Title: State, space and secularism: Towards a critical study of governing religion

Abstract:

Over the last decade, cities have become key sites of investigations into the politics of religious diversity. However, the vibrant scholarship on governing urban religion frequently suffers from conceptually thin understandings of the debate's key terms. This contribution critically engages with the conceptual underpinnings of this scholarship by discussing the interdependence of the dimensions of state, space and secularism. Regarding the state, I suggest that we should reconceptualise the state as strategic terrain, effect and social relation; regarding space, I discuss the analytical purchase of the TPSN (Territory, Place, Space, Network) approach, and regarding secularism I argue that we need to investigate local secularisms as problem-spaces and vernacular practices. Focusing on Islam in Western Europe, I demonstrate the analytical benefits of these theoretical reconfigurations by discussing the case study of the failure of one of Germany's most prominent mosque projects, the Munich Forum for Islam (MFI).

Key words: Relational state, space, local secularism, religion, Islam in Germany, TPSN

Wordcount: 8673

Author: Tobias Müller, tm498@cam.ac.uk, @_TobiasMueller

ORCID: 0000-0002-1999-4370

Author affiliation: Woolf Institute, Cambridge; and Department of Politics and International Studies (POLIS), University of Cambridge

Figures: With kind permission of the Munich Forum for Islam.

Figure 1: Munich Forum for Islam 2020.

Figure 2: Munich Forum for Islam 2020, accessed 16 September 2020, https://www.islam-muenchen.de/mfi-vision.

Figure 1: Current mosque of the Munich Forum for Islam (MFI)

Figure 2: Design of the proposed new mosque and Islamic centre of the Munich Forum for Islam

Tables: N/A

Funder information: This research was supported through a Vice Chancellor's Award of the Cambridge Trust, a doctoral scholarship of the German National Scholarship Foundation (Studienstiftung des deutschen Volkes), and a Junior Research Fellowship at the Woolf Institute, Cambridge.

Acknowledgements: A draft of this article was presented at the workshop "Religious? Secular? Rethinking Islam and Space in Europe" at the University of Cambridge in December 2017. I would like to thank Adela Taleb and Chris Moses, the co-organisers of this workshop, for being such inspiring academics, skilled organisers and critical interlocutors, and I would like to thank the participants of the workshop and the contributors of this special issue for their collaborative thinking over the last three years. I am very grateful to Thandeka Cochrane, Sebastian Scholl,

Chris Moses, and three anonymous reviewers for their incisive comments on earlier drafts of this paper.

What is an ideology without a space to which it refers, a space which it describes, whose vocabulary and links it makes use of, and whose code it embodies? What would remain of a religious ideology - the Judaeo-Christian one, say - if it were not based on places and their names ...?

Henri Lefebvre (1991, 44)

Introduction

The recent decade has witnessed a shift of scholarly attention regarding religion and politics away from the nation state and towards the city. While debates whether we live in a secular age (Taylor 2007) or a post-secular age (Habermas 2005) are as alive as ever, scholars have argued that we certainly live in "post-secular cities", with their pulsating assemblages of interdependent social, cultural, religious and political activities (Beaumont and Baker 2011). Thus, it has been suggested that we should focus on urban environments to understand key dynamics of religion and politics in the 21st century. The reason for this 'urban turn' is that through conversion, migration and transformation of religious life worlds, cities across the globe have turned into highly complex, constantly changing laboratories of conviviality, conflict and mundane everyday interactions (see Garbin and Strhan 2017). At the same time,

particularly in Euroamerica, cities are spaces of political contestation that are shot through with remnants of (post)colonial racial regimes, heightened surveillance of religious groups, particularly Muslims, and processes of frequently violent marginalisation and discrimination (cf. Desplat and Schulz 2012). However, these latter processes have so far been inadequately addressed by the recent scholarship on governing religion in cities (for synopses of the field see Becci et al. 2017; Martínez-Ariño 2019).

This article addresses this gap by critically engaging with what I argue is a theoretical and conceptual narrowness in the study of governing urban religion. The literature on governing religious diversity has provided us with a rich tapestry of intriguing empirical case studies. However, despite important theoretical advances (e.g. Burchardt 2019; della Dora 2018; Tse 2013), we still lack adequate conceptual frameworks that are able to trace the multidimensional power asymmetries and exclusionary mechanisms that shape the life worlds of religious people in urban spaces. This is particularly true for three key concepts that underlie these studies, yet are often either insufficiently theorised or not adequately connected: state, space and secularism.

In many studies of the regulation of religion in cities, despite the laudable efforts to illuminate our understanding of the local and municipal level (cf. Schiller 2016), analytically, the *state* remains an analytical ‘black box’. The two most commonly used concepts, governance and governmentality, provide insufficient theoretical tools to conceptualise the state’s effects in governing concrete instances of urban religion. In terms of theories of *space*, it seems that admonitions of scholars such as Kim Knott, to neither treat space merely as a “container in which activities take place” nor as “a backdrop against which they are played out”, have not resulted in the necessary rethinking of the theories of space underlying our understanding of the governing of diversity in cities (Knott 2005, 129). While some scholars have drawn on human geography to focus on particular spatial dimensions, for instance scale in the “multi-

scalar politics" of the London Olympia "Mega mosque" (DeHanas and Pieri 2011) or the politics of place in religious heritage making (Astor et al. 2017), these studies lack an adequate understanding of how scale and place intersect with other spatial dimensions like territory, network and positionality. Thirdly, while many scholars of governing religion make passing reference to Talal Asad, Saba Mahmood and their interlocutors, insights from the critical study of *secularism*, particularly on secularism as problem-space (Agrama 2012) and vernacular practice (Bangstad 2009), which have developed useful tools for analysing power/knowledge relations beyond the formal apparatus of the state, have not been adequately taken into account (see Fadil 2019). The failure to harness the critical potential of recent conceptual re-evaluations of state, space and secularism can produce analytically and politically misleading accounts, particularly through the possible neglect of the multi-dimensional nature of (post)colonial state-space-secularism entanglements through which certain religious minorities are categorised, surveilled and discriminated against (see Anidjar 2006).

In this contribution I will primarily focus on Islam in Western Europe, since scrutinising how Muslims emerge as targets and subjects resisting suspicion, surveillance, racialised discrimination and government intervention offers a particularly telling insight into the often-overlooked spatial dimension of the interdependences of secularism and the state (cf. Amir-Moazami 2018). The failure of one of Germany's most ambitious mosque projects, the Munich Forum for Islam (MFI), serves as a case study to illustrate how secularism and the state unfold their effects through multiple spatial dimensions that would be overlooked by conventional, frequently narrowly territorial understandings of the state. In this way, the case study supports the argument that the TPSN approach (Territory, Place, Scale, Network) enables a more refined, multidimensional analysis of the ways in which concrete intersections of state, space and secularism are imbricated in the production and contestation of religious space, with frequently exclusionary effects.

State: Terrain, effect, social relation

Studies of the governance of urban religious diversity have successfully debunked many of the methodological assumptions imbued in the 'national models' of integration and the relations of religion and the state. However, the territorial understanding underlying monolithic representations of the state on a national level often seems to be merely supplemented by the idea of the 'local state', leaving the idea that states are mainly understood through the notion of national territory largely intact (cf. Becci et al. 2017; Desplat and Schulz 2012; Griera and Nagel 2017; Martínez-Ariño 2018; Schiller 2016). Given the state's complex multidimensional entanglements across different networks and scales, this calls into question the possibility of understanding the state as 'local', a designation that has come under scrutiny by critical geographers (McCann and Ward 2012; Prince 2017). Connected to this is the question, how can we account for our scholarly complicity in reproducing the very symbolic categories on which state power rests, particularly national territory, as unquestioned sum-total of facts in our own analysis?

Understanding the relations between state and societal groups such as religions by focussing on governance, policies and regulatory frameworks, risks to neglect the effects of the state in producing power/knowledge formations and subject positions that shape the possibilities of religious and secular ways of life (see Amir-Moazami 2018). Based on this critique, Foucauldian notions of governmentality have been mobilised to critically analyse the ideological and biopolitical apparatuses that govern populations, for instance by casting Muslims in Western Europe as "new barbarians" (Edmunds 2012). However, not least given Michel Foucault's reluctance to analyse power through the lens of the state—he famously called state theory an "indigestible meal" (Foucault 2008, 77)—scholars drawing on governmentality as primary framework of analysis frequently do not to explicate their use of the term state. In contrast to Foucault, who suggested that "The present epoch will perhaps be above all the epoch

of space" (Foucault 1986, 22), scholars drawing on governmentality also often neglect to combine their insightful accounts of discursive power/knowledge structures with analyses of concrete spatial and material contexts (cf. Edmunds 2012; Peter 2012). This raises the question, how can we bring together Foucault's caution against the state as object of analysis with the urgency to critically assess the state and the discrimination and marginalisation it facilitates?

Both neo-Marxist and poststructuralist theorists have criticised the purportedly neutral facticity of the state prevalent in much social scientific analysis. As Philip Abrams claims, "We have come to take the state for granted as an object of political practice and political analysis while remaining quite spectacularly unclear as to what the state is" (1988, 57). Talking about the 'local' state does not avoid the pitfalls of viewing the state as a free-standing agent organised around a centrally organised sovereignty issuing orders to different agents. Similarly, societal groups including religious organisations cannot be considered as either adapting to or resisting the state, while maintaining the idea that they stand 'outside' of the state. Instead, as Timothy Mitchell suggests, "political subjects and their modes of resistance are formed as much within the organizational terrain we call the state, rather than in some wholly exterior social space" (1991, 93). Therefore, the processes by which the powerful distinction between state and society is drawn need to be turned into our very objects of scrutiny. They need to be understood "not as the boundary between two discrete entities, but as a line drawn internally within the network of institutional mechanisms through which a social and political order is maintained" (Mitchell 1991, 78).

In addition to its organisational and institutional materialisations, the ideological and moral dimension of religion forms a fundamental building block of the state as "message of domination" (Mitchell 1988, 81; see Jessop 2016, 24). If we take Mitchell's claim that the state-society boundary cuts right through an internal network of institutions seriously, then some religious doctrine and practice has to be understood as part of the discursive ensemble of the

state. As indicated by Lefebvre's claim quoted at the beginning of this article, the idea of European nation states being formed by Judeo-Christian traditions are a case in point of religion being *internal* to the ideological-material terrain we call the state (cf. Topolski 2018). Therefore, centring research around the question, 'how do cities regulate religious diversity?', risks to attribute a non-existent cohesiveness and coherence to a reified notion of the local state *outside* of society and disconnected from multi-dimensional "power-geometries" (Massey 1992, 81).

One possible answer to overcome the constraints of both governance and governmentality perspectives on the state is Bob Jessop's strategic-relational approach, which suggests that we should understand the *state as an effect and a social relation* (2016, 44). Following Nicos Poulantzas, the state can be understood as a "strategic terrain" of a material "condensation of a relationship of forces" (Poulantzas 1978, 74, 123). In this strategic terrain, so-called state actors and non-state actors are part of a process of what James Ferguson and Akhil Gupta have called "state spatialization", specifically through the two complementary processes of "verticality and encompassment" (2002, 994). Linking space and state in this way decentralises the difference between state and non-state actors and points towards the similarities in the technologies of government across various spatio-political domains.

Destabilising the conceptual boundaries between state and society, and state action 'from above' or 'from below', indicates a shift towards *topological* understandings of state and space. This means that "power relations, in topological terms, are not so much located in space or across it, as c*ompose* the space of which they are a part" (Allen 2009, 206; see Prince 2017). When applying this argument to the study of 'local regulation of religious diversity', the notion of something being potentially outside the 'reach of government' appears increasingly implausible. Spaces such as mosques, Islamic networks or transnational movements of Muslim groups cannot be considered outside of the strategic terrain called the state. Rather, they are

steeped in powerful interlocking systems of oppression and discrimination such as (post)colonial epistemologies, Orientalism, Christian nationalism, and Islamophobia, and are located in the context of what bell hooks calls a "white supremacist, capitalist, patriarchal state" (2000, 22). The enormous complexity of these structural patterns makes it plausible to employ a *spatial* perspective to analytically unpack the workings of the state and local arrangements of secularism in concrete instances of religious life worlds in the dense multiplicity of urban metropoles.

Space: Territory, Place, Scale, Network (TPSN) and multidimensional analysis

The renewed interest in the analytical possibilities of a focus on space has led to what has been referred to as a 'spatial turn' in the study of religion. This has sparked a fruitful cross-fertilisation of concepts and research agendas (Knott 2005; Obadia 2015) through new approaches such as "iconic religion" (Knott, Krech and Mayer 2016), "topographies of faith (Becci, Burchardt and Casanova 2013), "grounded theologies" (Tse 2013), and "infrasecular geographies" (della Dora 2018). While many of these approaches effectively engage with critical developments in conceptualisations of space, the analytical purchase of *topological* approaches associated with the cultural and spatial turn in human geography has not yet been adequately explored in scholarship on religion and politics (see Müller 2019). This contribution argues that a topological perspective is necessary to shift the analytical focus from social relations that unfold *within* a given space towards the ways in which these social relations and their power asymmetries *co-create* the spatial arrangement in which they are embedded. While geographers have long advocated for the use of more relational and multi-scalar analytics (see McCann and Ward 2012), which has been fruitfully employed in the study of religious practices of migratory communities (DeHanas and Pieri 2011; Vásquez and Knott 2014), the interplay of different dimensions of state and space, not just multiple scales, remains underexplored.

The TPSN approach (an acronym for Territory, Place, Scale and Network), offers a useful theoretical starting point to think about the interactions of various spatial dimensions and the social materialities and practices they enable and inhibit. The TPSN approach was formed through an amalgamation of neo-Marxist and poststructuralist theories that emphasise the need to analyse space through the interdependence of different dimensions of space (Jessop et al. 2008). Bob Jessop and other proponents of TPSN argue that we should "study socio-spatial relations as heterogeneous series of contradictory, dilemmatic, strategically selective, spatio-temporal, discursive-material ensembles" (Jones and Jessop 2010, 1124). Each of the four dimensions of the TPSN approach relates to one "spatial turn" in human geography. These have focussed attention on the specific socio-spatial imaginations and strategies enabled by territory, place, scale and network (Jones and Jessop 2010, 1124).

The TPSN approach allows us to take into account the interactions of different principles or "patternings" of socio-spatial relations (Jessop et al. 2008, 393). The dimension of territory points to constructions of bounded spaces with respective inside/outside divides. These territorial divides enable certain forms of regulation and control, for example through border fences or visa regimes, as discussed in the case study below. The dimension of place highlights the differentiation between core and periphery, which emerges through acts of naming and distinctive activities and imaginations associated with particular social spaces, such as the frequently overcrowded existing mosque of the Munich Forum for Islam or Munich's reputation as liberal, multicultural metropolis. The dimension of scale focuses on the vertical differentiation of social relations, such as dominant and marginal, local and global, parish and diocese, believer and *umma*. The dimension of network sheds light on nodal or rhizomatic differentiations such as the followers of influential scholars or alleged extremist networks.

Other dimensions might be necessary to complement the TPSN framework as lenses to understand certain socio-spatial relations. These include *positionality*, for example the

"Europeanness" attributed to Muslims from the Balkans, or *body*, for instance when the spatial marginalisation of religious minorities has potentially disproportionate effects on women due to requirements to maintain gender segregation in prayer spaces (see Jones and Jessop 2010, 1130; Knott 2005, 17).

While investigating urban religious diversity through the TPSN approach breaks down unidimensional understandings of space, its particular strength lies in the possibility to scrutinise how the various spatial dimensions intersect. For instance, as the case study of the failed Munich mosque shows, while religious diversity might be enabled in one socio-spatial dimension, e.g. by the multicultural politics of a city council (*place*), it might be obstructed through other spatial dimensions such as restrictive immigration laws (*territory*) or racialised suspicion and surveillance by the security services (*scale*).

While socio-spatial ensembles across the dimensions of territory, place, scale and network can produce a variety of possible outcomes, the concepts of "compossibility" and "incompossibility" allow us to focus on the ways in which these intersections facilitate and obstruct certain forms of sociality (Jones and Jessop 2010, 1124). In short, the idea of compossibility shifts our focus from what might be the case in the abstract towards the *actual* mechanisms in a given spatial field. One example of incompossibility is the idea of co-absence. Co-absence refers to a situation in which the absence of one socio-spatial structure or behavioural pattern makes another one very likely to also be absent.

In places such as Munich, where mosques are primarily *Hinterhofmoscheen* (backyard mosques) with very limited available space (*place*), the obligation for Muslim men to attend prayers in the mosque frequently leads to a prioritisation of male prayer facilities over the availability of spaces designated for the use by women, an exclusion of certain *bodies* from a *territory* marked demarcated through the category of gender (cf. Nyhagen 2019, 2). Many of

my female interlocutors from mosques other than the MFI told me that the absence of spaces designated for the use by women often exacerbates existing difficulties to play an active role in the life of the mosque, including the respective mosque community's administrative, political and interfaith activities inside and outside the actual mosque building (*network-positionality*). The MFI provides much more opportunities for female leadership than most other mosques in Munich. Nevertheless, the general difficulties to establish sufficiently large prayer spaces in Munich, fuelled by gentrification and state intervention, has particularly detrimental effects on women. With Jessop and colleagues, one could argue that the case study below shows that the aspirations for a significant increase in female placemaking and leadership in Munich was made incompossible. Physical space for women and increased female leadership in mosques can be interpreted as being co-absent; the absence of one is strongly connected to the absence of the other. Taking into account the interplay of different spatial dimensions, this can also be interpreted as a co-absence of adequate mosque facilities (*place*) and of increased opportunities for participation of Muslim women in the engagement with local and national state actors (*scale*).

This interlinking of different socio-spatial dimensions shows how the obstacles frequently imposed by the institutions of the liberal democratic state against establishing Islamic institutions in Western Europe, paradoxically, makes it difficult, or even incompossible, to meet the liberal egalitarian demand of gender balanced leadership in Islamic organisations. The incompossibility of insufficiently sized buildings and gender balanced mosque leadership, however, should not prevent us from recognising that countervailing tendencies are successfully reconfiguring this gendered marginalisation of space. Women fulfil many key functions within the MFI and two of the seven board members are women, which reflects recent studies that have identified the trend towards the "feminization of the Islamic institutional landscape" in Europe (Jouili 2015, 24). The TPSN perspective and its sensitivity to co-absences

and incompossibilities opens conceptual avenues to investigate how certain spatial arrangements obstruct or reconfigure the traditionally gendered designations that permeate spaces of religious leadership.

Similar to gender-based discrimination, the TPSN approach also offers the opportunity to analyse the spatial interlocking of stratified racial discriminations. The idea of "racial space" developed by geographers of race offers a useful complementary heuristic since it highlights contestation, fluidity, relationality and asymmetry as ontological and epistemological frameworks, which are key concepts of the TPSN approach (see Neely and Samura 2011, 1941). In turn, geographies of race can benefit from differentiating more clearly the spatial dimensions of racial space, which is a particular strength of the TPSN approach. In addition, while in some cases it might be analytically helpful to subsume race, class and gender as "other identities and social locations" into the same framework (Neely and Samura 2011, 1948), the effects of secularism cannot be simply understood through the notion of discrimination based on religious identity. Rather, as discussed in the following section, secularism produces concrete problem-spaces in which the legitimate boundary between religion and politics is constantly questioned (Agrama 2012). The topological and relational understanding of state and space discussed above provides us with a helpful theoretical foundation to investigate their multi-layered relations to secularism, a third conceptual shortcoming in the literature on governing religion in general and urban religious diversity in particular.

Secularism: Problem-space and vernacular practices

Many studies of urban religious diversity seek to spell out the complexities of concrete socio-political settings that do not conform to the ideal types proposed by Charles Taylor (2007), Jürgen Habermas (2005), and other political theorists. However, their analytical vocabulary is still mostly based on key assumptions of liberal democratic theory such as the distinctions

between public/private, state/society, and religious/non-religious. Talal Asad (2003) famously criticised the most widespread understanding of secularism as mode of separating religion and politics, arguing that this would profoundly misrecognise the productive power-effects of secularism to create and obstruct particular political subjectivities along the lines of race, religion, gender, class and nationality (see Müller 2020). With Foucault and Asad, binaries such as public/private, state/society and religious/non-religious turn from the background against which politics plays out into the very means of politics—into contingent effects of particular power/knowledge contestations. Combining insights from the critical study of secularism (Agrama 2012; Asad 2003, Amir-Moazami 2018) and critical geography (Allen 2009; Prince 2017), I suggest a "topological turn" in the study of secularism: Mirroring the shift from topographical (power unfolds in space) to topological (power composes space) understandings of socio-spatial relations, we need to shift from topographical (power unfolds between religion and state) towards topological understandings of secularism (power composes religion and state).

Thus, we need to transform these binaries from unquestioned assumptions into a series of strategic constructions that need to be understood as parochial power-formations. In a move to provincialise and decolonise the "liberal-secular matrix" (Amir-Moazami 2018, 22) within which religion and politics are negotiated, Hussein Agrama suggests that we should understand secularism as a "problem-space" in which the boundary between religion and politics is continually contested (2012, 27). While this is a very useful heuristic, Agrama neglects to develop an analytic of 'space' in 'problem-space' that disaggregates different spatial dimensions. This represents a gap in the critical scholarship on secularism that the TPSN approach can help to overcome by requiring us to look at secularism as our research object from multiple spatial angles.

Secularism, constantly questioning the rightful place and form of religion, mobilises a set of epistemological heuristics designed to advance often competing political objectives such as security, cohesion, equality and freedom. These, in turn, are stratified along the lines of race, class, gender, nationality and religion (see Asad 2003, 5). This means that any political engagement with religion is pre-configured and predicated upon epistemologies that are marked by spatialised hierarchies, particularly between different religions and racialised groups (see Meer 2013, 389). Muslim groups with transnational links to Saudi Arabia, Turkey, Egypt and the Balkans, as discussed in the Munich case study below, and those that convert to Islam (see Özyürek 2015), certainly share some experiences of minority religious traditions in European cities. Yet, the particular trajectories of the political experiences of these groups combined with their perceived location within the racially imagined body politics necessitates us to take seriously their differential positionality within local formations of secularism.

A poignant example of how these differential hierarchies of recognition and exclusion materialise in urban environments is Elisabeth Becker's article "Good mosque, bad mosque" (Becker 2017). She shows how the globally pervasive categorisation of *Good Muslim, Bad Muslim* identified by Mahmood Mamdani (2005) interacts with local cultural and political contexts to facilitate or obstruct the positive visibility of different mosques in Germany. The global suspicion towards Muslims in the context of securitisation and the war on terror, this example shows, is a pervasive force that has the potential to significantly structure power-asymmetries among different religious groups in urban contexts. In contrast, notwithstanding the hostile national and international climate, cases such as the East London Mosque demonstrate how an Islamic institution in Western Europe is widely recognised by politicians, secret services and the public as one of the most important social and political actors holding together a plural, multicultural social fabric in an economically deprived neighbourhood.

The complex arrangements of politics, religion, nationality and race that influence the possibilities of being religious in each context, therefore, cannot be understood through *national* models of secularism. Thus, while indebted to Talal Asad's seminal investigations into the workings of secularism, we need to understand secularism through concrete spatio-temporal situations in which "vernacular practices" (Bangstad 2009, 201) form specific ensembles of what could be called *local secularisms*. Thinking through locality with TPSN as discussed above, indicates that 'local' places are only one possible analytical entry point into complex assemblages of state and secularism across a variety of spatial dimensions. Analysing vernacular practices of secularism in conjuncture with a TPSN framework allows us to understand how certain subject positions are produced, ignored and obstructed across various socio-spatial dimensions.

The next section presents a case study of a failed mosque project in south Germany to illustrate the analytical purchase of the conceptual proposals outlined above, particularly interpreting the *state* as social relation and effect, analysing *space* through a multidimensional TPSN approach and reconsidering secularism as problem-space and vernacular practice. I will analyse the multi-dimensional entanglements of state, space and secularism in the Munich Forum for Islam's (MFI) failed attempt to build a large-scale mosque and Islamic centre in Munich. The findings presented in the remainder of this contribution are based on empirical material gathered through eight months of fieldwork (2016-2017), including 73 qualitative, open-ended interviews with municipal administrators, politicians, leaders and members of religious communities, social workers, secret service officials, and organisers of interfaith activities. In addition, I collected documents such as newspaper articles, legal proceedings, policy papers and press releases, as well as conducting participant observation in the daily lives of mosque communities, at interfaith events, and religious festivals.

Multidimensional socio-spatiality and failed place making in Munich

Munich is home to one of the largest Muslim populations in Germany. In contrast to Bavaria, a state that has been governed by the conservative Christian Social Union (CSU) since 1957, its capital Munich has a longstanding social democratic and liberal political tradition. In early 2007, a group of Muslims based at the *Münchner Forum für Islam e. V.* (Munich Forum for Islam, MFI) proposed to construct the first major purpose-built mosque in the city centre, which was enthusiastically endorsed by the city council, Christian and Jewish religious leaders, and other stakeholders.[i] Additional prayer space in the centre of Munich has been a serious concern for Muslims for decades as none of the few mosques in the city centre of Munich are purpose built. They are either *Hinterhofmoscheen* (backyard mosques) or small sections in large office buildings. Due to gentrification and soaring rents, Muslim groups often find it very difficult to afford prayer spaces in proximity to the city centre. The current mosque of the MFI is a modest two-storey corner house hidden in a back alley (see Figure 1) and is frequently filled to overflowing by worshippers, particularly for the Friday *jumu'ah* prayers. Their open Friday Tea gatherings are very popular among young Muslims and non-Muslims that are interested in social, ethical and political questions and that seek company across denominational, ethnic and gender boundaries. Thus, for many politicians in Munich, the MFI was the ideal organisation to create a large representative mosque and Islamic centre, a project they initially called *Zentrum für Islam in Europa – München* (Centre for Islam in Europe – Munich). Convinced by the liberal, multinational and interreligious ethos of the project, which resonated with the city council but not necessarily with the majority of Munich's Muslims, they allocated the project a prime location in the city centre. The iconic mosque and Islamic centre would have included a museum, a library, a coffee shop, a conference centre and one of the first academies for certified practical training of imams in Germany (see Figure 2).

Figure 2: Current mosque of the Munich Forum for Islam (MFI)

Figure 2: Design of the proposed new mosque and Islamic centre of the Munich Forum for Islam

However, by June 2016, the MFI's imam and CEO, Benjamin Idriz, and the chairman of the board of trustees, the former social democratic mayor Christian Ude, declared that the plans for

the new mosque had “failed” since they had not been able to raise the money required by the city council for the purchase of the designated piece of land. This came as a shock to many observers and supporters of the project and was interpreted as a serious setback for the establishment of Muslims in south Germany. However, the official explanation of the project’s failure—the inability to raise the necessary funds—conceals the complex interaction of state actors and Muslim groups across a variety of spatial dimensions and the power-asymmetries that conditioned and obstructed the possibilities of this attempt of to create a multi-ethnic and multi-denominational centre for Islamic worship and learning.

Investigating the causes for the failure through the perspective of the TPSN approach allows us to see how a seemingly local question about the construction of a religious building is entangled across various spatial dimensions. First, the MFI failed to raise the money for what they projected to be a unique *place* of encounter of Islam in Europe and interreligious dialogue through a connection to the *scale* of geopolitics: At various stages of the project, three wealthy individuals from Qatar, the United Arab Emirates and Saudi Arabia respectively had committed to fund the construction of the mosque. They were inspired by the MFI’s vision of an open-minded centre for Islam in Europe that would be based in Munich, a destination very popular among Arab elites from the Gulf countries for its outstanding hospitals and luxury boutiques. Thus, the project emerged through the intersection of a particular imagination of Munich as an ideal *place* of encounter of Islam in Europe, which was facilitated by the donors’ familiarity with the place through the health and tourism related *networks* and their perceived connection to the Munich group through their shared belonging to the imagined community of the *umma*, a concept combining the spatial dimensions of *scale* (spanning the whole globe) and *network* (individuals connected by shared faith and practice). Additionally, as a European from Macedonia in the Balkans, frequently branded as espousing particularly ‘tolerant’ forms of Islam, Imam Idriz’s *positionality* was considered a very suitable qualification to be a bridge

builder between what was conceived of as a coming together of Islam and Europe. The original funding commitment, thus, can only be understood by taking into account the particularity of Munich as a *place* with open-minded reputation, familiar to wealthy elites from the Gulf through visits to treat *bodily* ailments, which established a *networked* connection, the imam's European *positionality* and the *umma* as an imagined community across various *scales* and *networks*.

However, when the project's failure was announced in June 2016, the former mayor of Munich and Imam Idriz claimed that the strain in diplomatic tensions between Germany and Saudi Arabia, an intervention on a *scale* that transcends the *place* and *network* related dynamics discussed above, had caused uncertainties that made the anonymous donor withdraw his support. However, in several interviews, leading members of the MFI and the city administration told me that there was an even more important reason for the Saudi donor to ultimately not send the money. They claimed that the donor had realised that significant parts of the political establishment and the public were suspicious of large donations from abroad aimed at funding mosques in Germany—a suspicion based on a *territorial* construction of outside/inside. Articulating a widespread feeling of racialised fear of foreign and Islamic influence (Özyürek 2015), leading CSU politicians had publicly expressed their disapproval of an anonymous gift from the gulf to fund the new MFI mosque. In a newspaper article they mockingly used racist tropes to discredit the benefactor: "Is this [the donor] the rich uncle from Arabia that nobody knows?" (Rieber 2015). This led the donor to ask the mayor for a clear sign of approval that his involvement in the financing of the mosque was actually welcomed and enjoyed broad political support. As the mayor failed to publicly reiterate his full support, the donor decided to withdraw his commitment. This example shows that the intersection of the four spatial dimensions of the TPSN approach significantly help understanding the socio-spatial processes at work, which undermines the significance of the distinction between local and

global Islam or local and global politics: the *territory* of the nation state boundary as marker for racialised suspicion, the *place* of Munich as medical hub and multicultural metropole, the *scale* of the project bringing together 'Islam' and 'Europe' and being affected by diplomatic strains at a national level, and the affective *networks* of the *umma* as community of believers all contributed to the establishment and withdrawal of the funding commitment.

Local secularism, geographies of suspicion and the spectre of extremism

In addition to the state's role in the withdrawal of the donors, the relations of Muslims and the state in Munich were also significantly shaped by rather unexpected, contentious interactions in a variety of spatial dimensions. The MFI positioned itself in the landscape of Muslims in Munich—a combination of *place* and *network*—as a self-declared multinational, "enlightened" and "reformist" group that is "detached from the countries of origin" (MFI 2014). In this way, they positioned themselves against racialised and Islamophobic geographies that depict Muslims as being truly loyal to powers beyond Western nation states; beyond an imagined *territorial* political community that is considered Judeo-Christian and made up of persons and *bodies* that are predominantly white (cf. Topolski 2018).

While the MFI had previously been hailed as a 'model mosque' by political leaders and civil society in Munich, in July 2007, key personnel of the MFI were charged with being extremist by the secret service, the Bavarian Office for the Protection of the Constitution (*Bayrisches Landesamt für Verfassungsschutz*). They claimed that a close collaborator of Benjamin Idriz had at some point maintained ties to Milli Görüs, a group that was previously collaborating with the German federal government, for example in the German Islam Conference, before it became classified as "legalist extremist" and thus became official object of surveillance (see Müller 2017a; Schiffauer 2008). Secondly, the secret service argued that Idriz was cooperating with Imam Ahmed Khalifa, a Munich imam that had previously been a well-respected

interlocutor of the city administration. Khalifa had recently been charged with maintaining links to the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood. The reason that Idriz had contacted him in the first place was because Khalifa was one of the few people qualified to officially approve Idriz' professional training as an imam, which he needed for his visa as a Macedonian national. While the intervention of the Bavarian secret service was exercised through its *scaled* political authority, it was made possible through the *networked* connection between Idriz and Khalifa that emerged only because of his need to acquire a visa to attain the right to work on German *territory*.

Shortly after they had been charged with being an extremist organisation, the MFI and Idriz were asked to explain themselves at the Bavarian Ministry of the Interior, in the presence of leading figures of the Bavarian secret service. In this meeting they were pressured to distance themselves from other purportedly extremist groups such as Milli Görüs. In a desperate attempt to defend themselves against the accusations, the MFI leadership agreed to the Ministry's ready-made press release, which claimed that Milli Görüs was an extremist organisation. In response, Milli Görüs and other Muslim groups in Munich distanced themselves from the MFI, which contributed to the increasing isolation of the latter. As a result, major Muslim groups, including the influential Turkish umbrella organisations, were reluctant to lend them the symbolic and financial support required for the construction of the new mosque. After years of unsuccessful legal proceedings, all charges against the MFI and Idriz were dropped and the status as object of surveillance was revoked, most likely due to continued pressure from the liberal party, the CSU's coalition partner at the time. The networked perspective on these relational state effects sheds a very different light on the failure of the mosque project. The division among Munich's Muslim groups caused by the intervention of the secret services needs to be accounted for as a key reason for the failure to raise the funds—an interpretation that was widely shared by key employees in the municipal administration and leading MFI personnel.

As scholars of critical geography have pointed out, racialised discrimination does not only manifest through ideology and attitudes. Henry Lefebvre, reverberating the quote at the beginning of the article, argues that ideologies, including religious, nationalist and racist ideologies, "consist primarily in a discourse upon social space" (Lefebvre 1991, 44). This means that embodied and material perspectives help us to understand the ways in which for instance territorial boundaries, surveillance of racially and religiously marked bodies, and criminalisation of select social, religious and economic networks put asymmetrical burdens on already marginalised populations (see Chari 2008).

However, racism alone cannot explain the mechanisms behind the labelling of the MFI as an extremist organisation. The power/knowledge formation through which the two Munich imams were targeted by the secret services is animated by a particular conception of secularism, understood as the problem-space where the boundary between religion and politics is perpetually contested. It is the alleged crossing of this boundary by Milli Görüs and the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt that unleashed the chain of allegations of extremism. This means that at a time when the German Ministers of the Interior repeatedly declare that Islam is not a part of Germany and Muslims are frequently cast as suspect subjects (see Amir-Moazami 2018; Müller 2017b), mutual support among different Muslim groups to establish even the most basic infrastructure such as prayer facilities becomes criminalised. This criminalisation is the effect of interactions among Muslim communities being labelled as 'cooperation with extremist groups', once any part of the multi-scalar network is linked to an organisation that is declared to breach the Bavarian secret service's parochial standard of secularism.

The secret service's intervention was motivated by the systematic suspicion that a group of German Muslims might be extremist because they are not 'secular' enough, either because of alleged links with the Turkish state, or through purported links to political movements that want religion to play a pivotal role in public life (Müller 2017b; Schiffauer 2008). The German secret

service's definition of extremism includes "literal readings of Islamic precepts" and "considering Islam to be *the* ideal universal world order" (Bundesamt für Verfassungsschutz 2013, 10). This shows how secularism needs to be understood as a mode of questioning in which Muslim loyalty to the constitutional order is constantly under scrutiny. This questioning mode of secularism is entangled with border regimes, precarious residency permits and patterns of persecution that run along the lines of support among Muslim communities and permeates the attempts at establishing a major Islamic institution in a profound and complex way.

The failure of the new Munich mosque project demonstrates how in this assemblage of governing urban religiosity state and religion are entangled across various spatial dimensions. Solely focussing on the fact that the municipal administration had approved the construction plans, i.e. that the 'local' state supported the project, or that the 'local' Muslim community failed to raise the necessary funds, would neglect the complex interplay of racialised suspicion, state intervention and the collateral impact on the city's social fabric. The intricate nature of the mechanisms of discrimination, surveillance and marginalisation at work in the MFI case shows that the ways in which secularism, state intervention and exclusion of the cultural and ethnic Other intersect needs to be understood through the interplay of multiple spatial dimensions, in this case particularly territory, network and scale.

The case study shows that translating the racialised suspicion of not being secular enough into securitised surveillance and pushing one Muslim group to denounce another had severely detrimental effects on the placemaking efforts of Muslims in Munich. There existed no direct legal impediment and the project was supported by the city council—its construction was possible when seen in isolation. However, one could argue that the intersection of the various obstructing conditions across multiple socio-spatial dimensions made the realisation of a major mosque project incompossible in the sense of Jones and Jessop (2010, 1121). No single spatial dimension suffices to explain the failure of the mosque project. Only by looking at the

interlocking mechanisms of surveillance and the systemic distrust of Muslims along various social-spatial dimensions on the ground can we account for the incompossibility of the project.

This convergence of obstructing conditions involving multiple layers of government across different socio-spatial dimensions also supports Jessop's (2016) argument that it would be mistaken to understand the state as a vertically ordered, coherent entity or as an agent giving orders, a perspective common in governance scholarship. Instead, the case study shows that the state has multiple unintended effects that are predicated on and influence social relations. The MFI case also shows that using the lens of national models of state-religion relations are utterly insufficient to understand the way in which this constellation of local secularism conditions the life worlds of Muslims. Local secularisms are constituted not only by direct regulation of religion, but also by migratory regimes, racialised suspicion, securitisation of Islam, infrastructural conditions and local economic patterns such as real estate prices that interact to constitute secularism as vernacular practices.

In many ways this elaborates on the analysis of critical geographers of race, that "racialised and *territorialised* security ideology [is] crystallised around the figure of 'the immigrant'" (Saberi 2017, 49, my emphasis). However, the case of the MFI mosque shows that focusing on territory alone misses the multiplicity of socio-spatial interactions through other dimensions such as place, scale, network, positionality and body. Linked to and expressing itself in similar ways to racism, which "articulates spatially and materially, in producing racial geographies that persist past their legitimate expiry dates" (Chari 2008, 1911), the MFI case shows that local secularisms as vernacular practices produce cityscapes that are shaped along the lines of parochial religious, racial and cultural hegemonies that contradict the discursive construction of Munich as liberal, multicultural city and the promise of equal treatment in and by the liberal state. The case study of the failed mosque project, thus, illustrates the needs to combine the TPSN approach's insight on the multiplicity of spatial dimensions with the power-sensitive

analytics of geographies of race and critical studies of secularism to create a more fruitful analytical framework to understand how religion is being governed in the 21st century.

Conclusion

In his study on religion and zoning laws in Quebec, Marian Burchardt develops the notion of "urban religious diversity assemblages" in order to grasp the ontological openness of non-hierarchical, "decentred Latourian networks made of heterogeneous elements" (2019, 385). He cogently argues that we should understand urban spaces as spatial ensembles co-governed by a dynamic regime of bureaucrats, courts, and religious groups. While I agree with his instructive insights about the significance of non-hierarchical networked relationships, I argue that the TPSN approach in conjuncture with critical perspectives on secularism and race allows for a more fine-grained analysis of the interactions of the respective socio-spatial dimensions. As the case study of the Munich Forum for Islam demonstrates, the unitary and legalistic self-narrative of the state obscures some of its most pervasive effects. It conceals the ways in which the strategic terrain that we call the state is shaped in a way that privileges certain groups, primarily those that conform to the hegemonic religious and secular ideologies of the nation, the city or the neighbourhood. The specific understanding of religion that is advanced through the secret service's interpretation of the constitution, in conjuncture with other networked and multi-scalar social relations, the lived spaces of Muslims in Munich were affected in ways that were neither intended nor foreseen. The interplay of local economic pressures, the liberal self-narrative of the city, and the specific interpretations of the Bavarian secret services produce a particular form of vernacular secularism that seriously constrains the role of religion in the public sphere. This effect remains illegible to the state and is unintelligible through a spatially unidimensional understanding of the state and secularism. This demonstrates how European states struggle to pursue liberal values such as religious diversity in face of the fears and

racialised stereotypes of 'foreign' influence from Saudi Arabia, Turkey or Egypt that is deeply rooted among political elites and the general public.

While this contribution has focussed on Islam in Europe, future research should investigate how different local secularisms develop their sinews of power across different territories, places, scales, and networks and for differently marked populations. In order to develop more case-specific frameworks that are sensitive to further stratifications along the lines of race, gender, class and nationality, intersectional theory might be a crucial perspective to complement the conceptual propositions on state, space and secularism advanced in this article. This will allow us to investigate more thoroughly the specific power-geometries that permeate diverse urban environments and the multiple attempts to maintain and challenge the hierarchies they uphold across various dimensions of space.

References

Abrams, P. 1988. "Notes on the difficulty of studying the state." *Journal of Historical Sociology*, 1(1): 58–89. doi: 10.1111/j.1467-6443.1988.tb00004.x.

Agrama, H. A. 2012. *Questioning Secularism: Islam, Sovereignty, and the Rule of Law in Modern Egypt*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Allen, J. 2009. "Three spaces of power: Territory, networks, plus a topological twist in the tale of domination and authority." *Journal of Power*, 2 (2): 197–212. doi: 10.1080/17540290903064267.

Amir-Moazami, S. 2018. “Epistemologien der ‘muslimischen Frage’ in Europa.” In *Der inspizierte Muslim. Zur Politisierung der Islamforschung in Europa*, edited by S. Amir-Moazami, 91–123. Bielefeld: Transcript.

Anidjar, G. 2006. “Secularism.” *Critical Inquiry*, 40, 52–77.

Asad, T. 2003. *Formations of the Secular: Christianity, Islam, Modernity*. Stanford: Stanford University Press.

Astor, A., Griera, M., and Burchardt, M. 2017. “The Politics of Religious Heritage: Framing Claims to Religion as Culture in Spain.” *Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion*, 56: 126–142. doi: 10.1111/jssr.12321.

Bangstad, S. (2009). “Contesting secularism/s. Secularism and Islam in the work of Talal Asad.” *Anthropological Theory*, 9 (2): 188–208. doi: 10.1177/1463499609105477.

Beaumont, J., and C. Baker, eds. 2011. *Postsecular Cities: Space, Theory and Practice*. London: Continuum.

Becci, I., Burchardt, M., and Casanova, J., Eds. 2013. *Topographies of Faith: Religion in Urban Spaces*. Leiden: Brill.

Becci, I., Burchardt, M., and Giorda, M. 2017. “Religious super-diversity and spatial strategies in two European cities.” *Current Sociology*, 65 (1): 73–91. doi: 10.1177/0011392116632030.

Becker, E. 2017. “Good Mosque, Bad Mosque: Boundaries to Belonging in Contemporary Germany.” *Journal of the American Academy of Religion*, 85 (4): 1050–1088.

Bundesamt für Verfassungsschutz. 2013. “Islamismus: Entstehung und Erscheinungsformen.” Accessed 29 February 2020. www.verfassungsschutz.de/download-manager/_broschuere-2013-09-islamismus-entstehung-und-erscheinungsformen.pdf.

Burchardt, M. 2019. “Religion in urban assemblages: space, law and power.” *Religion, State & Society*, *47*(4–5), 374–389. doi: 10.1080/09637494.2019.1652020

Burchardt, M. and Griera, M. 2019 “To see or not to see: explaining intolerance against the ‘Burqa’ in European public space,” *Ethnic and Racial Studies*, 42(5): 726-744. doi: 10.1080/01419870.2018.1448100

Dehanas, D. N., and Pieri, Z. P. 2011. “Olympic Proportions: The Expanding Scalar Politics of the London ‘Olympics Mega-Mosque’ Controversy.” *Sociology*, 45 (5): 798–814. doi: 10.1177/0038038511413415

della Dora, V. 2018. “Infrasecular geographies: Making, unmaking and remaking sacred space.” *Progress in Human Geography*, 42 (1): 44–71. doi: 10.1177/0309132516666190.

Desplat, P., and Schulz, D., Eds. 2012. *Prayer in the City: The Making of Muslim Sacred Places and Urban Life*. Bielefeld: Transcript.

Edmunds, J. 2012. “The ‘new’ barbarians: governmentality, securitization and Islam in Western Europe.” *Contemporary Islam*, 6, 67–84. doi: 10.1007/s11562-011-0159-6

Fadil, N. 2019. “The Anthropology of Islam in Europe: A Double Epistemological Impasse.” *Annual Review of Anthropology*, 48, 117–132. doi: 10.1146/annurev-anthro-102218-011353.

Ferguson, J., and Gupta, A. 2002. “Spatializing States: Toward an Ethnography of Neoliberal Governmentality.” *American Ethnologist*, 29 (4): 981–1002. doi: 10.1525/ae.2002.29.4.981.

Foucault, M. 1986. “Of other spaces.” *Diacritics*, *16*(1), 22–27.

Foucault, M. 2008. *The Birth of Biopolitics. Lectures at the Collège de France 1978-79*. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.

Garbin, D., and Strhan, A., Eds. 2017. *Religion and the Global City*. London: Bloomsbury Academic.

Griera, M., and Nagel, K. 2018. “Interreligious relations and governance of religion in Europe: Introduction.” *Social Compass*, 65 (3): 301–311. doi: 10.1177/0037768618788274.

Habermas, J. 2005. *Zwischen Naturalismus und Religion: philosophische Aufsätze*. Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp.

hooks, b. 2000. *Feminist theory: from margin to center* (2nd ed.). London: Pluto.

Jessop, B. 2016. *The State. Past, Present, Future*. Cambridge: Polity.

Jessop, B., Brenner, N., and Jones, M. 2008. “Theorizing sociospatial relations.” *Environment and Planning D: Society and Space*, *26*, 389–401. doi: doi:10.1068/d9107.

Jones, M., and Jessop, B. 2010. “Thinking State / Space Incompossibly”. *Antipode*, 42 (5): 1119–1149. doi: 10.1111/j.1467-8330.2010.00796.x.

Jouili, J. S. 2015. *Pious Practice and Secular Constraints: Women in the Islamic Revival in Europe*. Stanford: Stanford University Press.

Knott, K. 2005. *The Location of Religion: A Spatial Analysis*. London: Equinox Publishing.

Knott, K., Krech, V., and Meyer, B. 2016. “Iconic Religion in Urban Space.” *Material Religion*, 12 (2): 123–135. doi: 10.1080/17432200.2016.1172759

Lefebvre, H. 1991. *The production of space*. Oxford and Cambridge, MA: Blackwell.

Mamdani, M. 2005. *Good Muslim, Bad Muslim: America, the Cold War, and the Roots of Terror*. London: Three Leaves Press.

Martínez-Ariño, J. 2019. "Governing religious diversity in cities: critical perspectives." *Religion, State and Society*, 47 (4–5): 364–373. doi: 10.1080/09637494.2019.1683404.

Massey, D. 1992. "Politics and Space/Time." *New Left Review*, 196 (November-December), 65–84.

McCann, E., & Ward, K. 2012. "Policy Assemblages, Mobilities and Mutations: Toward a Multidisciplinary Conversation." *Political Studies Review*, 10(3), 325–332. doi: 10.1111/j.1478-9302.2012.00276.x

Meer, N. 2013. "Racialization and religion: race, culture and difference in the study of antisemitism and Islamophobia." *Ethnic and Racial Studies*, 36 (3): 385–398. doi: 10.1080/01419870.2013.734392

MFI. 2014. "What Is MFI?" Münchener Forum für Islam. Accessed 24 January 2019. http://www.islammuenchen.de/what-is-mfi.

Mitchell, T. 1991. "The Limits of the State: Beyond Statist Approaches and Their Critics." *The American Political Science Review*, 85 (1): 77–96. doi: 10.1017/S0003055400271451.

Müller, Tobias (2017a) "Constructing Islam and Secularism in the German Islam Conference", in Paul Anderson and Julian Hargreaves (ed), Muslims in the UK and Europe III, Cambridge: Centre for Islamic Studies, 49-62. Available online: http://www.cis.cam.ac.uk/publications/muslims-in-the-uk-and-europe-iii/.

Müller, Tobias (2017b) “Engaging ‘Moderates’ Against ‘Extremists’ in German Politics on Islam”, in The Review of Faith & International Affairs, 15(2), 55-65.

Müller, Tobias (2019) “Reconsidering the spatiality of religion and the state: Relationality and the mosque not built”, in Religion, State and Society, 47(4-5), 474-490.

Müller, Tobias (2020) “Secularisation theory and its discontents: Recapturing postcolonial and gendered narratives”, in Social Compass, 62(2), 315-322.

Neely, B., & Samura, M. 2011. “Social geographies of race: connecting race and space.” *Ethnic and Racial Studies*, 34(11), 1933–1952. Doi: 10.1080/01419870.2011.559262.

Nyhagen, L. 2019. “Mosques as Gendered Spaces: The Complexity of Women’ s Compliance with, And Resistance to Dominant Gender Norms, And the Importance of Male Allies.” *Religions*, *10*, 321. doi: 10.3390/rel10050321.

Obadia, L. 2015. “Spatial turn, beyond geography: a new Agenda for sciences of religion?” *International Review of Sociology*, 25 (2): 200–217. doi: 10.1080/03906701.2015.1039269.

Özyürek, E. (2015). *Being German, Becoming Muslim. Race, Religion and Conversion in the New Europe*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Peter, F. 2012. “Nation, narration and Islam: Memory and governmentality in Germany.” *Current Sociology*, 60(3), 338–352. doi: 10.1177/0011392111426489

Poulantzas, N. 1978. *State, Power, Socialism*. London: Verso.

Prince, R. 2017. “Local or global policy? Thinking about policy mobility with assemblage and topology.” *AREA*, 49(3), 335–341. doi: 10.1111/area.12319.

Schiffauer, W. 2008. “Suspect Subjects: Muslim Migrants and the Security Agencies in Germany.” In *The Social Life of Anti-Terrorism-Laws*, edited by J. M. Eckert, 55–78. Bielefeld: Transcript.

Schiller, M. 2016. *European Cities, Municipal Organizations and Diversity: The New Politics of Difference*. London: Palgrave Macmillan.

Taylor, C. 2007. *A Secular Age*. Cambridge, MA; London: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press.

Topolski, A. 2018. “Good Jew, bad Jew ... good Muslim, bad Muslim: “managing” Europe’s others.” *Ethnic and Racial Studies*, 41(12), 2179–2196. doi: 10.1080/01419870.2018.1391402

Tse, J. K. H. 2014. “Grounded theologies: ‘Religion’ and the ‘secular’ in human geography.” *Progress in Human Geography*, 38 (2): 201–220. doi: 10.1177/0309132512475105.

Vásquez, M., and Knott, K. 2014. “Three dimensions of religious place making in diaspora.” *Global Networks*, 14 (3): 326–347. doi: https://doi.org/10.1111/glob.12062.

[i] For a detailed account of the failed attempt to construct the new Munich mosque see Müller 2019.