

## **Liberalism in India-Pakistan Relations: a critique of realism**

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### **Abstract:**

Liberalism is increasingly applied in explaining post-Cold War India-Pakistan relations. It is argued that both the nations have cultivated liberal values, resulting in complex interdependence and peace in their mutual relationship. The existence of different regimes as the Indus Waters Treaty, regional trade regime of SAPTA and SAFTA, CBMs and gas regime of TAPI and IPI, are referred to as liberal trends in their IR. However, this article contends such a view as naïve and idealistic. India and Pakistan are trapped in an unending security dilemma manifested by 3 major and one minor war, border disputes, alleged mutual interventions and the arms race. It argues that India-Pakistan relationship doesn't lend itself to the democratic peace thesis, trade-brings-peace theory, multilateralism and international regimes. First, a brief overview of liberalism is followed by its application to India-Pakistan relations. Subsequently, a critique of realism is presented and placed in the context of India-Pakistan relations.

**Key Words:** India, Liberalism, Pakistan, Realism

## INTRODUCTION

Different theories remain dominant in different times and contexts. A theory wins dominance through its intellectual debates with other theories and its effectiveness in explaining the dominant trend of international events of the time.<sup>1</sup> Liberalism remained dominant in explaining the post-World War First European international politics, certain Cold War European liberal economic and political transformations and post-Cold War international relations in general. Realism remained dominant when Europe braced for World War Second and prevailed through Cold War till the fall of Berlin wall. It implies that when men displayed altruism, reason, morality and progress and peace ensued, liberalism prevailed. On the contrary, whenever man displayed egoism, selfishness, and lust, resulting in war and retrogression, realism have prevailed.<sup>2</sup> In other words, with the change in international political dynamics and behavior of states, theoretical perspectives also change. Such a change in the application of theoretical perspectives is explained by former US president, Bill Clinton when he stated in the twilight of Cold War that “In a world where freedom, not tyranny, is on the march, the cynical calculus of pure power politics simply does not compute. It is ill-suited to the new era”.<sup>3</sup>

The world at present represents a complex picture of socio-political and economic disparities at different regional levels. There are regions with democratic form of governments, economically integrated under free-trade arrangements and mature regional organizations making states complexly interdependent and their sovereignties diminished. On the contrary, there are regions still depicting international relations of the early twentieth century Europe. South Asia is a region of the later type. In the contemporary world, the proverbial Machiavellian men and Hobbesian anarchy of “war of all against all” where life is “solitary, poor, nasty, brutish, and short”<sup>4</sup> sit at the heart of the political situation of South Asia.

However, with theoretical pluralism in the 1990s and the peaceful demise of Cold War, liberalism is widely applied in explaining international relations of different regions. Such application of liberalism is without taking into account the nature and context of different relations. Owing to such widespread popularity of liberalism, the same is applied in explaining the regional dynamics of south Asia as well. India-Pakistan relations are also explained through the paradigm of liberalism. It is argued that both the nations have cultivated liberal values, resulting in complex interdependence and peace in their mutual relationship. The existence of different regimes as the Indus Waters Treaty, regional trade regime of SAPTA and SAFTA, CBMs and gas regime of TAPI and IPI, are referred to as liberal trends in their IR. However,

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<sup>1</sup> Scott Burchill, et al., eds. *Theories of International Relations*. 3<sup>rd</sup> ed. (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005), 9.

<sup>2</sup> Charles W. Kegley and Eugene R. Wittkopf, *World Politics: Trend and Transformation*. 9<sup>th</sup> ed. (USA: Cengage Learning, 2003), 39.

<sup>3</sup> Kegley and Wittkopf, *World politics*, 43.

<sup>4</sup> Thomas Hobbes, “*Of Man, Being the First Part of Leviathan. Vol. XXXIV, Part 5. The Harvard Classics*. (USA, New York: P.F. Collier & Son, 2001) 1909–14.

this article contends such a view as naïve and idealistic. India and Pakistan are trapped in an unending security dilemma manifested by 3 major and one minor war, border disputes, alleged mutual interventions and an arms race. It argues that India-Pakistan relationship doesn't lend itself to the democratic peace thesis, trade-brings-peace theory, multilateralism and international regimes. First, a brief overview of liberalism is followed by its application to India-Pakistan relations. Subsequently, a critique of realism is presented and placed in the context of India-Pakistan relations.

## LIBERALISM

Classical liberalism has three main brands: republican liberalism, commercial liberalism and liberal institutionalism.<sup>5</sup> Republican liberalism (democratic peace) asserts that democracies almost never fight one another. It argues that “when the citizens who bear the burdens of war elect their government, wars become impossible”.<sup>6</sup> However, democracies incline to fight authoritarian states as the later has jingoistic, militaristic and expansionist tendencies due to “the greater weight of the military, high executive discretion and the complex politics of nationalism”.<sup>7</sup> The democratic peace thesis also holds that democracies are less prone to acquisition and use of nuclear weapons and that democracies are less vulnerable to civil conflict<sup>8</sup> and terrorism<sup>9</sup>. Commercial liberalism (trade-brings-peace theory) contends that free trade brings prosperity and establishes peace. It brings prosperity through the theory of comparative advantage, competition and functional specialization and peace through interdependence and interconnectedness. Prosperity and interdependence facilitate peace as wars wreak havoc on trade and inflict heavy costs. Similarly, free trade helps realize mutual harmony of interests, softens fractious state boundaries, eradicates aggression, shifts and replaces parochial loyalties, and unifies individuals into a single community.<sup>10</sup> Liberal Institutionalism asserts that international institutions could bring peace through collective security.

Neoliberalism as a variant in liberal school emerged in the 1990s. It concedes to realism in its believe in the state as the primary though not the only actor. It acknowledges international system as anarchic though tamable through international institutions and regimes, and thus cooperation achievable. The cooperation achieved is sustainable too, as cooperation generates

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<sup>5</sup>Amitav Acharya, “Theoretical Perspectives on International Relations in Asia” (Paper presented at the Conference on International Relations in Asia: The New Regional System, George Washington University, Washington D.C, September 27-29, 2007).

<sup>6</sup> Burchill, *Theories of International Relations*, 59.

<sup>7</sup>Stephan Haggard, “Liberal Pessimism: International Relations Theory and the Emerging Powers,” *Asia & the Pacific Policy Studies* 1 (1) (2014):7.

<sup>8</sup> Haggard, “Liberal Pessimism,”4.

<sup>9</sup>Chenoweth, 2013 in Stephan Haggard, “Liberal Pessimism: International Relations Theory and the Emerging Powers,” *Asia & the Pacific Policy Studies* 1 (1) (2014):7.

<sup>10</sup> Burchill, *Theories of International Relations*, 63-64.

rewards which dilute selfish tendencies of states. Neoliberalism prioritizes national economic welfare over national security. It believes in an inside-out approach and considers the primary determinant of foreign policy as states' intentions, information, ideals and interests.<sup>11</sup> Neoliberals believe that states are concerned with maximization of 'absolute gains' and therefore cooperation possible.<sup>12</sup>

Within the neoliberal school of thought "transnational interdependence" (complex interdependence) and "international regimes" are the two forerunner perspectives. Complex interdependence has three main assumptions. First, state is no more the dominant, coherent actor and its sovereignty is attenuated considerably. Second, states' foreign policy goals are broadened to include low politics, non-military issues as well. Third, instruments of policy don't remain confined to military capabilities. The world of complex interdependence of the 1970s has now evolved into globalization. The later is the developed form of the former. Globalization has paved the way for free trade and diminished states' economic and political sovereignty by diluting its citizen's loyalties to their respective nation-states and internationalization of ecological, economic and security decisions.<sup>13</sup>

International regimes stress that cooperation is possible under anarchy and that it could be and should be institutionalized.<sup>14</sup> As regimes provide incentives, states' divergent behavior and objectives converge and thereby reduces anarchy.<sup>15</sup> A hegemon is effective in the establishment and enforcement of a regime; however, it is not necessary for sustaining it.<sup>16</sup> It is believed that regimes develop "a life of their own" due to frequent interactions of states and their stakes involved in it.<sup>17</sup> In the same context, neoliberals believe that multilateralism can mould state attitude<sup>18</sup> and prescribes multilateralism, military restraint and disarmament for peace. Liberals also believe that western liberal democracy and capitalism is the terminal point of the evolution of political and economic institutions faced with no serious post-Cold War challenges and that the rest of the world will follow suit.<sup>19</sup>

## LIBERALISM IN INDIA-PAKISTAN RELATIONS

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<sup>11</sup>David Baldwin, 1993, in Charles W. Kegley and Eugene R. Wittkopf, *World Politics: Trend and Transformation*, 9<sup>th</sup> ed. (USA:Cengage Learning, 2003), 4-8.

<sup>12</sup> Burchill, *Theories of International Relations*, 65.

<sup>13</sup> Burchill, *Theories of International Relations*, 79-82.

<sup>14</sup> Burchill, *Theories of International Relations*, 64.

<sup>15</sup>Luca Ratti, "Post-cold war Nato and international relations theory: The case for neo-classical realism," *Journal of Transatlantic Studies*, 4:1, (2006): 86-87.

<sup>16</sup> Joshua S. Goldstein and Jon C. Pevehouse, *International Relations*. 8<sup>th</sup> ed. (Delhi: Dorling Kindersley, 2009), 89.

<sup>17</sup> Ratti, "Nato and international relations theory," *Journal of Transatlantic Studies*, 86-87.

<sup>18</sup>Amitav Acharya, "Theoretical Perspectives on International Relations in Asia" (Paper presented at the Conference on International Relations in Asia: The New Regional System, George Washington University, Washington D.C, September 27-29, 2007).

<sup>19</sup> Burchill, *Theories of International Relations*, 56.

Generally, India is considered a democracy with a non-democratic period of 21 months in 1975-77 and Pakistan a state hurtling towards democracy with long spells of military rules. Both the nations have fought 3 major wars (1948, 1965 and 1971), one half-war (the Kargil war of 1999) and are engaged in an expensive conventional and non-conventional arms race, border skirmishes, and alleged mutual interferences. Both have gone nuclear in 1998 and are subject to domestic civil violence and terrorism. The wars of 1965 and 1971 qualify the democratic peace thesis as in both cases, an Indian democratic regime fought an authoritarian one in Pakistan. Similarly, a link has been established by liberals between democratization in Pakistan and rapprochement with India.<sup>20</sup> Similarly, low level of civil strife and terrorism in democratic India and high level in Pakistan, particularly during the times of military rules under general Zia (1978-1988) and general Musharraf (2001-2008) confirms the assuaging effect of democracy on civil conflicts and terrorism.

On the score of commercial liberalism, liberals point towards different liberal trends. India and Pakistan embarked upon economic liberalization in the 1990s and their mutual tariffs reduced from 225 % in 1988 to 25 % in 2005.<sup>21</sup> India has granted Pakistan MFN status and Pakistan too is willing to have good trade relations with India for regional peace and stability.<sup>22</sup> India-Pakistan Chamber of Commerce and Industry has been established after Indian Prime Minister Vajpayee's visit to Lahore in March 1999 and India by 2008 has become Pakistan's ninth largest trading partner.<sup>23</sup> Liberals are also sanguine that under WTO's obligations both the states will further lower tariffs and remove quantitative restrictions and ultimately free trade will bring peace. Under the auspices of SAPTA (South Asian Preferential Trade Arrangement) and SAFTA (South Asian Free Trade Area), economic interdependence is an emerging trend in South Asia which is an omen of a cooperative security.<sup>24</sup> Such trends provide a strong basis for the liberal standing of India-Pakistan relations.

Classical liberal institutionalists are concerned more with collective security and to some extent with regional integration theory.<sup>25</sup> According to them, UNO has played an effective role in Indo-Pak dispute mitigation. Similarly, the establishment of SAARC, the subsequent SAPTA and SAFTA, and the regional integration trends like the South Asian university, SAARC headquarter and secretariat, under the umbrella of SAARC are noteworthy liberal strands in India-Pakistan IR.

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<sup>20</sup> Diehl, 2005 in Gautam Wahi, "The Common Futures of India and Pakistan: A New Approach," *Journal of Futures Studies*, 18(2), (2013):94.

<sup>21</sup> E. Sridharan, "Improving Indo-Pakistan relations: international relations theory, nuclear deterrence and possibilities for economic cooperation," *Contemporary South Asia*, 14:3, (2005):327.

<sup>22</sup> The Times of India, 8 March 2008 in Bhumitra Chakma, "South Asia's Realist Fascination and the Alternatives," *Contemporary Security Policy*, 30:3, (2009):407.

<sup>23</sup> Bhumitra Chakma, "South Asia's Realist Fascination and the Alternatives," *Contemporary Security Policy*, 30:3, (2009):407.

<sup>24</sup> Chakma, "South Asia's Realist Fascination and the Alternatives," 408.

<sup>25</sup> Acharya, "Theoretical Perspectives," 13.

Neoliberals assert that technological revolution has resulted in increased interdependence and interconnectedness between India and Pakistan. The mounting influence of non-state actors like the terrorist and secessionist organizations in India and Pakistan<sup>26</sup> and joint membership or observatory status and influence of IGOs like UNO, SAARC, SCO, ASEAN along with different MNCs and NGOs are eroding state sovereignties. The problems of environment, hitherto overshadowed by traditional security, are assuming importance.<sup>27</sup> Not only are low politics issues coming to fore, but there is an increasing convergence of interest between the two states on climate change, and both are cooperating with WTO regime on the issues of patents in agriculture and livelihood cases.<sup>28</sup> The internal crisis like terrorism in Pakistan, and corruption<sup>29</sup> in India, along with the poverty and bad governance are gaining serious attentions. India and Pakistan are also employing non-military means of exerting influence as is exemplified by Track II and Track III diplomacy to generate goodwill, remove misconceptions and point the areas of mutual cooperation.<sup>30</sup> Similarly, globalization is also playing a crucial role in changing the traditional rancor between India and Pakistan. All these factors plead for the existence of complex interdependence between India and Pakistan.<sup>31</sup>

The proponent of international regimes identifies SAPTA, SAFTA, and SAARC Chamber of Commerce and Industry as components of a trade regime, Indus Waters Treaty (IWT) of 1960, a water regime, Iran-Pakistan-India (IPI) and Turkmenistan-Afghanistan-Pakistan-India (TAPI) gas pipelines as the gas regime and CBMs regime. The trade regime is believed effective and is developing a life of its own. IWT is the regime that has sustained two total wars and a long cold war between India and Pakistan. Both the nations have stakes in the sustenance of the regime and is, therefore, functioning smoothly. Similar sanguine are liberals about the CBMs and the gas pipelines and its potential spillover effects of peace and prosperity.<sup>32</sup>

Moreover, liberals argue that multilateralism has been employed in Indo-Pak relations on several occasions and has worked well as compared to bilateral approach. The conclusion of IWT in 1960 and the subsequent resolution of the disputes of Salal dam in the 1970s and Baglihar dam in 2007 are such success stories of multilateral efforts. The signing of the post-

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<sup>26</sup> (Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), Al-Qaeda, LeT and Baluchistan Liberation Front (BLF) in Pakistan, Bajrang Dal, Shive Cena and the Naxalites in India)

<sup>27</sup> Shaukat Hassan, *Environmental Issues and Security in South Asia*, Adelphi Paper No. 262 (London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1991) in Bhumitra Chakma, "South Asia's Realist Fascination and the Alternatives," *Contemporary Security Policy*, 30:3, (2009):408.

<sup>28</sup> Gautam Wahi, "The Common Futures of India and Pakistan: A New Approach," *Journal of Futures Studies*, 18(2), (2013):94.

<sup>29</sup> Anna Hazare, "Corruption (is) a bigger threat to India than Pakistan" (Bhatt, S. (2011). Rediff News. Retrieved 11 10, 2012, from <http://www.rediff.com/news/slide-show/slide-show-1-corruption-a-bigger-threat-to-india-than-pakistan-says-anna-hazare/20110406.htm>)

<sup>30</sup> Stephen Philip Cohen, "India, Pakistan and Kashmir," *Journal of Strategic Studies*, 25:4, (2002): 54-55.

<sup>31</sup> Wahi, "The Common Futures," 94.

<sup>32</sup> Sridharan, "Improving Indo-Pakistan relations," 332.

1965 and 1971 wars agreements of Tashkent and Simla respectively, scaling down of the Kargil war of 1999 and diffusion of 2002 military standoff; all owes much to multilateralism.

While realizing the biblical injunction of beating swords into ploughshares, both India and Pakistan intend to reduce their arms. Both have displayed military restraint on many occasions and are willing to dispose of their differences peacefully. Such liberal dispositions from the Indian side are frequently pointed out in Gandhian and Nehruvian philosophies of peaceful foreign policy, “Gujral doctrine” and the like. Proposals of “Joint Defense” of Ayub Khan and “Cricket Diplomacy” of president Zia are parallel historical liberal responses from the Pakistani side. Similar considerable are episodes of the “Lahore declaration” of February 1999, the India-Pakistan comprehensive peace building process of 2003 and the Composite Dialogue Process (CDP) of 2004 and onward.<sup>33</sup>

Lastly, liberals argue that India and Pakistan are toeing the western track in its evolution towards the terminal form of liberal democracy and capitalist economy. India is already charmed as the largest democracy of the world. Pakistan at present, with its military committed to the profession of soldiering, judicial independence, freedom and proliferation of media and awareness and vigilance of the masses, is claimed to have reached the point of no return to its previous spells of military rules. Similarly, both India and Pakistan are complying with the liberal trade regimes of WTO, IMF and WB and are further liberalizing and capitalizing their economies.

## CRITIQUE OF REALISM

However, the liberal trends discussed above are considered naïve and idealistic by the realists.

### **The democratic peace thesis**

The democratic peace thesis has been insufficiently discussed and applied in Asia due to “illiberal variety” of Asian democracies.<sup>34</sup> Instead “authoritarian peace” thesis, the anti-thesis of democratic peace thesis, is debated and applied in Asian IR.<sup>35</sup> According to realists, India-Pakistan relations disqualify both the theses. Critiquing the democratic peace thesis, realists believe that India is a well-established democracy and Pakistan’s government is democratic when ruled by a civvy, and authoritarian when ruled by the military. With such generalizations, the wars of 1948 and 1999 disqualify the primary premises of republican liberalism as in these two cases, two democratic governments were up in arms against one another. Realists contend that since 1979, different non-Congress leaders like Morarji Desai, Inder Kumar Gujral and Vajpayee adopted conciliatory approaches towards Pakistan. Counter to the democratic peace argument, Pakistan’s democratic governments under Benazir Bhutto and Nawaz Sharif

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<sup>33</sup> Narayanan, “The India -Pakistan Dyad,” 182.

<sup>34</sup> Acharya , “Theoretical Perspectives,” 12.

<sup>35</sup> Acharya , “Theoretical Perspectives,” 13.

reciprocated with hawkish policy towards India especially after 1989 intifada in Kashmir.<sup>36</sup> Similarly, during the term of the BJP-led National Democratic Alliance (NDA), India-Pakistan relations went through different phases: the nuclear-weapons tests of 1998, the Lahore Declaration of 1999, the Kargil “half war” of 1999, the failure of the Agra talks with General Pervez Musharraf in 2001, the attack on the Indian parliament in December 2001, mobilization of troops by India against Pakistan (called Operation Parakram), and then renewal of a composite dialogue process in early 2004.<sup>37</sup> These events indicate that both the democratic and military regimes of Pakistan have acted as hawks and doves simultaneously vis-a-vis India. The same argument goes for the largest democracy-India, in its foreign policy towards Pakistan. In a word, the mentioned events establish no causal relationship between the internal make-up of India and Pakistan with their external behaviors.

While applying the authoritarian peace thesis, realists critique that Indian and Pakistani democracies, like most of the democracies of Asia, are of illiberal nature. In the case of India, the dominance of a single party, the Congress party, for the first 3 decades gave the Indian democracy a one-party socialist texture. With the rise of BJP and other parties, the congress monopoly was broken. However, the rise of multi-parties failed to do away with authoritarian enclaves-- feudal, caste-laden, ethnic and bureaucratic-- within the Indian democracy. It is because of the presence of such enclaves that India is termed as a failed-democracy. In the case of Pakistan, the illiberal element is comparatively more visible. During the direct military rules of general Ayub Khan (1958-1969), general Yahya Khan (1969-1971), general Zia ul Haq (1978-1988) and general Musharraf (2001-2008), Pakistani polity cannot be justified as democratic. The indirect influence of military through constitutional and unconstitutional means has remained so high that the civilian government of Pakistan is termed as pseudo-democracy. Now with such generalizations, the authoritarian peace thesis is also nullified as both the states have fought one another despite their authoritarian natures.

India-Pakistan relations also defies other hypotheses of the democratic and authoritarian peace thesis like acquisition and use of nuclear weapons, the rate of military expenditures and weapons imports, border skirmishes, efforts for peacemaking, mutual-internal interferences and military standoffs. There exist no causality between liberal or non-liberal domestic values and other variables explained above. Wars, border skirmishes, military standoffs, peacemaking multilateral or bilateral efforts, rates of military expenditures, conventional and nuclear arms race and mutual interferences have remained constant despite the change in regime, leadership and political party. Even there are instances when the same political party, the same democratically elected or military leader has blown both hot and cold with the adversary. The same personality with the same clique or regime is involved in wars, interventions and border skirmishes at one hand and has extended conciliation and friendship on the other. While nullifying the inside-out approach of liberalism, Neorealists argue that it is not the internal

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<sup>36</sup> Cohen, “India, Pakistan and Kashmir,” 43.

<sup>37</sup> Narayanan, “The India -Pakistan Dyad,” 174

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make-up of the states that determine states outcome but the structure of the international system. It believes in an outside-in approach and by implication discards both the theories. For neorealists, state behavior is determined externally and as such, liberal or non-liberal values do not determine state behavior.<sup>38</sup>

On the hypothesis of civil strife and terrorism, the democratic peace thesis seems qualified but only ostensibly. Realists concede that comparatively civil conflicts and terrorism have increased during or in the immediate aftermath of a military rule in Pakistan. The domestic civil strife and terrorism during the decades of the 1980s and 2000s augment the preceding argument. However, according to neorealists, the violence and terrorism in both the cases owe much to external systemic factors. In the former case, it was the fallout of the USSR's intervention in Afghanistan and in the later case, it was the result of the American invasion of Afghanistan. Another logic being put forward by the realist school of thought is that India has allegedly supported Baloch separatist militias and terrorist groups. It has interfered in Baluchistan, FATA and KPK to generate civil conflicts and terrorism. On the other hand, Pakistan has allegedly supported different secessionist and terrorist groups in the erstwhile Khalistan movement, Kashmir, and Naxalites. Thus, there is no causal link between democracy or authoritarianism and civil strife and terrorism.

Neorealists also discard the hypothesis of causality between domestic values and nuclear weapons acquisition and use. It was Indian democracy that introduced nukes to the region of South Asia. It is argued that India acquired nuclear weapon predominantly due to partisan politics and status and prestige. Direct security threat was not a reason as the Chinese belligerence and threat had declined considerably in the 1990s and Pakistan neither tried to nor acquired nuclear weapons before India. Yet, indirectly, Indian nuclear program could be assigned a security value. According to offensive realists, states are offensive positionalist and are "gap maximizers". In order to be secure, they try to establish global or at least regional hegemony. Armed with nuclear weapons, India's relative power is enhanced as against its weaker and smaller neighbors and emerged as the dominant regional power. Most of the smaller states of the region did bandwagon India. Pakistan, being a relatively stronger neighbor complied with the defensive positionalist logic and tried to correct the imbalance created by Indian nuclear explosions by exploding its own. Therefore, Pakistan's nuclear program, irrespective of domestic makeup, is the balance of power politics driven. Comparing the nuclear doctrine of India and Pakistan, Pakistan's one is based on first use and Indian one on retaliatory use principle. This doctrinal difference of Indian exhibition of more restraint in nuclear use policy is not due to the more democratic government of India. In fact, such a difference is again due to the Indian relative position in the global structure. States with conventional weapons superiority and greater relative strength projects self-restraint in their nuclear doctrines and mostly adopt retaliatory policies in nuclear use cases. China restrained

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<sup>38</sup> John Mearsheimer, (1998) 'The false promise of international institutions', in Michael Brown et al. (eds) *Theories of War and Peace*, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.

and responsible nuclear doctrine towards India and the Indian one towards Pakistan qualifies the (neo)realist logic of nuclear deterrence and nullifies nuclear extension of democratic peace thesis. In a word, India-Pakistan relations with its important dimensions of war and peace, civil conflicts and terrorism, and nuclear dynamics defy the basic premises of republican liberalism.

### **Trade-brings-peace thesis**

Trade between India and Pakistan is nominal and is not free due to tariff and non-tariff barriers, quotas, border controls, transport, visa problems and security issues. In 1948-49, 56 % of Pakistani export went to India which dropped to 4% in 1958. In 1948-49, 50 % of India's export went to West Pakistan and 80% to East Pakistan.<sup>39</sup> However, in 2010 it was just 1 % of the total trade of India and little above 1 % for Pakistan. Economies of India and Pakistan are competitive as both are mostly exporting the same products like textiles, apparel, leather goods, footwear and other labor-intensive goods.<sup>40</sup> According to Adam Smith and David Ricardo, the very spirit of free trade is the comparative advantage and functional specialization. Since both the nations are bestowed with the same natural resources, raw materials, skills and have same industrial or agricultural basis and are at the same stage of industrialization and development, therefore, their economies are necessarily competitive. India and Pakistan are low-income economies and are following import substitution strategies and will remain competitive unless a level of industrialization with a different product based is achieved. There are neither trade agreements between India and Pakistan, nor mutual FDIs or joint ventures.<sup>41</sup> Though India has extended MFN status to Pakistan, Pakistan has refused to reciprocate unless the dispute of Kashmir is resolved.<sup>42</sup> The agenda of India-Pakistan Chamber of Commerce and Industry is frozen since Kargil. It was revived in 2004 but went again dysfunctional in 2008 due to Bombay terror attack. According to Dale Copeland theory of trade expectations, economic interdependence will bring peace if the interdependent parties are sure of trade expansion in future.<sup>43</sup> Realists opine that the charged political environment and competitive nature of the two economies make such a surety of trade expansion and the subsequent peace in future skeptical.

### **Collective Security and integration theory**

Similarly, realists consider collective security and integration theory as Eurocentric and inapplicable in Asia.<sup>44</sup> The success of a collective security (global or regional) depends upon its members' fulfilment of commitments and consensual interpretation of an aggression or conflict-causing action.<sup>45</sup> Such commitment and consensus are lacking amongst the nations of

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<sup>39</sup> Sridharan, "Improving Indo-Pakistan relations," 327.

<sup>40</sup> Sridharan, "Improving Indo-Pakistan relations," 329.

<sup>41</sup> Sridharan, "Improving Indo-Pakistan relations," 329.

<sup>42</sup> Chakma, "South Asia's Realist Fascination and the Alternatives," 413.

<sup>43</sup> Sridharan, "Improving Indo-Pakistan relations," 325.

<sup>44</sup> Acharya, "Theoretical Perspectives," 13.

<sup>45</sup> Goldstein and Pevehouse, *International Relations*, 90.

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Asia in general and India-Pakistan in particular. UNO's resolutions in the case of Kashmir are repeatedly disregarded by India and SAARC principles of non-interventions, sovereign equality, territorial integrity and pledge against terrorism are allegedly not respected by both Pakistan and India. In fact, mistrust and political disputes between the two leading nations have resulted in the sluggish performance of SAARC.<sup>46</sup> Conforming to realist logic, both the powers have never let slip any opportunity off their hands of using UNO and SAARC as instruments of power politics.

### **Complex interdependence**

According to realism, India -Pakistan relationship is still miles away from meeting the three conditions of the complex interdependence of the 1970s and present day globalization. Realists argue that no doubt, states of India and Pakistan are under the twin pressures of sub-state actors and supra-state actors. Yet state as a political entity is still dominant, coherent and its sovereignties intact. The Indian and Pakistani state still commands the loyalty of its people and provides for the security and welfare of the population it has circumvented. Its sovereignty, one of the four pillars of Westphalia state system, might be challenged by certain sub-state and supra-state entities and forces, yet both the states are striving hard to augment their sovereignties by resisting such pressures. A challenge to sovereignty doesn't imply evaporation or dissolution of state as sovereignty cannot be absolute. Indeed, such challenges do not jeopardize the unity or coherence of the state. State as a political entity would lose its coherence, unity and sovereignty only when its population starts looking to other entities for their protection and welfare. The people of India and Pakistan still have stern faith in their states and unlike European union are not ready to hand over a bit of their states' sovereignties to the constituent regional organization.

Moreover, for realists, low politics still stands low in the foreign policies of India and Pakistan. A non-military issue including diseases, pollution, poverty, deforestation, climate change, global warming and water scarcity assumes importance only when it has direct implications for military or traditional security. For example, global warming or climate change is only a matter of concern when it affects the water supply. Water scarcity seems to be a matter of low politics; however, in the context of India and Pakistan, it has a direct correlation with high politics. Economies of both the nations are primarily agrarian and are water dependent thereby making water a strategic resource. Water scarcity has direct strategic implications for the security of India and Pakistan as well. India, being upstream, could use water as a bargaining chip for diplomatic leverage or a weapon against the maneuverability of Pakistani forces or rendering the Pakistani defence canals useless. In addition, lack of good governance, poverty, and corruption are much of the talked issues in India and Pakistan yet realists term these issues as of secondary importance. Terrorism in India and Pakistan cannot be considered a matter of low politics. It is, as per mutual allegations, not perpetrated by independent non-state actors. Instead,

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<sup>46</sup> Chakma, "South Asia's Realist Fascination and the Alternatives," 408.

it is state sponsored. Pakistan blames India for terrorism in KPK, FATA and Baluchistan. India blames Pakistan for helping LeT and other actors for terrorism in India. Therefore, the terrorism in India and Pakistan is but a proxy war fought by state-sponsored terrorist groups. It is not predominantly a non-state actor versus state war. It is a state versus state war but by other means.

To boot, “military force is not used by governments towards other governments within the region, or on the issues when complex interdependence prevails”.<sup>47</sup> According to realism, in the international relationship of India and Pakistan state to state military security threat has remained constant. So is the means of influence. Track II and III diplomacies are employed but to no avail. “Aman ki Asha” has failed and the “Samjhauta Express” derailed. A change in the means of influence has occurred but at doctrinal level. Pakistan’s alleged reliance on non-state actors, low-level less costly conflict, in Kashmir and elsewhere and Indian alleged response with the same coin in Baluchistan and elsewhere along the switching over to the “Cold Start” doctrine is not a change in the instrument of policy. The new doctrines still involve coercion and use of force but at different levels.

### **International regimes**

For realists, the regimes between India and Pakistan have fallen prey to realpolitik.<sup>48</sup> They have failed to build trust and stability; to spill over in other areas and in sustaining “a life of their own”. First, despite the fact that institutionalized regimes with a staff and headquarter acquire greater strength and stability<sup>49</sup> like EU, SAARC has failed in achieving its lofty objectives primarily due to, trust deficit and power politics between India and Pakistan. Second, the regional trade regime has failed in its objective of establishing free trade between regional economies particularly India and Pakistan. Third, the IWT regime, a highly praised one, has failed to build trust and stability between India and Pakistan. It has failed to spill over into other issues particularly the Kashmir issue. For realists the treaty is guilty of naivety and idealism to the extent that whenever Kashmir issue is resolved as per the wishes of any of the three parties, the IWT is to be revised. Currently, the regime is under severe stress and strain due to climatic, hydrological, demographic variations and Indian construction of a large number of dams on the rivers allocated to Pakistan. Owing to such stress, many of the prominent water experts of the region have put forward the suggestion for installing a new treaty, Indus II. Fourth, the CBMs between India and Pakistan are quite comprehensive; yet, their net result or spillover effect into actual confidence building is yet to be seen. Last, IPI and TAPI as the components of a gas (energy) regime are sabotaged by mutual trust deficits and sensitivity to cumulative relative gains and fear of negative security fallouts. Pakistan since 1994 is rejecting such regimes and other economic relations with India as a part of its Kashmir policy of no India-Pak

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<sup>47</sup> Keoane and Nye, 2001, 22.

<sup>48</sup> Chakma, “South Asia's Realist Fascination and the Alternatives,” 412.

<sup>49</sup> Goldstein and Pevehouse, *International Relations*, 90

rapprochement unless Kashmir issue resolved. As Pakistan fears of interlocking into a disadvantageous relationship with India so does India. India fears that the revenues generated by the gas regimes could be used by Pakistan to step up insurgency in Kashmir.<sup>50</sup>

### **Absolute gains or relative gains?**

Neoliberals agree with neorealists that security dilemma compels states to be sensitive to relative gains yet it doesn't mean that cooperation cannot take place between states.<sup>51</sup> Neoliberals argue that a state's sensitivity to relative gains is directly proportional to the intensity of the security dilemma in which it feels trapped. In other words, a state's sensitivity to relative gains of the other state is directly proportional to the threat perception of one state towards the other state.<sup>52</sup> Since nuclearization has amended for Pakistan's search for external security and now deterrence exists between India and Pakistan, therefore, such deterrence will enable Pakistan to engage in economic activities with India without fear of cumulative relative gain effect for the later.<sup>53</sup> (Neo)realists, however, disagree. While rivaling the neoliberal argument of states sensitivity to absolute gains, neorealists argue that states are more sensitive to relative gains than absolute gains.<sup>54</sup> Similarly, arguing against the argument of reduced sensitivity to relative gains under the shield of nuclear weapons; neorealists emphasize Pakistan's intact sensitivity to relative gains despite armed with second strike capable nukes. According to their logic, any interaction or regime by relative gains argument can only succeed, if it doesn't upset the balance of power.<sup>55</sup> India in this sense can be considered as offensive positionalist by maximizing its relative gains. However, Pakistan being, in search of the balance is defensive positionalist as it is defending its relative position. Therefore, according to realism, even in the face of MAD (Mutually Assured Destruction) sensitivity to absolute gains and thus cooperation possible between India and Pakistan is exuberance and sensitivity to relative gains or lack of trust a reality.

### **Multilateralism**

(Neo)realists disregard multilateral institutions and multilateral efforts with the same rigor.<sup>56</sup> It is observed that regional peace in Asia is based on bilateralism, instead of multilateralism and

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<sup>50</sup> Sridharan, "Improving Indo-Pakistan relations," 331.

<sup>51</sup> Duncan Snidal, 'Relative gains and the pattern of international cooperation', *American Political Science Review*, 85, September 1991, pp 701–726 in Sridharan, "Improving Indo-Pakistan relations," 323..

<sup>52</sup> Sridharan, "Improving Indo-Pakistan relations," 323.

<sup>53</sup> Sridharan, "Improving Indo-Pakistan relations," 322.

<sup>54</sup> Joseph M. Grieco, 'Anarchy and the limits of cooperation', in David Baldwin (ed), *Neorealism and its Critics: the Contemporary Debate* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1993), pp 116–142 in Sridharan, "Improving Indo-Pakistan relations," 323.

<sup>55</sup> Sridharan, "Improving Indo-Pakistan relations," 323.

<sup>56</sup> Sorpong Peou, "Realism and constructivism in Southeast Asian security studies today: a review essay," *The Pacific Review*, 15:1, (2002): 125.

that regional groups in Asia serve as “adjuncts” to the politics of balance of power.<sup>57</sup> In south Asia, SAARC has been used by India and Pakistan as an arena for the politics of balance of power. Indian official policy has always been that of employing bilateralism in its dealing with its neighbours. On the contrary, Pakistan in particular and other smaller states, in general, have always longed for multilateralism and have rejected bilateralism for its realpolitik spirit.

## CONCLUSION

With the victory of liberal democracy and capitalism over authoritarianism and socialism in the 1990s, liberalism won over realism in explaining international politics of most of the regions of the world. The same paradigm of liberalism is applied to explain the regional politics of South Asia including relations between India and Pakistan. However, India-Pakistan relations defy the logic of liberalism and still lends itself to the explanations being put forward by realism in many aspects. The two regional giants have fought wars both during military and civilian rules and suggest no causal relationship between domestic values and external behavior of the states. Trade between India and Pakistan is nominal and their economies are competitive in nature with no trade liberalization in sight in near future. Globalization has failed to diffuse loyalties or sovereignties of the two states and state is still coherent, unitary and sovereign in Indo-Pak subcontinent. Military security and means of influence still dominate other methods of influence. International regimes between India and Pakistan are numerous; however, instead of spilling over into other areas, they are vying for their existence in the face pummeling regional power politics. For India, bilateralism is still the official approach in dealing with its neighbours.

According to neorealists, failure of India-Pakistan peace efforts owes much to structural constraints and the politics of (im)balancing. India is trying to offset the balance in her favor both through external and internal balancing. On the contrary, Pakistan is trying to foil Indian attempts by restoring the balance of power. She is spending 6 % of its GDP on internal balancing by modernizing its conventional and unconventional arsenals. On the front of external balancing, Pakistan has sought the alliances of USA and China since its existence. Similarly, against the liberal claim of military restraint, both the neighbors have repeatedly employed war as an effective mean of exerting influence in the wars of 1948, 1965, 1971, and 1999 along with low-intensity warfare in Kashmir, mutual interventions and interferences. In a nutshell, against the claims of liberals, realism still reigns supreme in explaining relations between India and Pakistan.

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<sup>57</sup>Michael Leifer, *The ASEAN Regional Forum*, Adelphi Paper 302 (London, International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1996) 53-54.