Making Space for Local Voices Local Participation in Natural Resource Management, North-eastern Sakhalin Island, the Russian Far East Emma Wilson Newnham College This dissertation is submitted for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy at the Scott Polar Research Institute, Department of Geography University of Cambridge April 2002 Declaration: I hereby declare that my dissertation entitled, Making Space for Local Voices: Local Participation in Natural Resource Management, is the result of my own work and includes nothing which is the outcome of work done in collaboration. Statement of length: The dissertation does not exceed 80,000 as prescribed by the Department of Geography in the Faculty of Earth Sciences and Geography Emma Wilson 21 April 2002 Abstract This thesis explores the nature of local participation in natural resource management in Noglikskii district, north-eastern Sakhalin. It focuses on multinational oil and gas developments located off the shores of Noglikskii district in the Sea of Okhotsk. The involvement of multinational corporations and development banks in the Sakhalin offshore projects has increased the concern of international NGOs about ecological and social issues. Oil companies and environmentalists alike frame their activities with the discourse of 'sustainable development' and 'participation,' and this has opened up new opportunities for people to influence decision-making processes related to the offshore projects. The thesis assesses these opportunities and local responses to them, considering to what extent the people of Noglikskii district can actually influence development decisions that relate to their future livelihood security. Global ecological battles between NGOs and multinationals, which local people tend not to be involved in, are considered in the context of an analysis of local battles over the resources of the same place. The thesis draws on 10 months' fieldwork experience in Noglikskii district in 1999 and a return visit to Sakhalin in September 2001. It also draws on the researcher's past experience working as an environmentalist in Sakhalin and the Russian Far East (1994-7). Theoretically, it focuses on the concepts of space, voice, human agency, responsibility, and 'everyday life'. To this end, participation literature from Western and Southern geographical regions and literature on post-Socialism and the Russian North are all considered. The results of the research are intended to inform policy and practice and are aimed at various audiences: oil companies, decision-makers, local citizens, environmental organisations, development banks. The thesis aims to demonstrate how an ethnographic study of everyday practice can inform the process of public participation. The conclusions; however, highlight the complexity of incorporating multiple local voices into decision-making processes. In doing so the 'sustainable development' paradigm and the practice of 'participation' are both challenged. iv Acknowledgements My grateful thanks go to: The Economic and Social Research Council (ESRC) for funding my study and my Sakhalin-based fieldwork. 1 Piers Vitebsky, my supervisor, for guidance and support and for creating a stimulating community of social science postgraduates at the Scott Polar Research Institute (SPRI). Frances Pine, my second supervisor, for sound advice and encouragement. Lena Rockhill, Esther Wolff, Lucy Welford and Tanya Argounova, for their valuable comments on the thesis and for advice and moral support throughout. Otto Habeck, Agnieszka Halemba, Ben Seligman, Seona Anderson, Stephanie Irlbacher-Fox, Rane Willerslev, Mark Dwyer, Niobe Thompson, Larry Rockhill, Amber Lincoln, Sandra-Lynne Jones, lndra Nobl-Overland, Paul Fryer, Nikolai Vakhtin, Igor Krupnik and other SPRI students and associates for valuable insights, ideas and assistance. William Mills, Isabella Warren and others at the SPRI library for friendly assistance. The SPRI support staff, who keep the institute running. Visiting scholars at SPRI, especially Gail Fondahl and Julie Cruikshank, for critical advice and encouragement. Bill Adams and the late Graham Smith of the Geography Department for valuable comments on my work. Baskhar Vira, Tim Bayliss­ Smith, Liz Watson, Rie Tsutsumi, Nick Megoran, Simon Cross, Dave Rippin and others at the Geography Department for helping create a friendly and supportive research environment. In particular, Lee Risby for useful references and advice about Bourdieu. The staff and graduate community of Newnham College (principal Onora O'Neill) for their support, particularly Kanchana Ruwanpura and Kristine Vaaler. Ariane McCabe for valuable comments on the thesis and discussions on civil society in Russia. David Anderson and Roger Blench for insightful comments and for sharing their understandings of international development processes. Anna Reid for insights into Sakhalin history and culture. Bruce Rich for interesting thoughts on global issues. Bruce Grant for important Nogliki contacts and useful advice and anecdotes. Mike Br_adshaw, Tsuneo Akaha, Takashi Murakami, Tatyana Roon for valuable help and information exchange on Sakhalin issues. David Koester and Erich Kasten for assistance, advice, and information about Kamchatka. The staff of the American Museum of Natural History for their assistance during my visit. Robert Moiseev, Olga Chemyagina and others at the Kamchatka Institute of Ecology and Natural Resource Management for long-term collaboration, assistance and intellectual guidance. Specialists at the Sakhalin Regional Museum for advice and help over many years. Gennady Borovskoi at the Sakhalin State University Department of Sociology for assistance 1 Also to the B.B. Roberts fund, BP and others who supported the 1998 Project Kamchatka expedition . -- with the survey. Dmitry Lisitsyn, Natalya Barannikova, Sergei Alekseenko, Masha Denisova, and other present and former members of Sakhalin Environment Watch for inspiring work and valuable collaboration over many years. My close informants, whom I have kept anonymous within the text, for their hospitality, generous assistance, inspiration-and fascinating insights into Noglikskii District life. The herders and their families in the Val herding community. The Noglikskii District newspaper Znamia Truda for information and assistance and for being an inspiring institution. Noglikskii District library for help and information. Nogliki officials for their many interviews and all their help. The Sakhalin Association of Indigenous Peoples and other Sakhalin Native representatives, particularly Antonina Nachetkina for support and useful advice on my work. The Sakhalin regional archives for help with finding and copying materials. Tamara Roschina and her family and friends and Lena Lisitsyna and Masha for their generous hospitality over the years. Kristy Hopper and Lera Gussar for hospitality and support. Michael Allen, Sasha Solovyov, Vladimir Zykov and others in Yuzhno-Sakhalinsk for help and advice. Representatives of Sakhalin Energy Investment Corporation and the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development for cooperation and information. Friends and colleagues on Kamchatka: Artur Maiss, Tanya Mikhailov~ and others at the League of Independent Experts; Taisiya Solodiakova, Natalya Sycheva, Liliya Banakanova and others from Esso and Anavgai; Artem Ponomarev, and Gleb Rygorodetskii. Friends and colleagues in Moscow: Lena Surovikina, Vadim Kantor and others at Greenpeace; Anna Sirina, Natalya Novikova, Natasha Cherbokova and others at the Institute of Ethnography; and the teams at Ecojuris and Rodnik. Colleagues at Friends of the Earth-Japan and Pacific Environment, and others who have been a close part of the Sakhalin network, for valuable information and insights and for keeping the network alive. Colleagues at IUCN the World Conservation Union, for advice and assistance over the years. Many thanks also to Jenny Kavanagh and Matt Kibble for generous help and hospitality over many years as I have travelled back and forth from Russia (and from Flitwick). Mum and Dad for supporting me in everything and tolerating my long absences and erratic communication from afar. And to Gavin for his critical eye on my work, for making fantastic maps for the thesis, and for being a wonderful support in many ways. Table of Contents Abstract Acknowledgements Glossary of Terms and Acronyms Maps of Sakhalin Island and Northern Sakhalin 111 iv vii viii 1. Introduction 1 1.1 Summary of Thesis 1 1.2 Physical Geography and Demography 2 1.3 A Brief History of Natural Resource Use and Economic Development 5 2. Theoretical and Conceptual Framework 10 2.1 Summary and Overview 10 2.2 Players, Positions, Perception of Place 12 2.3 Space, Voice and Agency 16 2.4 Deconstructing Interventionist Discourses 24 2.5 The Domain of Everyday Practice 38 2.6 Dialogue as Critical Engagement 42 2. 7 Methodology and Methods 45 3. Sakhalin Offshore Projects: Global Responsibilities 53 3.1 Shell and the EBRD: Policies and Principles 54 3.2 Sakhalin Energy: A Stakeholder Dialogue? 57 3.3 Global Environmentalism: Challenging the Multinationals 65 4. Global and Local Discourses in the Local Arena 79 4.1 Global Activists Visit Northern Sakhalin 79 4.2 The Native Movement: Global Rights and Local Politics 95 5. Oil and Gas: Local Public Consciousness 109 5.1 Oil and Politics in the Local Newspaper 109 5.2 Challenging Power: the Gas-Fired Power Station Protest 120 6. The Nature of 'Vyzhivanie' (Survival Strategies) 134 6.1 Domestic Production: Gathering, Fishing and Garden Plot Cultivation 135 6.2 Fishing on Nyiskii Bay: Moral and Legal Entitlements 153 7. Reindeer Herding and Small-Scale Enterprise 166 7.1 Reindeer Herding: Freedom and Loss in a Human Landscape 167 7.2 Small-Scale Enterprise: Looking to the Future 178 8. Conclusions 189 8.1 Power relations 189 8.2 Voice and Dialogue 197 8.3 Human Agency 206 8.4 Trust and Responsibility 210 Appendix I: Appendix II: Appendix III: Bibliography Background to Sakhalin Offshore Projects The Russian Legal Framework: Environment and Participation Analysis of Survey 219 224 229 302 vii Glossary of Acronyms and Russian Words Acronyms BP British Petroleum DFID Department for International Development (UK) EBRD European Bank for Reconstruction and Development FoEJ Friends of the Earth-Ja pan ISAR International Society for Action and Renewal JEXIM Export-Import Bank of Japan NTFPs Non-timber forest products OPIC Overseas Private Investment Corporation PERC Pacific Environment (formerly Pacific Environment and Resources Centre) PSA Production Sharing Agreement RFE Russian Far East SEIC Sakhalin Enern:v Investment Company Ltd. or Sakhalin Ener2:v SEW Sakhalin Environment Watch SMNG Sakhalinmorneftegas (Sakhalin oil and gas company) TTP Territory of traditional natural resource use USAID US Agency for International Development Russian Words2 bania public steam baths dikorosy non-timber forest products (NTFPs) duma parliament, legislature gospromkhoz state resource enterprise lnternat boarding school iukola dried sliced salmon kolkhoz (pl. kolkhozv) collective farm koopzverpromkhoz state resource enterprise leskhoz forest service oblast' region olenevod reindeer breeder pastukh herder pel'meni small pasta parcels filled with meat or fish raion district rodovoe khoziaistvo clan enterprise sovkhoz state farm taiga boreal forest taimen' tairnen trout varen'ie syrupy jam 2 Here, and throughout the thesis, I use the Library of Congress transliteration system (see web-sites: http://clover.slavic.pitt.edu/-tales/lc.htrnl and http://www.history.uiuc.edu/steinb/translit/translit.htrn). For commonly used words and names (e.g. Yeltsin) I use the popular English spelling. I also use the plain 'e' in place of an 'e' with an umlaut (pronounced 'io'). Russian words in the text (except those in common use in English) are italicised, while Nivkh words, where they appear, are also underlined. - Khabarovsk Region Aleksandrovskii District \ ' - Aleksandrovsk- ' ' Sakhalinskij / Tatar Strait ' ' ' \ \ Tymov7koe ' \ Y, \no-S'li(balin~ .J. r~ Korsakov p . ,. d / ngorvoe C, I? Sea of Okhotsk Sakhalin Island --------- Major rivers ~ Railway --- District boundaries Ferry route A Approximate location of oil platform 'Molikpaq' 30 60 90 120 11°km I I I I I Northern Sakhalin --- - - 20 40 I I Rivers Marshland Tatar Strait 1. Introduction 1.1 Summary of thesis This thesis is principally concerned with the issue of local participation in natural resource management, focusing on the case study of Noglikskii District, north-eastern Sakhalin Island, the Russian Far East (see maps). The context of the study is the multinational oil and gas developments, taking place off the shores of the district in the Sea of Okhotsk. The involvement of multinational corporations and international development banks in the Sakhalin projects has triggered the concern of international environmental and human rights NGOs about ecological and social issues. New opportunities, framed by the liberal discourses of 'sustainability' and 'democracy', are opening up for local people to participate in decision-making processes related to the offshore projects. This thesis aims to assess these opportunities and local responses to them, considering to what extent local people can actually influence development decisions made by the state and multinational corporations which may have a direct impact on their lives. Theoretically, I focus on the concepts of space, voice, dialogue, human agency, responsibility and 'everyday life'. My main body of field research for this Ph.D. took place in 1999 when I spent ten months living in Nogliki, the administrative capital of Noglikskii District. I also draw on my experience of long-term residenc)' in the Russian Far East between 1994 and 1996 when I was _working as an environmentalist for Friends of the Earth-Japan (FoEJ). During this time I helped to establish the NGO Sakhalin Environment Watch, which features in the thesis. I also made shorter (three-week) visits to Sakhalin in 1997 and 2001 together with IUCN The World Conservation Union. The thesis has also benefited from research conducted in Kamchatka Region between 1996 and the present day, particularly a three-month expedition in summer 1998. As an interventionist myself, I critically examine the role of foreign environmentalists, oil companies and researchers in local development, and the influence of 'Western agendas' . 2 In this chapter I present the geographical background to the study and a brief history of natural resource use and economic development in Noglikskii District. Chapter 2 outlines my theoretical and conceptual framework and methodology. Chapters 3 to 7 comprise the ethnography, which forms the bulk of the thesis. I illustrate a number of ways in which interventionists and global discourses are influencing opportunities for local participation in decision-making. I analyse the policies and principles of Shell and the EBRD, who are major players in the Sakhalin offshore projects, and the public relations programme of the Western oil consortium 'Sakhalin Energy' (Chapter 3). I consider the ways in which global discourses are entering local society through environmental and Native rights movements (Chapter 4). In Chapter 5, I analyse the ways in which the offshore projects are brought to local consciousness in the local press, and focus on a public protest against construction of a gas fired power station paid for by Bonus payments from the projects. I also analyse human agency in the context of various forms of natural resource use: domestic production (garden plot cultivation, wild plant gathering, etc), fishing, reindeer herding and small-scale enterprise (Chapters 6 and 7). The results of the research are intended to inform policy and practice and are aimed at various audiences: oil companies, decision-makers, local citizens, environmental organisations, development banks. My aim is to demonstrate how an ethnographic study of everyday practice can inform the process of public participation. My conclusions, however, highlight the complexity of incorporating multiple local voices into decision-making processes, and challenge the 'sustainable development' paradigm and the practice of 'participation'. 1.2 Physical geography and demography Sakhalin Island (76,400 sq. km.)1 is Russia's largest island and is shaped like an elongated fish. 2 It lies in the Russian Far East (RFE), to the east of mainland Khabarovsk Region, 10,400 km (and 7 time zones) east of Moscow, 1000 km north of Vladivostok and only 40 km north of Japan. Sakhalin is washed by the Tatar Strait to the west, the Sea of Okhotsk to the north and east, and the Sea of Japan to the south- 1 See Map 1: Sakhalin Island. 2 It is 948 km long, 160 km at its widest point and 26 km at its narrowest. west. Sakhalin Region (Sakhalinskaia Oblast'/ also includes the Kuril Island archipelago, which stretches from north-eastern Hokkaido (northern Japan) to the southern tip of Kamchatka Peninsula. Noglikskii District lies in the north-east,4 its coastline facing out into the cold Sea of Okhotsk, where the Sakhalin offshore oil and gas projects are located.5 Sakhalin's maritime climate is milder (-30C to 15C)6 and wetter than the mainland. Autumn has typhoons and hurricane-force winds; snow is heavy from November to March. 7 Ice covers the sea for 6 months of the year in the north, reaching a thickness of l.5-2m with pack ice and ice sheers. Noglikskii District has a mild coastal climate, with plenty of snow and sunny winter days. The Tym' River, one of Sakhalin's two major rivers, 8 flows through Nogliki and into the Okhotsk Sea via Nyiskii Bay.9 Forests cover about two thirds of Sakhalin, with spruce and fir dominating in the south and larch in the north. Noglikskii District forests have suffered greatly due to forest fires, particularly in 1989 and 1998. Three-quarters of Sakhalin is mountainous. The mountains in the west of Noglikskii District give way in the east to pastureland. These have traditionally been used for reindeer herding, but over the past 70 years the gradual encroachment of the onshore oil industry has destroyed up to 90% of the coastal pastures (Roon 1999).10 Sakhalin's north-eastern coast is laced by a string of shallow lagoons with rich wetlands that have attracted the attention of international conservationists due to their importance for birdlife (Newell and Wilson 1996). 11 Local residents also use these areas for recreational and subsistence hunting, fishing and gathering.12 The coastal waters around Noglikskii District are the summer mating grounds for the ei:idangered western Pacific grey whale which is a symbol of environmental campaigns against the multinational offshore oil projects. 13 3 Oblast = administrative region. I use the translation 'region ' in the thesis. 4 See shaded area on Map I. 5 The Sakhalin-2 project field lies 16km from the shore (see Map 1). 6 Central Sakhalin temperatures range between -40C and 38C. 7 Maximum snowfall is 0.5m in the north and lm in the east. 8 Sakhalin has more than 65,000 rivers, most of which are rich spawning grounds. 9 Nyiskii Bay features in Chapter 6. 10 Reindeer herding features in Chapter 7. II S . eemap 2. 12 See Chapter 6 and Appendix III: Analysis of Survey. 13 See Chapter 3. . 4 In 2000 the population of Sakhalin Region totalled about 670,000, 14 including Russians (87.7%), Ukrainians (6.5%), Koreans (4.9%), and the indigenous Nivkhi (0.3%)15 and Orochony (Uil'ta, Oroki) (0.04%).16 More than 85 percent of the region's population lives in 19 towns. Yuzhno-Sakhalinsk (pop. 180,000) is the regional capital. Sakhalin Region has 17 administrative districts (raiony) including Noglikskii District (pop. 14,600), with Nogliki (pop 12,300) as the district administrative centre. Noglikskii District has 1086 indigenous residents (7.4% ): most Nivkhi now live in Nogliki while most Orochony and Evenki in rural settlements such as Val. 17 While Sakhalin Region as a whole has been experiencing a net loss of population, the population of Noglikskii District has remained stable over recent 18 years. Very little socio-economic or ethnographic research has been done about the semi­ urban mixed populations of northern Sakhalin, though much has been written about the island's Native peoples and Native culture (Taksami 1967, 1989; Sangi 1985, 1990; Yeremin 1988; Kwon 1993; Grant 1995; Roon 1996). Useful research has been done on the attitudes of residents of Yuzhno-Sakhalinsk to the ojl and gas developments (Akaha and Vassilieva 2000, 2001; Vassilieva 2000)19 and socio­ economic research has been completed for oil companies (e.g. Vysokov et al 1999). 14 From Sabirova and Allen (2000) Summer 2000 Update On Sakhalin Oil and Gas Projects (available on web-site: http://www.bisnis.doc.gov/bisnis/country/fareast.cfm). As of January 2001, the population of Sakhalin Region was just over 590,000, a decline of nearly 20 percent from 1999. 15 This is a total Sakhalin population of about 2010 Nivkhi, confirmed by 1989 census figures (http://www.nupi.no/cgi-win/Russland/etnisk_b.exe?Nivkhi). Census figures from 1989 give a population of 4673 Nivkhi living in Sakhalin and Khabarovsk regions (Moiseev 1999). 16 From forthcoming publication: Newell, J. (2002) The Russian Far East, FoE-Japan and NRDC (title as yet unconfirmed). 17 According to 1998 statistics, 218 native residents were living in rural village. These included 119 Orochi (Orochony), 69 Evenki , 24 Nivkhi, 5 Nanaitsy and one Negidalets (Goskomstat 1998). According to 1999 statistics there were 205 native residents in rural villages (Goskomstat 1999). I have been unable to find a breakdown by ethnic group for indigenous residents in Nogliki, but from newspaper sources and by extrapolating from available statistics we can estimate the Nogliki Nivkh population to be about 800-850. Very few Evenki and Orochony live in Nogliki . . 18 From Goskomstat (1998) and the web-site: http://www.sakhalin.ru 19 I use this work as a comparison for my own survey results, see Appendix III - Analysis of Survey. 1.3 A Brief History of Natural Resource Use and Economic Development Up to the late-19th century, the landscape and natural resources of northern Sakhalin were shared largely by the indigenous inhabitants, the Nivkhi (Gilyak), Even.Id (Tungus), and Orochony (Uil'ta, Oroki). The Nivkhi held fishing, hunting and gathering grounds in clan ownership (Vysokov 1995; Shternberg 1999) but the resource base was also shared by the nomadic Evenki and Orochony who started to arrive on Sakhalin from the mainland in the 16th and 1 ih centuries (Vysokov 1995; Roon 1996). The ethnographer Shternberg, exiled on Sakhalin between 1889 and 1897, observed: The idea of property rights with respect to territory is absent among the Gil yak. Fifty years ago nomadic Tungus appeared in Sakhalin and began to hunt on traditional Gilyak territories. Yet it never occurred to the Gilyak to protest against the invasion, although the Tungus appeared in small groups and could hardly have defended themselves had force been used. 5 (Shternberg 1999: 172) The Nivkhi (Gilyak) fished, hunted (for forest and marine mammals) and gathered berries and wild plants, using dog-sleds for transport and migrating seasonally between their summer homes on the coast and their winter homes in the forest or tundra.20 The Evenki were reindeer herders and hunted with dogs. The Orochony fished, hunted marine mammals and gathered wild plants. They were also nomadic and kept herds of reindeer primarily for transportation (Vysokov, 1995; Roon, 1996). There were Ainu living mainly in southern Sakhalin. The indigenous groups traded with each other and with mainland indigenous groups, Manchurians and Japanese (Vysokov 1995, Grant 1995). In the late 18th century, Japanese traders set up summer fishing camps in southern Sakhalin and Russian explorers began to negotiate with the Japanese over control of Sakhalin and the Kuril Islands. The 1855 Treaty of Shimoda gave both countries joint sovereignty over Sakhalin. In the mid-19th century, Russians began ~xploring Sakhalin's mineral resources. In the 1860s, Japan and Russia came into conflict over fishing grounds in northern Sakhalin, forcing the Nivkhi to define their own rights to · 2° Chapter 6 looks at present day Nivkh summer migration and coastal fishing camps. - the contested resources (Grant 1999). When Russia established total sovereignty over Sakhalin in 1875, there were plans to develop Sakhalin's resource potential - fish, coal, timber and iron-ore - using convict labour, but from the 1880s Sakhalin simply became Russia's most notorious penal colony (Chekhov 1987). In the 1890s commercial fishing artels were set up by 'incomer' Russian business magnates, notably Grigory Zotov, who also discovered Sakhalin's first oil reserves in 1904, attracting capital from England, America, Germany and China (Stephan 1971). After the Russo-Japanese war of 1904-5, Japan gained the southern half of Sakhalin, while Russia launched back into the industrial development of the north, abolishing the convict system. However, in 1920, Japan invaded northern Sakhalin and intensively exploited the oil reserves of the north-east until Sakhalin was returned to Russia in 1925 under the Soviet government. Between 1925 and 1944, Japan retained concessions to exploit oil in the north-east and coal in the west of Sakhalin. From 1925, Soviet planners encouraged workers from the western USSR to migrate to Sakhalin in order to develop agriculture, fishing, timber and mineral resource exploitation. They overtook the Japanese in oil production, and the reserves became vital to the Soviet government, being at the time the only known reserves in eastern Siberia (Stephan 1971). From the 1930s, the Soviet government imposed collectivisation, attempting to settle the Native people with sedentary agriculture, reindeer farming and collective fishing enterprises. The politics of village amalgamation (ukrupnenie) and sedentarisation (osedanie) followed from the 1950s- 60s. The Native residents were progressively marginalised from their pastures, hunting territories and fishing grounds and their systems of customary law were broken (Roon 19~9). Hundreds of native villages were closed and their inhabitants gathered into larger settlements. The northern Sakhalin coastline is scattered with deserted Native villages, like the entire Native north of Russia. In the 1950s and 1960s the Soviet government encouraged more and more settlers from European Russia to move to Sakhalin to work in scientific, industrial and administrative jobs and geological prospecting. Settlements grew up around a single state-run industry (timber, coal, oil) that also provided social infrastructure (housing, 7 electricity, heating, public baths [bania], shops, waste disposal), 21 creating a total state dependence. The state also guaranteed markets and subsidised transportation for these enterprises. Native children were placed in the total care of the state boarding school (lntemat) and traditional Native economic activities were reorientated, becoming entirely dependent on state support. In the settlements, the Native populations began gradually to become assimilated into the incomer populations. The 'post-socialist' era has been characterised by the withdrawal of state support for traditional resource use (reindeer herding, fishing) and the collapse of the timber, coal and other state industries on Sakhalin, together with the social infrastructure they had previously supported. Sakhalin has had to consider how to restructure the regional economy. Until the late 1990s, fishing and fish processing were the main source of budget income and the main employer in the Sakhalin Region. The Kuril Basin and Sea of Okhotsk are some of the richest fisheries in the world, providing more than 60% of Russia's total fish harvest. Much of the fish is exported to the US, Japan and Korea. Historically, fisheries around Sakhalin Island have been heavily exploited for more than a hundred years and over-fishing continues to be a major source of fisheries degradation. The Russian government has expressed concern about the number of foreign fishing vessels depleting the fish stocks of the Okhotsk Sea, while the Russian Far Eastern marine industry wants foreign vessels banned. Noglikskii District is suffering due to decreases in fishing quotas allocated to their. district, a situation they feel is unfair as it is brought about by outsiders. The limited fish quotas have exacerbated tensions in the district between the Native people (who benefit from priority fish quotas) and the non-Native people who believe they have an equal right to this local resou_rce. 22 Today, the oil industry is taking over from the fishing industry as number one in the region. The budgets of northern districts (Noglikskii and Okhinskii) are almost entirely dependent on revenues from the local oil company Rosneft' - Sakhalinmorneftegas (SMNG), particularly in view of the collapse of other former state industries (especially the timber industry). SMNG provides a large number of local jobs and also sponsors the district football team and supports charitable 21 This was what Humphrey ( 1995) and others have termed a 'total social institution' . 22 These issues are discussed in Chapter 4 and 6. 8 programmes. The majority of local political leaders are closely linked to the oil industry in some way.23 With the decline in onshore reserves, however, hopes are now pinned on the oil and gas reserves of the Okhotsk Sea shelf, which are currently being exploited by multinationals such as Shell, ExxonMobil and Mitsubishi. 24 The first oil from these reserves was produced in 1999. In that year, Sakhalin was second only to Moscow for foreign investment. The regional government believes Sakhalin will gain significant profits from the offshore projects, and politically they are very important to the Sakhalin governor.25 However, critics have doubts about the benefits that Sakhalin and its districts will gain from the projects. A report by the Russian Federation Auditing Chamber in 2000 questioned the economics of the projects.26 In December 2000, Sakhalin scientists issued an appeal to the government, expressing deep concern about the Western ownership of the projects and the lack of expected benefits to the Sakhalin region. 27 Critics claim the Production Sharing Agreements (PSAs) were negotiated on beneficial terms for the oil companies but without safeguards to guarantee local benefits.28 Provision of gas to settlements across Sakhalin was part of the original tender agreements. Residents are hoping that an increase in local gas provision will make up for delays in coal deliveries, which contributed to Sakhalin ' s recent fuel crises. Nogliki's gas fired power station has been constructed partly as a solution to this problem, though the project has caused controversy both in the district and region-wide.29 However, it is likely that most of Sakhalin's natural gas will be exported to Pacific Rim markets that can more easily afford world prices and little will be made available to local populations. There are plans to construct a pipeline down the centre of Sakhalin for oil and gas transportation. The Japanese are also interested in constructing a gas pipeline between Sakhalin and Japan, which will enable them to develop alternative energy systems based on natural gas. 23 See Chapter 5. 24 See Appendix I for more details about the offshore projects. 25 See Chapters 3 and 4. 26 See Appendix II: The Russian Legal Framework: Environment and Participation. 27 'Appeal' by the Scientific Council of the Sakhalin Institute of Sea Geology and Geophysics to President Putin and others. Copy of translation received by email on 02.04.01. 28 The Production Sharing Agreements are discussed in some more detail in Appendix II. 29 The public campaigns against this power station feature in Chapter 5. 9 However, local residents of Noglikskii District feel that they are not benefiting noticeably from the offshore projects. 30 While prospects increase for Pacific Rim oil and gas markets and the multinationals, Sakhalin Region and its districts are faced with the withdrawal of federal subsidies and·privileges for northern regions and the shifting of federal financial responsibilities onto regional and district authorities. Districts have freed the multinationals from their local tax obligations, according to the Production Sharing Agreements.31 In response to local economic crisis and disillusionment with the state's ability to provide, residents are becoming increasingly dependent on themselves, on the resources of their natural environment, their garden plots, their social networks and their personal resources of ingenuity and humour . . 30 Newspaper articles discussed in Chapter 4 and questionnaire responses (Appendix III) reflect this. 31 See Appendix II: The Russian Legal Framework. 10 2. Theoretical and Conceptual Framework 2.1 Summary and Overview In this thesis I analyse the nature of public participation in natural resource management in Noglikskii District. Participation can refer to 'participatory development' (Chambers 1983, 1993, 1997; Nelson and Wright 1995; Cooke and Kothari 2001), political life and democratic society (Held 1987; Fishkin 1995) and public involvement in nature conservation, natural resource management or environmental aspects of industrial projects (Steelman and Ascher 1997; Goodwin 1998, IUCN 2000; Karpov and Afinogenov 2000; Wolff 2001). In this thesis, I am primarily concerned with the latter category, but I see all categories as inter-related. As I have mentioned, the main focus of the study is on the multinational oil projects taking place off the shores of this district. I also consider a range of official and unofficial levels of local involvement in resource management and use: household decision-making, enterprise development, public consultations, legal regulation (and manipulation), local and global public activism. 'Public participation' was part of the Soviet ideology (Churchward 1983) and under the Soviet regime, there were spaces for dissenting voices, subversive actions and informal organisations (Yanitsky 1993; Davies 1997). 1 However, public involvement in decision-making and policy development was confined to expert groups (Skilling and Griffiths 1971; Glushenkova 1999). For local people to take up new opportunities for participation today may thus require social, cultural and psychological change. I therefore analyse local responses to new opportunities for participation in the context of an ethnographic study of everyday practice. My fundamental question is thus: What can we learn about local participation in natural resource management through an ethnographic study of everyday practice? 1 I expand more on this in Section 2.4. 11 The thesis title, 'Making space for local voices' refers to the creation of opportunities for local participation in decision-making. These are social spaces for negotiation and politics, 2 for people to make their voices heard; ideally they are spaces for dialogue. The term voice refers to the representation of local interests (i.e. 'having a voice in decision-making'). Rather than being a call to 'make space for local voices' the title of my thesis implies a critique of existing spaces. I consider how spaces of opportunity are being opened up for citizens of Noglikskii District, who is opening them up and how they are framed. I analyse the nature of negotiation and politics within these spaces and consider to what extent they provide opportunities for dialogue3 between local people and decision-makers. ' [E]ffective citizen participation in decision-making' is a key element of the 'sustainable development' paradigm (WCED 1987: 65). Sustainable development embraces a broad range of values: biodiversity preservation, protection of livelihoods, the 'greening' of industry, energy conservation. The discourse of sustainability and participation has also been adopted by industry. My thesis highlights the need for a critical consideration of the relationship between support for sustainable development principles and the integration of these into practice at the local level in the context of a major industrial project. If sustainable development is defined as 'development that meets the needs of the present without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs' (WCED 1987: 43), then how are the local needs of Noglikskii District citizens being met by the Sakhalin projects? Are the needs and capabilities of future generations of Noglikskii District citizens being guaranteed or compromised by the oil developments? Two major dynamics of change are providing opportunities for local participation in natural resource management in Russia today. First is the· 'democratic revolution' that was set off by Gorbachev' s reforms in the late 1980s and has been assisted by Western NGOs and foundations. The other is the 'economic transition '4 which, together with the forces of globalisation, has led Russia to open her doors to foreign 2 I take the word politics to embrace public action, power relations, negotiation and social change. 3 I explore the term dialogue in more detail in Section 2.6 and Chapter 8. 4 The term 'transition' is seen as being problematic, see Section 2.5. 12 investment in natural resource development. These two forces are closely linked. The first has led to an increase in opportunities for Russian people to have a role in decision-making, though in practice old hierarchies and expectations remain and actual change is slow. 'Democratisation', Western funding and the Internet have also Jed to the expansion of NGO networks across Russia and to the incorporation of Russian NGOs into international networks. Foreign companies have introduced principles of public participation into industrial projects in Russia. The involvement of foreign companies, especially multinationals, in natural resource exploitation has also catalysed transnational NGO collaboration on environmental issues and increased international concern for public participation in Russia. Once a little known Soviet resource periphery, Sakhalin now emerges as another site of the global battle between environmentalists and multinationals over the future of the planet's resources. 2.2 Players, Positions, Perceptions of Place The diverse players in my thesis include: local citizens; government officials; publicly elected and non-elected representatives; NGOs; environmental activists; development banks; oil companies; and their employees. These players occupy various positions in multiple and overlapping/ields (Bourdieu 1977) such as environmentalism, domestic production, politics, Native rights. In the past decade, the offshore oil and gas developments have opened up new fields of action and catalysed new interactions and struggles. Global battles are played out over globally significant resources. I consider the role of local citizens in these global battles and the discourses that frame them. I also compare these to the localised battles that are being played out over the management of the same resources. 5 The thesis focuses on a specific place at a specific moment in history (Noglikskii District at the tum of the millennium). Players have different perceptions of that place, depending on their position within a landscape or field, or time factors, such as length of stay and past history. According to Casey, 'the crux in matters of place is the role of perception' (1996: 17). Space, time, place and perception are important factors influencing people's actions and interactions. Casey also claims: 'There is no 5 See in particular Chapters 5 and 6. 13 knowing or sensing a place except by being in that place and to be in a place is to be in a position to perceive it' (ibid: 18). There is much to be said for living in a place and experiencing it from within, and this is the value of long-term fieldwork. However, I would argue against Casey here: many of the players in this thesis do not live in Noglikskii District and some have never set foot there, though all have clear perceptions of what the place means to them and act accordingly. In the ethnography, I aim to unravel the tangled webs of positions and interrelated fields in order to understand power relations, insider-outsider interactions and how these influence human agency. Participatory approaches to development often work on the assumption that there is a homogenous 'community' with common interests in a particular location, and overlook the possibility of internal conflict, uneven access to opportunities and deliberate non-participation (Cleaver 2001). It is impossible to talk of a local 'community' in Nogliki or other Noglikskii District settlements, except in terms of a population living in a specific location. The mixed populations6 of Noglikskii District are diverse, with different occupations, aspirations and visions of the future. My experience would suggest that local citizens are primarily concerned with the satisfaction of basic socio-economic needs, but there are countless ways of defining these and determining how they should be satisfied. The multitude of local voices makes it difficult to pin down local priorities through public consultation. I attempt to address this problem in the conclusions. Most local citizens live permanently in Noglikskii District and plan to stay; the place contains not only their past and present but also their future. They engage in a broad range of economic activities; some have a close relationship with the land, but most are based in the rural or semi-urban settlements (Nogliki, Val and others). Only a few local workers have jobs with the offshore projects, many more are employed in the (long-established) onshore oil industry. Local people are also employed in administrative jobs, teaching, the health and social sectors, trade, forestry, fishing. In 6 Throughout the thesis lmake the distinction between Native and non-Native populations. Native people make up 7% of the total population of Noglikskii District and include Nivkhi, Orochony (Uil 'ta, Oroki), Evenki, Nanaitsy and one Negidalets (Goskomstat 1998). The non-Native population is mostly made up of Russians, Ukrainians, Belorussians, Koreans and Tatars. My survey respondents also included two Chuvash, one Ossetian and one Mordvin. their leisure time they may travel to the forest or to the coast, but (especially in Nogliki) many spend weekends at their dachas 7 on the outskirts of town. 14 Despite the small percentage of Native residents (7%) and the mixed nature of local populations, Native issues are a source of social tension locally. This tension has heightened since the start of the offshore projects, which threaten traditional livelihood activities, but have also catalysed the revival of Native organisations and the involvement of Native representatives in decision-making. Native groups have adopted the global discourse of Native rights, land claims and compensation. However, Native representation can be problematic and I explore this in the ethnography. The 'Native community' is evoked when the Association of Indigenous Peoples8 is called upon to represent local Native interests or opinions. A conceptual collectivity is likewise evoked when people speak of the 'narod' as the mass of ordinary people not adequately represented by the Association or by some other representative. In reality, the Native population is as heterogeneous as any other. The Russian adjective for Native is 'korennoi' from the word 'koren" or 'root'. Most Native residents (korennye) view northern Sakhalin as their historical land; though the the discourse of colonisation and territoriality may be used by some for political purposes.9 The second and third generation non-Native 'incomers' (priezzhie) also have a strong sense of 'rootedness' on Sakhalin, and some refer to themselves also as 'Native '. Much of the 'Native debate' relates to land and natural resources and the notion of belonging to the local place. Russians also engage in fishing, hunting and gathering and challenge Native claims to priority access to resources. 10 Schoolteachers perceive the land differently from reindeer herders, but their concern 7 The word dacha is sometimes translated into English as 'country house'. This does not convey the full range of meaning. In Noglikskii District, most dachas are small, one or two storey wooden houses, often built by the owners and, most importantly, surrounded by a plot of land that is generally used for growing vegetables. People even refer to their plot of land as a dacha even they have no hut. The Nogliki dachas are located on the outskirts of the town, a car or bus ride away for most people. In the dacha season (spring, summer, harvest-time) people spend most weekends tending their garden plot. 8 In general, I translate 'korennoi' into English as 'Native'. However, the official translation of the Russian Native people's association is the Russian Association of Indigenous Peoples of the North (RAIPON). I therefore use the word 'indigenous' when referring to branches of the Association. 9 For example, in a Vladivostok News article from 1998, Vladimir Sangi claimed that Sakhalin's lands belong to the Nivkhi and that the colonisers, Russia and Japan should pay millions of dollars in compensation. He also demanded payments from the oil companies carrying out the offshore projects: (http://vlad.tribnet.com/l 998/iss 17 4/text/sakh l .htrnl) ( checked 14.04.02) 10 See Chapter 6. 15 for the environment may be equally passionate. 11 However, Native ancestral history is embedded in the local landscape and some still remember village life before resettlement. Living memory, a historical sense of place and unresolved moral debts towards the Native populations constitute important elements that are frequently overlooked in local debates on Native rights and identity. Some (mostly non-Native) people may view themselves as temporary residents. Some may have transferrable skills (e.g. oil industry workers) and can get jobs elsewhere. Others may desperately want to leave and yet feel trapped owing to a lack of money and opportunities. A sense of transitoriness or rootlessness may lead to a lack of care for the future of the environment. Some residents may also feel that local development is worth some sacrifice of the environment if it means jobs, electricity, social infrastructure and education for their children. In this thesis, I focus on potential (Native and non-Native) 'agents of change' - the cultural elites, Native and environmental activists, small-scale entrepreneurs, independent 'public activists' (obschestvennye deiateli). I also focus on certain 'charismatic minorities' (Native fishers and reindeer herders) who may feel as though they have little potential to influence decision-making. In the eyes of 'interventionists', however, these minorities may have symbolic value due to their 'Nativeness' and the location of their livelihood activities, close to the sites of the offshore projects. I support these with the results of a survey12 and analysis of the local newspaper, which provide more insights into the lives of the general population. By 'interventionists' I mean multinational oil corporations, international environmental NGOs, foreign researchers and other outside agents who interact with or have some influence upon local people and society. My own involvement in the Russian Far East has been as an environmentalist and latterly as a researcher. One aim of the thesis is to provide a critical analysis of how interventions affect people at the local level. I am wary of setting up oppositions (interventionist-local, insider-outsider) (Mohan 2001), though they are useful when considering interactions and local access II · . See Chapter 5. 12 See section 2.7 and Appendix III for analysis of my survey results. 16 to 'interventionist' discourses. I also explore the gradations of insider, outsider, local and global. In my view, 'interventionists' can be individuals as well as corporations and NGOs. Individuals have their own perceptions of Noglikskii District as a place, their position in that place and their own responsibility for it. An oil company employee may see Sakhalin as a lucrative job, an engineering challenge, a public participation process with Native content, depending on the company and their role within it. Global environmentalists may see Sakhalin as an 'oil frontier,' or a 'pristine' environment at risk; increasingly they are also concerned also with local populations. Environmentalists tend not to live long-term in northern districts of Sakhalin, though they often visit. Russians and Americans who work on the Molikpaq platform13 tend to live in Yuzhno-Sakhalinsk and stay in a camp in Nogliki before and after shifts. Foreign oil workers and ethnographers may live for long periods of time on Sakhalin, though the former tend to live in separate ex-pat communities in Yuzhno-Sakhalinsk, while the latter try to imagine they are part of the local community for that time and tend to live further north (often because this is where the Native populations live). Oil workers and ethnographers can leave the area, most will have families and homes in other countries and this affects not only their own perceptions of the place, but also local people's perceptions of them. However, living in a place for any length of time means that it begins to hold at least part of your own history. Similarly we become part of local people's history (Vitebsky 2000). 2.3 Space, Voice and Agency My main conceptual usage of the term 'space' refers to social and political spaces of opportunity for local people to take part in decision-making. I begin my discussion on space by clarifying certain spatial terms (local, global, etc.) that are used in both concrete and abstract senses. I do not ignore the significance of physical space (use of landscape, resettlement, migration) but consider it as a historical or geographical factor influencing action. As noted above, more important than the physical landscape itself are perception of that landscape and a sense of place within the landscape. 13 The Sakhalin-2 project offshore platform. ,------------------- 17 The term local refers here to Noglikskii District (or other districts or villages). NGOs based in Yuzhno-Sakhalinsk are not local in the context of this study, although in other contexts they may be seen as such (i.e. 'local' to Sakhalin Island). Geopolitically speaking, the regional level is Sakhalin Region ( Oblast). 14 Regional level decision makers are based in Yuzhno-Sakhalinsk. NGOs also tend to be based in the regional capital; some are seen to represent the whole region. The national level is the Russian Federation, the federal government and Moscow-based (national) organisations. The international level includes national governments and international organisations. 15 The global level signifies groups, networks and interest communities which span the globe; transnational economic forces; and issues that are considered to have significance for the whole world. Globalisation can be seen to have a dual character. On the one hand it causes a de­ localisation of economic activities, which environmentalists equate with increased environmental damage, as decision-makers are distanced from those affected by their decisions (Retallack 2001). On the other hand, globalisation has given rise to global networks of activists and NGOs who attempt to make business more accountable to local communities (Rich 1994). In the thesis I consider how these global networks of responsibility relate to local people. The term 'space' is used widely in popular language to represent not empty spaces, but spaces that allow for action, political or social arenas where people have the freedom (and choice) to take part in changing society ('having a voice'). 'Free Spaces' for Evans and Boyte are 'the arenas in which active citizenship is nourished and given meaning' (1986: 182). These include voluntary associations and communal groups (family, religious congregations, neighbourhoods); early feminist discussion groups; and the 'free pulpit' of the black church in America's Deep South in the early civil rights days (ibid: vii). Goldman notes that an (indirect) result of the World Bank's efforts to 'green' its image are new 'political spaces' for environmentalists to develop opposition strategies (2001: 209). In his article 'New Democratic Spaces at 14 The term 'regional' could also refer to the Russian Far Eastern region. Where this is the case it is explicitly stated. IJN,Wllllff L,.AAAY ~A'fllAIDQI 18 the Grassroots? Popular Participation in Latin American Local Governments' , Schonwalder asks 'to what extent decentralization policies can create or even widen openings for greater political participation of the popular sectors at the local level'(1994: 756). For the Former Soviet Union, Welsh and Tickle note how, after the collapse of the Soviet system, 'environmentalism represented one of the few free spaces within which any form of organisation outside the state existed'(l998: 12). Though the term 'space ' is often used in this abstract sense, and though social space has been theorised extensively (Lefebvre 1976; Soja 1980; Gregory and Urry 1985; Schatzki 1991; Harvey 1973, 1996; Crang and Thrift 2000), theorists rarely discuss the nature and functioning of these kinds of metaphorical spaces. I use the term here in an effort to distinguish between and analyse the opening up,framing or maintaining of spaces of opportunity and action or human agency within them. I also consider the factors influencing whether or not local people act within them. Space thus provides a way of thinking about potential for action. Spaces of opportunity for public involvement in decision-making may be opened up by legislation or by oil companies holding public consultations in compliance with company policy. Spaces for informal public action may be created by NGOs when they provide local people with information or access to the Internet. These spaces are generally opened up by agents who are outsiders to local society (interventionists) and the spaces they open up are shaped by their principles (or 'agenda' ). Local people may need to acquire new skills to be able to act within these spaces; the spaces may be culturally inappropriate; or they may be framed by alien language and discourses (Cooke and Kothari 2001). Outside agendas may not coincide with, or may even conflict with local ones. Thus, opening up a space of opportunity does not necessarily result in the space being occupied by local agents. Action may also be limited by state policy, legislation, common law, or traditional practices. Individuals may be limited by financial or technological constraints, such as access to the Internet, social networks, or social status. Internal constraints may also affect an individual's ability to take up opportunities: fear, concern for family well- 15 These may be organisations spanning several countries, or organisations that are active internationally but based only in one country. .,.... 19 being, desire for economic stability, the habitus (Bourdieu 1977).16 In the ethnography I shall point to some of the structural, practical and psychological factors influencing local agents. 'Free' and 'democratic' spaces tend to be opened up in the public domain of political action, activism and public meetings. In the thesis I also draw attention to spaces in the domain of everyday practice. 17 These may provide opportunities for subversive 'everyday resistance' (Scott 1976, 1985) or the more pragmatic 'survival strategies' (Bridger and Pine 1998).J am aware of the problematic nature of the public/ private dichotomy (Calhoun 1992; Humphrey 1994; Yurchak 1997; Pine 1998). 18 My 'public domain' and 'domain of everyday practice' are conceptual rather than spatial and, like my 'insider-outsider' categories, useful only for generalised comparisons. For example, the public domain, where local agents 'have a voice', is generally the one of interest to interventionists. The domain of everyday practice is often perceived as being 'voiceless' in the sense that activities do not tend to influence decision-making directly. I argue against the view of some observers that local people who focus their energies on the domain of everyday practice are passive in the face of threats to their environment and opportunities for participation. Rather, I see this as a domain of considerable agency and I shall demonstrate this ethnographically in Chapter 6. This domain essentially constitutes all that is not public action: the public domain is by far the smaller of the two. There is also a substantial overlap between the two domains, which becomes apparent in the ethnography. I interpret voice as the explicit representation of people's interests in decision-making processes. This may be official and direct (elected representation, referendums, agreements), semi-official and non-binding (public consultations, seminars), or unofficial (NGO activities, letters and articles in the press, petitions, public demonstrations). 'Having a voice in decision-making' implies that someone hears that voice and may act upon it. People may use their voices without being heard by anyone influential. Some may choose to withhold their voices - an act of silence or non- 16 I discuss the habitus in section 2.3. 17 I discuss the public domain and the domain of everyday practice in section 2.3. 18 Yurchak distinguishes between 'official' and 'non-official' rather than 'public' and 'private', basing the distinction on type of practice rather than spatial location. Thus one can engage in private activities ,-- participation may equally express a position (Cleaver 2001). As the space metaphor implies, I am interested in people's potential for having a voice, what limits this potential, what makes people act upon it (or not). People may (consciously or unconsciously) focus their energies into activities where their voices will not be heard, but where they feel they have a greater influence over the course of their own lives. The ethnographic study of everyday practice can thus yield insights that may not be gained by listening out for 'voices'. 20 Voice and related concepts (public opinion, participation) are central to democratic processes. Since the age of the Athenian Assembly, thinkers have debated what forms of democracy allow people to have an effective voice in the government of society (Held 1987; Fishkin 1995). My thesis is set in a country seeking to establish a democratic society, where citizens are reassessing their relationship with and expectations from the state and their own responsibilities in relation to the governing of society. In Russian, the word for a voice, 'golos', also means a vote. Gorbachev's 'glasnost" ('openness') is derived from the old Russian word for voice, 'glas.' '[Glasnost'] literally means voiceness, or speaking out' .19 'Glasnost" also translates as 'publicity'; the verb 'predat' glasnosti' means to make public or to make known. For Gorbachev, glasnost' meant political candour, closing the gap between social reality and Party propaganda, and publicising information, especially in the media (Smith 1990). The 'human factor' was central to Gorbachev's project, which was aimed at promoting the informed, conscious participation of individuals in restructuring society. Glasnost' was an important factor that catalysed the development of public participation in decision-making in Russia today and laid the foundations for a legal framework safeguarding people's rights to a voice in the governing of thek country. 20 Set against both the global ideal of 'democracy' and its particular recent Russian refraction, I explore several aspects of 'voice': the use of language and discourse in natural resource conflicts; the internal diversity of 'community' in terms of 'multiple voices'; and the concept of dialogue in participatory initiatives and everyday life. such as reading a book in the official sphere (at a meeting), and aspects of the official sphere are very much part of everyday life (work, transport, school, shopping, etc). 19 The spoken words of Pozner quoted in Smith 1990 r 21 My concern with space and potential for having a voice leads to the concept of human agency. Cleaver (2001) calls for a greater consideration of the scope of personal agency and the effects of structural constraint on local participation in development projects. Human agency is defined by Johnston et al as: 'the capabilities of human beings' (1994: 256). Giddens links these capabilities to power: 'an agent ceases to be such if he or she loses the capability to "make a difference", that is, to exercise some sort of power' (Giddens 1984: 256). Lukes also equates agency with power: Social life can only be properly understood as a dialectic of power and structure, a web of possibilities for agents, whose nature is both active and structured, to make certain choices and pursue strategies within given limits, which in consequence expand and contract over time. Any standpoint or methodology which reduces that dialectic to a one sided consideration of agents without (internal or external) limits, or structures without agents, or which does not address the problems of their inter-relations will be unsatisfactory. (Lukes [1977: 127] cited in Warf 1986: 270) Goodwin defines a 'sense of agency' in participatory programmes as 'the degree to which people feel capable of influencing their local environment and, in particular, the decision-making forces that shape it' (1998: 491). My ethnography will show that agency can be exerted not only in order to 'make a difference' in the sense of 'having a voice', but also in pursuing a subsistence lifestyle or engaging in other 'survival' or 'resistance' strategies. This may be a way of having influence over one's environment and future and promoting the 'agenda' (or 'vision of life' 21 ) of one's fa_mily or community, and may be more rewarding than participation in consultation processes, collecting signatures or writing petitions. Theorists debate whether non-human subjects (e.g. corporations, states) can be agents as well as human individuals (Johnston et al 1994: 256). In my thesis oil companies, NGOs and state agencies act as agents, but I am aware that within them individuals exert their own agency: oil company employees may fight from within to change 20 See Appendix II: The Russian Legal Framework. 21 This phrase originated in an email conespondence from Ariane McCabe about this subject. 22 company policy; small NGOs (as agents) may promote the values of the charismatic activists who run them. Large organisations, however, can also be seen as structures. Individuals within state agencies or large corporations may promote such structures through their own actions. In the ethnography, officials are seen blocking grassroots initiatives and blaming their own inaction on· 'the System'. 22 Human rights lawyers encourage local people to confront officials with their individual responsibility to uphold the law and protect the environment.23 Rothstein (2000) notes how agents are strongly influenced by the type and quantity of information they have and their expectations of what other agents will do, particularly in view of their experience of what the other agents have done in the past. Rothstein cites Young: ... agents are not perfectly rational and fully informed about the world in which they live. They base their decisions on fragmentary information, they have incomplete models of the process they are engaged in, and they may not be especially forward looking. Still, they are not completely irrational: they adjust to [sic] their behavior based on what they think other agents are going to do, and these expectations are generated endogenously by information about what other agents have done in the past. (Young 1998:6 cited in Rothstein 2000) In the thesis I shall consider how human action is influenced by the social system and social relationships and to what extent humans challenge or promote the existing system through their actions. I also consider the importance of information, past experience and expectations about others' behaviour in influencing human agency. For Giddens, structure and consciousness are produced through practice: 'In and through their activities agents produce the conditions that make these activities possible' (1984: 2). Bourdieu similarly focuses on practice. A closer look at concepts of habitus and field help us to analyse the dialectical relationship between human agency and social structures (1977). Habitus (systems of dispositions24 ) are the mental or cognitive structures through which people perceive and understand the social world 22 See Chapters 4 and 5. 23 See Chapter 4. 24 Bourdieu (1977) defines disposition as the result of an organising action (close to structure); a way of being; a habitual state (especially of the body); a predisposition, tendency, propensity, or inclination. 23 and by which they produce and evaluate their (individual or collective) practices (Bourdieu 1977; Jenkins 1992; Ritzer 2000). The habitus is formed by the internalisation of social structures25 and depends on social position, personal experience, cultural background and historical circumstances. Habitus constrains and suggests but does not determine behaviour arid thought; choices people make are not devoid of rationality. In short, the habitus, the product of history, produces individual and collective practices and hence history, in accordance with the schemes engendered by history. The system of dispositions - a past which survives in the present and tends to perpetuate itself into the future by making itself present in practices structured according to its principles, an internal law relaying the continuous exercise of the law of external necessitites (irreducible to immediate conjunctural constraints) - is the principle of the continuity and regularity which objectivism discerns in the social world without being able to give them a rational basis. (Bourdieu 1977: 82) The concept of habitus helps us to consider people's responses to rapid change and new social opportunities. If a person's past experience is rooted in Soviet structures and values, it may be difficult to act differently if the situation changes, e.g. if new opportunities for participation open up where people previously had no voice in decision-making. Habitus may help us to understand how old hierarchies, bureaucratic procedures, informal trade practices, expectations of state patronage and elaborate social networks of favours remain long after the dissolution of the Soviet Union. It can be a way to consider the phenomenon of cultural continuity.26 The players in this thesis act, often simultaneously, in various fields of action that cut across the social space of Noglikskii District. Bourdieu' s field is a 'social arena within which struggles or manoeuvres take place over specific resources or stakes and access to them' (Jenkins 1992: 84). The occupants of positions within a field are human or institutional agents. The structure of the field guides the strategies by which agents seek, individually or collectively, to safeguard or improve their position. These strategies, rather than being the product of rational calculation, are 'the ongoing result of the interaction between the dispositions of the habitus and the constraints and 25 The internalisation of external structures is a concept that has been widely discussed in psychology, e.g. by Winnicott and Klein . 24 possibilities which are the reality of any given social field' (Jenkins 1992: 83). To increase control over their own fate and that of others, agents deploy these different forms of capital: economic (material wealth); cultural (knowledge and skills); social (trust, reciprocity, social relations);27 and symbolic (honour, prestige, legitimacy). I also refer to political capital as a separate category. In the thesis I consider to what purpose players deploy various forms of capital and how relations, interactions and human agency are influenced by the presence or lack of particular forms of capital. The ethnography will demonstrate the significance of trust (Coleman 1990; Rothstein 2000), which I explore further in the conclusions. 2.4 Deconstructing Interventionist Discourses Milton (1993: 8) sees environmentalism as a 'trans-cultural discourse', a 'field of communication through which environmental responsibilities ... are constituted' (ibid: 9). The Western (interventionist) discourses of sustainable development, democracy and participation can also be viewed as trans-cultural and transnational discourses that constitute responsibilities. A field of discourse or a single issue can be made up of diverse or competing discourses (ibid: 8; Hayer 1995). Underlying my thesis is an ongoing battle over the meaning of interventionist discourses; their interpretation and use are contested by the public, NGOs, government and industry; at the global and local levels; and from Russian and Western perspectives. I consider the way in which regional and local players have adopted global discourses of environmental crisis, human rights, participation and democracy and what this signifies for power relations, identity politics, environmental and social responsibility, and relations between local and regional actors and outsiders. Meaning does not flow in one direction only (Milton 1993: 9) and I also explore local discourses and their contribution to global debates. The origins and ideology of the term 'sustainable development' have been widely explored (Holdgate 1996; Brenton 1994; IUCN/UNEP/WWF 1991; Adams 1995; WCED 1987; Brown 1981; Goldsmith et al 1972). The concept grew out of the global 26 This consideration owes much to a discussion with Lena Rockhill . r vision of 'First World' environmentalism as it took on development issues in an attempt to make conservation more relevant to 'Third World' countries (Adams 25 1995). Later the term was adopted by industry and governments to continue justifying combining growth and environmental protection (ibid; Brenton 1994) and has been criticised for trying to be all things to all people. Today, environmentalists use industry's own discourse to challenge its actions.28 Sustainability is not an alien concept to Russian science or society. 'Sustainable development' translates directly as ustoichivoe razvitie. However, the term ratsional'noe prirodopol'zavanie is also used in Russian development discourse. This term literally means 'rational use of natural resources' and was coined by Soviet-Marxist ideologists who believed humans should be masters over nature and 'rationally' modify the environment for the good of the state (Pryde 1991). The Russian verb to exploit mineral resources is 'osvoit", which also means 'to master' and is derived from the word 'svoi' (oneself) so literally means 'to make one's own' (Vitebsky 1990: 25). The Stalinist 'Great Plan' type of rational use discourse was, however, not the only one and Russian scientists also developed ideas that fed into the more conservation-focused Western sustainability paradigm (Zimenko and Krupnik 1987; Sokolov 1987). Vladimir Vernadsky introduced the concept of the 'biosphere' into scientific discourse as early as the.1930s (Yanitsky 1993; Holdgate 1996). Vladimir Sokolov was involved in the Man and the Biosphere (MAB) programme in the Russian Far East (Sokolov 1991) and was an author of the Brundtland Report (WCED 1987). In the 1890s Vernadsky emphasised the importance of (informed) public involvement in decision-making for the success of democratic transformations (Yanitsky 1993:11). Public participation, in the form of 'direct democracy' (voting), mass involvement and rotation of office, was central to Soviet political theory and practice (Churchward 1983). Yet in reality the general public was unable to influence policy making, and dissenting voices were silenced. This led to a gradual withdrawal of the individual from public life in the post-war period (Shlapentokh 1989). Yanitsky argues that social organisations, which started up in pre-Soviet times, continued to exist throughout the Soviet regime, apart from the period between 1930 and the late-1950s, 27 The concept of social capital has been extensively theorised (Coleman 1990; Putnam 1993; Baron et al 2000) and has been co-opted into the international development lexicon (e.g. World Bank 1997) though it is absent from the particular discourses of EBRD and Shell which I analyse in Section 3.1. 26 when former leaders of independent organisations nonetheless 'remained as the bearers of group consciousness' (Yanitsky 1993:15). Sarah Davies (1997) describes how public opinion under Stalin was fed or expressed by rumours, personal letters, leaflets (listovki), inscriptions (nadpisi); discourses of nationalism, anti-semitism, and populism; subversion of official language in jokes and songs; and petitions to figures of authority. A vibrant black market and complex personal exchange networks of favours (blat) developed as a response to the constraints of the Soviet economic system (Ledeneva 1998). Yurchak (1997) describes public cynicism towards authority in the later years of socialism, although very few people would challenge Soviet power, which was seen as immutable. By the 1980s, participation became an exercise in 'pretense misrecognition' (ibid: 171). People attended party meetings and played cards or read books, automatically putting up their hands to vote in favour of a decision. They produced their own non-official parallel culture characterised by political humour and the anekdot (joke). This eventually led to a 'personal noninvolvement in the officials sphere' (ibid: 183). This historical perspective on participation will inform my analysis of local attitudes towards power among Noglikskii District citizens. Soviet industrial development policy allowed no space for local people to take part in decision-making on industrial developments that affected their health and environment (Glushenkova 1999). Ziegler observes that environmental policy under the Brezhnev administration resembled a 'state corporatist' model of participation: 'The Soviet state played the dominant role in recognising problems, placing issues on the public agenda and modifying policies. Group activity, particularly among specialists, was an important aspect of Soviet environmental protection, but this participation was habitually manipulated and channelled to conform with regime priorities' (Ziegler 1992: 34). In the late 1980s anthropologists and sociologists began to call for more public participation in Soviet developmen! programmes (Sokolov 1987; Pika and Prokhorov 1989). Much of the public pressure before and during perestroika came from environmental movements expressing public discontent with the Soviet Union's appalling environmental record, including the Arai Basin, Lake Baikal and Chernobyl (Massey Stewart 1992; Tickle and Welsh 1998; Pickvance 28 This is demonstrated in Chapter 3. 27 1998). Environmental protest mostly reflected concern for health issues, but also acted as a vehicle for nationalist and other concerns (Zeigler 1992). As political liberalisation progressed in the Gorbachev period, independent ecological groups analogous to Western environmental movements began to emerge. Many were based initially in Universities or scientific institutes. and communities. Today there is a much broader base of NGO activity. Some Moscow-based groups, notably the Socio­ Ecological Union (SEU) function as umbrella organisations. The vibrant NGO networks in Russia today owe a great deal to Western funding and the Internet. With the collapse of the Soviet Union, the Russian economy may have shifted from command control to one governed more by 'free market' principles, but the functional, exploitative, rational-use paradigm still dominates. In practice, too, Russian industrial companies are still so closely linked to the government, that decision-making remains very centralised, while it has proved impossible to establish an effective independent environmental agency to control those decisions (Glushenkova 1999). 29 The greatest changes in integration of sustainable development principles into resource use practice in Russia have come in the sphere of environmental legislation. 30 Since the early 1990s, Russian legislation (thanks largely to Western influences) has been built up to provide more opportunities for environmental protection, including public monitoring, control and rights to information. A significant advance is the import of the concept of Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) from the USA, 31 though there have been problems integrating this with the Russian form of assessment, the State Environmental Expert Review (EER) (Cherp 1996, 1997, 2000; Wolff 2000).32 A considerable amount of popular literature has been published for Russian citizens on how to use environmental legislation (Bogoliubov 1996; Vasil'eva 1996; Ecoline 1997; Ekologia 1997; Yakovleva 1999). In recent years environmental law NGOs have become particularly involved in Native peoples' issues (Yakovleva 2001a,b). Razbash (1998) and Yakovleva (1999) provide good overviews of Russian legislation in the field of 29 In May 2000 Putin transferred the functions of the Russian State Committee on Environmental Protection to the Ministry of Natural Resources, which promotes natural resource exploitation. 30 Russian legislation relating to the environment and participation is summarised in Appendix I. 31 This translates into Russian as Otsenka Vozdeistviya na Okruzhayuschuyu Sredu (OVOS). 32 It is worth noting here that Russian legislation also allows for the public to carry out their own Public Environmental Expert Review parallel with the State EER. I analyse the relevant legislation more in Appendix II: The Russian Legal Framework: Environment and Participation. 28 public participation in environmental decision-making. In Appendix II, I discuss this legislation in more detail. In the ethnography I demonstrate how legislation has been used, particularly by Russian and international NGOs, to protest against the Sakhalin offshore projects and I consider the response of Noglikskii District residents to new legal opportunities. Gorbachev's concept of 'democracy' was a socialist democracy, based on the values inherent in Soviet society. Yeltsin turned away from the concept of the Soviet welfare state, allowing regions more freedom of self-govemment.33 Putin's democracy, however, supports the capitalist free market while re-establishing the 'strong hand' of authoritarianism. 34 Despite these political changes, socialist values have endured to some extent: 'The everyday moral communities of socialism have been undermined but not replaced' (Hann 2001: 10). At the same time, 'civil society' movements are gaining momentum across Russia. 35 However, the fundamental difference between capitalist and socialist (post-socialist) value systems, even when the latter are being 'democratic', is often not appreciated by interventionists (Anderson and Pine 1995; Hann and Dunn 1996; Bridger and Pine 1998). As (Hedrick) Smith noted in the early 1990s: We assume we understand what is really going inside the Soviet Union; we assume that as soon as Soviet people are given freedom, they will behave as we do. Our framework is capitalism and multi party democracy; our way of life seems so natural, so right to us, that we take for granted that once dictatorship is removed, Russians will reflect and assert our same values. (Smith, pxxvii) Many western con:imentators of the time (including Smith) held the view that western values were 'natural and right' and that Russians should aim to 'reflect and assert' them. The international discourses of the early 1990s represented the Cold War as 'a battle in which the "good" forces of western democracy and capitalism defeated the 33 Yeltsin urged the Republic of Sakha, ' take as much sovereignty as you can swallow' (Argounova 2001 : 169). 34 For example, Putin has att~mpted to reassert control over the Russian regions by appointing presidential representatives above regional governors - there is a presidential representative for the Russian Far Eastern region. Putin's clamp-down on the freedom of the media and environmental organisations have also been much reported in news bulletins. 35 I discuss the term 'civil society' in section 2.4. 29 "evil" forces of communism' (Pine and Bridger 1998: 6). Others have commented on this moral triumphalism and the 'missionising' nature of interventions in the 1990s (Vitebsky 1993; Walck 1995). I will consider Western and local moral frameworks in order to compare the interventionist-framed spaces for action to those generated by local people themselves, arguing that local action may require awareness raising not just among local people, but among interventionists about local realities and values. The language of sustainable development, corporate social responsibility and public participation is becoming increasingly important to the corporate agenda. The main aim of an oil company is to make profit from producing oil. Yet despite the unsustainability of this activity, oil companies are among the most enthusiastic proponents of 'sustainable development'. Oil companies consider social as well as environmental problems to be business risks and have set up social programmes, participatory initiatives, foundations and grant programmes in an effort to mitigate these risks. Forward-thinking companies such as Shell and BP are aware that their image has a direct impact on their economic success and are actively cultivating an image of themselves as 'good', 'responsible' corporate citizens, with a concern for the environment and society. NGOs and practitioner-academics have been instrumental in forcing the new corporate agenda and consumers worldwide are increasingly influenced by environmental and social concerns and anti-multinational feeling (Hertz 2001; Goldsmith and Mander 2001). Within corporations, individuals work to change corporate culture 'from the inside'. The changing face of corporate business is due to a mixture of external pressure and incremental internal change.36 In Section 3.1, I analyse the policies of the Sakhalin-2 project operator, Shell, and one of the Sakhalin- 2 project financiers, the European Bank of Reconstruction and Development (EBRD). I shall compare their policies and principles with the realities of project implementation at the regional and local levels. Shell is committed to corporate social responsibility or CSR (Beesley and Evans 1978; Clutterbuck 1981; Hopt and Teubner 1985; Pava and Krausz 1995; Hopkins 1999; Ledgerwood and Broadhurst 2000). CSR has been an important issue in Western law, politics and economics since the 1930s and especially since the 1960s 36 I should also note here that there are still many conservative forces who do not believe that CSR should be the concern of business and oppose any change. 30 (Hopkins 1999). Like 'sustainability' and 'participation,' however, the term means different things to different people: 'The common ground lies in the perception of a relative shift from government to companies as the source of social improvement and means to promote specific items of social welfare' (Beesley and Evans 1978: 13). Milton Friedman stated that the social responsibility of business is to increase profits and not to serve other social ends (Beesley and Evans 1978; Hopkins 1999). Similar principles underpinned the IMF 'shock therapy' of the 1990s in Russia (Chossudovsky 1997; Wertman 1998). Beesley and Evans (1978) counter Friedman with Dahl's claim that large enterprises should serve public and social purposes, and Shocker and Sethi's assertion that business should provide 'socially desirable ends' to legitimise its position in society (1978: 17,18). Hopkins cites a 1996 MORI poll in which 87% of British people claimed large companies should have a broader responsibility to communities than profit making (Hopkins 1999: 8). This makes Russian citizens' expectations of industry, which some economists dismiss as a hang­ over from the Soviet past, seem less unreasonable. In the ethnography I consider in what way the concepts of social investment and community partnership have been introduced into project implementation at the local level. Shell acknowledges that it will have an impact on the communities where it works, but lays the responsibility for social improvement at the door of governments, asserting that business does not have the power or the right to impose change (Shell 2001). However, in my experience as both environmentalist and researcher I have fourid certain questions about responsibility difficult to resolve. In the thesis, I aim to tease out the various forms of responsibility that are related to the Sakhalin offshore projects. 37 For example, if an economic activity is reinforcing oppressive or corrupt power structures, what responsibility does the company bear for local populations? If project agreements are controversial, who decides whether or not they should be re­ negotiated? In what way is a significant environmental threat to livelihoods related to the issue of socio-economic benefits from an industrial activity, and who has the responsibility of working to resolve this issue? The oil companies do not have the responsibility for all these questions; local governments, NGOs and local citizens also have to bear some responsibility for what happens. 37 I consider the issues of trust and responsibility in section 8.4 of the conclusions. 31 Shell has a commitment to what they call engagement, which means 'talking and listening to stakeholders' or in other words, 'dialogue ' (ibid: 10).Shell works closely with the World Business Council for Sustainable Development.38 In their pamphlet 'Stakeholder Dialogue: the WBCSD's approach to engagement', dialogue is defined thus: Dialogue is about communicating with stakeholders in a way that takes serious account of their views. It does not mean involving stakeholders in every decision, or that every stakeholder request will be met. It means that stakeholder input should be acknowledged and thoughtfully considered. It is about giving stakeholders a voice, listening to what they have to say and being prepared to act or react accordingly.39 In the ethnography I explore to what extent stakeholder engagement can be an effective dialogue between local 'stakeholders' and oil companies. Hopkins defines social responsibility as 'the ethical behaviour of business towards its constituencies or stakeholders' (Hopkins 1999: 7). In order to assess the question of responsibility we need to establish what companies mean by 'stakeholders'. Between them, Clutterbuck (1992) and Hopkins (1999) identify the following: shareholders; potential investors; employees; managers; customers; business partners; contractors and suppliers; the political arena; local communities; the environment. Coleman points out that 'responsibility to one set of interests may conflict with responsibility to another' (Coleman 1985: 76). He sees the problem of CSR as one of changing the mix of interests, moving away from the corporation's interests to other stakeholder interests. 'But the very multiplicity and diversity of the interests apart from those of the corporation itself suggests that the problem is even conceptually not a simple one: there is no single group toward which the corporation may exercise social responsibility, thus simultaneously satisfying the interests of all those affected by its actions' (ibid: 77). I am also concerned about this multiplicity of interests and the complexity of the tasks of identifying and satisfying them. In the ethnography I attempt to identify local stakeholders, in order to establish how their concerns can be both heard and addressed. 38 This organisation is considered to be an uncritical supporter of transnational companies, working to improve their image (personal communication). 32 Cooke and Kothari's (2001) collection of articles critique the participatory development paradigm that evolved from the pioneering work of Robert Chambers (1983, 1993, 1997). Participatory development initiatives invite people to take part in a project that is ostensibly meant to benefit the community, while oil company participation programmes are aimed solely at the mitigation of a potential risk to business. However, these 'development' critiques are relevant to my own analysis, particularly in their consideration of power and discourse. In the thesis, I draw attention to the discrepancy between the sustainability discourse promoted by oil companies and their financiers, and the implementation of these principles at the local level, a tendency that Francis (2001) also observes in the implementation of World Bank projects. The fundamental problem lies not in the methods but in the discourse of participation which 'embodies the potential for an unjustified exercise of power' or 'tyranny' (Cooke and Kothari 2001 : 4). Following Foucault, Hailey (2001) claims that the knowledge embodied in a discourse should be seen not as a truth but as an exercise of power and a study of any discourse must include an investigation of the motives and ideology of the 'experts' who advocate the approach. Ferguson believes a critique of development discourse needs to go further than accusations of 'mere rhetoric' (1990: 17,18). Drawing also on Foucault, Ferguson suggests that 'discourse is a practice, it is structured, and it has real effects which are much more profound than simply "mystification"' (ibid: 18). Ferguson sees power, in Foucault's terms, as decentred and 'subjectless' and having unintended consequences. Kothari (2001) also follows Foucault, focusing on the dispersed, circulating nature of power, the way that it masks itself and the everyday nature of social control. The notion that power and control lie at the political centre and those subjected to power at the local level is 'simplistic' (see also Kotkin 1995). Mohan (2001 : 164) points out the need to 'acknowledge that those we view as powerless are not'. In the thesis I draw on these ideas in order to consider how discourses frame action and interventions and influence the ability of local people to take part in participatory initiatives. I explore the tools of discourse and local access to them (newspapers, public meetings, education, the Internet). I question the aims of the oil companies in carrying out public consultation programmes. I assess the balance of power between the oil companies and other 39 From WBCSD report, 'Stakeholder Dialogue: the WBCSD's approach to engagement' available at: http://www.wbcsd.org/newscenter/reports/2001/stakeholder.pdf players with whom they interact during implementation of these programmes, and I consider the intended and unintended consequences of participation. 33 In my study, environmental NGOs provide a challenge to the development vision of the government and multinationals, working within the same frame of sustainability discourse. The battle is over language and meaning as much as resources and their sustainable use. International NGOs began working in the Russian Far East in the early 1990s and have formed a network focusing especially on Sakhalin issues. Some would call this the workings of a 'global civil society' (Rich 1994), or a 'global third sector' (Ledgerwood and Broadhurst 2000). NGOs focus to a great extent on flows of information and global NGO networks are highly dependent on the Internet, thanks to which even minor events can be reported across the world within hours. NGOs have also become expert at utilising the law to monitor and control corporate activities. The anthropologist Milton defines environmentalism as a 'quest for a viable future, pursued through the implementation of culturally defined responsibilities' that seeks to control the human activity that threatens the environment (Milton 1993: 2). However, '[t]here are many environmentalisms, not merely one' (Berglund 1998). Milton herself acknowledges that her general description fails to grasp the complexity of environmentalism, as 'there are many visions of a viable future and diverse answers to the question of for whom, or what, it should be viable' (Milton 1993: 3). Global environmental movements have what Melucci terms a 'planetary' consciousness - an awareness of living in an 'interdependent human and natural world system' (1989: 206). Global environmentalism40 is a discourse of global ecological crisis (Adams 1991) that calls on people to defend biodiversity, wilderness, pristine ecosystems, and endangered species, on behalf of Nature who can't speak for herself ('the Thing that has no Voice').41 Native people may be included as a part of the 'Thing that has no Voice ' . There is a tendency, especially among anthropologists, to see Western environmentalism as a form of cultural imperialism, evangelism, or naive fundamentalism (Lynge 1993; Wenzel 1991). The representation of Native people by environmentalists can be 40 The environmentalism of international NGOs and activists. 41 The term used for Nature by a US environmentalist in an interview, Sakhalin, September 2001. 34 problematic in the Russian Far East: there may be discrepancies between Native and environmentalist priorities.42 However, the relationship between environmentalists and Native groups is more morally ambiguous and equally balanced in terms of power than is implied by accusations of cultural imperialism. This relationship is constantly being negotiated on Sakhalin, where both groups have considerable bargaining power with decision-makers, oil companies and development banks. Native groups have adopted the global discourses of Native rights, land claims, compensation, even 'reparations' for past colonisation.43 In later chapters, I consider how these discourses are used at the regional and local levels and the affect that their adoption has had on local power relations and relations between the Native people and the oil companies. I also consider the relationship between the Native and environmental movements, who are potential allies in the global battle against multinational mineral developers. Berglund (1998: 7) sees environmentalism as a 'heightened awareness of the negotiability of human relationships'. In the thesis I explore the nature of negotiation between environmental NGOs, Native groups and the oil companies and development banks. I also explore and compare the environmental visions and activities of transnational NGOs and the local activists in Noglikskii District. The ethnography provides examples of 'grassroots' environmentalism on Sakhalin and environmentalism that has been strongly influenced by Western NGOs. But at the same time, Russia has her own history of environmental movements (Massey Stewart 1992; Ziegler 1992; Yanitsky 1993; Pickvance 1998; Tickle and Welsh 1998). Yanitsky (1993) traces this back to informal groups and organisations active in the 1920s, 1950s and 1970s. 44 Environmental groups included the Moscow Society of Naturalists, the All-Russian Society for the Protection of Nature, the Nature Protection Corps in Universities. Soviet scientists developed one of the most comprehensive systems of nature reserves in the world (Pryde 1972, 1991; Newell and Wilson 1996). On a day-to-day level, Soviet workers were involved in 42 From interviews with US environmentalists, Sakhalin, September 2001. 43 The word 'reparations' is taken from a Vladivostok News article where Vladimir Sangi claims compensation from Russia and Japan for past colonisation of Nivkh territories, Vladivostok News, 1998 (http://vlad.tribnet.com/1998/issl 74/text/sakh I.html) (checked 14.04.02). 44 According to Yanitsky (1993: 10), the first environmental organisation in the Russian Empire, the Khortitsky Association for the Protection of Nature, was established in 1910 in Ukraine. 35 environmental clean-ups (subbotniki),45 and Komsomol activities encouraged environmental consciousness. These are sometimes used as models for environmental activities today. In the ethnography I explore the nature of relations between the public and officials and scientists, and consider how these attitudes are changing on Sakhalin at the regional and local levels. Russian has no word for 'environmentalism' as such,46 though it is not lacking in related terminology. Protection of the environment is 'okhrana okruzhaiuschei sredy' or 'okhrana prirody' (nature protection). Schoolchildren are taught 'liubit' prirodu' (to love nature) or 'berech' prirodu' (to protect nature).47 In many forests you are still likely to see Soviet-era plackards urging people: 'Beregite prirodu' (Protect nature) or 'Beregite les ot pozharov' (Protect the forest from fires). Environmentalists are zaschitniki okruzhaiuschei sredy (defenders of the environment) or may be called 'greens' (zelenye), an imported Western term. Activists are sometimes called 'aktivisty', which has the broader sense in Russian of an active worker in public or social affairs, but was also used for dissidents in the past. The labelling is important: we shall see that non-specialists (people without a scientific degree and a 'speciality' or 'spetsial'nost") tend to be frowned upon for doing environmental work, especially if it is related to science. Previously the 'public' who participated in decision-making was made up of scientists and was effectively a scientific public (nauchnaia obschestvennost'). Today some people, particularly scientists, still find it difficult to accept the non-scientific environmental movement.48 My research reveals a tension between the strong interest of Russian and international NGOs, multinationals, development banks and the Russian government in the concept of civil society and an academic scepticism about the effectiveness of the term as an analytical tool. An example of the former is the Civil Forum convened by the president in Moscow on 21-22 November 2001 with 5,000 participants (NGOs, public officials, journalists, experts).49 The aim was to promote 'dialogue' and 'partnership' 45 However, the subbotniki and the work of the Green 'volunteer' (druzhina) groups were further examples of enforced participation in Soviet public life. 46 Berglund (1998) also notes this about the German language in her anthropological study of environmental activism in Germany. 47 Thank you to Tanya Argounova for reminding me of this. 48 Personal communication, Kamchatka scientist and public activist. 49 Russian Regional Report, Vol. 6, No.42, 28 November 2001. 36 between the state and society. 50 A declaration by Kamchatka NGOs (01.11.01) welcomed Putin's initiative, criticising the present state of civil society, and stressing the importance of public participation: In Russia, instead of a democratic system, based on the institutions of civil society, a system of 'controlled democracy' (upravliaemaia demokratiia) is being set up, in which citizens are increasingly alienated from decision-making in issues that are directly relevant to them and society as a whole is excluded from the system of control of the state (vlast') .51 Environmentalists see the development of civil society (primarily NGOs) as a way to control destructive industrial development. In a broader sense, 'civil society', 'the Third Sector' and NGOs are seen by Western interventionists as a counterbalance to the power of the state. Western development agencies and foundations such as the Eurasia Foundation, USAID,52 Charles Mott Foundation, the Open Society and DFID,53 support the development of civil society through grant programmes for NGOs in Russia (McCabe 2001). This can be seen as part of the Western 'democratisation' agenda for Russia (ibid). There are now about 350,000 officially registered non-commercial organisations in Russia, of which 70,000 are in operation, with about 2.5 million employees and volunteers.54 This is seen by observers as a sign of an active civil society. I agree, however, with Sampson (1996) and others that numbers of NGOs is a crude measurement of civil society, particularly at the local level. Academics have more diverse and nuanced approaches to 'civil society'. Its history, meaning and relevance have been widely discussed (Arato and Cohen 1992; Kumar 1993; Hann 1996; Anderson 1990; Pickvance 1998; Van Rooy 1998; McCabe 2001). Anderson calls for a focus on institutions that mediate civil, political and economic interests in local societies (Anderson 1996: 115). Hann advocates a shift in the civil society debate 50 On Sakhalin the regional administration held a forum for NGOs, officials, journalists, experts and business. Presentations were published as a collection of theses and papers: 'Improvement of the form and methods of cooperation between the authorities, public organisations, non-commercial organisations, business and the media', (2001) Yuzhno-Sakhalinsk, Sakhalin Regional Administration. At a conference on Kamchatka on 1 st November 2001, NGOs issued a declaration on the establishment of civil society in Russia. · 51 From the 'Declaration of the establishment and development of civil society in Russia' passed at the conference of Kamchatka NGOs, 01.11.01. 52 US Agency for International Development. 53 (UK) Department for International Development. 37 away from formal structures and organisations towards an exploration of beliefs, values, everyday practices and local political traditions, and the tension between individual and collective interests (Hann 1996). Hann's definition of civil society 'refer[s] loosely to the moral community, to the problems of accountability, trust and cooperation that all groups face' (ibid: 20). A US environmentalist in the RFE believes 'civil society' is most relevant to local settings when thought of in terms of 'responsibility' .55 Civil society can be a space for public action (Bryant 1993; Van Rooy 1998: 19; McCabe 2001); it can be a 'space for local voices'. It can also be a space for social networks, survival strategies, mediation, trust, accountability and responsibility. It is this sense that I focus on in this thesis. If we reconsider the concept of 'global civil society' as a moral community, a space for negotation and mediation, it can also help with the analysis of transnational networks of environmental responsibility and the relationship between international NGOs, the state and multinationals. Much of my ethnography considers the place of local people in this 'global civil society' and the role of multinationals and NGOs in 'local civil society'. Action within the space of civil society can be analysed in terms of social movements (McAdam et al 1996; Melucci 1989). However, a focus on social movements would be unlikely to yield much rich material in my analysis of human agency in Noglikskii District, though I do discuss the identity politics of the Native movement56 and a (rare) spontaneous single-issue protest led by local environmentalists.57 I explore the motivations for and nature of collective action, drawing on discussions of political mobilisation in McAdam et al (1996), particularly the concept of strategic framing: 'Mediating between opportunity, organisation and action are the shared meanings and definitions that peQple bring to their situation. At a minimum people need to feel both aggrieved about some aspect of their lives and optimistic that, acting collectively, they can redress the problem' (ibid: 5). Optimism is influenced by the habitus: new opportunities may or may not be perceived in an optimistic way, depending on past experience (Rothstein 2000). Melucci proposes analysis of the relationship between the social problem, the development of people's shared sense of colllinon interests, 54 From Russian Regional Report, Vol.6, No.42, 28 November 2001. 55 US environmentalist, personal communication. 56 See Chapter 4. and collective action itself. The appeal of Melucci's approach lies in his focus on individual needs and everyday life (Melucci 1989) which is the focus of my own research. 2.5 The Domain of Everyday Practice Nelson and Wright identify a need for 'critical analyses of ethnographic contexts to see how the discourse and procedures of participation actually work in practice' (1995: 2). This is the aim of my ethnography. In this section I explore theoretical approaches to the analysis of 'everyday life' and attempt to situate my own research within contemporary debates. A body of anthropological literature on 'post-Socialism' (Anderson and Pine 1995; Hann and Dunn 1996; Bridger and Pine 1998; Hann 2002) focuses on the everyday and local in order to critique western liberal economic models and development ideologies that have been applied to both analysis of and intervention in the post­ Socialist world, particularly in the early to mid-1990s: It was assumed that liberal democracies as they have evolved in North America and western Europe provide the optimum political framework for post-communist societies, a framework within which 'free markets ' , 'rule of law' and 'civil society' will emerge as a coherent package to replace the evils of totalitarianism. 38 (Hann 1998: x) The term 'transition' itself is seen by these authors as 'deeply problematic' and based on the 'unwarranted faith' of economists and politicians in 'the inevitability of transformation to capitalist demand economy' and the expectation that 'given the correct and economically rational conditions, ideals of standard liberal democracy would eventually take root' (Pine and Bridger 1998: 3). In 'reality, although the language and symbols of socialism were replaced by those of 'free-market democracy' after 1989, economies did not make the transition to a stable market capitalism, but were left 'in limbo '. When the structures of socialism were dismantled, there was nothing to replace them (ibid). While anthropologists are now 57 See Chapter 5 39 seeing 'beyond transition' (Sampson 2002) and seeking to correct the deficits of 'transitology' (Hann 2002: 1), the language of the EBRD and other players remains firmly within the 'transition' idiom.58 With a focus largely on rural communities, where they conducted long periods of fieldwork, the anthropologists mentioned above have documented everyday responses to the macro-level political and economic changes that resulted from the collapse of the Soviet regime, the values that frame local people's responses and their adaptation and 'survival strategies' (Bridger et al 1996; Bridger and Pine 1998). Survival strategies are based on local histories, cultural experience, environment, landscape, the local economy, social networks, local knowledge, informal activities, rituals, 'and above all their humour' (ibid: 12). My ethnography explores local survival strategies that are motivated not just by rationality and economic imperatives, but also by enjoyment of life, a desire to live well, or 'live to good purpose' (Vitebsky 2002: 181). The domain of everyday practice may not give people a 'voice,' but it may provide better opportunities for them to take control over their own future (the supposed aim of participation) or simply to 'muddle through' (Tishkov 1998:1; Hann 1993:12; Seeth et al 1998) or engage in vyzhivanie ('survival' or 'making do') (Vitebsky 2002: 181). Vyzhivanie embraces a vast range of activities, including domestic production, maintenance of social networks, informal economic activities, small scale entrepreneurship, cultural activities, barter and exchange (Humphrey1991), and activities formerly known as 'blat' 59(Ledeneva 1998). Everyday life is more than a domain of routinized activity, passive consumerism, triviality and habit (Certeau 1984; Gardiner 2000). It is the domain of resistance and counter-hegemonic forces; adaptation to change; the formation of moral values; creativity, utopia, spontaneity and humour. According to Gardiner, the critical approach to the study of everyday life seeks to 'give a voice to the silenced' (ibid: 9); its proponents 'take an explicit ethico-political stance and place considerable stress on the potential for individual and collective agency to transform existing social conditions ' ; it attempts to locate 'embryonic forms of transformative social change 58 'Transition' is also critiqued by Russian academics, e.g. the work of Moiseev on 'The Economic Development Problems of Peoples of the Russian North in the Transition Period' (Moiseev 1999). 59 Blat refers to a culture of mutual favours , networks, string-pulling and wrangling. In the Soviet times it was particularly prevalent as many goods could not be acquired through officials channels, so people would acquire them through their own personal networks (po blatu). 40 within the hidden recesses of everyday life itself, particularly in those moments when the ossifed and reified structures of modem society are defamiliarized and exposed to critical consciousness' (ibid: 19). Spaces for action are opened up in everyday life when something occurs to awaken a person's consciousness and challenge the unquestioning acceptance of the self and the social world that Bourdieu refers to in its extreme form as doxa (Bourdieu 1977: 164; Jenkins 1992: 70). In exploring how social change is effected on Sakhalin, I shall attempt to identify those moments of shifting consciousness in people's everyday lives that may be signs of embryonic social change. In his work on the south-east Asian peasantry, Scott (1976, 1985) focuses on 'everyday forms of peasant resistance,' which include: 'foot dragging, dissimulation, desertion, false compliance, pilfering, feigned ignorance, slander, arson, and sabotage' (Scott 1985: xvi).60 These avoid direct confrontation with authority, are based on informal networks, and tend not to be planned. For Scott, and in my own experience, organized political activity is usually the preserve of the middle class and intelligentsia. Scott's peasants are less interested in changing the structures of the state and the law than in 'working the system' (Scott 1976: xv; Hobsbawm 1973) and are motivated primarily by the defence of their 'right to subsistence ' 61 (ibid: 57). In a similar vein, my exploration of the ways in which Noglikskii District citizens work the system will raise the question of whether this is more profitable to them than challenging the structures of the 'System'. I also examine one.case where local citizens were mobilized in defence of their garden plots and their 'right to subsistence safety' .62 For Scott, the struggle between rich and poor is not merely over work, property rights, grain, and cash; but over the appropriation of symbols, the assessing of cause and blame, the labelling of past and present. This entails 'back~iting, gossip, character assassination, rude nicknames, gestures, and silences of contempt' which generally belong to the backstage of village life (Scott 1985: xvii). In Noglikskii District struggles over natural resources take place between the holders of various forms of 60 There is also a subversive dimension to proverbs, folksongs, oral history, legends, jokes, language, ritual, and religion (Scott 1985: 238). 61 This is taken from E.P. Thompson's work on 18th and 19th century workers' uprisings. 41 capital (Bourdieu 1977) not only between rich and poor. However, these struggles are similar and, as in Sedaka, conflicts are often deeply personal (ibid: 348).63 Scott (1990) argues that despite their compliance, the Malaysian peasants are not dominated ideologically. He draws a contrast between 'official transcripts' (what is said in public) and 'hidden transcripts' which the dominant and dominated keep to themselves. Humphrey (1994) suggests that this model is inappropriate to Soviet-type socialist (or post-Socialist) societies, where people are accustomed to a nested hierarchy of domination and public-private divisions are blurred.64 I agree that there is little the dominant and dominated hide from one another in Russian society, particularly in small villages where everyone knows one another and gossip is rife. Mitchell criticises Scott's narrow definition of hegemony: '[S]urely . .. there is clear evidence that political domination in Sedaka still works through the shaping of what can be thought and said, by [the] defining of what presents iself as "reasonable" and "realistic" and [the] maintaining of an ethic of reciprocity and politeness' (Mitchell 1990: 552). Hegemony, in Gramsci's terms, refers to 'non-violent forms of control exercised through the whole range of dominant cultural institutions and social practices, from schooling, museums, and political parties to religious practices, architectural forms, and the mass media' (ibid: 553). When considering the social order of late socialism, Yurchak uses the concept of a 'hegemony of representations', which was the unified discourse that pervaded the official sphere and its institutions and practices, and which coexisted in parallel with other representations in the non­ official sphere. This may help us to understand the way in which Russian people today separate the official and unofficial spheres, and combine 'deference to authority and resistance to it' (Akaha and Vassilieva 2001). In Bourdieu's theory of 'symbolic violence', domination must be euphemised or disguised. Symbolic violence is the 'gentle, invisible form of violence, which is never recognized as such, and is not so much undergone as chosen, the violence of credit, confidence, obligation, personal loyalty, hospitality, gifts, gratitude, piety' (Bourdieu 62 See Chapter 5. 63 See in particular Chapter 4. 64 Humphrey instead suggests the use of the term 'evocative transcript' to refer to 'a text that is intended to elicit or evoke a particular interpretation beyond the surface meaning' (Humphrey 1994: 22.23). 42 1977: 92). '[It] is the imposition of systems of symbolism and meaning (i.e. culture) upon groups or classes in such a way that they are experienced as legitimate' (Jenkins 1992: 10). Scott (1985: 325) warns that the compliance of subordinate classes as a result of 'pragmatic resignation' should not be confused with legitimisation. However, I do think it relevant to consider how people 11,aturalise and therefore accept a situation that they believe they cannot change. As Bourdieu states: 'Every established order tends to produce ... the naturalization of its own arbitrariness' (Bourdieu 1977: 164). Fatalism is a widespread response to the arbitrariness of the state and the market in Russian society (Yurchak 1997). In the ethnography I consider how fatalism and resignation influence local responses to the offshore oil and gas developments and how these responses are related to past experiences of state and industrial activities. 2.6 Dialogue as Critical Engagement In the thesis I use the concept of dialogue as a way to consider engagement between local people and their authorities and interventionists, particularly the multinationals, and as a way to address multiple and diverse stakeholder interests in development planning. Below I explore three approaches to analysis of the concept of dialogue. For Shell, dialogue is about 'talking and listening to stakeholders' (Shell 2001: 10). For Bakhtin, dialogue is a way of being (Morson and Emerson 1990: 50). Central to Bakhtin's philosophy are the concepts of heteroglossia (raznorechie or 'many­ speechedness') and polyphony ('many-voicedness'). What a person says and how they say it embody a particular world-view. Heteroglossia refers to the diversity of view­ points that are reflected in different speech genres. Bakhtin was concerned with the way in which heteroglossia and polyphony were transcribed in the (essentially monological) written text, and saw that Dostoevsky resolved this dilemma with the 'polyphonic novel' in which a plurality of voices could ex~st unmerged, providing a 'dialogic sense of truth' (Morson and Emerson 1990). Officaldom attempts to narrow heteroglossia and establish boundaries between legitimate and illegitimate language use. The question for subordinate groups is how to 'dialogize' dominant monological discourses (Gardiner 2000). An important aspect of the human utterance is its 'addressivity' (obraschennost') or the quality of turning to someone (Morson and Emerson 1990: 131). This calls to mind the oft-spoken Russian phrase 'k komu 43 . , . 7, ('who shall we turn to?'), which we shall see employed in context in the obratit sza. . chapters. In the context of Bakhtin' s philosophy this seems to demonstrate following k a loss of dialogue or of an addressee. Who did people turn to in the past, how a lac or fti . was it (Vitebsky 1992, 1993) and how can local populations re-establish e ecuve ' dialogue in their lives today? For Bakhtin a dialogue is open-ended. Central to his 'prosaics' is the concept of 'unfinalisability' (nezavershennost'). Cruikshank (1998) draws our attention to dialogue not only as a 'way of being' but also as a 'way of doing (anthropological) research': The work we do is grounded in talk, in dialogue, in interactive relationships. What too often are missing from scholarly studies ... are interruption and risk. Academics too often frame the experiences of others with reference to scholarly norms. Yet unless we put ourselves in interactive situations where we are exposed and vulnerable, where these norms are interrupted and challenged, we can never recognize the limitations of our own descriptions. It is these dialogues that are most productive, because they prevent us from becoming overconfident about our own interpretations. (Cruikshank 1998: 165) Cruikshank is concerned with 'how local voices can contribute to-theoretical paradigms that frame contemporary scholarship' (ibid: xiii) and the 'potential of stories to make us re-evaluate situations we think we understand' (ibid: xiv). What people tell to oil company representatives, environmentalists, journalists and researchers are all stories in their own way. Taking this analogy, much that Cruikshank writes about stories can be related to these kinds of public testimonies: 'One of the most trenchant observations of contemporary anthropology is that meaning is not fixed, that it must be studied in practice - in the small interactions of everyday life. Such practice is more likely to emerge in dialogue than in a formal interview' (ibid: 41). Finally, I also draw on the work of Habermas, whose democratic ideal is dialogical in that it focuses on communicative action. His model is the bourgeois public sphere of 17th and 18th century Europe and the critical debates of face-to-face conversations in European salons and coffee-houses (Calhoun 1992; Habermas 1994; Thompson 1994). For Habermas, society is composed of the system and the lifeworld (everyday 44 life). The lifeworld is the realm of personal relationships, human values, and (ideally) communicative action; it is the place where 'speaker and hearer meet', where they make claims, criticisms, agree and disagree (Ritzer 2000: 543). The system is ordered by non-linguistic media (money and power) and is seen to be colonizing the lifeworld particularly by impeding free communication. Habermas sees that the public sphere has degraded into consumerism; rational-critical debate has become the consumption of culture; and the formation of a general public interest through debate (the 'concensus theory of truth') has given way to the negotiation of increasingly diverse public interests (Thompson 1994). For Habermas, modem communication media such as radio and TV are unable to provide the same kind of forum for critical public debate as the bourgeois public sphere. Thompson sees the new media communications in a more positive light, but accepts that 'publicness has become detached from the sharing of a common locale. It has become de-spatialised and non-dialogical' (1994: 95). Electronic relations are different from face-to-face communication, but I would argue that the Internet provides the opportunity for dialogue to develop without the latter. However, this does not deny the value of face-to-face debate, which is enjoyed by players in my thesis at public meetings, seminars and conferences. In theory, oil company consultations and public hearings also provide opportunities for this kind of public debate. Acknowledging that there can be no return to the elitist model of the bourgeois public sphere, Habermas sees the site of social critique to be human communication in general (dialogue). In a similar way Fishkin (1995: 7) advocates the ideal of 'civic engagement', which implies that citizens not only deliberate issues, but care about local society enough to invest time, resources and effort in making it function. In the thesis I question whether public consultations can be genuine dialogues between local people and oil companies. I also explore the need of Noglikskii District citizens for dialogical relationships with local decision-makers, outsiders of various types and one other. I analyse the global dialogue between multinationals and environmentalists and the various different layers of negotiation that are part of this. I consider the value of open-endedness (unfinalisability) for these dialogues. I analyse attempts by dominant actors to 'monologize' local discourses, and by local actors to 'dialogize' dominant discourses. I also explore the difficulties posed by heteroglossia for those attempting to engage in dialogue. I consider dialogue as a 'way of being' in the Bakhtinian sense; as a way of doing research in the sense demonstrated by Cruikshank; and as a form of social critique in the way proposed by Habermas. 2. 7 Methodology and Methods65 45 I come from a mixed disciplinary and largely practitioner background. My BA degree in modern languages (German and Russian) has served as a sound basis for both environmental work and ethnographic fieldwork based on communication and social interaction. Initial PhD training in human geography introduced me to fieldwork methods, research design techniques and the qualitative-quantitative debate (Flowerdew and Martin 1997; Lindsay 1997). My actual fieldwork has been more anthropological or ethnographic, based largely on long-term participant observation (Ely et al 1991; Russell 1994) supported by informal interviews, a survey, newspaper analysis and archival research. I chose a (nested) case study approach (Ragin and Becker 1992) set in the context of the Sakhalin offshore oil and gas developments. I focused on the case of Noglikskii District as it faces the greatest ecological risk from the offshore projects given their close proximity to its coastline. My ethnography is made up of selected case studies illustrating natural resource use and human agency in Noglikskii District. My invitation to Sakhalin was provided by the NGO Sakhalin Environment Watch, with whom I had collaborated for several years. I was thus not limited in my fieldwork by an affiliation to a scientific institution. However I did benefit from collaboration and contact with ethnographers from the Nogliki Ethnographic Museum and the Sakhalin Regional Museum, the Sociology Department at the Sakhalin Regional University and the Kamchatka Institute of Ecology and Natural Resource Management (Petropavlovsk-Kamchatskii). I did not experience any trouble with the local or regional authorities, although regional leaders tend to mistrust foreign environmentalists, who are often perceived as attempting to undermine the regional economy.66 I did experience the limitations of various 'gatekeepers', while informants 65 I am grateful for the opport~nity to discuss these and other questions at the interdisciplinary workshop 'Negotiating the Post-Soviet Field: Qualitative Research in the Former Soviet Union, Weymiss Bay, nr. Glasgow, 22-24 June 2001, organised by Kate Thomson, Rebecca Kay and David Anderson. 66 See Chapter 3. 46 occasionally discouraged me from meeting other people, or promised to introduce me to interesting acquaintances but never quite got round to it. On Sakhalin, although times are changing rapidly, foreigners are still exotic (ekzatika) and treated as honoured guests simply because they are foreigners. However, people are seeing more and more wealthy foreign (and Russian) oil workers on the island, while their own standards of living may not be rising noticeably. Foreigners are expected to be wealthy: one informant asked me if my parents were magnates. Even if foreign researchers live among local people and share some of their hardships temporarily, they are always able to leave. This is psychologically significant for the researcher and also for his or her informants. My initial contact with people in Noglikskii District was through personal rather than official introductions. Finding a place to stay was a significant part of the research process, which I had previously underestimated. By agreeing to live with a family or in someone's flat, one is forming an alliance and this affects the way that other people respond to you. I first lived with a Native elite family, which provided good access to their social networks. I was, however, finding it difficult to meet people outside that community, so I eventually moved to a flat, where I lived alone for the latter part of my stay. This was the property of another (Russian) informant and moving there was seen as a sign of my alliance with him. Paying rent also means establishing relations based on money, which is significant in a society where money transactions are still mistrusted. I was very conscious of being a (political and financial) resource during my fieldwork period. One informant raised the issue of payment for interviews when a British writer came to visit Nogliki. The writer, who also has experience as a journalist, claimed she had never paid for interviews, only for accommodation and services. We resolved the ethical dilemma by paying for one interview, though the transaction was unnatural on both sides. People who had a !ot of experience with researchers (especially Japanese researchers) were beginning to perceive their information as something that was being harvested as a resource and transformed into careers and money. Participant observation entailed keeping a field diary. I generally did not write things down during an informal conversation, but soon afterwards. My (selective/ poor) 47 memory will have influenced the way that information was carried over time, hopefuily not significantly. Long-term fieldwork is important for understanding and interpreting what people say; getting to know dominant local discourses; understanding the context of situations. The researcher's identity can influence people's responses. People responded to me as a Westerner, an environmentalist, a (single) woman, an Englishwoman (not an American), a non-Russian, a non-Native. I shifted between insider and outsider positions. As an outsider I was sometimes neutral, which encouraged people to be more open. As a woman I was excluded from the male smoking corner and male bania,67 but had access to women's private conversation spaces. Long-term research is also important because informants can be inconsistent: they say different things to different people; they may answer the same question differently if asked again in a different way; they may change their opinions over time or due to some outside influence (e.g. the researcher). Often it is better not to ask questions, but to let people talk. Cruikshank's (1990, 1998) work provides valuable insights into learning how to listen. Informants may also say what they think the researcher wants to hear. People may show only their 'public' side at first; it takes time and the build up of trust for people to show their private side (Scott 1985, 1990). One Native informant told me soon after we met that Native people needed priority fish quotas because they eat more fish than Russians. When we knew each other better she admitted she didn't eat much fish and would rather sell the fish they caught and save up for a car. When a visitor came to Nogliki, the same informant explained a ritual for newcomers that involved splashing vodka on the forehead. She then looked at me and laughed: 'I made that up.' Participant observation allows the researcher to become aware of performance. It allows time for the researcher to gain access to the backstage of local life (Scott 1989; Kothari 2001). The method is not totally objective (no method can or should be) and I acknowledge that this thesis is merely my own interpretation of the events that I experienced and the people whom I encountered in a particular place at a particular time. 67 Public baths. 48 Although my research is intended to focus on potential agents of change, I have nonetheless been concerned about its representativeness. In order to substantiate information from close informants, I did a survey in Nogliki and Val about general use of natural resources, attitudes towards the authorities, opinions about the offshore projects and people's feelings about the future. I used this as a tool for gaining access to a broader sector of the population and it also provided useful insights into public opinion and local practice. A detailed analysis of the results can be found as Appendix III: Analysis of Survey. Surveys are most effective at providing comparable data when they cover a wide range of representative respondents and are administered objectively and uniformly (Lindsay 1997). I managed to collect a total of 223 completed forms (200 from Nogliki and 23 from Val). This is a fairly representative sample of the adult population of Nogliki (total population 12,300), while the questionnaires from Val were able to provide me with useful comparative information about the reindeer herding community. I personally administered some questionnaires, left others at schools or offices for people to fill out themselves and others were distributed and collected by friends. Thus the questionnaires were administered unevenly but covered a fairly broad range of social levels and occupations, including the unemployed. I held (semi-structured) interviews with officials, heads of enterprises and some elderly informants (Ely et al 1991; Lindsay 1997). In interviews I had a list of questions, but would let the interviewee talk freely about what they felt was important in the context of the issue we were discussing. On occasions I used a dictaphone. Sometimes people did not mind this; others were bemused, but accepted it; at other times the dictaphone was intrusive. It was not used in informal conversations, although one close_informant gave a very candid interview on tape, revealing a surprising degree of trust. With non-official informants interviews were more like conversations. With those I spent more time with, conversations have developed into on-going dialogues: Ethnographies always begin as conversations between anthropologists and our hosts, who are also in conversation with each other. If we are fortunate some of these conversations take unexpected turns, develop into genuine dialogues, and continue over many years. Dialogues open the possibility that we may learn something about the process of communication, about how words are used to construct meaningful accounts of life experience. In this way they · differ fundamentally from structured interviews, where one of the participants claims the rights to both pose the questions and interpret the responses. 49 (Cruikshank 1998: 25) Being fluent in Russian meant that interviews and conversations were spontaneous and natural, I did not need an interpreter and I was able to catch casual conversations (on the street, at the market), which were not aimed at me, or influenced by my being a foreigner. I also made an effort to study Nivkh, which was appreciated by my Native informants. The lessons provided interesting insights into the (former) educational process and the way Nivkh is being remembered and lost. They also provided an additional source of income for my landlady. However, Nivkh was not needed for interviews or conversations. Most Nivkhi, apart from the very elderly, speak fluent Russian. I attended local meetings of the Association of Indigenous Peoples in Nogliki, as well as a seminar in Yuzhno-Sakhalinsk and a conference in Moscow organised by the national Association. I gave a paper at a symposium in Sapporo together with the Native representative of the Sakhalin regional duma (Wilson 2000; Murakami and Tabata 2000). These meetings provided opportunities to observe in different contexts how Native interests were represented (including by myself). I attended a forestry seminar in Yuzhno-Sakhalinsk in which non-Native representatives from Nogliki also took part. I also travelled with visiting environmentalists in northern Sakhalin and attended the public meetings organised by them. 68 I tended to use a dictaphone at public meetings, and in these contexts no one questioned my use of it. I was unfortunately unable to attend any oil company public hearings during several years working on Sakhalin issues. I attended only a small meeting held by Exxon for the benefit of Native representatives. I did acquire detailed transcripts of some 1997 consultations and have relied also on private and newspaper reports from people who have attended oil company consultations at different times. 68 See Chapter 4. 50 I read the local newspaper Znamia Truda (Banner of Labour)69 regularly while I was living in Nogliki, subscribed to it in 2000, and have received most editions since then through local contacts. The newspaper is an invaluable source of information on local economic and social issues and I have drawn on it extensively in the ethnography. It is an important forum for political debate and publishes a range of opinions on local issues, providing insights into the dominant local discourses and the everyday lives of local citizens. In 1999 the newspaper won the All-Russia award for district newspapers. Overland (1999) notes how local newspapers provide information on the opinions of local figures who may hesitate to express those opinions in an interview, while citing from these published sources reduces the legal and moral liability from reporting unpleasant material. I found that people were not hesitant to express the same views face-to-face as they did in the local newspaper, but I do find that the local newspaper provides a more legitimate citation for gossip and petty local politics than personal quotations. I also did research in the Sakhalin Regional State Archives and the archives of the local fishing collective, Kolkhoz Vostok, and I received documents from the regional Land and Ecology committees. I have kept up correspondence with various Sakhalin informants over email. This is limited, of course, to those who have access to email, who are mostly based in Yuzhno-Sakhalinsk. Only one of my Nogliki informants writes by email and we have a frequent exchange of letters. I write to most Nogliki informants by ordinary letter, which is much slower. I receive regular email updates about environmental campaigns, and email bulletins from Russia-related environmental and Native rights networks. Writing up is an ethical can of worms. The unstructured nature of participant observation means that people are unaware of what you are observing. They open up their lives to you and if you do not have a notebook to hand they may be unaware that you are mentally noting things down to write up later. Overland (1999: 42) draws attention to 'the subjectivity of gathering quotations through personal conversations and the indeterminacy of translating them from Russian into English' not to mention translating from recording to transcript, or in some of my cases, from memory to notebook. My research is quite heavily focused on people, their characters, individual personalities, petty rivalries, political beliefs, semi-legal and illegal activities. This 69 The 4-6 page newspaper is published twice a week and has a variable circulation of 2000-3000. - -- ·- -~- - - - ------ --;-.-, 51 raises the question of how to write a thesis about people who are easily identifiable, particularly if I am intending in some way to return the thesis to the field. Overland also expresses concern about issues of anonymity and about juggling the need for freedom of exposition in order to present a full analysis (including information about illegal, immoral or embarrassing behaviour) with a concern not to offend informants (1999: 47-8). He resolves this question by providing either no name or a pseudonym to informants. In my ethnography, I have protected the identities of my informants as much as possible through pseudonyms and in some cases by altering personal information. Overland states that 'observation of people's behaviour in the public sphere does not require their consent' as the public sphere 'should remain open to public opinion and inspection' (ibid: 49). The public sphere is where figures have taken up leadership positions, published material, given official interviews, public speeches, conference presentations, and so on. However, I have also applied pseudonyms to public figures such as local politicians and environmental activists, though I have not changed the names of public organisations. I have avoided using the names of more important public figures (e.g. the Noglikskii District mayor, the head of the Sakhalin oil company, the Sakhalin governor) in order to draw attention away from the person and on to the official position they hold and their role as that official figure. I have not changed the names of newspaper journalists. Forging intimacy with informants entails building up intricate relationships of obligation which last beyond the fieldwork period. What are the obligations and responsibilities to the people back in the field? Some people assess the effectiveness of a researcher (or environmentalist) in quite strict terms. People ask 'what is the use (tolk) of your work? What will come out of it?' Researchers and other interventionists may be seen as a solution to local problems, but there may be a sense of helplessness and depression among informants. What are the realistic expectations of what a field researcher can do once they have left? 'Exiting' the field thus becomes problematic for the researcher. Writing a thesis is only one way of collating fieldwork material. The audience of a thesis is limited to one or two supervisors, two to three examiners and a handful of earnest students who may refer to it in the University Library. When considering advocacy and 'giving back to the community' , the question arises as to whether or not 52 to publish the thesis in Russian, or if not, then in what form to publish the material for various audiences. I have already published my Sakhalin research as academic articles in Japan (Wilson 2000a), the UK (2000b) and on Kamchatka (2001). An article of mine has also appeared in the Noglikskii District newspaper (Znamia Truda, 11 January 2001: 1) and I have disseminated information over the network of the Russian Association of Indigenous Peoples of the North (RAIPON). I intend to further publish or disseminate my material in various forms: articles in Znamia Truda; Russian and English journal articles; reports for industry and environmentalists; a book (in English and Russian). I am particularly concerned about the relevance of my work for the people of Noglikskii District. When my article about problems of traditional natural resource use was published in the local newspaper, an informant commented, 'What you wrote was right, but most people aren't ready for it here. It's like music playing in a restaurant and everyone is too busy eating their food.' 53 3. Sakhalin Offshore Projects: Global Responsibilities In this chapter I examine the power struggle between the forces of global capitalism and global environmentalism as it is being played out on Sakhalin in the field of offshore oil and gas exploitation. I focus on language and meaning; regulation and control; commitment, obligation and responsibility. Multinationals are obliged to adhere to the legislation of their host country and they also follow their own company policies, those of their financiers, World Bank guidelines and other standards of international best practice. The multinationals working on Sakhalin have both suffered from and exploited inconsistencies in the Russian legislation (particularly in its implementation). NGOs focus on the use of legislation to bring the companies to account. However, with regards to participation, the formal Law merely obliges companies to hold public consultations. 1 I will demonstrate how these consultations fail to ensure meaningful public participation in the Sakhalin offshore projects. I will also explore the ways in which NGOs try to ensure that international standards are applied to participation processes, including through reference to companies' own sustainability discourse. In the first part of this chapter, I present an 'ethnography of corporate discourse' on sustainable development, corporate social responsibility and public participation, noting how it reflects international standard practices and universally acknowledged values. I focus on Shell, the operator of the Sakhalin-2 project consortium Sakhalin Energy, and the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD),2 one of the financiers of the same project. 3 In the second part of the chapter, I analyse the Sakhalin-2 project public consultation process, with the aim of comparing the policies and principles laid out by the oil company and development bank in their promotional literature to the realities of project implementation at the regional and local levels on Sakhalin. In the third section, I analyse the attempts of global environmentalists to 1 Public consultations, in my interpretation, include open public hearings and closed interest group meetings (with Native representatives, fishing enterprises, etc.). · 2 In 1997, the EBRD agreed to lend $116 million to the Sakhalin-2 project. Equal loans were pledged by the US Overseas Private Investment Corporation (OPIC) and Japan's Export-Import Bank (JEXIM). 3 Both of these players have placed a lot of information about themselves in the public domain (see their web-sites: http://www2.shell.com/home/Framework and http://www.ebrd.org/ (19.04.02). They control multinational activities. I explore the shifting power relations between the environmental and pro-development lobbies. The latter also includes the Sakhalin government, represented in this narrative by the regional governor. I also aim to assess what effect the work of NGOs has had on public agency at the regional and local levels and to what extent local players are included in global environmental battles. In later chapters I wish to compare these global battles over resources and meaning to those played out over the resources of the same place by local agents.4 3.1 Shell and the EBRD: Policies and Principles 54 A careful analysis of Shell's and EBRD's policies reveal a clever ambiguity of language, which demonstrates both a serious commitment to sustainable development principles while leaving the interpretation of corresponding obligations open to interpretation. In its founding agreement, the EBRD pledges 'to promote in the full range of its activities environmentally sound and sustainable development' (Article 2.1 vii) (EBRD 1996: 28). Article 1 states that their purpose is 'to foster the transition towards open market-oriented economies and to promote private and entrepreneurial initiative5 in the central and eastern European countries'. 6 According to the EBRD Sakhalin-2 project summary,7 the project objectives are: (i) to increase Russia's crude oil production and exports; (ii) to promote the economic development of Sakhalin Island; and (iii) to introduce modem and environmentally sound offshore oil production techniques in the Russian Federation. The main 'transition impact' expected by the EBRD is a 'demonstration effect' to show how a project based on a Production Sharing Agreement8 can succeed, which would facilitate foreign investment in Russia's oil and gas sector. Most relevant to my analysis is another expected 'transition impact': '[Sakhalin Energy's] environmental practices, including its commitment to ongoing public consultation'. have also made an effort to engage with local communities on Sakhalin and have been willing to listen to stakeholders (NGOs, local leaders). 4 . See Chapters 6 and 7. 5 In Chapter 7, I consider oil company sponsorship of private enterprise in the light of this pledge. 6 http://www.ebrd.com/english/index.htm (10.11.01) 7 http://www.ebrd.com/english/opera/projects/psd/psdl997/94sakha1.htm (10.11.01) 8 See Appendix II for more information about Production Sharing. 55 In 1991 the EBRD adopted an Environmental Policy outlining its commitments to promoting sustainable development (EBRD 1996: 28-31).9 The Bank's Environmental Procedures detail their policies of environmental appraisal and public consultation (ibid'). All companies receiving EBRD support must 'ensure that all national requirements for public consultation in the country where the operation will take place are met'. The company is expected to publicise information about the proposed operation, so that the public has 'the opportunity to influence operation design including location, technological choice and timing'. This is an important pledge as it refers to public influence over project implementation. For a level 'A' project10 the company should consult with government agencies, elected officials and NGOs as well as 'all those potentially affected' by the operation so they can express their views before a financing decision is made. This obviously does not bind the company to take stakeholder views into consideration. Another problem in my view is that the definition of 'consultation' is left open. However, mechanisms for consultation are identified and these include 'technical meetings with experts, meetings with community leaders, public meetings, press and other media coverage and correspondence' (ibid: 18). The company is obliged to complete an Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) of the project and make it publicly available, together with a project summary in the local language, allowing time for public comment before the Bank's final review. The EBRD Public Information Policy (PIP) commits the Bank to working with representatives of 'civil society', including NGOs and 'locally affected people'. However, it also highlights the need to balance transparency and a willingness 'to listen and be receptive to comment' with accountability to shareholders and respect for client confidentiality (EBRD 2000). Thus Coleman (1985) is right to be concerned about the dilemma of satisfying diverse stakeholder interes_ts. Shareholders are the EBRD's most important stakeholders, other priorities being its clients and co-investors and its employees. Interaction with other stakeholders (including NGOs and the public) 'given their divergent interests, their large number and their global spread, must be looser and incorporated, for practical reasons, into the notion of the Bank's willingness to listen' (EBRD 2000). Listening is important, but again it does not oblige them to act in any way. The Bank 9 This and other documents mentioned here are available on the EBRD web-site at http://www.ebrd.com (10.11.01) 56 is also committed to upholding the principles of Agenda 21 11 and the Aarhus Convention (ibid) 12 and they have a policy relating to ethnic minorities (EBRD 1993). The language used by Shell likewise combines a demonstration of commitment to liberal democratic values with a lack of concrete obligation. Shell claims that 'openness, transparency and accountability are central to good relations with our stakeholders' 13 who include 'all of us in Shell, our customers, ... other companies with whom we work, ... governments and non-governmental groups and ... all those affected by our operations and products'. 14 Accountability means not only complying with national and international law, but also understanding 'the currents of public opinion' and endeavouring to 'meet societal expectations' (ibid). The Shell management primer on sustainable development talks about inclusivity, good governance, accountability, working within national economic and regulatory frameworks, making a positive impact on communities and societies and preserving the world's ecosystems in the long term. Shell reminds us that sustainable development does not mean the world stops developing its natural resources but that they are used responsibly (Shell 2001). Note that this last observation might equally have come from an environmentalist. The meaning lies behind the ambiguous wording. This is a good example of the inherent ambivalence of the sustainability discourse, its appeal to many and ultimately its lack of 'teeth'. However, Shell has invested much time and effort in the greening of its corporate image and this has contributed towards a general shift in corporate consciousness. 15 In the 1990s Shell revised their General Business Principles to include their commitment to sustainable development. The Shell Reports have broken ground on corporate reporting about sus.tainable development and are open to public debate on the Shell web-site. 16 The company has a Sustainable Development Management Framework, 10 A level 'A' operation is one with potentially diverse and significant environmental impacts which are complicated to identify, quantify and prescribe mitigation for (EBRD 1996) 11 From EBRD's magazine 'Environments in Transition', Autumn 1997: 6-10. 12 The Aarhus Convention on Access to Information, Public Participation in Decision-Making and Access to Justice in Environmental Matters (1998) (http://www.unece.org/env/pp/) (19.04.02). 13 'Establishing a Dialogue', http://www.shell.com (10.11.01) 14 www.shell.com (29.01.02) 15 Much of this shift in corporate consciousness has been due to the vision of John Browne, Chief Executive of BP. 16 http://www.shell .com (10.11.01) 57 Sustainable Development Council and Social Accountability Team; Shell works closely with the World Business Council for Sustainable Development;17 the Shell Foundation is managing a 'Sustainable Communities' programme of grants for local initiatives. Shell requires EIAs (and increasingly social impact assessments) for all new projects; conservation plans for sensitive areas; emergency preparedness plans; waste recycling; and pollution reduction. The 1998 Shell Report and other company materials adopt terms from the language of corporate social responsibility (CSR) such as the 'triple bottom line' of environmental, social and economic performance. 18 Shell acknowledges that it is bound to have a social impact in the societies where it operates (Shell 2001), but believes it brings benefit by being an economic actor, acting responsibly, being a good neighbour and taking local cultural differences into account (ibid). Shell has progressed from the 'strategic philanthropy' of the 1990s, 19 to what they term 'social investment' (Shell 1998, 2001). Clutterbuck (1992: 152) notes that CSR thinking has moved on from 'community investment' to 'community partnerships' . I consider the realities of Shell's commitment to social investment in Chapter 7. In Russia generally there has been a lot of talk of partnerships between Native groups and oil companies. On Sakhalin no such partnerships have been established, but in this chapter and in Chapter 4, I discuss the evolving relationships between Sakhalin's Native people and local as well as multinational oil companies. 3.2 Sakhalin Energy: A Stakeholder Dialogue? Sakhalin Energy Investment Corporation (SEIC or Sakhalin Energy) has made more of an effort with public relations than other oil companies on Sakhalin. Below I analyse the nature of their public relations .work (community work, public consultations and public hearings) and question the objectives, value and effectiveness of public participation. Public relations work is very personal and individual personalities make a big difference. Local people perceive an oil company in the light of those who represent 17 Ledgerwood and Broadhurst (2000) provide a background to the WBCSD, but it should be noted that the organisation is criticised for its superficial commitment to environmental principles. 18 http://www.sustainability.com/philosophy/triple-bottom/default.asp 19 From Blomquist, P. (2000) 'The New World of Corporate Responsibility', The Seattle Times, 13 April 2000 (http://seattletirnes.nwsource.com/news/editoriaUhtml98/bloml 3_20000413.html). 58 the company in their everyday lives: at festivals, school open days, sports events. Significantly, public relations people are not responsible for decision-making about the industrial project itself. From 1992-1997 Sakhalin Energy's full time public relations officer was American Andy Newton,20 who travelled around Sakhalin meeting with local people to find out what social projects the company could invest in. Andy Newton, who now works for Exxon in a similar capacity, is personally committed to Sakhalin and is convinced of the socio-economic benefits that the offshore oil and gas projects will provide to local people. He is well known and well liked, particularly among Native people. 21 He speaks Russian fluently, plays the guitar and sings in Russian, had a long-term partner from Sakhalin, shuns ex-pat accommodation, and is very much 'one of us' (nash chelovek). Other oil workers tend to be quite definitely 'them' (Amerikantsy) in the eyes of local people, even when they take Russian wives and mistresses. 22 Newton's work for SEIC was assessed by local people in terms of his personal contribution to the communities he worked with. Significantly his discussions with local people did not provide a channel for them to influence project implementation. In a 1997 report23 on NGO activities on Sakhalin, US grant foundation representative, Laura Carson,24 noted that 'Sakhalin Energy is the most visible financier of social and cultural projects [on Sakhalin]'. 25 Andy Newton's work included information exchange and organisational support (an Internet search for the Deaf Association, providing information on Alaskan Native organisations, Internet access at the regional library, etc.). In a promotional leaflet,26 Sakhalin Energy lists their community work: youth initiatives, sports events, art exhibitions, support for talented musicians, the Junior Achievement Award, libraries and museums (including the Nogliki museum). They have also off~red internships at Sakhalin Energy to Sakhalin students, some of which have led to employment with them. They have supported Native festivals and 20 This is not his real name. 21 In her 1997 report, Carson described him as 'one of the most revered people on Sakhalin, known to people throughout the island'. When he visited my landlady's house in 1999 he was treated with great respect; the women greatly enjoyed flirting with him and singing along to his guitar. 22 I did not explore this question in depth, but it is my impression that Russian wives and mistresses tend to be absorbed into the ex-pat community, rather than vice versa. 23 Unpublished trip report, 1997. 24 Not her real name. 25 Unpublished trip report, anonymity preserved. 26 The leaflet is entitled 'We try to be "worthy citizens" in the society we are working' (undated). 59 art exhibitions, the Nivkh language newspaper 'Nivkh Dif', the Poronaisk Technical College for Native Crafts, and scholarships to St. Petersburg for Native students. In a display in the Nogliki library in September 2002, sponsored programmes also included children's ecological camps, hospitals and clinics. Sakhalin Energy's public relations intiatives are appreciated by local people, but the nature of the support is nonetheless unsustainable. The engagement is aimed at generating positive publicity, not local development. At a Hokkaido University conference, 'Russian regions: Economic Growth and the Environment' (July 21-24, 1999), the Native representative from the Sakhalin regional legislature suggested that Sakhalin Energy invest in local production. The idea was that if Native enterprises could become self-sufficient rather than depending on continuous hand-outs, they could support social development in their own communities. 27 Sakhalin Energy representatives responded that they would consider supporting such projects if people turned to them for assistance. However, people may not know how to approach the oil companies. They may have psychological barriers to what they consider begging. Support from oil companies still tends to be in the form of grants and there is some considerable resistance to the grant culture: those who receive grants may even find they are bullied in their local community. 28 Thus people's response to opportunities does not depend solely on the opportunities being offered, or on the awareness of opportunities being available. It also depends on their perception of what they will gain from the opportunity, appropriate knowledge and skills (e.g. entrepreneurial nature, ability to write grant proposals), moral pressure from society and from within (the habitus). Attempts have beep. made to engage local people through sociological studies (Vysokov et al 1999). Surveying is familiar to local people, and from my own experience,29 people were quite happy to spend time on it. However, it is a passive form of engagement. Often people are not sure why they are filling out the questionnaire, it does not matter if it is being administered by a regional sociological research centre, an oil company or a foreign researcher. Ultimately the information 27 The idea is of course equally appropriate for non-Native enterprises. 28 I explore the grant culture more in Chapter 7. 29 See Appendix III: Analysis of Survey 60 gained may or may not be used, it has no legal status and no one is obliged to act on the information. Comments made by people at public hearings demonstrates that the public is both aware of and concerned about issues such as this. Also, even assuming that the sampling was representative of the overall population, surveys and statistics are only representative of a specific moment in time, and people's opinions change, particularly in response to economic change. For a programme of monitoring of public opinion to be meaningful it needs to be open-ended. This is difficult and costly on the basis of surveying alone. Public consultations theoretically provide the opportunity for a more dialogical engagement than surveying but in general they do not provide an opportunity for people to influence the course of project implementation, which would be my definition of an effective 'stakeholder dialogue'. 30 Usually planning decisions have already been made before the company presents the project to local people. The results of the consultations have no legal status: the fact of holding them is the only legal requirement. Environmentalists believe that the real motivation for holding consultations is the requirements of project financiers, as revealed by the following comments from US environmentalists who been involved with Sakhalin issues for many years: Russian law is pretty good at guaranteeing public participation in decision-making, but actual implementation of this has been ... (pause) ... I believe that from observing . . . the oil projects, that public participation was done solely to satisfy the investment banks that were investing in the projects. And in fact public comments were neither taken into consideration by the company, nor did they have any impact on changing the course of the projects to make them any more sustainable or environmentally responsible.31 The [consultation] process seems to crop up when NGOs pound their fists and make a lot of complaints, and it seems that in the past this has helped spur consultation. Or when there's big financing in question, EBRD financing or other big financing, and that is ushered out as a way to show the banks that they are providing consultation . . . . They seem to be sporadic, they 30 · I refer here to the WBCSD report, 'Stakeholder Dialogue: the WBCSD's approach to engagement' which I cited from in Chapter2(http://www.wbcsd.org/newscenter/reports/2001/stakeholder.pdf) 31 From interview with US environmentalist Tony Anderson (pseudonym), Yuzhno-Sakhalinsk, September 2001 . 61 seem to be timed strategically. When financing is in question or when NGO or public pressure . reaches a point where they have to do something, so I'm a little bit sceptical of this process.32 In May 1997 consultations were carried out regarding the Sakhalin-2 project offshore drilling platform, Molikpaq, according to the EBRD lending requirements. In October of the same year a series of consultations followed the rewriting of the Sakhalin-2 project BIA in the wake of a protest action by NGOs (see Section 3.3). Reports from that time suggest that Sakhalin environmentalists did not see the public consultation process as an effective means of participating in project planning. The meetings were reported to have been 'quickly organised, poorly publicised, and then advertised post factum as being weighty proof of public understanding and support'. 33 In 1997 Sakhalin environmentalists made suggestions to Sakhalin Energy on how to organise meetings to ensure maximum public participation and comment. These included: advertising the meeting at least one month in advance; developing a way for the public to propose agenda topics; and providing sufficient time at the meetings for the public to make short presentations which might provide an alternative view of the projects. NGOs called for clarification of the legal definition of a public hearing. 34 The following analysis demonstrates the on-going struggle over defining the format of public hearings. In private correspondence, Sakhalin environmentalists express deep cynicism about the process of public consultation and in particular the format of public hearings. 35 [Public hearings are when] people meet together, the company tells them what they are planning to build or do, explains about the project, tells them how good Sakhalin Energy is, assures them that there will be no threat to the natural environment and that lots of jobs will be created and eyeryone will live well. This is usually accompanied by films and slides and they hand out attractive leaflets. In fact, it is a beautiful and exhausting presentation for the public, where several people make presentations about one and the same thing . . .. At the end of the show, when everyone is tired of watching films and hearing the same thing over and over again, there is usually a tiny bit of time left for questions.36 32 Interview with US environmentalist, John Frank (pseudonym), Yuzhno-Sakhalinsk, September 2001. 33 . From Laura Carson's 1997 report on Sakhalin NGOs. 34 From Carson' s 1997 report. 35 I use the term public consultation to mean public or private meetings with stakeholders. Public hearings are full, open public meetings. 36 Sakhalin environmentalist, personal communication, 1999. 62 In October and November 1997, Sakhalin Energy organised public hearings in Yuzhno-Sakhalinsk and five district centres, including Nogliki. 37 These were preceded by preliminary consultations with district leaders and, separately, with Native representatives. From analysis of the transcripts, the format of the public hearings was close to that outlined above. After an introduction, there was a video, followed by a series of speeches with slides: a project overview, a talk on the direct and indirect benefits to local communities and a talk on the ecological aspects of the project. Afterwards there was a question and answer session. Questions asked at the consultations in all towns reveal a public that is concerned about the actual process of consultation, questioning their role in the process and the influence they might have on project implementation. The questions also revealed concern about local benefits, technical and environmental safety and pipeline construction. The latter issue was fended off with the excuse that the 1997 consultations related only to Phase I of the project, and that pipeline construction would be discussed in Phase II. The layered nature of project development has been criticised by environmentalists for not allowing debate about cumulative project effects or discussion of future stages of project implementation. In 2002, consultations are being held about the pipeline after the pipeline route has already been established. In December 1999 a public hearing was held by Sakhalin Energy in Nogliki about the exploratory drilling programme for 2000 (Znamia Truda, 281 h January 2000). 38 The theme of the consultation was advertised in advance and project materials could be studied in the Nogliki library beforehand.39 The hearing was attended by local officials and the public. The format of the meeting was the same as usual: company representatives gave presentations with slides, and so on. According to the journalist, Vasil'eva, questions were raised mostly about ecology (e.g. disposal of drilling wastes). In response to questions about local job opportunities, a Sakhalin Energy representative gave the number of Russian workers and contractors already working 37 This section is based on transcripts provided by SEIC, and comments by NGOs and local citizens. 38 Znamia Truda (Banner of Labour) is the Noglikskii District Newspaper. 39 SEW wrote a detailed commentary on these materials that was published in Znamia Truda some time after the consultations (ZT, 15 March 2000, pl). with the company,40 but did not address the specific concern of local jobs. Vasil'eva concludes: 'The main thing is that there was dialogue', which meant that 'both sides wanted to find a common language and reach mutual understanding.' Local councillor, Andrei Korotkin,41 pointed out at the meeting that the fact that Sakhalin Energy was carrying out public hearings demonstrated that the company was conducting its work in accordance with Russian legislation and international standards. People at the meeting expressed the desire for the company to write about their work in the local press. In 2000, a page began to appear (irregularly) in Znamia Truda entitled 'The Sakhalin-2 project: yesterday, today and tomorrow.' This generally provides information about positive aspects of the projects or attempts to dissipate public concern about negative issues. 63 Special interest group meetings between oil companies and the public are more conducive to discussion and in some cases even result in change. In 1999, for example, environmental representatives from the EBRD met with reindeer herders and subsequently recommended Sakhalin Energy not to fly helicopters over reindeer pastures at calving time. In 1997 Sakhalin Energy also met with reindeer herders, who expressed concern about threats to their pastures, but, according to the transcripts, were encouraged by assurances that high level technology would be used in pipeline construction. The herders then failed to attend the open public hearing in Nogliki. This may have been due to transport difficulties or because they felt that they could not achieve anything more by attending the public meeting. However, the result of this and the failure of other Native representatives who had met privately with Sakhalin Energy to attend, was that Native issues were not raised at the open public meeting. Exclusive dialogue between oil companies and Native groups takes the latter out of general debates on socio-economic issues relating to the district as a whole. This reduces the possibility of finding joint solutions to socio-economic problems and is likely to exacerbate rather than resolve tensions between Native and non-Native residents. Environmentalists also suggest that in establishing a special dialogue with Native people, SEIC are seeking to silence the voices of those who could potentially campaign against the projects. 40 Statistics were: 363 Russians working for Sakhalin Energy; 1000 working for their contractors; 200 Russians to be employed in related jobs However oil companies also meet with environmentalists such as Sakhalin NGO Sakhalin Environment Watch (SEW). Their relationship appears to me, however, to be based more on confrontation (from SEW) and response (from the oil companies) rather than compromise and negotiation. Project financiers have also met with SEW. Other interest groups that the oil companies c.onsult with include the Association of Fishing Enterprises, potential contractors and the press. 42 Aside from public hearings there are several ways in which Sakhalin citizens can officially try to influence decisions relating to the offshore projects. These include commenting on the materials submitted for state ecological expert review, carrying out a public expert review. 43 The public is also entitled by law to demand access to information that may affect their health and environment. The public may also resort to direct action, though these methods are generally limited to national or international NGOs. 64 In 2001-2002 SEIC is carrying out public consultations along the proposed route of a pipeline from the north-eastern offshore oil fields to the south (for export). In 1999 I was shown a map of the pipeline route in the office of the Sakhalin Regional Land Committee and officials assured me that, according to geophysicists, there was no alternative route. The 2002 public consultations are therefore taking place after the pipeline route has been agreed by scientists and officials. Sakhalin Energy's socio­ economic team is carrying out comprehensive public consultations, claiming that they want to hear the voices of all citizens who might be affected.44 However, environmentalists are cynical: We heard the same comments four years ago when they did the hearings for the first part of the Sakhalin-2 project. The same discussions, oh yes, they would communicate with the villagers, they would take their opinions into consideration, they would work with them. This is all done to satisfy foreign observation again from the banks.that are investing in this project. However, what we see is that this is only words. We have not seen actual real implementation of what is a true public consultation process. And I think that despite what representatives of 41 Not his real name. 42 List of meetings appended to transcripts of public hearings. 43 See Appendix II - The Russian Legal Framework: Environment and Participation. 44 From personal communications between 1997 and 2002 I have observed that social experts have demonstrated genuine commitment to social policy change within the companies working on Sakhalin. 65 Sakhalin Energy and Exxon would say, I would say that both companies have shown themselves to be bad corporate actors in the Russian Far East. And [they] would have to prove otherwise in order to improve their reputation and to make me believe that they are actually in any way interested in community out there.45 NGOs nonetheless continue to battle with the multinationals to enable a more dialogical form of public consultation. In April 2002, during Sakhalin Energy's pipeline consultation period, Sakhalin Environment Watch tried to persuade the oil company to take part in a public hearing organised by the environmentalists themselves. This hearing encouraged presentations from opponents to as welJ as proponents of the projects and welcomed a full public debate of issues. Sakhalin Energy refused to attend the meeting. Sakhalin Environment Watch went ahead with the hearing, distributing the results over email to development bank representatives and copying them to NGOs in the US, UK and Japan. 3.3 Global Environmentalism: Challenging the Multinationals In this section I describe the development of Sakhalin's environmental 'movement', based in Yuzhno-Sakhalinsk. I consider the ways that the multinational offshore projects have influenced environmental activism on Sakhalin as a whole. I assess the role of the oil companies and their financers, the state, scientists, and (regional and international) NGOs, with the aim of analysing power relations. The offshore projects have catalysed the development of environmentalism on Sakhalin in a number of ways.46 The public can now refer not only to the evolving body of Russian legislation that guarantees environmental controls and public participation in de9ision-making, but also to the standards of the oil companies and development banks, as well as international conventions and best practice. Transnational alliances enable Sakhalin NGOs to gain access to global information networks (particularly via the Internet), while international NGOs receive more accurate information and gain greater legitimacy in the international arena through partnerships with Sakhalin groups. Perhaps largely because of this transnational 45 From interview with Tony Anderson, Yuzhno-Sakhalinsk, September 2001. 66 network of responsibility, Russians consider Western companies easier to monitor than their Russian counterparts, who have more political power locally, provide local jobs and support district and regional budgets, and are not so vulnerable to international scrutiny. In the early to mid-1990s, the Russian Far East (RFE) was just beginning to open up and international NGOs were starting to become involved there, encouraging the growth of the NGO sector. These organisations included: Friends of the Earth-Japan (FoEJ) (whom I was working for); the Pacific Environment and Resources Centre (PERC)47 ; a US government sponsored small grants programme, ISAR (the International Society for Action and Renewal); the Eurasia Foundation (democracy building and human rights) and the World Wildlife Fund (WWF). Other US-based NGOs (e.g. Earth Island Institute, Environmental Defense Fund) supported initiatives in the RFE without a permanent presence there. Western NGOs, notably the Earth Island Institute, provided Internet access to Russians, catalysing the growth of NGO networks. Westerners also sponsored conferences and workshops. While such meetings were sometimes disparagingly called 'tusovki' (social gatherings), the importance of face-to-face debate between scientists, activists and officials was highly valued.48 Western environmentalists started to get involved in the RFE in response to the arrival in the region of American and Asian resource extraction companies, particularly in the forestry sector, and in view of the huge resource markets of China, Japan, South Korea and other Asian countries.49 They considered the forests of the RFE to be one of the world's last remaining 'wildernesses' and they thus needed to be preserved from the destructio!} of unsustainable industrial practices (Newell and Wilson 1996). Western NGOs also saw the need to build up a strong 'civil society' to control corporate behaviour and make industry more responsible. Opportunities were opened 46 Not all is directly due to the offshore projects. International NGOs have also been greatly involved with Sakhalin forestry issues; there was an international forestry conference on Sakhalin in September 2001. 47 Now known as Pacific Environment. 48 Ata conference organised by FoEJ, a participant commented: 'If you have achieved nothing else With this conference, we are deeply grateful for the opportunity to meet and talk with one another'. 49 From interviews with American environmentalists from PERC and FoEJ, 18th - 20th September 2001. up by US foundations such as W. Alton Jones and USAID,50 who began to prioritise the RFE in the early 1990s. There were strong links between the goals of conservation, democracy building and economic liberalisation. 67 Sakhalin's environmentalists were isolated from NGO development in the RFE in the early 1990s, partly due to Sakhalin's geographical isolation and the difficulty of access ( only by plane), partly due to its status as a closed region for many years under the Soviet regime. I first visited Sakhalin in autumn 1994 to collect information for the FoEJ 'Hotspots' project (Newell and Wilson 1996). I met with various environmental activists - scientists, journalists, teachers, a former ecology committee employee and others. What was striking about this 'environmental community' was that although people knew one another, and in some cases were close friends, they were not working together on any initiatives. One representative of the Sakhalin Nature Protection Society (obschestvo okhrany prirody - a Soviet-era organisation) was waging a one-person public campaign against the offshore oil projects and had links to a network of like-minded 'specialists', none of whom seemed to want to campaign publicly with him. An ornithologist researching the north-eastern wetlands was very concerned about threats from the offshore projects, but felt as though nothing could be done. When I asked about an 'environmental movement' on Sakhalin, I was told that I had 'come too late'. There had been a surge of environmental activism in the late 1980s, but this had not been consolidated, and people were left feeling disheartened and depressed. Even in 1994, the offshore oil and gas developments were perceived by Sakhalin environmentalists to be one of the most serious threats to the island's ecology, and there was particular concern about the lack of information about the projects. 51 This was expressed in terms of a lack of 'glasnost", which 1:Jetrayed people's enduring sense of disappointment at the apparent failure of Gorbachev' s reforms. Even compared with other regions of the RFE, people felt there was a lack of environmental information coming into and going out of Sakhalin, and a lack of contact with outside NGOs. Sakhalin environmentalists did not of course have access to the Internet at the time. 50 US Agency for International Development. 51 From discussions with Sakhalin activists (October 1994) and personal letters (November 1994). 68 Environmentalists spoke of the need for an 'international ecological centre' to unite interested people and serve as an information clearing house, but there had been no efforts to set up such a centre, no leaders or organisers presented themselves. The activists were particularly interested in my foreign contacts, and seemed to be hoping that, as an outsider (and, it seems, a neutral intermediary), I could provide the catalyst to unite people around the proposed centre. The perceived need for an outsider to organise people appears to be an important psychological phenomenon and emerges also in later chapters (see also Yanitsky 1993). Sakhalin environmentalists also understood that they could only monitor the offshore projects effectively in partnership with international organisations. International monitoring, in their eyes, could make up for the inadequacies of the legal system, which they feared were being exploited by the multinationals. Environmentalists were concerned about corruption among state officials and expressed the hope that the centre would provide an alternative to the state system of nature protection, which they saw as being extremely ineffective. From 1995 to 1996 I was based in Yuzhno-Sakhalinsk and attempted to set up the proposed centre, an environmental magazine and an NGO. It proved difficult to unite people, though they ostensibly had the common goal of protecting the Sakhalin environment. People had different personal ideals and motivations; individuals wanted to control and promote their own ideas and projects. Some had intensely personal agendas that were stronger than their environmental commitment (political ambition, material advancement, desire to leave Sakhalin); these people invariably seized the opportunity to move away from Sakhalin when they could. 52 No one seemed to want to take on the role of leader. Perhaps this was related to a fear of 'sticking out' (Yanitsky 1993) or to appear to be seeking personal gain, but most of all, people clearly did not trust one another. A centre was finally set up in 1996, based on an uneasy alliance between a number of the most committed activists. The grant application for the centre required a director to be named, but this caused friction that was only resolved (temporarily) when the 52 However, one activist, Dmitrii Lebedev (not his real name), got a job with the Moscow-based legal NGO Ecojuris and became an important ally for Sakhalin activists in the federal capital: he also became advisor to the Sakhalin federal duma (parliament) representative. 69 most active of the group suggested being leader in name only, assuring the others that in reality they were all equals. However, as time went on, one activist dropped out due to fear of the FSB, another, as mentioned above, left for Moscow. The wife of one of the activists got a job in the Regional Committee of Ecology and became an official herself, part of the state system. As the influence of informal NGO activities increased, she became one of the strongest opponents to grassroots 'dilettantism', and her views were supported to an extent by her husband, who by that time had secured an oil company contract for scientific research. The latter's own acceptance of oil money left him open to criticism from other activists. The radical arm of environmentalism, in the person of one of the original activists, Boris Tereshkov, became the NGO Sakhalin Environment Watch (SEW). This organisation has built up a significant following now, mostly among the younger generation (teenage to early 30s), and mostly in southern Sakhalin, though they are known throughout the island. An offshoot organisation for school-age activists has been established. There have also been splits within the organisation, younger activists accused Tereshkov of being too dictatorial. Two former SEW members have now set up an independent NGO, others have attempted to set up projects on their own. This nascent pluralism is a good sign for 'civil society' and 'democracy', but the breakaway elements have found it difficult to make a success of NGO work outside of the parent organisation. Some foreign observers believe that SEW is the only NGO on Sakhalin, which is far from the truth, but in effect, it is still the only Sakhalin NGO significantly involved in global networks. SEW and its foreign partners are concerned that other Sakhalin NGOs have been 'bought off' by oil companies: [A] great deal of the environmental movement that is doing 'feel good' projects, you know environmental education projects, is actually funded by the oil industry and thus has been silenced. Whether that is a direct requirement of the oil companies or an indirect requirement that these organisations do not raise any concerns about the oil projects I don ' t know but it is a very unfortunate indication of the lack of health of civil society that the oil companies would consider coming in and basically buying off groups. And so you see the independent groups (of which there are a few) have been fairly isolated and that is not healthy and again unfortunate that the oil companies are trying to create those divisions within the movement.53 53 From interview with Tony Anderson, September 2001. 70 The 'feel good' environmental groups are involved in youth activities: river cleaning, ecological camps, caving, hiking, and so on.54 These groups mostly evolved in the early 1990s largely independently of Western influences. Many of the youth activities reflect the work of organisations such as Komsomol in the Soviet era. In Nogliki, too, people tend to look to Komsomol and other Soviet-era organisations as models for public activity, particularly youth work. In her 1997 report on Sakhalin NGOs, Laura Carson noted that 341 NGOs were registered on Sakhalin, 55 of which 19 were known to have ceased their activities. Of these, only 8 environmental organisations were registered, though many other environmental groups were not.56 It is difficult to even speak of an NGO 'sector' on Sakhalin, as there is little understanding of what a public organisation is and what its role in society can represent. On the other hand, the lack of imported conceptions of NGO development norms has made for a truly grassroots approach styled to suit the Sakhalin environment. ... Some of the most successful civil organisations working in Sakhalin are not officially registered as NGOs or as public organisations. The isolation of Sakhalin from the general development trends seen in the NGO community throughout the Russian Far East has meant that groups have picked out their paths on their own, coming to structures that may seem very different from one another despite similar goals .... Sakhalin groups have slowly and steadily found their own in-roads to public sector work. Similarly Sakhalin NGOs have found their own fundraising channels.57 One example of 'truly grassroots' activism cited by Carson is the teacher-led public protest against the construction of a gas-fired power station in Nogliki. I analyse this protest and the work of the Nogliki teachers in Chapter 5. Carson notes about SEW: '[Only the case of Sakhalin Environment Watch] represents a traditional approach to creation of a public organisation, an approach that has seen a long prehistory and has been informed by contact with several foreign and developed Russian Far Eastern NGOs' . 54 Other Sakhalin NGOs are involved in social or political activities. 55 According to information from a participant at the 2001 Civil Forum, as of 10.12.01 there were 930 NGOs registered on Sakhalin. 56 A good example of why it is impossible to 'measure' civil society in terms of numbers of NGOs. 57 From Carson ' s 1997 report. 71 The Sakhalin environmentalists have not become a united movement, but did cluster around the common theme of the offshore oil projects and occasionally collaborate today despite their differences. Some alliances remain strong, such as that between SEW and Ecojuris. 58 When SEW gained access to the Internet, they became part of powerful national and international environmental NGO networks.59 SEW also joined with the Ecological Press Club, an independent public initiative at the Sakhalin regional library, and this helped to ensure that issues were covered in the regional media. The fact of multinationals starting up a series of oil projects in one of the world's richest and as yet 'pristine' seas (the Sea of Okhotsk), the home of the endangered Western Pacific Grey Whale, 60 has attracted a considerable amount of international NGO attention. There are concerns that most of the product will be shipped out to Japan, leaving the RFE regions in a continuing state of energy crisis, unable to afford world prices for the oil or the gas. Gasification of Sakhalin was promised in the tender agreements for the projects, but oil companies now claim it is economically unfeasible. Our FoEJ project focused on forest conservation and protected areas, but became deeply involved in oil and gas issues, as there were virtually no channels of information other than ourselves at the time; we were able to send reports over the Internet. SEW provided local activists with an opportunity to make contact with outside NGOs and channels of influence extending as far as the national governments of Russia, the US and Japan. It also provided international NGOs with a ('local') Sakhalin partner, which increased their access to information and their credibility in negotiations at the international level._ Today SEW is the main Sakhalin-based NGO opponent to the offshore projects. However, Tereshkov' s initial focus was quite different. Tereshkov was passionate about forest conservation, and collaborated with FoEJ initially to gain 58 Moscow-based environmental and human rights NGO. This organisation appears in Chapter 4. 59 In 2000, for example, there was a huge nation-wide NGO protest against Pu tin's plans to import nuclear waste into Russia and his decision to subsume the Committee of Ecology and the Forest Service into the Ministry of Natural Resources. Signatures were collected over the Internet to support calls for a national referendum. Ultimately the attempt failed because many of the signatures were declared invalid by the state electoral committee. 60 In 2002, environmental NGOs Sakhalin Environment Watch and Moscow legal NGO Rodnik have filed a lawsuit against the Russian government arguing that it is not doing enough to protect the grey whales. The case is waiting to be heard in the courts. 72 access to foreign organisations, who could help to save Sakhalin's last remaining old growth forests. He soon realised that getting involved in oil and gas issues was unavoidable. This is due to his own desire to see the offshore projects carried out in an environmentally safe and economically just fashion, but all the same he has expressed frustration in the past at the amount of time that oil issues take away from forest protection activities. The most effective Western NGOs focus on capacity building and development of 'civil society' in the region they are working, by providing information, communications, advice and financial support. They make sure that they are not promoting their own agenda in the Russian Far East, but focusing on the priorities of their partners in that region: We support over 60 different NGOs throughout the [Russian Far East]. We provide them with small grants, equipment, information, training, advice and other capacity-building tools. We organize meetings and conferences to get them together to discuss regional issues and work on regional strategies. And we bring them to the North American continent and other places on the Pacific Rim for educational exchanges .... What we don't do is tell them what to do or how to do it. We have found that the best way to build a lasting movement is to let it grow on its own terms and with local leadership. After all, that is what participatory democracy is all about and from our experience, it's what works.61 International NGOs work with SEW because of a shared (global) ecological vision, accessibility by email, SEW' s eagerness to co-operate with outside organisations and their Western style of working: their ability to work with the media, write grant proposals, organise campaigns, do accounting.62 Most of this depends on the energy, vision, and personality of Tereshkov himself; and the agendas of the foreign organisations who support Tereshkov are essentially his own (particularly forest conservation). Thus the momentum has come from within, from the grassroots (at least from the urban grassroots of Yuzhno-Sakhalinsk), but SEW has flourished because it is in tune with Western agendas and therefore attracts the support of Western groups. 61 From web-site http://www.pacificenvironment.org 20.01.02 62 From interviews with US environmentalists, Yuzhno-Sakhalinsk, September 2001. 73 The development of environmentalism has depended to a great extent on individuals and individual responses to opportunities; personalities and personal histories; relationships and group dynamics. I relate this to the concept of habitus that I discussed in Chapter 2. The more personal aspects of and individual's habitus have influenced events perhaps more than the collective habitus (attitudes to leadership, money, etc.). Tereshkov has taken a bold stance by developing SEW in the way that he has. He has come into conflict with the authorities (including the governor), the oil companies, some local journalists and officials (though others are allies), and like other activists he has an FSB file. He has a confrontational and nonconformist personality. Tereshkov's case is a good example of the significance of Russia's 'culture of specialist knowledge' to a person's life history. He left university without completing his degree in geology. His lack of a proper qualification was a great hindrance to him in getting a job in a society where 'specialities' are so important. Despite being extremely bright and knowledgeable in a broad range of subjects, he was forced to work as a carpenter, though he managed to distinguish himself with his work at the local art museum. His lack of a qualification leaves him vulnerable to the accusation of dilettantism today. However, his past has left him more psychologically self-sufficient. He does not need to be accepted by society if he is doing something he believes to be right. He also believes that he has a right to talk with authority about issues that he is not an 'expert' in, but has researched thoroughly. Tereshkov's 'generalist' approach is precisely what is valued by international NGOs, who find that some scientists cannot relate to politicians and journalists, or campaign, network, or manage other people. Western environmental activists tend to be 'generalists', often with humanitarian degrees. Russian attitudes to non-specialists are still cautious, but thi~ is gradually changing, particularly in regional centres, and the increasing political power of SEW is a good example of this. I think civil society- the environmental NGO community [in the Russian Far East] - has developed to the point that people understand that you don ' t need to be a specialist to be effective and that really is a change, that is a big psychological and philosophical change for Russian society, too. 63 . 63 From interview with John Frank, September 2001 . Jn later chapters, I will consider the way that individual personalities have shaped action in the public domain in Noglikskii district, and how they have defined relationships with outsider organisations. I will also consider the role of expert know ledge and local know ledge in environmental issues, and the unwillingness of local people to make their voices heard if they consider themselves 'not qualified' to raise an issue. 74 The loose international coalition of NGOs opposing the Sakhalin offshore projects has devised innovative approaches to controlling the multinationals. On discovering a range of cases of non-compliance with Russian environmental legislation on the part of SEIC in 1997, the Pacific Environment and Resources Centre (PERC) decided to inform the project financier, the EBRD, appealing to their sustainable development mandate. On 31 June 1997, a letter signed by nine international environmental organisations, including SEW and FoEJ as well as PERC, was sent to the EBRD Board of Directors who were scheduled to vote on an application from SEIC for $116 million to finance the first phase of the Sakhalin-2 project. The fax arrived on the morning of the meeting. This was because the activists got everything completed right at the last minute, but as it turned out the timing could not have been more dramatic. The letter drew attention to the fact that, contrary to Russian legal requirements, the Sakhalin-2 project had failed to pass the ecological expert review and licensing requirements, and had failed to secure formal approval for the project from ministries and committees. It also criticised the lack of public participation in decisions affecting the environment and local economic development, and the lack of transparency of socio-economic aspects. The public consultation process was described as 'unreasonably fast-_tracked and done in a shoddy manner'. 64 The letter also expressed concern that under the Production Sharing Agreements local communities were unlikely to receive an equitable distribution of project revenues, despite the considerable threats posed to local livelihoods. The EBRD's response was to halt their loan until the Board of Directors could be assured that SEIC was fulfilling its legal obligations. 64 From letter to EBRD from international environmental NGOs, 31 June 1997. 75 This incident was not only a challenge to the power-position of the multinationals but was also a shock to the Sakhalin governor. The latter responded by sending a fax to me, the only foreign activist whom he had met personally, and, as it happened, someone quite uninvolved in the writing of the letter, although I had signed it. The governor's response was to emphasise insider~outsider contrasts, attempting to draw the line between acceptable and non-acceptable interventions by external agents. He drew attention to the fact that most of the organisations that had signed the letter were not registered on Sakhalin. He insisted that the Sakhalin Regional Administration was more concerned about the ecological safety and general success of the offshore projects than any outsider or 'detached' (storonnye) organisations. He objected to the fact that international NGOs had not consulted him before sending the letter to the EBRD, as this demonstrated that they did not want to co-operate with the regional administration. He particularly opposed environmentalists' claims that the population of Sakhalin would not receive adequate benefits from the Sakhalin-2 project: 'we consider this to be interference in the internal affairs of the Sakhalin Region'. 65 The governor listed a series of 'public consultations' that had taken place for the projects: eight expert working groups involving more than 60 specialists; parliamentary hearings in the Sakhalin duma in March 1997, to which the public were invited; and five international conferences between 1995 and 1997 in collaboration with the governor of Alaska. Crucially, all of these allowed only for specialists to voice their opinions, apart from the duma hearings where members of the public (in my opinion) would be unlikely to feel as though they could raise issues themselves. In his reply to the governor, the author of the letter noted that it reflected 'the kind of approach to environmental decision-making that must be taken today by members of the international bu_siness and environmental community'. 66 In private correspondence, environmentalists discussed this question of their responsibility and entitlement to get involved in Sakhalin issues. They argued that international environmental NGOs were justified in their concern about environmental issues world-wide, particularly if they might have international impacts, like the Sakhalin projects. Furthermore, NGOs had a responsibility to monitor the funds provided by their own country's government, and to ensure these funds (their taxes) were not 65 From fax from the Sakhalin Governor, 01.10.97. 66 From a letter to the Sakhalin Governor, September 18th 1997 (copied by email to activists) being used to fund environmentally harmful projects. If the Russian government allowed multinationals and development banks in to develop the resources of a region, it should also expect international environmental NGOs to monitor the projects. That is understood by global environmentalists to be the essence of 'civil , , 67 society. 76 This incident signalled a power shift between NGOs and the oil companies and investment banks involved in the Sakhalin projects and the NGOs had discovered a new tactic in targeting the bank to influence the oil company. NGOs still cite this case as the turning point in relations, when the multinationals and banks started to take them seriously and listen to their demands. When the Sakhalin-2 project Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) was reworked and public comments were invited, the international response was huge; PERC began to engage in more dialogue with companies and banks; FoEJ were able to discuss their concerns with the Japanese EXIM Bank in Tokyo. When I made an arrangement to meet with EBRD in London to discuss the new EIA, a representative of SEIC, who was on his way to Moscow, stopped over in London to be present at the meeting. The EBRD environmental representative suggested however, that I was in danger of 'losing credibility as an environmentalist' by raising issues of revenue distribution and the dubious legal status of the projects, implying that these issues were somehow unrelated to the environment. There has since been a shift in mood, with increased concern about corporate social responsibility. The EBRD letter also signalled a shift in state-public relations on Sakhalin, and revealed that the governor's power position itself could be undermined by international public_ pressure. In chapter 5, I illustrate an example where the public challenged the power of the state in Noglikskii district. Later chapters also demonstrate, however, the extent to which hierarchies with~n the state system have remained much the same, with the public less focused on changing the structures of power so much as circumventing them (Cooke and Kothari 2001). A direct challenge to state power is rare. 67 From email correspondence with environmentalists, October 1997. 77 In November 1997 a public meeting was held to discuss environmental aspects of the Sakhalin-2 project, organised by SEW and the Ecological Press Club. 68 Present were over thirty representatives of NGOs, journalists, councillors, and scientists, including two local council representatives from Nogliki, Svetlana Barannikova and Natalya Komarova.69 The main result of the meeting was that in January 1998, a Public Council for Ecological and Economic Aspects of the Offshore Projects was set up by SEW and PERC, involving 20 NGOs and political parties (including Communists, Cossacks, Democrats, and Women of Russia). The aim of the public council was to work as an independent advisory committee to ensure that decisions relating to the Sakhalin projects were made 'democratically'. In a letter sent around that time Tereshkov wrote that this committee was one of the most important successes of the collaboration between SEW and PERC on Sakhalin. However, in the same letter he also noted that the council had a long way to go before it could be effective and there was a lot of pressure on SEW, especially as the governor was strongly opposed to them and was very critical about them in the press. In an interview in 2002, Tereshkov admitted that the Council had never been able to function as they had initially hoped, and had no influence with the government or the oil companies on decision-making. 70 In 1999 the Russian State Committee of Ecology71 denied Exxon the environmental permit needed to drill an exploratory well at their Chaivo-6 field (Sakhalin-I project) after the project failed its State Environmental Expert Review because of Exxon' s plans to discharge drilling waste into the sea. Exxon's threats to withdraw from the project led then Prime Minister Stepashin to pass a decree in 1999 allowing the discharge of drilling waste into the Sea of Okhotsk. A coalition of citizens' organisations, led by Ecojuris, protested the decree in Russia's Supreme Court, which ruled in the citizens' favour and invalidated Stepashin's decree. In 2000, Exxon again threatened to pull out of the Sakhalin I project. They were eventually granted a licence to drill an appraisal well on the Chaivo-6 field after finally agreeing to re- 68 Public initiative based at the Sakhalin regional library. 69 These players also feature in. Chapter 5. 7° From interview with Tereshkov, September 2002; see also Chapter 4. 71 There are various translations of this official body and indeed various terms are used in Russian. The Russian phrase I have encountered most often is 'Komitet po Ekologii ', which I translate here as 'Committee of Ecology' . Other more official versions include 'Komitet po okhrane okruzhayuschei sredi' or Committee for Environmental Protection. 78 inject their drilling waste into the well. This decision increased the cost of the project by US $3 million. 72 In Chapter 4, I explore the interactions between local people and Ecojuris representatives when the latter visited northern Sakhalin in 1999. SEW and their international allies have a global vision and agenda. Biodiversity preservation is a global rather than a local value; concern about multinational activities is a concern about globalisation. In the eyes of most observers SEW is a 'local' NGO, though in fact they are a global player, acting outside the field of experience of most Noglikskii district citizens. NGOs in the RFE have virtually no membership, no constituency. Does SEW speak on behalf of the people of Sakhalin, or simply on behalf of the Thing Without a Voice?73 Environmentalism is also a local, everyday concern. In later chapters I consider whether the international environmental agenda reflects the concerns of local people in Noglikskii district, and I assess the opportunities available to them to raise their own concerns in the global arena. 72 It also changed oil company policy on drilling waste. All new Sakhalin offshore projects are now planned with full re-injection, while SEIC is planning to reduce their disposal to 30%. However, in 2001 Exxon lobbied (unsuccessfully) to have the fisheries category for their drilling areas reduced from the 'higher' to the 'first' category, which would de facto allow discharge. 73 This is the way that a US environmentalist described nature when talking about his responsibility for speaking on its behalf (cited in Chapter 3). 79 4. Global and Local Discourses in the Local Arena In this chapter I consider the way that local societies are being exposed to global discourses (particularly human rights, the rule. of law and participation). I observe the way that local people respond to the visits of outsiders. Visitors place a special emphasis on the importance of legal tools for defending rights. Local players point to the lack of information (about rights, opportunities and industrial planning) that inhibits human agency in the public sphere. In the latter part of the chapter I focus particularly on the Native movement. Native representatives have adopted the language of rights from global discourse and are attempting to assert their rights at the local level. I demonstrate the conflicts between the discourse of Native rights and that of 'equal rights for all' that dominates among the non-Native population. 4.1 Global Activists Visit Northern Sakhalin In 1999 several groups of environmentalists concerned about the Sakhalin oil and gas projects visited north-eastern Sakhalin from Moscow or abroad, holding public meetings with local citizens. In this chapter I focus on two visits. The first was the Moscow-based environmental and human rights NGO Ecojuris, 1 the second was a group of oil spill response experts from Alaska and the Shetlands, accompanied by an activist from the US environmental NGO Pacific Environment (PERC). Both groups were accompanied also by representatives from Sakhalin Environment Watch (SEW). The visitors aims included providing local people with information on how to defend their rights through _use of the law; sharing information about the experiences of local people in other regions with oil and gas development; and gainiang more information for themselves about the local situation in northern Sakhali~. For some local people, particularly non-Native residents, these meetings represented the only public forum where they could openly express their concerns about issues relating to the oil and gas industry and other broader environmental issues. 1 I mentioned this NGO in the previous chapter. 80 In April 1999, Ecojuris representatives, Olga Yaroschenko2 and Dmitrii Lebedev3 visited Okha, Nekrasovka4 and Nogliki, together with Alexei Andreev5 from the Sakhalin Regional Association oflndigenous Peoples of the North,6 Andrei Belyi7 from Sakhalin Environment Watch (SEW), a film crew from NTV national television, and myself. The group held meetings with local people, assessing people's response to the offshore projects and providing information about their legal rights and advice on specific issues that they raised. The first public meeting, in Okha, was attended by about 30 local residents, 8 including local council deputies, (mostly Russian) oil company workers, three (Russian) geophysicists, unemployed residents, three rows of Native women who said nothing throughout the meeting, local television and newspaper journalists. The next meeting was with the Okhinskii District council, including the head of the council, two female and two male deputies and the (female, Native) specialist for Native affairs from the local administration. The final meeting in Okha was with the workers of the local oil company Sakhalinmorneftegas (SMNG). The meeting had been arranged with the chief engineer, but all the (mostly non-Native) workers turned out on the orders of their boss, and filled a medium sized conference hall. In the village of Nekrasovka (see map 2) we met with six members of the Nekrasovka village administration (sel'sovet). The head was a Russian woman, and there appeared to be two Native council members, too. Also present were the (non-Native) leader of the local fishing kolkhoz, local (non-Native) environmental activist Aleksandr Petrov,9 and three Native women who didn't speak. In Nogliki, there was a public meeting at the Nogliki Club attended by about 80 children and 50 adults. The children had heard that the NTV camera crew were travelling with us and asked: 'Are you going to film?' Some children walked out half way through the meeting, perhaps because they realised they were not going to be filmed, but many others stayed. The final meeting was in 2 This is a pseudonym. 3 In the previous chapter, I described how Lebedev moved to Moscow after many years of environmental activist work on Sakhalin. 4 See maps. 5 Not his real name. 6 Elsewhere I use the shorter name, the Association of Indigenous Peoples, or simply the Association. 7 Not his real name. 8 The following are approximate numbers that I counted at the meetings: they are meant to give a Jeneral impression of the size and representativeness of the meetings. This is a pseudonym. 81 Yuzhno-Sakhalinsk with the Public Council for Ecological and Economic Aspects of the Offshore Projects 10 and was attended by 25 people, including officials from the Regional Committee of Ecology as well as environmental NGOs and a representative from the regional Association of Indigenous Peoples. The range of issues raised at these meetings was broader than those raised at the oil company hearings, implying that the public felt a greater sense that it was worth speaking out. The format of the meetings was more conducive to discussion, as the presentations were much shorter than the question and answer sessions, and the aim was to hear what local people had to say. As might be expected, local people at the meetings (especially at the non-urban meetings) were particularly concerned about their local food supply: 'We live on fish'. In Okha, a local council deputy, expressed concern about the location of the Sakhalin-4 project in the north-west (see below) and declared, 'The local people rely on fish. There wasn't much saffron cod (navaga) this year'. People noted an ongoing decline in fish populations. The onshore oil and gas industry has been progressively degrading the local environment over the last 70 years. In local eyes, the offshore projects present not a new threat, but a continuation of the ecological destruction that state industry has been waging for over half a century: 'Our oil workers don't know how to work cleanly.' It is a discourse of loss and resignation, and expectations are that things will continue to be the same. In Nekrasovka, local environmental activist, Aleksandr Petrov, complained, 'Seventy years ago there was a lot of fish in the bays, there were lots of spawning grounds .... Now there is nothing, it has all been destroyed' . Where the offshore projects have already started to drill they are seen as responsible for recent pollution. In Nogliki, a Nivkh woman spoke up, 'The derrick (vyshka)1 1 is already affecting the fish. It smells - we can't eat it. T~e seals are all skin and bone. There are white spots all over the fish. It's not just us - the Russians rely on fish, too.' Another Nivkh woman added, 'Soon there will be no fish left at all.' People at the meetings also noted their present dependency on the (onshore) oil industry for tax payments into the district budgets, and expressed fearthat oil wealth would move out of the northern districts, as the focus shifted to the offshore fields. 10 This was mentioned in the previous chapter. 11 She is referring to the Sakhalin-2 project drilling platform, Molikpaq. 82 Although people I have spoken to in other situations have expressed a vague hope that the offshore projects would make them rich, the people at these meetings did not expect that the multinationals would be able to provide the same economic security as the local oil company, Sakhalinmomeftegas (SMNG). They demonstrated a profound sense of mistrust towards foreigners, and seemed to be well aware of the details of the offshore projects (e.g. the multinationals' tax holidays). Petrov, for example, objected, 'In 20 years the foreigners will exploit everything and we will receive nothing (shish)!' A Native woman, complained at the public meeting in Okha, 'The politicians have talked about profit from oil development - but we don't get any of it. We are mostly unemployed. Our main source of food is polluted. We haven't got anything and we are not going to get anything. We live only off fish, and off the taxes that they are not going to pay. We are going to remain poor'. People were concerned that SMNG were going to abandon northern Sakhalin. One woman suggested they would . have to look elsewhere for income: 'We get profit from fish, we could process fish .... Okha is a town of oil workers. Now SMNG are removing jobs. We have to get jobs from other resources.' Resignation lies heavily in people's speech and people do not seem to have a sense of their own agency. 12 I also observed a reluctance for people to recognise their own responsibility for taking action. They expressed gratitude that experts had come from outside to help them. They showed an interest in taking action, but the response was often in the form, 'who should we tum to?' In Okha, someone asked, 'If there are problems with Sakhalin Energy, which government do we tum to? At what level should we address the problem?' A council deputy referred to an incident two years previously where an emission of loam from oil industry activity had caused considerable damage to local property: 'Who can these people tum to? As deputies, we couldn't help.' At the Yuzhno-Sakhalinsk meeting, a Native representative said, 'I am pleased that Ecojuris came. There was no one to tum to:' As well as working at Ecojuris, Dmitrii Lebedev is advisor to Sakhalin's Federal Duma deputy, Ivan Zhdakaev. At the Nekrasovka meeting, Lebedev urged people to to write a joint letter (obraschenie) to Zhdakaev: 'He has access to whomever you 12 I introduced this idea in Chapter 3 with reference to Goodwin (1998). 83 like. It is worth trying this channel'. In the meeting with local council deputies in Okha, the deputies asked Lebedev about Zhdakaev's work. Lebedev defended the deputy: 'He lives for Sakhalin. His work involves a constant stream of complaints, people ask for money, for flats .... The harder life is, the more often people tum to their deputy'. In answer to the question: 'Is Zhdakaev effective?' Lebedev replied: 'Judging by the volume of work he does for Sakhalin, yes, he is effective. He phones, he meets people. He is active. There are others who are more effective, but he is pretty good. Lots of deputies don't go along at all to the duma meetings'. The above exchange demonstrates the distance (not only physical but in terms of communication) between the Sakhalin electorate and their elected representative in Moscow. People vote for their federal duma deputy and 'tum to him' in times of need, but they do not have much of an idea of the work he does in Moscow (much like UK MPs and especially Euro-MPs). It seems almost that the 'turning to' is more important than the result, indeed that little is expected as a result. Nor could Zhdakaev's special advisor give any concrete answers about the nature of his effectiveness, which appears to be measured in terms of phoning and meeting people and attending duma meetings. The discourse of 'who can we tum to' implies a distinct lack among local people of a 'sense of agency'. Other forms of this discourse include 'we do not have enough information' and 'we need advice from specialists' . The chairman of Okhinskii District council in Okha said, 'The public is quiet because they are not organised among themselves. We always try to support grassroots initiatives. We are looking at the possibilities of developing a Native people's department in the district council. We need legal advice from Ecojuris. We are talking about including something on Native peoples and natural resource use in the district statutes. We don't know enough about the law. We have no lawyers. We need legal advice.' The head of the Nekrasovka village administration noted with relief: 'What a good thing that we met with specialists', while Petrov made a passionate speech of thanks to Ecojuris for coming to visit: 'Now we are no longer alone. No one acknowledges our presence. They called us dilettantes, non-specialists .... Where can we go, who can we tum to?' Petrov's sense of agency has clearly been undermined by officials calling him a dilettante. This confirms his sense that help should come from outside, 84 from specialists. People appear to have given up being active: 'We have let our hands drop (My opustili ruki).' If an idea is suggested, e.g. 'Take the fish for analysis to the local sanitary-epidemiological station,' then people respond that they have tried and failed already, e.g. 'The local branch is not interested.' Some had tried to speak out, but had been 'silenced' . Petrov told us about someone who had investigated an (undisclosed) environmental issue: 'They made a fool of him - he was forced to write another paper to say he'd got it wrong. He died in mysterious circumstances. They don't let us get close to documents.' Petrov himself had been 'silenced': 'I once stood up and spoke [while TV cameras were filming], and tried to prove that we are concerned about the oil industry. Not one word got on TV.' Similarly in Okha, a newspaper containing an interview with Y aroschenko did not go on sale and a TV interview was not aired. A commonly cited reason for inactivity is fear. A Native woman from Okha spoke after the meeting: 'We get no information usually, and today I found out a lot. ... Many people keep quiet because they are afraid. We don't have a public (obschestvennost') like you do [in the West]. Everyone is afraid. We need the people not to be afraid. Everyone is dependent. How can we be independent?' At the Nogliki public meeting, a man from Katangli related an incident where oil was stored on the roof of the house he shared with three other families. They had started court proceedings, but the head of Rosneft' 13 had said: 'If you complain you won't get moved from your house.' The Regional Committee of Ecology refused to help, as did the Department of Construction. The Sanitary­ Epidemiological Station had not responded after two months. 'Now we can't breathe. There are several thousand tonnes of oil. Who can we turn to now?' The residents were clearly intimidated by the head of Rosneft', either because some of them worked for the oil company (SMNG) or for other reasons. The officials they turned to also seemed afraid to help or could not be bothered. Y aroschenko recommended that they wrote a letter listing the specific officials they had approac~ed and listing specifically in each case what the officials had and had not done. They should then calculate the 'moral damage' done to the occupants of the house. According to Y aroschenko, the problem with the present system is that people are not accountable for what they do or fail to do: 'Officials do not have a sense of their own responsibility.' 13 Local oil company Sakhalinmomeftegas is part of Rosneft'. Its full title is Rosneft' - Sakhalinmomeftegas. 85 With reference to the offshore projects, Y aroschenko drew attention to the fact that the law does not protect people, largely because officials do not ensure that it is implemented properly: 'We have very good legislation, a progressive Constitution. But they are very poorly implemented'. Native representatives complained about the vagueness of the law on Production Sharing: 'It is just a framework law. There is no mechanism to use it, no specificity (konkretnost')'. Y aroschenko sees the multinationals trying to evade the law: 'The companies didn't come here to fulfil our legal demands - it's too expensive .... I don't think our officials or our companies are ready for it ... All officials tum a blind eye (smotriat skvoz' pal'tsy) to the law breaking of the companies. It is these officials who are the criminals.' There is a strong sense of mistrust of and alienation from state officials. At the meeting with SMNG, Lebedev blamed the head of the Regional Committee of Ecology for acting against environmental interests by signing documents and allowing things to happen. At the Nogliki meeting, the head of the Sakhalin Association of Indigenous Peoples declared, 'The oil industry has destroyed the environment. Our officials couldn't care less (u nikh naplevatel'skie otnosheniia)'. An official from the Regional Committee of Ecology has even been quoted as saying: 'We are the real enemies of nature. We are the ones who sign the papers'. Contrary to popular opinion, Y aroschenko believes that it is easier to bring Russian officials to account than oil companies, whose 'tankers have Panama flags'. She urges people to sue the state officials who fail to accept their responsibility for controlling the multinationals: 'The officials are hired by us, the public. They should carry out the will of the public. They are starting to realise this with the threat of prosecution ... We need to make the state officials work and understand that they can't get away with it. .. , The law is the only civilised way for people to defend their rights'. For Y aroschenko, rights are there to be defended actively, and the law is the best tool for this job. The Sakhalin-4 project14 is proposed for the waters off the north-western Sakhalin coast, the site of important fishing grounds close to Nekrasovka and other Native settlements, some of which are officially 'closed' but still inhabited. In 1999 the people of Nekrasovka had a village meeting (skhod) to discuss the Sakhalin-4 project. 14 This project has been suspended after US partners ARCO dropped out (see Appendix I). 86 It was attended by about 70 local people and two SMNG representatives. The villagers expressed categoric opposition to the project and approved an official letter ( obraschenie) which Alexei Andreev of the Association was to take to the speaker of the Federal Duma in Moscow. They also collected more than a thousand signatures to support the letter. But, as Petrov put it, ' . . . they [the oil company] got their own way (sdelali po svoemu).' The head of SMNG insisted that Andreev delay his trip to Moscow so they could meet, and made Andreev promise not to hand over the documents. The SMNG boss suggested having another public meeting where he would personally come along and explain the situation to local people. In Nekrasovka they began to discuss the position they were to take at that meeting. Andreev said, 'I will try to make a deal (dogovoritsia)'. Another person replied, 'You will give in to him.' As Y aroschenko pointed out, according to Russian law the villagers of Nekrasovka could hold a referendum about any industrial project if it is planned for a place where Native people live. The local people thus have the chance to use the formal Law to defend their interests. However, this is unfamiliar to them, and they prefer to take a more traditional approach, that of the petition letter (obraschenie). They entrusted their letter to a representative who was to take it personally to Moscow. 15 However, people appeared to sense, and be resigned to the fact that the balance of power and agency lay overwhelmingly on the side of the oil company, not on the side of ordinary people, despite the hundreds of signatures that represented their own opinions. Yaroschenko later commented: 'Andreev spoke just like an official. I had a two hour private meeting with him and no concrete proposals were made. He was very open about the SMNG boss, but showed a blatently subservient position'. Frustrated, she added, 'Native peopl_e have a different psychology from us,' referring to the work of her ethnographer colleague, 'They are afraid to say no, and they make their opposition known through silence. They also think that to strike a deal with someone (dogovoritsia) is to make a step forward. They will also do anything if someone pleads with them or asks them a favour. They only ask favours themselves in extreme cases of need'. The Nekrasovka case demonstrates the dilemmas facing Native representatives, who now have opportunities for co-operation and partnership with oil 15 Taking letters long distances for other people is also a traditional Russian thing to do. companies, but can easily be manipulated into compromising the position of those people they are representing. 87 For Y aroschenko the biggest problem was convincing people of their potential for making change and asserting their rights. At all the meetings, Y aroschenko urged local (Native and non-Native) people to learn about their rights and to act on that knowledge: 'Use the law, be decisive. People are successful in other regions.' 'There are laws, Native people have specific rights. We just have to be active.' 'You have to decide what you want and work from there.' After the meetings, though, Yaroschenko exclaimed: 'Sakhalin people are more lacking in initiative than any other people I have met in Russia! Take the fishermen in Nekrasovka for example. The head of the Nekrasovka kolkhoz16 said, "We need an Association of Fishermen, we met with the mayor in Okha." They expect the state to create one for them! ... And why is no one interested in tourism? In most places there are loads of tourism groups .... Why has no one taken advantage of the train station to set up a cafe, kiosks, etc?' Y aroschenko specifically referred to the 'nuzhen chelovek' discourse: 17 'In general, there is a need for Russians and Native people alike to have someone from outside, a chelovek (person) that can solve problems. They are used to someone else solving their problems. This comes from the Russian tradition (the tsars) and the Soviet tradition where everything was decided by the state' .18 People had told Yaroschenko that Ecojuris' visit had made issues come alive for them. In Okha it had been the only meeting of its kind for years. There had only been two others, where oil companies had said how good it would all be. 'We have to travel out into the regions on such visits,' she said with conviction, adding with a sigh, 'But what will the effect be?' In October 1999 a team of oil spill response experts, were invited by SEW to Sakhalin, accompanied by Tony Anderson of Pacific Envir~nment (PERC). Ecojuris had focused largely on explaining to local people how to defend their rights and bring their officials to account using Russian law. The oil spill response experts in October 1999 had two main aims. Firstly they aimed to review the existing status of 16 Collective fishing enterprise. 17 Nuzhen chelovek just means 'we need someone' but implies 'we need someone to come in and take control/ sort everything out. ' 88 environmental monitoring, oil spill prevention and response preparedness in the offshore oil and gas fields. The aim of the visit was for the foreign experts to share their own experience of oil spill response in the Shetlands and Alaska and make recommendations on how to minimise environmental risks. When informed of their proposed visit, the deputy mayor retorted, 'We ~ave our own specialists who can study the same issues.' The second aim was raise awareness about the possibility of setting up local initiatives and environmental procedures that could (and should in their view) be funded by the oil companies and the state. The consultants visited local sites including Pil'tun Bay, the Nogliki oil workers' camp, Molikpaq and Korsakov in the south, and they took part in public meetings in Nogliki and Yuzhno-Sakhalinsk. The recommendations were written up in a trip report: Sakhalin's Oil: Doing it Right (Lawn et al 1999), which was distributed widely in Russian and English as a hard copy and over the Internet. Recommendations relate to public participation, environmental monitoring, pollution prevention and oil spill response. The experts left local people with the responsibility of implementing their recommendations by making demands to the oil companies and the authorities. One recommendation is the establishment of an independent Sakhalin Coastal Citizens' Advisory Council (SCCAC) 19 'funded jointly by the oil industry and the state - but politically independent of either,' with a broadly based elected board of management (including Native representatives, NGOs, fishermen's unions, tourism groups) and a small salaried secretariat. International NGOs could have observer status. The SCCAC would (i) conduct and review research into environmental science, oil spill prevention and response; (ii) canvass public opinion; (iii) advise government and industry. The committee would link local people, the government and the oil companies: 'Collecti_ve problem solving is often more productive than the traditional adversarial approach' (ibid). The experts also recommend that 'environmental activism in Sakhalin be encouraged, supported and listened to by government, industry, the media and the public', 'all environmental data collected by oil companies, contractors and government agencies be made public' and 'all environmental work be subject to public peer review.' (ibid) . In their report the experts urge government and industry not to ignore public criticism: 18 I have already discussed this idea with reference to Yanitsky (1993). 19 In 2002, this has not yet been established. Even if public opinion seems critical, government and industry should pay attention to it because experience has shown that critical public opinion can have a very positive effect on proposed development projects. For example, it is widely acknowledged that the environmental activists in the United States who were vigorously demeaned by the government and the oil industry in the early 1970s, for criticizing the proposed construction of the Trans-Alaska Pipeline System, actually contributed to the construction of a better, safer system. (ibid) The trip by the oil spill response experts also highlighted the gulf between the multinational projects and local oil industry problems, both in terms of international interest, and in terms of environmental concern and preparedness. On 28th September, shortly before the experts' trip (and less than two months after the first offshore oil was produced), there had been a small oil spill near Molikpaq. 20 That same afternoon Friends of the Earth-Japan emailed Sakhalin Environment Watch and environmentalists worldwide, having heard about the spill from a journalist from the Hokkaido Shinbun newspaper. The message was 'we should jump on this' and the response was swift. The same day in the UK Greenpeace wrote a letter to Sakhalin Energy (copied to the EBRD, OPIC and JEXIM) expressing concern about the spill. They asked for information about the size and time of the spill, the spill mitigation measures being used, and when and how the authorities and the public had been informed. On 29th September a colleague at the Scott Polar Research Institute (SPRI) received an email from a remote sensing lab in Massachusetts requesting a recent image of the area so they could measure the size of the spill and/ or track its movement. Yet while the world responded to the news of the Molikpaq spill within hours, information only slowly filtered through to Nogliki. On Thursday 30th September I asked people on the streets of Nogliki and in local shops if they had heard anything about the spill. No one had heard anything, not even the receptionist at the Fishing Inspectorate. By Friday morning most people knew as they had read the district newspaper Znamia Truda, where the spill had been duly reported. SEIC had sent a fax 20 According to official reports, the floating storage and offloading tanker (FSO) became disconnected from its mooring buoy in stormy weather, releasing oil into the sea and creating a 100m by 500m slick. 90 to the Noglikskii District Aministration to inform them about the spill and to say they were doing all that they could. Znamia Truda readers were informed that they could get information from the Citizens' Defence and Emergency Situations departments in the administration. A representative from the District Committee of Ecology flew out to the scene, a rare occasion where a local official was allowed out to the Molikpaq complex. When I interviewed him later he did not know how the slick was being dispersed and I was told the information in the local newspaper had been inaccurate. The mayor's office had only basic information: 'If it had been a serious spill we would have made a bigger noise about it.' Although it was indeed only a minor spill, environmentalists used the incident as a lever for negotiation with the oil companies. Again they approached them via their financiers, and again appealed to their environmental mandate. On the 29th September, SEW wrote a letter to the EBRD's senior environmental specialist and OPIC's environmental impact analyst. They reminded the representatives about their banks' pledges to respond to public interest groups, especially regarding threats to the environment. SEW requested that the bank representatives help them to secure permissions for the oil spill response experts to visit Molikpaq and other facilities during their trip. Sakhalin Energy had initially been reluctant to grant this permission but allowed the visits to go ahead. On the way back from a trip to Val, the oil spill response team visited the site of another oil spill, this time a local one. On 30th September, a train carrying diesel fuel had been travelling so slowly from Okha to Nogliki that it had fallen off the rails tipping the load from one of its tanks into the Tomi River, which flows into Nyiskii Bay. 21 About 25 tonnes of diesel fuel was spilled (much more than from Molikpaq). This incident wasn't reported by the railway service until 5th October. Long wooden planks had been thrown in to the water in an attempt to stop the flow, but the diesel had slipped through and the planks simply got entangled with weed and twigs. The expert team was able to compare this 'oil spill response' to the shiny modern equipment paid for by the multinationals that they had come to inspect. Profoundly affected by this, the experts made an additional recommendation in their report. 'Our 21 This bay features in Chapter 6. final recommendation is for an immediate, full and public environmental and safety audit of the onshore oil and gas developments in Sakhalin which we believe to be at least as serious a threat to the island's water, land and air as the proposed offshore projects' (Lawn et al 1999). 91 On 15th October, the team held a round table meeting at the Nogliki administration building. Although a range of officials had been invited, there was only a handful of people present. These included an official from the District Committee of Ecology (not the chairman), the head of the Emergency Situations (ES) Department, and three deputies from the local council (not the chairman or the vice-chairman or the head of the local oil company). The mayor, the land committee, fishing inspector and others also stayed away. Those present expressed most concern at the lack of information available about the offshore oil and gas developments. Deputy Barannikova explained, 'We're most worried about oil spills. We don't know how stable the tankers are. We don't know what safety measures there are .. .. We only heard about the last spill from the press'. The emergency situations official commented, 'We got a fax from Sakhalin Energy in the morning, then for two days there was no information from them. Eventually, the regional emergency situations department asked them for information and passed it on to us. . .. It's very bad that all the information is in Yuzhno-Sakhalinsk.' Another deputy complained: 'Our district is sidelined (Nash raion v storone.) People get virtually no information. We only get information through the newspaper. There are no clear relations between the district and Molikpaq.' Barannikova continued, 'In case of a spill, we have no information, no local radio. How do you tell the population? What if people are needed [to help with a clean-up]? How can we protect the shoreline?' The lack of information and the 'sidelining' of Noglikskii District pose a real problem. People equate information with power. They feel powerless in Nogliki because they see that information is being retained in the power centre, Yuzhno­ Sakhalinsk. Without information people cannot form ideas, they worry more, and they cannot prepare for an emergency. Barannikova raised an important point - no local radio.22 The local community is dependent on a bi-weekly newspaper for their 22 The local radio was disbanded in 1998. In 2001 a local TV station was set up in Nogliki . information, so how can they be expected to react to emergencies that happen on the days in between? 92 On the other hand, the phrase 'we have no information' is part of the discourse of 'no sense of agency'. It is repeated so often it becomes a response to everything, a convenient phrase to fall back on. I also see it as being a way out of taking the initiative or taking responsibility for the state of affairs. For example, only two weeks before this meeting, there had been a detailed article in the newspaper about the work of SakhBASU, the oil spill response service based in Nogliki (Znamia Truda, 22 September 1999, p3). This article explained how to contact the organisation. The local deputies themselves could have invited SakhBASU to a council meeting to clarify outstanding questions. But instead the deputies complained that no one had consulted them. And when asked what Sakhalin Energy's public hearings had been like, they replied, 'They told us how beautiful and safe it was going to be. They didn't say anything about monitoring or about what will happen in our waters.' This echoes what was said repeatedly during Ecojuris' tour. There is a lack of understanding on the part of local people about what public consultations could and should be, and what questions they should pose to the oil companies. The deputies drew a distinction between 'being consulted' (as deputies, etc.) and attending a public hearing. The main concern of the ecological committee official, was that the Regional Committee of Ecology deals with Molikpaq, while the local committee is generally not able to get involved: 'We only heard about the spill on the following day. Our specialist went out this time as well as the specialist from Yuzhno-Sakhalinsk. But the information went to the regional committee together with the video that they filmed. We don't have that jnformation'. When asked if anyone had done studies of water quality in the bays, the reply was: 'What goes into the water is the responsibility of the fishing inspectorate.' This is a problem of the layered responsibilities in Russia's nature protection bureaucracies. It is also a technique commonly used by officials. It seems, like the phrase 'we don't have any information,' to be a way to distance themselves from personal responsibility for action. This is the kind of attitude that Olga Y aroschenko urges the public to control. 93 The oil spill response experts gave their own slide presentation to the officials. One of them showed slides of Prince William Sound, site of the Exxon Valdez disaster: 'You have been given assurances. We were given the same assurances 25 years ago. Many were categoric lies ... I'm not saying that Sakhalin Energy is lying. But oil companies create a mythical world that they want to believe.' He continued, 'At home, the commercial fisheries we depended on (herring and salmon) have been devastated. Our town of Kordova - it reminds me of Nogliki - hasn't been the same since. Everyone depends on the bay. There has been a lot of social upheaval. They took a lot of precautions after the event. They should have done so before. Now, for example, a private company is paid $50 million a year for tug service. The companies know how to do it safely. But they have to be made to do it. 23 This is why we set up a public committee with representatives from the public, environmental groups, Native groups and local government. The group gets enough money to sponsor its own studies. We had to take control of the spill. Exxon turned a lot of it over to us. You have to involve local people as much as possible.' Another expert continued, 'The oil industry can be a slow learner. It doesn't learn by its mistakes. Your spi1124 is not unusual. It is bad, but it is an opportunity. It is clear after visiting government offices that the spill has got people worried. Industry and the authorities are open to practical suggestions'. The team assured people that it was up to them to act, to take the initiative, but the response was pessimistic: Kravchenko (deputy): I'm afraid there will only be a few people interested. We have no civil society (U nas otsutsvuiet grazluianskoe obschestvo). Rick (expert): There is money in this. There are staff. There should be 12 members of staff and oil companies should pay $2 million per year according to the Oil Pollution Act of 1990. Kravchenko: We don't have any law like that. Rick: We didn't need the law to set up our citizens' committee. (29.83) In the evening after the meeting with the officials, the spill response experts met with the public in the art school. A close informant, Zina, 25 and her children and I had put up posters all over town about the event and there had been an advertisement in the local newspaper. The poster urged people to, 'Come along - you won't regret it. You 23 M h . y emp asts. 24 He is referring to the Molikpaq spill. 94 will get useful and interesting information' (Znamia Truda, 9 October 1999, pl). But the attendance was much lower than for the Ecojuris trip (perhaps because there was no talk of TV camera crews). Ten children and twelve adults turned up. They seemed interested in the presentations, but there were not many questions. After the meeting a Russian woman turned to me: 'Well, we've heard the oil spill experts. Now what are we expected to do?' Four months later, Zina wrote a passionate plea in the local newspaper for people to take action (Znamia Truda, 16 February 2000, p3). The article was entitled: 'Some day nature will get her own back on humans (Kogda-nibud' priroda otomstit chelovechestvu).' The article clearly reflected ideas that Zina had picked up during meetings with Ecojuris and the oil spill response experts as well as her conversations with other environmentalists in private. Perhaps one could call this an 'awakening consciousness'. She was already concerned about ecology, but would probably not have thought about writing a newspaper article or situating Noglikskii District in the global context as she did. She cited the catastrophic oil spills, Exxon Valdez and Braer, as historical examples of disasters that we think 'can't happen to us': The oil companies exploiting the Sakhalin shelf assure us that they have learnt from these mistakes, they have everything under control and there won't be any spills. But we know that any interference with nature brings its own consequences, and that will affect us who live on this island. But everything is decided without us in the upper levels of society in these races for oil, for gas, for money .... It has long been clear that humankind is moving towards its own destruction. And those people who are doing at least something to stop the course of events, will not change much. Unless they are joined by the local communities themselves . . . . If we are going to be so powerless and helpless, so unconcerned (ravnodushnye) then Nature will one day cmelly get her own back on humans . . .. High ranked officials seem to think that they control our fate, but we are also important. It is our island - we have to live here. (Znamia Truda, 16 February 2000, p3) In 2002 there is still no Sakhalin Coastal Citizens' Advisory Council. Zina collaborates with Sakhalin Environment Watch, but like other Native activists, she has also benefited from oil company grants. 26 She may decide that it is personally more beneficial to use oil money to support her dance troupe and her social projects 25 Not her real name. with unemployed young people and alcoholics than to write letters in the local press criticising those who are sponsoring her activities. 4.2 The Native Movement: Global Rights and Local Politics 95 The above discussion leads us to an exploration of the relations between the oil companies and the Sakhalin Native population. Oil companies are particularly sensitive to the presence of Native people in their sites of operations. For example, Shell's experience with the Ogoni of Nigeria in the mid-1990s was very damaging to their international reputation. The case of the trans-Alaska pipeline, on the other hand, was an example of the Native people of a place taking land issues into their own hands, with the help of lawyers and with the support of the local non-Native populations. There is a growing body of national and regional legislation that supports Native rights in Russia,27 but at the local level the Native people of Noglikskii Dstrict are threatened by the withdrawal of privileges (most importantly fish quotas)28 . Many have problems keeping their clan enterprises29 going, and all are concerned about environmental issues that may affect their livelihoods. The oil projects have brought the issue of Native rights, indeed Native cultural survival, to the fore on Sakhalin. Although the non-Native residents of Sakhalin tend not to be sympathetic to Native claims to special status, the Nivkhi, Evenki and Orocheny have special status in the eyes of interventionists. Oil companies and development banks consult specifically with the Native peoples. Environmentalists loudly publicise threats to Native territories and resource use practices, though they have a more ambivalent view towards the Native populations themselves (see below). A number of Native activists (all Nivkhi) have emerged from Noglikskii Dstrict, and the Native cultural elite has a strong base in Nogliki today. V.iacheslav Lok, an 26 See Chapter 7. 27 I cover some of this in Appendix II: The Russian Legal Framework: Environment and Participation. 28 Fish quotas have been reduced because stocks have been depleted, largely because of over-fishing by ventures acting outside the local area, in the coastal waters and the Okhotsk sea. This makes it harder for local people to accept a reduction of their personal quotas. 29 A clan enterprise (rodovoe khoziaistvo) is a Native enterprise (sometimes run by a non-Native manager). This form of enterprise was introduced in the early 1990s, but in 1999 they were forced to re-register as a form of enterprise recognised by the Citizens' Code. Thus they remain Native in name only, although they are able to benefit from priority fish quotas. 96 international Native rights campaigner, was born in Noglikskii District. He has returned in his later years, to 'help his people' . The former head of the Sakhalin Association of Indigenous Peoples, Andrei Korotkin, has also been an influential political figure locally and regionally, and was a deputy on the Noglikskii District council from 1999-2001. The present head of the Sakhalin Association of Indigenous Peoples, Alexei Nitkuk, 30 was born in Noglikskii District and runs a fishing business there. Leading cultural figures also live in Nogliki, including the Semenovna sisters. One is an artist, another a singer, the third an ethnographer and historian at the local museum. These sisters dominate the cultural scene to an extent today, and did so even more in the past, when they led a traditional folk group and when one was director of the Native souvenir workshop. The term 'Native community' is problematic, given the factional nature of the Native population. Those who work with the Association are perceived as benefiting from national and international contacts, and from personal contacts in Yuzhno-Sakhalinsk. The Association and the commercial firm Aborigen Sakhalina31 are perceived as controlling money that comes to Sakhalin for Native people's programmes. Native people who are not involved with the Association complain that they do not have a voice in the distribution of money and other benefits. Some consider the clan enterprises (run by the 'elite' families).get too much benefit from their links with the Association, while these enterprise s do not provide benefits to the community as a whole. Native factionalism is compounded by local conflict between proponents of 'Native rights' and 'equal rights for all'. The local newspaper Znamia Truda provides a forum for these debates. The polarisation of views means that more pressing social issues related to ethnicity such as alcoholism, prejudice in the job market, and preservation of traditional livelihoods, are not debated enough publicly o~ taken seriously. Most local citizens ( and the newspaper itself) support 'equal rights for all'. 32 However, the aggressive way that this idea is promoted in the press contributes to a sense of 30 Not his real name. 31 Aborigen Sakhalina was set up in the early 1990s as an umbrella organisation for all Native enterprises on Sakhalin. Federal funding for Native enterprise was funded through this structure, though many complained of a lack of transparency in the management of these funds. In 2001 the company was apparently bankrupt, though its status still remains unclear. 97 oppression among Native people and a corresponding desire to reassert their identity. This public debate, far from resulting in consensus (as is Habermas' ideal), or even negotiation, tends instead to undermine support for Native rights, detract energies from constructive action and reduce the possibilities of finding joint solutions to common socio-economic problems. In this chapter I illustrate the scope and character of the debate by presenting the views that key local figures have aired in the public domain. First I summarise the arguments in four articles published in Znamia Truda in April and May 1999. I then explore the views of two key public figures perceived as being particularly unsympathetic to the Native cause and the response of local Nivkhi to them. I relate the arguments in some detail in order to convey the full character of the exchanges and their motivations, rather than because the detail itself is important. 33 Larisa Barannikova, a teacher, environmental activist, and local deputy34 used the national May 1 st celebration as an occasion to put across her opinions on ethnic conflict (Znamia Truda, 30.04.99, p2). Her article is also a response to a public statement made by Nivkh activist, Viacheslav Lok, where he claimed that the territory of northern Sakhalin belonged to the Nivkhi. Barannikova harks back to the Soviet era when everyone used to live in harmony and consider themselves Russians. She herself was born in Primorskii Region to Ukrainian parents and her children were brought up on Sakhalin. Her grandchildren were born there. 'I consider my grandchildren to be Native (korennye) . ... I teach them to care for nature, be honest and work hard. In what way are these children worse than the children of Nivkhi?' Barannikova also objects to Lok's claims for special status and privileges (l'goty) for the Native population: 'The Soviet authorities, with the kindest intentions, did everything so that these people could liye better: moved them into houses, raised their children, educated them at full cost to the state. Others didn't get these privileges'. In Barannikova's view, Nivkhi should not demand special privileges from the ~tate, as Russians do not have the right to do this. She particularly objects to the fact that Lok spent 20 years in Moscow then came back to declare himself leader (vozhd') of the Nivkhi and claim 32 . However, the newspaper also supports freedom of speech. 33 I should note here that the newspaper articles are cited correctly but the authors of them have been given pseudonyms. If a researcher is able to locate the issue of the newspaper, the pseudonyms will not p,revent them from identifying the article. 4 She was not re-elected onto the council in 2001. 98 half the island for 'his people'. Roots should not matter more than how much time you have lived in a place and devoted to it. However, Barannikova objects less to Lok's claim for lands for the Nivkhi than to his claim of 15 hectares for his fishing enterprise. Like Hivon's (1998) 'bullied farmer', an entrepreneur is expected to provide local people with some benefits. In her article, Barannikova reveals that Lok does not provide fish for the people of Nogliki, nor did he pay taxes to the district budget in 1998. It is a non-Native entrepreneur, Mashkovtsev, who provides poor war veterans with fish. 35 In an introduction to Lok's response (Znamia Truda, 08.05.99, p2), the editor of Znamia Truda emphasizes how Barannikova was writing about equal36 rights for all, and insists that the newspaper does not share Lok's views, but does believe in pluralism of opinion. Drawing on global discourses, Lok argues that he was not claiming Sakhalin only for the Nivkhi, but giving ethnic politics 'a new frame,' noting the need for Russia to deal with its ethnic issues, or risk more situations like Chechnya. Regarding providing fish for local people, Lok argues that productive fishing grounds are used by Kolkhoz Vostok, who cannot provide enough fish for the local population or even its workers. 37 Lok claims to be saving his own people from hunger and unemployment, by trying to create jobs. Lok questions Barannikova's authority in trying to influence Native issues, arguing that Native people are protected by the Russian constitution and international law. 38 He implies that the district authorities oppress Native people by not addressing issues relevant to them, although these issues are addressed at regional and federal levels. He adds that Barannikova's approach was superficial and she should be dealing instead with issues that she was elected to the council to deal with. He also suggests that Barannikova had political motives in writing h~r article, as it was written in the run up to an election campaign. The editor of Znamia Truda was clearly concerned about clarifying the issue of Native rights and requested the local expert on Native legislation, Nivkh council 35 On reading this article, a Nivkh informant claimed that Barannikova had demonstrated a superficial understanding of the situation, adding that Mashkovtsev was 'number one poacher' in the district. 36 Editor' s emphasis. · 37 See Chapter 6. 38 When Lok cites international law that allows Native people to catch fish without licences or taxation, the editor intervenes, having consul ted with the local tax office, and clarifies that the district council 99 deputy Andrei Korotkin, to provide an explanation (Znamia Truda, 22.05.99, p3). Korotkin confirmed that Russia had not signed any international laws, including ILO Convention No.169 because of sensitive land questions. He further argues that it is pointless to keep raising and exaggerating Native rights issues, and that it is more important to resolve these problems by economic means. Public spending on free medical care works out at three times as much per Nivkh as per person in the district. Compare this to the amount that the Nivkhi pay in taxes to the local budget, and to the other things they get out of the budget: education, culture, assistance to poor families. What is the justification for allocating a line in the district budget for development of Native economic activity, as Lok suggests? Can we take the money away from health, education, culture, and housing? (In the past the Nivkhi fed themselves.) Money comes from the federal, regional and local budgets for the Native peoples programme. I am not against the Nivkhi or others who want to live on the land like their ancestors, and I am not against the organisations that support their development and culture. But I think that a debate on Native rights and privileges is out of place during a period of political instability, economic crisis and social tension. (ZnamiaTruda, 22.05.99, p3) Korotkin's arguments are based on a sound knowledge of legislation and on economic pragmatism. In his view, poor Nivkhi have the same rights to health care and education as poor Russians; the welfare system is meant to deal with inequalities by providing for poor people who pay less in tax. This would be fair if the rest of the playing field were level, but many do not agree that it is. In a subsequent article, a Nivkh entrepreneur congratulated the Native people of Sakhalin on the passing of the law 'On Guarantees of the Rights of Native Peoples' (30.04.99) and took_the opportunity of picking up on some of Korotkin's points (Znamia Truda, 14.05.99, p3). It is possible that this new law will improve the situation of the Sakhalin Native people involved in traditional livelihoods. However we, the Nivkhi of Nogliki, have the unenviable task of proving that we exist. Of 700 adult Nivkhi only 150 have work. Less than 100 children go to school. Hungry children stay at home because unemployed parents can ' t send them to school. I think we can believe the deputy [Korotkin] , that the working Nivkhi cover only 7 withdrew tax holidays for clan enterprises on 17.05.97. Clan enterprises also have to pay VAT on the fish that they sell . They are freed from profit tax for traditional activities and from property tax. 100 percent of the needs of their fellow Nivkhi with their taxes. But the rest of their needs are not satisfied by the taxes collected from other nationalities as taxes are poorly collected. While social indicators do suggest that the Native population suffers more social deprivation than the non-Native population,39 the Nivkhi of Nogliki find it difficult to make claims for special assistance by framing them in terms of Native rights, particularly as they are no longer involved in traditional economic activities. In February 1999, Nivkh councillor Korotkin made a prominent public statement, which caused outrage and a sense of betrayal among other Nivkhi. He claimed that the Nivkhi of Sakhalin can no longer be considered Native or claim rights and privileges, as they have been assimilated into larger settlements and no longer live on their traditional lands.40 He drew attention to the fact that Nivkhi are no longer pure blooded, that even the head of the Association has Chinese and Japanese blood. He compared the Nivkhi unfavourably to the Nentsy of the Yamal peninsula, who have retained their language, culture and rituals and live with their reindeer on the tundra. He added that the Nivkh intelligentsia is doing well for itself, riding round in nice Japanese cars. Korotkin emphasised that he only relies on himself in life, implying that Nivkhi expect too much from the state. At a meeting of the local branch of the Association in April 1999, the responses to Korotkin's statement were emotional: 'Korotkin is an enemy of the people. Russia is sick and Korotkin is sick.' He had missed the point, people argued, by focusing on ethnic purity. For the Nivkhi it is not the purity of blood that provides identity, nor is it their language, which is remembered by only 3% of the population, all now middle aged or older. For many, the essence of Nivkh identity lies in historical memory, and they objected to Korotkin's version of history: 'He implies that we made the decision ourselves to resettle to the town!' The problem with Nivkh identity is that for the young people, including the head of the Sakhalin Association, Yuri N itkuk, this memory is not part of their lived experience. They have a shared history but they have not all lived it. And one could argue that the 'traditional activities' of clan enterprises are no more traditional than those of non-Native fishing enterprises, apart from the fact that they get access to better fi shing grounds and get priority fishing limits for private use. 39 There is no documentation to support this as ethnicity is no longer recorded, but this claim is based on a discussion with a representative of the Noglikskii District department of social affairs. 101 Native people nonetheless sense that the local authorities are trying to deny them their rights by talking of taking away priority fish limits. In 1999 Nivkhi also perceived as a sign of oppression the fact the post of expert in Native issues at the local administration has not been filled since the las.t representative had been fired (apparently by Korotkin and allegedly for being drunk at work).41 Lok interpreted this state of affairs as oppression, Korotkin perceives it as an economic imperative. At the April meeting, candidates were proposed for the job of specialist. Maria proposed her niece. Other candidates were all female: 'What? Are there no men? (Chto, muschin net?)' asked one woman. A name was put forward, but he worked for the oil company (therefore already had a job). As for the others, 'There are men, but they are all uneducated. (Est' muschiny, no vse bezgramotnye).' It was agreed that the administration would not pay for a specialist, anyway, as Korotkin sits on the council that approves the budget. Korotkin was perceived as suppressing all Native initiatives by clamping down on district budget spending using his powerful position on the council. The very real limitations of the council (lack of money, domination of oil company interests)42 are perceived as violations of Native rights, or even as Korotkin's personal war against the Native population. Anger is thus focused on him. Other (non-Native) local leaders are also criticised for their anti-Native views, for example Elena Kravchuk, whose attitude to Native issues is fairly typical of the authorities. She blames the Intemat (boarding school) for making children forget family life and responsibilities (who is supposed to look after others, provide food and so on). This in her view made it difficult for them to adapt to a social environment elsewhere, and is largely to blame for today's social problems, including alcoholism and prostitution. Native people blame the Intemat system for splitting families, breaking their ties with the land, causing loss of livelihood skills, and destroying independent initiative. It also fostered a dependency on the ~tate, which many see as a problem today, particularly as the state has now withdrawn from their lives. A Russian teacher who spent three years living in Provideniia, Chukotka, spoke with sympathy of the plight of the Nivkhi: 'In Nogliki the Nivkh children were isolated. 40 Only the reindeer herders of Val could be called Native as they live and work on the land. 41 It was filled in 2001. 42 See Chapter 5. 102 Families were destroyed and they lost their language. Parents lost the skills of raising their children. The state looked after the children, then deserted them. The Nivkhi are now carting boxes around while the Russians are doing the fishing.' However, one of my Nivkh informants seemed to survive the Internat with her fighting spirit intact. There were problems, she said, with petty power struggles among the girls, but she got her own back on all the ringleaders eventually. She also feels that they were (materially) well looked after: 'In the Internat we ate better than anyone else did. We had so much fruit! And they dressed us. And God forbid any of us should get sick. All the doctors and nurses used to run around after us. And if a Nivkh child died it would be a disaster. We were really well cared for'. Kravchuk believes job creation is the solution for the Native people. 'Nitkuk's job is to give them the idea that labour (trud) is the way to improve life, not charity'. However, when I questioned her about the potential for setting up a project to build small businesses in non-timber forest products (NTFPs) in Noglikskii District, she recommended that I did not work with Nivkhi. 'Native people can collect berries and catch fish, that's all. They have no experience with processing. They need special training'. Despite her negative talk about the effects of the Internat, and her clear prejudice regarding capabilities, Kravchuk insists that everyone is equal. 'We can't give [the Native people] any special status.' 'They expect to be given status, but what will they do with it?' Kravchuk criticises the Native intelligentsia, who she feels are not interested in the 'ordinary people' (narod). The administration offered to open up the souvenir workshop TEVI, but the intelligentsia refused.43 'The intelligentsia lives well,' says Kravchuk, 'Everyone has their own power. Nitkuk's workers live terribly. He is not interested in them living better and knowing their rights. Nitkuk is a nationalist'. Barannikova has similar views: 'The Native representatives can look after themselves. They need to represent the ordinary people (narod)'. 'We have given so much land to the Nivkhi. Lok employs Russians. 'Yho is surviving? The intelligentsia is.' One Nivkh informant went so far as to call Kravchuk 'enemy number 1' of the Nivkhi and Korotkin an 'enemy of the people' . He accused Kravchuk and Korotkin of 43 Maria, the former director of the TEVI claims the administration tried to take over their workshop and the Nivkhi didn ' t want that. 103 manipulating the district mayor. He said he was fed up of local politics, 'I can't get involved in politics any more. I've given up (ia opustila ruki)'. Nivkhi have very little direct influence on local politics outside their own 'community' . The democratic system means that the Native people of Noglikskii District (at 7%) are not numerous ( or united) enough to vote in a candidate of their choice. It wasn't the Nivkhi who voted Korotkin on to the council. It was with some trepidation that I made an appointment to meet Korotkin in May 1999. The views he threw at me were pretty much the same as those he had expressed already in public. He impressed me with his intelligence, his grasp of the law, his knowledge of the United Nations and international processes, his concern for the distribution of oil revenues locally and his cynicism about capitalists. I was even seduced to an extent by his logic on the Native question, though it allowed no space for sympathy with the particular socio-economic problems of his fellow Nivkhi, or for historical memory, moral responsibility, and the need to overcome the psychological barriers to moving forward. He was dismissive of Nivkh identity, conceding only that 'they haven't yet forgotten how to eat fish and they have preserved the remnants of their dances and culture'. But essentially he believes that Soviet pa!ernalism has made his people lazy: 'They are waiting for someone to make them rich'. Korotkin used to be head of the Sakhalin Association and is frustrated at what he sees as people's inability to help themselves: 'In 1992-94 the government gave a lot of money to clan enterprises. They gave one guy a motorboat and some land, but he abandoned everything. Another guy bought a boat, a tractor, and two houses, but he might as well have thrown the money to the wind. There are 3,000 Native people on Sakhalin, and only 1,000 of them work. They can't feed themselves'. In 1999 he was driven by this frustration and, as a: council deputy, by economic pragmatism. He believed that Nivkhi should not be given land or privileges, as their claims to special status are not sufficiently justified and everyone is equally poor. After this. meeting, I spoke to my Nivkh landlady, who sighed, 'He didn't talk like that in the past. He doesn't realise the source of these problems, the history. The Russians came and took the land from the Nivkhi'. Finding a voice to represent the interests of the 'Native community' and indeed a discourse that resonates outside that 'community' has been very difficult, though 104 much easier at the international level than at the local level. Significantly, the Association has chosen a path of 'negotiation' and 'partnership' with the oil companies and the regional administration as a way to resolve resource use conflicts. Environmentalists see this as an exclusive dialogue, accompanied by what some perceive to be the 'buying off' of potential opponents by the oil companies through sponsorship of Native economic and cultural activities. Environmentalists feel they have lost potential allies who could have supported their international campaign. During the public consultation process in October and November 1997 a series of preliminary consultations were held with Native representatives in Nogliki and Val. As the head of the Union of Nivkhi (the precursor to today's Noglikskii District Association), Yurii Nitkuk complained that Native people were not being consulted enough and there was no one to represent the interests of the Nivkhi effectively. He announced they were going to fight the authorities for their rights. This was talk that would not have been acceptable at a larger public meeting in the presence of the authorities themselves. Nitkuk sensed he had been provided with an opportunity to speak openly about his concerns, and appeared to sense this was a potential ally, rather than an opponent. He gratefully took up the offer to discuss Alaska Native issues at a separate meeting with a Sakhalin Energy representative that was arranged for a later date. In Val the oil company representatives met with the head of the reindeer herding enterprise and one of the herders. They had one concern and that was whether the oil and gas pipelines from the project would cut across their territory, and whether there would be a risk that local people would lose their traditional sources of food. They appeared to be appeased by the reassurances that SEIC would use modem technology to build the pipelines, and expressed their intention to take part in the public hearing in Nogliki several weeks later. However, they were not there, nor were Nitkuk and other Nivkh representatives. They seemed to get what information and contacts they needed from the preliminary meetings and all _but one failed to attend the official public hearings a few weeks later. This started a precedent of separate consultation about Native issues. On the one hand, smaller group meetings with specific interest groups are generally more effective at defining issues and potential solutions. On the other hand, as I mentioned in the previous chapter, it means that Native issues are not raised as issues of general concern to the district at the public meeting. 1 105 Nitkuk spoke at an Native people's conference held at the Federal Duma in Moscow in May 1999 about Sakhalin Native issues and the offshore oil and gas projects. Largely as a response to this, a seminar was organised in Yuzhno-Sakhalinsk in July 1999, as part of a large ecological programme .organised by the Russian Association of Indigenous Peoples of the North (RAIPON) and their Danish-Greenlandic partners who were providing the funding. The seminar was entitled 'Native People and the Environment,' and brought together Native representatives from Moscow and other Russian regions, as well as the Sakhalin regional administration, lawyers, and oil companies. The reason for holding the June seminar on Sakhalin and not elsewhere in Russia, was the extent of international concern over threats posed by the Sakhalin offshore oil and gas projects to the natural environment and Native livelihoods.44 These opportunities to have a voice in important public forums meant that the members of the Association had to work out a position in relation to the oil projects. At the April meeting in Nogliki, Nitkuk noted that 'ecology' is a new discourse for the Association. 'Why do we have to talk about ecology? Because the land is ours, the centre of life. The Nivkhi have lived here for thousands of years. We are losing our lands. The bays have been polluted in the past 10 years. Before, we used to demand more limits. Now we can't catch the limits we are given because there isn't that much fish left to catch'. Previously much of the local Nivkhi's concerns have been framed in terms of access to resources and privileges and preservation of culture, rather than protection of land and water resources against pollution or conflict (and negotiation) with industry. Ecology is still understood first and foremost in terms of control over land and resources, and the discourse of loss is as dominant here as elsewhere, for example when talking about language or traditions. The responses to ecological problems are, however, changing: 'We need to send our polluted fish for analysis'; 'We need grants for ecological activities'. People talk about taking action themselves, they discuss legal regulation and the need to know their rights. 'There have been blatant violations of the law in the offshore projects' . 44 The RAIPON seminar invol~ed three sides: the governor, the Association, and the oil companies. Before the seminar, Nitkuk emphasized the importance of participation: 'Observers will become witnesses'. However, the resolution was signed in private between the governor and the Association and was not seen by others present. I later received an English translation from the EBRD. 106 Nitkuk was concerned about what position the Association should take in relation to the offshore projects. He is aware of the extent to which local communities in northern Sakhalin depend on oil and gas production. 'It is good that we have oil but not good that they don't observe environmental standards.' But the formulation of a response is hindered by a lack of information. At the April meeting the participants ranged over the familiar topics of lack of information, the need for experts, the need for capital: 'There is an informational vacuum and we are poorly prepared for this.' 'We need a fund from the oil companies.' 'We need to think about the offshore projects.' 'We need a scientist to come and give a lecture on the offshore projects.' 'We are against anything illegal. We want them to use clean technology.' 'What position can we take? We can't ban the work.' 'We're confused.' The discussion at the April meeting reverted back to a priority topic - support for clan enterprises. The priorities for discussion at the Yuzhno-Sakhalinsk seminar in July would be the legal status of lands, payments for use of mineral resources (to go to clan enterprises), and money for reindeer herders from the oil companies. They discussed creating some sort of commission to monitor where money goes: 'We need to see and manage these monies. We don't see how the region or the district disperse money.' One woman commented that previously there was some transparency 'ransche my videli.' Nitkuk noted that money comes into the Noglikskii District budget for Native people but there is no budget allocation to the Native peoples, so the money is being used for something else: 'We need our own fund. A law should be passed by the regional duma. Then the district administratio~ would look at us differently. We need help to go direct to where it is needed. (Nuzhna addressnaia podderzhka).' The responsible management of money is an important issue in Native affairs. In the early 1990s, the Native representative in the Sakhalin regional administration, received a large sum of money for Sakhalin's Native people. The money for 107 Noglikskii District was sent to Korotkin (as the then president of the Association). It was invested in the construction of a block of flats for Native residents, but the money ran out, and the block remains half-built. Several people who were allocated flats sold them or swapped them for a house with a garden in the old part of town, for food, clothes, or even vodka. The Poronaiskii District Association, on the other hand, got the same money and invested it in their clan enterprises: 'There was no Korotkin in Poronaisk.' 'You have to give money to the producers (proizvoditeli).' Now in Poronaisk all the clan enterprises are able to help the Association, the local school, and other social projects. The hopes of Nogliki's Nivkhi still lie with their clan enterprises: 'We have to set the clan enterprises back on their feet. Then they can give money to the poor and help with these problems.' But they need start-up capital: 'We need a sponsor.' These discussions demonstrate the indecision within the Native community about whether to be concerned about the threat to their livelihoods from the oil companies, or whether to see the oil companies as a potential sponsor for their struggling enterprises. Without economic prospects for the future, what use is a clean environment? There is a split in the Native community (one of many) between those who attend regular meetings and those who feel they are excluded from these debates. Social activists such as Zina Karpova45 draw a distinction between the 'elite' and the 'ordinary people' (prostoi narod). The Karpovs and their relatives (who often gather at their kitchen table) could be considered 'elite' themselves - the husband of Zina' s sister used to be head of the Native Association in Val and her brother-in-law works for an oil company; Zina's husband is a pipeline engineer. Zina attends Association meetings but she also has a lot of contact with people who do not, and sees herself as a representative of these 'excluded' people. 'The ordinary people (prostoi narod) don' t get anything from the Association.' Zina told me about her dreams of doing her own public work in the community: 'I want to set up my own programme to help the ordinary people (prostye liudi). The others in the Association are too clever, the ordinary people don't relate to them. I want to work on housing issues, alcoholism and ecology . . .. The Association doesn't do this kind of social work. I can work with these people. I know the language of the drunks.' Rita feels she needs to have 45 Zina featured at the end of the first part of this section as the woman who wrote the article 'Some day nature will get her own back on humans' . 108 authority to do her social projects. But she does not want to work with 'them', the intelligentsia: 'It is a group of dynasties .... They decide things at home and we come along just to vote, lift our hands up in the air. They are always pushing each other further up. We don't get anything from the Association. It's always "clan enterprises". We don't need these clan enterprises. They've had so much of the money. It's always the same people'. If Zina talks the 'language of the drunks', Korotkin 'talks the language of Moscow and says we all have to learn it.' Action and power relate to the language one speaks. But in order to work effectively, Zina has to learn to communicate also with the elites she mistrusts so much. She acknowledges this: 'We can only be effective if we sort out our own problems between ourselves. No one gets on with each other ... We need a boss (nuzhen khoziain) to bring order ... Korotkin was a good leader, he knew his stuff and was politically aware.' Despite feeling betrayed by Korotkin, the 'ordinary people' acknowledge his leadership qualities. It seems difficult for an insider to become a leader without compromising local trust. Sometimes it is easier to tum to an outsider. People asked if I would set up something like Sakhalin Environment Watch in Nogliki. As an outsider they saw me as someone who could potentially organise them and remain fairly neutral. This chapter has considered the influence of global discourses on local society. Outsiders encourage local people to use the rule of law to defend their rights in the public domain or to learn from the experience of Western oil regions about how to set up citizen initiatives to control the activities of multinationals. However, local people's alienation from decision-making structures and a real or imagined lack of information inhibit a 'sense of agency' in the public domain. People tend to hope for solutions to come from outside rather than looking for them within. The chapter has also illustrated some aspects of the Native debate and the problems of Native leadership and representation. I see the Native/ non-Native split as undermining cohesion and the possibilities for joint problem solving in l~cal society. Likewise a lack of trust within the 'Native community' undermines efforts to resolve serious social problems related to exclusion and poverty. In the next chapter I look more closely at local power relations and the local public response to the offshore oil and gas projects. I examine a case where local agents challenged the power of state and industry by mobilizing the public to protest against construction of a gas-fired power station. 109 5. Oil and Gas: Local Public Consciousness This chapter provides an analysis of coverage of the offshore projects and related issues in the local Noglikskii District newspaper, Znamia Truda, which is probably the main public forum in the district for local people to express their views. The newspaper also provides a fairly broad coverage of the offshore projects, which I analyse below. The analysis reveals local concerns about the oil and gas projects, including ecological issues and the fear that benefits will go to the regional and federal centres, not to local populations. Following on from that, I focus on the case study of a local public protest against construction of the Nogliki gas-fired power station, close to local dachas. The local public was mobilised as the power station represented a pollution threat to their garden plots. I explore their motivations for protest, and also the reasons why this has remained an isolated example of mass public mobilisation in Noglikskii District. I also examine the region-wide protest against the same power station, which was more politically oriented. This focused on issues of illegality and corruption, and reflected the broader issue of opposition to the offshore projects. Both the offshore projects and the gas-fired power station are important political tools in Sakhalin Region, particularly in relation to the power position of the regional governor. 5.1 Oil and Politics in the Local Newspaper The local newspaper is a good source of information for local citizens and an important forum for local debate. It also acts as a channel of influence in local society, by raising local concerns with public figures, who may be able to resolve them. 1 In the Soviet era, newspapers had a similar role. People were able to raise issues of concern to them in the newspaper (so long as this was not co_nsidered to be a challenge to the System). 2 There is therefore cultural continuity in this role of the local newspaper as mediating institution. This thesis, however, demonstrates the influence that the newspaper has on local agency in the public sphere. Below is an example of how pressure from the public via the newspaper impelled local leaders to 1 This is generally in the sphere of social and domestic issues, which I explore in Chapter 6. 2 I am grateful to Lena Rockhill for pointing out this parallel. 110 write an appeal to regional leaders outlining public concerns about the projects. Note that this took place in 1997, which was also the year of the power station protest and is considered by some local observers as being a time when 'civil society' briefly flourished in the district. On November 22°d 1997 Znamia Truda published a letter addressed to the Sakhalin governor and the head of the regional duma, signed by the Noglikskii District mayor and the head of the District Council (Znamia Truda, 22 November 1997: 1). The letter was drafted at a special District Council meeting where they studied a document related to the Production Sharing Agreements (PSAs) for the offshore projects and citizens' letters published previously in Znamia Truda. Local people had requested a guarantee from the authorities of ecological security, public health, the well-being of future generations and adequate living conditions in line with Russian law and the 'civilised states of the world' (i.e. the West) during the implementation of the offshore projects. The letter to the governor begins with a message of support for local opinion and needs. The authors note that Noglikskii and Okhinskii districts will bear the brunt of the ecological risk from the offshore projects and call for 'civilised order' in the distribution of project benefits 'according to the example of Alaska, whose experience we have studied'. They continued, 'We object to the production sharing and other payments ... going to Moscow and Yuzhno-Sakhalinsk'. The letter recommends setting up a three-way commission (Regional Administration, Regional Duma and Noglikskii District authorities) to negotiate an agreement on public information and monitoring of the projects. The authors suggested that the District Administration, local enterprises and other organisations develop proposals for a socio-economic development plan to the year 2005 with a focus on local production. The District Administration was_recommended to halt approval of land allocations for pipeline construction until the proposals were accepted. However, as far as I am aware, there is no development programme or 'three-way commission' tod~y; along with other districts, Noglikskii District has agreed to free the multinationals from taxes;3 and the pipeline route was established before public consultations began. 4 3 See Appendix II: The Russian Legal Framework: Environment and Participation. 4 See Chapter 3. 111 What, then, was the point of writing the letter? Did local leaders earnestly believe they could make a difference, or was it simply a public relations exercise in response to public pressure exercised through the newspaper? The petition (obraschenie) as a way of appealing to power, was also widely used in the Soviet times and dates back to the Tsars. It is still a popular approach today (e.g. Vitebsky 1992).5 However, as I mentioned in Chapter 4, sometimes it appears that an appeal of this kind and the fact of 'turning to' someone, is more important than effecting real change. The letter probably raised local awareness about the offshore projects and, in the short-term, served to build public trust in local leaders. However, in the end it seems that the governor did not feel threatened by the local leaders and later convinced them to agree to tax holidays for the multinationals and to his controversial plans for the Nogliki gas-fired power station using project Bonus money. The offshore oil and gas developments have engendered considerable local interest, which is increasing. However, although coverage of the projects in the local newspaper is good, the theme does not dominate over other local issues, such as the state of the district budget, the local oil industry, social infrastructure, salary payments and so on.6 Out of a total of 139 local newspapers analysed for the period 1999-2000, I counted 69 articles about the offshore oil and gas developments. These included promotional articles, progress reports and press releases from Russian or western oil companies; information about local service industries; environmental protest articles; reports of minor spills and hitches; and pre-election campaign articles by candidates for the positions of governor and duma deputies. The newspaper also covers public meetings and visits by politicians and oil company representatives. Znamia Truda regularly prints information about investments and payments to the region and the district from the offshore projects, providing a certain amount of transparency at a time when people often complain about the lack of information. 5 I also refer to the petition as a form of public appeal in Chapter 4 . Several of the respondents to my survey noted that they had taken part in the writing of petitions. 6 I outline these issues later in the chapter. 112 Two main opinion camps are represented in the local newspaper. One is the pro­ 'Shelf' 7 lobby - the Sakhalin governor, the Deputy Minister of Fuel and Energy, representatives of Western oil companies, the head of local oil company SMNG and others. These players talk about a golden future for Noglikskii District and claim that local citizens should be proud that this is the first district in Russia to test out the Production Sharing Agreements. A counterbalance is provided by local journalists, who pose socio-economic questions and demand to know why promises have not been kept, and local deputies, who criticise economic decisions that deprive the district of potential benefits. A stronger opposition is voiced by activists warning of grave ecological dangers. The district mayor is lodged uncomfortably between the pro and contra positions. The two main positions regarding the offshore projects are demonstrated in an article from July 1999 by local journalist Panchenko. The article covers the celebration of Sakhalin Energy's first oil production at the Nogliki Club, attended by the Sakhalin governor, Deputy Minister of Fuel and Energy, and other 'shishki' (important people): Panchenko: What are your impressions? Garipov: I come here a lot. I would like to know what your impressions of our work are. Panchenko: So far we haven't particularly felt the benefit from these great projects. It would be easier to talk about [benefits to] the Sakhalin region as a whole. The people of this district [i.e. Noglikskii District] hope in the future to enjoy a tangible benefit from these projects . .. . What do you think of this first experience with Production Sharing Agreements? Garipov: ... [Y]ou citizens of this district should be proud that this law was tried out first in your district. (Znamia Truda, 31 July 1999, pl) In his opening speech the district mayor listed the services provided to the foreign companies by Nogliki airport, the hotel services firm, the central hospital. The governor congratulated the district for being 'at the centre of such magnificent projects': 7 The offshore projects are referred to as the 'Shelf (shelf) in Russian, meaning the continental shelf where drilling is taking place. 'Shelf is also used as an adjective (e.g. shel'fovye proekty [the 'shelf projects]). 113 And we still have Sakhalin 3,4,5. This means more jobs, new enterprises, development of the socio-economic sphere. It means construction of the second phase of the gas-fired power station. The district has a future. And for many long years. (Znamia Truda, 31 July 1999, pl) The American visitors also adopted the same patronising style: 'We can envy the population of Noglikskii District that such grand projects are taking place on their territory.' On the part of the journalist however, there is a noticeable cynicism about the way that project benefits will be divided up by Russian decision-makers, and about the desire and ability of American companies to improve local socio-economic conditions in the way that they have done in Alaska. Panchenko reflects gloomily: It's all very well having these celebrations, but life goes on and we do not feel any changes from the implementation of the first stage of the Sakhalin-2 project. Of course it is not Alaska, where the Americans develop social infrastructure for themselves. The Bonuses and the money for the Sakhalin Development Fund are received by the Sakhalin Regional Administration and the sums of money are not very significant after being divided among the districts. And the Royalty ... will be divided between the Centre [Moscow] and the region. (Znamia Truda, 31 July 1999, pl) Panchenko's final paragraph takes a more upbeat turn, however, as she highlights the potential benefits from the projects. She draws attention to the representation of Sakhalin workers in the SEIC workforce, and the potential for more construction jobs as more wells are drilled. She concludes with a list of production and investment figures. On 15th January 1999 deputy Korotkin reveals plans by the Sakhalin Regional Administration to in~rease the number of regional structures to be financed by them. Korotkin's objection to this (supported by the Noglikskii and Okhinskii district councils among others) is that the districts will get less money. As he notes in the article, the other districts (apart from Okhinskii and Noglikskii) are dependent on the Sakhalin Region and will do anything the regional authorities tell them to do: It is laughable and ... sad. Noglikskii District has to take on the ecological risks of the offshore projects and the construction of the federal object, the gas-fired power station. But we still have impassable roads, frequent cuts in the decrepit heating network, inconsistent 114 provision of water that is sometimes rusty, a hospital building built in the 1940s and 50s, ban-ack type living accommodation in Katangli, Val, Nysh and Nogliki, leaky roofs in blocks of flats .... I admit that the oil company [SMNG] does pay its dues to the local budget. This means that we have been able to stabilise the payment of budget salaries .. .. However, we are particularly concerned that the District Administrations have being landed with the responsibility of carrying out state functions (provision of privileges relating to the federal laws 'On the North' and 'On Veterans', children's allowances, etc.) .... Sakhalin Regional Duma has forgotten that it is elected by and made up of people from the districts, but today has in fact turned away from their needs and cares. (Znamia Truda, 15 January 1999, pl) This echoes the sentiments of the 1997 petition to the governor. It is unacceptable to take on significant ecological risks if the local standard of living remains desperately low. The regional centre is seen to be benefiting more from the offshore projects, and also appears to be reducing its support, even turning its back on the north. In January 2000, Znamia Truda published the Sakhalin governor's New Year speech as the article 'We can and will live better'. The governor notes that even former opponents of the offshore projects are now saying that the projects are the 'pride of Russia' . Before even one tonne of oil was extracted, we created thousands of jobs with these projects, ensuring that resources came into the regional budget. With the money from the offshore projects we have built hospitals, schools, bridges and roads, and we have financed social programmes. (Znamia Truda, 12 January 2000, pl,3) The potential of the projects is so great, the governor continues, that the largest companies in the world are setting up business relations with Sakhalin. 'There are international conferences, including prestigious ones in London, where the main theme in recent years has become Sakhalin oil and gas.' The governor insists that part of the natural gas from the offshore projects will be used to gasify Sakhalin and, by doing this and selling their own oil and gas, Sakhalin will become a non-subsidised region in 2-3 years. The projects will help to reduce prices, pay pensions and budget 115 salaries8 and 'improve island life for Sakhalin- and Kuril-islanders.' He also sees the gas-fired power station playing an important role in the development of Sakhalin's energy sector in the future. However, in an interview on the 19th January, the director of an energy firm undermines the governor's optimism: 'Of course gasification of the region is the main aim. But the potential customers' ability to pay leaves a lot to be desired' (Znamia Truda, 19th January 2000: 1). The director recommends providing gas first of all to larger power stations (including the one in Nogliki). Only towards 2005 can they think of providing gas to towns and villages along the gas pipeline route. American oil company workers have admitted it is economically unfeasible to build the necessary infrastructure,9 and environmentalists believe that most of the oil will be exported as Russians will not be able to pay world prices for oil and gas. 10 The offshore projects played an important role in the pre-election campaign for the post of Sakhalin governor in 2000. Znamia Truda was an important local forum for these debates and the main channel of information about candidates. On top of the rhetoric and promises of the kind presented in the previous section, the governor announced on a visit to Nogliki that he had signed a law 'On the Fund for Future Generations' according to which personal bank accounts were to be opened for every Sakhalin citizen in 2003 and for war veterans in January 2001 to receive money from Royalty payments (Znamy Truda, 4 October 2000, pl,4). This news was hidden away on the back page of Znamia Truda at the end of an article, and Sakhalin citizens in general do not take it seriously, seeing it as purely an election ploy. When I asked people about this fund in 2002, many were sceptical about the initiative. People believed that the sums of money going into the bank accounts would be insignificant, and some doubted that accounts will be opened for non-veterans. 11 The governor's opponents in the 2000 election sought to gain political capital by criticising the offshore projects. The former head of SMNG condemned what he saw as the corrupt practices of those, including the governor and the head of the Regional 8 Budget salaries are those that co~e out of the local budget (teachers, nurses, administration employees, etc.) 9 From personal communications, Sakhalin (1997-2001). 1° From interviews with US Environmentalists, Yuzhno-Sakhalinsk, September 2001. 11 From personal communications, Sakhalin, September 2001 . 116 Duma, who had signed the Production Sharing Agreements (PSAs) and had promised a shower of dollars from the offshore projects: There is no point in waiting for the rain of oil dollars. The conditions by which they signed the PSAs may give us some money- less than they could have, it is true. But considering Sakhalin's small population, that money could ordinarily solve most of our social problems. But only on one condition - we get rid of those people who grabbed what they could (khapnuli) at the stage of signing the agreement. If those people remain, then ... tens of millions of dollars will go to them and two or three thousand will be thrown to us, like bones from the lord's table. (Znamia Trudo,, 18 October, p2) Another candidate expressed her belief that people are wrong to pin their hopes on the offshore projects. She writes, 'The global projects - Sakhalin-I and the rest - are butter on a sandwich. Without butter one can survive, but not without bread.' For her, the 'bread' is regional (rather than Western) production: 'It is essential to increase the volume of our own regional production, small and medium-sized businesses. We can only guarantee social security to old people, invalids and the young, through focused use of budget funds constituted from the taxes of Russian enterprises' (Znamia Truda, 20 October 2000, p2). A third candidate expresses concern about the neglect of northern districts due to implementation of the PSAs: 'What is being done now on Sakhalin is a crime against the populations of the northern districts .... [N]o one is resolving the problems of transport and communal services. In fact one can speak of a focused attempt to empty the northern districts . . . ' (Znamia Truda, 7 October 2000, p2). The north-south discourse resonates in northern districts, as do the call for a greater focus on regional production and the talk of corruption. However, northern populations are a minority in the electorate, which makes the north-south divide an ineffective campaign platform. In any case, the incumbent governor was voted back in for a third term. 12 At the Sakhalin Forum-2000 in December, he made a speech about 12 I do not have a breakdown of voter preferences by district in the 2000 gubernatorial elections. However, in the 1999 elections to the Federal Duma, the governor 's candidate was favoured by Noglikskii District voters but did not win the overall majority of votes (Zimine and Bradshaw 2000). Zimine and Bradshaw link this to the importance of the oil industry (including the offshore projects) to Noglikskii District. The prevalence of oil industry representatives on the district council also supports this positive correlation between oil interests and political influence. This might lead one to assume that concern about the environment and cynicism about benefi ts from the offshore projects is offset locally by an enduring faith in the ability of the oil industry to support local development, and a lack of belief in the ability of other forms of economic activity to provide the same economic security. However, my survey results (Appendix III) reveal a divided public, with 22% stating there were no 117 Sakhalin being a world player in the resource market, stating, 'We are not a resource appendage. We are partners in the world market' (Znamia Truda, 28 December 2000). The governor's development vision is a global one and, although he mistrusts foreigners, he is keen to be a partner at the international level and sees the offshore projects as a way to achieve this. He also realis.ed in his election campaign that larger economic development issues are more effective campaign platforms than issues of local development, particularly in northern districts. Analysis of the available evidence thus makes it difficult to assess the level of local concern about the offshore projects and how this influences voting tendencies. However, analysis of Znamia Truda does reveal that Noglikskii District citizens are in fact preoccupied with more pressing local socio-economic priorities. I summarise these concerns in the following section. The newspaper is portrayed acting once more in the capacity of mediator of local concerns. It is worth noting that it is the journalists themselves who raise questions about the offshore projects. In June 1999, journalists met with district leaders and posed questions from themselves and readers of Znamia Truda. The results were published in an article 'Empty coffers give rise to questions (Voprosy porozhdaet pustaia kazna)' (Znamia Truda, 7 July 1999, pl; and 10 July 1999, pl). The socio-economic priorities that were raised by readers included electricity and water provision; the rising cost of flats; allocation of pastures for cattle; responsibility for filling holes in the road and cleaning up a burnt out shop. 13 Pensioners were concerned about district plans not to pay their bus fares from 1999 as they have refused to take on federal responsibilities that are being delegated to them. People complained about the absence of a district consumer rights department. According to the mayor, this department and the department of social.security (sotszaschita) are federal responsibility, but the federal government can't afford to pay for them. Readers complained that the children's allowance had not been paid since September-October 1997. The mayor argued that these were to be paid after budget salaries had been paid off. 14 Hospital workers asked why budget salaries were not being paid if SMNG had paid their taxes. Readers asked economic alternatives for the district apart from offshore oil development, 19% making no response, and 59% making some suggestion about alternatives (31.5% suggested fishing, 25.5% suggested logging and timber processing). 13 The response to the infrastructure-related questions was that there was not enough money in the district budget to deal with them. 118 why the bania15 in the 'kolkhoz' area of town16 was closed. The mayor explained that when the kolkhoz handed over responsibility for housing maintenance to the district housing maintenance department they handed over the bania, too, and he argued that the administration cannot afford to pay for it as public baths are not profitable. When journalists asked whether the multinationals would take on any responsibility for the social sphere, the mayor replied in the negative: the district would receive Bonuses, Royalty and taxes, no more. Journalist Kuznetsov sighs: At the public consultations in Nogliki several years ago, we were promised golden mountains. In time these mountains have turned into dust. Several people still have hopes, citing Alaska as the example, where the oil companies are actively involved in building social infrastructure. But you can't forget that American companies work there, and what they do, they do for themselves, for their children. They won't make such efforts for our children . . .. Here we just have Exxon giving us 3,000 dollars for our museum refurbishment. .. . And Sakhalin Energy gives a little help to our hospital. ... The district will get a stable income into the budget from the offshore projects when coastal infrastructure is built, but as yet we are far from this. (Znamia Truda, 7 July 1999, pl) In the Sakhalin region as a whole, a kind of 'livening up' (ozhivlenie) can be felt, but here there is absolutely nothing, the oil workers are virtually the only people working. And if they should experience a crisis, God forbid, then the district will turn from a 'donor' into a complete sponger (nakhlebnik). (Znamia Truda, 10 July 1999, pl) The mayor explained that the greatest ' livening up' is being observed in the forestry sector, but that it is more advantageous to log in the south because of the cost of transportation. The local economy needs investors, but they avoid the north, afraid of the transport costs. The mayor has little hope for local entrepreneurs. Of more than 400 registered in the district, hardly any are involved in production; the majority of them are involved in trade (torgovlia). In this chapter we have seen how serious local socio-economic development questions arise from question and answer sessions between journalists ( on behalf of readers) and 14 The previous budget salary payment covered only the period until April 1999 15 Public steam baths. 16 These are the houses that formerly belonged to Kolkhoz Vostok. 119 local leaders. These are quite common in Znamia Truda. Issues of particular concern locally include north-south development priorities, investment in the district, support for local production, small and medium business, and how to diversify from the present dependence on the oil industry. The question of corporate social responsibility is framed in the Soviet experience: journalists ask whether the multinationals will support development of local infrastructure. There is considerable cynicism that Americans will not provide for Russians in the way they provide for their own in Alaska. In 1999 and 2000, journalists and local citizens were not optimistic that the offshore projects would boost Noglikskii District's development prospects. 17 Journalist Viktorov objected to what was written in the regional newspaper, 'Gubernskie Vedomosti' on 10th February 2000: ... they wrote: 'In recent years Noglikskii District has been developing swiftly (stremitel'no) thanks to the offshore projects.' I doubt if anyone in the district would agree with the word 'swiftly' .... There is zero public construction work, improvement of settlements has also been frozen. The rubbish from containers has started to be thrown onto the floor, and [the collectors] put it into cars with spades - it seems they have run out of money for new containers. I won't go into the details, but I strongly oppose the phrase 'a district swiftly developing thanks to the offshore projects.' (Znamia Truda, 23 February 2000, p2) The local newspaper provides a voice to represent readers' concerns with local leaders, and this has on occasion led to further action on the part of the leaders themselves. The newspaper helps to make leaders aware of local public concerns and this increases their ability to react to these concerns if the district budget permits. As I noted above, however, while the newspaper may influence events as a mediator, it does not work to challenge the structures of power or mobilise the public. In the fo llowing section I analyse a case where local teachers were able to mobilise the public in a campaign against the construction of the Nogliki gas-fired power station. 17 From analysis of newspapers in 2001, local opinions have not changed considerable in the time since then. 120 5.2 Challenging Power: the Gas-Fired Power Station Protest This chapter explores the 'public work' (obschestvennaia rabota) of two activist schoolteachers in Nogliki. In 1997, the teachers organised a campaign against the construction of the Nogliki gas-fired power station close to local dachas just outside the town. It is rare that people have been able to mobilise other members of the Nogliki community in such a way. This issue, however, touched the domestic sphere and therefore became a protest that local people felt both motivated and indeed entitled to participate in. I also consider the work of the teachers today and their reflections on the possibilities of local mobilisation today. I also consider the political aspects of the power station protest and the role of local and regional political figures. The Nogliki gas-fired electric power station (Noglikskaia gazoturbinaia elekrostantsiia, known locally as NGES), when fully completed, is supposed to, in the words of the governor, 'solve Sakhalin's energy problems' (Znamia Truda, 12.01.99, p3). Energy provision will be mostly for southern Sakhalin, though should also be able to supplement existing supplies and cover their own needs comfortably thanks to the power station. Much of the Bonus money from the offshore oil and gas developments has been poured into this project, which is the pride of the Sakhalin governor, like the offshore projects themselves. When people ask what money has been given to Noglikskii District from the offshore projects, the power station is the first thing that is mentioned. Noglikskii District residents are of course keen to have a reliable source of electricity, and gas is a cleaner source of fuel than coal. However, the plans for this power station provoked opposition _because it would be situated so close to their dachas and garden plots, and particularly because people were aware that there had been alternative proposals for a power station to be built further from the town. Local residents were concerned about polluted dust falling on their garden plots and the food that their families would be consuming. In 1997, as in subsequent years, people were heavily dependent on home grown potatoes, cucumbers, tomatoes and other vegetables, 18 partly due to the decline or collapse of several local industrial sectors and also due to 18 See Chapter 6. 121 non-payment of 'budget salaries' . At a public meeting in Nogliki, the governor noted that the power station protest had been the first public protest of that scale against an industrial project on Sakhalin. He added that it was the first time that public opposition has resulted in so many amendments to a project19 (Znamia Truda 10 June 1999, pp. 1,2). There were several layers of opposition to the power station protest. While, the local protest was framed in domestic terms, the broader, region-wide protest was framed in overtly political terms. Construction of the power station had been central to the governor's pre-election campaign of 1996, and it had been started up in haste, without the reviews and consultations with experts and the public that are required by law. Various players were keen to expose this, and the perceived misuse of public funds, to enhance their opposition campaigns. I shall start by look at the local (domestically framed) protest, then examine the region wide (political) protest. I follow this with a closer look at inter-relations between activists and local officials, the general public and council deputies, in order to explore what motivates or inhibits action in the public sphere. The protest action in Nogliki was an example of a single-issue protest (McAdam et al 1996; Berglund 1998) that united people against the construction of the power station, but was not enough to create a 'movement'. The protest was initiated by two teacher­ activists, Svetlana Barannikova, who was in her late 50s, and Alena Petrova, in her early-40s. These women have protested about a number of issues in the district, but rarely have they been able to attract such mass support. In 1999, Barannikova was a representative of the local council. 20 She is very vocal about many issues, particularly environmental and Native issues. 21 When I first suggested doing research in Nogliki, my colleagues at Sakhalin Environment Watch (SEW) told me to contact the two teachers. SEW perceived them as the 'environmental movement' of the local area. They also featured in Laura Carson' s report on Sakhalin NGOs as an example of 'grassroots environmental 19 Apparently there were 20 amendments, including raising the height of the chimneys. 20 Barannikova appeared in Chapter 4. In 2001 she failed to be re-elected onto the council. Petrova stood for election, but also failed to be voted in. 122 activism'. 22 However, when I spoke to the teachers it was clear that there was no co­ ordinated movement as such, as the women were very busy with full time jobs, household maintenance, domestic production and family problems. They also found it difficult to mobilise local people who are likewise preoccupied with this kind of 'survival' (vyzhivanie). 23 This is an important point as, in my experience, it is the most common excuse that people make for not getting involved in public action. However, as garden plots are central to most people's domestic 'survival strategies',24 and. as the health of their children is a dominant universal concern, these became a reason to mobilise. The framing of the protest also legitimised local people's position (as non-specialists), and so the teachers were able to gain considerable local support. Petrova first read about the plans to build the power station in the local newspaper Znamia Truda. Having discovered that it was to be built close to local dachas and garden plots on the outskirts of town, she began to investigate the plans further with the help of a group of teachers, which expanded as public awareness of the issue grew. They discovered that the decision to construct the plant had been made with only the participation of the district mayor and with no public consultation or environmental impact assessment (EIA). The activists approached the case through analysis of the legal situation and made their challenges using legal tools. Petrova, who was at the time studying law via correspondence classes, decided together with Barannikova to approach district officials from the District Committee of Ecology, the Fish Inspectorate, and other agencies to find out how to bring the construction in line with environmental legislation. They enjoyed the support of the regional environmental prosecutor until he was abruptly replaced by someone who had no interest in their case. The teachers held two public meetings in Nogliki about the construction of the power station. Their main concerns were the environmental effect of pollution from the power station's chimneys and the impact of sound pollution on the quality of life of those people who would be living and working on their garden plots near the station. 21 See Chapter 4. 22 See Chapter 3. 23 Vyzhivanie means 'survival' or 'making-do' (Vitebsky 2002) and includes a range of activities from subsistence food growing to dealing with family problems to the maintenance of social networks. I referred to it in Section 2.5. 123 In March 1997, a group, headed by Barannikova, collected 872 signatures to demand a referendum to build the power station further away from their dachas (Sovetskii Sakhalin, 19th May 1999, p2). The referendum was held and around the same time Barannikova was elected to the local council. The results of the referendum showed that local people were in favour of moving the power station to a site further away from town, but the referendum itself was declared invalid for not complying with the regional legislation on public referendums. Nevertheless, the group had raised local interest, and so the district and regional administrations paid for two local protesters (not the teachers themselves) to be taken to mainland Russia to visit gas-fired power stations there and see how cleanly they were working. The protesters returned dissatisfied as they had not been shown stations near populated areas, but leaflets were circulated in Nogliki that they no longer had any complaints about the station. After completion of an environmental impact statement, where the protestors views were considered, 20 amendments were made in the project plans, including raising the height of the chimneys to reduce the pollution threat, but the station was still built on the original site close to the garden plots. By the time the power station had been built, there was little that local protestors could do. The teachers' letters to the Federal Duma and Federal Committee of Ecology were answered by advice that the only option remaining was to bring the case to court. Petrova prepared documents for a court case, but eventually decided not to take this step, which would have taken considerable effort an.d which she felt would probably not have been successful. The local domestically framed protest ended with the construction of the power station. Today it is \\{Orking, though the second phase of construction has not been completed. The dust is probably quite hard to see, but the power station noteiceably hums, and this is quite loud close to some dachas. In 2001 I was sitting with a friend in her house on the outskirts of town and we could hear the power station humming. I asked if anyone had protested about the noise: 'No one protests but what is the point? They will do what they want anyway'. Petrova commented: 'Yes it hums, and we won' t know about the dust until things stop growing.' 24 I discuss 'survival strategies' (Bridger and Pine 1998) in Chapter 3. 124 The region-wide political protest, however, continued after the local protest was silenced. It would be too much of a simplification to suggest that there were two distinct forms of protest around one single issue. The local protest, for example, resulted in Barannikova being voted on to the district council, providing apparent political power to the local activist (see below). Local people were mobilised to defend the domestic sphere - this was an action legitimated by their knowledge of this sphere and their usual level of agency in issues relating to it.25 But they were also dissatisfied at their economic circumstances, and objected to regional budget money (their taxes) and Bonus money from the offshore projects being used to construct a large industrial installation on their doorstep. Local kitchen table talk26 and newspaper articles constantly allude to the north being neglected by the powers in the south, while the valuable oil and gas resources from the north goes to fund those very powers in the south. The local protest was predominantly a defence of the domestic sphere, but also alluded to broader social and political issues, which local people (as 'non-specialists') would not normally feel entitled to protest about. When the power station was built, the protest was taken out of their legitimate sphere of action and influence. It was left to journalists and politicians to continue the protest at a different level, though the debate was accessible to local people through local and regional newspapers. The region-wide protest started at the same time as the local protest. The issue was raised again particularly in 1999, in preparation for the Federal Duma elections of 199927 and the gubernatorial elections of 2000. Regional newspapers detailed the story of the project development, framed overtly as a political scandal. The Sakhalin governor was originally chosen by President Yeltsin and the first gubernatorial elections were in October 1996. In 2000 he now standing for re­ election. According to journalists, 'he needed to invigorate his campaign (nuzhna byla iziuminka)' and so he used the Nogliki power station project as a vehicle (Sovetskii Sakhalin, 20th May 1999, p2). In 1996, a joint stock company was hastily set up, with 25 See Chapter 6. 26 Kitchen table talk means literally talk around the kitchen table or any other private discussion. 27 See Zimine and Bradshaw (2000) for an analysis of these elections. 125 the involvement of the regional administration, to take on the power station construction. At the time, the Regional Duma had been dissolved and deputies were informed of the decision to approve construction only when they reconvened and it was too late to discuss the issue. The financing for the construction came out of the regional budget and the external budget fund (vnebiudzhetnyifond), which is made up of payments from the offshore oil project Bonuses. The estimated cost of the project is about $46 million US, though apparently nearly 50% of this money is being returned to the region in taxes (Gubemskie Vedomosti, 09.06.99, p2). Journalists and experts criticised the project for going ahead without the necessary pre-project research, consultations with the public and specialists, or analysis of alternatives. Opponents to the governor made accusations of corrupt practices. One of them saw in the project, 'not a desire to resolve Sakhalin's energy problems, but the creation of a "long-term construction", with the aim of laundering money and promoting the governor in the pre-election period' (Region, 26.02.99, p 5). On 301 h January 1999, when the first turbo-generator in the power station was being tested, it was linked up to the old Dagi-Nogliki-Katangli gas pipeline, which was nearly 25 years old, in a poor state in many places and had very low pressure. The first attempts to send gas through at higher pressure burst the pipeline leaving local citizens in their cold flats in the dark for the whole night (Sovetskii Sakhalin, 18.05.99, p2; Znamia Truda, 01.09.99, p3) This increased anxiety in Nogliki, but did not mobilise the public. The incident was a technical one and was resolved within the oil company itself, who set new regulations for gas pressure in the pipeline and started a programme of pipeline repair. However, the incident was used as political capital by the governor's opponents in their pre-election campaigns. A deputy from the Regional Duma was sent to Nogliki to check the authenticity of the accusations of political manipulation from the 20th May Sovetskii Sakhalin article. The deputy emphasised that the article had 'laid out the events very subjectively and tendentiously' (Gubemskie Vedomosti, 10.06.99, pl). The General Prosecutor of the Russian Federation, sent Sakhalin's Federal Duma deputy, a reply to the Sovetskii Sakhalin article, stating that the money allocated to the power station has been used according to its purpose. This was confirmed by inspectors from the Sakhalin Regional Department of the Ministry of Finance (Sovetskii Sakhalin, 28.10.99, p2). 126 The governor himself stated that the majority of the arguments, facts and conclusions raised in the article were false. At the time of the governor's visit to Nogliki, the district mayor, as always torn between his district and regional obligations, objected to the portrayal of him in the Sovetskii Sakhalin article as an opponent to the power station. The power station, he added, means more than one hundred well paid jobs for the people of Nogliki; extra badly needed taxes in the district budget; a reliable source of electricity; the prospect of heating Nogliki; closure of the old boiler houses with their old equipment and polluting emissions. He added that no situation is ideal, there is no 100% winning situation (Znamia Truda, 10.06.99, pp. 1,2). The power station was set in operation in November 1999, and has faced many technical difficulties along the way. The worst problem, according to the director, has been that the sole buyer of their energy, Sakhalinenergo,28 has not been able to pay for their electricity as their own clients are unable to pay (Znamia Truda, 01.07.00, pp. 1,2). The workers at the power station were the ones suffering: wages were not paid for two or three months at a time; specialists left what had been a prestigious job. Of 132 available jobs, there were only 123 people at work in 2000. The head of the power station was lobbying for holidays from property tax, which is considerable and is split between regional and federal budgets: 'There is a foundation for this request. The foreign investors have got considerable long-term tax holidays until they establish themselves. Why not do the same to domestic producers as they try to set themselves up?' (Znamia Truda, 16th December 2000). A local journalist visiting the power station in July 2000 noted how smart the building and the asphalted roads were. He was impressed by the fence that surrounded the power station, and the strictness of admission procedures. He noted that dozens of trees and bushes have been planted and ther:e are large grassy areas, 'which collect fallen dust from the power station.' (Znamia Truda, 01.07.00, pp. 1,2). Although the teachers had dropped the power station issue by the time I arrived in Nogliki, they were still interested in local environmental issues, which they sought to resolve themselves without trying to mobilise the public. In 1999 Barannikova was still a deputy on the local council, and they have been able to raise issues at council 28 Sakhalinenergo buys energy wholesale and sells it on. 127 meetings and also in the local press. Barannikova had responsibility for environmental questions in her capacity as council deputy. Aside from their environmental work, the two teachers also play an active role in the teachers' union, particularly over wage payment. In August 1997, for example, the teachers staged a 3-day action.29 The local oil company had not paid their taxes and so the teachers had not received their salaries. The teachers set up a road block to prevent oil workers from getting to work. On the third day of the action the company paid and the road block was removed. 30 In January 1999, there was a meeting of Nogliki teachers, led by Barannikova, protesting (again) at non-payment of salaries, again due to delays in payment of oil company taxes. Rather than go on strike, the teachers negotiated with the district mayor to set deadlines for payment of salaries, which were owing from October the previous year, threatening to go on strike if these salaries had not been paid by 15th February (Znamya Truda, 30.01.99, p2). This action was also successful. However, in general the teachers are frustrated by their 'public work', particularly in the environmental sphere, as they seem to do a lot of work themselves, with little support from the public, and virtually no help from local officials. They were also disappointed in the response of Sakhalin Environment Watch who, they complained, had not written to them, though they had travelled to meetings in Yuzhno-Sakhalinsk. In 1999 the teachers had documents about radioactive equipment that had been brought from Ukraine and was being stored at the gas-fired power station. They were trying to get the information to the right places so they turned to Znamia Truda for help. Journalist Novitskaya reminded people: 'We all have the right to reliable information, especially if it relates to our health' (Znamia Truda, 04.02.99, pl). Novitskaya did not trust the assurances of safety from outside 'specialists', and was determined that locaJ people should feel safe: 29 We have no reason not to trust the specialists. But let's look at these facts from another angle. Our district may be a resource periphery but it isn't a radioactive waste dump yet. The regional specialists don't live here. The power station workers are also acting like detached observers (it's true that a number of them have come to us and whispered their complaints, and there is no union at the power station who could ensure normal working conditions). But From Laura Carson ' s 1997 report. 30 Health workers then complained that they had not been paid, while the teachers had. Davydenko pointed out that they had not participated in the road block so what did they expect? 128 we live here, and we are concerned about this. Opposite the power station there are dachas and garden plots and people should be able to feel safe. (Znamia Truda, 04.02.99, pl) This quote sets the specialist know ledge of outside experts against local people's concern for their own well-being and the security of their domestic sphere. It emphasises the economic and political north-south divide. The teachers also noted privately that the company responsible for the radioactive waste, Vostokmorneftegas, does not pay its taxes locally, implying that the company had even less right to dump radioactive waste in Noglikskii District. (By the same standards, the multinationals should not be granted tax holidays, and local oil company SMNG has more of a moral right than others to pollute the environment, which explains local tolerance of SMNG's polluting practices). The teachers' wage payment protests underline their direct dependence on taxes from SMNG, and the value of their union for defending their interests. Similarly, it is clear from Novitskaya's paragraph above that the gas power station workers are dependent on the power station, but are afraid to protest and have no union to defend their interests. Novitskaya called on local people to take action over the radioactive waste, but in fact Znamia Truda took action on their behalf. The editorial office contacted the citizens' defence and emergency situations departments in the district administration, who assured them that the waste was stored legally and did not pose a threat to health (Znamia Truda, 05.06.99, pl). However, the radioactive waste was eventually sent back to the Ukrainian factory it came from: And while specialists at all levels spent a long time trying to prove that it was being stored in accordance with the requirements of the sanitary-epidemiological station and the radioactivity it was giving off was within acceptable norms, our newspaper stuck to a firm position - you can't set a precedent. Nogliki is not a radioactive waste dump. '(Znamia Truda, 19.02.00, pl) The teachers were also concerned about 'the dark day'. On 21 Septembe.r 1998 the sky went dark for over two hours in the early afternoon on a day of particularly intense forest fires across the whole of northern Sakhalin (Znamia Truda , 23.09.98) The teachers were not happy with experts' conclusions that the forest fires were solely 129 to blame for the incident, but they had no evidence to support an alternative explanation. They are also wonied about ecological threats from the offshore oil and gas projects. They are less concerned, they say, by the economic activities of local indigenous peoples: 'We're more interested in radioactive waste, the offshore projects, the dark day and the gas fired power st.ation than traditional natural resource use.' However, though they collect information about the offshore projects, there have been no local campaigns against the projects, or efforts at public monitoring. The teachers think that the research and dissemination of information that they do is the responsibility of local officials. Barannikova complains, 'The officials should be doing this work. I am a teacher. I have my own problems at work and at home. I just happen to care for the environment' . Her demands are now framed in western terms: 'We need an independent monitoring station. We need to get a grant'. Activists criticise officials for their lack of support, while acknowledging their dependence on the state and their need to break away from this dependency in order to work effectively. Despite talk of independence, Barannikova - a staunch Communist who actively campaigned to get the (Communist) district mayor, Susenko, elected - looks back to the Soviet era as a period of relative public stability and morality. She feels that people are lost without the Soviets to organise them. The Soviet youth group, Komsomol, left a huge vacuum that is difficult to fill, children no longer have any ideas (ideology). She would like to set up a similar organisation in the schools. The children would have green and blue ties and little badges. She wants to apply for a grant to get children to clean up the town. Barannikova is often criticised locally. Some of this is personal: 'She is resentful and she's always shouting'. Native people feel she is antagonistic towards them although one informant said she admires her spirit: 'Barannikova is a fighter. I'm not.' Officials say that she is not suitably qualified (nekompetetna) to make the statements that she does in the local press (see below). It is not just her abrasive personality that provokes this response from officials. It is common for officials and scientists to consider public activists to be 'dilettantes' .31 People are made to feel as though they 31 I discussed this in Chapter 3. 130 should only speak out on matters that they are qualified to speak about32 - for most of them this is the domestic sphere. Activists break through this cultural barrier, and often face criticism for doing so.33 Petrova felt betrayed by the head of the District Committee of Ecology after the power station protest. He had written a letter opposing the plans, but had not followed it up. Petrova complained, 'The officials say to the public, "Go on, protest!" but they are the ones who are supposed to do something - they are in the position to act. We opposed the power station, made a noise, we got people mobilised. And after that there was nothing. The Ecology Committee chairman writes nice letters, but he doesn't support us in any way. They say that we are not qualified. Here we are, making a noise about the power station and the officials say: "You're not experts on energy issues!"' The Ecology Committee chairman told me he was not interested in 'public control': 'The public shouldn't be telling me what to do. Barannikova is a teacher, and is nekompetentna (not qualified to deal with these questions).' The District Committee of Ecology received a positive environmental expert review on the gas power station construction from the Regional Committee of Ecology. 'We have a different approach,' he said, 'I am an official, I follow orders.' Local officials just follow the orders given them from higher up the hierarchy. The excuse about following instructions from above, is recognised by Scott as 'the time-honored refuge of petty officials everywhere' (Scott 1985: 231). The Committee chairman added: 'If they wanted to protest, they should have done a public expert review, there is a law on this' .34 We heard the same story from local activist Aleksandr Petrov in Nekrasovka: 'Nobody acknowledges us. They call us dilettantes, non-specialists .... We are not specialists, but we are concerned about what is happening' . The same attitudes predominate in Yuzhno-Sakhalinsk. 35 A scientist and fellow environmentalist commented about the work of Sakhalin Environment Watch: 'Tereshkov is necessary, but still a dilettante and I will not work with him'. Another scientist, working in the Regional Committee on Ecology claimed, 'The public are dilettantes. No self­ respecting scientist wants to have anything to do with the public'. In the eyes of the 32 This relates to Bourdieu's (1984) notion of 'competence' and is discussed by Goodwin (1998) in the context of public participation in conservation in the UK. I explore this more in the conclusions. 33 Compare to Tereshkov in Chapter 3. 34 However, a public expert review takes time and money (see Appendix II). 35 This relates to Section 3.3. 131 two Nogliki teachers, grassroots mobilisation is hopeless: 'People don't believe (ng_ veriat) any more'. The teachers believe that 'change has to be from the top,' but despair of the corruption that goes on further up the hierarchy: 'It is impossible for the grassroots to change anything if the upper levels (verkhushka) are all selling themselves (prodazhnye ). ' In 1999 Barannikova was in the position of both being a grassroots activist and occupying a 'power' position. She was one of only two women on the Noglikskii District council, which was then made up of seven councillors, with a large ratio of oil company representatives.36 Natalya Komarova was the other female deputy and a journalist for a regional newspaper. Although Barannikova was reluctant to talk about the council, Komarova spoke candidly: 'When I was in hospital recently, people in the same ward said that they did not want to speak to me because I was a deputy.' For her, this illustrated the attitude of local people towards those in power. The irony was that she did not see her job as deputy, in the way the general public sees it, as a power position. She and Barannikova were always outnumbered as women on the council, but more importantly, their interests were outnumbered by oil interests: 'Barannikova and I tend to vote in favour of proposals for social support to the community, but the men vote against them. They are probably more pragmatic. They know it is not worth their while to push through such proposals. Most of the proposals are voted down 5 to 2. We have very little real power. I can hear about someone's social needs, and bring it to the attention of the council. But they will say: "We don't have any money to support that." The bad thing is that the majority on the council work for the local oil company. No one is going to vote against the big boss, against the interests of the company'. Natalya Komarova seems trapped in a position that is neither 'in power' nor 'one of the peopl~.' She is unable to promote the social programmes that she feels will help the population, and so feels powerless, but she is perceived as one of the people in power who are not trusted by the population. 36 The council chairman was deputy head of the Nogliki branch of SMNG. The others included his boss, an oil company tractor driv{!r and another SMNG dependent. Nivkh deputy, Andrei Korotkin, was not related to SMNG and was the only full-time member of the council. After the 2000 elections, the total number of councillors was increased to nine. This included 5 representatives of the oil industry and 4 non-oil industry people. For these council elections Nogliki was divided into electoral districts. An informant who (unsuccessfully) stood for election complained, 'They did everything to get the oil people in .... My parents couldn't even vote for me as we live in different areas.' 132 Natalya's husband, Boris, expressed typical views on the authorities: 'I would have the Japanese take over. I don't care ifl take part in decision-making or not. I would trust the Japanese. At least they would build roads and I would be able to deliver my bread.' (He is a baker.) 'Or I would have Margaret Thatcher in charge.' 37 About protest, he said: 'If they were not defending my interests I would want to protest.' I argued that, from what they had been saying, local leaders do not represent their interests. Why don't they protest? Boris replied: 'We don't oppose the authorities because we are afraid of losing our jobs, or whatever. Or we are too busy with our own lives or we don't believe it will change things.' This again emphasises the dominant importance of the domestic sphere - the 'domain of everyday practice' - in people's lives. Boris also touches on two other important factors inhibiting agency in the public domain, namely fear of opposing authority and a sense of alienation from power, a lack of self-belief. These factors were also identified by another informant, Kostya, who had moved to Nogliki from Tatarstan in the mid-1990s. According to Kostya, people do not protest because they are too involved with family and their own (everyday) problems; they feel that one person's voice will make no difference; and they believe people in power 'don't give a damn' (im gluboko plevat'). Kostya told me why he had moved from Tatarstan and how he came to give up activism: I put myself forward for the district council. My mistake was that I went on local radio and called the district mayor a goat. And I said what I thought of the lot of them. After that the local radio correspondent was told to take a holiday and I couldn't register my candidacy for the local council .... The reason I left Tatarstan was that I roused the public (podnial obschestvennost'). They told me that either I would end up in prison for 20 years or I would be killed. So I came here. That's how things are decided in our country. Now I would rather stay quiet and look after my family. In other cases, business interests are too great for people to rock the boat. In an interview, the director of Kolkhoz Vostok complained that no one had canvassed public opinion about the offshore projects: 'We're concerned, but if we made an official complaint, well the governor has a personal interest'. People are afraid to lose a good position by demonstrating opposition. The importance of the governor's 37 I discuss this yearning for firm but benign economic leadership (Pine 1998) in the conclusions. 133 support for Kolkhoz Vostok was made evident in 2000 when environmental officials in Yuzhno-Sakhalinsk threatened to close the fishing grounds near the Kuril Islands that provide 95% of the catch of Kolkhoz Vostok. At the last minute the governor intervened and kept the area open. As one Nivkh informant put it, the attitudes of the authorities are: 'We can consider your interests but we are not obliged to defend them'. A young Russian mother complained, 'The local administration doesn't listen to the people. It only works for itself.' Another woman commented: 'Hardly anyone votes. There's no point. Whoever you vote in, it's not for the people'. A security guard feared he would get into trouble for what he wrote in my questionnaire about the mayor and the President: 'In the West you have a higher standard of living and so can get involved in public life. You also believe that you can change things. Here in Russia the power is up there shrouded in mystery (pokryto mrakom). Ordinary people don't know what is going on'. This chapter has demonstrated once more the close links between energy issues and politics on Sakhalin. Despite the emphasis that politicians place on large-scale energy projects, however, Noglikskii District citizens are preoccupied with local socio­ economic concerns (roads, housing, water provision) which are often neglected by regional politicians. Local citizens have a strong sense of a 'north-south divide'. This chapter has revealed the importance of the local newspaper as a mediating institution in local society. I have demonstrated how the Nogliki public was mobilised to protect their domestic sphere in the case of the gas-fired power station protest, but also that human agency in the public domain is otherwise inhibited by the dominant official discourse of the need for specialist knowledge. People demonstrate a fear of authority and a lack of self-belief. They appear to be alienated from power, and are convinced that those in power are not working in the interests of the naroq (the ordinary people). On the other hand, ordinary people in power positions are inhibited in their desire to effect social change by dominant economic interests - in this case the limits of the district budget and the dominance of oil interests in local politics. Significantly this chapter has demonstrated the importance of the domain of everyday practice in people's lives. It is this domain that I focus on in the next chapter. - - - --- --------- 134 6. The Nature of 'Vyzhivanie' (Survival Strategies) The previous chapter demonstrated the importance of the domestic sphere to ordinary people in Noglikskii District. When the public was mobilised to take part in a public protest it was in order to defend this domestic sphere. The aim of this chapter is to further explore the domain of everyday practice and notions such as 'subsistence', 'survival strategies', ('vyzhivanie'), 'cash' and 'the market'. In the first part of the chapter I focus on domestic production, 1 in the latter part I focus on the seasonal fishing practices of local Nivkh residents and conflicts over the fish resources of N yiskii Bay. 2 In the first part of the chapter I give a profile of a household that I knew well during my time in Nogliki in 1999. I describe their seasonal cycle of domestic production, commenting also on general practices in the district through reference to the local newspaper, my survey results and the accounts of other informants. I explore the significance of domestic production for maintaining social networks and creating social and cultural capital. I also consider the moral discourses that surround domestic production. I analyse the role of the local newspaper Znamia Trnda as mediator between local actors and as moral commentator. Later, I look at regulation and 'organisation' (organizatsiia) of domestic production and the way that former state responsibilities are being taken on by private enterprise. In the chapter as a whole I consider why people tend to focus more on domestic production and battles over fish resources than on public activism or participation in decision-making. In particular, I encourage the reader to consider these case studies in the light of the parallel battles that are being fought globally over the same resources.3 In this context I compare the level of human agency ihat people have demonstrated in the public domain to the level that they demonstrate in the domain of everyday practice. 1 By domestic production I mean dacha cultivation, gathering of non-timber forest products, small scale fishing and other resource use activities based on the household economy. 2 See Map 2. 3 I refer here to Chapters 3 and 4. 135 6.1 Domestic Production: Gathering, Fishing and Garden Plots This chapter is largely based on the experiences of one Native household in Nogliki. This family has adopted many typical Russian resource use practices as well as retaining traditional Native practices. 4 Tatiana is a Nivkh woman in her early sixties. Born in a Nivkh village on the north-western Sakhalin coast, she spoke only Nivkh until the age of nine. Her aunt and grandmother were shamans. She completed her education in Leningrad (now Petersburg), and speaks with equal nostalgia about the sandy beaches of her old village and the parquet floors of Leningrad ballrooms. In Leningrad she met her husband Vladimir and they lived on the Russian mainland for 17 years where they raised their children. They moved back to Sakhalin in the late 1970s, this time to Nogliki. Tatiana was missing her homeland and suffering headaches. 'When I got back on Sakhalin soil I went out to collect cloudberries (moroshka) and felt better straight away. I haven't had headaches since.' In 1999 Tatiana was working part time at a local school and receiving a state pension, which partly made up for the delays in salary payment. While often complaining how difficult life is and how much time is spent on subsistence-type5 'survival' activities, Tatiana says: 'No one lives better than we do. The other [Native people in Nogliki] live really badly.' Tatiana is a member of the Nivkh elite and, owing to her living know ledge of the Nivkh language, her historical roots, knowledge of northern Sakhalin, and various traditional skills (music, crafts, food preparation), she often has contact with foreign researchers, most of whom are ethnographers (from Japan, Poland, Canada). She also plays an active role in the local and regional Native associations. As we have seen in previous chapters, there is some bad feeling in the Native community towards 'elite families' who are seen to benefit from foreign contacts and access to social, cultural, financial and political resources (including foreign researchers). Even family friends 4 My notion of typicality is backed up by reference to my survey results (see Appendix III). 5 The dictionary definition of 'subsistence' is: (as a qualifier) denoting or relating to production at a level sufficient only for one's own use or consumption without any surplus for trade (Pearsall 1999). In this chapter 'subsistence' practices create surpluses that are either traded unofficially or exchanged within local networks of friends and family. Hence the use of inverted commas. resent Tatiana's social and cultural capital. One Native friend who wanted me to stay with her instead of Tatiana complained, 'Everyone goes to Tatiana.' 136 Tatiana's domestic use of natural resources was fairly typical of other families in Russia that I have had close contact with.6 Like many households in Russia, Tatiana and her family spend a lot of time on informal subsistence-type activities. These include vegetable growing, collection of non-timber forest products (NTFPs),7 small-scale fishing, bartering for reindeer meat. They also process these foods by preserving in jars, salting, drying, making jams, soups, and pel 'meni. 8 Tatiana is passionate about winter fishing. Her husband is also involved in various informal trade activities by which he provides the family with reindeer meat and large fish. The couple is assisted by their extended family who share in the production, preparation and consumption of the produce from garden plots and fishing and gathering expeditions. This is part of the family network of reciprocity: the local extended family (sisters, son, daughter-in-law, nieces, nephews) regularly use their telephone, shower or washing machine. Relatives who live far away may visit for long periods, particularly in summer, and help with domestic production. In their study of dacha cultivators in western Russia, Seeth et al (1998) conclude that it was the middle class and higher income families not the poorer families who benefited most from dacha cultivation, due to the considerable 'opportunity costs' in both time and financial input. In line with these conclusions, Tatiana and Vladimir's subsistence-type activities do not indicate a poor family forced to subsist as a result of poverty, but a better off family maximising the (human, financial and time) resources already at their disposal. Time is in limited supply for Tatiana, who has many social commitments, but she does spend a lot of time on domestic production, too. The reasons for spending time on growing, gathering, and fishing are various. For a start, collection of NTFPs, cultivation of garden plots, and winter fishing, can be enjoyable recreational activities ( despite being 6 This has been in Yuzhno-Sakhalinsk, on Kamchatka (Petropavlovsk, Esso, Anavgai), in Vladivostok, Magadan, Yakutia, Khabarovsk and in European Russia (Moscow, Voronezh). 7 In Noglikskii District these include: berries, mushrooms, wild onion, fem, burdock, pine nuts. Virtually all respondents in my survey gathered NTFPs, mostly berries and mushrooms (see Appendix III). 137 very hard work). The people I spoke to on a daily basis expressed pride in collecting and growing their own produce. This was especially strong when they were able to offer it to guests, either on the dinner table or as a gift. Also important is the value of productive work, central to the Soviet ideology and still ingrained in the minds of people, especially the older generations. People often spoke, too, of the importance of providing ecologically clean (ekologicheski chistyi) food for the family. A proud hostess may respond to praise with: 'It's all natural!' These comments were sometimes part of an East-West discourse, where Westerners are understood to prefer ready meals made from non-natural ingredients, while in the East, they may not be as 'civilised', but they eat natural food products. Many expressed dissatisfaction with the low-nutrition Korean noodles and hormone filled American chicken that had been saturating their markets since Russia's move towards 'free market' economics began. They were particularly indignant because poor quality food was a serious health issue and they expressed concern for their children. There was, however, also a noticeable move towards 'own production'. I also observed in (national) TV advertising more promotion of Russian (otechestvennye) products, for example the advert for the chocolate bar Shok- 'Shok ­ it's done in our own way (Shok - Eto po-nashemu)' .9 Imported processed foods are one way in which the effects of globalisation are perceived locally, and in the food sphere local people demonstrate their rejection of it. Subsistence activities themselves may be perceived as a form of resistance to the 'free market'. Subsistence practices also provide a reliable source of food independent of financial income. Money can never be relied upon, as salaries often remain unpaid for months on end. Money is thus often used for unexpected purchases rather than everyday usage such as food buying, and is not generally saved. While I was staying with the family, Tatiana received a sum of money from abroad. She did not put this money into a savings account. Instead she ordered painting equipment and other items from Japan when I went there on a trip.10 8 Small pasta parcels containing meat or fish. 9 The promoters still chose an imported English name and copied the Western marketing style. IO Another (Russian) informant living in quite poor conditions used an unexpected sum of money to buy a ring rather than put it towards domestic bills. 138 Natural products are important for traditional food preparation. Tatiana often makes traditional Nivkh dishes, such as fish skin and berry mousse (vyz,gals); seaweed and fish soup (J;m(_); dtied sliced fish (iukola or ma) and finely sliced frozen fish (stroganina). The latter two are popular throughout the Russian North. Food preparation is an important Native cultural activity and Tatiana's culinary talents are, like her language knowledge and musical skills, an important source of cultural capital. She prepares food for festivals, birthdays and visiting foreigners. Russians also provide copious amounts of food for birthday parties and special guests, and the food is traditional in its own way. However, food is a greater expression of identity for the Native people and plays a much more important role at official gatherings. For example, Tatiana helped to prepare the 'banquet' after a seminar for the Russian Association of Indigenous Peoples in Yuzhno­ Sakhalinsk in 1999. Like the ritual that opened the meeting and the traditional music performances in the evening, the food was an expression of Nivkh culture. However, like their language skills the traditional food-preparation skills are not being passed on to the next generations. Younger members of the community tend not to be asked to prepare food for special occasions. As well as being as source of cultural capital, domestically prepared food also serves as a source of social capital. Tatiana gives her produce away to family, friends and acquaintances. I I This is sometimes patronage, not always exchange. Exchange and gift giving of natural food products are popular throughout Russia. Food products (caviare, berry jam [varen'ie] , dried fish) are often sent from Siberia and the Russian Far East to relatives and friends in western Russia. Domestic production has a natural cycle, which shapes people's lives and is readily give precedence over other activities. Russian and Native citizens of Noglikskii district (and throughout Russia) drop everything at potato planting and harvesting times, gather their family together, and spend the whole time in their garden plots until the job is done. If a wild harvest of mushrooms (griby), wild onion (cheremsha), fem (paporotnik), berries I I According to my survey, 30% of respondents share domestically grown, gathered and prepared products to relatives, while 15% share with friends and acquaintances. 139 (iagoda), pine nuts (orekhi) is missed and products not processed, that may mean fewer stores for winter or a missed opportunity for immediate consumption. The following calendar-based narrative reflects Tatiana's domestic production in 1999 and also draws on information from other Russian and Native informants, responses to my survey12 and the local newspaper Znamia Truda, which has a particularly good coverage of garden plot cultivation. Jn winter Tatiana catches fish from under the ice on the frozen river near to town. 13 On March 31 st 1999 I went fishing with Tatiana and her cousin. Before we left, Tatiana insisted on stripping off my Western Goretex jacket and making me put on layers of her pure wool sweaters with her down jacket (pukhovka) over the top. 'Foreigners like to wear synthetic fabrics,' she said, 'We like everything to be natural'. We fished from mid­ morning until dusk, and I counted 40 people on the same stretch of river, mostly Native but also some Russians. Tatiana pointed out that the Russian man next to us was fishing at the wrong level and was catching all sorts of flat fish, which would not be good to eat. I managed to catch a good number of smelt (koriushka) as I was using Tatiana's special lures, which she had bought in Japan. In the evening her cousin cooked most of the smelt with seaweed in a big slimy soup called put', a traditional Nivkh dish with Japanese influence. We later fried up some more of the fish at home. The day's work was clearly for pleasure, though of course related to consumption. For Tatiana, the main point of winter fishing is the pleasure. In a letter sent to me in 2001 she writes: Every Sunday I try to get out fishing. Yesterday, for example, I caught only two saffron cod (navaga). That is 1 %, the other 99% is the fact of going out into Nature - it is pleasure to just to walk and think and breathe our pure northern air. On the 9th May I ate dried sliced salmon (iukola) with Tatiana. A Nivkh friend in the north had sent the iukola as a gift, together with some seal oil. We cut the iukola into small slices, dipped the slices into soy sauce with our fingers and then drank a spoonful 12 See Appendix III: Analysis of Survey. 13 Anyone is allowed to fish using a rod anywhere and at any time without a licence. People need permissions and quotas to fish with nets, especially for commercial species (e.g. salmon). 140 of seal oil. Tatiana believes she has kept her health because she drank a lot of seal oil when she was young. 'At my age,' she sighed, 'I should be making iukola but I am still working. I get paid hardly anything but it is worth it, I enjoy my work'. Tatiana's contemporaries tend to spend summer months on the shores of Sakhalin's north-eastern and north-western coasts. 14 In 1999 Tatiana's cousin spent several months on the western coast with an old friend, fishing and collecting wild plants. The 9th May was Victory Day, and at the flat of some (Nivkh) friends we discussed fishing. May was apparently the worst month for fish. The ice was just melting on the river, and they were waiting for it to clear so that they could start fishing again. The official bird-hunting season was to begin in the middle of May and they were hoping to go hunting. I noted that Tatiana's son had already gone hunting. Early in June, Tatiana's family dug over their garden plot and start planting potatoes. The family lived for several years in a wooden house surrounded by a plot of land in the kolkhoz area of town where most of the Native people tend to live today. It is, in general, poorer and the wooden houses are considered less comfortable than the modem flats in the centre of town. However, many Native families prefer the kolkhoz area of town, because they have lived there so long and the place is familiar, they have good personal networks and they like the garden plots around their houses. An elderly Nivkh informant, Natalya Grigorevna, spoke fondly of the garden (dvor) behind her house: Natalya Grigorevna: We're used to it here. I don't even want to live in a block of flats. Here we have the garden (dvor). You go out and dig about a bit, do something. Or you just go out and stand there .... But in the blocks of flats, you just go into your flat - and sit there . .. it isn't interesting. Emma: What do you grow here? Natalya Grigorevna: Here? I have potatoes, cabbage, can-ots, dill, parsley, flowers - I just threw lots of seeds about, I can't remember exactly what's growing there. We planted cabbage last year. We had a good harvest ... we salted it and it lasted us until this supuner. The children ate a Jot of it. This year we didn't plant as much and the heads are small. 14 In the second part of this chapter we will encounter some of these women. 141 Tatiana and her husband now live in a modern flat in the centre of Nogliki. 15 Flat occupants have plots of land near the flats, or dachas or garden plots just outside town, some near the gas-fired power station. Tatiana's son and daughter-in-law still live in the former home and all the family use that land for growing vegetables, especially potatoes. They store their annual harvest of potatoes in the cellar and this generally lasts until the next harvest. I was chastised for buying potatoes in the shop before I saw where their stores were kept. Potato planting and harvesting are probably the most important domestic activities in the local calendar (it is the same throughout Russia). Officials may not turn up at a pre­ arranged meeting because they are planting or digging up their potatoes. 16 Local journalist, Komarichev, writes: '[T]he potato is the tsarina of our garden plots, our second bread.' (Znamia Truda, 11 June 1999, pl) Many people in Nogliki have dachas and/ or garden plots where they grow potatoes and other vegetables, and sometimes berries. 17 If there are any families in the district today that are not involved in garden plot cultivation, then there aren't many of them. Our difficult life spurs people on to dig in the earth with determination, not sparing any effort or time. An impressive amount ofland is cultivated in this way in the district today. There are 221 ha of collective plots that used to belong to enterprises and organisations. And there are a total of 143 ha belonging to garden-allotment societies ... A total of 598 ha in the district is occupied by private house-owners with their allotments. (Znamia Truda, 11 June 1999, pl) There was a rush of garden plot acquisition in the early 1990s when a lot of garden­ allotment societies were ~et up and lightly forested areas near Nogliki were transformed into dacha and garden plot quarters. Znamia Truda journalist Viktorov notes that the garden plot phenomenon has a longer history than this: people were given garden plots during the war and in the post-war period to encourage self-sufficiency. 'How difficult were those dry years when the staple crop, potatoes, didn't grow well' (Znamia Truda, 25 15 This is the half-built block of flats allocated to Native residents that I refer to in Chapter 4. 16 This has happened a number of times in my experience. August 1999, p3). Although it is a practice initially introduced by the Russians, cultivation of private plots seems as popular now for the Native people as for the non­ Native residents of Noglikskii district. 18 The kolkhoz system encouraged use of private plots as secondary income (Humphrey 1998; Seeth et al 1998). Natalya Grigorevna related how people used to grow potatoes in her old Native village of Dagi: 'Whoever wanted to used to grow potatoes there'. However, some Native people do not cultivate plots, due to lack of skills or money. It may also be due to alcoholism, though the Russians suffer from that, too. Yet potato planting is used in the moral discourses of some middle class Russians about the Native population. Barannikova complains: 'The Native people are lazy, they don't plant potatoes' .19 142 In June 1999, Znamia Truda journalist Komarichev spoke to cultivators at one of Nogliki' s garden-allotment societies. Pensioner Evgenii Krivoruchko always plants his potatoes early (earliest ever was 18th May), and planted them on the 1 st June in 1999, as spring was late. In 1999 he was lucky to acquire a truck-load of manure, which is very expensive (see below). Krivoruchko also has a private house with a garden in Nogliki, where he grows other greens and more potatoes. His total annual harvest is about 25 bags of potatoes, which is enough for three families - his own, his son's and his daughter's. His children and their families help out with the cultivation of both plots. Pensioner Sentyabrina Chaplygina planted her potatoes on the 2°d June with the help of her son, daughter, and son-in-law. She usually harvests 12-13 bags but last year (1998) they only got 3Y2 bags. In 1998 she put manure on the plot, but this year she has reverted to a mix of turf and old fish leftovers that she collects over winter. Sentyabrina grows onions, carrots, red pepper, marrow, peas, berry bushes, and a variety of flowers. She has a greenhouse where she -grows cucumbers and tomatoes, which she plants in early June. Sentyabrina spends the whole summer at her dacha. This is the time when many elderly Nivkh women spend time fishing and collecting wild plants and berries on the coastal bays. 17 From my survey, 74% ofrespondents practise garden plot cultivation, while 52% have a garden plot of their own. Potatoes are by far the most important food type in people's diets (see Appendix III). 18 From my survey, 72.5% of Native and 74.5% of non-Native respondents cultivated garden plots. 143 As well as reporting on local practices, Znamia Truda acts as a mediator in local society, as we have established in previous chapters. In June 1999, a Nogliki citizen telephoned znamia Truda asking why the local oil company, l(atanglineftegas, did not give their workers days off (sel'khozdni) for planting potatoes. Journalists got in touch with the company's chief of personnel who replied that workers were given days off but only as holidays or unpaid leave, as the oil company could not afford to grant their workers paid leave for digging potatoes (Znamia Truda, 11 th June 1999). By 3 July 2000 after more local protest (telephone calls and letters to the newspaper), the district mayor issued an order (rasporiazhenie) recommending all enterprises to give their workers up to 3 days off (paid or unpaid according to company finances) for planting potatoes and vegetables between the 7th and 20th June 2000. Workers in the budget sphere (teachers, administrators, etc.) were to be allowed up to three days off including one day's paid leave (Znamia Truda, 3 July 2000, pl). Another concern expressed to the local newspaper was about transport to out-of-town garden plots. Readers made suggestions for ways in which the district administration could help with transport, and these were relayed by journalists to the mayor. The mayor tried to negotiate with the local oil company, but with no success, but he was able to arrange for the gas fired power station (NOES) to provide a temporary free bus service until the district got more regular buses (Znamia Truda, 3 July 2000, pl). As Komarichev reported, there is no real dacha maintenance service, though some private entrepreneurs will charge 20 to 25 roubles per sotka ( one hundredth of an acre) to dig plots for others. Some, Komarichev notes, 'are shameless enough to ask for 35 roubles!' (Znamia Truda, 11 June 1999, pl). Readers expressed concern at a possible increase in the cost of water provision to dachas (20-25 R in 1998), and ab9ut the high cost of manure, which could cost as much as 1.5 thousand roubles for a truck load. One man worked out he could buy 7-8 bags of potatoes for that price for the winter and so decided 19 On Kamchatka a similar comment reflected a failed effort at patronage: 'We give them seed potatoes but they are too lazy to plant them!' 144 not to plant anything in his plot that year. As Komarichev noted, 'it is easier for those who can find their own channels for getting a truck load of manure much cheaper. But not everyone is that lucky' (Znamia Truda, 11 June 1999, pl). The journalist questions why it is so expensive? Is it the transportation cost.from Nysh20 where the manure originates? He also questions the quality of the manure - it is often mixed up with stones and twigs. More and more people are turning to cheaper options: turf and fish leftovers or even chemical fertilisers. Despite the expense of cultivating a garden plot, Znamia Truda journalist Viktorov suggests that most people are turning to garden plots as life's hardships force them to work the land 'in order to make ends meet with more confidence' (Znamia Truda, 25 August 1999, p3). Those who have bent their backs and used their hands to work the land, gained knowledge (znanie) and skills on their plots - call them dachas or just garden plots - have received a tangible gain from their efforts. Families cover their needs in potatoes, and stock up for the winter with salted vegetables, jams (varen 'ie) made from raspberries, blackcurrants, and other berries. (Znamia Truda, 25 August 1999, p3) But there are other reasons, not just 'making ends meet' that make garden plot cultivation important for local people. 'Vegetable plots are good for the health and you can encourage children to work hard not just through words, but through concrete actions. ' (Znamia Truda, 25 August 1999, p3) Values such as hard work can be promoted through cultivating a garden plot. However, it is getting more and more expensive to cultivate a garden plot, and in an article encouraging people to take up plot cultivation and companies to help out with transportation, Komarichev writes: 'We have to act. Or soon garden plots will be a thing only for well off families. And the poorer families who particularly need the garden plots will not be able to afford them' (Znamia Truda, 1 March 2000, ppl,2). 20 Nysh is not on my maps but is situated in Noglikskii District, on the Nogliki to Tymovskoe road. 145 Garden plots can also be moral battlegrounds. Journalist Viktorov reports a gradual increase in garden plot theft. People have had their spring onions snipped, radishes and young potatoes dug up and berry-bushes stolen. The militia should deal with these offences, but Viktorov also urges people to get together with their dacha neighbours and increase the protection of their plots. 'The increase in thefts from garden plots can be related to the increase in unemployment and other negative phenomena of our lives today. However, a lot depends on the individual. One person may go round stealing things from other people's garden plots, another might sweat away working on the same garden plots' (Znamia Truda, 25 August 1999, p3). The journalist stresses that everyone now has an individual moral responsibility for protecting their own resources. Tatiana gathers non-timber forest products (NTFPs) (dikorosy) in the local forest. Good gathering places are generally inaccessible without a car. Those who do not have a car may access poorer harvesting grounds or depend on their kinship and friendship or patronage networks for their NTFPs. Berries, mushrooms, wild onion and fem are regularly sold on the market by private sellers. Poorer residents would not be able to afford the produce sold on the market, which is bought by those who may have money but no time to travel out of town. Most gathering is for private consumption. Tatiana's husband, son or nephews drive and may do some small-scale fishing. Her son provides essential mechanical services when the car has technical problems. The extended family (including guests) help with the picking when they can. Tatiana collects and prepares many different NTFPs including mushrooms (griby) , berries (iagoda) , (dwarf Siberian) pine nuts (orekhi), wild onion (cheremsha), fem (paporotnik), and burdock (lopukh). 21 In June 1999 Tatiana travelled to Nabil'skii Bay with her husband Vladimir, his boss and his boss's wife, daughter and grandddaughter. Vladimir's job involves driving his boss round and periodically indulging in heavy drinking sessions with him. 22 As part of this contract with multiple official and non-official obligations, he also drives his boss and the family on recreational fishing trips. While the men fished for krasnoperka (lit. 'red-fin'), 21 According to my survey, respondents collected all of these products: mushrooms 92%; berries 95.5%; wild onion 67%; fem 52%; pine nuts 37%; medicinal plants 29.5%. 146 Tatiana gathered wild onion, fern, and burdock. These all have fairly short growing seasons in June and July, and have to be gathered while they are young. Tatiana remarked that there were a lot of people by Nabil'skii Bay, camping in cars or tents, but they were 'all strangers' ('vse chuzhie'). Tatiana appeared to consider the recreational space to be 'ours' (nash) (as 'locals' or 'Native locals'). Nabil'skii Bay is one of the string of shallow lagoons that international observers fear to be most at risk from the offshore oil and gas projects. With their small exits and shallow waters, they would suffer hugely if oil from a slick got in. The value of these bays as nesting and migrating sites for rare birds has been internationally recognised (Newell and Wilson 1996). Less is known internationally about the importance of these bays for local subsistence and leisure activities. Nor do local people protest to oil companies or Znamia Truda about threats to their recreational space. Concerns about the bays only tend to be expressed publicly in terms of threats to Native livelihoods. On the 20th July, I went on another trip, this time to the forest. Vladimir was driving, Tatiana was there, too, together with their daughter-in-law. We stopped at a mountain pass and had to drink some vodka to show respect for the spirits. Tatiana grumbled that Vladimir only insists on observing this ritual because he is so fond of vodka. We collected a lot of fem in a forest clearing not far from the road. In another forest area we collected wild onion, fighting off swarms of mosquitoes and midges. The harvesting areas were not obvious from the roads and clearly needed some special local knowledge. Places and the resources they hold are perceived to belong to those who know about them and use them. Tatiana and Vladimir transform the natural resources they gather into social capital through their networks of patronage and exchange. After expeditions their house becomes a family production line. Their bath is used for storage (the huge taimen trout (taimen ') that had been exchanged for wild onion with a family friend was taken and replaced by fem left to soak in hot water). The evening of the expedition mentioned above, Tatiana distributed some of the fresh wild onion in the kolkhoz area of town. The next day while 22 When !found them drunk on one occasion, Vladimir apologised awkwardly: 'It's an important contract. I drive him around. He pays really well - the main thing is he pays really well'. 147 her daughter-in-law helped to sort the fern, Tatiana chopped the wild onion finely, squashing it into the jars, making lots of juice come out of the leaves and adding plenty of salt. A (Russian) friend came to pick some up. Tatiana's niece came round to prepare pel'meni with wild onion and taimen'. We also ate taimen' soup with salted wild onion. Taimen' is in fact a Red Book species on Sakhalin, and it is illegal to catch it. However, it is a valuable good for barter if someone does happen to catch one. Vladimir tended to be responsible for most of the barter activities. As well as the fish, he would also drive north to visit the reindeer herders to get reindeer meat. 23 In August, the mushroom season began. 24 In a Znamia Truda article entitled 'Good rains and hot sun' Viktorov announced that over the weekend of August 7th_gth hundreds of people from Nogliki had gone mushroom picking after the recent warm, rainy days. Cars were parked on both sides of the road leading from Nogliki southwards to Tymovskoe. 'People returned home, some with enough mushrooms for a fry-up, others with a bucket full, ... I know for sure that one person gathered 7 buckets full of white mushrooms' (Znamia Truda, 11 August 1999, pl). In August and September we went through the 'mushroom phase' at home. Tatiana went out on several mushrooming expeditions25 and would exclaim: 'Oh we have so many, but I can't stop picking them!' She derived great pleasure from being out in nature, doing productive work, seeing the mushrooms 'standing up so straight'. We ate a lot of mushroom soup, fried mushrooms, mushroom salad, mushrooms in vinegar, mushrooms and mayonnaise. 26 Mushrooms are often sold on the market in their fresh or more often preserved forms. On a day in early September Tatiana collected a large bag of pine nuts from the woods not far from Nogliki together with her son and his wife. In Nogliki people either collect pine nuts themselves (again transport is an issue) or buy them on the market. As 23 See Chapter 7. 24 Russians and Native people alike have a good knowledge of mushrooms, though the knowledge was probably brought to the area initially by the Russians. 25 She gathered milky caps (gruzdi), champignons (shampig'rwny), russulas (syroiezhki), birch bolete (red cap) (podosinoviki) and rough bolete (podberewviki). Slippery jack (masliata) are also found locally. 26 Mayonnaise is imported from Korea and sold in large plastic buckets (with lids) which are used for collecting berries when they are empty. It is one of the rare foreign products that people have adopted. Some even prefer it to Russian mayonnaise, which is generally not available in any case. 148 elsewhere in Russia, people traditionally nibble them on the street, as they nibble sunflower seeds. 27 Early September was also the season for shiksha berries, mountain ash or rowan berries (riabina) and cowberries (brusnika). By mid-September we were still eating mushrooms, but we were also eating a lot of varen 'ie (syrupy jam). This product is common throughout Russia. Those who do not make jams will probably have relatives who send or bring jam as a gift. Tatiana made varen'ie out of golubika (great bilberries) and zhimolost' (honeysuckle berries) and had a unique recipe of watermelon skins28 and klopovka (lit. bugberry). 29 The varen'ie Tatiana made out of (pure) bugberry was particularly good for making mors - the juice drink made by adding water to varen 'ie. Tatiana complained that it was difficult to make varen 'ie today (in 1999) because of the high cost of sugar. Many elderly women could no longer afford to do this because suddenly a basic food has become a luxury. This is how local people are experiencing the 'free market'. Decision-making on domestic production takes place at the household level. In her family, it is Tatiana who makes decisions on what to plant and gather and how to prepare it. It is common for women to take on the responsibility for this kind of domestic decision-making, though in addition, Tatiana has a particularly dominant personality in the domestic sphere. However, she depends on Vladimir and other members of her family for help with the garden plot and for transport to the gathering grounds in the forest and near the bays . . There are no real efforts by the state to control domestic production. People have full autonomy over the way they decide to use their garden plots and anyone who wishes to cultivate a plot is able -to acquire land to do so. The only legal limitations to domestic production are in the sphere of gathering. 30 This control is undertaken by the forest 27 The process of shelling the nuts is part of the enjoyment, though shelled.pine nuts are sold in Moscow airport (probably for the benefit of foreigners). 28 Watermelons are bought on the market. 29 Bugberry is found only on Sakhalin, its name derives from the Russian for bug - klop - as its sharp sweet-sour smell is supposed to be like the smell of squashed bugs. The juice is supposed to lower one's blood pressure. 30 In 2001 one person was allowed to gather 10kg of any type of berry apart from dogrose and mountain ash (5kg); 30kg of mushrooms; 20kg pine-cones (Znamia Truda, 04.08.01, pl). service.31 Forest rangers can stop cars on the roads and check how many buckets have been collected. 149 Much more important for the district forest service. is the threat of forest fires set off by careless people when they are collecting berries and mushrooms. In Noglikskii District, forest fires have regularly caused devastation. In 1998 - a particularly hot, dry and windy year - Noglikskii District had 71 forest fires across 19.9 thousand ha. and half a million cubic metres of timber were burned (Znamia Truda, 6th May 1999, pp2,4). The district mayor issued a decree 'On measures to protect the forests from fires on the territory of Noglikskii district' (16th April 1999). This set limitations on forest access during the 'fire danger' period between the spring thaw and the autumn snows or heavy rains. The forest service erected barriers on the roads so that people did not go into the forests and risk setting off a fire. Other measures included attracting local people to fire fighting activities and encouraging the larger companies in the district (the oil company and the road construction company) to provide fire fighting equipment in places that might need it. In 1999 there were 7 fires, across 615 ha. and 23.3 thousand cub. m were burned. The decree was extended to 2000 as a precaution (Znamia Truda, 11 May 2000, p2). In summer 2000, the District Forest Service decided to allow people into the forests with permits. The head of the Forest Service said: 'The weather is good, nature is giving us harvests of mushrooms and berries - why not meet people halfway and let them make stores for the winter.' But as journalist Panchenko notes: 'And how did people pay her back? Not everyone, but some barbarians .. . robbed a bulldozer ... ' Apparently the thieves took the bulldozer's accumulator and siphoned off 300 litres of diesel fuel, broke into a hut and stole sleeping bags and blankets. 'It wasn't poor people who did it, either - you could see the tracks of a Jeep everywhere' (Znamia Truda, 9 September 2000, pl). In the Soviet era, domestic production fed into the overall Soviet production system. People relate how they used to collect berries and hand them in at a local collection point, where they would receive money or tokens that could be used to buy food. The head of 31 Since 2000, this is the Department of Forestry in the Ministry of Natural Resources. 150 the Forest Service explained how Noglikskii District Forest Service used to collect 5 tonnes of cowberries (brusnika) per year in the 1970s and 80s. Neighbouring Tymovskii District Forest Service used to make birch juice and gather cranberries (kliukva) and fern (paporotnik), which was very valuable as it was exported to Japan. Berries would be collected by the population or forest service workers and collected at a central point managed by the Forest Service. Nothing much was done with the berries (apart from personal consumption) and there was a lot of waste. In 1999 the Forest Service had a licence to collect various NTFPs, but they did not process them - they were mainly for personal consumption. There are enough NTFPs in Noglikskii district to satisfy local consumption, but the Forest Service head feels that it is not an economic option for small business development at the district level as there is not enough fern, and other products would not provide a stable enough income. Wild forest products are limited in supply, and berry gathering grounds can be decimated by a forest fire. This means that Tatiana's knowledge of harvesting grounds is particularly valuable. Domestic production, then, is a sphere of almost complete autonomy for Noglikskii district households. The problem is probably that there is not enough assistance from the state. Attempts are being made to compensate for this through private enterprise. The Nogliki bread factory, for example, collected berries from the local population in 1999 but did not have the necessary equipment to make the biscuits (prianniki) they were planning to make with dried fruits. Employees took the collected berries home to store in their own freezers until required by the factory. They applied unsuccessfully for a grant from the Institute of Sustainable Societies (Khabarovsk and Yuzhno-Sakhalinsk) towards their production Efforts are also being made by an enterprise called 'N ysh' in the village of N ysh, in southern Noglikskii district, to provide local people with a place to sell their excess produce (vegetables, milk, berries). In recent years this enterprise has been trying to improve their links with the local population in an attempt to stave off collapse. Providing produce to the district hospital, the old people's and invalids' home and other district organisations is no longer enough. They have begun allocating plots of land to 151 people from Nysh itself and increasingly from Nogliki, so that they can plant potatoes, cabbages and other vegetables. These plots are tended by workers from the Nysh enterprise who charge for this service. Journalists from Znamia Truda call on Nogliki companies to help their workers with transport to Nysh to encourage them to cultivate plots here. The Nysh enterprise also sells cabbage, tomato and cucumber seedlings raised in their greenhouses. They also sell manure from their cows (as mentioned above) and hire out cows to local people. If a family is able to pay back the cost of the cow in produced milk, the cow becomes their property. The enterprise buys the milk produced by these cows locally, as well as milk from another dairy in a nearby village, and processes the milk into sour cream, tvorog, 32 and butter. The enterprise grows hay for its own cows' winter feed, and sells the surplus locally (Znamia Truda, 25 July 2000, pl). The Nysh management and journalists such as Komarichev urge local people to get more involved in small farming: 'It's time for villagers themselves to get really involved in small farming (podsobnoe khoziaistvo)' (Znamia Truda, 24 April 1999, pl,4). Viktorov: 'The time has come for serious work in the fields in our northern outpost (glubinka)' (Znamia Truda, 17 June 2000, pl). The Nysh enterprise tried to get a group of unemployed people interested in raising cows and poultry, but as Komarichev writes, 'the reaction was muted'. Are the people of Nysh going to get out of the habit of working hard from dawn to dusk like villagers all over the world? There is no alternative but to turn to small farming. The government should enable local government to hand out credits. There is good experience in the past. Brezhnev gave out long term, free credits to encourage people to buy cows and pigs. At that time, Brezhnev, with some success, was trying to make amends for Kruschev's mistake in destroying a decades long traditional way of life of millions of families - producing their own food products, especially meat, milk and potatoes. We can learn things from the west, but it is worth turning back to our own experience, too. (Znamia Truda, 1 March 2000, ppl,2) Despite all these efforts to improve contacts with local people, the managers of 'Nysh' do not seem to be able to save the business. And there is little help from the state. The 32 This is often translated as 'cream cheese'. 152 district administration promised 300 thousand roubles for products, but 140 of these had not reached Nysh by August 1999 (Znamia Truda, 25 August, 1999, pl). In August 2000 they were paying salaries in meat (Znamia Truda, 26 August 2000, pl). The journalist Viktorov notes that: 'Severnl agricultural enterprises in the south are being given considerable help by the oblast, but the arms didn't reach our district' (Znamia Truda, 17 June 2000, pl) This reflects the general concern that the regional powers in Yuzhno­ Sakhalinsk care only about people in the south and neglect Sakhalin's northern districts. In this chapter I have presented a picture - a 'snapshot' - of the domestic production cycle in Noglikskii District. Domestic production is an all-consuming activity that is hard work but also fun. Local diets depend quite heavily on the products of garden plot cultivation and gathering expeditions, not to mention winter fishing and barter and exchange of fish and meat. Social networks are reinforced through exchange and gift giving of domestically produced food. Local people are proud of producing fresh, 'ecologically clean' food, rather than the convenient, synthetic food that they assume people eat in the 'civilised' world. In this chapter we have also seen the way that the discourses surrounding domestic production have a moral content, particularly in the Znamia Truda articles that I have cited from. For example, domestic production is portrayed by journalists as a means of instilling values of hard work into children; people are urged to take up small farming and build up local production; people are advised to take on the responsibility for protecting their own dachas and garden plots from thieves. Thieves are held up in contrast to the honest people who spend their energies on tending their plots. Local regulators and busines-ses endeavour to help local people in their domestic production activities. However, the discourse of domestic production is ultimately a discourse of self-sufficiency, in which people are urged to take on the responsibility for their own lives. This contrasts with the discourses that have emerged thus far (the lack of information, the need for outsiders and specialists to come and take control, and the pre­ eminence of specialist over local know ledge). In the next section I look more closely at --- - - - --------~ the moral world of local citizens of Noglikskii District, particularly at the contrast and conflict between inside and outside moral worlds. 6.2 Fishing on Nyiskii Bay: Moral and Legal Entitlements 153 In this chapter, I explore the question of local entitlements to the fish resources of Nyiskii Bay, which is situated to the north of Nogliki (see map 2). The chapter explores the tension between the Law (Zakon) and the moral rules (svoi zakony) by which people govern their own actions and judge the actions of others around them. Much of the debate is framed in terms of evolving insider-outsider relations. I demonstrate that these relations are subjective; they shift, layer and overlap, depending on circumstance and perception. A local Russian fishing inspector, for example, may be an insider or an outsider, depending on the nature of the debate. Incomer populations become long-term populations over time, and thus feel they have as legitimate a right to be considered 'Native' as the local Nivkh and Orochon populations, and an equal moral right to access the local fish resources. I see the local insider-outsider discourses as reflecting the moral codes and boundaries that determine entitlements and action in the local arena. As we have seen in Chapter 4, conflicts between assimilationist discourses stressing that 'we are all the same' and nationalist discourses of difference tend to obscure important natural resource management concerns. This is particularly evident in the case of local fishing practices. The underlying crisis here is ecological - the decline in local fish populations. However, rights discourses dominate over responsibility discourses. Entitlements to fish quotas are debated more in local public forums (e.g. the newspaper) than, for example, industrial pollution, commercial logging along the Tym' river, (large­ scale) poaching, fish farming and conservation of fish resources and habitat. Local people blame outsiders for the pollution and resource depletion that are at the root of the crisis, and resent having to pay the price through limited access. The case of Nyiskii Bay illustrates the conflict between the seasonal Nivkh inhabitants of the bay and contemporary forces of regulation and control, which act ostensibly according to the letter of the Law. 154 Here I also compare this local conflict between local fishers and regulators to the larger conflict between preservation of local fish resources and the offshore oil and gas projects. I consider the difference between the dialogue that local fishers are engaged in with local regulators and authorities over access to the fish resources of the bay, and their dialogue with oil companies and local decision-makers over preservation of the same resources. I also compare local response to the offshore projects and the Soviet resettlement programmes of the 1960s. I first met Tetya Nadya outside her hut in the previously closed village of Nyivo, on a narrow spit of land between Nyiskii Bay and the Sea of Okhotsk. At that time, in September 1999, a big scandal had arisen in the Native community involving OMON (the special police force). They had been invited by the Fishing Inspectorate to help out with fishing regulation, and, we were told, had behaved aggressively and violently, even firing several shots through the fishing boat of another summer resident, Tetya Lida, as it was propped up outside her hut. We used to live here freely, caught as much fish as we wanted, and dried it, salted it. Before, we didn't have the problems we have now .. .. I don't know why it is, we asked at the meeting why is it like this? Why don't they let us catch this fish? ... it's our food! (Interview with Tetya Nadya, Nyiskii Bay, September 1999) To loca:l people such as Tetya Nadya, this incident was an act of invasion and unnecessary force by 'outsiders' and an arbitrary enforcement of the Law. The OMON forces 'come from somewhere' ('oni otkuda-to priezz.haiut') and 'check up on us' ('oni nas proveriaiut'). 'Why don't they go after those poachers who catch the fish, take the caviare and throw the rest away? We make iukola ( dried fish) and salt it and everything.' Tetya Nadya emphasises her own moral entitlement to the fish resource through comparing the wastage of commercial poachers to her own traditional (and complete) use of the resource. Iukola is a key cultural symbol for the Nivkhi. Significantly, the Russians do not make it. 155 Tetya Nadya was born in the Native village of Nyivo in the early 1940s. She describes the village with nostalgia. There were 'good houses', people had gardens, they grew potatoes, some people even kept cows and pigs. There was a shop, a club and a banya. The children travelled on dog-sleds to the boarding school (lnternat) in Nogliki. There was a fishing kolkhoz called 'New Life' (Kalkhaz Navaia Zhizn '), where Tetya Nadya's father was a brigade leader (brigadir). The workers received money for the fish they handed in to the kalkhaz and were allowed to claim some of the catch for themselves. When people went hunting, they would share the meat with others in the village. The Nivkhi got on well with their Russian neighbours in the kalkhaz ('Ran' she kak-ta druzhna zhili ... '). In those days, the Russians (who included both managers and enlisted workers known as 'verbavannye') were considered to be insiders in the community, being part of the collective enterprise. In contrast, Russians often appear today in Native discourse as invaders or aggressors. OMON and the fishing inspectorate are Russians, as are the youngsters who come from Nogliki and vandalise the Native huts: 'Sometimes we lock up the hut and they knock down your door and go in just like that ... they go in and destroy everything.' In the late 1950s the villagers of N yivo were told by the authorities to move to Venskoe, another Native village, as Nyivo was apparently in danger of flooding. Tetya Nadya remembers: 'Our people (nashi) didn't want to move away ... but we had to and that was that (a nada nada vat tak vat).' Later, in 1964 they were all moved to Nogliki when three villages were amalgamated. Despite the move, the indigenous villagers retained strong emotional ties to their former settlements and their fishing grounds. In the 1990s the Nivkhi began to return to their old villages to fish, to rediscover their roots and cultural practices, and to find tranquility away from the stress of the settlement. Nowadays, Tetya Nadya returns to Nyiskii Bay every summer. She fishes to make fish soup and iukala, and collects berries and leaves to make tea: 'As soon as it is summer we can't wait to come here.' Natalya Grigorievna, another Nivkh resident of Nogliki, is older than Tetya Nadya. She was born in 1934 in a small Native settlement, Tymyt', which was renamed Gafuvich ('there's an oil tower there now'). In 1939, the population of Tymyt' were moved to Dagi and the Kolkhoz Novyi Byt ('New Way of Life'). In 1950, Natalya and her fellow villagers were forced to move to Chaivo. They were given one week's notice: 'They 156 came and held a meeting' ('Priekhali, sobranie sdelali'). In 1964, for reasons of 'non­ profitability', the three kolkhozy from the villages were joined together to form Kolkhoz Vostok, based in Nogliki. The villagers were resettled again: 'Nobody asked the people. It was all decided by Party officials (partiinye liudi). They came from Nogliki.' These demographic upheavals were characterised by non-consultative meetings to inform local people about decisions that had already been made in an outer moral space. People did not expect to be consulted, nor did they try to protest. Bruce Grant comments on his informants' tales about resettlement to Nogliki: 'Most people interpreted the decision as official policy and assumed that it would be for the best' (1999: 188). Only retrospectively did local residents regret their lack of resistance to events. One of Grant's informants commented in 1990: 'The tragedy is that nothing happened. The empty houses in Nogliki were all ready. The kolkhoz had already been built. Most people just got up and moved. That's the tragedy- that there was no tragedy' (ibid: 188). Yet it was not the imposition of the kolkhoz system per se that distressed local people. Indeed, there is considerable nostalgia for the early kolkhoz days before resettlement to Nogliki, when people were still allowed to live and fish in or close to their traditional fishing grounds on the bays. Even today, despite stories of considerable physical hardship, particularly during the war, when people had to work waist deep in cold water and some people died, Natalya Grigorievna speaks of the 'harsh discipline' of the Nyiskii Bay collective as a good thing: 'We needed it.' The state-imposed framework of discipline was seen as essential to productive work (which was not an imposed Soviet value), and it was also accompanied by guaranteed housing, jobs and social infrastructure. In those days, state power was perceived to an extent as being morally justified. Also, insofar as the discipline included · mutual criticism by members of the collective, it was perceived as 'internal' to some degree. In her discourse, Natalya Grigorievna emphasises the difference between this 'internal,' morally justified discipline 157 and today's 'external' regulation by the Fishing Inspectorate, which she only encountered when she moved to Nogliki. Today, regulation and control by state organs are not automatically morally justified, particularly if the moral rights of local people are perceived to be infringed. Natalya Grigorievna' s .discourse of insiders and outsiders portrays modem regulation from outside as a bad thing, especially when she sees it to be aggressively aimed at the Native community. Although the amalgamation of the smaller kolkhozy in 1964 was ostensibly carried out for economic reasons, by 1968 Kolkhoz Vostok was in debt and plans were not being fulfilled, so it started expeditions back to deserted villages to access the fish resources of those places. Since then, the kolkhoz has been fishing in most of the bays, including Nyiskii. Before the collapse of the Soviet system, Kolkhoz Vostok used to have the status of 'Native enterprise' ('natsional'noe predpriyatie'), which meant that the collective enjoyed privileges such as extra fish quotas. Like in other Native enterprises in the Soviet Union, the workforce of Kolkhoz Vostok became progressively less Native. By 1982, the kolkhoz employed only 120 Native workers out of a total of 336 (Krupnik and Smoliak, cited in Grant, 1999: 191). Today they have shed the Native label and do not count the numbers of Native and non-Native workers, though they estimate about one quarter of the work-force is Native. 33 The economic fortunes of Kolkhoz Vostok have not improved considerably in the past 10 years, but there has been a shift in the consciousness of the workers. The latter are starting to question authority and they view the Law as a possible tool for defending their own interests in the everyday domain. When Kolkhoz Vostok was declared bankrupt in 1998, an 'external manager' (vneshnyi upravlyaiuschii) was brought in. According to the law on bankruptcy, the manager had exceptional independent power over decision­ making. In 1999 kolkhoz workers sent an anonymous complaint (zhaloba) to the district prosecutor, expressing outrage at the activities of the new manager. While workers were still owed their wages from the previous year and pensioners had not been paid what they were entitled to, the manager was living in a new flat, was reallocating job I I I responsibilities within the kolkhoz, and was paying out large sums of money to certain workers. As it turned out, the complaint was declared legally invalid due to its 158 anonymity. However, the prosecutor's assistant, understanding that the issue nonetheless had to be resolved publicly, published a defence of the manager's emergency powers in the local newspaper (Znamya Truda, 23.06.99, p3). Natalya Grigorievna laughs at the thought of anyone criticising the kolkhoz manager in the 1970s ('You must be joking! ... You think anyone would have listened to us?') But the workers of today demonstrate that they are prepared to take action, and significant! y, tum to the Law, if they see their rights being infringed by a manager who appears to be abusing the privileges of his position and accruing personal wealth at their expense. A similar shift in perspective can be seen on the part of the Native fishers of Nyiskii Bay. In the Soviet era, the state (in the form of the kolkhoz) had a moral entitlement to control fishing in Nyiskii Bay as long as it was providing employment to local Native populations, and allowing them to continue fishing in their traditional areas. When the state removed people from these areas, local attitudes to the kolkhoz system changed, and in local eyes the kolkhoz forfeited its moral entitlement to the resources of those places. People now believe the kolkhoz is aligned with the external controlling organs, the Fishing Inspectorate and OMON, and the enterprise finds itself in conflict with the Native fishers of Nyiskii Bay. There has been a shift in the form of entitlements, from property relations based on practice, identity, and relatedness to place (in the Soviet era), to externally imposed and regulated quotas, based on legal definitions of entitlement, policed, often aggressively, by outsiders (the present day). The conflict over the fish resources of Nyiskii Bay is one of access to the depleted resources of a particular place. The Native summer residents have both a traditional moral entitlement and a legal entitlement defined in federal (and international) legislation. However, in practice, access is officially determined through allocation of fish quotas. At the local level, this is decided by a commission in the district administration, including local regulators and a representative from Kolkhoz Vostok 33 From interview with director of Kolkhoz Vostok. 159 (Znamya Truda, 19.12.98, p2). In 1999 indigenous residents complained that there were no Native representatives at these meetings. In 2000, indigenous representatives apparently did attend these meetings. Recommendations on who is to receive fish must be approved by officials in Yuzhno-Sakhalinsk. District quotas are worked out in Yuzhno­ Sakhalinsk, regional quotas are determined by Moscow. Local residents mistrust the scientific research that determines the allocation of fish quotas to their local area. There is a feeling that the specialist knowledge of outsiders is unreliable. Officials point to the lack of independent local studies of their fish populations. ( 'We want to do it ourselves' ... 'We need a grant to do scientific research'). Grants - also a limited resource - are a relatively new phenomenon here, but are already perceived, by officials, entrepreneurs and NGOs, as a potential tool for bypassing hierarchical structures of power, regulation and financing. In 2000, a total of 32 fishing enterprises were registered in Noglikskii district, of which 10 were indigenous 'clan enterprises' ('rodovye khozyaistva').34 Fishing takes place on the rivers, in the river estuaries, in coastal lagoons such as Nyiskii Bay, along the coastline, and further out to sea (see map 2). Kolkhoz Vostok owns some lands on Nyiskii Bay, while the rest are owned by the state. Indigenous families, communities (obschiny) and clan enterprises are allocated fishing grounds and accompanying plots of land on Nyiskii Bay and other bays in the district. In 1999, clan enterprises had to re-register as ordinary commercial enterprises but retained access to the bays. Indigenous residents are allowed personal quotas of 100 kg of salmon per person every year, while indigenous enterprises are allowed a certain priority in the distribution of commercial quotas. Kolkhoz Vostok is allowed a 'scientific quota' of salmon for Nyiskii Bay, arranged with the Yuzhno-Sakhalinsk based Institute of Fisheries and Oceanography. Other local (non­ indigenous) fishing enterprises and some registered elsewhere on Sakhalin can get quotas for coastal fishing according to a strict distribution procedure (Znamya Truda, 19.12.98, p2), but do not fish in the coastal bays. Deep-sea fishing is carried out by international vessels, with quotas allocated by Moscow. Illegal fishing in the Okhotsk Sea is probably the greatest threat to the fish resources, and the most difficult to police. 34 From Barannikova and Lisitsyn 2000. 160 (Non-Native) pensioners complain to the local newspaper that, despite living in a district so rich in fish resources, they cannot buy fish in the shops or on the market (Znamya Truda, 07.07.99, p4). Instead it is the entrepreneurs (including the clan enterprises) who access the resource and sell it elsewhere for a greater profit. Such inequitable access to fish is morally unacceptable to local residents, many of whom cannot afford to buy meat. The pensioners use the newspaper as a way to get their message across to the fishermen: 'Let's have a response from you fishermen. We are waiting for your fish. And V.V. Volodin's shop 'Veteran' will hopefully remember the non-working pensioners and labour veterans' (Znamya Truda, 07.07.99, p4). After several more letters and calls came to the editorial office of the newspaper, journalists were able to announce that the population could finally buy fish in a newly opened municipal shop 'Sakhalinskaya Initsiativa' ('Sakhalin Initiative') (Znamya Truda, 28.07.99, pl). In Russia, the implementation of the Law is selective and often subjective. Some local bureaucrats no longer accept the moral entitlement of the Nivkhi to fish quotas, and are making efforts to withdraw that privilege. Local discourse argues that the Nivkhi no longer have special rights to these resources or even to indigenous status. There is some indignation that non-indigenous residents who want to engage in small-scale subsistence salmon fishing are forced to become poachers. As one Russian informant commented: 'People are not very different. All are unemployed, all are looking to the rivers to get something to eat.' Tetya Nadya is frustrated with the officials, perceiving their discourse as one of exclusion not equality: 'They say to us: go and build yourselves dachas, plant cucumbers and tomatoes. Why would I want cucumbers when I want to dry this fish? I want to live in my own way.' ('Po svoemu khochu ya zhit. ') Here again she emphasises the Russian­ Native difference through use of cultural symbols. Tetya Nadya spends her summers here on the bay as Sentyabrina Chaplygina spends hers on her dacha. 160 (Non-Native) pensioners complain to the local newspaper that, despite living in a district so rich in fish resources, they cannot buy fish in the shops or on the market (Znamya Truda, 07.07.99, p4). Instead it is the entrepreneurs (including the clan enterprises) who access the resource and sell it elsewhere for a greater profit. Such inequitable access to fish is morally unacceptable to local residents, many of whom cannot afford to buy meat. The pensioners use the newspaper as a way to get their message across to the fishermen: 'Let's have a response from you fishermen. We are waiting for your fish. And V.V. Volodin's shop 'Veteran' will hopefully remember the non-working pensioners and labour veterans' (Znamya Truda, 07.07.99, p4). After several more letters and calls came to the editorial office of the newspaper, journalists were able to announce that the population could finally buy fish in a newly opened municipal shop 'Sakhalinskaya Initsiativa' ('Sakhalin Initiative') (Znamya Truda, 28.07.99, pl). In Russia, the implementation of the Law is selective and often subjective. Some local bureaucrats no longer accept the moral entitlement of the Nivkhi to fish quotas, and are making efforts to withdraw that privilege. Local discourse argues that the Nivkhi no longer have special rights to these resources or even to indigenous status. There is some indignation that non-indigenous residents who want to engage in small-scale subsistence salmon fishing are forced to become poachers. As one Russian informant commented: 'People are not very different. All are unemployed, all are looking to the rivers to get something to eat.' Tetya Nadya is frustrated with the officials, perceiving their discourse as one of exclusion not equality: 'They say to us~ go and build yourselves dachas, plant cucumbers and tomatoes. Why would I want cucumbers when I want to dry this fish? I want to live in my own way.' ('Po svoemu khochu ya zhit. ') Here again she emphasises the Russian­ Native difference through use of cultural symbols. Tetya Nadya spends her summers here on the bay as Sentyabrina Chaplygina spends hers on her dacha. 161 Tetya Nadya has more faith in the head of the Association of Indigenous Peoples, Yuri Nitkuk, than in any officials: 'He makes an effort for our people. He does all the running around for us.' The Association is made up of 'our people' (insiders) and thus perceived by some as a more 'moral' entity than the District.Administration, or at least as an entity that will help its own people. This may be a disadvantage for those who feel that the Association does not represent their interests.35 Like other elderly Native people, Tetya Nadya also relies on her son to help her with transport and fishing, and to visit the administration to secure their fish quotas. Natalya Grigorievna's son, Vasya, works as a pipeline engineer for a Russian company. He lives with Zina, who is half-Nivkh and half-Russian. They have three children. During Vasya's vacation the family travels to Nyiskii Bay, and stays in his parents' hut. The children collect mushrooms, pine nuts and berries, help Vasya with fishing, and Zina with preparing fish and caviare. Vasya fishes the combined quotas of his large family. Zina's three children still receive their full fish quotas despite being three-quarters Russian. Zina jokes: 'Nivkhi are proud of being Nivkhi, especially when it comes to fish' . Everyone's 100 kg quotas equal two barrels full. However, Vasya and Zina fish more than their legally allocated quota. They fish to fill 6 barrels, with the aim of selling four of them: 'We don't eat that much fish,' said Zina, 'I want a car'. At the same time, Zina fulfils a key social role in the local indigenous community. Zina and the family share their supplies of fish and caviare with family and friends. Even when there is no fish or caviare, family, friends, neighbours and (Native and non-Native) school-friends often visit their house and are fed soup, bread or pel'meni by Zina. As a local 'public activist' Zina also helps her neighbours address problems of alcoholism and housing. She works with youth groups, and is helping elderly women to sell their crafts. She has made videos and taped the songs of elderly women and has been reviving traditional rituals with their help. For this work she has been able to secure financial support from oil companies. 36 35 See Chapter 4. 36 See Chapter 7. j' I I 162 Once the Fishing Inspectorate has stopped showing interest in the bay, barrels of surplus fish are taken to Nogliki to sell. According to Zina, the Fishing Inspectorate used to be Jess strict. The former head used to understand the. Nivkhi and he would tum a blind eye or 'look through his fingers' ('smotrel skvoz' pal'tsy'). Probably because of the increasing decline of resources, and the accompanying pressures from regulators and resource users alike, the present head, a long-term Russian resident of Sakhalin, has a different outlook: 'Everyone should be the same. Why should [the Native people] get special treatment? Especially if a Nivkh works for an oil company'. At the same time he recognises the moral debt owed by the incomer populations to the original indigenous resource users: 'Moving people from their own settlements and own lands - that is another issue'. Vasya sells the surplus fish to Russians who sell it on. Nivkhi are not entitled to sell the fish themselves since, legally, indigenous fish quotas are for subsistence only ( 'dlya sobstvennykh nuzhd'). Legislation paradoxically serves to criminalize certain traditional economic activities such as trade. Selling fish on the black market, moreover, is a business not without its dangers. A member of the Nivkh elite was allegedly blown up in his car by the fish mafia the year before I arrived in Nogliki. Indigenous residents do not consider fishing over their quotas to be a crime. Local non­ indigenous residents are not considered to be poaching if they catch one or two salmon for the dinner table. Most local people believe that the large scale poachers (who come from outside) are the main cause of the fish population declines. Regulators do not reveal information on large scale poaching. As one official commented: 'We don't have facts about big poaching ... we don't see the poachers'. Some local people claim that officials deliberately tum a blind eye to the large-scale (outside) poacher:s. This is a different kind of moral decision from the decision to tolerate the indiscretions of the 'insiders' - the Nivkhi and local Russians. In the case of large scale poaching, bribery may play a part in such decisions. 163 Not only is local over-fishing by indigenous residents not seen in the same light as large­ scale poaching, but also may even serve social purposes within the community. Indigenous people who are unable to catch their full quota of fish themselves are put onto a list by a rodovoe khozyaistvo or 'brigade' that fishes for them. These may be Native brigades or mixed brigades using Native quotas. These quotas are used to over-fish, to cover the costs of fuel and equipment and to provide a source of personal profit. But the system is open to abuse: They can't always bring back all of the fish. They supply two or three fish [to the people who gave them their quotas]. But with those quotas they always manage to catch enough for themselves .. . . I took quotas from one woman, for example, and brought her back the whole quantity of fish. She said that this was the first time in all these years that someone had brought her all the fish ... 37 Native entrepreneur Oleg asked Zina, in her role as local activist, to co-ordinate the list of people whose quotas he would use. Oleg did not provide everyone with the fish he owed them, though he still managed to send some fish to southern Sakhalin to sell. Zina was distraught at this betrayal of trust, and at having been forced to betray the trust of her neighbours. This story highlights a key point in this section, namely that some forms of activity are technically illegal but are considered morally acceptable, whereas other forms of activity are illegal and morally unacceptable. To explain this, one informant quoted me a Russian proverb: 'Est' zakon, est' i svoi zakoni' ('You have the Law, and then you have your own laws'). From Zina's point of view, her family has a moral right to illegally over-fish their quotas and trade them on the black market, as these quotas have been set by outsiders (using dubious scientific calculations) and are regulated by outsiders. Local people do not consider themselves responsible for the depletion of fish resources. Zina also shares part of their catch with other members of the community and works hard to help resolve people's social problems. Oleg, on the other hand, was unable to justify his over-fishing by providing fish for the people whose quotas he had used. His deception was compounded by the fact that he managed to get fish to market to make a personal 37 From interview with Russian entrepreneur, Nogliki, 1999. 164 profit. His betrayal of Zina, who had persuaded her own social network to trust Oleg, is a violation of the community's moral norms. Implicit moral codes appear to be well understood in the local sphere of natural resource use. On the other hand, the responses of local residents to the multinational offshore oil and gas developments are less confident. Multinational corporations and the rest of the oil industry inhabit an outer moral space, which they share with the Russian authorities. Local people are beginning to relate changes in the local environment, particularly the increased numbers of sick, wounded and poisoned fish found locally, to the Molikpaq platform or the period of seismic testing before it was erected. Yet they are unsure how to respond. Over tea at the local museum one day in 1999, the conversation turned to the problem that increasing numbers of fish smell of oil or phenols. With some humour, the women related stories of mutant fish ('with three eyes, or was it one eye?'), fish with distended bellies, an unnaturally long flat fish ('I only saw it when it was cooked'). The women laughed as they said that there was nothing they could do as the evidence had been swallowed. Deep down they acknowledge that it is a serious state of affairs when people eat deformed fish out of hunger and do not know what is happening to their environment. But their impotence is translated into humour. Tetya Nadya appears to feel that the offshore projects are being carried out in a moral sphere that she cannot influence: E.W. - What do you think about them drilling for oil in the sea? Tetya Nadya - Oi .. . Of course we don't want them to pollute our waters. E.W. - Have you been at any meetings where you discussed these questions? Tetya Nadya - Yes we have meetings for the indigenous peoples. Not long ago we had a meeting and we talked about the [sick] fish. E.W. -And have you been at any meetings with the oil companies? , Tetya Nadya - No they didn't ask our people, they make deals (dogovaryvaiutsya) with someone there (tarn), come here and that's that (priekhali i vot tak vot). 165 This exchange clearly echoes the local response to Soviet resettlement. Outsiders make decisions and strike deals with no prior consultation before coming to inform local people about what is going to happen. At a meeting of the Association, one Native resident said: 'We can make no claims to our lands. They will take over, use the land, get oil, make profits: the Americans or whoever else will get them.' Such fatalism is hardly surprising given the socio-historical context. Local fatalism can be exploited by oil companies during their consultations, where the message 'it's too late to change anything' is implicit in the process (Yurchak 1997). This is particularly true of the latest pipeline consultation. 38 It often takes an outsider organisation, such as Ecojuris or PERC to stand up to the multinationals.39 However, such battles, where the formal Law is a major instrument of power, are fought out at the global level, almost entirely outside the sphere of experience of local people and these precedents do not serve to reduce local fatalism or encourage political mobilisation. Despite signs in this chapter and previous chapters that local people are gradually beginning to adopt both the discourse and practice of the formal Law to define and assert their rights, it seems that negative expectations rooted in the habitus are still shaping local responses to outside interventions. 38 I refer here to the fact that the pipeline route was established before consultation with local people. 39 See Section 3.3. 166 7, Reindeer Herding and Small-Scale Enterprise In the previous chapter I demonstrated that local people have a much greater 'sense of agency' in the domain of everyday practice than in the public domain. I drew a contrast between local people's active concern for their domestic sphere and local fishing grounds and their alienation from decision-making processes relating to the offshore projects, even though these pose a direct threat to their gathering and fishing grounds and leisure space. In this chapter, I focus on another form of natural resource use that is important to the north-eastern Sakhalin landscape - reindeer herding. I explore the 'survival strategies' that reindeer herders have been employing in order to preserve their culture and livelihoods in the face of long-term environmental degradation and socio-economic change. As in the previous chapter, I highlight the contrast between the formal law, which is seen to be ineffective at protecting people's lands and livelihoods, and the moral laws that frame action in the domain of everyday practice. I focus also on the points of engagement between the reindeer herders and interventionists: the opportunities for consultation with the oil companies, and the role of the herders' wives and families in representing their interests in the public domain. I consider the nature of herders' voices in decision-making and the significance of their silences. In the latter part of the chapter I focus on the entrepreneurs who are seeking to find innovative ways to revive reindeer herding and make it relevant to present day economic conditions. Solutions generally focus on including reindeer herding into an integrated enterprise together with other types of activity such as tourism, fishing, and souvenir making. This leads into a discussion about the culture of grants and the dilemmas posed by a dependency on foreign sources of funding, particularly oil company sponsorship. Throughout the chapter we encounter actors seeking to exert their agency in some way, . not necessarily by using their 'voice '. 167 7.1 Reindeer Herding: Freedom and Loss in a Human Landscape The shamans used to say that the time would come when we Uil'ta would not recognise our own land. Strangers would come here. The land would be dug up, turned over, animals and people would not be able to live here, deer would be shot, and then the strangers would leave. We didn't use to believe this, but now we see with our own eyes what the oil workers have turned our land into. And we ourselves have nowhere to live. (Reindeer herder, cited in Roon, 1996: 165) In the Soviet era, reindeer herding was one of the main economic activities of the Native Evenki and Orochony1 in northern Sakhalin, but the industry began to diminish from the 1960s and 1970s due to Soviet amalgamation policies and the expansion of the on-shore oil and gas industry. Figures given for the number of domestic reindeer today are difficult to confirm and range between 120 and 1788 (see below). The collapse of the Soviet system signalled the collapse of the state reindeer herding enterprises. What the herders2 now practice in small clan groups is closer to their pre-Soviet livelihood activities: they rely on a few domesticated reindeer mainly for transport while engaging in hunting, fishing, NTFP gathering, and informal trade and barter. The recent revival of the state farm Olenevod and the state enterprise MGP Vai3 have not significantly changed the present-day independent way of life of the herders. I did not live with the reindeer herders, and I am aware that even when they spoke directly to me, their speech may have been shaped by expectations about what Westerners might want to hear. However genuine, I understood that many of the phrases had been spoken many times before to visitors when communication was limited to words and limited by time (e.g. Hoffman 1999). The herders have many visitors from the outside, but only a few, such as Heonik Kwon (1993) and Tatyana Roon (1996), have I , I use the self-reference Orochon (pl. Orochony) chosen by Kwon (1993:5-8) rather than the ethnonym Uil'ta, chosen by Roon (1996: 10-13) or the official classification Orok (Kwon 1993: 6; Roon 1996: 11-12) largely because people wrote this on their survey responses. Respondents were all female (Orochonki) and the correct transliteration would be Orochenka, etc. but I use the simpler spelling adopted also by Kwon. 2 In Russian, reindeer herders are called pastukhi (herders) or olenevody (reindeer breeders) or olenevody­ pastukhi. Kwon (1993) notes that most of them are in fact hunters and refers to them alternately as pastukhi and hunters. Roon (1996) refers to early Uil'ta as okhotniki (hunters) and those involved with reindeer as olenevody (reindeer breeders). I refer to them as herders. 168 spent long enough with them to have a claim to having heard their true voices, through practice as much as through speech. On the other hand, I was able to spend time talking with the herders' wives and families, whom I met in Val and at meetings in Nogliki and Yuzhno-Sakhalinsk; and with the managers of enterprises related in one way or another to reindeer herding. These people and organisations all have their own needs, goals and visions, which to a greater or lesser extent reflect those of the herders themselves. Reindeer herding is practised by only a very small minority of the population, and many people think that it will soon die out completely as a livelihood activity on Sakhalin. In an interview in 1999, district councillor Andrei Korotkin4 claimed that 'reindeer herding does not exist' on Sakhalin. (Real) reindeer herding is practised by the Nentsy of the Yamal peninsula, who 'live in the tundra today in the way they have always lived. They live with their deer, they remember their rituals and their language'. Korotkin's argument is that the Nentsy did not let themselves be resettled into villages and towns and be assimilated into the non-Native population. Because of this they have been able to preserve their language and their traditional way of life. Korotkin did concede that, unlike the semi-urbanised Nivkhi of Nogliki, the 'herders from Val who live near Pil'tun Bay could be called Native' (even though their livelihood activity could not be called reindeer herding). When Evenk entrepreneur Evgenii Alekseev approached officials in Yuzhno­ Sakhalinsk for assistance in reviving the herding enterprise MGP 'Val' , most of them responded that they did not even know that reindeer herding was practised on Sakhalin (Znamia Truda, 30.08.00, pl). Sakhalin has about 17 herders in total, belonging to about six main families (Roon 1996). This is a tiny proportion of the Noglikskii district population (14,600). But for the reindeer herders and their families who live in Val, reindeer are still at the centre of their livelihood practices and their cultural identity. The collapse of the Soviet system has meant the withdrawal of federal subsidies for herding; non-payment of salaries; loss of guaranteed domestic markets and transportation to those markets; loss of reindeer due to 3 MGP stands for maloie gosudarstvennoie predpriiatiie or 'small state enterprise' . 4 See Chapter 4. 169 increased poaching; loss of support for social infrastructure that was provided by the state enterprise. What is more, for more than half a century, the onshore oil industry has been encroaching on the coastal summer pastures with geological explorations, oil and gas extraction, road building and pipeline construction. Large stretches of pastureland have also been lost to forest fires, with particularly bad fires in 1989 and 1998. It is estimated that 90% of summer pastures have been lost over the past 70 years to fires and industrial encroachment (Roon 1999). Very little of the landscape has been regenerated after the oil industry has passed through, although this is required by law, and herders did not receive the compensation allocated to them for the loss of pastures to the onshore oil industry. Observers fear that the multinationals' onshore infrastructure development could destroy the remaining pastures and signal the end to the herders' way of life and identity, including their language (Roon 1996). The Orochony only use their language when they are with their herds, and it is in those activities related to their herds that they have preserved at least some of their traditional skills (Roon 1996). The practice of 'reindeer herding' legitimises these people's claim to Native status in the eyes of those who would deny that status to the 'assimilated' Nivkhi of Nogliki. The job of herder involves a range of activities. These include migration with domestic reindeer (which they do not kill), hunting for wild reindeer, informal trade and barter in reindeer meat,5 gathering NTFPs to sell in Val, fishing for their own consumption, to sell or barter, or as seasonal work for an employer. In winter the herders live in the taiga6 forest to the west of Noglikskii District. In summer they move with their reindeer to the eastern pastures of the tundra and the sparse birch forest close to the shore and the coastal lagoons, particularly Pil'tun Bay, where the deer calve.7 The herders' wives and families live in the sovkhoz quarter of Val. 8 The children visit the herders in the school holidays; the wives visit rarely. The women used to work mainly in the souvenir workshop in Val in the Soviet period, after they were forced to abandon their nomadic lifestyles and settle 5 This unfortunately includes exchanging reindeer meat for vodka with visitors. 6 Boreal forest. 7 . Seemaps. 8 Val is divided into two distinct areas: the sovkhoz (where the herders' families live) and the razvedka (frontier) for the oil industry. The sovkhoz is split into the Old Village (staryi poselok) and the Middle Village (srednyi poselok), while the razvedka also has a newer part the Finnish Village (finskii poselok). in the village. Today they still make souvenirs and crafts, using animal motifs and reindeer furs and skins. A market for these souvenirs is created by ethnographers, linguists, environmentalists and journalists who visit the herders.9 170 In 1999, British and American oil spill response experts (Chapter 4), Greenpeace and others visited the reindeer herders. International interest in the herders has increased dramatically since the offshore oil and gas projects started up. Environmentalists value the insights that Native people can give them about issues of sustainable development and climate change. They are concerned at the effect of the oil industry on the herders' way of life, and are keen to use the herders' presence close to the offshore projects to support their own cause internationally. Representatives from oil companies and investment banks have also started visiting the herders, concerned about the effects of the oil projects on their livelihoods and the effects of this on international public opinion. I visited the herders on their pastures twice in 1999 together with visiting foreigners. 10 In the herders' camps we saw a scattering of tents among the sparse dwarf Siberian pine or moss-hung larch, with a few scraggy reindeer tied up close by. The focal point of the camp was the fire, where the herders would sit to drink tea, have conversations and share stories. Children stay with them in the summer months during their school holidays. The herders told us: 'Our children thrive better here than in the village' . One herder also told us how he gave up his university education in Khabarovsk 11 because his health deteriorated through being away from his own environment. Local people feel that the reindeer herders should be allowed to get on with their lives and be left alone as much as possible. 'Don't touch them, the best thing to do is to not touch them at all, just get one person to do their documentation ... so there won't be any complaints (pretensii) on the part of the state.' To the herders, the most important thing is the freedom their lifestyle brings ('No-one puts pressure on us')12 • They compare this to the (physical and mental) constraint of the village. However, their freedom implies also a lack of engagement with outsiders who could have a profound influence on their future. 9 However, only one Orochon woman wrote in her questionnaire response that the offshore projects have rirovided the benefit of an increased market for her crafts. She lives in Nogliki, not Val (see Appendix III). 0 Greenpeace and a British writer. 11 Administrative centre of Sakhalin's neighbour Khabarovsk Region (see map for Khabarovsk Region). 171 The short amount of time that we had with the herders provided us with only minor insights into their extensive knowledge of their landscape. This knowledge and their 'way of knowing' (Kwon 1993; Anderson 2000) should.really feed into decision-making processes relating to industrial projects that plan to occupy the same landscape, but they are not generally studied because of the way that information is gathered in such processes. Among the Orochony, knowledge about the landscape (and the skills needed to survive in the landscape), is passed on from a patron, be that one's father or grandfather, or another influential figure (Kwon 1997: 147). This knowledge is constantly being renewed by the herders through conversations within their own 'conversational community' (ibid: 145). My own 'snap-shot' impression of the herders was of men who spoke very little (apart from the talkative and charismatic Tcherbakov13 [see below]). Yet Kwon writes, 'In the winter, almost every evening during supper and thereafter, the Orochon men-hunters speak constantly in the forest camp' (ibid: 146). Through dialogue the Orochony 'assert expressive individuality, distinctive person-hood' (Kwon 1997: 147) In conversation 'everyone has an equal right to participate' as long as he keeps hunting in the forest, no matter how lucky he is at hunting (ibid: 145). Orochon herders enjoy a constant dialogue in their own community. Dialogue with outsiders, on the other hand, is very different, and requires a new set of discourses, it may require time and money, and it may require travel to Val, Nogliki or further afield if the outsiders do not visit them. The herders may not be able to afford the time or money, and in any case prefer to stay with their herds. In general, then, it is the women - the herders' wives, mothers and daughters - who engage with outsiders, by attending public meetings or hosting visitors. While Kwon was on Sakhalin in 1990-91, local political debate was about perestroika and the new social system that was emerging in the wake of the collapse of the So".iet Union. Kwon notes that middle-aged women were dominant in political gatherings to discuss, for example, 12 - Comment by herder. 13 Not his real name. 172 the establishment of the commercial firm Aborigen Sakhalina. 14 The herders, on the other hand, although they were passionate readers of political newspapers and magazines, rarely participated in official gatherings, even when they were in the village, though they used to discuss issues amongst themselves. It would seem that this is not a case of a 'lack of information' inhibiting action, rather the herders simply did not want to get involved in the politics. The herders prefer to employ their own strategies to deal with social and political change. There has been some cultural continuity in the strategies that reindeer herders have employed to deal with the structural changes that have taken place in herding over the years since they were first collectivised in the 1930s. A good example of this is the issue of ear-marking. Traditionally the head of every clan had his own mark (metka) for the clan reindeer, which took the form of cuts in the reindeer's ears (Roon 1996: 82). When the herders were grouped into two collective reindeer farms 'Val' and 'Nabil' in 1932, they were forced to hand in their own deer to the farm, but they continued to use their own marks for the deer and kept track of the deer that were born. 'In principle, the Uil'ta were not in agreement with the kolkhoz organisation of the herds, but did not openly voice their dissatisfaction' (Roon 1996: 159). Instead they preferred to make their silent resistance, by keeping track of their deer and passing on the know ledge of which ones were theirs. Changes in the structure of herding in the 1960s, particularly the introduction of 'free calving' ('vol'nyi otel') and the abolition of the job of teliatnitsa15 , led to many of the domestic deer becoming wild or half-wild by breeding with wild deer. By the 1990s it was difficult to determine the ownership of half-wild deer (Roon 1996) and it became difficult to work out exactly how many domestic reindeer were. 16 Today the herders resist 14 Aborigen Sakhalina was established in the early 1990s as an umbrella organisation for all Native enterprises on Sakhalin and as a way to channel federal funding that came to the region for Native programmes. By 1999 many people were expressing distrust and disillusionment with the organisation. By 2001 Aborigen Sakhalina had apparently collapsed, though it was unclear where federal funding for Native programmes was being channelled instead, and it was also unclear what activities were continuing in its name. 15 This was the woman who tamed newly born deer. 16 According to official statistics from 1999, MGP 'Val' had 1788 deer (Znamia Truda, 30.08.00). According to official statistics that I acquired in 2000, MGP 'Val' had 1087 deer in 1999 and 1019 deer in 2000 (Goskomstat, 2000). According to the papers of MGP 'Val', there were 840 head ofreindeer in 1999.16 (Then-director) Yeremin claimed that these 840 deer were the 'general herd' (obschestvennaia 173 a return to ear marking. They recognise their own deer without the need for earmarks and they do not kill their own. The herders hunt wild deer and sell or barter the meat. By law, a hunter needs to have a licence to hunt a wild deer, and as the herders do not tend to get licences, what they do is technically unlawful. However, to justify their hunting of wild reindeer, they argue to the state authorities that many of the wild reindeer are half-wild and thus were originally the property of the herding enterprise (Kwon 1997). Some herders are also trying to increase the size of their herds by taming wild reindeer (Roon 1996, 1999). 17 The distinction between domestic and half-wild deer is blurred by the absence of earmarks on both types of deer. The Hunting Administration has the responsibility for controlling wild reindeer hunting, and if a deer does not have an ear­ mark it is technically a wild deer. However, if the hunters kill wild reindeer for their own subsistence needs, local officials tum a blind eye: 'They hunt wild reindeer. That's life'. But in fact the herders' practices go beyond subsistence. 18 While there is no 'surplus' as such, outsiders provide a market for reindeer meat. This in effect forces the herders to hunt more wild deer in order to meet the demand for informal trade: The herders kill a lot of wild deer. People come to them, bring vodka and food products and they are forced to kill wild deer. If we just provided them with food products we would be able to preserve a lot of deer. They might need a few years, maybe even 10 years to revive the herds. We should ban all deer hunting, and work with the herders so that they killed fewer deer themselves. 19 The informal trade in alcohol, which the herders themselves seem unable to control or avoid, has other negative effects, as Yeremin explained: 'Herders sometimes lose their deer. They get drunk and don't look after them'. Some informal traders deliberately go to the herders with the intention of getting them drunk and encouraging them to provide meat.20 Some outsiders (people believe it is mostly oil workers) poach the domestic deer stada) and included half-wild deer. According to local estimates, herders also own about 120-200 private deer. 17 However, sometimes the wild reindeer lure females away from the domestic herds instead. 18 In the same way as the Nivkhi over-fish their quotas on Nyiskii Bay (see Section 6.2). 19 Interview with Russian hunter. · 20 This is often talked about. The herders' families told us that we should bring food products and cigarettes as gifts and on no condition should we bring vodka. However, one of our drivers brought vodka and after drinking with the herders he drove us home under the heavy influence of the vodka, with a stash of reindeer meat in the back of the car. 174 themselves. Y eremin noted, 'A lot of deer are killed by poachers. More than our herders kill. The poachers are people from Nogliki, workers from [local oil company] SMNG. They are well equipped with snowmobiles, all-terrain vehicles, and helicopters' . Law enforcers are unable to protect the deer, as Yeremin explained: 'We lost about 20-30 domestic deer over last winter [1998-1999]. You have to have proof if you call the militia. We don't complain, we can prove nothing. We didn't go to SMNG - they are so high up they are not bothered'. Again we see here the sense of alienation from power that has been demonstrated in other chapters. Thus we see that herders have chosen an informal path of 'survival', which provides them with a certain amount of freedom. Yet although the herders benefit from informal trade, they are also forced to over-hunt the wild deer to meet demand, and are often forced to drink heavily, which can lead to further loss of deer. While officials tum a blind eye to the herders' 'illegal' hunting of wild deer, the law cannot protect the herders from the loss of deer to poachers. It appears that the law is also unable to protect the reindeer herders from the loss of their lands to the encroaching oil industry. In 1991, legislation was introduced that allowed for the establishment of clan enterprises with allocations of land. However, the reindeer herders tended not to set up clan enterprises. One reason was that they were only allowed 15 ha of land, which was not enough to support reindeer. There have since been attempts to set up various forms of enterprise, but this process has been hampered by constantly changing legislation. 21 The herders also find it difficult to complete the paper work, which entails several trips not only to Nogliki, but also to Yuzhno-Sakhalinsk. Native users regret not having-set aside territories for traditional use before the expansion of the oil industry. On the other hand, large areas of reindeer pasture are still intact, despite the loss of important coastal pastures. 21 For example, in 1999 all clan enterprises had to re-register as another form of enterprise recognised by the Citizens' Code (e.g. Limited Company). 175 In the early 1990s, in response to new legislation and thanks to the efforts of Viacheslav Lok, the whole of Noglikskii District was declared a Territory of traditional natural resource use (TTP). The declaration remained in force for 10 years but in practice nothing happened. It was finally cancelled at a meeting of the district council in June 1999. It was indeed unfeasible for a whole district including settlements and industrial facilities to be made into a TTP. However, there were no attempts to identify specific territories within the district and establish more realistic boundaries. In 1999, this was perceived by Native people as another attempt to deny them their rights. Officials argued that lands for traditional resource use were already protected. There were two wildlife preserves and four natural monuments in Noglikskii district at the time, a total of 168,187 ha or 14% of the district territory. 'Noglikskii' wildlife preserve (65,800 ha) protects reindeer pastures and wild reindeer in the west of the district and Lunskii Bay is protected as a natural monument (22,110 ha).22 The most important reserve for the Val herders in 1999 was 'Olenyi' ('Deer') wildlife preserve (80,000 ha) to the south of Pil'tun Bay where their summer pastures and calving grounds are. The preserve was created in 1989 to protect these summer pastures but, like other preserves of its type, only for a limited period of ten years. In 1999 this time period ran out. Despite the assurances of nature protection agencies that the preserve would remain in force, and despite a plea to the Sakhalin governor by the Association of Indigenous Peoples, the reserve was allowed to fall out of use. Sakhalin Energy is now preparing to lay a pipeline through the territory of this former wildlife preserve. The issue of compensation payments for oil industry appropriation of reindeer pastures is likely to be very complicated, as the herders of Val appear to have no legal right to the pastures their herds use on a day-to-day basis. There has been considerable confusion over the legal status of the reindeer pastures of the Aleksandrovskii District enterprise Olenevod,23 some of which reach into Noglikskii District and are used by the Val herders. According to the Regional Land Committee, the lands were allocated to the farm in 1986 for a period of 25 years as reindeer pastures. The Val herders split from Olenevod in the 22 Sakhalin Energy reassessed plaris to lay a pipeline here after protests from biologists and due to its ff otected status. 176 early 1990s, but there is no documentation about the split or the lands allocated to the new enterprise MGP 'Val'. Legally all the territory remained officially allocated to Olenevod. One official noted, 'When they set up MGP 'Val' it was not legal. They didn't divide up the territories'. In 1999, Olenevod completed a land survey and inventory of their pastures and confirmed their official allocation to the enterprise. These lands totalled approximately 1,100,000 ha including land in three different districts. Some of these lands are pastures in Noglikskii district that are used by the Val herders. More importantly for Olenevod, they include lands that will be crossed by the Sakhalin-2 project pipeline. As the lands have been officially allocated, the enterprise will be able to claim compensation. The Val herders - the actual users of the pastures - do not have a valid claim to these lands or to any compensation. The officials say, however, 'We work according to documents'. Thus the reindeer pastures are not protected from the encroachment of the oil industry. The herders and their wives react in different ways to this threat. While the herders' wives attend seminars where talk is of 'partnerships', 'agreements' and 'compensation', the male herders tend to respond to the expansion of the oil industry using their own terms of reference located in their own landscape. Molikpaq can be seen from the shores of Pil'tun Bay when the mists lift. For the herders it has become a symbol of ecological degradation, though environmental conditions began to change before the oil platform was put in place, perhaps, they say, as a result of seismic testing or the huge forest fires of 1989. According to the herders, there are fewer fish and seals in the sea. One herder claimed to have seen three dead seals along one stretch of coastline where usually no dead seals are washed up. Killer whales are no longer washed up on the shore, signalling that they have moved away from the area altogether. Another herder noted that some of the marine birds they hunt are starting to eat land-based insects instead of plankton from the sea (judging by the stomach contents). The herders do not know exactly what these environmental changes are related to but they have no way of investigating themselves. The reindeer herders are very concerned about the proposed construction of pipelines across their pastures, but their response is limited by a conviction that they will not be 177 able to do anything to change events. Like the women on Nyiskii Bay, the herders have had no opportunity to participate in decision-making over the years. They appear to believe that there is no alternative to oil extraction and that the movement towards 'Development' is stronger than their own personal need for a future. Tcherbakov commented: 'I'm against the pipeline - it won't bring me anything. I am in my 50s. But it will benefit other people'. The herders are restricted in their ability to participate by the need to be with their herds all the time. They also feel that they do not have the legitimate knowledge to protest. Tcherbakov claims they need to get a specialist in to sort out the economic aspects of the projects. He does not believe that compensation will be paid, either. The local land users lost their trust in the local administration long ago. In 1999 Native representatives raised the issue that compensation from SMNG had not been paid to the herders for destruction of their pastures over the lifetime of the onshore oil and gas industry. According to the Regional Land Committee, this money was paid into the budgets of Okhinskii and Noglikskii District administrations for the restoration of reindeer pastures. But this money was not used for its intended purposes. Local officials were not surprised, 'How can the administration be expected to use the money for restoring reindeer pastures when the teachers and doctors have no money for their salaries?' At the district level, officials make out that they have no control over the process of decision-making: 'The pipeline decisions are made at the regional level ... Everything is decided in the Regional Committee. 'We have sent our recommendations to Yuzhno­ Sakhalinsk. We are very concerned about the plans, but it is not for us to decide. Higher powers make the decisions'. So what kind of voice do the reindeer herders have in these decisions? One official-commented, 'The herders have no choice, they are never in their village. The management of MGP 'Val' decides. Sakhalin Energy makes agreements with all the official organs'. In 1999, MGP 'Val' director, Y eremin, expressed concern about the construction of the pipeline and the system of compensation: 'If someone has a plot of land he gets compensation but he loses his plot of land'. His implication was that the land would be more useful to the herders than the compensation. Y eremin had a private meeting with representatives of Sakhalin Energy in Val in 1998. There were no 178 open public meetings about the Sakhalin-2 project in Val, and he decided not to go to the public hearing in Nogliki: 'What would be the point?' The Orochony and Evenki of Val have fewer opportunities to be heard in the public arena than do the Nivkhi of Nogliki. This is partly to do with the fact that most meetings are held in Nogliki and it is difficult for the Val residents to travel there. Also the Nivkh elite has traditionally strong associational tendencies and strong representatives.24 The Orochony and Evenki of Val do not have these strong representatives or influential kinship ties. They feel overlooked and uninformed about what is happening. Like the Nivkhi, they also have painful splits in the community and these hinder efforts to create an effective voice in public debate. The women of Val regularly attend meetings (when they are invited) but rarely make presentations. Nivkhi tend to make presentations on behalf of all Noglikskii District Native people. However, reindeer herding still remains an important issue in these presentations. Sakhalin Energy insists that they want the fullest possible consultation with local communities in their 2001/2 pipeline consultation. But the choice whether or not to have the pipeline, or the option of changing the route of the pipeline will not be available to local land users. The herders may not be entitled to claim compensation for the loss of their lands, and compensation in any case would be less use to them than the land itself. Many people talk about the imminent demise of reindeer herding as a livelihood activity. Yet the herders seem to view large-scale development decisions as being outside their sphere of influence. The future for them will depend on the flexibility of their families' 'survival strategies' and on the success of new forms of enterprise, which I explore in the following section. 7.2 Small-Scale Enterprise: Looking to the Future In this section I focus on the creation of new forms of enterprise to support reindeer herding in Noglikskii District. I do this in order to explore the problems of establishing small businesses and restructuring state enterprises in the context of the 'free market', and to consider the effect of the grant culture and oil company funding on local 24 See Chapter 4. 179 enterprise. The most common form of small enterprise in Noglikskii District today (and elsewhere in Russia) is torgovlia (buying and selling of goods). This thesis, however, is concerned primarily with natural resources. Much of the small business trade in natural resources is informal, and people may or may not pay taxes on it. People sell fish and NTFPs on the local market, some people have cows (or chickens) and sell milk (or eggs) privately, there are various kinds of services related to dacha maintenance. 25 Tourism is developing and the Native souvenir trade is being revived. There is also a busy informal trade in meat and fish. 26 Small-scale enterprise is actively being encouraged by interventionists in the Russian Far East. On Sakhalin there are several programmes to support small business development. The America-Russia Centre (ARC) in Yuzhno-Sakhalinsk does training in small business development, which includes courses in how to write grant applications and business plans. The Institute of Sustainable Communities (ISC)27 is based in Khabarovsk and provides grants for small businesses on Sakhalin, too. The Sakhalin Regional Micro­ Credit Programme started up in the south of the island in 2000.28 IUCN The World Conservation Union is starting up a project to develop small businesses in NTFPs. 29 Terms such as 'grant' (grant), 'application form' (zaiavka), 'business plan' (biznes plan), 'training' (trening), 'marketing' (marketing) are beginning to sneak into the local vocabulary. In 1999, local entrepreneurs were seeking to revive reindeer herding in some way. When we visited the reindeer herders in 1999, MGP 'Val' and the infrastructure that it supported30 were languishing in an extreme state of disrepair and local people had already taken any scrap-metal and other useful objects from the territory that still technically belonged to the enterprise. The herding enterprise had previously been responsible for providing the local community with gas, electricity, water and housing. In 25 See Chapter 6. 26 Informal trade also embraces other resources e.g. fuel , but this is outside the scope of my thesis. 27 Web-site address: http://www.iscmoscow.ru/english/index.htm · 28 This programme disburses loans of between $1000 and $5000 US to local small businesses. They ~rovide training to start-up entrepreneurs in collaboration with ARC. 9 See: http://www.iucn.org/info:_and_news/press/kamchatka.html an interview, the director, Yeremin, described his job as 'handing the responsibility for social infrastructure over to the district administration'. He added, 'MGP 'Val' isn't really needed'. Yeremin ultimately lost respect locally for failing to save MGP 'Val' 180 from collapse. At a meeting of herders in May 2000, Evgenii Alekseev31 was elected as director in his place and MGP 'Val' was renamed 'Valetto' (Znamia Truda, 30.08.00).32 Alekseev is an Evenk entrepreneur in his early 30s and the son of a famous reindeer herder from Val. The young Alekseev previously worked on a fishing boat for Kolkhoz Vostok and has also travelled widely as a sailor. He used to spend holidays with his relatives the herders. In 1999 Alekseev put all his savings into setting up a fishing venture with the herders in Val, 33 but it was unsuccessful. Nonetheless he continued to try different channels and claimed he had come to an agreement (dogovorilsia) with someone in Moscow about reviving reindeer herding ('I don't need the district administration'). Finally in 2000, after three years of being persuaded by the herders, Alekseev made his decision to stand for director of MGP 'Val' and was voted in. MGP 'Val' was renamed 'Valetto'34 . In a local newspaper article he claimed, 'If I fail, I will be ashamed before the memory of my father, it will be a curse on the family' (Znamia Truda, 30.08.00: 1). Together with the property from the old business, Valetto inherited debts for gas and other utilities totalling 450,000 R (over $16,000 US) (Znamia Truda, 30.08.00: 1). Eleven herders became co-founders of the new enterprise. The plans were to revive the domestic herd and develop fishing and hunting, while the women would make crafts and souvenirs. Later they would set up processing facilities for fish and reindeer meat and reindeer antlers. In the newspaper article, Alekseev urged the herders to start work: 'The time has past when someone gives something for nothing, we have to get to work ourselves' (Znamia Truda, 30.08.01: 1). Alekseev had always been willing to co-operate with outsiders, such as Greenpeace and the oil spill response experts who visited Nogliki in 1999, and he has also used these 30 This included an electrical generator, a saw mill, technical equipment and a shop. 31 Th" . d Is Is a pseu onym. 32 I write more about this new enterprise in Section 7.2. 33 Fishing is more lucrative than herding and a way for herders to earn money to support other activities. 34 In Orochon this means 'people of the Val river' and is the name of an old Orochon clan (Roon 1996: 14). 181 opportunities to promote the sale of souvenirs by his relatives.35 But he points out how difficult it is for foreigners to understand Russia: 'People tell you all sorts ... ' ('Lapshu na ushi veshat' 36 ). He insists that 'to understand Russia you have to live here ... You can't understand Russia with Reason' ('Umom rossiiu ne poniat").37 This goes especially for foreigners who want to change things: If you lived here even 6 [more] months I could show you all the reasons why people in Russia don't go about changing things. They like things the way they are. I could show you all these people and their jobs and the money they make on the side .... I could make money just like that for myself. I could go out and get a good job and earn enough to look after myself, but I have this thing, that I have to work for other people, perhaps it is related to my Zodiac sign. I'm the first 10 days of Pisces. That means people who have this tendency. Alekseev is happy with the opportunities available to him today to do business and make money and he believes that deep-down most people in Russia are satisfied to keep things the same: 'In Russia the situation remains the same because people don't need it to change'. In 1999, the former herding enterprise Olenevod in Aleksandrovskii District was being revived by a young half-Evenk entrepreneur named Vladimir Gurkin. Gurkin is a hunter and is considered a leader by the (unemployed) herders of his area. In 1998 they voted for him to become director of Olenevod. The enterprise still exists, but no one is engaged in herding. Instead the enterprise organises hunting, fishing, some tourism (mainly groups from Moscow). Gurkin talks about plans to tame wild reindeer and revive herding (both to provide employment to herders and to justify his claims to the enterprise's reindeer pastures). Gurkin spends his time travelling between his village, the district centre Aleksandrovsk, and Yuzhno-Sakhalinsk in order to arrange documentation, talk with officials, and liase with Native representatives and NGOs. 35 Driving through Val with the oil spill experts, Alekseev stopped the driver, jumped out and went into his grandmother's house, returning with some souvenirs: 'She doesn 't want to see you but she wants to sell ~ou these slippers'. He sold some goods and took the money and rest of the goods back to his grandmother. 6 Lit. = 'They hang noodles on your ears.' 37 A popular Russian proverb, especially for telling to foreigners. 182 Some believe Gurkin is taking advantage of the legislative confusion over the allocation of reindeer pastures to make a financial profit at the expense of the Val herders. Others admire his business skills and are convinced that he will make good use of any compensation money his enterprise receives. Legal .experts from Moscow comment: 'He is doing everything right according to the law. He has a lawyer, he is well acquainted with the necessary documents. He absorbs everything. Alekseev on the other hand has no team. He tries to do everything himself. He seems to have his own channels of influence. He doesn't seem to need to work with the Law'. In this section I focus particularly on the private enterprise of the Russian entrepreneur, Igor Mikhailov. Mikhailov is Russian, was brought up in Val and has close contacts with the reindeer herding community. Mikhailov used to be a private hunter with the state resource enterprise Koopzverpromkhoz (KZPK) and is now developing his own business that includes fishing, hunting and ethnic and sport tourism. This is based on a clan enterprise set up together with two Orochon partners. As a Russian manager of a Native enterprise he is vulnerable to accusations that he is exploiting the Native people's social and cultural capital. Mikhailov is determined to disprove his critics and also to establish the business independently of any umbrella organisations: 'Aborigen Sakhalina is in chaos. We are doing it all ourselves'. Mikhailov is an experienced fisher and hunter, an expert at processing furs, 38 and has the ability to survive for long periods alone in the forest. All of these are skills that people might associate primarily with the Native population, although in Noglikskii district, as elsewhere in the RFE, there is a strong tradition of Russian hunters from the Soviet period. Mikhailov sometimes takes a Native assistant to the forest on his expeditions to teach them 'the skills of their ancestors'. Mikhailov is also part of-the small minority of local people who have access to international foundations, and by writing grant proposals has been able to support the development of his business. 38 When I showed him the slippers I had bought from Alekseev's grandmother he noted they were smelly and took them away to treat them properly. 183 Support for reindeer herding is non-profitable and needs a constant flow of money from other sources. However, Mikhailov sees great potential for developing various forms of activity related to reindeer herding, as long as someone is able to organise the herders and do their paper work. By engaging in other more lucrative activities money can be generated to feed into processing of meat, skins and antlers that are often thrown away today due to lack of storage and transportation. Mikhailov's tourism business is not yet profitable, but it has a small stream of clients (from Japan, Moscow, foreign oil workers from Yuzhno-Sakhalinsk) and he has a tourism base in the forest. Like Alekseev and Gurkin, Mikhailov looks to fishing to provide work for the herders and a steady income for the business. Like Oleg in Chapter 6, Mikhailov fishes the quotas of local Native people who are unable to fish for themselves. Unlike Oleg, he is scrupulous about providing people with their fish. To cover his costs, pay the fishermen herders and make profit for the business he overfishes those quotas and sells the surplus. To make applications for fishing grounds and licences Mikhailov had to make several trips to Yuzhno-Sakhalinsk, something that the herders themselves would neither want to do nor have time to do. Hunting is another resource use activity that can be profitable and integrate well with reindeer herding. Mikhailov still has contracts with the resource enterprise Koopzverpromkhoz (KZPK), which is based in neighbouring Tymovskii District:. They give me 8 dollars for a fur, then the KZPK sells the furs on to Khabarovsk for 50 dollars each, and they sell them on the international market - to Italy, say - for 100 dollars. Then when it is made into products abroad, it is about 500-700 dollars for one sable. That's the way it goes. The hunter expends his"iabour, and the rest goes to middlemen who make their fortunes. There are more middlemen in Russia than anywhere else. It would be better to be a middleman, driving lorries here and there. The KZPZ used to be a huge resource enterprise trading in furs, fish and NTFPs (including export of fern to Japan) and controlling resource use across the ·whole of northern and central Sakhalin. Now Aleksandrovskii District has broken away, and in 184 1999 Noglikskii was trying to break away. 'The enterprise doesn't exist except on paper. It's just the director. He's living well, selling furs on to Khabarovsk. ... That's why Noglikskii District has to break away .... We just have to become independent'. Noglikskii District hunters continue to work with the KZPX because this enables them to hunt for extra furs for themselves on the side; 'One has to live' ('zhit'-to nado'). And with those furs they make hats and sell them locally for a reasonable price. Mikhailov eventually hopes to set up a contract directly with Khabarovsk. He can then sell the furs for a higher price and pay the herders more than the KZPK would pay. He has already organised the herders to do some hunting, paying them money for the sable furs that they have provided: 'I gave [one herder] some money recently and he was speechless. It's probably the first actual money he's ever made'. Exxon plans to construct a pipeline across some of Mikhailov's hunting grounds. Mikhailov has had private talks with Exxon about this. Exxon also held a public hearing about the pipeline in Nogliki, which Mikhailov was unable to attend as he was on a hunting expedition, 'I missed it ... but what's going to change anyway?' Viacheslav Lok recently claimed some of Mikhailov' s hunting grounds for traditional use, using new legislation about Native rights to claim their traditional lands. The grounds were far away from Lok's main territories but Mikhailov was forced to hand them over. These lands will also be eligible for compensation from Exxon. I asked Mikhailov how he would recommend restructuring reindeer herding in the district. First of all, he said, you have to secure some lands - 'this can be very expensive' . Next, he continued, you need to set up something like a 'faktoriia'. A 'faktoriia' is a 'trading station' that could be permanently located in the forest or tundra, or alternatively could move from place to place. The station would collect production from fishing, reindeer herding, hunting, gathering, souvenir making, and org;mise the marketing and distribution, including abroad.39 If a strong enterprise were set up locally, claims Mikhailov, it could organise the reindeer herders and leave them as much as possible to 39 The concept offaktoriia is pre-revolutionary, but developed under the Soviets in parts of the Russian North. Faktorii were popular in the 1920s-30s but were abolished in the 1950s-60s. 185 enjoy their 'freedom'. Finding start-up capital is one of the major problems about setting up such a business. Entrepreneurs talk about needing a sponsor in a way that sometimes sounds like the nuzhen chelovek4° discourse. One option for start-up capital is the foreign grant. New opportunities to access foreign grants have allowed Mikhailov to expand his business. In 1999 he received a grant of $25,000 US from the ISC to start up ethnic tourism with the Val herders and to develop souvenir manufacturing and marketing. With the grant money he was able to buy equipment (including a computer, printer and digital camera). He set himself up on the Internet and started to develop advertising and to work with the herders on possible tourism programmes. After receiving the grant money, Mikhailov soon fell out with his original partners, who demanded half the project money in cash as they had invested their own money in the business previously. Mikhailov argued that grants were not given in cash, and a project had to be completed and the money completely accounted for. After falling out with his original partners, Mikhailov started to work with Zina Karpova, whom he had met through me. Zina had told me of her plans for work with young people who had nothing to do in their spare time, and with elderly people to help revive and preserve their traditional knowledge. Zina has become passionate about rediscovering her ancestry, adopting the discourse of the cultural elite: 'We want to live traditionally but in the modern context'. With Mikhailov's help, Zina started actively to engage people in her community. She set up a young people's club 'for ecology and dancing' and started collecting stories and legends from elderly women, recording them on tape with the aim of eventually publishing a book. She and Mikhailov made a video of some elderly women talking about their lives. 41 One woman has since died and Zina feels this emphasises how important this kind of work is. She published an article in the newspaper about ecology and the offshore projects.42 She also took over th,e ISC project that another Native woman had been unable to finish. The project was to develop souvenir production and Zina organised local craftspeople (mostly women) to make souvenirs. Mikhailov ~ . This means 'we need someone (to take control/ solve problems)' . 41 Incredibly, Zina gave all the video footage to a visiting woman from BP. 42 I mentioned this article in Chapter 4. 186 helped Zina to set up her own souvenir business with a workshop and to arrange exhibitions in Nogliki, Yuzhno-Sakhalinsk and Khabarovsk. They wrote a grant proposal for a project to integrate Native traditions with ecotourism, but it did not get through 'because of our bureaucracy. We couldn't open a bank account because of just one paper that we didn't get on time'. Nonetheless they reapplied for the following round of grants and are waiting for a response. I should draw attention to this mention of Russian bureaucracy, as it is a major factor inhibiting human agency. Zina and Mikhailov got a grant from BP for materials to make souvenirs. 43 They also managed to get grant money for costumes for the dancers of the local Native dance troupe, although they fell out with its leader. Zina and her daughter set up a youth group, mostly for 'difficult' teenagers with social problems including alcohol and drugs. The teenagers did a New Year concert for the children's home and for Nivkh children. The youth group also organises sporting activities and the youngsters took part in sports competitions at the Native people's festival in 2001. Zina says, 'People call these kids "difficult" but I like them .... In every "bad" person there is a lot of good and in every "good" person there is so much bad'. Zina is also involving young Nivkhi in her work with elderly Nivkh women to revive ancient Nivkh rituals in Nogliki. In October 2001 Zina held a traditional ritual specially for visiting oil company representatives, hoping to attract BP who have an Native people's programme focusing particularly on production and had expressed interest in her business plans. As I observed in September 2001, the women making crafts for this enterprise would only work directly with Zina. Zina is well respected and svoi chelovek ('one of us') within the Native co:minunity. Mikhailov has commented several times that it is difficult to work with Native people because of their 'natural character', but says that Zina really helps him with this, by being a mediator. They trust her and she trusts Mikhailov. However, it is difficult for Mikhailov and Zina to find other people to work with whom they can trust to take on serious organisational work. They paid for one young Nivkh to do some study courses. He was the only young person they really felt they could trust. 43 BP also ordered a set of fur trimmed pendants (podveski) embroidered with their flower emblem. 187 But they were disappointed when he broke their trust by giving away a project idea to competitors. Mikhailov has suffered from mistrust and outright hostility from local people because of the work he is doing. A representative of the local administration tried to undermine his credibility in the eyes of the ISC representative and tried to persuade Zina not to work with him 'but she didn't listen'. Mikhailov has also experienced hostility from other Native representatives, who he feels are envious of his success with grants, particularly as he is manager of a 'Native' enterprise and essentially getting funds allocated to Native activities. He complains how difficult it is to set up a business in Russia, particularly in the provinces: 'People are envious of success, happy when you have problems.' A local journalist blames local attitudes on the Soviet system and the way that it suppressed individual initiative: You couldn't do things on your own initiative [under the Soviets]. People don't think for themselves today. Young people need to earn money and do business. There are never enough leaders .... Individualists are not approved of here. Here if someone is successful in business, people envy them. They think they may not be honest. ... You have to support people who do things for themselves .... Under the Communists it was always the same - ne vysovyvatsia (don't 'stick out'). Zina feels that she finally has the possibility to work independently, without the Association, Aborigen Sakhalina, the old Native souvenir workshop, or any other Native 'gatekeepers'. Zina believes that her decision to continue working with Mikhailov has helped to change attitudes in the local administration. Now they are being more friendly and have even given her_ money for a project. Mikhailov believes this is partly because she and Mikhailov have shown that they can work seriously, and partly because the administration people understand that if they want to access ISC grants themselves they have to tolerate Mikhailov, who is strongly supported by ISC. Thus foreign grant programmes are changing local consciousness.in an indirect way. ' I 188 While grants are a way to support the initial establishment of local initiatives and enterprises, I question how sustainable grant giving programmes are in the long term. A local oil company representative expressed concern about Mikhailov, who he feared was 'stuck in the culture of grant giving'. As yet there are few opportunities to get credit for business development, either from foreign sources, or from local ones. Existing opportunities are focused in southern Sakhalin. Grants themselves remain a limited resource that can only be harvested if one has a set of particular skills. I argue that grant programmes can often serve to divide local communities rather than contribute to sustainable local development and community cohesion. This should be considered seriously by oil companies before they set up grant programmes. This chapter has highlighted a number of points that I consider in the conclusions. Reindeer herders demonstrate an approach to problem-solving in life that entails asserting agency while avoiding engagement with outsiders. The latter is undertaken by their families, who may have different priorities and a different vision of the future (Kwon 1997). Ultimately the 'freedom' of the herders' lifestyle is undermined by the fact that the law cannot protect them from poachers and the encroachment of the oil and gas industry. In the latter part of the chapter I have considered alternative forms of business development that are helping to revive reindeer herding and make it work as a business. The chapter has served to demonstrate the importance of trust and personal relations in the development of effective working partnerships. It has also demonstrated the way that factors such as the 'culture of envy' greatly undermine relations within local society, and also undermine opportunities to develop business or social or cultural activities. I have also drawn attention to the problem of grant dependency and dependency on oil companies. There is a tension here between economic and environmental priorities. The inclination here seems to be to focus energies on securing funding for local projects that provide a socio-economic benefit to the local community rather than on organising public control of the multinationals' activities. 189 8. Conclusions In this concluding chapter I summarise what my ethnography of everyday practice and public activism reveals about local participation in natural resource management on Sakhalin and in particular in Noglikskii District. First I discuss the nature of the power relations that have been revealed in the ethnography. Second I consider voice as a way of having influence over decision-making and dialogue as a form of engagement between the public and decision-makers (oil companies, state officials, the government). Thirdly I look at human agency in the public domain and the domain of everyday practice. Finally I consider trust and responsibility in the context of my study. I relate all of the above to the sustainability and participation paradigms, considering in practical terms how relevant they are to local realities and how effective they can be at engaging local people in development processes. 8.1 Power relations The most powerful players in the 'field' of Sakhalin offshore oil and gas development are the multinational oil consortiums, the investment banks and the Russian (federal and regional) government. The financial and political power of these players is challenged by environmental and human rights NGOs using the power of language, the media, global communications and the law. Regional and national political figures also try to make political capital from criticising the projects, predominantly from an economic point of view, focusing on questions of corruption, mismanagement and the lack of benefits to Sakhalin. The power of the multinationals lies in their control of huge financial resources, which they are able to convert into political capital, in order to ensure that they are able to proceed with the minimum of financial expenditure and in the fastest possible time. The federal and regional government and legislature have ensured beneficial conditions for investment for the oil companies (the Production Sharing Agreements) at the sacrifice of benefits to the Sakhalin region (e.g. tax holidays). The rationale for 190 this is that Russia desperately needs foreign investment.1 The oil companies on Sakhalin use this state of affairs to manipulate decision-making in their favour. A threat to pull out of the projects can provoke a prime-ministerial intervention. The offshore projects themselves (like the gas-fired power station) are also used as political tools, particularly to bolster the position of the governor, who was re-elected in 2000. Thus any claims by oil companies that they do not get involved in the political domain are unconvincing. 2 However, NGOs have demonstrated the effectiveness of the rule of law for challenging arbitrary political power. They have also been successful in challenging the activities of the multinationals by appealing to their financiers. The 1997 NGO letter to the EBRD is considered to be a watershed in the redefinition of state­ industry-NGO relations relating to the Sakhalin offshore projects. The multinationals are dependent on their financiers for the funding of their projects and are bound to demonstrate compliance with the Banks' policies and principles in order to secure that funding. The EBRD letter also demonstrated to the Sakhalin governor that his own power position, previously defined by clear geographical boundaries, could be undermined by transnational non-governmental actors. The power of the international NGO community is dependent on global communications networks, particularly the Internet, which have dissolved geographical and national boundaries and enable fast exchange and dissemination of information across the world, regardless of time zones. Information is a particularly important tool for NGOs. Multinationals are keen to avoid negative publicity, which could influence their consumers. Consumer power (predominantly that of Western consumers) should not_be underestimated in this case study, although it is not explicitly analysed. Many of the power struggles between NGOs and multinationals are over information and symbolic resources, particularly control over collection, presentation and dissemination of information. The print media remains a battleground for the oil companies and environmentalists. 1 However, Hertz (2001: 7) notes how Western governments also go to great lengths to attract corporations, turning a blind eye to tax loopholes (see also Steiner 2000). 191 Shell claims that openness and transparency are central to its relationships with stakeholders. However, Sakhalin citizens and NGOs complain about the lack of information available to them about the projects. A lack of information effectively disempowers people, who as a result find it difficult to formulate a response to events. Oil companies control the information from the in-depth scientific and sociological studies that they finance, which becomes the property of the company. They are not obliged to publish the information, and the researchers themselves are unable to do so independently. Mohan (2001) questions the authority of interventionists who create reports and maps on the basis of local data. Oil companies also control the format of public consultations, the information disseminated at these meetings and, to a large extent, the materials produced from them. Sakhalin Environment Watch appears to be the only public organisation on Sakhalin providing a challenge to the power of the governor and the multinationals, particularly in relation to the offshore projects. Since it was established, SEW has developed closer relations with regional officials and has been able to influence decision-making in some cases. The NGO continues to have antagonistic relations with the governor because of their stance on the oil projects, and the latter criticises SEW in the media. SEW has collaborated with Ecojuris and Rodnik on legal cases brought against the multinationals. 3 However, while the law might be the most effective tool in terms of direct influence, their major tool of influence is information. 4 Activists from SEW note that the greatest effect of their work over the 6 years since the NGO was established has been the increased coverage of environmental issues in the regional media (newspapers and television). Their national and international campaigns also rely heavily on the Internet. Support from international NGOs, whq communicate mainly by email, and the abundance of (uncensored)5 information available over the Internet have galvanised NGO action in Russia and the Internet has enabled Sakhalin voices to be heard nationally and internationally. 2 This claim is usually the response when the oil companies are asked about their responsibility for such issues as equitable distribution of project revenues. · 3 At the regional and local level, SEW has been involved in other legal battles particularly over unsustainable forest use and management. 4 These two ' tools' in fact feed and support one another. 192 Despite the effectiveness of SEW at the regional, national and global levels, and in spite of visits to northern Sakhalin, articles in the local newspaper and the creation of an informal 'branch' of SEW in Nogliki, collaboration with citizens of Noglikskii District is erratic and ties remain tentative.6 Most people in Noglikskii District do not have access to the Internet and therefore do not benefit from the regular information bulletins and discussion of issues that rely on email. Local activists rarely take part in global initiatives or debates, though representatives sometimes attend meetings in Yuzhno-Sakhalinsk. 7 Their lack of contact is partly due to their lack of access to the Internet, partly it is due to personal relations, and partly to the amount of time people have to spare to be involved in these issues. Local people are helpful and open when activists from SEW visit, but the activists point out that no one telephones them when they return to Yuzhno-Sakhalinsk, perhaps because they do not believe that their phone call will change anything. Local activist-teachers are too busy with pressing local concerns: the teachers' union and payment disputes, local environmental campaigns,8 family problems, domestic production and full time teaching jobs. In order to be effective at the local level, an organisation such as SEW needs to have a local presence, but they have neither the time, funding or staff capacity to support such an initiative. SEW also does not have regular contact with Noglikskii district officials apart from the fish inspector. This, however, is not only due to lack of time, but also because they do not consider local government to be effective: 'I don't see how we can influence situations by working with local government. ' 9 Noglikskii District citizens feel much the same, but judge local government to be more effective at defending their interests than other levels of power.10 However the local (onshore) oil indu_stry is clearly the most powerful player in Noglikskii District today. Eighty percent of the district budget is made up of their taxes. The district 5 Emails are not secure, however. I was present on one occasion at a round table meeting on Kamchatka, when a gold mining company representative supported his comment by direct reference to a private email between two American environmentalists. 6 SEW is, however, active in other districts, particularly with regards to forestry issues and protected area creation. 7 Vladimir Lok is an exception. He has been an international activist for over a decade and attended the Earth Summit in 1992. 8 SEW did not hear about the Nogliki radioactive waste campaign. 9 From interview with activists from SEW, September 2001. 10 See my survey analysis (Appendix ill). 193 council is dominated by representatives of the oil industry. Locally they are perceived as being good leaders; they are what Russians term 'khozaistvenniki' .11 The irony of this is revealed by the journalist who served on the council but felt that her own desires to promote social welfare programmes were over-ridden by budget pragmatism and oil interests. Although the oil industry has destroyed much of the local environment, their contributions to the local budget and infrastructure development appear to exonerate them at least to some extent in the eyes of the local electorate. There is a tension between a concern for the environment, and a concern for basic needs, which the oil industry helps to satisfy. 12 Local regulators, who have been ineffective enough at bringing the onshore oil industry to task for its environmental record, feel entirely alienated from the offshore oil and gas projects and powerless to influence or monitor project implementation. This has led to a sense of resignation, which makes them more likely to sign documents without questioning the process of project implementation. In this and other issues, local officials hide behind the power hierarchy to evade their own responsibilities. Decisions are made 'up there' or 'in the regional capital' or 'in Moscow'. Regional level officials express similar attitudes. Decisions are always made somewhere else. I have encountered this evasion of personal responsibility at all levels of Russian society. Local people feel themselves to be alienated from the state, which people refer to as the 'powers' (vlasti) or 'power' (vlast') . 'Power' is 'up there' , 'shrouded in mystery' . People in any positions of power ( officials, politicians, enterprise managers) are assumed to be corrupt, self-interested or if not, then impotent. The further away that 'power' lies from Nogliks~ii District, the less it is perceived as defending the interests of ordinary people. 13 People equate state power with the power of industry. In the Soviet times of course the state controlled industry and industrial planning, while today the state and industry remain closely linked. The public perceives the multinationals in the same way - as remote and inaccessible. Symbolically, the Molikpaq platform lies off the coast, barely visible and shrouded in mist. People's 11 Good . econorruc managers. 12 This is of course a universal dilemma. 194 expectations about the multinationals are based on their experience of state industrial planning and other Soviet policy implementation such as the resettlement programmes of the 1950s and 1960s. They do not expect consultations to provide opportunities for meaningful participation in planning, because they did not in the past: 'Whether one consciously believed in the officially proclaimed goals was less important than the act of participating in routine official practices, perceived as inevitable' (Yurchak 1997: 168). In Yurchak's analysis of late socialism, state power was something immutable and, for the ordinary citizen, 'one had to be insane to challenge the immutable' (ibid: 169). This led to a deep cynicism about power, a public disengagement from the state, and a 'personal noninvolvement in the official sphere' (ibid: 163).14 In my opinion this disengagement from power is deeply rooted in people's habitus (Bourdieu 1977) and thus, despite dramatic regime changes, it also characterises people's present day attitudes to power and authority. The deep rooting of Soviet structures in the habitus of post-Soviet people is also a reason why so much of the social structure remains unchanged in practice. Yurchak notes how the discourse of glasnost' destroyed the immutability of the Soviet hegemony. Yeltsin welcomed in an era of relative freedom and unpredictability in all aspects of society. By voting for Putin in 2000, the Russian people were signalling their desire (nostalgia) for a strong hand, for predictability and security. In today's society hegemonic relations are still evident. People act within a social framework that determines what is reasonable and realistic. A pertinent example of a still dominant hegemonic discourse is that of the pre-eminence of specialist knowledge, which judges the public unqualified to speak on important matters (see below). My study also draws attention to a new 'immutable force ' in peoples' lives, that of global capitalism. I imagine that local people do not often ponder the immutability of global capitalism. However, their expectations about the offshore oil and gas developments, based on their previous experience of state and industrial power and their mistrust of foreigners, are influenced by their long-standing alienation from the 13 From results of survey analysis. However, I should point out that Yeltsin was still president at that time. Opinions of Putin may well be different today. 14 Shlapentokh (1989) notes how this was the case from the post-war period. sources of power and a sense of impotence in the face of huge outside economic interests. 195 Noglikskii District society itself is interlaced with power relations at all levels, many of these unrelated to the authorities or outside industrial interests. Power is particularly related to people's access to and manipulation of different forms of capital (social, cultural, symbolic, financial and political). Power may be benign or it may undermine the functioning of society. The collapse of the supposedly 'egalitarian' Soviet system meant that elements of the population became even more polarised, access to capital became even more differentiated and sources were more jealously guarded. Several examples of this have emerged in this thesis. For example, tension between Native and non-Native residents is largely related largely to priority access of the latter to fish quotas. Grant programmes serve to divide people rather than contribute to local development. Access to travel and sponsorship opportunities cause friction among Native residents. Researchers represent a resource that is also fought over. I consider issues of mistrust and envy further in Section 8.4. While Noglikskii District society 'has no civil society' according to a local journalist, a focus on 'mediating institutions' (Anderson 1996) reveals elements of local society that attempt to challenge hegemonic discourses and state-industrial power. Local activist-teachers challenged the power of the state when they opposed the construction of the gas-fired power station. However, while they managed to mobilise local people and alter project plans, they emerged from that experience with a deep sense of disillusionment and moral exhaustion. They felt betrayed by local officials who had supported them in words but had not acted decisively in their support. Today they are convinced th~t they could not mobilise the public again in the same way, as people believe that it is not worth challenging the power of the state or major industrial interests, particularly if the governor has a decisive voice in the planning. 15 However, the teachers have enjoyed more success with their own independent initiatives, particularly in collaboration with the teachers' union and the local newspaper. The local newspaper Znamia Truda is an important institution in local 15 Business interests, such as the fishing enterprise Kolkhoz Vostok, who enjoy the support of the governor, also demonstrate a reluctance to oppose the governor. 196 society. It has acted in a direct mediating capacity by making appeals on behalf of local citizens to the administration or industrial enterprises, and in some cases has been able to resolve local problems by doing so. Readers' letters have been discussed at local council meetings. As an official newspaper it has the authority to engage in such negotiations, and in such a way it serves to empower local people. By providing information on local news and events, the district budget, political debates, local enterprises and the state of social infrastructure, the newspaper is also potentially empowering local people. Coverage of the offshore projects has been fairly objective and local journalists have challenged local and visiting figures about ecological issues and the question of benefits to the district. The paper often plays a moralising as well as mediating role. After its initial growth in the late 1980s and early 1990s, the Native movement has enjoyed a revival from the late 1990s onwards, largely due to the increased attention focused upon it in the context of offshore oil and gas development. Native representatives have ambiguous relationships with the authorities and industry. The Sakhalin Association of Indigenous Peoples has opted for a relationship of compromise, even deference, towards industry and the government, rather than confrontation, a stance that has disappointed the environmental lobby who had been hoping to secure allies from the Native movement. The result has been empowerment for Native representatives in the sense of a greater degree of access to negotiating tables, but Native representatives have as yet been unable to negotiate long-term socio-economic benefits for themselves or for the people they are representing. Within the local Native 'community', factionalism and conflict undermine their ability to establish a united front. Nonetheless, Native representatives are an important voice in deb_ates about the responsible use and management of natural resources on Sakhalin. The ethnography has demonstrated the dominance of state and industrial power, but also the power of NGOs to challenge this dominance. It reveals that Noglikskii District society also contains elements that challenge hegemonic forces locally. Local power relations are both cohesive and divisive. Some analysts consider participation to be an opportunity for a re-negotiation of power relations between interventionists, technical elites and local people, but it may also serve as a way for outsiders to gain 197 popular support for their projects, while allowing local participants no control over decision-making (Goodwin 1998; Kothari 2001). Taylor (2001: 138) claims that participation needs to be not a 'placatory gift from the powerful', but a genuine shift in the social and power structures of capitalist society'. 8.2 Voice and Dialogue My ethnography has demonstrated how Shell's policies of 'stakeholder dialogue' and 'engagement' (Section 2.4) do not provide opportunities for 'effective public participation' (WCED 1987). I acknowledge that the multinationals are helping to establish a culture of public consultation on Sakhalin, which the EBRD will probably be able to note down as a 'transition impact' .16 However, the nature of public consultation on Sakhalin (open public hearings and interest group meetings) does not allow for local people to change the course of project development, and is aimed less at establishing 'dialogue' than arranging mitigation (e.g. compensation) which some might equate with 'silencing' . The format of the open public hearings - the only option available to most citizens to 'participate' in the offshore projects - has been criticised by environmentalists and other participants for presenting the projects in a one-dimensional, positive (and glossy) way. Very little time is allowed for question and answer sessions at the end of the hearings, which means that there is no space for a real debate on the issues raised in the presentations. The information gained from oil company consultations tends to be recorded in the form of transcripts, reports and maps, which are a necessary record, but static. There are very few, if any, opportunities for people to follow up on how the concerns that tbey raised at a public hearing are being considered within the company. The format of public hearings is strictly controlled by the oil companies. Masse (2001) notes how people construct their own needs in response to what they perceive is expected of them, and what they are likely to receive. Compensation is one such demand. Some Native representatives, for example, are genuinely interested 16 Pressure from national and local NGOs is also helping to promote and encourage public participation in decision-making in other parts of Russia without the presence of foreign companies (IUCN 2000; Karpov and Afinogenov 2000). 198 in receiving compensation for use of lands by the oil companies, and they may put the money to good use. However, others may discuss compensation options with the oil companies, while commenting in private that compensation is useless and it is better to retain the land. Compensation is a Western concept but also resonates with people's nostalgia for state paternalism. My ethnography thus demonstrates the limitations of oil company public hearings in the format they follow today on Sakhalin. The process limits meaningful participation to verbal contributions, while local knowledge may be non-linguistic or generated by practice (Cleaver 2001; Mohan 2001). Real life takes place 'backstage', and what people say in public might be very different from what they say in private (Kothari 2001; Scott 1985, 1990). People who withhold their voices at public meetings or do not attend may be making a point as strongly as those who go along and voice their concerns out loud, however this is not recognised within the consultation process. Some people may not be able to attend public hearings because they are busy herding, fishing, hunting or tending their garden plots. Some informants told me that they did not attend public meetings because they believed their attendance would change nothing. People might even feel liberated by asserting their right not to attend public meetings after so many years of being forced to attend meaningless meetings under the Soviet regime. Hailey (2001) notes that the formulaic nature of participatory development initiatives in South Asia makes them less effective than local NGO work based on 'community dialogue' and personal contact, conversation and discussion, which demand more investment of staff and time. Oil companies on Sakhalin, particularly SEIC, have also made efforts to develop personal relations between their PR representatives and the public outside of public hearings. However, this communication seems to focus on discussion of potential sponsorship or participation in Native festivals (PR exercises) rather than debate about how project implementation might affect local people and how they might be able to participate in project planning in a meaningful way. Local people's response to the visiting experts in 1999 was different in Noglikskii and Okhinskii districts. People welcomed critical comments about the projects, where previously they had only heard positive reports from the companies, and they 199 appreciated suggestions on how to formulate a response to the offshore projects, and to other ecological issues in their districts. People also appreciated the opportunity to discuss their concerns openly. Significantly, attendance at the independent public hearings organised by SEW in April 2002 was also much greater than attendance at the SEIC hearings in December 2001. 'Stakeholder dialogue' is problematic not only with regards to the format of public consultations. The concept of stakeholder is also more diverse than oil companies might make out. The local community is only one of several stakeholders that the multinationals and their financiers seek to engage with. Local interests may conflict with those of other stakeholders (shareholders, employees, etc.), while the local 'community' itself is made up of many different and often conflicting voices. My research has identified various diverse voices that make up the heteroglossia (Bakhtin 1984) of Noglikskii District society. These include environmentalists, Native activists, entrepreneurs, reindeer herders, fishermen, Native people who live seasonally on the shores of the bays, citizens who cultivate their garden plots at weekends, local councillors, district administrators and officials, the local oil company, trained oil workers, journalists, teachers, artists, nurses, bank workers, and so on. All of these people have their own 'vision of the future' for their family, their community and their district. And they have their own hopes and expectations about benefits from the oil and gas developments. 'Participation' does not necessarily mean that everyone's voice must be heard. Many would prefer to let someone else talk on their behalf. However, it is important to consider seriously who represents whose interests and how they are represented. Power over deciding w~o has a special voice in oil project consultations is to a large extent in the hands of the oil companies and choosing one section of the population over another is problematic. The oil companies are focusing particularly on consultation with the Native populations. 17 To some extent this is justified, as a number of Native families still live and practice traditional resource use on the land where the multinationals plan to construct pipelines and oil related onshore facilities . Environmental activists argue that the oil companies are including the Native people 17 NB. They also meet separately with fishing enterprises and other special interests. 200 in this way as an attempt to control those who might challenge existing power relations (see also Kothari 2001). Whether or not this is the case, the exclusive dialogue between oil companies and Native groups also results in the alienation of non-indigenous resource users and draws the discussion of Native resource use away from the district wide forums of the full public hearings. This can only serve to increase the already significant Native/ non-Native tensions in local society. In my opinion, resource use issues need to be discussed on a district wide basis and debate should focus on actual use of resources rather than ethnicity. This approach would hopefully encourage local people to seek joint solutions to resource use problems rather than dissipate their energies on identity-based petty politics. It would also provide the opportunity for a broader range of local voices to be heard. 18 Following Bakhtin, I believe participation could ideally be an open-ended (unfinalisable) dialogue. This idea is reinforced by Goodwin's study of conservation in the UK, where local respondents believed participation initiatives should be open­ ended, transformative, relating to ideas as well as action, and at best becoming a dialogue that could redefine conservation (1998: 489). Participation is an opportunity for dialogue between the public and the state or industry, and also between the public and scientists (ibid; Steelman and Ascher 1997). This is particularly pertinent in Russian society, where excessive emphasis is still placed on specialist knowledge, while the know ledge of ordinary local people is undervalued. The activist teachers are criticised by local officials as 'dilettantes' who are not qualified to deal with the issues that they raise. Foreign NGO observers note that there is generally more acceptance of non-specialists nowadays at least at the national and regional levels, and the influence and authority of Sakhalin Environment Watch demonstrate this. However, in smaller c~ntres such as Nogliki, it is much harder for non-specialists to be taken seriously. The problem of the legitimacy of local knowledge has also been noted in critiques of participatory processes in Western countries (e.g. Goodwin 1998). Participation requires local voices to adopt the language of 'expertise' in order to be heard 18 As my survey has demonstrated, for example, local Native and non-Native populations extensively use the north-eastern coastal area (forests, rivers, bays) for leisure as well as subsistence activities (see Appendix Ill). 201 (Vitebsky 1995; Cruikshank 1998). Expertise offers the only institutionally acceptable way of discussing significant issues. 19 This separates fact from morality, value and feeling, and limits the ways in which local people can express their objectives, undermining their ability to question with authority those of outside experts (Goodwin 1998). Local people's perception of their lack of technical or social 'competence' 20 to make informed statements about the environment is reinforced by the emphasis on technical competence in public debate (Berglund 1998). This undermines local discourses, denying local people an authoritative way to talk about their own problems, and 'rendering them not just powerless but opinionless' (Goodwin 1998: 488). My gas-fired power station case study demonstrates how most local people in Noglikskii District feel their 'legitimate' sphere of knowledge is limited to the domestic sphere. Reindeer herders likewise feel unsure about their competence to challenge the financial business of Native organisations, even though these organisations are receiving money on their behalf. Local activism depends on the ability of activists to break through cultural barriers limiting action and comment to a 'legitimate' sphere of knowledge. A dialogical approach to participation challenges 'monological' hegemonic discourses (Vitebsky 1993). In their study of forestry planning in the US, Steelman and Ascher (1997) note that preferences expressed by the public can be inconsistent and conflicting. They refer to some critics who argue that 'the general public may not be a particularly competent, interested, or knowledgeable participant' (ibid: 73).21 I agree that ordinary local people do not have the technical knowledge, for example to plan the best route for a Sakhalin pipeline. On the other hand, local people, particularly those who live on the land, have an intimate knowledge of the landscape and the human activity that takes place in that landscape, This kind of knowledge surely should have a place alongside the geophysical data and the reports from resource committees that have influenced the decisions made about the pipeline route. Goodwin (1998: 494) notes that the legitimacy and authority of local people's knowledge about the locality, the people and local problems, comes from their relationship to place and their intimate involvement in local social practices. This endows local participants with the 19 This is what Giddens (1991) terms the 'sequestration of experience' (Goodwin 1998: 487). 20 Goodwin draws here on Bourdieu (1984) who sees 'competence' as the 'recognition of an individual's capacity and entitlement to speak and have an opinion ' (Goodwin 1998: 487). 202 competence to speak. The problem, then, is how to ensure that this competence is recognised within planning processes. There are other kinds of specialist local knowledge. The teachers who protested against the gas-fired power station and the storage of radioactive waste did their own investigations, read reports, accessed documents and built up their own store of know ledge to back up their arguments. Dismissal of their protests, however emotional, as the ravings of unqualified dilettantes appears to be a convenient shield that officials hide behind in order not to have to face up to their own duty to respond to the protests. In order to incorporate both technical-scientific expertise and local knowledge, Steelman and Ascher (1997) advocate flexible approaches to participation, with more or less technical or public input depending on the issue at stake. I advocate a dialogical approach, involving interaction between scientists and local activists through public discussions and exchange of information over a sustained period of time. The benefits to companies of not having full dialogical participation in decision­ making are clear - the savings on expense, the time-scale of project implementation, and the minimisation of negative publicity. However, experience from other countries demonstrates that dialogue with local residents is accepted by industry as a necessary process. When the Trans-Alaska pipeline was constructed, there was a 'nation-wide discussion,' not just in the state of Alaska. '[Y]ou're not seeing similar attempts here to truly engage the public ... the companies are guilty of this as well as the government officials.' 22 Environmentalists believe this underlines the need to have independent NGOs working to force the oil companies to engage in a more effective dialogue with the public. I know in America_there would be a lot more money spent on involving the public in these decisions, it would be much more of a sensitive issue .. . . [W]e have a high speed rail proposal in Seattle and they're exploring many routes and all of those routes, its in the newspapers every day. They are not deciding on any route not until they have had a number of public hearings, where every community can voice its opposition or not. And this of course makes the project a lot more expensive and it slows it down, but at the same time you have a lot more input . . . from the public that ' s going to be affected by a high speed rail link next to their house or their business .... And I just don ' t see that happening on Sakhalin. Because the 21 This is the essence of Plato's critique of democracy in The Republic (Held 1987; Plato 1974). 22 From interview with Tony Anderson, September 2001 202 competence to speak. The problem, then, is how to ensure that this competence is recognised within planning processes. There are other kinds of specialist local knowledge. The teachers who protested against the gas-fired power station and the storage of radioactive waste did their own investigations, read reports, accessed documents and built up their own store of know ledge to back up their arguments. Dismissal of their protests, however emotional, as the ravings of unqualified dilettantes appears to be a convenient shield that officials hide behind in order not to have to face up to their own duty to respond to the protests. In order to incorporate both technical-scientific expertise and local knowledge, Steelman and Ascher (1997) advocate flexible approaches to participation, with more or less technical or public input depending on the issue at stake. I advocate a dialogical approach, involving interaction between scientists and local activists through public discussions and exchange of information over a sustained period of time. The benefits to companies of not having full dialogical participation in decision­ making are clear - the savings on expense, the time-scale of project implementation, and the minimisation of negative publicity. However, experience from other countries demonstrates that dialogue with local residents is accepted by industry as a necessary process. When the Trans-Alaska pipeline was constructed, there was a 'nation-wide discussion,' not just in the state of Alaska. '[Y]ou're not seeing similar attempts here to truly engage the public ... the companies are guilty of this as well as the government officials.' 22 Environmentalists believe this underlines the need to have independent NGOs working to force the oil companies to engage in a more effective dialogue with the public. I know in America ther_e would be a lot more money spent on involving the public in these decisions, it would be much more of a sensitive issue .... [W]e have a high speed rail proposal in Seattle and they're exploring many routes and all of those routes, its in the newspapers every day. They are not deciding on any route not until they have had a number of public hearings, where every community can voice its opposition or not. And this of course makes the project a lot more expensive and it slows it down, but at the same time you have a lot more input ... from the public that's going to be affected by a high speed rail link next to their house or their business ... . And I just don't see that happening on Sakhalin. Because the 21 This is the essence of Plato's critique of democracy in The Republic (Held 1987; Plato 1974). 22 From interview with Tony Anderson, September 2001 203 company wants to save money and they want to build quickly they want to develop as quickly as possible so they can get back their investment so they'll do what they can. 23 At the same time, in countries with a longer tradition of democratic governance, industry is less likely to get away with a cosmetic paiticipation process. Multinationals work in many different countries, so their behaviour depends to a great extent on the laws, media and public expectations and response within that society. The 1997 SEIC public consultation transcripts and the Noglikskii district newspaper report reveal the nature of local expectations. People are critical and questioning, but they do not challenge unsatisfactory responses from the oil companies. People appear satisfied that the company is demonstrating adherence to the law by having consultations, or that they have high level technological solutions to environmental threats. Local people seem most concerned with getting more information. For journalist Vasil'eva, dialogue means 'finding a common language' and 'achieving mutual understanding' (Chapter 3), while for Goodwin's British respondents, dialogue relates to action and influence. So what does an oil company expect to gain from public consultations? Francis (2001) observes that the World Bank tends to label processes 'participatory' when they consist only of information sharing or consultation, without any actual participation in decision-making. This appears to be the case on Sakhalin, too. By facilitating local participation through public consultations the oil companies and their sponsors are not demonstrating a genuine commitment to the principles of sustainable development, but instead are creating that effect in order to secure benefits for themselves. The oil companies are performing for their financiers (the Banks), while the Banks are performing for their shareholders and their Boards of Directors. Both are attempting to avoid situations like the EBRD letter and the court cases and the bad press that these kinds of public protests generate. Companies are also concerned about building support for the project among ·local citizens and leaders by demonstrating adherence to the law and international best practice in order to ensure support for the project. Increasingly companies are also realising that if they do not follow the law they inay end up fighting with NGOs in the federal courts. Certainly empowerment of local people does not seem to be a direct result (or aim) of 23 From interview with US environmentalist John Frank, September 2001. - ·- --- ----------------~ 204 participation. There is a Russian slang word for this, pokazukha, which means a show without substance. If public consultations are seen as mere pokazukha, this further undermines public confidence in the concept of public participation, by confirming their belief that participation is meaningless. This also serves to undermine the EBRD's hoped-for 'transition effect'. Other (indirect) effects of the offshore projects have enabled local people to make their voices heard where they may otherwise not have done. The offshore oil and gas developments have given the Native people of Sakhalin several opportunities to express their opinions and concerns not only in special consultations with the oil companies, but in local, regional, national and international forums, sponsored by international Native rights organisations. The revival of the Sakhalin Association of Indigenous Peoples has been a significant development for a certain sector of the Native population. Meetings of the Association allow for open debate of specific Native concerns, and there is some potential for influence through the Association (channelling funding, negotiating with oil companies). The Association has raised the profile of reindeer herding and threats to fisheries in the north-east at regional, national and international meetings. However, there are (naturally) conflicts and factions within the Native community and the Association finds it impossible to represent the interests of all the Native people in the district (or the region). Nonetheless, for those who feel the Association defends their interests, it has become an effective channel for their voices. The offshore projects have also catalysed the development of the international NGO community around Sakhalin issues. SEW enjoys an on-going dialogue with various international NGOs. H9wever, they have expressed disappointment that some once active foreign partners have now ceased to collaborate with them. This is one of the problems associated with foreigner dependence. Dialogue needs to be on-going in order to develop the trust that is essential for collaboration. Another indirect effect of multinational involvement is the international interest in Noglikskii District. Previously only ethnographers and ethno-linguists visited northern Sakhalin, but visitors now include environmental and human rights NGOs and experts from Moscow and abroad. These visitors are able to make contact with 205 local people by holding private and public meetings, which are a good opportunity for people to talk openly about issues that concern them and to get expert advice. These are also rare opportunities for local discourses to reach an international audience. Yet these opportunities, like the oil company consultations, do not become on-going dialogues. After the meetings people expressed th.eir appreciation, but were left feeling unsure about what to do next. The problem is how to find an appropriate open-ended, dialogical format for ongoing engagement between local people, oil companies and international NGO networks. When the oil spill response experts visited Nogliki in 1999, they recommended the creation of a Sakhalin Coastal Citizens' Advisory Council (SCCAC) to be funded jointly by the state and the oil industry ('but politically independent of either') (Lawn et al 1999: 15). This is based on the model of a citizens' council formed in the Prince William Sound area after the Exxon Valdez spill. The SCCAC would conduct and oversee research into environmental science, oil spill prevention and response, canvass public opinion and advise government and industry. This would provide a forum for an on-going dialogue between the public, scientists, state and industry; international NGOs would have observer status. Since the oil spill response experts left northern Sakhalin, however, no one has made any attempt to establish such a council. The responsibilities for doing this may be unclear, but local Noglikskii District activists could make the first move. If they did this, they would be able to rely on the support of international NGOs, SEW, Ecojuris, Rodnik and others. I believe that what is probably stopping them is a lack of belief that such an initiative could work, based on their experience that neither government nor industry tends to listen to them, while international environmental battles are usually fought without them. My survey revealed a very low level of participation in associational activity and decision-making processes, apart from voting in elections. However, I would agree with the oil spill response experts, that '[t]he essence of participatory democratic forms of governance is that citizens have not just the right to vote, but also an obligation to become informed on issues affecting them and to express their concerns broadly and openly' (Lawn et al 1999: 15). This resonates with Habermas ' s ideal of communicative action or Fishkin's 'civic engagement' (1995: 7). 206 Public debate of some sort is necessary for people to be able to discuss issues and formulate their responses to them. The public consultations do not allow for that kind of open debate. Given the lack of coffee houses and the absence of a coffee-house culture in Noglikskii District, the local newspaper Znamia Truda provides perhaps one of the few regular forums for public debate.24 It plays an important role in local society in raising awareness and gradually changing consciousness. At a time when people are often asking 'Who do we tum to?' the newspaper provides a listening ear and the editorial staff try to act upon what they hear. Appropriately, the letters column of the newspaper is entitled 'Dialogue' (Dialog). In time, Noglikskii District citizens may develop their own opinions about how participation should be conducted, not only in oil company consultations, but also in other forms of natural resource management and in general social and political life. Goodwin's (1998) respondents saw participatory projects not an end in themselves, but as leading to a greater consciousness and questioning of issues. The more 'effective' role of participation may thus be more elusive and uncertain, focusing on participation as a process (i.e. 'unfinalisable'), in which the objectives and actions are not settled in advance, but emerge from the act of participation itself (Goodwin 1998: 495). 6.3 Human Agency In Chapter 2 I introduced the concept of space as a way to consider potential for action. As the ethnography has illustrated, oil companies, NGOs and local activists have opened up new opportunities for local people in Noglikskii District to take part in decision-making prpcesses, but local citizens have not always taken advantage of these opportunities. They appear to have difficulty in formulating their response to the offshore oil and gas projects. In this section I consider what encourages and inhibits human agency in the public domain. I follow this with an exploration of the nature of human agency in the domain of everyday practice. I aim to demonstrate why local people tend to focus their energies on action in the latter domain. 24 Others include meetings of the teachers' union and the Native peoples' Association. 207 As I mentioned above, local citizens of Noglikskii District (particularly non-Native citizens) do not tend to have access to global communications networks, while contact with regional NGOs in Yuzhno-Sakhalinsk is erratic. This is partly due to technical reasons such as the lack of access to the Internet, and to the inevitable financial constraints, but is also influenced by the disparity between local and global agendas. Global issues include protection of the grey whale, biodiversity preservation, protected area creation, campaigns against 'frontier oil drilling' and the global take-over of multinationals, some of which are not of concern to local people. Local environmental issues are more closely related to everyday socio-economic and domestic problems (Berglund 1998). Local and global concerns coincide in some areas, particularly with regards to fisheries protection and in the field of Native rights. Global Native rights discourses find resonance at the local level in the same way that global environmental discourses find resonance with regional NGOs such as Sakhalin Environment Watch. Another important factor is that Native leaders of both the old school (Lok) and the new (Nitkuk) are now based in Noglikskii District. Information, as we have seen, is a valuable tool and resource for NGOs as well as oil companies. Appropriation of discourse can be a tool of influence. Local hopes about what the offshore projects could and should provide include provision of infrastructure and local socio-economic development. As I established in Chapter 3, these expectations, rather than being a hangover from the Soviet era, are in tune with the arguments made by proponents of CSR. But global discourses of corporate social responsibility have not filtered through to local communities yet. When they do, people will be able to 1:1se these discourses to challenge the companies' actions in the way that environmentalists are now using their pledges of commitment to sustainable development and participation. In the Soviet era, censorship of the media meant that any efforts to oppose state authority were hidden or reported falsely. The fact that many things can Iiow be reported in the media is bound to have an influence on human consciousness and potentially also their level of agency in the public domain. I believe that good information provision and communications are empowering, while a lack of these 208 resources can be profoundly disempowering. However, I also observed a tendency for local people to make their lack of information an excuse for inactivity. This has led me to conclude that the psychological factors inhibiting agency are stronger than technical ones such as poor information provision. The teachers were able to mobilise the public to protest against the construction of the gas-fired power station, because the power station posed a threat to their garden plots, their source of food. Broader political and socio-economic issues that are debated in the local newspaper and at the kitchen table (particularly relating to the regional budget and north-south relations) were reflected in this local protest. However, the protest was successful at mobilising people because it was framed in terms of a defence of the domestic sphere, providing people with a sense of their own competence as 'experts' and the legitimacy of their protest (Berglund 1998). Nonetheless, construction went ahead, despite reports of corruption and mismanagement of the project in the regional press. The teachers' belief that they could not mobilise the public in the same way today is largely due to a lack of optimism that people can change anything (McAdam et al 1996).25 Lack of belief in the effectiveness of action is a powerful psychological factor inhibiting action in public domain in Noglikskii District. People are also inhibited by their fear of power and authority. A founder member of SEW left the organisation in fear of the FSB. When I was carrying out the survey of local opinions, several respondents expressed concern that the local authorities would somehow get access to their own questionnaire response. Officials defer to their regional and federal bosses for fear of losing their jobs. Oil company workers on the local council were reportedly afraid of crossing their boss who also sat on the council in 1999. On the other hand, kolkhoz workers did take the step of sending an ( albeit anonymous) letter to the local prosecutor's office to voice their concerns about the activities of their new external director. But in general, people seem afraid of losing any security that they might have in an insecure world. What is more, despite evidence that the social system can be challenged, people seem to hide behind a conception of power as immutable, as an excuse for inaction. 25 My survey results show that generally people feel pessimistic about the future (Appendix III) 209 Suggested reasons why people don't generally engage in public activism include: they are too concerned with their domestic life and personal problems; they feel they will not be heard; people in power don't care. Local impotence in the face of power is expressed as indifference. The discrepancy between the participation principles espoused by the multinationals and the realities of implementation can be expressed in the Russian catch-phrase, 'Khoteli kak luchshe, a poluchilos' kak vsegda' ('They had the best intentions but it turned out the way it always does'). 26 Given people's disengagement from power and their lack of optimism about the effect that any action will have in the public domain, it is no surprise that they focus their energies more on the domain of everyday practice where tangible direct benefits can be felt. It is evident from the ethnography that the domain of everyday practice is a domain of considerable agency. 'Survival' (or vyzhivanie) is broader than 'subsistence' and involves the use of social and cultural capital and the maintenance of social networks. The all-consuming nature of vyzhivanie is held up by local respondents as an excuse for not engaging in public activity. People tell me: 'We are too busy with vyzhivanie to get involved in politics/ environmental issues/ public consultations.' Scott suggests that a low level of peasant revolt may be explained by the way that survival strategies stave off immediate threats to their wellbeing (Scott 1976: 194). Everyday resistance and survival strategies can undermine resistance by patching up the mess. Elsewhere I have called this the 'Mir Space Station mentality' (Wilson 1998). On the other hand, 'being too busy with vyzhivanie', like the lack of information, could be seen as merely an excuse for inactivity in the public domain. On the other hand, survival strategies are also about quality of life: Tatiana loves fishing for sheer pleas~re, fresh air and exercise. People chose to spend time on these activities because they enjoy them. Public hearings are really not that much fun. Another factor that significantly influences agency is money. Money is also a highly moral thing in local society. People gain a sense of agency and a sense of self-worth from financial independence. SEW gain their moral independence from foreign grant funding and reject oil money (as bad money). They claim that other environmental 26 Originally coined by Viktor Chernyomyrdin, but now widely used as a commentary on a whole range of possible situations. 210 groups have been 'bought off' by the oil companies when they accepted grant money for their activities. In the same way they claim they have lost potential allies in the indigenous camp as they have also accepted money from the oil companies and are negotiating with them rather than opposing them. Small-scale enterprises have a fair amount of autonomy from the state. The managers of these enterprises are limited only by how to finance their activities. In general they are looking for an outside sponsor who can take on the former role of the state. Financial opportunities are currently offered by foreign grant giving bodies including oil companies. Thus enterprises are in danger of becoming dependent on oil companies. Local entrepreneurs are faced again with the dilemma: money or the environment. The oil companies are posing a real threat to the natural environment and the resources upon which local people depend for their livelihoods. Yet at the same time they are among the only potential funders for local business initiatives. There is a need for independent credit systems, either as foreigner-managed micro­ credit schemes (which are starting up in southern Sakhalin) or as Russian bank-run credit schemes. There is a danger that grant givers promote a particular form of development (e.g. support for Native enterprise, craft making, tourism) at the expense of other forms of enterprise. Foreign agendas may thus influence the direction of local development. What is more obvious and damaging to local society is the way that differentiated access to grant opportunities, which requires among other things the skills of grant­ writing and the ability to travel regularly to Yuzhno-Sakhalinsk, causes splits in local society. As one informant stated: 'Money divides people' .27 I might rephrase that as 'people's attitudes tow_ards money divide people.' 8.4 Trust and Responsibility Finally, I want to draw attention to the significance of trust and responsibility when considering human agency and interactions in the context of large-scale resource 27 A colleague on Kamchatka stated in a similar way that after the collapse of state support for scientific research, it was when money started to appear from outside sources that the Kamchatka scientific community became divided. 211 development and participation processes. So far my conclusions have revealed several areas where trust is lacking in the interactions of agents. Many people do not trust the multinationals to deliver equitable benefits to the Sakhalin Region as a whole or its districts. The governor mistrusts NGOs whom he accuses of undermining the regional economy. The environmentalists and mu.ltinationals mistrust one another. There is a lack of trust between local citizens and their officials and authorities. In the experience of Alaska, Canada and the Shetlands, the government, the public, the media and influential local leaders and activists have taken on the responsibility of defending the interests of local communities. In this they have often drawn on the law as an effective tool. When plans were announced in 1968 to build the Trans­ Alaska pipeline, Alaskan environmentalists, Native residents and fishermen filed lawsuits against the construction. As a result the pipeline was raised above the ground over permafrost, 600 crossings were made for migrating caribou, and pledges were made to provide jobs for Alaska Native people in the oil industry. The construction was delayed almost five years and the cost of construction increased from under $1 billion US to nearly $8 billion US.28 The Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act (ANCSA, 1970) was passed as a response to Native people's efforts to secure lands and benefits from the oil developments. The global discourse of rights has been adopted by environmentalists and human rights activists and the indigenous movement on Sakhalin, and it is creeping into the discourse of everyday life in Noglikskii District.29 In the 2002 Reith Lectures,30 Onora O'Neill criticises the 'passive culture of human rights' which 'suggests that we can sit back and wait for others to deliver our entitlements'. This echoes the criticisms of Native people's dependence on the state made by non-Native proponents of assimilation in Noglikskii District.31 However, th_e non-Native sector of the population has also been faced with the withdrawal of the benefits and privileges of the paternalistic Soviet state. The discourse of rights is a Western discourse, but does resonate with Soviet (not only Native) expectations. 28 Sources: Newell and Wilson 1996; Steiner 2000; http://www.enr.com/new/A0906.ASP (03.04.02); http://tapeis.an1. gov/documents/docs/Section_ l 3 _May2. pdf (03 .04. 02); http://www.corecom.net/JPO/taps.htm (03.04.02)). 29 E.g. in the local newspaper 30 All references to O'Neill in this section refer to the Reith lectures which are available on this web­ site: http://www.bbc.co.uk/radio4/reith2002/ (18.04.02) 212 I might mention here what some observers refer to as Russia's culture of victim-hood (Rancour-Laferriere 1995) or the Russian characteristic of 'self-doubt' (Akaha and Vassilieva 2001: 39). O'Neill mentions the need for victims to feel that they are 'agents of change'. The Russian response to self-doubt has typically been to seek someone to tum to (Ries 1997) rather than to think in terms of their own agency. Agency is reserved for 'muddling through' and 'vyzhivanie' rather than for effecting social change. A more proactive approach to human rights and accountability is demonstrated by NGOs. In the ethnography, Ecojuris lawyer, Olga Yaroschenko, urges Sakhalin citizens to bring their officials to account and force them to take on the responsibility for defending the interests of people and the environment, rather than evading that responsibility. Likewise they believe that oil companies cannot be trusted, so they have to be made accountable to the public. Although Shell has pledged a commitment to the principles of corporate social responsibility (CSR), the formal law merely obliges developers to hold public consultations as part of an BIA. The problem is how to force oil companies to take on their responsibilities over and above the legal minimum. Environmentalists who visited northern Sakhalin in 1999 pointed out that oil companies react only after a disaster and urged Sakhalin citizens to learn from the experiences of other regions and press for higher standards before there is a spill. They fear that oil companies will try to cut comers. Despite adequate technological knowledge, safety precautions were taken only after the Exxon Valdez spill in Prince William Sound in 1989 (Steiner 2000) and after the Esso Bemicia spill in the Shetlands in 1978 (Wills 1991). Their message to Nogliki citizens was, 'The oil companies know what to do, they just need to be made to do it'. As we have seen, NGOs have been successful at using the Law to bring the multinationals to account. These national and international efforts are focused largely on protection of the global commons and biodiversity from the potentially damaging 31 It is also a common criticism of Native populations in mixed communities that I have encountered elsewhere, e.g. on Kamchatka. 213 effects of multinational activities. There are few efforts to protect local communities from the boom and bust nature of oil development or from the danger of oil companies cutting costs and corners. This however takes a more locally-based effort. Wills (1990) documents the dramatic effect of offshore oil development on local Shetland Island society: the huge influx of workers; the establishment of new planning institutions; the importance of individual personalities in the struggle and the responsibilities shouldered by local agents, especially the Shetland Islands Council: Shetland has been immensely enriched by the oilmen and the money with which they were persuaded to part, but socially it has been tom apart and unevenly stitched together again. Without the efforts of the council, however, the damage would have been permanent and the wealth would have been concentrated in a very few hands, with little long-term social or economic benefit to the general population. (Wills 1991: 13) If Noglikskii district society is to be 'torn apart' by the Sakhalin offshore projects it is likely to be even more 'unevenly stitched together again' than Shetland was. This is particularly as there appears to be no equivalent to the Shetland Islands Council to defend public interests by demanding fair benefits from the oil companies and ensuring that wealth is not concentrated in the hands of a few. The Noglikskii District mayor, administration and council have been unable to negotiate an economic deal to compensate for the ecological risks to be shouldered by the district, and instead agreed to tax holidays for the multinationals. Despite local protest, district leaders allowed the gas fired power station to be built close to local dachas, though an alternative site was also_proposed some distance from the town. Drawing on Kant's philosophy, Onora O'Neill argues that 'nobody has rights unless others have duties'. When the law on the Guarantees of the Rights of Indigenous Peoples of the Russian Federation ( 1999) was passed, it was criticised for the wording, which guaranteed rights, but did not bind other parties to their respective duties. Thus, indigenous people 'have the right (imeiut pravo)' to use their traditional lands, receive support government and public organisations. But likewise, state authorities 'have the right (imeiut pravo)' to pass laws, adopt socio-economic 214 programmes and give support to Native peoples. Regional and local administrations have since made excuses that they cannot implement the law as there is no money in the budget to do so. O'Neill chooses a discourse of obligation and duty over the discourse of rights because it forces people to address the question, 'who has to do what, for whom, when?' This is an important distinction that is very relevant to my study. My survey32 revealed a low level of social capital in local society if measured in terms of associational behaviour and participation in decision-making. However, it also revealed a considerable degree of trust in kinship and friendship networks (another form of social capital), which I had also observed during fieldwork. As I mentioned above, the survey also revealed a low level of trust in figures of authority, but a high level of trust in key figures in people's everyday lives: the boss at work, the school and the local newspaper. Mikhailov and Zina have demonstrated that collaboration between Russian and Native individuals is possible. This kind of collaboration depends on personal trust which sometimes needs to be mediated. Zina acts as both leader in her local community and mediator between Native craftspeople and Mikhailov. Zina took on a similar responsibility in the case of Oleg and the fish limits, but her trust was betrayed. Trust within local society is embedded in overlapping local moral codes according to which local people act and interact. In my ethnography I have explored certain aspects of this moral framework, such as the acceptance of (illegal) over-fishing of official quotas as long as obligations to provide for the community are respected, or moral judgements about gaining access to money from grant-giving programmes. Some local residents d~monstrate a rejection of capitalism and western values and symbols, some hearken back to the lost morality of the Soviet era. It seems that there is also a tacit local understanding about tolerance of environmental damage by the local oil industry as long as they can guarantee payments into the local budget. For the Native community there is a need for the non-Native population to acknowledge the historical moral debt owed to the aboriginal population of the district. The proponents of 'assimilation' defend their views with equal conviction, arguing in 32 See Appendix III. 215 favour of 'equality for all'. The moral agendas of other players (local officials and regulators; regional politicians; international environmentalists such as Ecojuris, Greenpeace, etc.) may be quite different from those of ordinary local citizens, though some may resonate locally. Local politicians such as the district mayor and the district council deputies are caught between local and outside moral spheres, which causes some inner conflict in decision-making, though decisions are generally resolved in favour of the outside player (the governor, oil companies, power station, and so on). On several occasions, I have observed the problematic nature of leadership in Sakhalin societies (both in Yuzhno-Sakhalinsk and in northern districts). This relates not only to the responsibilities and obligations of political leaders, but also the representativeness and effectiveness of cultural and ethnic leaders, the difficulty in finding NGO leaders and ensuring collaboration among experts, the moral ambiguity of entrepreneurial leadership in the sphere of Native resource use. People have demonstrated a reluctance to take on leadership roles. People are afraid to 'stick out' (vydeliat'sia). Yanitsky refers to the 'levelling value-systems' of Soviet ideology as a factor influencing post-Soviet participation in social movements (Yanitsky 1993: 31). The indigenous community has a problem finding leaders, while charismatic leader figures such as Korotkin and Lok spend their efforts on fighting in the press. The Nivkhi find it difficult to present their situation and defend their identity to the general public. Sections of the Native population feel as though their interests are not defended by their representatives, who are perceived as a powerful elite that controls the economic, social and cultural life of the Native community. Difficulties with leade_rship relate to a perceived need among people for an outsider to come and organise them. Yanitsky (1993: 18) observes the need for Russians to have impulse from outside to spur them into action. Many people when speaking of how to resolve a problem revert to the 'nuzhen chelovek' 33 discourse. One likewise often hears, 'nuzhen khoziain'. 34 Pine (1998: 109) observes what she terms the 'Blake syndrome' in post-Socialist Poland. When asked what could be done to alleviate 33 'Nuzhen chelovek' literally means 'we need someone' or 'someone is needed'. It is the expression of a desire for someone to come along and sort things out. In my view this is a typical Russian evasion of personal responsibility. 216 socio-economic problems, a woman insists: 'What we need here is a Blake'. Blake Carrington from the American TV soap opera Dynasty is seen as the epitome of a firm but benign economic leadership. Margaret Thatcher is admired for the same reasons in Russia even today. 35 I have also observed a fascination with the leadership qualities of Pinochet, which to me is rather more disturbing. My ethnography demonstrates the significance of 'petty squabbles', of factionalism, family feuds, character assassination, back-biting, petty power politics, and so on. These are things which generally belong to the 'backstage' of life, but which, in my view, greatly contribute to an undermining of local trust relations. When analysing Bakhtin' s prosaics, Morson and Emerson cite the character Elena Andreevna from Chekhov's Uncle Vanya: "Ivan Petrovich, you are an educated, intelligent man, and I should think you would understand that the world is being destroyed not by crime and fire, but by ... all these petty squabbles". 36 Petty squabbling is perhaps less divisive than the culture of envy, which is in my opinion one of the most divisive of local social phenomena. An activist from Yuzhno-Sakhalinsk made this comment on the 'culture of envy' in local Russian society: Activist - Russians have this mentality of envy (zavist'). Somebody does something and others start to envy them and then start to make things difficult for them (vstavliat' palki v kolesa, lit- they put spokes in their wheels). EW - Why is that? Activist-That's just the way it is. But I think that sometimes it's because people are lazy. We used to live in a time when decisions were made for us, things were done for us and we would just carry out orders. Now it is totally different and everyone has to get used to the different way of doing things. But we can't all do it. And so if it works for someone, we look at them, get envious and then start to ... (pause). But I think the time will come when the cultural paradigm and attitudes will change. I argue that internal disharmony (problems with leadership, mistrust and envy, the divisive effects of money entering a community) can undermine any efforts to establish dialogical relations within local society to resolve socio-economic 34 This translates adequately as 'we need a good manager'. 35 During my study-year in Voronezh 1990-91 English and Russian students in the student hostel often spoke of swapping Thatcher for Gorbachev. 3 From Chekhov's Uncle Vanya, Act II, p.191 (cited in Morson and Emerson 1990: 23). development problems, and this in turn undermines efforts to build dialogue externally with interventionists. 217 Reflecting in this section on trust and responsibility necessarily brings me back to reflecting on my own role as a researcher. Expectations of what a researcher can do as an outsider might be very high. Researchers can be a contested resource themselves. People looked to me as a potential leader both in Yuzhno-Sakhalinsk when I was working as an environmentalist and in Nogliki when I was a researcher. In both cases a local leader emerged (Boris Tereshkov and Zina Karpova) to take the place that people had mentally allocated to me, the outsider. They have both faced difficulties that an outsider may not have faced, but ultimately they have achieved much more. Through conversations and relationships, the researcher influences people's lives and vice versa. Generally the changes that take place are not earth-shattering, but 'tiny', sometimes a chance event, such as my introducing Zina to Igor Mikhailov, turns out to have a big effect. But this tends to depend more on people themselves than on the researcher or the event. The interventionist makes a good catalyst. Milton (1993) notes that while some anthropologists still feel uneasy about contributing to change (for traditional reasons such as a desire for objectivity), many now consider a certain amount of social responsibility to be a fundamental part of their discipline. Milton also understands that commitment to a cause may be weakened by the ability of an anthropologist to see other points of view, resulting in a form of 'moral paralysis'. As a researcher I am troubled that my research findings, even when they appear in the local newspaper, have very little relevance to the lives of the people I am writing about. I feel a strong urge to help these people in a direct and tangible way and feel frustrated when I cannQt. Returning to visit people is appreciated greatly because it means you have not forgotten them. Bringing presents and useful items (e.g. volleyballs for the youth sports group) is a way to demonstrate thanks and a desire to help, though it also demonstrates powerlessness. Ultimately most researchers cannot return indefinitely (particularly not if it means travelling to the other side of the globe) and eventually the time comes to move on. We may leave people with additional motivation and capabilities (knowledge, skills, communications, inspiration, a 'sense of agency') to make a difference in their own lives and those of others. But the responsibility to do this will still rest with them. I conclude also that I 1 218 the responsibility for local engagement in the development process depends to a large extend on local people themselves. I felt it appropriate to end the thesis with a 'local voice' . A young intern at the local newspaper did an interview about my environmental work and research (Znamia Truda, 30.06.99: 3,4). The title of the article, 'Za svoi prava nado borotsia' ('You have to fight for your rights') reflected the rights-based discourse, but the more self­ reflective post-script demonstrated a sense of 'awakening consciousness'. It reflected a new discourse that I had been beginning to hear also in communities elsewhere in the Russian Far East - that of self-reliance: Even in Cambridge they are studying the problems of the North, but when are we ourselves going to start paying attention to everything that is going on around us? Are we going to just sit and wait for help from someone or other? Anyone can find guilty people and criticise them. But who can start taking their life into their own hands (kto vovnetsia w obustroistvo svoei zhizni) if we sometimes don't even know our own rights? But apart from ourselves, no one is going to help us. (Znamia Truda, 30.06.99: 4) 219 Appendix I: Background to Sakhalin Offshore Projects International oil companies have been interested in the Sakhalin offshore projects since the mid-1970s. In 1972 the Soviet Union made a proposal to Japan for joint exploration of oil and gas on Sakhalin's continental shelf. Exploration began in 1975 and in 1978 reserves were confirmed in two fields, Chaivo and Odoptu (now part of the Sakhalin-I project). Exploration of the Sakhalin-2 fields began in 1984. However, a slump in world oil prices halted development of the projects until 1991. 1 Sakhalin-I: The original Sakhalin-I consortium was set up in 1995 and signed their Production Sharing Agreement (PSA) in that year. The consortium is made up of: Exxon Neftegas Ltd (ExxonMobil - operator) (30% ), the Japanese SO DECO (30% ), the Indian Oil and Natural Gas Corporation Ltd. (30%), Rosneft-Sakhalin (11.5%) and the Rosneft subsidiary, Sakhalinmorneftegas-Shelf (8.5% ). The project covers three fields, Arkutun-Dagi, Chaivo and Odoptu, located off the north-eastern Sakhalin coast. Estimated reserves are 325 million tons of oil and condensate; 425 billion cu. m of gas. 2 The estimated cost of the project is $11 billion US. In 1999 the Russian State Committee of Ecology denied ExxonMobil the environmental permit needed to drill an exploratory well at their Chaivo-6 field, after plans to dispose of drilling waste at sea failed to receive approval from the State Ecological Expert Review Committee. When ExxonMobil threatened to withdraw from the project then Prime Minister Stepashin passed a decree allowing the discharge of drilling waste into the Sea of Okhotsk. This decision was challended in the Russian Supreme Court by a coalition of citizens' organisations, led by Ecojuris. The court ruled in the citizens' favour and invalidated Stepashin's decree. In 2000, Exxon were finally granted a licence to drill an appraisal well in the Chaivo-6 field after agreeing to re-inject their drilling waste back into the well, a decision which increased the cost of the project by US $3 million. The decision also changed oil company policy on 1 Sources: Sabirova and Allen (2000) Year End Update on Sakhalin Oil and Gas Projects; Sabirova (2001) Sakhalin oil and gas update; (web-site http://www.bisnis.doc.gov/bisnis/bull00.cfm, checked April 2002); Newell and Wilson (1996); Akaha and Vassilieva (2000, 2001); Newell (forthcoming). 220 drilling waste. Re-injection of drilling waste is now included in the plans of all new Sakhalin offshore projects, while SEIC is reported to have reduced their disposal to 30%. However, in 2001 Exxon lobbied (unsuccessfully) to have the fisheries category for their drilling areas reduced in order to allow discharge to go ahead. ExxonMobil continues to lobby for permission to discharge driHing waste at sea, an approach opposed by environmental groups and fishing companies. ExxonMobil is about to begin a $3.5 billion Phase I development, with oil extraction from Chaivo using directional drilling from onshore and erection of an arctic drilling rig. Construction of a $400 million US onshore pipeline has been proposed to transport oil across the Tatar Strait to De-Kastri Port in Khabarovsk Region. From here crude would be exported to China, Japan, and South Korea. ExxonMobil has also teamed up with Japanese firms to create Japan Sakhalin Pipeline FC Co. Ltd., which has prepared a feasibility study for an underwater pipeline route to Japan. Governor Farkhutdinov and the Ministry of Energy strongly oppose these plans, and would prefer Sakhalin-I and Sakhalin-2 to collaborate on joint infrastructure construction (see below). The governor has threatened to suspend the Sakhalin-I project. Transporting oil to Khabarovsk Region would mean that the Sakhalin budget would get no export revenues from it. The north-south pipeline and export terminal will create more jobs for Sakhalin although construction will be more expensive. Apparently the governor also wants to promote Sakhalin Oil Company, which is owned by the regional administration and produces oil and gas from small fields in the south and could use the export pipeline near these fields. The governor is also against having two pipeline routes, as according to the terms of the PSA, the government is required to reimburse the cost of both pipelines to investors. In summer 2001, ExxonMobil again caused concern among environmentalists by conducting seismic testing while grey whales were feeding off the northeastern coast of the island. The Ministry of Natural Resources banned the surveys but Exxon had reportedly already finished the seismic work by that time. Environmental NGOs Sakhalin Environment Watch and Rodnik (Moscow) have taken Exxon and SEIC to court for threatening grey whale habitat. 2 A recently drilled appraisal well at the Chaivo-6 field revealed an oil rim around the gas deposit with an estimated flow rate of 6,000 barrels a day. 221 Sakhalin-2 The Sakhalin-2 project consortium, Sakhalin Energy Investment Company Ltd. (SEIC or Sakhalin Energy) was established in 1994 and signed its PSA in the same year. The consortium includes: Royal Dutch Shell (operator) (55%), Mitsui Sakhalin Holdings B.V. (25%), Diamond Gas Sakhalin B.V. (Mitsubishi) (20%). The project has two fields, Piltun-Astokhskoe and Lunskoe off the north-eastern coast, with estimated reserves of 140 million tons oil, 494 billion cu. m of gas (the largest of the proven gas reserves). The estimated project cost is $10 billion US. Sakhalin-2 produced the first offshore oil in July 1999 at a rate of 20,000 barrels/ day. In the 2000 season they increased production to nearly 80,000 barrels/ day. The first phase of development of the Sakhalin-2 project involves ecologically risky tanker transportation from the Molikpaq platform which was put in place in 1999. In September 1999, during off-loading from Molikpaq in high winds, about half a ton of crude oil was spilled, and attracted much attention both on Sakhalin and internationally, raising international and local concerns about the environmental safety of the offshore projects. Shell plans to invest $5 billion US over the next five years to develop a 600-km gas­ oil pipeline from offshore platforms to a 9.6 million-tons/ year liquid natural gas (LNG) plant and oil export terminal in the south of Sakhalin (Prigorodnoe). So far no ecological expert review has been completed for this pipeline and agreement on the pipeline route was reached with officials before the present public consultation process began. A US-Russian-Japanese consortium won the $10 million US tender to develop technical specifications for a feasibility study for the Prigorodnoe LNG plant. In December 2000, approximately $100 million US in major contracts were awarded to, among other companies, the Russian-French joint venture Starstoy for pipeline and terminal design, AMEC Services Ltd. (UK) for offshore platform design, and Parsons Engineering (US) for design of onshore infrastructure. Starstroy got the contracts after Russians drew attention to the fact that there was only 18% Russian content in the Sakhalin-2 project (70% is required by the PSA over the lifetime of the project). 222 Sakhalin-3 In 1993 Mobil and Texaco won the tender to explore and develop this block. In January 1999 Exxon included Rosneft and SMNG in the project consortium in order to get on the list of projects eligible for a PSA. The consortium (Pegastar) now includes: ExxonMobil (operator), Texaco, Rosneft and Sakhalinmorneftegaz (SMNG). The PSA has been signed with the Sakhalin and federal governments and is waiting to be ratified by the Federal Duma.The project has three blocks located off the north-eastern coast: Kirinskii ( estimated 687 million tons of oil and condensate and 873 billion cu. m of gas) Ayashskii and Eastern Odoptinskii (114 million tons of oil and condensate and 513 billion cu. m of gas). Delays with the production sharing negotiations mean that exploratory drilling is unlikely before 2003. Sakhalin-4 Project partners are Rosneft and SMNG. The project has two blocks, Astrakhanovskii and Schmidtovskii, located off the north-western coast of Sakhalin. Reserves are estimated at 123 million tons of oil and condensate and 540 billion cu. m of gas. A letter of intent was signed between Rosneft-Sakhalinmorneftegaz and Atlantic Richfield Co. (ARCO) in 1997, and a cooperation agreement signed in 1998, but ARCO withdrew from the project in February 2000. The Astrakhanovskii reserves are estimated at 100 billion cu. m of gas deposits. Extracting the gas is estimated to cost U.S.$2.6 billion with expected profits of U.S.$4 billion. ARCO withdrew from the project over concern about the lack of a PSA, requirements that it would have to re­ inject drilling waste and concerns voiced by indigenous peoples about environmental threats. In 2000, SMNG began exploratory drilling independently. SMNG has reportedly started to negotiate with BP over a share in the project. Sakhalin-5 Project partners are British Petroleum (BP),3 Rosneft and SMN~. Estimated reserves are 154 million tons of oil and condensate and 450 billion cu. m of gas. The local BP office in Yuzhno-Sakhalinsk is being reregistered as BP Exploration Operating Company (BPEOC) Sakhalin Inc. BP and Rosneft-SMNG now have an alliance agreement to explore opportunities for developing the Sakhalin-5 block. Sakhalin-5 3 ARCO merged with BP Amoco in January 2000 and the company is now known as BP. I: I I 223 has not yet come up for tender, but it is likely that BP and Rosneft-SMNG will make a joint bid: The block is not yet included in the federal list of fields that can be developed under a PSA. Sakhalin-6 The Russian firm Petrosakh, owned primarily by Alfa Group, spent U.S.$13 million on seismic studies in the project area in summer 2000. They plan to drill a first well to estimate reserves, which may initially yield 600,000 tons of oil each year. Petrosakh plans to start directional drilling without signing a PSA if granted a license from the Ministry of Natural Resources. 224 Appendix II: The Russian Legal Framework: Environment and participation The use of legislation as a tool to resolve environmental conflict on Sakhalin is increasing, notably in response to development of the offshore oil and gas projects. Local and national NGOs have taken the lead in using legislation to regulate resource developers; such experience has been publicised in the local media and across the Internet. Local populations themselves are, however, more reluctant to use legal tools to assert their rights, despite increasing awareness about the strengthening legislative framework. Russian environmental legislation is noted for its strictness and comprehensiveness. It is the implementation of laws, not the laws themselves, that is problematic. Below is a brief overview of some of the important legislation related to issues of environmental protection and public participation. Article 42 of the Russian Constitution (1993) guarantees Russian citizens the right to a clean environment, to reliable information on the state of the environment and to compensation for damage to health or property caused by violation of environmental laws. Other articles of the Constitution guarantee freedom of speech and thought (Article 29), the right to associate (Article 30) and to participate in the governing of the state (Article 32), and the right of appeal to officials, municipal councils or courts (Article 33). According to the Noglikskii District Statutes (2000), all members of the public have a right to participate in decision-making at the district level in the following ways: local referenda;' local elections; citizens' meetings (skhody); legislative initiatives; individual or collective petitions (obrascheniya) to the local mayor, administration or council; and what is known as 'territorial public self­ governance' ('territorial'nQe obschestvennoe samoupravlenie'). Important environmental protection laws with provision for public participation include the law on Environment Protection (1991), the law on the Environmental Expert Review (1995) and the law on the Sanitary Epidemiological Well-being of the Population (1992). The Land Code (2001) guarantees citizens and NGOs the right to take part in decision-making about land development from the earliest planning 1 In order to call a referendum local groups need to collect 20 signatures to support their cause. 225 stages. The right to hold a referendum on environmental issues is laid out in the Constitution and the Law on Environmental Protection. Public access to information is a critical legal issue in the sphere of participation. The law on Information, Informisation and Protection of Information ( 1995) and the Presidential Decree on Additional Guarantees of the Rights of Citizens to Information (1993) guarantee citizens' rights to request and receive information about environmental and public health issues, and also guarantees their rights to control and monitor the activities and decisions of the authorities (Yakovleva 2001a). According to the above law and the Constitution, access to information relating to human rights and freedoms cannot be limited (ibid). Razbash (1998) and Yakovleva (200la,b) provide insights into the complexities of gaining access to environmental information. One of the most significant legislative advances in the sphere of sustainable development has been the introduction of the concept of the Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) into Russian industrial practice from the mid-1980s. In Russia this translates as OVOS (Otsenka vozdeistviya na okruzhayuschuyu sredu). The introduction of the EIA was mainly due to Western influences, following the US National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) of 1970; the adoption of the EIA into project procedures by UNDP, the World Bank and EBRD in the 1980s; with the Russian tendency to use western models of political organisation; and the need for Russia to comply with international environmental legislation (Cherp 1996). Cherp (1996, 1997, 2000) analyses the differences between the OVOS (the imported concept of EIA, which is carried out by the project implementer) and the state Environmental Expert Review ( carried out by a state review committee and based on the traditional Soviet decision-making system), highlighting the complications that arise from trying to fuse Western and So\liet processes. Any project likely to have an effect on the environment has to pass a state Environmental Expert Review (EER), according to the Law on Environmental Protection (1991) and the Law on the Ecological Expert Review (1995). However, Cherp notes that the EER process does not provide for proper public consultation and it is susceptible to corruption. However the public is permitted by law to challenge the state EER decision in the courts or carry out a public EER, though the latter is complicated and expensive. The OVOS process has better provision for public participation (public hearings or a public discussion are 226 required), but the OVOS itself is only obligatory for certain types of project.2 The companies implementing the Sakhalin offshore projects are required by Russian law to provide an OVOS and to pass the state EER for each stage of their projects. The Land Code obliges any land user to carry out any necessary regeneration work on the land when they have finished using it, though Russian oil companies tend not to respect this obligation. The attempted integration of Western and Soviet principles and practices, together with the chaotic and dispersed nature of the Russian environmental protection system itself, have led to conflicts of responsibility within agencies whose tasks include both nature protection and resource exploitation (Cherp 1996; Glushenkova 1999). This problem was compounded by Putin's decision in May 2000 to subsume the ecological committee into the Ministry of Natural Resources.3 Another factor destabilising the Russian system of environmental regulation is the allocation of responsibility for environmental issues between the federal, regional and local government structures. The Constitution and laws such as the Federal Law on Basic Principles of Local Self­ Governance (1995) allocate these responsibilities. Local regulators often have limited powers and are dependent on regional bodies. The Sakhalin offshore projects are located in federal waters, and responsibility for their monitoring and control is out of the hands of Noglikskii District regulators, which causes a sense of both impotence and resignation locally. There are specific laws for indigenous peoples, which defend their rights to pursue a traditional way of life. Article 49 of the Law on the Animal Kingdom ( 1995) entitles indigenous peoples to priority hunting and fishing rights on their traditional lands. The law on Guarantees of the Rights of Indigenous Peoples of the Russian Federation (1999) provides an important tool tothose fighting for indigenous rights, but it is a framework law and needs to be filled out with appropriate legislation at the regional and local levels. Article 69 of the Russian Constitution guarantees the rights of Native 2 According to a Ministry ofEcol~gy order and the 1994 OVOS regulations [Polozhenie ob OVOS]. 3 This, together with Putin's decision to import nuclear fuel , resulted in calls for a national referendum. Protestors collected 2.5 million signatures to support their campaign. Two million signatures were needed to bring about a referendum, but the Central Electoral Committee declared 600,000 of the signatures to be invalid and a referendum was avoided. 227 people according to international norms and principles,4 while Article 73 acknowledges government responsibility for the protection of the traditional environment and livelihoods of indigenous populations. Article 12 of the Sakhalin Regional Statutes (Ustav) (1995) echoes this, while article 20 confirms the representative of northern Native people in the Sakhalin regional parliament and article 76 confirms the responsibility of the regional and local authorities to support creation of territories of traditional natural resource use (TTPs), and to give privileges for use of natural resources (free licences etc.). Indigenous representatives complain that there is no specific article on Native rights in the Noglikskii District Statutes. New legislation provides specific protection of Native rights to practice traditional forms of natural resource use on their traditional lands. These include the law on Indigenous Communities (ob obschinakh) (2000), the law on Territories of Traditional Natural Resource Use (2001), the new Land Code (2001) (Articles 95 and 97) and the new law on Environmental Protection (2002) (Article 4). Oil companies are particularly concerned about the issue of Native land claims. As most Native people do not have an official claim to the lands they are using, payment of compensation for use of lands will be a complex issue. In Russia, compensation for damage to natural resources is paid in advance of an industrial project starting. Compensation for damage to fisheries from the Sakhalin II project was estimated in the project plans at U.S.$1.68 million by the Vladivostok­ based Pacific Institute of Fisheries and Oceanography (TINRO), which initially estimated it as U.S.$3 million. SEIC, however, forced this number to be reduced to U.S.$200,000, which will be invested in two fish hatcheries located on the Tym' River in neighbouring '.fymovskii District. Environmental groups do not believe that SEIC is paying adequate compensation nor that two hatcheries - with their associated environmental problems - will make up for the damage to fisheries caused by the offshore projects. Local people have little faith in the term compensation. Many would rather keep their lands than give them up for a one-time payment - if it is paid to them. Compensation paid to local administrations by local oil company SMNG for many years of previous damage to reindeer pastures was 4 However, the Russian Federation has still not ratified important international conventions such as the ILO Convention 169. 228 supposed to regenerate the pastures. The money was, apparently, swallowed by local budgets. In Chapter 3, I refer to the controversial issue of drilling waste disposal at sea. According to the Law on the Continental Shelf (25.10.95, amended 10.02.99), discharge of waste and other materials into Continental Shelf waters requires a special permit from the Russian State Committee of Ecology. The permit is given on the basis of two basic pieces of legislation: the state standard GOST 17 .1.2.04-77 'Indicators of the condition of fisheries', which categorizes all fisheries into higher, first and second category; and the 'Rules for the protection of coastal waters from pollution' (1984, Moscow), which forbid discharge of any waste into waters of the higher fisheries category. Perhaps the most controversial law related to the development of the Sakhalin offshore oil and gas products is the Law on Production Sharing (1995, revised 1999) which regulates the relationship between the Russian Federation and investors during the exploration and production of mineral resources in the Russian Federation. Critics of the PSAs, who include environmentalists, economists, journalists, the former head of Sakhalinmorneftegas, A. Chemiy, and the Sakhalin representative in the federal duma, I. Zhdakaev, consider the system of Production Sharing to provide inadequate benefits to local communities, indeed to the Russian side in general. In 2000 the Russian Federation Auditing Chamber issued a three-hundred-page report detailing the ways in which the PSAs are not profitable for the Russian government. On 20 December 2000, a group of scientists from the Sakhalin Institute of Sea Geology and Geophysics wrote a letter to President Putin expressing concern over the foreign control of the projects anq the lack of expected benefits to local Sakhalin communities (Appeal, 20.12.00). According to the Sakhalin-2 project PSA, all the production goes first to SEIC until the company has covered its investment costs. After that, 90% goes to the consortium and 10% to Russia. Only after the project has then started to make 17 .5% profit will the Russian side start to receive a larger share of the profits, which will be about 50% (split between the Federation and Sakhalin region). Sakhalin Energy estimates this to occur round about 2017-2019. However Sakhalin scientists are not convinced that this will happen. In their appeal, they note that the technical­ economic justification for Sakhalin-2 determines profitability to be -0.35% and predicts that investment costs will never be recuperated (Appeal, 20.12.00). Steiner (2000: 350) also warns of the danger that oil companies may 'bury' their profits in order to avoid payments and taxes, as they have done in Alaska and elsewhere. 229 In accordance with the PSA Law (Article 13), the Sakhalin projects have been freed from their federal tax obligations, apart from the royalty (only 6 percent) and profit tax (32 percent once profit is being made). The projects have likewise been freed from regional and district taxes. This means that tax holidays have been granted to multinationals such as Shell and Exxon, rather than to struggling reindeer herding and fishing enterprises and small farms. In theory, the lack of direct benefits is compensated by the payment of 'Bonuses' at strategic points in project development (total US$45 million) and by the Sakhalin Development Fund (total US$100 million). As the Sakhalin-2 project celebrated the first oil from Molikpaq in July 1999, Sakhalin received the third payment to the Development Fund (US$20 million) and the start of royalty payments. In October 1999 SEIC paid the first installment of compensation, totaling approximately US$160 million, for previous geological exploration work (50% to the federal, 50% to the regional budget). However, at the same time they claimed back US$23 million of VAT that they had paid previously in contradiction to their PSA (Wilson 2000: 283). 230 Appendix Ill: Analysis of Survey Towards the end of my fieldwork period in Noglikskii District in 1999, I undertook a survey of local people to elicit information about their use of natural resources, attitudes towards the authorities, opinions about the offshore projects and people's feelings about the future. Below I analyse the results of this questionnaire. I compare my own results in places to the results of research carried out in Yuzhno-Sakhalinsk by Akaha and Vassilieva to investigate views of Sakhalin citizens towards the offshore oil and gas developments (Akaha and Vassilieva 2000, 2001; Vassilieva 2000). I collected a total of 223 completed forms out of approximately 250 distributed. This was a total of 200 responses from Nogliki and 23 from Val. This is a fairly representative sample of the adult population of Nogliki (pop. 12,300) while the questionnaires from Val were able to provide me with useful comparative information as they were entirely filled out by members of the reindeer herding community (herders and their families). I personally administered some questionnaires, left others at schools or offices for people to fill out themselves and others were distributed and collected by friends. Thus the questionnaires were administered unevenly but covered a fairly broad range of social levels and occupations, including the unemployed. I consider the sample valid if not 100% representative. There is a bias towards (female Russian) teachers in the sample, for example, as I left questionnaires at three local schools and another educational establishment. There is also a bias towards the indigenous populations ~s my assistants who distributed the questionnaire were Nivkhi. Twenty-three percent of my Nogliki respondents were Native, as opposed to only 7% of the whole population of the district. All of the Val respondents were indigenous. One disadvantage of a survey is the lack of opportunity for follow-up questions, particularly if the researcher is unable to administer all the questionnaires personally. I did not have the opportunity, for example, to ask people about the nature of the protests that involved petitions or signature collection, or about the exact places where 231 they practice resource use. When I administered questionnaires myself I was able to ask further questions and I took additional notes. This is not reflected in the aggregated results, but some of this information appears in the ethnography. Due to the way that I processed the results, I did not allow the opportunity to compare the results of people of different occupation, age group, level of education. I avoided making the survey a central part of my thesis because the reservations I have about survey results (e.g. bias and representativeness) and my own limitations (time limitations, lack of experience in surveying, etc.). However, the analysis below reveals tendencies and opinions that support observations that I made in the field. Question-by-question commentary 1. Age: The respondents were mostly adult. There were two respondents under 18 years of age. The sample included five 'non-working pensioners'. 2. Gender: There were far more female respondents (182 or 81.5%) than male respondents (41 or 18.5%). This is partly due to the high number of female teachers and is partly an indication that women are more likely to fill out questionnaires than men. I analysed male and female responses separately. 3. Marital status: I did not use this category in my analysis. It would have been useful to ask a question about ethnicity of spouse or partner, as this clearly influences the type of natural resource use practiced in the family. As it was, I could only assume that some female Russian respondents had male Native partners. 1 4. Nationality: For the purpose of analyses I divided responses into Native and non­ Native categories as well as according to gender. Among Native respondents there were Nivkhi, Orocho_ny and Evenki. Among the non-Native respondents were Russians,2 Ukrainians, Tatars, Belorussians, Koreans, Chuvash, with one Ossetian and one Mordvin. 5. Place of birth: Non-Native respondents came from other parts of Siberia, from Western Russia, the Ukraine, Central Asia, etc. Native respondents may have 1 E.g. a Russian woman who seasonally lives in the coastal area and gives the Association of Native People a high score in question 26. 2 One Russian female respondent added: 'We are all mixed race.' come from western or southern Sakhalin, but most were born in Noglikskii district. 232 6. When did you move to Noglikskii district: I did not use this question or question 5 in the analysis. 7. Education: (see below). 8. Speciality: Question 7 and 8 were not used in my analysis. It is interesting to consider the difference between the specialities people have and the jobs that they are doing, but it was not directly relevant to my analysis. 9. Occupation: A range of occupations were represented, including 45 teachers (the largest professional group), 11 shop assistants, 9 workers from the onshore oil and gas industry, 8 resource use officials, 4 journalists, 3 heads of clan enterprises, 13 housewives and 26 unemployed people. While it seems to be a fairly broad range, the responses to questions 27 and 29 suggest that those who responded to the questionnaire are the type of people who also tend to vote. 10. Do you plan to retrain for the oil industry?: Twenty-five percent of respondents did not respond to this question. Just under 25% said that they did not plan to retrain for the oil industry, while 22% said that they wanted to but there were no opportunities. Only 6.5 % were planning to retrain; all of these were from Nogliki. 11. What is your level of income?: I did not use this question in the analysis. 12. What property do you own?: Over 50% of respondents (and 59% of Native respondents) wrote that they owned a garden plot. Non-Native people tended to own flats (25%) rather than houses (16%), while Native people tended to own houses (33%) rather than flats (7% ).3 Forty percent of non-Native respondents owned cars, while only 6% of Native respondents did. Native and non-Native residents owned boats and kept animals. 13. What is the most seriQus natural resource use problem in the district?: This was an open question with no choices of response offered. It came before a number of specific questions about the offshore oil projects, which may have influenced people' s response if they read these questions before completing the questionnaire, but this was not evident from the results. Less than 2% cited the offshore oil projects as the most serious problem. However, 27% cited the oil and 3 Native houses tend to be in the poorer 'kolkhoz ' area of town, while an increasing number of (mostly non-Native) residents are building their own houses on the outskirts of town near the railway station and the airport. This difference between Native and non-Native houses does not emerge in the survey. 233 gas industry and oil pollution as the biggest problem. This was by far the largest group of people who expressed an opinion. Other major issues included forest fires (18% ), fishing (fish quotas, poaching, over-fishing) (7 .5% ), logging (7% ), water pollution (6%) and the gas fired power station (2.5% ). Five people (2.5%) stated that ecology was the biggest resource use issue. Only two people cited traditional resource use as a major problem. 4 Three respondents stated that the major problem was people's irresponsible attitudes towards nature, while four responded that inadequate control from the administration and regulators was the biggest problem. Other complaints included unsustainable use of resources and people thinking only of their own profit. Some respondents also cited low wages, unemployment and social problems as resource use issues (they may lead to poaching, etc.). One respondent noted that inappropriate berry picking techniques were damaging to the environment. Some people noted several resource use problems, while 37% of respondents found this a difficult (or irrelevant) question and ignored it. 14. What types of natural resource use do you or your family practice?: This question had a very good response. Even people who answered almost no questions at all tended to answer this one. Virtually all respondents (and/ or their families) gather NTFPs, particularly mushrooms (92%) and berries (95.5%). The separate figures for Native users are also high (87% and 94% respectively). Other NTFPs gathered in the district include: wild onion (67% ), fern (52% ),5 pine nuts (37%) and medicinal plants (27% ). Twenty-one percent of respondents practice hunting, 65% practice fishing and 74% cultivate garden plots.6 Figures for Native respondents are: hunting - 23%; fishing - 75%; and garden plots - 72%. Other resource use activities included animal husbandry (including reindeer herding for four of the Val respondents), dog breeding and wood carving. One respondent mentioned collection local spring water, which many local residents do, but no others mentioned. Some respondents did not include hunting and fishing in their answer to this question, but then wrote that they hunt and fish in the eastern coastal area (question 19). The responses to this question referred to the respondent and/ or their family so it is difficult to extrapolate gender differences. 4 One of these was a male respondent from Val who wrote 'They don't let Native people live freely.' 5 One Russian female respondent noted that one has to travel to find fem . 6 Compare to figure of 50% who own a garden plot. I' However, from my observation, resource gathering trips and garden plot cultivation often take place together with the family. 234 15. Do you process the products from domestic production?: A significant number (89%) of respondents process their products; 93% store processed or unprocessed products for the family; 30% give products to relatives; 15% give them to friends and acquaintances. Only 9 people said that they sell the products, of these 7 were Native women. 16. Do you tell the tax inspector if you sell produce?: I suspect some people misunderstood this question and wrote 'no' if they do not sell products. Only 3 people admitted to telling the tax inspector. However, we do not know in what quantities people sell their produce. 17. What percentage of your food consumption is made up of what foods?: This was also difficult for people to answer, as some people understood the percentages to refer to a total of 100%, others interpreted it differently, resulting in scores totalling well over 100%. However, a general picture of consumption can be seen which corresponds to my own observations. Thus fish is more important to local diets than meat, and this is more the case for Native people, with 24% choosing the highest percentage category for fish, than for non-Native people, of whom 12% chose the highest category. Potatoes are the most popular food, with 39% of Native and 39.5% of non-Native respondents putting them in the highest percentage category. The tables reveal that potatoes are more important than grains (rice, buckwheat) and bread in local diets. 18. How often do you visit the eastern coast (bays, forest, rivers, pastures)? This question would have been more interesting if I could have followed it up with more detailed questions, such as where exactly people visit (names of bays, forests, rivers, etc). It ':Vould also be useful to map these patterns of resource use, both for Native and for non-Native resource users. One respondent underlined 'forest' and 'rivers' as if to emphasise that she does not visit the bays. Another underlined all but the pastures. However, all other responses are geographically unspecific. What these responses demonstrate is the fact that the eastern coastal zone is intensively used by a large proportion of the population, both Native and non-Native resource users. Only three respondents claimed to live seasonally on 235 the bays.7 Of the respondents, 17.5% claimed that they visit the eastern coastal area 'allthe time', which could imply 'often' or 'every week'. 8 More male than female respondents said that they visited the area 'all the time': 16% of Native female respondents 15% of non-Native female respondents compared to 25% of Native male respondents and 45% of non-Native male respondents. However, this category was very close to the category 'only in the fishing season', which could also imply 'often'. Twelve percent of the respondents (27 people) said that they visited the coastal area in the fishing season; of these, 22 people were Native (8 male and 14 female). Nine percent of Native respondents said they hardly ever visited the bays, compared to 15% of non-Native respondents who hardly ever visited. The majority of respondents (50%) visited the coastal area 'sometimes' (37.5% of Native respondents, 56% of non-Native respondents and 60% of non­ Native female respondents). 19. What do you do in the eastern coastal area?: Collection of NTFPs is the most popular activity, practised by 68.5% of the respondents. Sixty-five percent used the coastal area for leisure. This figure is lower among Native respondents (48%) and higher among non-Native respondents (73% ). Sixteen percent of Native respondents and 9.5% of non-Native respondents used the area for hunting. Nine percent use the area for tourism. 9 The four herders from Val used the area for herding. Other respondents used the area for ethnographic research (1 person), haymaking (1) and sketching (1). 20. Do the offshore projects pose a threat to your environment and livelihoods?: This question is clearly loaded: a more neutral question may have elicited a more neutral response. In retrospect I would have posed a question about impacts of the offshore projects, and offered categories for open ended comments about expected impacts (environme11t, livelihoods, local economy, community, personal). This would entail merging question 20 with question 22. The result of my question 20 was that 74% of respondents answered that the offshore projects posed a threat to their environment and livelihoods. This was virtually the same for Native and non-Native respondents. Threats included: marine and river pollution (20.5%); oil spills (20.5% ); ecological damage (17.5% ); threats to fish (12.5% ). Five Native 7 One of these was the Russian Woman mentioned above who appears to have a Native husband. 8 The categories for this question should have been more specific ('every week', 'one a month', etc.) 236 respondents and one non-Native respondent were concerned about threats to marine mammals. Four people were concerned about drilling waste disposal. Three Native women from Val were were concerned about damage to berry and mushroom gathering grounds and about reindeer getting shot. Other concerns raised included threats to birds, air pollution, soil pollution, fires, destruction of reindeer pastures and forests. One Native male from Nogliki objected to encroachment on Native lands due to industrial work related to the offshore projects. Two female Russian teachers were concerned about what happens when oil is pumped out of a rock formation leaving a vacuum. 10 Two (female, Russian) teachers responded that the threat from the offshore projects is 'very great, because no one is answerable for anything.' One female Russian respondent wrote as her response: 'Yes and no - the work is supposed to be carried out with care for the environment'. According to Akaha and Vassilieva' s study, 51 % of their Yuzhno-Sakhalinsk respondents (36 people) were concerned about environmental problems, including: oil spills (34% ), oil dumping, drilling waste disposal, and damage to fisheries. Five people expressed concern that environmental damage and violation of federal laws were not made public (2001: 40). 21. If you discover serious environmental pollution, who do you turn to first of all?: This question was meant to demonstrate who local people felt was responsible for environmental protection. Most people felt that the district committee of ecology was responsible (34% ), although they did not always know its proper name. Others felt that they should tum to the district administration (27% ). 11 Some people suggested publicising such incidents: four people (1.5%) said they would make the incident public, nine people ( 4%) said that they would tum to an ecological organisation (e.g. Greenpeace), 5 people (2%) said that they would tell the local_ newspaper. Only two people mentioned Eko-Shelf, the ecological company working on the offshore projects, who have an office in Nogliki. Only one person mentioned SakhBASU, the oil spill response team that is training local people in Noglikskii district to respond to offshore oil spill incidents. Several respondents demonstrated a lack of faith in local institutions to help out in such an event. Six people (2.5%) said they would not tum to anyone. 9 The Russian 'turizm' can mean tourism or hiking. It is unclear what respondents had in mind when they chose this category, but I know that some respondents do organise tours for clients in this area. 10 This has been linked to earthquakes in the media. 237 Four people (1.5%) wrote responses similar to: 'There is no one to tum to, it would be useless.' Seven people (3%) wrote that they didn't know. Forty-one people (18%) made no response to the question. One (female Russian) teacher responded: 'No one cares. (Nikomu eto ne nuzhno),' while another wrote 'No one cares, they would look at me as if I was mad ( U nas nikomu eto ne nuzhno, na menya posmotryat kak na bolnuyu).' 22. What benefits have the offshore projects brought and what could they bring?: These questions provoked the greatest lack of response of all: 52% of respondents did not answer the question about present benefits, while 50.5% did not answer the question about future benefits. 12 The most obvious benefit that people had felt from the projects was job creation (cited by 14% ). 13 Other benefits included: local socio-economic development (3 people); clients and markets (2 people); regional economic development (1 person); Bonus payments (1 person). One person remembered the money from Exxon which had gone towards refurbishing the Nogliki museum. Some people took the opportunity to complain about the lack of benefits so far. Responses included: nothing for us (2 people); benefits only to those working on the projects (2); benefits only to oligarchs or those in power (2). Three women from Val wrote: 'No benefits only unemployment'. Others wrote responses such as: 'pollution'; 'plundering of Native heritage'; 'small spills' ; 'we haven't received our wages for half a year'; 'lack of petrol in the district' .14 Nineteen percent of respondents felt there had been no benefits and wrote 'nothing', while 2% wrote 'don't know'. The Native respondents were more negative, with 24.5% having observed no benefits from the projects so far, compared to 17% of non-Native respondents; male respondents (29%) were more negative than female respondents (17%) about present benefits. 15 Of Akah~ and Vassilieva's respondents in their Yuzhno-Sakhalinsk survey, 54% said they had observed benefits (mostly jobs and benefits to the regional budget), while 40% said they had observed no benefits and 6% did not answer the question. Seven percent mentioned foreign investment as a benefit, 11 This includes the department of emergency situations at the district administration. 12 In some cases this was because the response for one question appeared to refer to both. 13 Some respondents wrote 'only jobs' . 14 These were counted as 'nothing ' responses. 15 Akaha and Vassilieva (2001) noted that women responded more negatively to the offshore projects than men. while 6% cited funding for educational programmes and 6% cited funding for social programmes (2001: 40). Benefits expected in the future included: jobs (9%);16 local socio-economic benefit (3% ); money into the district budget (2.5% ); regional economic development (1 % ); infrastructure and services (1 % ); increased living standards 238 (1 % ). Other benefits included: oil processing (1 person), export of products (1), gasification of Sakhalin (1). Other responses included: 'The Americans might give us some money'; 'Life will be a bit better'; 'Nothing for me and my family'. Others wrote instead of possible benefits, 'death to nature', 'nothing, only ecological damage' .17 Four people responded 'I don't know', while 16.5% (37 people) answered that they did not expect any benefits. Expectations for the future were virtually the same for Native and non-Native respondents. However, more male respondents (24%) than female respondents (15%)expected no benefits in the future. I understood from the responses that my questionnaire had not given people an adequate opportunity to list the negative aspects of the projects as they saw them. In Akaha and Vassilieva's survey 81 % of respondents cited negative impacts from the projects, while 88.5% expected negative effects in the future. Environmental concerns dominated (see question 20) but other concerns included: the excessive influence of foreign companies and foreigners (including control of future projects, hiring of foreign specialists); 18 fear that income from the offshore projects would escape the local economy; concern about corruption in the local and regional administrations and enterprises; a lack of information about the projects. There was generally not enough space for people to express such concerns in my questionnaire, though the same concerns are reflected in the local newspaper and kitchen table conversations. 23. What alternative development options are there for the district apart from the offshore projects?: This question provoked a broad range of suggestions about development options for the district. These included: fishing and fish 16 Akaha and Vassilieva (2001) also noted from the results of their Yuzhno-Sakhalinsk survey that 'employment was by far the most prevalent hope among the citizens of Yuzhno-Sakhalinsk' in relation to the future of the offshore projects. They also noted that many people's expectations tended to be hopes rather than based on fact (2001: 39). 17 These were counted as 'nothing' responses. , I 239 processing (31 % ); logging and timber processing (25.5%); tourism (5% ); oil and gas processing (3% ); animal husbandry (2% ); NTFP processing (2% ); renewable resource use (2% ). Some suggested more focus on the onshore oil industry (3 people), others suggested the local oil company should develop the offshore projects (3 people). Other suggestions included farming, hunting, fur production, various factories (including furniture, footwear, textiles), processing of garden plot produce, mineral springs for health, private enterprise. Six percent of respondents said that there were alternatives, without suggesting any; 19% said there were no alternatives to the offshore projects; while 22% made no response. 24. Have you taken part in decision-making on natural resource management?: The majority of people (58%) had not taken part in decision-making; 10% made no response to the question. Fourteen percent had collected signatures; 12.5% had attended public hearings; 9.5% had joined in the writing of a petition. Five people had made a complaint to court (zhaloba); 19 four people had been involved in decision-making through work; two people had handed out leaflets (listovki). People who did one thing tended to do one or more of the other activities, too. 25. What public, religious, political, sport or professional organisation are you a member of?: Most respondents did not belong to any organisation (56.5% ); and 24% made no response. Of the organisations that people were members of, the most popular were sports organisations (4% ); the teachers' union (3.5% );20 indigenous groups (the Association of Indigenous Peoples, the Nivkh Union and the Native Youth Union) (2%). Three respondents were members of the Communist party; three were members of religious groups; four were members of Sakhalin Environment Watch. 26. How effectively do the following people or organisations defend your interests?: This questjon was very difficult to reply and to assess, as people had very different interpretations of the numbering system. I have therefore only used positive scores (3,4,5) for the analysis. What the results do demonstrate is that people feel their interests are represented and defended better than their friends and relatives than by people in power. The further away from power, the less faith 18 On the other hand, 70% of Akaha and Vassilieva' s respondents felt that development of international ties through the Sakhalin projects brought benefits to Sakhalin (investment, enhanced status, employment opportunities, better salaries, infrastructure improvements, etc.) 19 One female Russian respondent noted that she did not think her complaint to court could be counted as 'taking part in decision-making' . 240 people have in a person's or institution's ability to defend their interests. In general; local representatives are perceived as defending local people's interests more than national leaders. However, Native respondents demonstrated a much greater faith in the President and the federal duma. 21 People tended to give the resource regulatory organs high scores at random, and I interpret this as being related to people's personal experiences with specific agencies and officials. The Association of Indigenous Peoples got some high scores, but not from many people, which supports the idea that the Association does not represent the interests of the broader Native community. The local newspaper consistently got high scores, while the school and the boss at work often gained high scores (again depending on personal experience, e.g. if employed or if children at school). The highest scores were for relatives, then for friends and acquaintances, demonstrating that kinship networks are still stronger than friendship networks,22 but that both are very important in local society. Even so, some respondents seemed to feel that the question 'defend your interests' was not appropriate to the categories friends and relatives, and thus left those spaces blank despite filling in the others. 27. Did you vote in the following elections?: The election turn-out of my respondents (55-72%) was good. Despite demonstrating considerable cynicism towards (formal) politics in the questionnaires (low participation in decision­ making, low scores for political figures in question 26, individual comments, lack of faith in authorities to deal with environmental issues), these respondents have retained their faith in the process of elected representation (see also below). 28. Have you ever stood as a candidate for the local council?: Nineteen respondents (8%) had stood for the council. Of these three were Native (4% of Native respondents) and 16 were non-Native (10% of non-Native respondents). 29. Will you vote in 1999 and 2000?: Sixty-nine percent wrote that they would vote in the next elections. One (Russian, female) teacher expressed her sense of disillusionment in the voting process: 'I don't believe in anyone, everything is bought and sold ( vse kupleno i prodano ). ' 20 Two teachers wrote 'union' in response to question 26 but did not mention it in question 25. 21 This is probably related to the passing of federal legislation in favour of indigenous rights. 22 Compare also to question 15, where distribution of domestic produce serves to uphold these networks. l' 241 30. How do you think living standards will be in Noglikskii district in 10 years' time?: People tended to be pessimistic about the future, with 30 percent indicating they believed things would get much worse, and only 6% believing things would get much better.23 Twenty-eight percent believed things would get 'better, but not much better'; 6% believed things would get 'worse, but not much worse'; 22% anticipated no change; 5% made no response. A Russian woman who felt in future things would get 'better but not much better', wrote at the bottom of her questionnaire 'I want my Sakhalin to flourish! We have to live here, and our children and grandchildren.' 23 One (female Russian) respondent followed her 'much better' with 'I hope'. II I 242 A. NOGLIKINATIVEFEMALE Total responses: 37 4. Nationality Nivkh: 32 Orochon (Uil' ta, Orok): 2 Evenk: 2 Russian: Ukrainian: Tatar: Belorussian: Korean: Chuvash: Mordvin: Ossetian: Unknown: 1 9. What is your job? Accountant Teacher Local oil and Offshore oil Librarian Shop / kiosk Shop Tax gas industry prqjects assistant manager insoector 6 2 1 1 Kolklwz 'Val' herding Director of clan Seasonal hunting, Cow Private Ethnographer Vostok enterprise enterprise fishing herd entrepreneur 2 1 1 l District District Resource use Hospital (non- Childminder l(jndergarten Children's administration council reirulator medical) supervisor home carer Lawyer School laboratory Technician Hotel Production Church Fitter/ assistant (school) manager engineer assistant construction 1 I Laundry worker Printing house Metalworker Journalist Bread factory Part-time waitress Seamstress Driver Artist Cleaner Communications Electrician Mechanic Militia 1 1 Bank worker. Economist Secretary Nurse Postal worker Choreographer Cook 2 2 Guard Housewife Student/ at school Unemployed Pensioner Invalid 7 l 4 2 2 10. Do you plan to retrain for work in an oil company? Plan to Don't Ian to · Want to but no o ortunities No res onse 3 18 8 7 12. What property do you have? House Aat Gara e Car Motorbike Tractor Boat Cow(s) Deer Horses 12 4 2 Sheep Goats Poultry Dacha · Garden Hunting Fishing Nothing No Response plot dogs equipment 18 9 3 243 13. What do you think are the most serious natural resource use problems in the district? Forest fires, Timber industry, Gas fired power Oil and gas industry, Offshore oil Other industry regeneration loe:!!ing station pollution projects 6 3 10 I Fishing, fish limits, No fish in the Assistance for Hunting of Hunting Indigenous rights, poaching shops reindeer herding reindeer traditional resource use 10 l Ecology NTFPs Poor quality Water Other Low Social Unemployment drinking water pollution pollution wages problems 2 I l l 1 l Poaching Inadequate control/ attention from nature Oil and gas used without the Unsustainable use protection organs and administration agreement of local residents of resources Damaging techniques of People think only of Irresponsible attitudes Don't know No response berry-picking own profit to nature l 10 14. What types of natural resource use do you or your family practice? (a) NTFP gathering: Mushrooms Berries Wild Pine nuts Fern Medicinal Burdock Dried None onion plants flowers 37 37 25 32 17 11 1 (b) other types: Hunting Fishing Garden plot Reindeer Dogs Other Wood Spring Nothing cultivation herding animals carving water 6 28 29 l 1 1 15.1 Do you process the products? Yes 33 15.2 What do you do with processed (or unprocessed) products? Store for family Sell Give to relatives Give to friends & ac uaintances 34 6 13 5 16. If you sell products, do you inform the tax inspector? Yes No No response 24 12 244 17. What percentage of your food consumption is made up of the following? Meat Fish Vegetables Berries Potatoes Grains (inc.rice) Bread 10% or less 20 2 15 11 1 3 1 10-25% 5 9 9 6 7 8 4 25-50% 7 12 7 8 6 12 7 50% or more 11 4 20 11 21 18. How often do you visit the eastern coast (bays, forest, rivers, pastures)? All the time Live seasonal! On! in fishin season Sometimes Hardi ever No res onse 5 2 11 15 4 19. What do you do there? Fishing Hunting NTFPs Tourism Leisure Reindeerh Research/ Haymaking Drawing erding work 16 3 30 2 20 1 1 20.1 Do the offshore projects pose a threat to your environment and livelihoods? Yes No Don't know No more than in other countries No res onse 32 20.2 What are the threats from the offshore projects? Coastal, river, & Threat to Drilling waste Oil spills Threat to marine Destruction of Fires sea pollution fish disposal mammals pastures 15 11 10 5 1 1 Destruction of ecosystems & Destruction of Loss of berries, Reindeer will Threat to birds bioresources forests mushrooms be shot 2 1 1 Air Cutting Pumping oil out creates Threat Ecological damage, Encroachment on Native pollution the forest vaccuum in rock to soils pollution lands 21. If you discover serious environmental pollution, who do you turn to first of all? Committee of District or · pepartment of District The public Ecological Ecology village emergency situations council organisations (e.g. administration (administration) Greenpeace) 20 7 1 I I Forest Sakhbasu ( oil Fish The (oil) The regional nature Militia Eko-Shelf service spill response inspectorate company protection prosecutor ecological service) responsible company I Newspaper Emergency The UN God There is no one to Noone Don't No telephone '02' turn to/ it's use! ess know response 2 1 9 245 22.1 What benefits have the offshore projects brought? Regional economic Bonus payments Local socio-economic Taxes Jobs development development/ stabilisation 1 3 Clients / markets Money to refurbish No benefits only Benefits only to oligarchs and those museum (Exxon) unemployment in oower 1 Benefits only for those who work Nothing for us 'Yes' Don't know Nothing No response on offshore projects 1 13 19 22.2 What benefits could they bring in the future? Regional economic Local socio-economic Money into district Infrastructure Jobs development develooment budget development/ services 3 2 Increased living Increase in income for Oil Increase in regional fuel-energy Gasification of standards those with iobs processing capacity and export of products Sakhalin Americans might give Life will be a bit Nothing for me Don't 'Yes' Nothing No response us some money better and my fami ly know 9 21 23. What alternative development options are there for the district apart from the offshore projects? Fishing, fish Fish Tourism Logging, timber Reindeer Farming Hunting Animal processing farming processing herding husbandry 11 l 1 8 l l 1 Offshore Onshore oil Oil and gas Gas pipeline Oil extraction Gas fired power Transport development by industry processing to the south for Russia station local company 2 2 l Various Furniture Footwear Textile Production Fur production Native crafts and factories factory factory factory souvenirs l 1 Renewable / clean Mineral springs NTFPs Processing of garden Free economic Good resource use for health processing plot produce zone roads Private ente rise Don't know Yes Nothin No res onse 2 6 14 24. Have you taken part in decision-making on natural resource management? If so, how? Petition Collectin si atures Demonstration Strike Public hearin s Com -laint to court 6 8 Leaflets Conference Discussions Job District soviet Yes Not taken No response (committee) part l 18 6 246 25. What public, religious, political, sport, professional organisations are you a member of? Sport Teachers' Oil workers ' Journalists' Association of Native Youth Union Union Union Native People Union l 1 3 l English teachers' Communist Religious Sakhalin Environment District circle party Watch council 2 26. How effectively do the following people or organisations defend your interests? 5-very well 4-well President Federal duma 3=3, 4=1, 5=5 3=8, 4=3, 5=2 Native rep District mayor (admin) 3=10, 4=4 3=5,4=2,5=2 Fish inspectorate Hunting specialist 4=1, 5=2 3=2,5=1 3 - satisfactorily 2-badly Governor 3=10, 4=2 District council 3=2,4=3 Land committee 3=5,5=1 1-notat all 0 - difficult to answer Regional duma Regional administration 3=14 3=7,4=3 District Village administration administration 3=4,4=2 3=3 Local newspaper Militia 3=8,4=9,5=6 3=4,4=2,5=1 Nivkh Union 1 None No response 14 14 Native rep (duma) 3=8,4=8,5=2 Ecological committee 3=4,4=3,5=1 School 3=1, 4= 11, 5=5 Boss at work Association of Friends and Relatives Other public organisation Native peoples acquaintances 3=6,4=5,5=3 3=6,4=2,5=7 3=3, 4=11, 5=9 3=6, 4=3, 5=13 3=7,4=1 27. Did you vote in the following elections? (yes responses) District council District ma or Re · onal duma Governor Federal duma President 16 18 17 16 16 24 28. Have you ever stood as a candidate for the local council? Yes No I ~o response 31 29. Will you vote in 1999 and 2000? 24 10 I Don't know I ~o response Yes No 30. How do you think living standards in your district will be in 10 years' time? Much better Better, but not much Much worse Worse, but not much No chan e No res onse 4 9 10 3 7 4 247 B. NOGLIKI NATIVE MALE Total responses: 9 4. Nationality Nivkh: 8 Orochon (Uil'ta, Orok): Evenk: l Russian: Ukrainian: Tatar: Belorussian: Korean: Chuvash: Mordvin: Ossetian: Unknown: 9. What is your job? Accountant Teacher Local oil and Offshore oil Librarian Shop / kiosk Shop Tax gas industry oroiects assistant manager insoector 2 Kolkhoz 'Val' herding Director of clan Seasonal hunting, Cow Private Ethnographer Vostok enterprise enterprise fishing herd entrepreneur I District District Resource use Hospital (non- Childminder Kindergarten Children's administration council regulator medical) supervisor home carer Lawyer School laboratory Technician Hotel Production Church Fitter/ assistant (school) manager engineer assistant construction I Laundry worker Printing house Metalworker Journalist Bread factory Part-time waitress Seamstress Driver Artist Cleaner Communications Electrician Mechanic Militia Bank worker Economist Secretary Nurse Postal worker Choreographer Cook Guard Housewife Student/ at school Unemployed Pensioner Invalid 3 10. Do you plan to retrain for work in an oil company? Plan to Don't Ian to Want to but no o ortunities No res onse 2 3 3 12. What property do you have? House Flat Gara e Car Motorbike Tractor Boat Cow(s) Deer Horses 6 3 5 Sheep Goats Poultry Dacha Garden Hunting Fishing Nothing No Response plot dogs equipment 7 I I 248 13. What do you think are the most serious natural resource use problems in the district? Forest fires, Timber industry, Gas fired power Oil and gas industry, Offshore oil Other industry regeneration loe:cing station pollution projects 1 4 I Fishing, fish limits, No fish in the Assistance for Hunting of Hunting Indigenous rights, poaching shops reindeer herding reindeer traditional resource use 2 I Ecology NTFPs Poor quality Water Other Low Social Unemployment drinking water pollution pollution wages problems Poaching Inadequate control/ attention from nature Oil and gas used without the Unsustainable use protection organs and administration agreement of local residents of resources Damaging techniques of People think only of Irresponsible attitudes Don't know No response berry-picking own profit to nature 14. What types of natural resource use do you or your family practice? (a) NTFP gathering: Mushrooms Berries Wild Pine nuts Fem Medicinal Burdock Dried None onion plants flowers 8 8 8 8 7 4 I (b) other types: Hunting Fishing Garden plot Reindeer Dogs Other Wood Spring Nothing cultivation herding animals carving water 3 8 8 I 15.1 Do you process the products? Yes No 8 15.2 What do you do with processed (or unprocessed) products? Store for farnil Sell Give to relatives Give to friends & ac uaintances 7 5 2 16. If you sell products, do you inform the tax inspector? Yes No I ~o response 7 249 17. What percentage of your food consumption is made up of the following? Meat Fish Vegetables Berries Potatoes Grains (inc. rice) Bread 10% or less 5 I 4 5 I 2 10-25% 3 2 l 2 5 4 2 25-50% 3 l l l 2 2 50% or more 3 3 2 18. How often do you visit the eastern coast (bays, forest, rivers, pastures)? All the time Live seasonal! On! in fishin season Sometimes Hardi ever No res onse 3 5 19. What do you do there? Fishing Hunting NTFPs Tourism Leisure Reindeerh Research/ Haymaking Drawing erding work 8 4 6 I 6 20.1 Do the offshore projects pose a threat to your environment and livelihoods? Yes No Don' t know No more than in other countries No res onse 7 20.2 What are the threats from the offshore projects? Coastal, river, & Threat to Drilling waste Oil spills Threat to marine Destruction of Fires sea pollution fish disposal mammals pastures 2 2 3 Destruction of ecosystems & Destruction of Loss of berries, Reindeer will Threat to birds bioresources forests mushrooms be shot Air Cutting Pumping oil out creates Threat Ecological damage, Encroachment on Native pollution the forest vaccuum in rock to soils pollution lands l l 21. If you discover serious environmental pollution, who do you turn to first of all? Committee of District or Department of District The public Ecological Ecology village emergency situations council organisations (e.g. administration (administration) Greenpeace) 3 l 2 Forest Sakhbasu ( oil Fish The (oil) The regional nature Militia Eko-Shelf service spill response inspectorate company protection prosecutor ecological service) resoonsible company Newspaper Emergency The UN God There is no one to Noone Don' t No telephone '02' tum to/ it's useless know response I l 2 250 22.1 What benefits have the offshore projects brought? Regional economic Bonus payments Local socio-economic Taxes Jobs development development/ stabilisation 1 I Clients / markets Money to refurbish No benefits only Benefits only to oligarchs and those museum (Exxon) unemployment in power Benefits only for those who work Nothing for us 'Yes' Don't know Nothing No response on offshore projects 1 2 5 22.2 What benefits could they bring in the future? Regional economic Local socio-economic Money into district Infrastructure Jobs development development budget development/ services 2 1 Increased living Increase in income for Oil Increase in regional fuel-energy Gasification of standards those with iobs processing capacity and export of products Sakhalin Americans might give Life will be a bit Nothing for me Don't 'Yes' Nothing No response us some money better and my fami ly know 6 23. What alternative development options are there for the district apart from the offshore projects? Fishing, fish Fish Tourism Logging, timber Reindeer Farming Hunting Animal processing farming processing herding husbandry 5 3 Offshore Onshore oil Oil and gas Gas pipeline Oil extraction Gas fired power Transport development by industry processing to the south for Russia station local company Various Furniture Footwear Textile Production Fur production Native crafts and factories factory factory factory souvenirs Renewable/ clean Mineral springs NTFPs Processing of garden Free economic Good resource use for health processing plot produce zone roads I Private ente rise Don't know Yes Nothin No res onse 2 24. Have you taken part in decision-making on natural resource management? If so, how? Petition Collectin si atures Demonstration Strike Public hearin s Com laint to court 3 Leaflets Conference Discussions Job District soviet Yes Not taken No response (committee) part 6 251 25. Wliat public, religious, political, sport, professional organisations are you a member of? Sport Teachers' Oil workers' Journalists' Association of Native Youth Union Union Union Native People Union English teachers' Communist Religious Sakhalin Environment District circle party Watch council I 26. How effectively do the following people or organisations defend your interests? President 5=3 Native rep (admin) 3=5,5=1 5-very well 4-well Federal duma 4=1, 5=2 District mayor 3=1, 5=1 Fish inspectorate Hunting specialist 3=2,5=1 3=3,5=1 3 - satisfactorily 2-badly Governor 3=4,5=1 District council 5=1 Land committee 3=1, 5=1 I -not at all 0 - difficult to answer Regional duma Regional administration 3=1, 5=1 3=1,5=1 District Village administration administration 3=1, 5=1 3=1 Local newspaper Militia 3=3,4=3,5=2 5=1 Nivkh Union None No response 5 3 Native rep (durna) 3=2,4=2,5=1 Ecological committee 4=3,5=1 School 3=2,4=2, 5=1 Boss at work Association of Friends and Relatives Other public organisation Native peoples acquaintances 5=3 3=3,5=3 3=1, 4=3, 5=3 3=1, 4=3, 5=3 27. Did you vote in the following elections? (yes responses) District council District ma or Re ional duma Governor Federal duma President 2 3 4 4 3 5 28. Have you ever stood as a candidate for the local council? Yes I ~o response 29. Will you vote in 1999 and 2000? No I Don't know I ~o response 30. How do you think living standards in your district will be in 10 years' time? Much better Better, but not much Much worse Worse, but not much Nochan e No res onse 4 4 252 C. NOGLIKINON-NATIVEFEMALE Total responses: 125 4. Nationality Nivkh: Orochon (Uil'ta, Orok): Evenk: Russian: 107 Ukrainian: 9 Tatar: 1 Belorussian: 1 Korean: 2 Chuvash: 1 Mordvin: Ossetian: 1 Unknown: 3 9. What is your job? Accountant Teacher Local oil and Offshore oil Librarian Shop I kiosk Shop Tax gas industry projects assistant manager inspector 9 35 3 2 9 2 Kolkhoz 'Val' herding Director of clan Seasonal hunting, Cow Private Ethnographer Vostok enterprise enterprise fishing herd entrepreneur 3 District District Resource use Hospital (non- Childminder Kindergarten Children's administration council regulator medical) supervisor home carer 4 1 4 1 4 2 Lawyer School laboratory Technician Hotel Production Church Fitter/ assistant (school) manager engineer assistant construction 1 1 2 1 Laundry worker Printing house Metalworker Journalist Bread factory Part-time waitress 2 3 4 2 Seamstress Driver Artist Cleaner Communications Electrician Mechanic Militia 3 2 Bank worker Economist Secretary Nurse Postal worker Choreographer Cook 3 2 Guard Housewife Student/ at school Unemployed Pensioner Invalid 5 2 5 10. Do you plan to retrain for work in an oil company? Plan to Don't Ian to Want to but no o ortunities No res onse 8 11 23 34 12. What property do you have? House Flat Gara e Car Motorbike Tractor Boat Cow(s) Deer Horses 19 33 2 47 3 9 4 Sheep Goats Poultry Dacha Garden Hunting Fishing Nothing No Response plot dogs equipment 3 8 1 57 24 3 253 13. What do you think are the most serious natural resource use problems in the district? Forest fires, Timber industry, Gas fired power Oil and gas industry, Offshore oil Other industry regeneration lrnrn:ing station pollution projects 26 8 6 37 I I Fishing, fish limits, No fish in the Assistance for Hunting of Hunting Indigenous rights, poaching shops reindeer herding reindeer traditional resource use 4 I I Ecology NTFPs Poor quality Water Other Low Social Unemployment drinking water pollution pollution wages problems 2 I 10 6 Poaching Inadequate control/ attention from nature Oil and gas used without the Unsustainable use protection organs and administration agreement of local residents of resources I 3 I I Damaging techniques of People think only of Irresponsible attitudes Don't know No response berry-picking own profit to nature I I 2 46 14. What types of natural resource use do you or your family practice? (a) NTFP gathering: Mushrooms Berries Wild Pine nuts Fern Medicinal Burdock Dried None onion plants flowers 118 121 77 15 70 44 I (b) other types: Hunting Fishing Garden plot Reindeer Dogs Other Wood Spring Nothing cultivation herding animals carving water 20 70 91 9 I 2 15.1 Do you process the products? Yes No 114 5 15.2 What do you do with processed (or unprocessed) products? Store for farnil Sell Give to relatives Give to friends & ac uaintances 119 33 20 16. If you sell products, do you inform the tax inspector? Yes No No response 51 118 254 17. What percentage of your food consumption is made up of the following? Meat Fish Vegetables Berries Potatoes Grains Cine.rice) Bread 10% or less 55 31 28 42 6 36 28 10-25% 36 38 41 31 13 43 35 25-50% 9 29 23 17 37 22 20 50% or more 3 14 11 11 57 9 27 18. How often do you visit the eastern coast (bays, forest, rivers, pastures)? All the time Live seasonal) Onl in fishin season Sometimes Hardi ever No res onse 19 4 75 20 19. What do you do there? Fishing Hunting NTFPs Tourism Leisure Reindeerh Research/ Haymaking Drawing ercling work 33 5 82 15 93 1 20.1 Do the offshore projects pose a threat to your environment and livelihoods? Yes No Don't know No more than in other countries No res onse 94 10 4 11 20.2 What are the threats from the offshore projects? Coastal, river, & Threat to Drilling waste Oil spills Threat to marine Destruction of Fires sea pollution fish disposal mammals pastures 20 6 4 25 I Destruction of ecosystems & Destruction of Loss of berries, Reindeer will Threat to birds bioresources forests mushrooms be shot Air Cutting Pumping oil out creates Threat Ecological damage, Encroachment on Native pollution the forest vaccuum in rock to soils pollution lands 1 1 2 l 29 21. If you discover serious environmental pollution, who .do you turn to first of all? Committee of District or Department of District The public Ecological Ecology village emergency situations council organisations (e.g. administration (administration) Greenpeace) 35 34 4 l 2 4 Forest Sakhbasu ( oil Fish The (oil) The regional nature Militia Eko-Shelf service spill response inspectorate company protection prosecutor ecological service) responsible company 3 1 1 I 2 2 Newspaper Emergency The UN God There is no one to Noone Don't No telephone '02' tum to/ it's useless know response 2 1 I 4 2 5 21 255 22.1 What benefits have the offshore projects brought? Regional economic Bonus payments Local socio-economic Taxes Jobs development development/ stabilisation 1 l 2 1 20 Clients / markets Money to refurbish No benefits only Benefits only to oligarchs and those museum (Exxon) unemplovment in power l l 2 Benefits only for those who work Nothing for us 'Yes' Don't know Nothing No response on offshore projects 2 2 5 17 66 22.2 What benefits could they bring in the future? Regional economic Local socio-economic Money into district Infrastructure Jobs development development budget development/ services 2 3 5 2 14 Increased living Increase in income for Oil Increase in regional fuel -energy Gasification of standards those with iobs processing capacity and export of products Sakhalin 2 l l 1 Americans might give Life will be a bit Nothing for me Don't 'Yes' Nothing No response us some monev better and mv famil v know 1 l l 4 5 16 61 23. What alternative development options are there for the district apart from the offshore projects? Fishing, fish Fish Tourism Logging, timber Reindeer Farming Hunting Animal processing 45 Offshore development by local corn an farming processing herding 9 36 I Onshore oil Oil and gas Gas pipeline Oil extraction industry processing to the south for Russia 5 husbandry I 3 Gas fired power Transport station Various Furniture Footwear Textile Production Fur production Native crafts and factories factory factory factory souvenirs 1 2 1 2 Renewable/ clean Mineral springs NTFPs Processing of garden Free economic Good resource use for health processing plot produce zone roads 2 I 4 1 1 Private ente rise Don't know Yes Nothin No res onse 4 7 23 22 24. Have you taken part in decision-making on natural resource management? If so, how? Petition Collectin si atures Demonstration Strike 9 17 Leaflets Conference Discussions Job District soviet Yes Not taken No response (committee) part 2 2 3 1 1 79 10 l 256 25. What public, religious, political, sport, professional organisations are you a member or? Sport Teachers' Oil workers' Journalists' Association of Native Youth Union Union Union Native People Union 4 7 1 I English teachers' Communist Religious Sakhalin Environment District circle party Watch council 1 3 2 4 I 26. How effectively do the following people or organisations defend your interests? President 3=2 Native rep (admin) 3=10, 4=1 5-very well 4-well Federal duma 3=6,4=1 District mayor 3=25,2,5=1 Fish inspectorate Hunting specialist 3=12,4=8 3=5,4=5 3 - satisfactorily 2-badly Governor 3=24,4=2 District council 3=26,4=7,5=1 Land committee 3=12,4=4 1-not at all 0 - difficult to answer Regional duma Regional administration 3=25 3=16,4=3 District Village administration administration 3=28,4=2 3=2, 4=2 Local newspaper Militia 3=33,4=29,5=5 3=19,4=1 Nivkh Union None No response 69 22 Native rep (duma) 3=11, 4=1, 5=1 Ecological committee 3=15, 4=6, 5=2 School 3=29,4=8,5=3 Boss at work Association of Friends and Relatives Other public organisation Native peoples acquaintances 3=21, 4=22, 5=6 3=5,4=2,5=1 3=16,4=29,5=22 3=10, 4=27, 5=35 3=4,4=2 27. Did you vote in the following elections? (yes responses) District council District ma or Re · onal duma Governor Federal duma President 74 85 77 78 75 91 28. Have you ever stood as a candidate for the local council? Yes I ~~ response No 12 98 29. Will you vote in 1999 and 2000? No I ~on't know I ~o response 20 30. How do you think living standards in your district will be in 10 years' time? Much better Better, but not much Much worse Worse, but not much Nochan e No res onse 4 37 38 9 29 2 257 D. NOGLIKI NON-NATIVE MALE Total responses: 29 4. Nationality Nivkh: Orochon (Uil'ta, Orok): Evenk: Russian: 21 Ukrainian: 3 Tatar: 1 Belorussian: 2 Korean: . Chuvash: 1 Mordvin: I Ossetian: Unknown: 9. What is your job? Accountant Teacher Local oil and Offshore oil Librarian Shop/ kiosk Shop Tax gas industry_ projects assistant manager insoector 1 3 1 1 1 Kolklwz 'Val' herding Director of clan Seasonal hunting, Cow Private Ethnographer Vostok enterprise enterprise fishing herd entrepreneur 1 1 District District Resource use Hospital (non- Childminder Kindergarten Chi ldren' s administration council regulator medical) supervisor home carer 4 Lawyer School laboratory Technician Hotel Production Church Fitter/ assistant (school) manager engineer assistant construction 2 Laundry worker Printing house Metalworker Journalist Bread factory Part-time waitress Seamstress Driver Artist Cleaner Communications Electrician Mechanic Militia 2 Bank worker Economist Secretary Nurse Postal worker Choreographer Cook Guard Housewife Student/ at school Unemployed Pensioner Invalid 6 10. Do you plan to retrain for work in an oil company? Plan to Don't Ian to Want to but no o ortunities No res onse 2 13 7 7 12. What property do you have? House Flat Gara e Car Motorbike Tractor Boat Cow(s) Deer Horses 6 6 15 2 5 Sheep Goats Poultry Dacha Garden Hunting Fishing Nothing No Response plot dogs equipment 1 3 5 19 1 2 1 258 13. What do you think are the most serious natural resource use problems in the district? Forest fires, Timber industry, Gas fired power Oil and gas industry, Offshore oil Other industry regeneration Jogging station pollution projects 7 3 9 2 Fishing, fish limits, No fish in the Assistance for Hunting of Hunting Indigenous rights, poaching shops reindeer herding reindeer traditional resource use l l Ecology NTFPs Poor quality Water Other Low Social Unemployment drinking water pollution pollution wages problems 1 1 1 1 Poaching Inadequate control/ attention from nature Oil and gas used without the Unsustainable use protection organs and administration agreement of local residents of resources 1 Damaging techniques of People think only of Irresponsible attitudes Don't know No response berry-picking own profit to nature 1 1 6 14. What types of natural resource use do you or your family practice? (a) NTFP gathering: Mushrooms Berries Wild Pine nuts Fern Medicinal Burdock Dried None onion plants flowers 27 27 23 11 18 6 2 (b) other types: Hunting Fishing Garden plot Reindeer Dogs Other Wood Spring Nothing cultivation herding animals carving water 11 23 24 3 2 15.1 Do you process the products? No 5 15.2 What do you do with processed ( or unprocessed) products? Store for famil Sell Give to relatives Give to friends & ac uaintances 27 2 11 6 16. If you sell products, do you inform the tax inspector? Yes No No response 11 13 259 17. What percentage of your food consumption is made up of the following? Meat Fish Vegetables Berries Potatoes Grains (inc. rice) Bread 10% or less 15 3 9 16 3 10 9 10-25% 8 13 13 6 4 10 7 25-50% 4 7 4 2 16 5 6 50% or more 1 5 1 4 2 4 18. How often do you visit the eastern coast (bays, forest, rivers, pastures)? All the time Live seasonal! Onl in fishin season Sometimes Hardi ever No res onse 13 11 3 19. What do you do there? Fishing Hunting NTFPs Tourism Leisure Reindeerh Research/ Haymaking Drawing erding work 18 10 18 2 19 2 20.1 Do the offshore projects pose a threat to your environment and livelihoods? Yes No Don' t know No more than in other countries Nores onse 22 5 2 20.2 What are the threats from the offshore projects? Coastal, river, & Threat to Drilling waste Oil spills Threat to marine Destruction of Fires sea pollution fish disposal mammals pastures 8 4 6 Destruction of ecosystems & Destruction of Loss of berries, Reindeer will Threat to birds bioresources forests mushrooms be shot 2 'Ill Air Cutting Pumping oil out creates Threat Ecological damage, Encroachment on Native oollution the forest vaccuum in rock to soils pollution lands 8 21. If you discover serious environmental pollution, who do you turn to first of all? Committee of District 9r Department of District The public Ecological Ecology village emergency situations council organisations (e.g. administration (administration) Greenpeace) 11 6 1 1 1 Forest Sakhbasu (oil Fish The (oil) The regional nature Militia Eko-Shelf service spill response inspectorate company protection prosecutor ecological service) responsible company 1 Newspaper Emergency The UN God There is no one to Noone Don't No telephone '02' tum to/ it's use! ess know resoonse 1 2 2 3 260 22.1 What benefits have the offshore projects brought? Regional economic · Bonus payments Local socio-economic Taxes Jobs development development/ stabilisation 8 Clients / markets Money to refurbish No benefits only Benefits only to oligarchs and those museum (Exxon) unemplovment in power Benefits only for those who work Nothing for us 'Yes' Don't know Nothing No response on offshore projects 9 8 22.2 What benefits could they bring in the future? Regional economic Local socio-economic Money into district Infrastructure Jobs development development budget development/ services I I I Increased living Increase in income for Oil processing Increase in regional fuel-energy Gasification of standards those with jobs capacity and export of products Sakhalin I Americans might give Life will be a bit Nothing for me Don't 'Yes' Nothing No response us some money better and my family know I 10 8 23. What alternative development options are there for the district apart from the offshore projects? Fishing, fish Fish Tourism Logging, timber Reindeer Farming Hunting Animal processing farmi ng processing herding husbandry 9 2 10 I 3 I Offshore Onshore oil Oil and gas Gas pipeline Oil extraction Gas fired power Transport development by industry processing to the south for Russia station local company I I 2 Vaiious Furniture Footwear Textile Production Fur production Native crafts and factories factory factory factory souvenirs I I I Renewable / clean Mineral springs NTFPs Processing of garden Free economic Good resource use for health processing plot produce zone roads 2 I I, Private ente rise Don't know Yes Nothin No res onse 3 3 4 24. Have you taken part in decision-making on natural resource management? If so, how? Petition Collectin si atures Demonstration Strike Public hearin s Com laint to court 2 2 3 Leaflets Conference Discussions Job District soviet Yes Not taken No response (committee) part I 16 4 261 25. What public, religious, political, sport, professional organisations are you a member or? Sport Teachers' Oil workers' Journalists' Association of Native Youth Union Union Union Native People Union 4 1 English teachers' Communist Religious Sakhalin Environment District circle party Watch council 26. How effectively do the following people or organisations defend your interests? President 3=1 Native rep (admin) 5 -very well 4-well Federal duma 3=4 District mayor 3=7,4=1 Fish inspectorate Hunting specialist 3=7,4=3 3=3,4=3 3 - satisfactorily 2-badly Governor 3=5,4=1 District council 3=8 Land committee 3=5,4=3 1-not at all 0 - difficult to answer Regional duma Regional administration 3=3 3=2,4=1 District Village administration administration 3=8,5=1 3=1 Local newspaper Militia 3=5,4=6,5=3 3=5,4=1,5=1 Nivkh Union None No response 16 7 Native rep (durna) 3=2 Ecological committee 3=10, 4= 1, 5=1 School 3=5,4=4 Boss at work Association of Friends and Relatives Other public organisation Native oeooles acquaintances 3=3,4=1,5=4 3=3 3=6,4=4,5=8 3=5,4=5,5=7 27. Did you vote in the following elections? (yes responses) District council District ma or Re · anal duma Governor Federal duma President 14 15 17 17 15 20 28. Have you ever stood as a candidate for the local council? No I No response 25 29. Will you vote in 1999 and 2000? No Don't know No response 8 30. How do you think living standards in your district will be in 10 years' time? Much better Better, but not much Much worse Worse, but not much No chan e No res onse 4 11 3 2 7 2 262 E. VAL FEMALE Total responses: 20 4. Nationality Nivkh: 2 Orochon (Uil' ta, Orok): 11 Evenk: 6 Russian: Ukrainian: Tatar: Belorussian: Korean: Chuvash: Mordvin: Ossetian: Unknown: I 9. What is your job? Accountant Teacher Local oil and Offshore oil Librarian Shop / kiosk Shop Tax gas industry projects assistant manager inspector 3 I Kolkhoz 'Val' herding Director of clan Seasonal hunting, Cow Private Ethnographer Vostok enterprise enterprise fishing herd entrepreneur I I I District District Resource use Hospital (non- Childminder Kindergarten Children's administration council regulator medical) supervisor home carer I I Lawyer School laboratory Technician Hotel Production Church Fitter/ assistant (school) manager engineer assistant construction Laundry worker Printing house Metalworker Journalist Bread factory Part-time waitress Seamstress Driver Artist Cleaner Communications Electrician Mechanic Militi a Bank worker Economist Secretary Nurse Postal worker Choreographer Cook Guard Housewife Student/ at school Unemployed Pensioner Invalid 7 2 10. Do you plan to retrain for work in an oil company? Plan to Don't · Ian to Want to but no o ortunities No res onse 5 8 7 I I 12. What property do you have? House Flat Gara e Car Motorbike Tractor Boat Cow(s) Deer Horses 4 4 Sheep Goats Poultry Dacha Garden Hunting Fishing Nothing· No Response plot dogs equipment I 15 2 263 13. What do you think are the most serious natural resource use problems in the district? Forest fires, Timber industry, Gas fired power Oil and gas industry, Offshore oil Other industry regeneration Jogging station oollution oroiects Fishing, fish limits, No fish in the Assistance for Hunting of Hunting Indigenous rights, poaching shoos reindeer herding reindeer traditional resource use 1 Ecology NTFPs Poor quality Water Other Low Social Unemployment drinking water pollution pollution wages problems Poaching Inadequate control/ attention from nature Oil and gas used without the Unsustainable use protection organs and administration agreement of local residents of resources Damaging techniques of People think only of Irresponsible attitudes Don't know No response berry-picking own profit to nature 18 14. What types of natural resource use do you or your family practice? (a) NTFP gathering: Mushrooms Berries Wild Pine nuts Fem Medicinal Burdock Dried None onion plants flowers 13 18 15 15 3 1 (b) other types: Hunting Fishing Garden plot Reindeer Dogs Other Wood Spring Nothing cultivation herding animals carving water 6 14 ll 4 15.1 Do you process the products? Yes No 18 2 15.2 What do you do with processed (or unprocessed) products? Store for famil Sell Give to relatives Give to friends & ac uaintances 18 4 16. If you sell products, do you inform the tax inspector? Yes · No No response 6 12 264 17. What percentage of your food consumption is made up of the following? Meat Fish Vegetables Berries Potatoes Grains (inc. rice) Bread 10% or Jess 4 3 10 4 4 7 5 10-25% 5 4 6 1 2 3 25-50% 1 4 2 5 1 50% or more 3 2 1 1 3 4 3 18. How often do you visit the eastern coast (bays, forest, rivers, pastures)? All the time Live seasonal! Onl in fishin season Sometimes Hardl ever No res onse 4 3 11 19. What do you do there? Fishing Hunting NTFPs Tourism Leisure Reindeerh Research/ Haymaking Drawing erding work 14 4 15 6 4 20.1 Do the offshore projects pose a threat to your environment and livelihoods? Yes No Don' t know No more than in other countries No res onse 8 3 6 20.2 What are the threats from the offshore projects? Coastal, river, & Threat to Drilling waste Oil spills Threat to marine Destruction of Fires sea pollution fish disposal mammals pastures 1 5 1 2 Destruction of ecosystems & Destruction of Loss of berries, Reindeer will Threat to birds bioresources forests mushrooms be shot 3 3 Air Cutting Pumping oil out creates Threat Ecological damage, Encroachment on Native pollution the forest ·vaccuum in rock to soils pollution lands 21. If you discover serious environmental pollution, who do you turn to first of all? Committee of District or _ Department of District The public Ecological Ecology village emergency situations council organisations (e.g. administration (administration) Greenpeace) 7 5 1 Forest Sakhbasu (oil Fish The (oil) The regional nature Militia Eko-Shelf service spill response inspectorate company protection prosecutor ecological service) responsible company Newspaper Emergency The UN God There is no one to Noone Don't No telephone '02' tum to/ it's useless know response 7 265 22.1 What benefits have the offshore projects brought? Regional economic Bonus payments Local socio-economic Taxes Jobs development development/ stabilisation Clients / markets Money to refurbish No benefits only Benefits only to oligarchs and those museum (Exxon) unemployment in power 3 Benefits only for those who work Nothing for us 'Yes' Don't know Nothing No response on offshore projects I 16 22.2 What benefits could they bring in the future? Regional economic Local socio-economic Money into district Infrastructure Jobs development development budget development/ services l Increased Ii ving Increase in income for Oil processing Increase in regional fuel -energy Gasification of standards those with jobs capacity and export of products Sakhalin Americans might give Life will be a bit Nothing for me Don't 'Yes' Nothing No response us some money better and my family know 2 17 23. What alternative development options are there for the district apart from the offshore projects? Fishing, fish Fish Tourism Logging, timber Reindeer Farming Hunting Animal orocessing farming processing herding husbandry Offshore Onshore oil Oil and gas Gas pipeline Oil extraction Gas fired power Transport development by industry processing to the south for Russia station local company Various Furniture Footwear Textile Production Fur production Native crafts and factories factory factory factory souvenirs Renewable/ clean Mineral springs NTFPs Processing of garden Free economic Good resource use for health processing plot produce wne roads I, Private ente rise Don't know Yes Nothin No res onse 2 6 7 24. Have you taken part in decision-making on natural resource management? If so, how? Petition Collectin si atures Demonstration Strike Public hearin s Com laint to court 9 6 Leaflets Conference Discussions Job District soviet Yes Not taken No response (committee) part 8 2 266 25. What public, religious, political, sport, professional organisations are you a member of? Sport Teachers' Oil workers' Journalists ' Association of Native Youth Union Union Union Native Peoole Union English teachers' Communist Religious Sakhalin Environment District circle party Watch council 26. How effectively do the following people or organisations defend your interests? President Native rep (admin) 4=2 5 -very well 4-well Federal duma District mayor 3=1, 4=1 Fish inspectorate Hunting specialist 3=8 3=2 3 - satisfactorily 2-badly Governor 3=2,4=1 District council 3=1, 4=1 Land committee 3=1 1-notatall 0 - difficult to answer Regional duma Regional administration 3=3,4=2 3=1, 4=2 District Village administration administration 3=1, 4=1 3=7,4=2 Local newspaper Militia 3=6,4=3 3=5,4=1 Nivkh Union None No response 10 8 Native rep (duma) 3=2,4=1 Ecological committee 3=3,5=1 School 3=4,4=4 Boss at work Association of Friends and Relatives Other public organisation Native oeooles acquaintances 3=1, 4=1 3=1, 4=2 3=1, 4=1, 5=1 3=3,5=2 27. Did you vote in the following elections? (yes responses) District council District ma or Re · onal duma Governor Federal duma President 15 16 15 17 15 18 28. Have you ever stood as a candidate for the local council? 14 I ~o response Yes No 29. Will you vote in 1999 and 2000? Yes No I ~on't know I ~o response 11 2 30. How do you think living standards in your district will be in 10 years' time? Much better Better, but not much Much worse Worse, but not much 10 267 F. VAL MALE Total responses: 3 4. Nationality Nivkh: 1 Orochon (Uil'ta, Orok): Evenk: 1 Russian: Ukrainian: Tatar: Belorussian: Korean: Chuvash: Mordvin: Ossetian: Unknown: 9. What is your job? Accountant Teacher Local oil and Offshore oil Librarian Shop / kiosk Shop Tax gas industry projects assistant manager inspector Kolkhoz 'Val' herding Director of clan Seasonal hunting, Cow Private Ethnographer Vostok enterprise enterprise fishing herd entrepreneur District District Resource use Hospital (non- Childrninder Kindergarten Children's administration council regulator medical) supervisor home carer Lawyer School laboratory Technician Hotel Production Church Fitter/ assistant (school) manager engineer assistant construction Laundry worker Printing house Metalworker Journalist Bread factory Part-time waitress Seamstress Driver Artist Cleaner Communications Electrician Mechanic Militia Bank worker Economist Secretary Nurse Postal worker Choreographer Cook Guard Housewife Student/ at school Unemployed Pensioner Invalid 3 10. Do you plan to retrain for work in an oil company? Plan to Don' t Jan to Want to but no o ortunities No res onse 2 12. What property do you have? House Flat Gara e Car Motorbike Tractor Boat Cow(s) Deer Horses Sheep Goats Poultry Dacha Garden Hunting Fishing Nothing No Response plot dogs equipment 1 1 1 268 13. What do you think are the most serious natural resource use problems in the district? Forest fires, Timber industry, Gas fired power Oil and gas industry, Offshore oil Other industry regeneration 102:!ring station pollution projects Fishing, fish limits, No fish in the Assistance for Hunting of Hunting Indigenous rights, poaching shoos reindeer herding reindeer traditional resource use l Ecology NTFPs Poor quality Water Other Low Social Unemployment drinking water pollution pollution wages problems Poaching Inadequate control/ attention from nature Oil and gas used without the Unsustainable use protection organs and administration agreement of local residents of resources Damaging techniques of People think only of Irresponsible attitudes Don't know No response berry-picking own profit to nature 2 14. What types of natural resource use do you or your family practice? (a) NTFP gathering: Mushrooms Berries Wild Pine nuts Fem Medicinal Burdock Dried None onion plants flowers 2 2 2 2 2 (b) other types: Hunting Fishing Garden plot Reindeer Dogs Other Wood Spring Nothing cultivation herding animals carving water l 2 2 15.1 Do you process the products? Yes No 3 15.2 What do you do with processed (or unprocessed) products? Store for famil Sell Give to relatives Give to friends & ac uaintances 3 16. If you sell products, do you inform the tax inspector? Yes No -No response 269 17. What percentage of your food consumption is made up of the following? Meat Fish Ve_getables Berries Potatoes Grains (inc. rice) Bread 10% or less I I I 10-25% I I 25-50% 50% or more I I 18. How often do you visit the eastern coast(bays, forest, rivers, pastures)? All the time Live seasonal! Onl in fishin season Sometimes Hardi ever No res onse 3 19. What do you do there? Fishing Hunting NTFPs Tourism Leisure Reindeerh Research/ Haymak:ing Drawing erdin.e; work 3 2 I 20.1 Do the offshore projects pose a threat to your environment and livelihoods? Yes No Don't know No more than in other countries No res onse 3 20.2 What are the threats from the offshore projects? Coastal, river, & Threat to Drilling waste Oil spills Threat to marine Destruction of Fires sea pollution fish disposal mammals pastures I Destruction of ecosystems & Destruction of Loss of berries, Reindeer will Threat to birds bioresources forests mushrooms be shot Air Cutting Pumping oil out creates Threat Ecological damage, Encroachment on Native pollution the forest -vaccuum in rock to soils pollution lands I 21. If you discover serious environmental pollution, who do you turn to first of all? Committee of District or . Department of District The public Ecological Ecology village emergency situations council organisations (e.g. administration (administration) Greenpeace) 2 Forest Sak:hbasu ( oil Fish The (oil) The regional nature Militia Eko-Shelf service spill response inspectorate company protection prosecutor ecological service) responsible company Newspaper Emergency The UN God There is no one to Noone Don't No telephone '02' tum to/ it's useless know response I 270 22.1 What benefits have the offshore projects brought? Regional economic Bonus payments Local socio-economic Taxes Jobs development development/ stabilisation Clients / markets Money to refurbish No benefits only Benefits only to oligarchs and those museum (Exxon) unemployment in power Benefits only for those who work Nothing for us 'Yes' Don't know Nothing No response on offshore projects I 2 22.2 What benefits could they bring in the future? Regional economic Local socio-economic Money into district Infrastructure Jobs development development budget development/ services l Increased living Increase in income for Oil processing Increase in regional fuel-energy Gasification of standards those with jobs capacity and export of products Sakhalin Americans might give Life will be a bit Nothing for me Don't 'Yes' Nothing No response us some money better and my family know 2 23. What alternative development options are there for the district apart from the offshore projects? Fishing, fish Fish Tourism Logging, timber Reindeer Farming Hunting Animal processing farming processing herding husbandry Offshore Onshore oil Oil and gas Gas pipeline Oil extraction Gas fired power Transport development by industry processing to the south for Russia station local company Various Furniture Footwear Textile Production Fur production Native crafts and factories factory factory factory souvenirs Renewable/ clean Mineral springs NTFPs Processing of garden Free economic Good resource use for health processing plot produce zone roads I, Private ente rise Don't know Yes Nothin No res onse 2 24. Have you taken part in decision-making on natural resource management? If so, how? Petition Collectin si atures Demonstration Strike Public hearin s Com laint to court Leaflets Conference Discussions Job District soviet Yes Not taken No response (committee) part 2 l 271 25. What public, religious, political, sport, professional organisations are you a member or? Sport Teachers' Oil workers' Journalists' Association of Native Youth Union Union Union Native Peoole Union English teachers' Communist Religious Sakhalin Environment District circle party Watch council 26. How effectively do the following people or organisations defend your interests? President Native rep (admin) 3=1 5-very well 4-well Federal duma District mayor Fish inspectorate Hunting specialist 3 - satisfactorily 2-badly Governor District council Land committee 1-notat all 0 - difficult to answer Regional duma Regional administration 3=1 District Village administration administration Local newspaper Militia 3=1 Nivkh Union None No response 2 I Native rep (duma) 3=1 Ecological committee School Boss at work Association of Friends and Relatives Other public organisation Native peooles acquaintances 3=1 3=1 27. Did you vote in the following elections? (yes responses) District council District mayor Regional duma Governor Federal duma President 2 3 2 2 3 28. Have you ever stood as a candidate for the local council? Yes No No response 3 29. Will you vote in 1999 and 2000? Yes No Don't know No response 3 30. How do you think living standards in your district will be in 10 years' time? Much better Better, but not much Much worse Worse, but not much 3 G. NOGLIKSKII DISTRICT TOTAL Totalresponses:223 4. Nationality Nivkh: 43 Russian: 128 Belorussian: 3 Mordvin: 1 9. What is your job? Accountant Teacher 9 45 Orochon (Uil'ta, Orok): Ukrainian: Korean: Ossetian: Local oi I and Offshore oil gas industry projects 9 13 Evenk: 9 12 Tatar: 2 2 Chuvash: 2 I Unknown: 4 Librarian Shop / kiosk Shop Tax assistant manager inspector 4 11 1 4 Kolkhoz 'Val' herding Director of clan Seasonal hunting, Cow Private Ethnographer Vostok enterprise enterprise fishing herd entrepreneur 2 1 3 2 l 4 l District District Resource use Hospital (non- Childminder Kindergarten Children's administration council reirulator medical) supervisor home carer 4 l 8 l l 5 2 Lawyer School laboratory Technician Hotel Production Church Fitter/ assistant (school) manager engineer assistant construction l l 2 2 1 1 2 Laundry worker Printing house Metalworker Journalist Bread factory Part-time waitress 3 4 4 2 Seamstress Driver Artist Cleaner Communications Electrician Mechanic Militia 3 4 3 Bank worker Economist Secretary Nurse Postal worker Choreographer Cook 3 2 2 2 Guard Housewife Student/ at school Unemployed Pensioner Invalid 13 4 26 5 3 10. Do you plan to retrain for work in an oil company? Plan to Don't Ian to Want to but no o ortunities No res onse 15 52 49 56 12. What property do you have? House Flat Gara e Car Motorbike Tractor Boat Cow(s) Deer Horses 48 44 2 66 3 5 21 6 5 Sheep Goats Poultry Dacha Garden Hunting Fishing Nothing No Response plot dogs equipment l 6 14 l ll7 l l 39 8 268 13. What do you think are the most serious natural resource us rorci lems in the district? Forest fires, Timber industry, Gas fired power regeneration logging station 40 15 6 Fishing, fish limits, No fish in the Assistance for poaching shops reindeer herdinf 17 1 1 Ecology NTFPs Poor quality Water drinking water pollution I IJ'-'"-·- - 5 1 1 13 17 I 1 I • Poaching Inadequate control/ attention from nature Oil and gas used without the protection organs and administration agreement of local residents l 4 l Damaging techniques of People think only of Irresponsible attitudes Don't know berry-picking own profit to nature l l 3 2 14. What types of natural resource use do you or your family practice? (a) NTFP gathering: Mushrooms Berries Wild Pine nuts Fem Medicinal Burdock onion plants 205 213 150 83 117 66 1 (b) other types: Hunting Fishing Garden plot Reindeer Dogs Other Wood cultivation herding animals carving 47 145 165 4 I 13 l 15.1 Do you process the products? Yes 200 15.2 What do you do with processed (or unprocessed) products? Other industry 2 .igenous rights, ditional resource use Unemployment ns l Unsustainable use of resources l No response 82 Dried None flowers l 3 Spring Nothing water l 5 Store for farnil Sell Give to relatives Give to friends & ac uaintances 208 9 67 33 16. If you sell products, do you inform the tax inspector? No No response 99 158 268 13. What do you think are the most serious natural resource use problems in the district? Forest fires, Timber industry, Gas fired power Oi l and gas industry, Offshore oi I Other industry re_generation loe:l!in_g station pollution prC>jects 40 15 6 60 4 2 Fishing, fish limits, No fish in the Assistance for Hunting of Hunting Indigenous rights, poaching shops reindeer herdin_g reindeer traditional resource use 17 1 1 1 1 2 Ecology NTFPs Poor quality Water Other Low Social Unemployment drink.in_g water pollution pollution wa_ges problems 5 1 1 13 7 1 1 1 Poaching Inadequate control/ attention from nature Oil and gas used without the Unsustainable use protection or_gans and administration agreement of local residents of resources 1 4 1 1 Damaging techniques of People think only of Irresponsible attitudes Don't know No response berrv-pickin_g own profit to nature 1 1 3 2 82 14. What types of natural resource use do you or your family practice? (a) NTFP gathering: Mushrooms Berries Wild Pine nuts Fem Medicinal Burdock Dried None onion plants flowers 205 213 150 83 117 66 1 I 3 (b) other types: Hunting Fishing Garden plot Reindeer Dogs Other Wood Spring Nothing cultivation herding animals carving water 47 145 165 4 1 13 1 1 5 15.1 Do you process the products? 15.2 What do you do with processed (or unprocessed) products? Store for famil Sell Give to relatives Give to friends & ac uaintances 208 9 67 33 16. If you sell products, do you inform the tax inspector? Yes 1 No response 3 158 269 17. What percentage of your food consumption is made up of the following? Meat Fish Vegetables Berries Potatoes Grain (inc. rice) Bread 10% or less 100 40 67 78 14 58 45 10-25% 57 66 64 52 30 67 53 25-50% 21 55 35 30 65 41 37 50% or more 7 36 13 16 88 26 58 18. How often do you visit the eastern coast (bays, forest, rivers, pastures)? All the time Live seasonal! Onl in fishin season Sometimes Hardi ever No res onse 39 3 27 ll2 29 3 19. What do you do there? Fishing Hunting NTFPs Tourism Leisure Reindeerh Research/ Haymaking Drawing erding work 92 26 153 20 145 4 1 1 1 20.1 Do the offshore projects pose a threat to your environment and livelihoods? Yes No Don't know No more than in other countries No res onse 166 19 20 20.2 What are the threats from the offshore projects? Coastal, river, & Threat to Drilling waste Oil spills Threat to marine Destruction of Fires sea pollution fish disposal mammals pastures 46 28 4 46 6 2 1 Destruction of ecosystems & Destruction of Loss of berries, Reindeer will Threat to birds bioresources forests mushrooms be shot 2 1 3 3 3 Air Cutting Pumping oil out creates Threat Ecological damage, Encroachment on Native pollution the forest vaccuum in rock to soils pollution lands 1 1 2 l 39 1 21. If you discover serious environmental pollution, who do you turn to first of all? Committee of District or Department of District The public Ecological Ecology village emergency situations council organisations (e.g. administration (administration) Greenpeace) 76 54 6 2 4 9 Forest Sakhbasu (oil Fish The (oil) The regional nature Militia Eko-Shelf service spill response inspectorate company protection prosecutor ecological service) responsible company 3 l 2 l 1 2 2 Newspaper Emergency The UN God There is no one to Noone Don't No telephone '02' tum to/ it's useless know response 5 l 1 2 4 6 7 41 270 22.1 What benefits have the offshore projects brought? Regional economic Bonus payments Local socio-economic Taxes Jobs development development/ stabilisation I I 3 I 32 Clients / markets Money to refurbish No benefits only Benefits only to oligarchs and those museum (Exxon) unemployment in power 2 I 3 2 Benefits only for those who work Nothing for us 'Yes' Don't know Nothing No response on offshore projects 2 2 2 5 43 116 22.2 What benefits could they bring in the future? Regional economic Local socio-economic Money into district Infrastructure Jobs development development budget development/ services 2 7 6 3 20 Increased living Increase in income for Oil Increase in regional fuel -energy Gasification of standards those with jobs processing capacity and export of products Sakhalin 2 I I I l Americans might give Life will be a bit Nothing for me Don't 'Yes' Nothing No response us some money better and my family know I 1 l 4 l 37 ll5 23. What alternative development options are there for the district apart from the offshore projects? Fishing, fish Fish Tourism Logging, timber Reindeer Farming Hunting Animal processing farming processing herding husbandry 70 l 12 57 l 3 2 5 Offshore Onshore oil Oil and gas Gas pipeline Oil extraction Gas fired power Transport development by industry processing to the south for Russia station local company 3 3 7 1 l l l Various Furniture Footwear Textile Production Fur production Native crafts and factories factory factory factory souvenirs 2 l 1 l l l 2 Renewable / clean Mineral springs NTFPs Processing of garden Free economic Good resource use for health processing plot produce zone roads 4 l 5 l l l Private ente rise Don't know Yes Nothin No res onse 5 14 42 49 24. Have you taken part in decision-making on natural resource management? 1f so, how? Petition Collectin si atures Demonstration Strike Public hearin s Com laint to court 21 31 28 5 Leaflets Conference Discussions Job District soviet Yes Not taken No response (committee) part 2 l 2 4 l l 129 23 271 25. What public, religious, political, sport, professional organisations are you a member or? Sport Teachers' Oil workers' Journalists' Association of Native Youth Union Union Union Native People Union 9 8 2 1 3 1 English teachers' Communist Religious Sakhalin Environment District circle party Watch council 1 3 3 4 1 26. How effectively do the following people or organisations defend your interests? 5-very well 4-well President Federal duma 3=6,4=1, 5=8 3=18, 4=5, 5=4 Native rep District mayor (admin) 3=26,4=2,5=1 3=39,4=6,5=4 Fish inspectorate Hunting specialist 3=29,4=12,5=3 3=15,4=8,5=2 3 - satisfactorily 2-badly Governor 3=45,4=6,5=1 District council 3=37, 4=11, 5=2 Land committee 3=24,4=7,5=2 1-not at all 0 - difficult to answer Regional duma Regional administration 3=47,4=2,5=1 3=27,4=9,5=1 District Village administration administration 3=42,4=5,5=2 3=14,4=4 Local newspaper Militia 3=56,4=50,5=16 3=35,4=5,5=3 Nivkh Union 1 None No response 126 54 Native rep (duma) 3=26,4=12,5=4 Ecological committee 3=32, 4=13, 5=6 School 3=41, 4=29, 5=9 Boss at work Association of Friends and Relatives Other public organisation Native peoples acquaintances 3=31, 4=29, 5=16 3=19, 4=6, 5= 11 3=28,4=48,5=43 3=25,4=38,5=60 3=11, 4=3 27. Did you vote in the following elections? 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