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<journal-meta>
<journal-id journal-id-type="doi">10.1111/(ISSN)1468-0017</journal-id>
<journal-id journal-id-type="publisher-id">MILA</journal-id>
<journal-title-group>
<journal-title xml:lang="en">Mind &amp; Language</journal-title>
<abbrev-journal-title abbrev-type="publisher" xml:lang="en">Mind &amp; Language</abbrev-journal-title>
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<issn publication-format="ppub">0268-1064</issn>
<issn publication-format="epub">1468-0017</issn>
<publisher>
<publisher-name>Blackwell Publishing Ltd</publisher-name>
<publisher-loc>Oxford, UK</publisher-loc>
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<article-id pub-id-type="doi">10.1111/mila.70010</article-id>
<article-id pub-id-type="publisher-id">MILA70010</article-id>
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<subject>ORIGINAL ARTICLE</subject>
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<subject>ORIGINAL ARTICLE</subject>
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<title-group>
<article-title xml:lang="en">Agnosticism about artificial consciousness</article-title>
<alt-title alt-title-type="left-running-head">McClelland</alt-title>
</title-group>
<contrib-group>
<contrib id="mila70010-cr-0001" contrib-type="author" corresp="yes">
<name>
<surname>McClelland</surname>
<given-names>Tom</given-names>
</name>
<contrib-id contrib-id-type="orcid">https://orcid.org/0000-0001-5956-1425</contrib-id>
<email>tom.mcclelland57@gmail.com</email>
<xref ref-type="corresp" rid="correspondenceTo">*</xref>
<xref ref-type="aff" rid="mila70010-aff-0001">
<sup>1</sup>
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<aff id="mila70010-aff-0001">
<label>
<sup>1</sup>
</label>

<named-content content-type="organisation-division">Department of History and Philosophy of Science</named-content>

<institution>University of Cambridge</institution>

<city>Cambridge</city>
 <country country="GB">UK</country>

</aff>
<author-notes>
<corresp id="correspondenceTo"><label>*</label>

<bold>Correspondence</bold><break/>
Tom McClelland, Department of History and Philosophy of Science, Free School Lane, University of Cambridge, Cambridge, CB2 3RH, UK.<break/>
Email: <email>tom.mcclelland57@gmail.com</email>
<break/>

</corresp>
</author-notes>
<pub-date date-type="pub" publication-format="electronic"><day>18</day>
<month>12</month>
<year>2025</year>
</pub-date><fpage/><lpage/><history>

<date date-type="rev-recd">
<day>03</day>
<month>09</month>
<year>2025</year>
</date>

<date date-type="received">
<day>28</day>
<month>10</month>
<year>2024</year>
</date>

<date date-type="accepted">
<day>09</day>
<month>09</month>
<year>2025</year>
</date>

</history>
<permissions>
<copyright-statement content-type="issue-copyright">© 2025 John Wiley &amp; Sons Ltd.</copyright-statement>
<copyright-statement content-type="article-copyright">© 2025 The Author(s). Mind &amp; Language published by John Wiley &amp; Sons Ltd.</copyright-statement>
<copyright-year>2025</copyright-year>
<copyright-holder>© 2025 The Author(s). Mind &amp; Language published by John Wiley &amp; Sons Ltd.</copyright-holder>
<license>
<ali:license_ref>http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/</ali:license_ref>
<license-p>This is an open access article under the terms of the <ext-link ext-link-type="uri" xlink:href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/">Creative Commons Attribution</ext-link> License, which permits use, distribution and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited.</license-p>
</license>
</permissions>
<abstract xml:lang="en" abstract-type="main">
<p xml:lang="en">Could an AI have conscious experiences? Answers to this question should be based not on intuition, dogma or speculation but on solid scientific evidence. However, I argue such evidence is hard to come by and that the only justifiable stance is agnosticism. The main division in the contemporary literature is between biological views that are sceptical of artificial consciousness and functional views that are sympathetic to it. I show that both camps make the same mistake of overstating what the available evidence tells us. I then consider what agnosticism means for the ethical problems surrounding the creation of artificial consciousness.</p>
</abstract>
<kwd-group kwd-group-type="author-generated" xml:lang="en">
<kwd id="mila70010-kwd-0001">AI ethics</kwd>
<kwd id="mila70010-kwd-0002">artificial consciousness</kwd>
<kwd id="mila70010-kwd-0003">evidentialism</kwd>
<kwd id="mila70010-kwd-0004">hard problem</kwd>
<kwd id="mila70010-kwd-0005">precautionary principle</kwd>
</kwd-group>
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