

I have always said that a belief was knowledge if it was  
(i) true (ii) certain (iii) obtained by a reliable process

But the word 'process' is very unsatisfactory; we can call inference a process, but even then unreliable seems to mean only a fallacious method not a false premiss as it is supposed to be.

Can we say that a memory is obtained by a reliable process?

I think, perhaps we can if we mean the causal process connecting what happens with my remembering it:

We might then say the self must be caused by what are not beliefs in a way <sup>or in circumstances</sup> that can be more or less relied on to give true beliefs, and if in this train of causation occur other intermediary beliefs these must all be true ones.

e.g. 95 telepathy knowledge? — is it ~~sure~~

may mean (i) Taking it there is such a process, can it be relied on to create ~~true~~ beliefs in the telepathic (within some limits e.g. when what is believed is about the telepathic's thoughts)

or (ii) Supposing we are agnostics, does the feeling of being telepathed to guarantee truth.

Delto for female intuition, impressions of character etc

Perhaps say not (iii) obtained by a reliable process but (iii) formed in a reliable way

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We say I know however whenever we are certain, without reflecting on reliability. But if we did reflect then we should remain certain if and only if we thought our way reliable. (Supposing us to know it, if not taking it merely as described it would be the same e.g. God put it into my head as supposedly reliable process). For to think the way reliable is simply to formulate in a variable hypothetical the habit of following the way.

One more thing. Russell says in his Philosophy Problems that there is no doubt that we are sometimes mistaken, so that all our knowledge is infected with some degree of doubt.

Moore used to deny this, saying of course it was self-contradictory which is mere pedantry and ignorance of the kind of knowledge meant.

But substantially - the point is this: we cannot without self-contradiction say  $p, q, r, \dots$  is false

(i.e. we know what we know otherwise it would not be a contradiction)

But we can be <sup>really</sup> certain that one is false and  $\therefore$  must yet really certain of each; but  <sup>$p, q, r, \dots$</sup>  each is then infected with doubt. But Moore is right in saying not necessarily all are so infected. But if we exempt some, we shall probably become fairly clear that one of the exempted is probably wrong and so on.