup>12</sup> their maintenance  
9 may itself create a TOC. This TOC may be international and hold between countries that  
10 could share the burden of maintaining specific NET interventions; it may be domestic  
11 but intergenerational, holding between successive governments of the same country; or  
12 it may be both international and intergenerational—as in Gardiner’s ‘perfect moral  
13 storm’<sup>19</sup>. The threat of a TOC for maintenance may be a sufficient reason to refrain from  
14 deploying a specific NET, particularly due to high transition costs or risks from abrupt  
15 cessation of the intervention (insofar as such risks exist). The possibility of a TOC for  
16 maintenance depends in part on the cost of collective action, and thus the specifics of  
17 the different kinds of NETs matter here. If enhanced weathering can be implemented at  
18 relatively low costs it could be part of an overall response to climate change: especially  
19 in partnership with existing agricultural practices (especially when contrasted with  
20 SRM). However, establishing this requires significant research and moreover, as we  
21 explain below, using enhanced weathering to avoid reducing GHG emissions (rather  
22 than in combination with reductions) potentially creates a serious moral hazard.

23  
24 But does a TOC in fact hold? Nicholas Stern<sup>20</sup> and Fergus Green<sup>21</sup> (the latter more  
25 forcibly) argue that radically reducing emissions does not, contrary to received wisdom,  
26 put states into a TOC, because of the nature of the co-benefits that would accrue from  
27 doing so. If states, or at least *particular* states, could be reducing emissions and  
28 obtaining co-benefits all the while freeing up resources for additional welfare, but are  
29 not doing so, then they wrong their citizens, whose interests they are supposed to serve.

30  
31 *iii. Distribution of risk, externalities, and redress for damage*

32 Some NETs might displace risk from those deploying them onto others. This  
33 displacement can be spatial and temporal: onto people in future generations, or people  
34 living in other countries<sup>22</sup>. This is likely for enhanced weathering: the most effective  
35 areas for deployment are the hot, wet climes of the tropics, so the (often severely  
36 underprivileged) people living there would be exposed to the risk of unintended  
37 consequences, such as toxic by-products from increased silicate weathering.

38  
39 Such risks are one kind of ‘negative externality’; in general, negative externalities are  
40 costs borne by those other than the technology’s implementers. Externalities may be

1 positive. Countries in drier, colder climates would likely reap the benefits of lower carbon  
2 levels, less acidic seas, and higher biological production from large-scale enhanced  
3 weathering implemented in tropical zones; ocean-based increases in biomass would  
4 surely not respect national borders, so that were the US (let us imagine) to implement  
5 such measures in their territorial waters, the effects would be felt in Mexico. Risks can  
6 be negative externalities when they cross borders (or generations) in the same way<sup>22</sup>.

7  
8 One ethical question is whether it is permissible to implement techniques that impose  
9 risks on others without their having a say, in particular when they may not even benefit  
10 from the techniques' desired initial effects; another is how such risks should be  
11 distributed among candidate recipients and managed so as to minimize them. If  
12 enhanced rock weathering were implemented by the UK Government, for example, and  
13 that had consequences that caused serious damage, who would be responsible for  
14 repairing—or compensating for—that damage? Ethical considerations potentially  
15 require those nations that implement the technologies and benefit from them to absorb  
16 (or compensate for) the relevant externalities and materialized risks. (On the ethical  
17 obligations of those countries that benefit from geoengineering, see Heyward<sup>23</sup>.)

18  
19 Issues of post-implementation, collective action, and redress for damage are all  
20 exacerbated by uncertainty. Although reducing or removing uncertainty will not fully  
21 resolve the ethical issues, it would certainly clarify them. As such, these ethical points  
22 encourage further consideration and research into enhanced weathering techniques.  
23 However, other ethical considerations push in the other direction, to which we now turn.

24  
25 *iv. 'Dirty Hands' — or, arming the future*

26 Is a government ever permitted to do something unethical because doing so will prevent  
27 *even more unethical* consequences? In this section, we assume for the sake of argument  
28 that NET measures come at some ethical cost, e.g. by creating moral hazard, by placing  
29 us in a dominating relationship with nature, or by creating opportunity costs—perhaps  
30 implementing NET will mean not doing some other valuable action, like alleviating  
31 poverty. In the case at hand, the question is whether a government would be permitted  
32 to choose enhanced weathering in a straight choice between that and business-as-usual  
33 emissions. Whether having 'dirty hands'—purposefully performing an unethical action  
34 to avoid some even less ethically desirable outcome—is impermissible is often cashed  
35 out in terms of how 'categorical' we take ethical claims to be<sup>24,25</sup>.

36  
37 From a categorical perspective, choosing dirty hands is impermissible. But those who  
38 take a less categorical view of morality may see it as laudable. It is not easy to do  
39 something others, here both nations and individuals, may consider unethical, but doing  
40 it to secure a better outcome is somewhat heroic. Of course, all of this is mere hypocrisy

1 if a government claims that the reason for doing something unethical is that otherwise *it*  
2 will do something even more unethical. Governments have control over what they do,  
3 and in that case the answer is easy: do neither! The harder question involves doing  
4 something unethical to prevent *someone else* from doing something worse (or  
5 something worse from happening).

6  
7 An argument along these lines has been made by Paul Crutzen<sup>26</sup>, and is criticized by  
8 Stephen Gardiner<sup>27</sup>. Gardiner refers to it as the 'arm the future' argument. It goes like  
9 this. Reducing emissions would be best. We are not doing much to reduce emissions,  
10 and that will probably continue. At some point, people will be faced with a terrible  
11 choice: geoengineering, or catastrophe. Obviously, geoengineering is better than  
12 catastrophe, so those people should choose it. Without the research, that choice is  
13 unavailable. So, we should do the research<sup>27</sup>. Gardiner's main objection to this argument  
14 is that current governments still have control over whether it is true that 'we're not doing  
15 much to reduce emissions', and that 'that will probably continue'. It is up to us whether  
16 we take more radical action to reduce emissions in a way that will not force anyone into  
17 the position of having to use geoengineering techniques—whether SRM or  
18 CDR/NETs—to avoid catastrophe. For as long as this remains true (and for as long as  
19 individual countries are not 'off the hook' because of collective action problems),  
20 Gardiner's criticism is persuasive.

21  
22 It is worth emphasizing that we need not choose between enhanced weathering and  
23 reduced GHGs: insofar as NETs are relatively cheap, relatively low-impact ways of  
24 mitigating the effects of increased carbon emissions, they may be a natural *partner* to  
25 more traditional strategies. Relatedly, it is not obvious that there is bright red line, on  
26 one side of which GHG emissions reduction is a plausible strategy, the other side of  
27 which geoengineering is the only way forwards. Plausibly, the situation is more  
28 complicated, and some desirable scenarios combine the two.

29  
30 However, insofar as we choose to emphasize NETs at the expense of reducing GHGs  
31 (that is, there are opportunity costs), or insofar as emphasizing such after-the-fact  
32 technological solutions lowers the urgency of reducing GHGs, a choice is being made  
33 about the extent to which ongoing natural systems such as the carbon cycle will depend  
34 on human technology. It strikes us as important that this choice is seen as such. This  
35 naturally leads to considering the possible moral hazards of developing NETs.

### 36 37 *v. Moral hazard*

38 In the last section we assumed that NETs are ethically costly. In the next three, we  
39 consider reasons why this might be true.

40 The notion of 'moral hazard' comes from economics, and is the idea that 'people with

1 insurance may take greater risks than they would do without it because they know they  
2 are protected<sup>28,29,30,31</sup>. Applied to NETs, the moral hazard is that because countries have  
3 the 'safeguard' available of removing carbon with NETs (not to mention reducing the  
4 temperature with SRM), they may diminish their efforts to reduce GHG emissions in  
5 other ways.

6  
7 Of course, whether geoengineering measures actually pose a moral hazard depends on  
8 whether we should think of them as 'insurance'—back-up plans to be used only in cases  
9 where the primary plan fails—or as legitimate primary plans. To dip briefly into fantasy,  
10 imagine that enhanced weathering techniques had developed to the stage that the  
11 planet's rate of carbon processing was, in effect, under our immediate and fine-grained  
12 control. Under these conditions, what reasons would we have for lowering our GHG  
13 emissions? Here, enhanced weathering is not merely a stopgap, but an ongoing part of  
14 planet management (although, as we discuss below, the dominating position of humans  
15 in this scenario may yet be problematic). If it is a legitimate primary plan, then there is  
16 no reason to frame the issue as involving moral hazard. There would not be anything  
17 morally hazardous about countries diminishing their efforts to reduce GHG emissions.

18  
19 How should we think about the implementation of NETs compared with straightforward  
20 efforts to reduce emissions, e.g. by cutting consumption, switching to clean energy  
21 sources, investing in public transport infrastructure while raising taxes on private  
22 vehicle usage, transforming fossil fuel and agricultural industries into alternative  
23 sustainable industries, and so on? The most persuasive argument for conceiving of  
24 (certain kinds of) SRM and CDR techniques as creating 'moral hazard' involves their  
25 *safety*. Efforts to reduce emissions in the way just mentioned are generally safe, and  
26 often involve co-benefits. Caution is required here: although there are clear health  
27 benefits in encouraging people in developed countries to drive less, there are economic  
28 costs involved in dramatic changes to consumption and production, which often fall on  
29 the most vulnerable. However, these costs are, in a sense, the kinds of costs we are used  
30 to. In contrast, some SRM and CDR strategies are far from safe (it has even been  
31 suggested that afforestation is problematic<sup>32</sup>). This worry is less pressing for less  
32 ambitious forms of enhanced weathering.

33  
34 The combination of the possibility of moral hazard and uncertainty generates something  
35 of a dilemma. If the Royal Society Report is correct, then more research is required to  
36 decide whether or not various strategies in fact present moral hazards. However, if they  
37 do, then that research should not be done, as often doing the research, and making a  
38 technology available, are coupled<sup>29</sup>.

39 *vi. International governance*

40 Enhanced weathering, at the scale required to genuinely make emissions 'negative', will

1 have to be administered globally and will therefore have global impacts and carry global  
2 risks. For example, enhanced rock weathering requires the dusting of huge tracts of land  
3 with finely ground rock silicate. That land may lie outside the country implementing the  
4 technology, and may have impacts on everyone (via its general effects on the climate  
5 system), and on those in the countries whose land is dusted (e.g. effects on those  
6 populations' respiratory health)—and indeed on those in bordering countries if the rock  
7 silicate crosses borders via wind currents. NETs therefore require appropriate global  
8 governance<sup>22,23,29,28</sup>.

9  
10 One of the five 'Oxford Principles' requires 'public participation in geoengineering  
11 decision-making', another requires 'governance before deployment'<sup>33,34,35</sup>. The Royal  
12 Society notes:

13  
14 '...a flexible framework for international regulation is needed. [...] In general however, any future  
15 improvements to the regulatory context should be democratic, transparent, and flexible [...] and  
16 should discourage unilateral action'<sup>28</sup>.

17  
18 The problem, of course, is that we do not have international democratic institutions in  
19 place: by which we mean, institutions that in some sense give *every* potentially affected  
20 individual a voice in decision-making. Not all countries are democratic, and even those  
21 that are often fail to consult with their citizens before making important decisions. Even  
22 if we ignore this 'democratic deficit' and focus only on groups of state representatives,  
23 e.g. parties to the UNFCCC, there is still a problem of efficacy. Parties met 20 times  
24 since 1992 and accomplished very little<sup>36</sup>. The Paris Agreement is something of an  
25 exception; but parties' current pledges are unlikely to sum to the Agreement's stated  
26 goal. How, then, should we think about the prospects of global governance of large-  
27 scale NETs into the indefinite future?

28  
29 If there is no institution for (genuine) global democracy, then it is hard to see how  
30 global governance of geoengineering could be feasible. If it is not feasible, then the  
31 requirement cannot be met, and at its most dramatic, this means either scrapping the  
32 requirement, or scrapping geoengineering. Of course, which of these we should do  
33 depends on the severity of the risks, which are a lot worse for certain kinds of SRM  
34 approaches than for certain kinds of NETs. Even within NETs, some are riskier than  
35 others: cloud treatment and enhanced weathering involve more risk and uncertainty than  
36 'blue carbon' (that is, capture from oceanic and coastal ecosystems) habitat restoration.  
37 The greater the uncertainty and the worse the risks, the less acceptable it is to make  
38 global interventions without appropriate global governance. For NETs with lower risks,  
39 and about which there is less uncertainty, governance by the UNFCCC may represent  
40 the best compromise between political feasibility and moral desirability.

41



1            *vii. The 'hubris' objection*

2 The hubris objection to the implementation of global NETs in response to anthropogenic  
3 increases in carbon emissions accuses its implementers of excessive arrogance or self-  
4 confidence.

5  
6 There is a less sensible and a more sensible version of this worry. The less sensible  
7 version says that in intentionally manipulating the climate at the scale proposed for  
8 some NETs, we would be 'playing God'; it is not *our place* to intervene on the climate at  
9 that scale. A fallacy lurks here: the idea that there is some 'natural' state of the world and  
10 humans' place in it that ought to be protected against change. Whatever is 'not natural' is  
11 somehow also bad, with the corollary that whatever is natural is somehow also good.  
12 This is demonstrably false: nature contains plenty of terror (natural disasters, violent  
13 killing, starvation and suffering) and there are artificial goods (like medical advances, or  
14 the internet). This is not to mention that the distinction between 'natural' and 'non-  
15 natural' is itself difficult to draw in a compelling way. This same objection has been  
16 waged against abortions, stem cell research, the genetic modification of food, cloning,  
17 and so on. There is little to recommend it.

18  
19 The more sensible version of the objection suggests that there are better and worse ways  
20 in which humans might relate to the environment—and that standing in a relation of  
21 *domination* over it is especially problematic. Certain interventions upon the climate  
22 system do seem to put humans into a dominating relationship with nature. For example,  
23 in implementing NETs instead of choosing to make radical cuts to our consumption  
24 practices, we move away from an appropriate balance between humans and the natural  
25 environment (Confucians emphasize the importance of this kind of balance<sup>37</sup>). Here  
26 'playing God' is better understood as exercising inappropriate levels of control over the  
27 natural world.

28  
29 *Conclusion*

30 The complexity of the technologies, systems, and measures involved in combating  
31 anthropogenic climate change raise difficult scientific and engineering challenges, but  
32 there are significant ethical dimensions as well. In the case of enhanced weathering, in  
33 comparison to other geoengineering measures, there is at least the possibility of a  
34 reduced cost, reduced impact way of decreasing atmospheric carbon, with positive  
35 knock-on effects such as decreased oceanic acidity. However, uncertainty about these  
36 factors make relying on such possibilities difficult. Moreover, the ethical considerations  
37 are not exhausted by uncertainty: issues of responsibility and governance are pressing,  
38 and if enhanced weathering presents a moral hazard, it is not obvious whether we  
39 should attempt to resolve that uncertainty in the first place. Ethical considerations  
40 further highlight the distinction between less ambitious NETs, best seen as supplements

1 to traditional GHG emissions reduction, and more ambitious, extensive approaches. The  
2 former are less effective alone, but present less moral risk. The latter require  
3 significantly more caution. Our aim has not been to resolve such issues, but to argue  
4 that ethical concerns have a place alongside empirical, political and social factors as we  
5 consider how to best respond to the critical challenge that anthropogenic climate change  
6 poses.

7  
8 Adrian Currie  
9 *CSER, Cambridge University*

10  
11 Holly Lawford-Smith  
12 *University of Sheffield*

13  
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