

Civil Society and Democracy in Post-Authoritarian and Post-Totalitarian Regimes

ROBERTO FOA¹

20 years have now passed since the democratic revolutions of Latin America, East Asia, and Eastern Europe. In most cases, the transition has been sustained, with only a small number of reversions from democratic rule. However, while military, business, and political elites have generally respected democratic norms of political competition, disillusionment with mainstream political parties, corruption, failure to control organized crime, declines in voter turnout, and withdrawal from civic life all present challenges for democratic governance (Howard 2003, Ramet 1999, Beetham 2004; Diamond and Morlino 2005; Mainwaring and Hagopian 2005; O'Donnell 2004a and 2004b; Powell 2004; Rueschemeyer 2004). As the consolidation of democracy ultimately depends upon democratic legitimacy, some see in these trends the risk of a more widespread appeal for demagogic populism or electoral authoritarianism, citing cases such as Venezuela and Russia as examples (Gershman 2007).

While reformers in Latin America, East Asia, and Eastern Europe may have shared the desire to arrive at a common destination – namely, the promised land of western liberal democracy – they have had to set out from very different departure points. The countries of Latin America and East Asia were formerly authoritarian regimes, characterized by the rule of a military junta which, in many cases, had in fairly recent history seized power from a democratically elected government. Pinochet's Chile, Chung-Hee Park's Korea, and Suharto's Indonesia presented themselves as temporary suspensions of the rule of law, aimed at quelling extremist movements and restoring stability, so as to enable an eventual return to civilian rule. The countries of central and eastern Europe, by contrast, were communist regimes which sought not only to repress dissident elements, but also to build a new society through the mechanisms of the one-party state, namely

¹ foa@fas.harvard.edu. Department of Government, Harvard University: 1737 Cambridge St, Cambridge, MA 02138.

official trade unions, works councils, professional associations, and the various committees and activities of the party itself. As a result, they cultivated a civil society that was bifurcated between an official civic sector organized under the ruling party, and a large underground opposition movement that was not (Ekiert and Kubik 2001).

The purpose of this paper is to explore how differences in the quality of democratic governance may arise from the distinctive civic legacies of the previous regime. Following Bernhard and Karakoç (2007), it is argued that authoritarian and totalitarian rule have led to identifiable patterns of civic engagement, and that these affect the nature of democratic life in important ways. However, in contrast to much of the recent literature, this paper argues that the legacy of communist rule - as a result of mass literacy, relative equality, and polarisation between official associations and the opposition movement - is a more active civil society that may be more suitable to 'making democracy work' (Putnam et al. 1993). In making this argument, section 1.0 compares the quality of democratic governance in post-authoritarian and post-totalitarian regimes, and presents data which suggests that former communist regimes have largely been more successful in certain areas, such as regulatory and judicial reform, economic policy, and formation of a democratic consensus, than their post-authoritarian counterparts. Sections 2.0 and 3.0 establish a basis for a comprehensive, multi-dimensional analysis of the strength of civil society across societies, and demonstrate the stronger civic engagement to be found in post-totalitarian regimes. Section 4.0 shows the association between patterns of civic association and the quality of democracy, and finally, section 5.0 concludes.

1. 0 Comparing Quality of Democracy across Post-Authoritarian and Post-Totalitarian States

While scholars of democracy have often discussed at length the difference between democratic and non-democratic rule, and indeed the differences between varying forms of 'illiberal democracy', 'defective democracy', or 'hybrid regime', there has been relatively little recent attention paid to the differences between autocratic regime legacies. While authoritarian regimes can be defined negatively, for example by their absence of open and participative institutions, weak legitimacy, and their reliance upon the distribution of rents in order to maintain power, totalitarian regimes often contained important mechanisms of participation and social mobility, depended for their functioning not on the distribution of economic incentives alone, but also upon an official regime ideology, and were characterized by a sustained attempt to reconstruct civic life under the ruling party through professional groups, labor unions, social clubs, political


committees, and public works councils (Skocpol 1979, Berman 1997). In the words of Lindblom, authoritarian regimes are essentially repressive, with ‘strong thumbs and no fingers’, operating primarily to quell internal dissent. By contrast, totalitarian regimes have sought to mobilise citizens into political life, deploying a range of instruments to channel public sentiment through official institutions and thereby shore their legitimacy (Lindblom 1977).

Following the transition, there have been subtle but important divergences in the nature of democracy in post-authoritarian and post-totalitarian societies. Figures 1.1-1.3 compare matched samples of medium income post-authoritarian and post-totalitarian regimes across various indicators of governance and political legitimacy². Post-totalitarian regimes began with substantially weaker scores on corruption, regulatory quality, and rule of law, but were able to match or exceed post-authoritarian regimes on all these measures by 2005 (figures 1.1)³. As a result, post-totalitarian regimes have generally experienced a more successful economic transition, with a sharp initial dip in income per capita followed by a much larger and more sustained recovery (figure 1.3). In addition, though post-totalitarian regimes exhibit declining electoral turnout, they are also characterized by lower levels of political extremism, whether measured by left-right placement or by support for violent opposition to the new regime (figures 1.2). This has given rise to relatively greater political stability over the course of the transition process (figure 1.1).

² The sample includes all medium-income (GDP per capita above US \$5,000 at PPP) societies: post-totalitarian cases are Albania, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Bosnia, Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Macedonia, Poland, Romania, Russia, Serbia, Slovenia and the Ukraine; and the post-authoritarian cases are Argentina, Brazil, Chile, the Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Guatemala, Indonesia, South Korea, Malaysia, Mexico, Peru, the Philippines, South Africa, Taiwan, and Uruguay.

³ The only unambiguous area in which post-authoritarian regimes appear to proven more resilient is the index of voice and accountability: though this result is driven entirely by the sharp deterioration in the score of the Russian Federation.


Figure 1.1 Worldwide Governance Indicators by Transition Type, 1996–2005




Notes: 'Post-Authoritarian' countries include Brazil, Chile, Mexico, Peru, the Philippines, South Africa, Taiwan, Argentina and South Korea. 'Post-totalitarian' countries include Russia, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Romania and the Ukraine.

Figure 1.2 Indicators of Democratic Legitimacy, 1990--2005


Electoral Turnout



Political Extremism




"The entire way our society is organized must be radically changed by revolutionary action" (% agree)



Notes: 'Electoral turnout' is the percentage of the eligible population voting in the most recent parliamentary election.
 'Political extremism' is the proportion of respondents identifying at the extremes of a (1-10) left-right scale.

Figure 1.3 GDP per capita, post-totalitarian and post-authoritarian states compared



GDP per capita at PPP, \$US 2000. Source: World Bank.

Civic Mobilisation in Authoritarian and Totalitarian States

"Dear Auntie Sonia!

Forgive me for taking so long to reply to your nice letter. I have never been so busy. I am member of four clubs. I'm on the governing committee of two of them, and the chairman of one (the young naturalists). Besides that, I'm a member of the commission of [socialist] competition, the reading group, the school's editorial board, and the chemical brigade. I'm also an instructor in collective assistance, a member of the management committee, and part of MOPR [the international Society of Workers' Aid]. At the moment, I'm also organising anti-religious propaganda through the management sub-committee and running the class committee. Recently I was placed in charge of organising a chess club in the school. I think that's all of it." (from Figs 2008: 29)

Why should totalitarian regimes, based as they were on the absolute centralisation of power, make a better transition to their polar opposite, a pluralist democracy? In placing the emphasis on post-totalitarian civil societies, our thesis radically departs from the recent literature, which has argued that while civil society is structurally deficient in both post-authoritarian and post-totalitarian regimes, it is especially so in the latter. This literature began with early studies of

'social capital' in post-communist countries, conducted in the 1990s, found lower levels of social trust, community engagement, and confidence in social institutions in eastern Europe, compared to many other regions of the world (Rose 1999, Rose, Mishler and Haerpfer 1994). Such studies were built upon by political scientists to show that political engagement is weaker in post-communist societies: Howard (2003) points to data collected as part of the 1995-7 World Values Surveys, showing low levels of voluntary association across all countries in the region, and across many categories of voluntary membership, while Bernhard and Karakoç (2007), claim that not only is membership of civic groups and associations weaker in post-communist Europe than in other emerging democracies, but also protest activity, another important dimension of civic life (Bernhard and Karakoç 2007). Scholars varied in their views of the causes of this weakness. Some attributed it the deficit of civic engagement to the legacy of the communist experience, as individuals resorted to informal dealing and corruption as a means of subverting bureaucratic restrictions (Rose 1999). Others argued that the decline in social capital has occurred or been exacerbated by the transition process itself, for example as a result of rising income inequality, retrenchment of public services, and the collapse of the 'organized' civic sector of the former regime (Kuehnast and Dudwick 2004, Howard 2003). Commenting on the more negative views, for example, Howard notes some authors feel this 'hollow democracy will remain unstable, since civic organizations lack the active support of the population, leaving democracy at risk of being toppled by hostile forces whether based on non-democratic historical traditions or a new, anti-democratic ideology' (Howard 2003).

This paper, by contrast, suggests that the recent literature is mistaken. Studies of civil society in emerging democracies have tended to rely on indicators that are only loosely related to political activity, such as associational membership, and have failed to measure a full range of civic attributes ranging from the quality of public debate, to attitudes to democracy, to protest and civic activism, to the structure of organisational life. Using a wider range of civil society indicators covering a much larger sample of countries, it can be shown that post-totalitarian societies generally exhibit robust civil societies and that this can be linked to the success of democratic transition. Moreover, it can be argued that the relative strength of civic life in post-totalitarian democracies can be traced to the organised civic life under communist rule, specifically the attempts at group mobilization by the ruling party, a tradition of limited local democracy (e.g. workers' councils, trades unions), the politicisation of everyday activities, the importance for the regime of mass literacy and political education, and the progressive formation

of a 'counter civil society' which united religious groups, dissident intellectuals, youths, liberal professionals, and sections of the working class.

While rejecting the recent literature on civil society and totalitarianism, however, the view of this paper is very much in line with the 'classic' discussion of authoritarianism and totalitarianism, deriving from Linz (1975). For Linz, social mobilization is one of the defining features of totalitarian regimes, arguing that in such societies 'civic participation in and active mobilization for political and collective tasks are encouraged, demanded, rewarded, and channeled through a single party and many monopolistic secondary groups' while 'passive obedience and apathy, retreat into the role of 'parochials' and 'subjects,' characteristics of many authoritarian regimes, are considered undesirable by the rulers' (Linz 1975). The experience of living under totalitarianism is therefore radically different from authoritarian rule, as whereas the latter is merely repressive, totalitarian regimes are actively - and in revolutionary times, hyperactively - involved in financing, establishing, and sometimes even empowering civic groups and organisations, under the aegis of the ruling party. To both internal and external observers, this degree of popular participation enhanced the legitimacy of the regime and explained both their longevity, and why they almost never faced military coups. As Linz continues, such popular mobilization 'brings a totalitarian society closer to the ideal *and even the reality* of most democracies and basically differentiates it from most "nontotalitarian nondemocratic systems" (emphasis added). Totalitarian societies did not simply aim at 'compression' the civic sector, therefore, as did authoritarian regimes (O'Donnell 1974), but were characterized by almost obsessive attempts at civic mobilization. In the attempt to create a 'new man', motivated by collective purpose and ideals rather than individual self-interest and gain, totalitarian regimes demanded a fanatical degree of public activism (Skocpol 1981). Communist societies therefore abounded with a staggering array of professional groups, labor unions, social clubs, political committees, and public works councils (Skocpol 1979, Berman 1997).

2. Measuring the Dimensions of Civic Life

In order to compare civic life across post-authoritarian and post-totalitarian societies, we need a comprehensive and reliable set of civil society indicators that will enable a full comparison. The purpose of this section, therefore, is to provide a fuller discussion of different conceptions of civil society, before proposing the means of their operationalisation. Yet how then can we go about measuring differences in civil society? As Lehbruch (2001) has written, "the denotations of

‘civil society’ have undergone significant changes over time and in different national contexts”, and for the purposes of this article, therefore, we break down our search for civil society indicators across four theoretically-grounded concepts that can be operationalised and tested in an empirical framework. These are: *civic culture and values*; *protest activity*; *the public sphere*, and the *density of civic organizations*. Within these categories, we select civil society variables that are i) *valid*, in that they measure a wide range of the key dimensions of civil society structure and functioning, and ii) *representative*, in that they cover data for at least half of the 181 countries that are members of the United Nations Organisation. Applying these two criteria, we are left with the 11 variables detailed in Table 1.0. The remainder of this section discusses in greater depth the four concepts of civil society upon which these indicators are based.

Table 2.1 Civil Society Indicators

Variable	Description	Source	Aspect of Civil Society	Countries Covered
<i>Democracy</i>	proportion of public agreeing that 'democracy is the best form of government'	World Values Survey	Values	78
<i>Polarization</i>	Variance of the left-right placement of the general public	World Values Survey	Values	89
<i>Confidence</i>	Average of the public who have confidence in i) parliament, ii) the government, and iii) political parties	World Values Survey	Values	91
<i>Turnout</i>	Electoral turnout in most recent election	International Institute for Democracy	Public sphere	176
<i>Media</i>	Average of the daily newspaper circulation and the number of daily news journals	UNESCO	Public sphere	166
<i>Politics</i>	proportion of public who are ‘interested in’ politics	World Values Survey	Public sphere	103
<i>Demonstration</i>	rating on likelihood of violent demonstrations and protests	International Country Risk Guide	Protest	140
<i>Activism</i>	proportion of public who have or would be prepared to sign a petition, join a boycott, or join a peaceful demonstration	World Values Survey	Protest	100
<i>Strikes</i>	ratio of strikes and lockouts to country population	ILO	Protest	105
<i>Membership</i>	levels of membership of civic associations	World Values Survey	Structure	96
<i>International</i>	international NGO density	LSE Civil Society Yearbook	Structure	175

i) Area 1 -- Civic Culture and Values

Early modernization theories, in particular those of Inkeles and Smith (1974) and Lerner (1958), laid emphasis on the importance of changing values under conditions of urbanization and industrialization as key to bringing about the emergence of democratic government. Lipset (1959) argued that the rise of a middle class as a result of economic development leads to the rise of democratic regimes, in part because the values of this new class reflect liberal ideals of participative and open government. Almond and Verba (1963) also argued for the role of political culture, maintaining that the health of democracy rests upon the existence of a 'civic culture', mixing 'participative' norms of engagement in institutional channels such as voting, petition, and peaceful protest, 'subject' norms of trust and respect for the rule of law, and 'parochial' norms such as tolerance and respect between citizens. More recently, empirical work by Inglehart (1997) and Inglehart and Welzel (2005) has returned to the arguments of Almond and Verba in explaining democratic transition during the third wave. They use an index of 'self-expression values', which includes important aspects of the civic culture, including tolerance for the beliefs and lifestyles of others, norms of individualism, trust, and certain beliefs regarding civic participation, such as expressed *willingness* to protest or sign a petition. Using the self-expression values cluster from Inglehart and Welzel (2005) the authors conduct a time-series model showing that societies with well developed expressive norms at the start of the third wave, that is, at around 1990, achieve significantly higher levels of what they term 'effective' democracy (characterised by lower levels of corruption) by 2005.

As measures of the extent to which civil values are supportive of democratic transition, we include three variables. The first is the proportion of the general public agreeing that 'despite its faults, democracy is the best possible form of government'. The second is a measure of value polarization: the growth of extremist parties is often taken as a worrying signal that authoritarian reversion may occur, either via the ballot box or by a coup d'état launched in order to prevent radical parties from taking power. Dalton (2005), for example, demonstrates that value polarization is lower in stable democracies and that, as such, the degree of polarization is a good indicator of the progress of democratic transition. As a measure of value polarization, we take the variance in public responses to a question in the World Values Surveys asking respondents to place themselves on a left-right scale. Finally, another indicator of the success of democratic transition is the degree of confidence that the public have developed in political parties,

politicians, and governments. We therefore include a measure taken from the World Values Surveys which averages the proportion of the public with 'a great deal' or 'some' confidence with respect to three areas, namely i) parliament, ii) political parties, and iii) the government.

ii) Area 2 -- Protest Activity

Related to the new emphasis on citizen values, recent empirical approaches to civil society have emphasized the importance of civic action, and in particular 'elite-challenging' activities or 'protest' (Dalton 2008, Norris 1999 2002). Dalton (2008) and Dalton and Van Sickle (2005), for example, have analyzed the origins of protest in advanced industrial democracies, arguing that such behavior reflects not so much 'grievances' but rather a highly developed civic culture in which deferential norms have been displaced by norms of self-expression and the expectation of civic rights. Their analysis is supported by Inglehart, Welzel and Deutsch (2005), who argue that participation in 'elite-challenging' activities is more important than voluntary association in making democracy work, and that such activities reflect underlying values of expression and autonomy. Finally, Norris (1999, 2002) has analyzed the decline in confidence in social and political institutions of developed democracies, not as a sign of institutional failure, but rather as the result of 'critical citizens', that is, voters willing to question the motives of their leaders and, where necessary, engage in direct action such as protest, petition, and opinion campaigns in order to change policies or unseat politicians that are suspected of wrongdoing. It is no coincidence that the most longstanding democracies have the highest levels of public protest and strikes, as well as deep-rooted norms of scepticism regarding the honesty and integrity of the political elite (Norris 2002).

As indicators of protest, we take three measures. First, we take the averaged proportion of the public willing to or having taken part peaceful demonstrations, petitions, and boycotts, from the World Values Surveys. Second, we take the per capita number of strikes and lockouts, taken from the International Labour Organisation (ILO 2008). Finally, we include the rating of the International Country Risk Guide on the likelihood of violent protests and demonstrations (International Country Risk Guide 2008).

iii) Area 3 – Strength of the Public Sphere

A third dimension of civic life is the public sphere, understood as a discursive space in which individuals and groups congregate to discuss matters of mutual interest and, where possible, to reach a common judgment. The origins of the theory of the public sphere lie in Juergen Habermas, and specifically in his notion of communicative rationality, understood as the ability to achieve consensus over competing conceptions of the good through fora of civic debate such as newspapers, conversation among peers, or the townhall meetings. For Habermas, the original public sphere could be found in the eighteenth century bourgeois coffee shops and salons, and other arena where individuals could debate ideas and form common viewpoints (Habermas 1962 [1989]). Crucial to the emergence of such a sphere was the development of the printing press, its use in disseminating pamphlets and journals, and concomitant with this, mass literacy, so that such works could be debated and understood. Subsequent theorists have argued that the existence of a public sphere is a vital precondition for a stable democracy, and the project of political liberalism as a whole, as it is only in the public sphere that an 'overlapping consensus' can be formed from among competing conceptions of the public good. The importance of the public sphere has been highlighted by, among others, Hannah Arendt, who attributed the rise of totalitarianism in interwar Germany to the detachment of liberal intellectuals from the public discourse of Weimar life (Arendt [1951] 2007), and Craig Calhoun, who has argued that civil society without a strong public sphere 'lacks opportunities for participation in collective choice, whether about specific policy issues or basic institutions', and that the public sphere is 'a medium of social integration, a form of social solidarity, as well as an arena for debating possible social arrangements' (Calhoun 2005). We may expect the consolidation of the public sphere to play a particularly important role in conditions such as those faced by post-communist regimes, where the entire political and economic system is undergoing rapid and confusing change. This is because first, elites have to communicate to citizens the reasons why certain policies are being implemented; second, citizens have to understand the new 'rules of the game' including such matters as voting rules, the allocation of privatisation shares, new citizen rights granted under the constitution, and the platforms of the major political parties; and third, because the media is also a means for citizens to communicate with elites, indirectly, insofar as the media must reflect the views of their audiences and are actively consumed by the political class.

As measures of the health of the public sphere, we include three indicators. First, the proportion of the public who describe themselves as 'very' or 'fairly' interested in politics, taken from the World Values Surveys; second, the number of newspaper titles and newspaper circulation per

capita, as reported by UNESCO (UNESCO 2008); and third, voter turnout in the most recent election (International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance 2009).

iv) Area 4 -- Density of Civic Organization

Conceptions of civil society deriving from de Tocqueville have emphasized its organizational aspects, including membership of voluntary organizations, attendance of town meetings, and 'bridging' civic ties between citizens from diverse social backgrounds. More recently, this conception of civil society has notably been adopted by Robert Putnam (1993, 2000), who has laid emphasis on the role of voluntary organizations as 'schools of democracy' in which develop the basic skills of negotiation, compromise, and public management are developed. Examining the potential links to democratic transition and consolidation, Paxton (2002) has recently conducted an analysis of the effect of civil society on democracy using a combination of local organizational membership from the values surveys and international organization activity from the Civil Society Yearbook, finding that in time-series analysis certain kinds of organizational membership have a positive effect upon the emergence of a future democracy. Specifically, Paxton finds that the more 'connected' a given organizational form is - either to international civil society or to membership of other kinds of groups - the stronger is its positive effect on future democratization.

We include two indicators for the organizational strength of civil society: data from the World Values Survey on the average number of memberships of religious, sports, cultural, labor, professional, political, humanitarian and environmental associations; and data from the London School of Economics Global Civil Society Yearbook regarding the density of International NGOs in different countries across the world (LSE 2003-2007).

Results: Descriptive Statistics

Descriptive results are reported in Table 2.2, which shows the average normalised percentile rank of each grouping by indicator. Across the indicators, post-totalitarian regimes perform significantly better over a number of domains, including support for democracy (50th percentile - i.e. the middle of the global distribution - against 42nd for post-authoritarian regimes), consensus on the political spectrum (again, at 52nd percentile close to the global mean, against 35th percentile

for post-authoritarian regimes), newspaper circulation (at 59th percentile, well above the mean), interest in politics (at 47th percentile, close to the mean, against just 26th percentile for post-authoritarian regimes), and participation in civic activism, such as petition, peaceful protest, and boycott (41st percentile, against just 19th percentile among post-authoritarian regimes). There are also several indicators where post-authoritarian regimes score better, including confidence in politicians, election turnout, and rates of associational membership, as well as two indicators (international NGO density and frequency of strikes and lockouts) where no clear difference is evident.

Table 2.2 Comparison of Civic Indicators by Regime Legacy

	post-totalitarian	post-authoritarian
'despite all its problems democracy is the best form of government'	0.50	0.42
Degree of left-right consensus	0.52	0.35
Confidence in parliament, politicians, the government	0.27	0.37
Electoral turnout	0.28	0.48
Newspaper circulation	0.59	0.39
Interest in politics	0.47	0.26
Civic activism (petition, peaceful protest, boycott)	0.41	0.19
Strikes and lockouts	0.41	0.40
Membership of civic associations	0.24	0.62
International NGO density	0.54	0.58

Notes: sample includes all medium-income (GDP per capita above US \$5,000) societies. Post-totalitarian societies are Albania, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Bosnia, Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Macedonia, Poland, Romania, Russia, Serbia, Slovenia and the Ukraine. Post-authoritarian societies are Argentina, Brazil, Chile, the Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Guatemala, Indonesia, South Korea, Malaysia, Mexico, Peru, the Philippines, South Africa, Taiwan, and Uruguay.

As the classic literature would suggest, the strong areas for post-totalitarian regimes include civic activism and protest, political literacy, and pro-democratic values, whereas their weaknesses lie in the areas of organizational membership and trust in formal institutions.


3. Mapping Global Civil Societies

How do post-authoritarian and post-totalitarian societies compare in global perspective? We are able to compare the pattern of civil society in post-totalitarian societies not only to the post-authoritarian cases, but also to the countries which were established democracies prior to the mid-1980s, and to the countries which remain autocratic regimes today. Because of the large number of indicators (11) and dimensions (4) under consideration, this comparison cannot be made using conventional plotting, but can be done through a network analysis, whereby similarity across all 11 indicators is used to determine the strength of the bond between two nodes⁴. The purpose of network analysis is to visualize the pattern of relationships among variables, which may represent agents or organizations in a network, or, as in this case, variables that are theoretically and empirically related to one another in a complex dynamic fashion. Network Analysis can be done using 1 or 2 modes (e.g. variables only or variables with countries). The algorithm simply draws a line between two items which have a correlation above a given threshold. The tool gives a visual representation of relationships between the pattern of civil society to be found across countries, such that countries with similar distribution of scores (high on some areas, say, and low on others) will cluster together.

Figure 3.1 draws a network using the principal components method, which plots points according to the underlying dimensions inherent in the distribution of correlations between nodes.

⁴ Specifically, the ties between nodes are calculated via the following method. Each of these variables is standardized and then fit to a normalized distribution to mitigate any leverage effect of outliers. The sample is then limited to the 94 countries for which almost complete data is available, and in order to make factor analysis and cluster analysis possible, the remaining 3 per cent of missing observations were imputed using the other variables in the dataset. For the network analysis each of the 11 indicators is standardized with mean 0 and standard deviation 1, and the strength of the tie is the correlation between the 11 points, with the two countries mapped to the x and to y axis respectively. This yields a number between -1 and 1 representing the similarity in the structure of civil society between any two countries.

Figure 3.1 Network Analysis, Using 11 Civil Society Indicators (method: PCA)



Points colored by regime type. Key: established democracies – blue; post-totalitarian regimes – red; post-authoritarian regimes – light grey; authoritarian regimes – dark grey.

Using the principal components method of network formation, we are able to view the two axes (along the y and the x) than connect the four clusters. Highlighted in blue are those societies in which a democratic polity existed prior to the early 1980s, post-totalitarian societies are highlighted in red, post-totalitarian societies in light grey, and existing autocracies in dark grey. Stable democracies form a cluster toward the lower corner, and the authoritarian and post-authoritarian societies cluster along the ‘ y ’ axis to the left of the figure. Meanwhile, visible is a cluster of post-totalitarian societies, in particular those of central and southeastern Europe, in the middle of the chart, together with the earlier post-totalitarian societies which now form established democracies (Germany, Japan, Italy), as well as several more recent post-authoritarian states that are on the path to democratic consolidation (Portugal, Greece, Spain). Consistent with the views of Huntington (1996), the post-totalitarian societies of the former Soviet Union sit alongside the post-authoritarian societies of Latin America on the left axis, while the

post-authoritarian democracies of Africa sit together in a tight cluster with the regimes that continue under authoritarian rule, implying very little difference in civic structure between these two cases.

Dimension Reduction

For the purpose of multivariate analysis, it is often useful to engage in dimensional reduction. Factor analysis, for example, is a common technique used by political scientists to detect summary dimensions in the pattern of correlation in a set of variables: a well-known case is that of Arend Lijphart (*Patterns of Democracy*, 1999), who found two dimensions (called executives-parties and federal-unitary) to be sufficient to explain the variation in ten measured characteristics of political institutions in democracies (Fisher 2000). Conducting a factor analysis on the civil society variables reveals two factors above the conventional eigenvalue threshold of 1, which cumulatively explain 92.5 per cent of the variance.

Factor Analysis Results - Principal Factor Method

Variable	1	2
Electoral Turnout	0.309	0.401
Public Belief in Democracy	0.380	0.019
Left-right polarization	-0.668	0.139
(Mis)trust in politicians	0.154	-0.494
Newspaper circulation	0.756	-0.139
Interest in politics	0.082	0.526
Internal stability	0.660	-0.110
Civic activism	0.801	0.152
Membership	0.164	0.626
International NGO density	0.696	-0.048
Strikes and lockouts	0.209	-0.087
Eigenvalue	2.919	1.157
Cum. Variance Explained	66.27%	92.53%

The two factors can be interpreted as follows. The first factor, which explains two-thirds of the variance in civil society characteristics, is a measure of the degree to which civil society actors operate outside of official mechanisms, by engaging in protest, new social movements, and contributing to the media. Accordingly, the factor loadings include newspaper circulation, the

proportion of the public who have or would be prepared to sign a petition, join a boycott, or participate in a demonstration, and the density of international NGOs, such as *Amnesty International* or *Greenpeace*. Interestingly, this factor also includes a low degree of left-right polarization and a low rating on internal conflict, with the implication that the civic activity is essentially 'loyal opposition' (that is, opposition to the government but not to the democratic regime per se). Countries scoring highest on this factor include Germany, Sweden, and Belgium, and are all economically developed, pluralist democracies, whereas countries scoring lowest on this measure are societies under authoritarian government.


The second factor, which explains about a quarter of the observed variance in civil society characteristics, is essentially a measure of how well political mechanisms function to channel popular activity into institutionalized forms of participation. Accordingly, its attributes are whether a society is characterized by high voter turnout, widespread discussion of political issues and debates, a high level of confidence in politicians and political parties, as well as engagement in local communities and associations. In one sense this is the 'Tocquevillian' conception of civil society: participation in local associative life serves as a 'school of democracy' leading to wider interest in politics, involvement in national politics, and confidence in the political system. Societies registering highest on this factor include therefore include many long-established democracies with a strong tradition of local politics, such as Sweden, Norway, or the United States. Interestingly, however, we also find that countries such as Rwanda, Vietnam, and the People's Republic of China, which retain a quasi-totalitarian control over public life, also rank highly on this factor - as does Israel, a country which is a pluralist democracy, yet retains an strong culture of collective service in pursuit of the national interest. This suggests that there is an element of 'Rousseau' here: what defines a country's score on this factor is not whether the regime is democratic or non-democratic, but the extent to which popular political participation is mobilized through official mechanisms, pluralist or otherwise, of popular sovereignty to produce collective outcomes.

Based on the factor scores reported above, therefore, it is possible to create two indices that together can explain the range of civic variation across societies, which, following Huntington (1968), are termed 'mobilisation' and 'institutionalisation,' respectively. 'Mobilization', the first measure, based on four indicators derived from the first factor: i) the extent of civic activism (petition, protest, boycott), ii) the density of strikes and lockouts, iii) the density of international NGOs, and iv) the breadth of newspaper circulation. These four indicators all represent the extent to which a vibrant, independent civic sector exists within an active public space, which, as

we have seen, can explain most of the total variation in the characteristics of civil society. Taking an average of the country scores across these measures, an index (*mobilisation*) is generated which correlates ($r = 0.93$) with the factor 1 scores derived inductively in the first section. The second index (*institutionalisation*), based on the second set of factor scores, measures the extent to which civil society is institutionalized through the mechanisms of the state (i.e. political parties, elections), or exists outside of this sphere, taking the average of: i) electoral turnout, ii) interest in politics, and iii) membership of political parties. This measure, *institutionalization*, correlates ($r = 0.82$) with the factor 2 scores identified previously.

Figure 3.2 maps out societies according to their scores on these two dimensions. Also shown are whether a country is a pre-1980 democracy (blue), a post-totalitarian regime (red), a post-authoritarian regime (grey), or a non-democracy (black).

Figure 3.2 Global Civil Societies: Mobilisation and Institutionalisation



We can think of the positioning of societies in this space according to Huntington's classic (1968) discussion of the relationship between social mobilization and political institutionalisation. Countries in the top-left space are most typical of what Huntington termed the 'praetorian' order,

in which 'workers strike, students riot, and armies coup': citizens are mobilised into political activity, yet this activity is not channeled through the party system or the ballot box. France, South Korea, and Argentina are the societies most typical of this combination; though as predicted by Ekiert and Kubic (2001), a large number of post-communist societies also find themselves in this category. In the top-right quadrant we find those societies with high levels of mobilisation and also high levels of institutionalisation: Denmark, Sweden, and Norway are most typical of this grouping. In the bottom right are societies with a high level of institutionalisation, but a low level of mobilisation: in this category are autocracies such as Vietnam, Rwanda and China. Finally, the lower left quadrant contains those societies which have a low level of both mobilisation and institutionalisation: El Salvador and Guatemala are examples of civil societies that are neither especially active nor strongly channeled into the political process.


It is striking that many post-totalitarian societies fit in the upper-left quadrant, with high levels of social mobilisation into protest, strike, and engagement in the public sphere, yet very low levels of institutionalisation through the post-transition party system or in public elections. Meanwhile, post-authoritarian regimes are typically weak on civic engagement, though have somewhat stronger levels of engagement in official political channels. These respective legacies are as we might expect, following the classic literature on authoritarian and totalitarian regimes: namely, that authoritarian regimes are essentially repressive, functioning so as to dampen down civic activism and 'restore order', whereas totalitarian regimes are mobilising, seeking to channel citizens through the institutions of the one-party state - even though such institutions have rarely survived intact following the democratic transition, and left behind a fragmented and pluralised civic structure.

4. How Does Civil Society Relate to the Quality of Democratic Governance?

Having charted a map of global civil societies that covers a representative sample of countries, and enables us to compare differing regime legacies across the world, let us return to our motivating question, which is the relationship between civic legacy and democratic consolidation. Are the patterns of civic life across post-authoritarian and post-totalitarian regimes, that we have just identified, beneficial or harmful for the quality of democratic governance? The purpose of this section of the paper is precisely to test how much of the variation in quality of democratic governance can be explained by variation in these civic

attributes. More specifically, this section of the paper tests Huntington's (1968) thesis that the stability and effectiveness of a government (the 'degree of government') would depend on the balance between social mobilisation and political institutionalisation. Huntington famously argued that in regimes where social mobilisation - say through student movements, trade unions, or fringe movements - is not accompanied by strong political parties, capable of acting as a funnel for these new social forces, the result is protest, riot, terror and violence. On the other hand, where the power of political actors clearly trumps that of civic actors, the outcome is tyranny. Figure 4.2 displays the expected relationship between political stability and the combination of mobilisation and institutionalisation, following Huntington's hypothesis, by superimposing a set of isobars or contour lines over the map of civil society presented above in Figure 3.2.


Figure 4.1 The Huntington Thesis: Institutionalisation and Mobilisation



The Huntington Thesis (1968). *Political Stability* here is a sum of the balance between institutionalisation and mobilisation. To the extent that both are present, the effect on *Political Stability* is increased. Yet either alone, without the other, is associated with ungovernability and state failure. Huntington argued that modernising societies saw an increase in mobilisation *preceding* an increase in institutionalization: therefore initial modernisation brings an increase in instability, until institutions are sufficiently developed so as to channel new social forces into political life.

As we have seen, post-totalitarian societies on average have a highly mobilised civic sector with a low degree of institutionalisation, while post-authoritarian societies have much lower levels of mobilisation (consistent with the purely repressive function of the authoritarian state) though greater institutionalisation. Following Huntington's hypothesis, post-authoritarian and post-totalitarian regimes (the large red and grey dots in Figure 4.1) should have similar levels of political stability: for while post-totalitarian regimes have attained a higher level of social mobilisation, as the *balance* between mobilisation and institutionalisation is the same in both cases. Huntington would also have estimated such regimes to sit at different positions on the chart (namely, along the diagonal axis). Huntington's hypothesis, of course, is not the only possible relationship between mobilisation, institutionalisation, and positive regime attributes, such as political stability or effectiveness at public service delivery. A 'critical citizenship' perspective, for example, would argue that in the long run it is mobilisation which matters, and that short-run bursts of instability (say, through protest activity) ultimately encourage elites to respond more effectively to public demands in future (Norris 1999, Inglehart and Welzel 2005): according to such a view, the isobars should run horizontally across the figure, and not diagonally. And of course, there is also the perspective that mobilisation is inherently destabilising, and that only institutionalisation matters for political stability; in this case the isobars should run vertically across the graphical space. Finally, Figure 4.2 shows what might be called the 'modified' Huntington hypothesis, according to which mobilisation and institutionalisation have negative effects when evaluated while the other variable is zero, but together produce a strong positive interactive effect. While visually this 'modified' thesis appears very differently (and hence generates different predicted outcomes), it retains Huntington's insight that it is the *relationship* between mobilisation and institutionalisation which matters for political stability, and not simply the absolute level of one or both of these variables.


Figure 4.2 The Modified Huntington Hypothesis



The Modified Huntington Thesis (1968). *Political Stability* here is the product of the interaction between institutionalisation and mobilisation. *Political Stability* is best increased by adding equally to both rather than to either separately.

Which of these perspectives is closest to the observed data? To address this question, we can use the Worldwide Governance Indicators produced by the World Bank, which assemble over 300 items from over 30 sources in order to provide comprehensive estimates of governance along six dimensions, namely *Voice and Accountability* (a measure of democracy), *Political Stability*, *Rule of Law*, *Regulatory Quality* (a measure of the ease of doing business), *Government Effectiveness* (a measure of the quality of the bureaucracy and of public service delivery), *Control of Corruption*. We begin with political stability, shown in Figure 4.3. The isobars are calculated based on the regression coefficients from a simple regression of political stability upon our indices for mobilisation, institutionalisation, and their interactive term.

Figure 4.3 Empirical Results: Mobilisation and Institutionalisation on Political Stability




Notes: contour lines show the estimated effect on *political stability* at each combination of *mobilisation* and *institutionalisation*, based on a regression of *political stability* upon both variables and their interactive effect. The large 'dots' reflect the mean average for each regime type (democratic 1980, post-totalitarian, post-authoritarian, non-democracies). Regression adj. r-squared = 0.51 with 94 observations.

The pattern of political stability across societies suggests support for the 'critical citizenship' argument that ultimately, higher levels of mobilisation do produce stable polities, relatively independently of the degree of institutionalisation. There does appear to be a limited effect at higher levels of mobilisation, such that greater institutionalisation is associated with somewhat greater stability in these cases, as the modified Huntington hypothesis would predict. However, most of the variation occurs as we move along the y axis.

To further test the Huntington argument, we can examine the other dimensions of governance measured by the Worldwide Governance Indicators. Figure 4.4, for example, shows the relationship between our two civil society indices and scores for *Control of Corruption*. Here the evidence for the modified Huntington argument is stronger, in particular at higher levels of social mobilisation. Nonetheless, again most of the variation occurs on the y-axis, and entirely so in societies at low levels of mobilisation.


Figure 4.4 Empirical Results: Mobilisation and Institutionalisation on Control of Corruption



Notes: contour lines show the estimated effect on *control of corruption* at each combination of *mobilisation* and *institutionalisation*, based on a regression of *control of corruption* upon both variables and their interactive effect. The large 'dots' reflect the mean average for each regime type (democratic 1980, post-totalitarian, post-authoritarian, non-democracies).

The other governance indices show similar relationships to those shown in Figures 4.3-4.4, with the notable exception of voice and accountability, which is shown in Figure 4.5. Here, institutionalisation appears to have a *negative* effect at low levels of mobilization, though this of course is endogeneity: non-democratic regimes force higher levels of institutionalisation (electoral turnout, expressions of regime support) from their subjects. Notwithstanding objections regarding causal inference, it is clear that high levels of mobilisation, even with very poor institutionalisation, have no observed relationship to weaknesses in democratic governance.

Figure 4.5 Empirical Results: Mobilisation and Institutionalisation, Voice and Accountability



Notes: contour lines show the estimated effect on *voice and accountability* at each combination of *mobilisation* and *institutionalisation*, based on a regression of *voice and accountability* upon both variables and their interactive effect. The large 'dots' reflect the mean average for each regime type (democratic 1980, post-totalitarian, post-authoritarian, non-democracies).

5. Conclusion

This paper has examined civic life and democratic governance across a wide sample of post-authoritarian and post-totalitarian regimes. Contrary to an established literature, civil mobilisation is stronger among post-totalitarian societies than in post-authoritarian societies, and this disparity has its origins in the specific attributes of the former regime, including mass literacy, relative equality, and polarisation between an officially organised civic sector, on one hand, and an underground opposition movement that united religious groups, dissident intellectuals, and salaried professionals, on the other. In contrast to the purely repressive function of the authoritarian state, we suggest that this is a legacy of the mobilising tendency of totalitarian regimes, by which involvement in the public sphere was encouraged, and retreat into private civic life viewed with suspicion. As a result, many of the behavioral attributes necessary

for 'making democracy work', such as following the media, discussion of politics, and mobilisation into protest activities such as petitions, strikes, and peaceful demonstration, are to be found more readily in the countries transitioning from communist rule, than in those in which an authoritarian regime has recently held power.

In the final section of this paper, we have begun to examine the relationship between civic mobilisation and the quality of governance across countries. Contrary to the Huntington hypothesis, according to which high levels of social mobilisation are potentially destabilising, leading to various forms of government dysfunctionality, we find that mobilisation is strongly associated with the quality of governance - and only weakly interacts with the degree of institutionalisation. As a result, the pattern of civic life found in many emerging post-totalitarian regimes - namely, with high levels of civic mobilisation but only low levels of institutionalisation through political parties or elections - is not symptomatic of an underlying problem, as many contemporary 'transitologists' have claimed, but is in fact consistent, both with a high quality of governance, and with the pattern of civic life found in many established democracies, including France, Italy, and the United States.

By contrast, our analysis presents a more sombre view of the pattern of civic life found in many post-authoritarian regimes. The data presented in this paper suggests that the violent repression and 'demobilisation' of civic life that has occurred in countries such as Indonesia, Guatemala, or Brazil, has left these countries with low levels of civic engagement, and a form of politics in which clientelism, corruption, and narrow rent-seeking are more prevalent. The legacy of authoritarian rule has therefore not been the restoration of the capacity of the state to function, but rather, the erosion of public institutions and the undermining of the prospects for high quality governance in emerging democratic regimes.

Bibliography

- Almond, G. and Verba, S. (1963). *The Civic Culture*. Boston: Little Brown.
- Beetham, David. (2004). "The Quality of Democracy: Freedom as the Foundation." *Journal of Democracy* 15 (4): 61-75.
- Bernhard, M. and Karakoç, E. (2007). *Civil Society and the Legacies of Dictatorship*, World Politics, Volume 59, Number 4, July 2007, pp. 539-567.
- Dalton, R. and van Sickle, A. (2005). "The Resource, Structural, and Cultural Bases of Protest". Irving: Center for the Study of Democracy research series.
- Diamond, Larry and Leonardo Morlino. (2005). "Introduction." In *Assessing the Quality of Democracy*, eds. Larry Diamond and Leonardo Morlino. Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, pp. ix-lxiii.
- Ekiert, G. and Kubik, J. (2001). *Rebellious Civil Society*. Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press.
- Habermas, J. (1962 trans 1989). *The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere: An Inquiry into a category of Bourgeois Society*. Polity, Cambridge.
- Howard, M. (2003). *The Weakness of Civil Society in Post-Communist Europe*. New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Huntington, S. (1968). *Political Order in Changing Societies*. New Haven: Yale University Press.
- Huntington, S. (1991). *The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century*. Norman: University of Oklahoma Press.
- Inglehart, R. and Welzel, C. (2005). *Modernization, Cultural Change and Democracy*. New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Linz, J. (1975) "Totalitarian and Authoritarian Regimes", in Fred Greenstein and Nelson Polsby, eds., *Handbook of Political Science*, vol. 3. Reading, MA.
- Linz, J. and Stepan, A. (1996). *Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation*. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press.
- Mainwaring, Scott and Frances Hagopian, eds. (2005). *The Third Wave of Democratization in Latin America: Advances and Setbacks*. New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Minkenber, M. (2002). "The Radical Right in Post-socialist Central and Eastern Europe: Comparative Observations and Interpretations", in *East European Politics and Society*, vol. 16, No. 2 (spring 2002), pp.335-362.
- Norris, P. (1999). *Critical Citizens: Global Support for Democratic Government*. New York: Cambridge University Press.
- O'Donnell, Guillermo. (2004). "The Quality of Democracy: Why the Rule of Law Matters." *Journal of Democracy* 15 (4): 32-46.
- Paxton, P. (2002). "Social Capital and Democracy: An Interdependent Relationship", *American Sociological Review*, 67, 254-77.
- Przeworski, A. (1991). *Democracy and the Market*. New York: Cambridge University Press.

- Ramet, S. (1999). *The Radical Right in Central and Eastern Europe Since 1989*. University Park: Penn State Press.
- Rose, R. (1999). "What Does Social Capital Add to Individual Welfare? An Empirical Analysis in Russia", SCI Working Paper No. 15. Washington DC: The World Bank.
- Rueschemeyer, Dietrich. 2004. "The Quality of Democracy: Assessing Inequality." *Journal of Democracy* 15 (4): 76-90.